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Naoto Aoyama, Silva Emilson C. D.

Correlated Pollutants, Interregional Redistribution and Labor Attachment in a Federation
in **Environmental & Resource Economics**, Volume 41, Number 1, September , 111-131

We examine the efficiency of federal policies in a federation characterized by decentralized leadership, imperfect labor mobility and transboundary pollution. Selfish regional governments regulate correlated pollutant emissions by choosing pollution tax and abatement levels in anticipation of the center's redistributive policy. The center's objective function obeys a proportional equity principle, which implies that its choice of interregional transfer satisfies the equalization of weighted regional welfare levels. Regional and central governments make their choices subject to migration incentives. We show that the subgame perfect equilibrium for the sequential game played by regional and central governments yields socially optimal policies.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

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Jennings Colin, Roelfsema Hein

Civil Conflict, Federalism and Strategic Delegation of Leadership
in **Journal of Peace Research**, Volume 45, Number 4, July , 557-573

This article analyzes negative externalities that policymakers in one region or group may impose upon the citizens of neighboring regions or groups. These externalities may be material, but they may also be psychological (in the form of envy). The latter form of externality may arise from the production of 'conspicuous' public goods. As a result, decentralized provision of conspicuous public goods may be too high. Potentially, a centralized legislature may internalize negative externalities. However, in a model with strategic delegation, we argue that the median voter in each jurisdiction may anticipate a reduction in local public goods supply and delegate to a policymaker who cares more for public goods than she does herself. This last effect mitigates the expected benefits of policy centralization. The authors' theory is then applied to the setting of civil conflict, where they discuss electoral outcomes in Northern Ireland and Yugoslavia before and after significant institutional changes that affected the degree of centralization. These case studies provide support for the authors' theoretical predictions.

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Jiménez Redondo Juan Carlos

Descentralización, autonomía, principio de las nacionalidades, derecho de autodeterminación: ¿confusión terminológica o interés político?

in **Cuaderno de federalismo**, Volumen XX , 105-126



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Fercot Céline

Diversity of Constitutional Rights in Federal Systems

in *European Constitutional Law Review*, Volume 4 - Issue 02 , 302-324

The contribution of subnational constitutions to the development of constitutional law – Subnational recognition of a diversity of fundamental rights as symbol of constitutional autonomy – Identical, less protective and more protective subnational rights – Diversity in sources, uniformity in application – Positive rights and the provision of public goods – federal courts and state courts: federal chemistry and constitutional laboratories

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

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Andreson Cameron D.

Economic Voting, Multilevel Governance and Information in Canada

in *Canadian Journal of Political Science--Revue canadienne de science politique*, Volume 41, Issue 02, June , 329-354

While an important component of incumbent support, the effect of economic conditions on vote choice (economic voting) can be undermined by the presence of multilevel institutions; voters are faced with the prospect of evaluating economic conditions and governments at different levels simultaneously. This paper tests the applicability of a model which seeks to account for how and how well voters cope with the complexity of multilevel governance. The accountability-centred model suggests that federal and provincial governments should only be evaluated for those actions and outcomes that they can reasonably be seen to have influence over. Additionally, it is asked whether high information respondents are better able to navigate some of the complexities of Canada's multilevel system. Analyses are conducted using data from the 1993 and 1997 Canadian Election Studies.

Résumé. Les conditions économiques constituent un facteur d'appui électoral important pour les dirigeants politiques. Il semble, toutefois, que l'impact de ce facteur soit amoindri dans les États présentant plusieurs niveaux de gouvernement. Dans les sociétés ayant des institutions multi-paliers, les électeurs ont en effet le défi d'attribuer les performances économiques aux divers paliers de gouvernement. Cet article teste un modèle théorique qui tente d'expliquer comment les électeurs se comportent face à la complexité de la gouvernance multi-paliers au Canada. Le modèle, centré sur la responsabilité des dirigeants, suggère que les gouvernements fédéral et provinciaux devraient uniquement être jugés pour les décisions et résultats politiques sur lesquels ils exercent manifestement une influence. Cet article examine, en outre, la question de savoir si les électeurs bien informés saisissent mieux la complexité de la gouvernance multi-paliers lorsqu'ils évaluent la performance des dirigeants. L'analyse se fonde sur les données de l'Étude électorale canadienne de 1993 et de 1997.



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Stojanovic Nenad

How to Solve the Dilemma of Power Sharing? Formal and Informal Patterns of Representation in Swiss Multilingual Cantons.

in Representation, Volume 44, Issue 3, September , 239 - 253

Formal rules for group representation like constitutional quotas or reserved seats are among the most widespread mechanisms of power sharing in culturally heterogeneous countries. Critics, however, consider these tools as counterproductive for the establishment of peace and democracy in such societies. In this paper it is claimed that this 'dilemma of power sharing' can be tackled by focusing upon informal practices for group representation and on less rigid formal rules that indirectly or implicitly ensure power sharing. It illustrates possible institutional solutions by presenting the first comparative exploration of the patterns of group representation in the four Swiss multilingual cantons

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Toulemon Robert

In What Respects will European Federalism be Different?

in Federalist Debate (The), Year XXI, n. 1, March , 6-10

According to many superficial observers of European reality, the widening of the European Union (EU) would mean the end of all perspective of federal evolution. On the contrary, the increase of the number of its members leaves no choice but between either paralysis or federalism. Some people, for example in France, believe they can find an alternative solution in a directorate of the bigger States. They forget that such an orientation is rejected by the others and that its efficiency is far from being guaranteed. Its first result would be to foster inner tensions and push smaller states towards an extreme pro-American attitude. This return to interstate tensions would be a definite step backward. It would not allow Europe to achieve a real political presence.

Federalism is the organizational form the best adapted to the community of peoples and States of Europe, which corresponds the most exactly to the motto proposed for the Union, "Unity in Diversity", combining the greatest autonomy of the federated entities, in other words subsidiarity, a federalist term par excellence, and a supra-state authority in the fields of common competence. However, to federate nations several of which in turn have occupied first rank positions in the world and which still believe themselves to be first rate powers, is a difficult undertaking. The federal systems of the American States, of the German Länder, of the Swiss Cantons, of the Canadian provinces, of the States of Australia or India, while they provide useful examples, cannot simply be transposed to Europe.

In the present period of constitutional crisis we are going through, it is not without interest to consider the lessons offered by historical experiences in federalism, but also to define the peculiar features of a future European federal model.

The lessons we can draw from historical experiences

The historical examples are first to be considered from the point of view of the institutions. But how much freedom of choice is kept by the federated entities in their inner policies is also a matter to be carefully considered.



Institutions

The first experience to be considered is ours.

The distribution of competences between different levels, some being exclusive and others shared, the decision-taking by majority vote, the primacy of community law over States' law, the existence of a common currency managed by a Central Bank are the federal elements to which the EU owes its main achievements.

In the same way, the semi-proportionality of citizens' votes in the Council and representations in the Parliament is not far different from the current systems of representation of federated entities in existing federations. Some combine equal representation in one assembly (the Senate in the US, the Council of States in Switzerland) with the representation of populations in another assembly (the House of Representatives in the US, the National Council in Switzerland). Others add to the assembly representing the populations another chamber where the federated States have a semi-proportional representation; such is the case in Federal Germany. The provision in the European Reform treaty of a double majority of States and population in the Council of Ministers is inspired by the same philosophy.

Indeed, the ambition of federal systems is to find a balance between the equality of States and the equality of citizens. History tells us that this equilibrium is not easy to reach nor to preserve. The crises of federalism may lead to conflicts; the most bloody was the one which tore the US during the Civil war. The adversaries of federalism put forward these crises to support the thesis that all federations are threatened by a sudden breakdown. They quote the example of the Soviet Union or Yugoslavia. So doing they forget that those federations were purely formal constructions which hardly masked the dictatorship of a single party and a crushing hegemony in the former USSR as in the present Federation of Russia. There remains that keeping the balance between the influence of the most populated and less populated States is as essential as the balance between the federated States and the federation. The tensions peculiar to federal systems result most of the time from the sharing of competences and their exercise. The feeling that "Brussels" meddles too much in minor matters which could remain in the field of responsibility of the States, or even local entities, feeds the demand for a better respect of the subsidiarity principle. The Reform treaty gave national Parliaments a power of caution in this field, the last word pertaining to the Court of Justice. The existence of a strong judiciary is necessary to the good functioning of federalism. The greatest merit of federalism is to substitute judicial arbitration to armed conflicts. This substitution means that the arbiter must be recognized as independent of the federated entities and of the federal institutions as well. The independence of judges depends as much on the duration of their mandate and the conditions of its renewal as on the authority who designates them. The extreme solution is the appointment for life, as in the Supreme Court of the USA. Until now the member-States of the EU have refused to extend the competence of the Court of Justice to matters of defence and foreign policy; in the same way they refuse to extend the competence and the power of initiative of the Commission to these same fields. As it had been remarked by the founder of the College of Bruges, Henri Brugmans, until now Europe has just practised federalism the wrong way round. Without competence for the questions which normally pertain to federalism, it often deals with matters which, somewhere else, concern the States themselves. The formula contemplated by the Reform treaty that creates a High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy linked to the Council and the Commission, with a diplomatic service of its own, would be a real step toward a federalism going in the right direction.

Another lesson drawn from federal examples: the necessity to have a strong executive at the head of the federation, strong meaning legitimate and visible. In this respect the Reform treaty marked only a limited progress. The creation of a President of the European Council with a larger mandate and no longer fulfilling national functions is useful, but the appointment procedure is far from democratic and creates a duality with the president of the Commission. However, the supporters of a Federal Europe must see to it that these dispositions are adopted, whatever the fate of the Reform treaty.

What Autonomy for the States?



The promoters of federalism have to answer the fundamental question posed by their adversaries: what autonomy will be left to the federated States in a European Union? From this point of view the experience of the other federal systems deserves to be considered.

Everywhere education remains the concern of the federated entities, as well as, for an important part, the tax system, welfare policies and protection of the environment. We may, for instance, notice the choice by California to endorse the Kyoto Protocol that the USA government has not ratified. Be that as it may, political and social choices are basically made or arbitrated by the federal elections in the Federal State. In a European Federal Union these choices will be decided, for a large part, as they are now, by national elections, but the importance of European elections should increase together with the competences of the Union. However that may be, European states will keep more latitude in the choice of their economic, social or environmental model. For example, differently from other federal states, there is a consensus about maintaining at the national level the mechanisms of social welfare and to exclude the taxes on individuals from a fiscal harmonization, however advisable the latter may be. The system of ownership of firms will equally remain a national competence, even if the necessity of a fair competition, essential condition for the single market, remains under the competence of the Union.

Nevertheless, there is the field of ethical values and fundamental rights where, even today, the EU has greater powers than the US. Such is the case, for example, of the abolition of the death penalty. However, the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court in Washington tends to place the fight against discrimination above the traditional States' rights.

The Specifics of a European Federalism

The particular character of a European federation will be to be pluri-national. The US, Germany, India, Switzerland, in spite of the latter being plurilingual, conceive themselves as forming one nation. Only the Belgian federation is bi-national, but its recent and very complex structure combining regions and linguistic communities makes it a model difficult to transpose. Rather than a federal State, Europe will define itself as a federal "Union of States and Citizens", a formula which seems to me more accurate than Jacques Delors' "federation of Nation States" - which was coined to appease the "souverainistes". Indeed, to quote Jean Monnet: "we do not form a coalition of States, we unite men". Moreover, several members of the EU, for example the United Kingdom, are pluri-national.

The first consequence of the pluri-national character of the EU is that it must foster a patriotism of values, of citizenship, a constitutional patriotism, and, in no case, an ethnic or geographical patriotism. This form of patriotism seems to me of a superior ethical level and certainly better adapted to the aspirations of younger generations, consequently it will be easier to make them share it. It is also a response to the perpetual adversaries of the EU who like to caricature it as an empire designed to be dominated by Germany, while one of its essential values is the refusal of any hegemony.

A second consequence concerning the institutional organization of the federation: national organs, governments and parliaments will have to work together with the federal government, especially in the fields of foreign policy, defence and domestic security. In existing federations, federated entities only partake more or less in the Union government through their representative assembly: the US Senate, the German Bundesrat, the Council of States in Switzerland. But neither the Governors of the American States nor the Minister-Presidents of the Länder take part in the definition of the federal foreign policy. It should not be the same in the European federation.

The institution of a President of the European Council relieved of national functions was one of the most important innovations of the Reform treaty. It raised reservations among federalists and supporters of the communitarian method, who could see it as a strengthening of the "Europe of States". We hope that a president who has only European responsibilities will act as the champion of the common interest. His role will be to associate the chiefs of national Governments to the management of EU's affairs.

From this innovation two evolutions seem possible. The more likely, at least for some time, will be the division of the government of the EU into a community domain where the Commission will have the main influence and an inter-governmental domain mostly concerning the States. In the medium term another evolution would be advisable: the



two domains progressively coming together. This merging could take place by a progressive community of decisional procedures (an extension of the majority vote to foreign policy and defence, being understood that, as long as no integrated army is in existence, the minority would not be obliged to take part in an armed intervention that they would not approve of), by the fusion of presidencies and the creation of a European Cabinet composed of several ministers with a double function, on the model of the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, another innovation of the Reform treaty. It would be a clever means of conciliating the desire of each State to have a Commissioner and the necessity to ensure the coherence of the Community's Executive.

Each of these ministers would have a vast range of responsibilities and would receive a power of coordination over the corresponding commissioners. In this way it would not just be Foreign Affairs, but also defence, domestic security, the economy, sector policies, the quality of life, including the environment and welfare, education, communication, culture and youth, which would represent seven or eight portfolios. Chosen without consideration of nationality by the President of the Commission, with the approval of the Parliament and the European Council, these ministers would constitute a select cabinet within the Commission. They would be closer to the government but they would benefit from the independence of the Commission; they would, so to speak, realize "smoothly" the passage from the inter-governmental to the community method before the completion of the federal system. The existence of a restricted cabinet sitting under a unified presidency would reduce the risk of incoherence deriving from the multiplication of the number of commissioners. The mode of designation of the federal President and his cabinet is another subject which requires specific solutions. Several formulas can be envisaged according to the system to be preferred: more parliamentary or more presidential. A strictly parliamentary or definitely presidential one would not be well adapted to European complexity. The keeping of double presidencies, a solution retained in the Reform treaty, leads to parliamentarism, the president of the Commission acting as a Prime Minister. Nevertheless, it remains only half parliamentary, the essential role in defence and foreign policy being devolved upon the President of the European Council. The merging of the presidencies would leave the option open.

An evolution toward a parliamentary system could take place through the creation of a real post of Prime Minister, when the conditions of transfer of governmental power in all fields to a Cabinet responsible to Parliament are obtained. On the contrary, the election of the President of the European Council by universal suffrage would lead to a presidential system. A more original formula might perhaps better answer European specificities. It would be to propose to popular suffrage a reduced and collegial team on the model of the Swiss Federal Council. In this hypothesis the federal President designated by an agreement between the governments and the Parliament would keep his (or her) role of representation and arbitration, and the main powers would be endowed to the executive college.

These speculations about the various possible forms of a European government may seem irrelevant in the present day when the EU goes through an existential crisis. But we can also argue that we may seize the opportunity of the crisis to ponder over the medium and longer term institutions. Indeed, one of the causes of today's difficulties lies precisely in the lack of vision and the absence of debates on the future.

The emergence of a strong executive cannot be conceived without the strengthening of the role of the Parliament, which should be endowed with the initiative to introduce laws and the power to control the Executive, which would be conceived according to the more parliamentary or more presidential model which will finally prevail.

Recognizing the part played by national parliaments in the affairs of the EU is already, and will be even more tomorrow, an original feature of the European federal system. Beyond the control of subsidiarity, for which the national parliaments will be called to play an ever increasing role, it would be useful to give them the possibility to deliberate with the European Parliament on the general policy of the Union. In the same way, they could be associated to the process of amendment of the Treaties, thanks to a Convention composed of national and European MPs and representatives of the various Executive authorities. These revisions would not be submitted to the unanimity rule, but to a reinforced qualified majority, for example two thirds of the States and populations; minority states would be allowed to exert their right to opt out.



This right to abstain recognized in the Reform treaty would be another specificity of a European Federal Union, different from a federal State. One of the European values is the settlement of conflicts by law and conciliation. The recourse to force against a member state is not conceivable within a European federation. On the other hand, economic sanctions must be allowed in case of breach of contract and, if necessary, political sanctions in case of severe or persisting default. Indeed, this possibility does exist today. The withdrawal from the EU is not a sanction but a safety valve; it should render it possible a relaxation of the amendment procedure: minority States would have a choice to opt out, and ask for a special dispensation or to transform their membership into an association.

Less radical than withdrawal, the granting of the possibility to opt out could conciliate the desire of a majority to move forward and the timidity of some members. In this way, a vanguard could be constituted, not by selection but by voluntary self-exclusion. The result would be the same, but the political impact would be quite different. Selection is unacceptable for those who are not chosen, but those who exclude themselves must consider it is their own decision and should be able to go back to the majority at any time.

The failure of "enhanced cooperations" can be explained by the fact that this formula is felt as selective rather than dispensational. We must add that the term cooperation was poorly chosen to name ambitious actions. Rather than "hard core" it should have been "soft core".

It would be much better to say consolidated integration. The opting out formula can lead to an improved integration, as can be seen with the monetary union. It can be observed that a temporary exclusion of a country which has the will, but not the capacity, to take part raises no difficulty, since it will be resolved at the proper time. Finally there is the question of the voting right at the Council and Parliament for countries which are temporarily excluded or opting out on the issues in question; it would seem logical, at least, to ask countries who opt out not to exercise their voting right. To reflect upon federal forms adapted to European specificities is all the more useful as in several countries, among others France and the United Kingdom, federalism meets with a hostility which comes from a lack of understanding. For many Frenchmen and Englishmen federalism means centralization, for others, the Germans for example, it offers a guarantee against the encroachments of centralization. Therefore the battle for federalism is difficult. We must rely on a clear vision of what is possible in a Europe which remains more attached to national sovereignties than it was in the post-war years.

The worst criticism from which federalists must defend themselves is that they advocate the death of sovereign States. By devising formulas which will allow the states not to alienate their sovereignty forever, thanks to the right to opt out, to preserve some freedom of choice in domestic policies, especially in social and fiscal matters, and to take part in the definition and running of the affairs of the Union, it may be possible to convince those of our adversaries who are sincere and in good faith.

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Bartoli Clelia

La democrazia indiana: una creazione transculturale

in **Ragion Pratica**, numero 1, giugno 2008 , 99-114

No abstract available

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Diez, Thomas

Michel Foucault and the Problematization of European Governance



in *International Political Sociology* , Vol. 2, Issue 3, September 2008 , 266-268

If I were to make a list of the articles that have influenced me most in my academic writing, Richard Ashley's "Imposing International Purpose" (Ashley 1989) would definitely be on it. In a period when it had become fashionable for those who wanted to be progressive to talk about "global governance" and "governance without government" (see Rosenau and Czempiel 1992), Ashley developed a distinctly Foucauldian theme to problematize the governance fad. Problems of transnational or global governance, he argued, do not simply exist as objectively given, but are constructed by discourses that "impose" a "purpose" on international society.

This may have been a rather obvious statement, but it is easy to forget how uncontested the principal idea of governance was at the time, and how rarely challenged its positive connotations. The problems of the global governance literature, however, ran even deeper through the work on European integration and governance. Andrew Moravcsik's liberal-intergovernmentalist voice, giving prominence to the power of domestic interest groups within member states in the formulation of European policies, was just about to enter the scene (Moravcsik 1991). Even though Moravcsik did question the more or less teleological and largely uncritical vision of European integration espoused by neofunctionalists and federalists, his focus was on an alternative explanation of core decisions in the integration process and not on the conceptual dissection of European governance as such. He also stuck to a narrow, rationalist approach that did not aspire to be "critical" (see the exchange between Diez 1999 and Moravcsik 1999).

The turn to Foucault's work provided an escape route from the confines of the academic debate at the time. In the first instance, the *Archaeology of Knowledge* (Foucault 2002) and *The Order of Things* (Foucault 2001) in their different ways provided the background against which the question of "imposing European purpose" could be posed: What are the rules according to which constructions of European governance can be legitimately articulated? How are particular visions of the European project—such as that of a largely decentralized, "network" Europe already found in the writings of so-called integral federalists in the aftermath of the Second World War—marginalized yet always present in the integration discourse? What are the alternative rules that these discourses follow? How do particular issues become "problems" of European governance, and how does their solution tie into dominant contemporary discourses?

While by no means dominant, there has over the last decade or so been a mushrooming of discursive analyses of European integration with these questions at their heart (for an initial overview, see Wæver 2004). The spirit of these works is captured in the title of a book that to the detriment of the field was never published: Ole Wæver and colleagues in Copenhagen labeled their project *The Struggle for Europe*, notably juxtaposed to Moravcsik's *The Choice for Europe* (Moravcsik 1998). Here European integration was neither an inevitable outcome of functionalist spillovers nor the result of strategic choices by particular actors. It was shaped by competing discourses of European governance that struggled with each other not so much on the stage of political summits and intergovernmental conferences, but in the articulations of European integration that take place in the daily speeches of politicians as well as other public speakers, the newspaper commentaries, the "table talk" in the canteens of Brussels, and so on.

There are undoubtedly problems with this literature. Perhaps the most obvious one is the tendency to focus on political discourse in a traditional sense. Much of this work (including my own) is based on analyses of parliamentary debates, public speeches of politicians, party pamphlets, and other public speeches and papers. Yet, it seems to me that the Foucauldian spirit should have driven the analysis to seemingly less central sites, and should have included less traditionally "political" discourses such as popular culture.



Some work since the late 1990s has moved in this direction, and to a certain degree has also taken up Foucault's later work on governmentality (see Burchell, Gordon, and Miller 1991). This seems immediately suitable for analyzing today's modes of European governance that often operate via decentralized technology and co-ordination in which the collection of statistics to meet targets has become the dominant mentality of governmental administrators. Much of this work has focused on issues of borders and migration (e.g., Huysmans 2004; Walters and Haahr 2005) and has opened up avenues for both the study of the construction of European identity through its margins and the problematization of increasingly dominant forms of governance.

Bringing Foucauldian themes to the study of European integration has had two major effects. It has revitalized a particular concern with power beyond the question of which member state would get the most out of an intergovernmental bargain. It has also enabled the formulation of a critical position that does not fall into the pro-/anti-European trap. For me, personally, it has also made attractive and exciting an area of study that many students of international relations still consider boring and tedious.

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Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 1. The theory of federation

Malhotra Neil

Partisan Polarization and Blame Attribution in a Federal System: The Case of Hurricane Katrina
in *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, vol. 38, n. 4, Fall , 651-670

When multiple government authorities at overlapping levels of administration fail to do their jobs properly, whom do citizens hold responsible? People can potentially make more accurate judgments by taking into account the roles and responsibilities of the officials involved. However, if party identification plays a major role in shaping Americans' attitudes on federalism, such information may potentially lead to even greater partisan polarization. This article explores these questions using a controlled experiment in which citizens were provided job titles of government officials involved in the poor response to Hurricane Katrina. Both Republican and Democratic citizens update their blame attributions in the same direction in response to new information. Despite polarized general attitudes on federalism, partisans do not polarize further when using specific information

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Moor Pierre

Reflexions autour du concept de constitution
in *Zeitschrift fur Schweizerisches Recht*, Vol. 127, issue 1/2, 2008 , 207-228

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 1. The theory of federation

Tiernan Anne

The Council for the Australian Federation: A New Structure of Australian Federalism
in *Australian Journal of Public Administration*, Volume 67, Number 2 , 122-134

In October 2006, state premiers and territory chief ministers gathered in Melbourne for the first meeting of the Council for the Australian Federation (CAF). This little-heralded event marked the beginning of the first formalised structure for state and territory only collaboration since Federation. This article describes the genesis and creation of this new structural response to ongoing state concerns about the trend to an increasingly centralised pattern of Commonwealth-state relations. It identifies the intended functions of the Council, which include: acting as a mechanism for coordinating approaches to negotiations with the Commonwealth; operating as a clearing house for policy ideas in Australia and internationally; harmonising regulatory frameworks; and developing improvements to service delivery in areas of state responsibility.

Informed by interviews with key players involved with its establishment and documentary sources, this article assesses CAF's performance during its first 18 months of operation. It explores the hopes and aspirations of key CAF stakeholders, and some of the issues that have confronted the fledgling organisation. Personnel changes among the



cohort of state and territory leaders, and the election of a federal Labor government in November 2007 have altered the dynamics of CAF. The article argues that CAF's emergence is an attempt by sub-national governments to develop new capacity and leverage to address the asymmetries that characterise contemporary Australian federalism. However, there are questions about CAF's future, particularly about state and territory governments' capacity to pursue collaborative agendas given the pace and scope of Kevin Rudd's 'new federalism' reforms and the demands it is placing on their policy and administrative systems.

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Subsection 2. Constitutional reform

Mandelartz Herbert

Die unendliche Geschichte: zur Föderalismusreform

in *Recht und Politik*, volume 44, issue 3, 2008 , 181-182

No abstract available

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Subsection 2. Constitutional reform

Sánchez Navarro Angel J.

El Consejo de Estado y la Reforma Constitucional

in *Revista de derecho politico*, n. 71-72 , 515-550

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 2. Constitutional reform

García Piedad - Márquez Escudero

El procedimiento agravado de reforma de la Constitución de 1978

in *Revista de derecho politico*, n. 71-72 , 175-193

No abstract available

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Subsection 2. Constitutional reform

Meyer Hans

Il compromesso tra federazione e lander sulla riforma del federalismo tedesco

in *Rassegna parlamentare*, n. 3 , 673-682

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government



Subsection 2. Constitutional reform

Mahon Pascal

Il quadro generale della nuova impostazione della perequazione finanziaria e della ripartizione dei compiti tra Confederazione e Cantoni (NPC) come riforma del federalismo svizzero

in *Diritto pubblico comparato ed europeo*, n. 1 , 317-343

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 2. Constitutional reform

Ibáñez Rosaz Víctor

La reforma de la Constitución de Mendoza y los llamados “proyectos abiertos”. Algo más sobre las atribuciones del poder constituyente derivado y la oportunidad del referendum popular

in *Cuaderno de federalismo*, 2006-Vol:19-Nr:19 , 89-104

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 2. Constitutional reform

Carpizo Jorge

La reforma del Estado en 2007 y 2008

in *Cuestiones constitucionales. Revista mexicana de derecho constitucional*, n. 19 , 19-48

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 2. Constitutional reform

Gerotto Sergio

La riforma del federalismo svizzero: brevi note sulla nuova disciplina delle sovvenzioni pubbliche in materia ambientale

in *Diritto pubblico comparato ed europeo*, n. 1 , 362 ss.

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 2. Constitutional reform

Previtali Adriano

Le nuove norme sulla collaborazione intercantonale in Svizzera e il loro impatto sull'autonomia cantonale



in *Diritto pubblico comparato ed europeo*, n. 1 , 344-361

No abstract available

Section A) *The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government*

Subsection 3. The division (and the conflicts) of powers and competences

Agudo Nury Raquel, Buckley Alison E.

Foreward: Symposium on Ordering State-Federal Relations Through Federal Preemption Doctrine
in *Northwestern University Law Review*, Vol. 102, issue 2 , 503-506

No abstract available

Section A) *The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government*

Subsection 3. The division (and the conflicts) of powers and competences

Mendelson Nina A.

A Presumption Against Agency Preemption

in *Northwestern University Law Review*, Vol. 102, issue 2 , 695-726

No abstract available

Section A) *The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government*

Subsection 3. The division (and the conflicts) of powers and competences

Glickman Robert - Levy Richard E.

A collective action perspective on ceiling preemption by federal environmental regulation: the case of global climate change

in *Northwestern University Law Review*, Vol. 102, issue 2 , 579-648

No abstract available

Section A) *The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government*

Subsection 3. The division (and the conflicts) of powers and competences

Jamart Annick

Belgique : le modèle fédéral a vécu

in *Esprit*, n. 347, août/septembre 2008 , 225-227

No abstract available

Section A) *The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government*

Subsection 3. The division (and the conflicts) of powers and competences

Buoso Elena



**Concorso di competenze, clausole di prevalenza e competenze prevalenti
in Regioni (Le), n. 1 , 61-90**

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 3. The division (and the conflicts) of powers and competences

Rosen Mark D.

Contextualizing Preemption

in *Northwestern University Law Review*, Vol. 102, issue 2 , 781-810

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 3. The division (and the conflicts) of powers and competences

Jones Stephe

Cooperative Federalism?: The Case of the Ministerial Council on Education, Employment, Training and Youth Affairs

in *Australian Journal of Public Administration*, Volume 67, Number 2 , Volume 67, Number 2

New Federalism reforms introduced in Australia in the early 1990s were expected to improve efficiency and reduce duplication through new cooperative intergovernmental arrangements. The reforms were also an attempt to reduce the continuing trend of Commonwealth intrusion in state powers. As well as establishing the Council of Australian Governments (COAG), the reforms created the Ministerial Council on Education, Employment, Training and Youth Affairs (MCEETYA) to promote a more coordinated and cooperative approach to the delivery of education. MCEETYA provides the quintessential example of the difficulties of establishing a national approach when the function, education, is squarely within the power of the states. This article investigates the operation of MCEETYA from its inception to 2006.

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Dana David A

Democratizing the Law of Federal Preemption

in *Northwestern University Law Review*, Vol. 102, issue 2 , 507-550

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 3. The division (and the conflicts) of powers and competences

Strohmeier Gerd

Der Bundespräsident: Was er kann, darf und muss bzw. könnte, dürfte und müsste

in *Zeitschrift für Politik*, Jahrgang 55, Heft 2, 2008 , 175-199



The paper illustrates and categorises the (most important) powers of the Federal President in Germany anchored in the Basic Law. Furthermore, the use of the presidential powers in the past and the potential use of the presidential powers in the future are discussed (o.U.). In addition, the article deals with the major »informal powers» of the Federal President and their consequences.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

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Gusy Christoph

Der Gestaltungsauftrag der Bundesländer im Versammlungsrecht

in Recht und Politik, volume 44, issue 2, 2008 , 66-74

Die Föderalismusreform 2006 hat die Bundeskompetenz zur Regelung des Versammlungsrechts beseitigt und die Materie dadurch den Ländern zur Gesetzgebung überantwortet. Der Beitrag erörtert die sich daraus ergebenden Gestaltungsaufträge und -grenzen für die Landesgesetzgebung.

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Köhne Michael

Direktwahl des Bundespräsidenten?

in Recht und Politik, volume 44, issue 2, 2008 , 95-99

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

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Sands Jr. Joseph C.

Education Funding in a Recentralizing Democracy: A Cautionary Tale of Four Brazilian Cities

in Latin American Politics & Society, Vol. 50, Nr. 3 , 93 - 120

The administration of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso enacted measures to constrain subnational politicians in a newly democratized and highly decentralized federal system. Lacking sufficient accountability at the subnational level, the central government attempted to increase its control of educational funding and minimize local discretion over educational spending. These reforms constrained the distribution of intergovernmental transfers, but entrusted the disbursement of educational spending to local oversight. This article argues that while the constraints protected the federal treasury from predatory practices, the local oversight did not protect educational spending from mayoral discretion. This argument is based on an analysis of initial reform implementation in four municipal school systems. The mayors responded to the federal initiatives in a variety of ways, but these were based on the requirements of their own political survival. The four cases thereby become studies in how one effort to recentralize democracy is working in Brazil.

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Subsection 3. The division (and the conflicts) of powers and competences

Young Ernest A

Executive Preemption

in *Northwestern University Law Review*, Vol. 102, issue 2, 869-902

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 3. The division (and the conflicts) of powers and competences

Epstein Richard A.

Federal Preemption, and Federal Common Law, in Nuisance Cases

in *Northwestern University Law Review*, Vol. 102, issue 2, 551-578

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 3. The division (and the conflicts) of powers and competences

Mancini Marco

I regolamenti degli enti locali tra riserva di competenza e "preferenza" in un multilevel system of government

in *Regioni (Le)*, n. 1, 113-154

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 3. The division (and the conflicts) of powers and competences

Paris Davide

Il ruolo delle Regioni nell'organizzazione dei servizi sanitari e sociali a sei anni dalla riforma del Titolo V: ripartizione delle competenze e attuazione del principio di sussidiarietà

in *Regioni (Le)*, n. 6, 983-1024

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 3. The division (and the conflicts) of powers and competences

Saiz Arnaiz Alejandro

La competencia de los Territorios Históricos del País Vasco en materia de régimen electoral municipal

in *Revista Espanola de Derecho Constitucional*, n. 82, 11-52

No abstract available



Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 3. The division (and the conflicts) of powers and competences

Benelli Filippo, Mainardis Cesare

La cooperazione Stato-Regioni e il seguito giurisprudenziale (con particolare riferimento alla c.d. negoziazione delle competenze)

in *Regioni (Le)*, n. 6 , 959-982

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

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Hernández Antonio M.

Las violaciones a la autonomía municipal en Córdoba

in *Cuaderno de federalismo*, Volumen XX , 145-158

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 3. The division (and the conflicts) of powers and competences

Schapiro Robert A.

Monophonic Preemption

in *Northwestern University Law Review*, Vol. 102, issue 2 , 811-840

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 3. The division (and the conflicts) of powers and competences

Learner Howard A.

Restraining Federal Preemption when there is an "emerging consensus" of state environmental laws and policies

in *Northwestern University Law Review*, Vol. 102, issue 2 , 649-664

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

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Armengol i Ferrer Ferran

Resumen de Competencias ejecutivas y potestad reglamentaria

in *Revista d'Estudis Autonomics i Federals*, n. 6 , 272-319



Una de las novedades introducidas por el Estatuto de Autonomía de Cataluña de 2006 -y por la mayor parte de las reformas estatutarias llevadas a cabo entre 2006 y 2007- ha sido el reconocimiento expreso de la capacidad de la Generalitat de Cataluña para suscribir acuerdos de cooperación exterior. Tales acuerdos, si bien habían constituido ya una práctica consolidada y reconocida tanto a nivel doctrinal como jurisprudencial, carecían de un reconocimiento legislativo expreso que garantizara la seguridad jurídica de los actos realizados por las CCAA en aplicación de los mismos. El nuevo marco estatutario de los acuerdos autonómicos de acción exterior supone un cambio cualitativo y cuantitativo en la concepción misma de la autonomía. Se propone aquí abordar el nuevo régimen derivado del EAC de 2006, teniendo presente la perspectiva de la globalización de las relaciones internacionales. A tales efectos, se realiza un estudio del nuevo marco estatutario en dos partes. En la primera, se analiza el artículo 195 del Estatuto, precepto que regula de forma específica los acuerdos de acción exterior de la Generalitat de Cataluña y plantea la aplicación a los mismos de los principios de lealtad institucional y bilateralidad. En la segunda, se examina el régimen jurídico aplicable a los acuerdos de acción exterior, concretamente, su denominación, tramitación, derecho aplicable y sistema de solución de diferencias. Completa este análisis una breve referencia a la regulación en el Estatuto de los acuerdos de acción exterior de los entes locales.

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Maestas Cherie D., Atkeson Lonna Rae, Croom Thomas, Bryant Lisa A.

Shifting the Blame: Federalism, Media, and Public Assignment of Blame Following Hurricane Katrina

in *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, vol. 38, n. 4, Fall , 609-632

Federalism sprang to the forefront in public debates about the response to Hurricane Katrina as officials from the national, state, and local government sought to shift blame to other levels of government. Our analysis shows that attempts by national political actors to frame the response as the fault of state government actions were successful, but the size of the effect was conditional on predispositions. Those who were more attentive to coverage were more likely to believe that state failure to call for help had a great effect on the length of time it took for national government to provide aid to New Orleans. The effect was strongest for Republicans, however, suggesting that predispositions mediate acceptance of elite frames that transfer blame.

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Borzi Antonio

Significato e funzione dei “nomina” delle materie nel riparto della potestà legislativa tra Stato e Regioni: il contributo della giurisprudenza costituzionale

in *Federalismi*, Anno VI - N. 13

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

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Lucas McMillan Samuel



Subnational Foreign Policy Actors: How and Why Governors Participate in U.S. Foreign Policy
in *Foreign Policy Analysis*, July 2008 - Volume 4 Issue 3

U.S. governors lead overseas missions seeking investment and promoting trade, establish international offices, meet with heads of government, receive ambassadors, and take positions on foreign policy. This paper describes how governors are involved in participating in U.S. foreign policy, explains why governors seek to voice their views and play an active role in working with leaders and issues beyond their state's borders, and argues that U.S. states and governors need to be better conceptualized and considered in both international relations theory and foreign policy analysis. This study reveals that governors with greater institutional powers—such as appointment and budgetary control—as well as personal powers—derived from their electoral mandate, ambition, and public approval—are more likely to have higher degrees of foreign policy activity. These actions are more likely to take place during wartime and also from governors representing U.S. states bordering Canada or Mexico.

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Brock Kathy L.

The Politics of Asymmetrical Federalism: Reconsidering the Role and Responsibilities of Ottawa
in *Canadian Public Policy*, Volume 34 Number 2, 143-162

This article argues that while asymmetrical arrangements among the units of any federation are necessary and even desirable, federal encroachments on provincial jurisdiction in Canada over the past few decades have triggered a protective impulse in the provinces that has resulted in a multiplication of deals recognizing provincial differences. The nature and variety of such arrangements are undermining the sense of federal comity, goodwill, and understanding so critical to national unity. To avoid heading further down this trajectory and attenuating the bonds that hold the nation together, the federal government should reconsider its role in the federation. While the current Conservative government policy of open federalism begins this reconceptualization of federal and provincial roles and responsibilities, more constructive and principled action is required.

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Schneider Sandra

Who's to Blame? (Mis) perceptions of the Intergovernmental Response to Disasters
in *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, vol. 38, n. 4, Fall, 715-738

This analysis shows that the intergovernmental response to Hurricane Katrina collapsed because those involved in the process did not have a clear understanding of their own roles and responsibilities or how the entire governmental response system should operate. New data are presented which demonstrate that citizens' attitudes about intergovernmental responsibilities coincide quite closely with how the disaster response system is designed to function, but they differ from the way public officials involved in the Hurricane Katrina relief efforts thought the process should work. This mismatch between what various levels of government are expected to do and what activities they actually perform in emergency situations has contributed to extremely negative impressions within the American public about governmental performance during natural disasters.



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Subsection 4. The legislative branch

Burkhart Simone, Lehnert Matthias

Between Consensus and Conflict: Law-Making Processes in Germany

in German Politics, Volume 17, Issue 3, September , 223-231

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 4. The legislative branch

Brunner Martin, Debus Marc

Between Programmatic Interests and Party Politics: The German Bundesrat in the Legislative Process

in German Politics, Volume 17, Issue 3, September , 231-251

Legislation in Germany is dominated by three central actors: government, Bundestag (first chamber), and Bundesrat (second chamber). While the role of the Bundesrat as initiator of laws is disregarded in most research on legislation in Germany, it will be at the centre of this article, which analyses the factors determining the success of Bundesrat bills. We focus on the question whether the actors' policy positions or party strategic considerations are decisive for, first, the success of a bill inside the Bundesrat and, second, in the whole legislative process. Policy positions of the parties at the federal and the state level are extracted from party manifestos using the wordscores method. Our results show that programmatic positions are relevant to win a majority in the Bundesrat. However, the overall success depends more on whether the initiator belongs to the government or opposition camp at the federal level.

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Miller Bernhard, Stecker Christian

Consensus by Default? Interaction of Government and Opposition Parties in the Committees of the German Bundestag

in German Politics, Volume 17, Issue 3, September , 305-322

Consensus implies accommodating opposition. In the parliamentary process evidence on the interaction of opposition and governing parties is sketchy and theoretical approaches are manifold and ambivalent. Most prominently, there are contradicting hypotheses about the role of parliamentary committees in this interaction. While some authors consider committees as arenas for opposition influence and consensus others regard them as an apex of majoritarian dominance only. We argue that behavioural patterns in committees do not follow a static majoritarian or consensual pattern but a dynamic one which varies with context. This article elaborates this argument with regard to the committees of the German Bundestag. Based on novel data we show that different majority constellations in the Bundesrat induce different behavioural patterns in Bundestag committees. Under an opposition-controlled Bundesrat and consent bills decision-making in committees follows a more consensual approach.



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Manow Philip, Burkhart Simone

Delay as a Political Technique under Divided Government? Empirical Evidence from Germany, 1976-2005

in German Politics, Volume 17, Issue 3, September , 353-366

This article analyses whether the majority situation of Germany's second chamber has an impact on the duration of the legislative process. While it is often assumed that diverging majorities between Bundestag and Bundesrat delay law-making, the little empirical research that exists could not confirm such an effect of divided government. We therefore seek to discover whether and how an oppositional majority in the Bundesrat can credibly threaten to delay the legislative process for an undue length of time. Our study is based on a comprehensive dataset featuring a wealth of information on all bills adopted between 1976 and 2005. We show that divided government delays legislation, but to a somewhat lesser extent than often assumed. We show that under divided government the federal government loses some of its power over the parliamentary calendar - with possible consequences for its ability to implement its political agenda. Interestingly, this finding is not limited to bills that require the consent of the second chamber, but applies to all bills.

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Subsection 4. The legislative branch

Seemann Wenke

Do State Elections Affect Federal Governments' Legislative Behaviour? Empirical Evidence from the German Case, 1976-2005

in German Politics, Volume 17, Issue 3, September , 252-269

One often finds assumptions in political science literature based on a phenomenon referred to as Dauerwahlkampf (permanent campaigning) which postulate an influence of state elections on the federal government's legislation in Germany. However, specific effects have not been observed, nor are there any systematic studies of the presumed relationship. Therefore, this article discusses the assumptions and empirically examines their validity. The results of the quantitative analysis not only confirm a significant influence of state elections on the German federal government's bill initiation and passing rates, but also indicate a surprising effect of state elections on the degree of conflict in the voting behaviour of the Bundestag and the Bundesrat.

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Subsection 4. The legislative branch

Wallack Jessica S.

India's Parliament as a Representative Institution

in India Review, Volume 7, Issue 2, April , 91-114

India's parliament is failing as a platform for representing and aggregating citizens' preferences to form public policy. Policies increasingly pass without discussion and disruption seems to be replacing debate. While most of the public and academic critique of the Parliament focuses on the members and discusses reforms to the electoral system or membership criteria, this paper steps back to consider how well the institution is equipped to represent the population in policy deliberations. India's parliamentary procedures stand out among parliaments around the world in the limitations they place on most members' ability to represent their constituents in the normal course of debate or policymaking. This



article argue that these features may contribute to the observed disruption, lack of debate, and decline in standing. The conclusion suggests some institutional reforms.

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Subsection 4. The legislative branch

Breunig Christian

Legislative Politics in Germany: Some Lessons and Challenges

in German Politics, Volume 17, Issue 3, September , 381-392

This paper reviews the articles in this volume and places them in the broader discussion about German politics and comparative legislative behaviour. I describe their collective understanding of German law-making and highlight the strong empirical foundation of the research. Some challenges of the research agenda appear after comparing and contrasting the individual articles. Specifically, I start with a simple veto game and then amend and scrutinise this model using theoretical and empirical insights from this volume and the larger literature on legislative politics. The article closes by suggesting two future areas of research: institutional transformation and policy dynamics.

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Subsection 4. The legislative branch

Lehnert Matthias, Linhart Eric, Shikano Susumu

Never Say Never Again: Legislative Failure in German Bicameralism

in German Politics, Volume 17, Issue 3, September , 367-380

Bills adopted by the Bundestag hardly ever fail. Even under divided majorities in the two chambers legislative failure is a rare phenomenon. This fact has long been accepted as evidence against the popular complaint about legislative stalemate in the German bicameral system. However, it is not at all clear why we should expect to see bills fail in the first place: Rational political actors should anticipate a veto and refrain from initiating bills which are doomed to failure. The question then is why some bills do fail. Building on recent advances in Congressional research, we address this question both theoretically and empirically. We discuss two possible explanations for bill failure both rooted in the rational choice approach: incomplete information and mixed motivations. From each we deduce hypotheses about the conditions under which bills are likely to fail. We test these hypotheses using multilevel logistic regression and a novel dataset which covers legislative decision-making over almost 30 years.

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Subsection 4. The legislative branch

Bach Stanley

Senate Amendments and Legislative Outcomes in Australia, 1996-2007

in Australian Journal of Political Science, n. 3, vol. 43, september , 395-423

ABSTRACT: There has been a recurring argument in Australia about how the Senate should exercise its constitutional power to amend government legislation that it receives from the House of Representatives. Much less attention has been paid to how the Senate has exercised this power, and how often Senate amendments have resulted in legislative changes that governments otherwise would not have made. This article explores the legislative record and finds that,



during the Howard ministry, Senate amendments did not often provoke negotiations leading to bicameral compromise. Most often, the House either agreed to the Senate's amendments, many of which were government proposals, or disagreed to them. In the latter cases, the Senate most often gave way, instead of insisting on the legislative changes it already had approved.

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Shikano Susumu

The Dimensionality of German Federal States' Policy Preferences in the Bundesrat

in German Politics, Volume 17, Issue 3, September , 340-352

Academic discussions have increasingly attested to the fact that state governments in the German Bundesrat represent partisan interests more than state-specific interests. This view seems to be confirmed by recent developments in which opposition parties exploit the Bundesrat to block the projects of the federal government. This contrasts with the behaviour of state governments in the earlier years of the Federal Republic, which were characterised to a greater extent by more heterogeneous interests. Using roll-call vote data in the Bundesrat, this article investigates to what extent preferences of the state governments are heterogeneous. More concretely, item response models are utilised to examine the dimensionality of the policy preference constellation. The results show that, besides the partisan left-right dimension, there was another dimension at work in the 1950s. The analysis of the roll-call data after German reunification shows, by contrast, the strong growth of relevance of the first partisan dimension.

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Subsection 5. The executive branch

Saeki Manabu

Appointing the Fed Chair

in Public Policy and Administration, Volume 23, No. 3 , 227-245

Several scholars observe presidential appointment as a principal mechanism for the president to influence the bureaucracy in the United States. In order to study presidential influence on the Federal Reserve Board, which is widely considered to be one of the most independent governmental agencies, this article examines the influences of the Chairs and Governors of the Board appointed by Democratic and Republican presidents separately on monetary policy. The results show a significant impact of the presidential appointment of the Fed Chair, but not of the Governors. Also, when presidential popularity is declining, the serving president is likely to influence the Fed to stimulate the economy and improve his popular standing. However, this politically-motivated influence is present only under the Fed Chair appointed by the serving president, but not under the Chair appointed by the previous president.

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Subsection 5. The executive branch

Birkland Thomas, Waterman Sarah

Is Federalism the Reason for Policy Failure in Hurricane Katrina?

in Publius: The Journal of Federalism, vol. 38, n. 4, Fall , 692-714



Governmental responses to Hurricane Katrina are generally cited as policy failures. Media and popular analyses focus on the federal government's policy failures in hazard preparedness, response, and recovery. Meanwhile, disaster experts realize that disaster response is a shared intergovernmental responsibility. We examine the federal nature of natural disaster policy in the US to consider whether federalism, or other factors, had the greatest influence on the failures in Katrina. We find that some policy failures are related to policy design considerations based in federalism, but that the national focus on "homeland security" and the concomitant reduction in attention to natural hazards and disasters, are equally, if not more complicit, in the erosion of government disaster management capacity that was revealed in Hurricane Katrina.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 5. The executive branch

Gomez Brad T., J. Matthew Wilson

Political Sophistication and Attributions of Blame in the Wake of Hurricane Katrina

in *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, vol. 38, n. 4, Fall , 633-650

The governmental response to Hurricane Katrina was widely perceived to be flawed and inadequate. However, given the number of actors involved in coordinating relief efforts, both in the private sector and at all levels of government, attributions of responsibility vary widely. Drawing on the Theory of Heterogeneous Attribution, we explore the relationship between political sophistication and assessments of blame for the delayed governmental response. Using data from a survey of Louisiana residents, we find that citizens at higher levels of sophistication are less likely to find the federal government chiefly to blame, and more likely to fault actors at the state level. Moreover, less sophisticated respondents tend to focus blame disproportionately on the president, a tendency to which the more sophisticated are not as prone.

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Subsection 6. The judiciary branch

Hernández Antonio M.

Competencia de las provincias y de la Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires para instituir jurados

in *Cuaderno de federalismo*, Volumen XX , 159-162

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 6. The judiciary branch

Ooyen Robert Chr van

Das Bundesverfassungsgericht als aussenpolitischer Akteur: von der 'Out-of-Area-Entscheidung' zum 'Tornado-Einsatz'

in *Recht und Politik*, volume 44, issue 2, 2008 , 75-85

No abstract available



Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 6. The judiciary branch

Clark Bradford R

Federal lawmaking and the role of structure in constitutional interpretation

in *California Law Review*, Vol. 96, n. 3 , 699-730

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 6. The judiciary branch

Vandamme Thomas

Prochain Arrêt: La Belgique!

in *European Constitutional Law Review*, Volume 4 - Issue 01 , 127-148

Belgian Constitutional Court beats all in referrals to EU Court – How come? – Origin and evolution of Belgian federalism – Permanent reform – Modest origins of present constitutional court – Use of Belgian and EC law to widen its channels – Identification of Belgian constitutional rules with EC rules – Statutory extension of Court's powers – Use of techniques in referral of *Advocaten voor de Wereld* – Translation of national constitutional issue into a European one – EC law-driven constitutional evolution in Belgium – Eventual undermining of Belgian constitutional principles

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 6. The judiciary branch

Hall Jeffrey B.

Taking “Rechts” Seriously: Ronald Dworkin and the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany

in *German Law Journal*, Vol. 9, issue 6 , 771-798

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 6. The judiciary branch

Suberu Rotimi T.

The Supreme Court and federalism in Nigeria

in *Journal of Modern African Studies* , Volume 46, Issue 02, June , 451-485

Since Nigeria's transition from military to civilian rule in 1999, the country's Supreme Court has risen from a position of relative political obscurity and institutional vulnerability into a prominent and independent adjudicator of inter-governmental disputes in this chronically conflicted federation. Examined here is the Court's arbitration, during President Olusegun Obasanjo's two civilian constitutional terms (1999–2007), of fifteen different federal-state litigations over offshore oil resources, revenue allocation, local governance and public order. The Court's federalism decisions



were remarkably independent and reasonably balanced, upholding the constitutional supremacy of the Federal Government in several findings, tilting towards the states in some declarations, and simultaneously underwriting federal authority and state autonomy in other rulings. Despite the Court's important and independent role, however, the Nigerian federation was vexed by violent conflicts, underscoring the structural, political and constitutional constraints on judicial federalism in this notoriously complex and divided country.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 6. The judiciary branch

Steiner Udo

The role of the Federal Constitutional Court within Germany's federal structure

in *Federalismi*, Anno VI - N. 13

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 6. The judiciary branch

Price Rohan

The role of the high court in federal arbitration during the great depression: preserving a future for 'reason and moral suasion'?

in *Australian Economic History Review*, Volume 48, Number 2 , 146-169

Between 1929 and 1933 the Australian federal system of conciliation and arbitration came under economic and political strain. This article reveals that arbitration proved to be an adaptable industrial relations framework for dealing with economic depression. While the monetary entitlements of workers were reduced, the legal instrumentality that conferred the wage cuts, the Arbitration Court, itself defied abolition and evolved to be a protective body. There was a subtle and previously unremarked interaction in the regulatory functions of the High Court, the Arbitration Court, and the Commonwealth Parliament characterised by the purposeful abstention of the High Court and Scullin Government and the activism of the Arbitration Court.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 6. The judiciary branch

Höreth Marcus

Warum ist der EuGH mächtig? Strategien der Streitschlichtung als

in *Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft* , 18. Jahrgang (2008), Heft 2 , 233-255

Why is the European Court of Justice Powerful?

Strategies of Dispute Resolution as "Endogenous" Explanation

Usually the success story of the ECJ is explained by "exogenous" factors such as functional needs of member states for



a powerful European Court or the excessive use of preliminary rulings by lower national courts. But there are also "endogenous" explanations for the Court's power that should not be ignored. Therefore, I will show from a comparative perspective that the ECJ has used strategies of dispute resolution that are strikingly similar to the ones originally developed by the US Supreme Court. As the clever use of these strategies enhances the Court's authority, they have to be considered as decisive "endogenous" stepping stones in the process of the Judges' "self empowerment" as a bench of Constitutional Judges.

Die Politikwissenschaft hat in den letzten Jahren verstärkte Anstrengungen unternommen, den Aufstieg des EuGH zu einem europapolitischen Schlüsselspieler empirisch zu erklären. Nur selten wird dabei jedoch der EuGH selbst als eigennutzenorientierter und strategisch handelnder Akteur in den Blick genommen. Für seine Macht werden vielmehr andere – insofern „exogene“ – Faktoren ins Spiel gebracht: Einerseits wird vermutet, dass es den Präferenzen der Mitgliedstaaten bestens entsprochen habe, mithilfe des EuGH ein starkes Gemeinschaftssystem zu etablieren. Andererseits wird dazulegen versucht, dass die mit dem EuGH kooperierenden nationalen Gerichte sowie transnational operierende Unternehmen besonders von einem starken EuGH profitieren und ihn deshalb auf seinem Weg zu einem europäischen Verfassungsgericht unterstützt haben. In diesem Artikel wird demgegenüber eine „endogene“ Erklärung für die Macht des EuGH angeboten: Es kann in vergleichender Perspektive gezeigt werden, dass die Luxemburger Richter im institutionellen Eigeninteresse auf Strategien der Rechtsprechung zurückgegriffen haben, die bereits durch den U.S. Supreme Court zur Anwendung gekommen sind. Jene Streitschlichtungsstrategien haben einen wesentlichen Beitrag zur Autoritätssteigerung des Gerichts geleistet. Sie müssen daher als „endogene“ erklärende Variable für die institutionelle Machtentfaltung des EuGH und seine „Selbstautorisierung“ als EU-Verfassungsgericht stärker berücksichtigt werden.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7. Economic and fiscal federalism

Slavova Tatjana

A rank order and efficiency evaluation of the EU regions in a social framework

in *Empirica: Journal of Applied Economics and Economic Policy*, Volume 35, Number 4 , 339-367

In this paper, methods of multi-criteria efficiency evaluation are implemented for ranking the socio-economic systems of the EU regions. The socio-economic rank order problem is a multi-criteria non-convex optimization problem that was solved by the implementation of a new efficiency evaluation, AOWI (Absolute Optimal Weights Index). The rank order of the 268 NUTS-2 regions from the 27 European Union countries in the social framework obtained on the basis of 16 socio-economical indicators illustrates social divergence within the European Union and in the new European Union regions.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7. Economic and fiscal federalism

Borck Rainald

Central versus local education finance: a political economy approach

in *International Tax and Public Finance*, Volume 15, Number 3 , 338-352

This paper models voters' preferences over central versus local education policies when there are private alternatives. Education is financed by income taxes and individuals are mobile between communities. Public education levels are



chosen by majority vote. Contrary to conventional wisdom, centralisation may benefit the rich and poor, while the middle class prefer decentralised education. The model is also extended to include peer effects. Peer effects increase the support for central school finance, even in the community with good public schools.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism

José Marchiaro Enrique

Desarrollo económico y constituciones provinciales

in **Cuaderno de federalismo**, Volumen XX , 127-144

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism

Wildasin David E.

Disaster Policies

in **Public Finance Review**, Volume 36, No. 5 , 497-518

Although major disasters like the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes are infrequent, they dominate empirical loss distributions, as illustrated by a statistical analysis of flood losses in Louisiana. Extraordinary Federal emergency assistance has shifted a large portion of the burden of the 2005 floods to the rest of society, relieving financial stress in the disaster-stricken region but raising serious questions about the incentives for subnational governments to implement costly but efficient disaster avoidance policies in the future. The Federal government cannot credibly commit not to insure losses from future disasters, nor can it efficiently assume responsibility for land use, economic development, and other state and local government policies that affect disaster risk. Mandatory disaster reserves provide an alternative policy option through which actuarially fair Federal insurance could credibly strengthen the incentives for efficient subnational government disaster policies.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism

Katsimi Margarita

Exchange rate strategies towards the euro-zone for new EU member states with currency boards

in **Journal of Macroeconomics**, Volume 30, Issue 3 , 1043-1063

The paper investigates the transition of the new EU countries with a currency board arrangement (CBA) to the euro-zone. The arguments for and against retaining a CBA while participating in the exchange rate mechanism of the EU (ERMII) are discussed. Then, we show in the framework of a signalling model that abandoning a CBA and allowing the exchange rate to fluctuate within the bands of ERMII can signal to markets the sustainability of nominal convergence and, hence, diminish uncertainty in the pre-accession period and increase the probability of being accepted into the euro-zone.



Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7. Economic and fiscal federalism

Swati Mukerjee, Quinn Michael

**Federal Medicaid Assistance To States: Impact On Prenatal Care
in Contemporary Economic Policy**, Volume 26 Issue 3 , 380 - 397

In the context of dramatically increasing U.S. health-care costs, this paper contributes to an ongoing debate discussing proposals to replace the government's current policy of matching state Medicaid spending with a block grant system. State-level panel data analysis provides evidence that, ceteris paribus, increasing the federal matching formula has a negative impact on prenatal care. This aggregate result masks significant differences between high- and low-spending states and appears to be driven by the high-spending states thus implying that a 2-track approach to Medicaid funding may be more appropriate than the current system.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7. Economic and fiscal federalism

Chiang Shin-Hwan , Mahmud Ahmed Saber

**Federations, coalitions, and risk diversification
in Public Choice**, Volume 137, Numbers 1-2 , 403-426

We investigate the optimal size of a nation in the context of a portfolio choice model under uncertainty. With an equal sharing rule, we characterize the equilibrium coalition structure, which is shown to depend on income, risks, and market correlations. Specifically, coalitions are likely to form among regions with similar variance in income and among regions with negative market correlations. The conditions that yield a grand coalition, two sub-coalitions of different sizes, and singletons are derived. Moreover, the equilibrium coalition structures are also examined when geographical contiguity is required.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7. Economic and fiscal federalism

Claeys Peter, Ramos Raúl, Suriñach Jordi

**Fiscal sustainability across government tiers
in International Economics and Economic Policy**, Volume 5, Numbers 1-2 / July, 2008 , 139-163

This paper analyses how fiscal adjustment comes about when both central and sub-national governments are involved in consolidation. We test sustainability of public debt with a fiscal rule for both federal and regional government. Results for the German Länder show that lower tier governments bear a relatively smaller part of the burden of debt consolidation, if they consolidate at all. Most of the fiscal adjustment occurs via central government debt. In contrast, both the US federal and state levels contribute to consolidation of public finances.



Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism

Cafari Panico Ruggiero

I limiti dell'autonomia impositiva delle Regioni: la parola passa dalla Corte Costituzionale alla Corte di giustizia in Diritto pubblico comparato ed europeo, n. 2 , XIII ss.

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism

Antonini Luca

Il federalismo fiscale ad una svolta: il nuovo disegno di legge

in *Federalismi*, Anno VI - N. 16

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism

Jorio Ettore

Il federalismo fiscale esige un eguale punto di partenza. Una prima lettura della proposta Calderoli

in *Federalismi*, Anno VI - N. 16

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism

Pierozzi Bruno

Il federalismo fiscale in Italia: evoluzione e prospettive. Realizzazioni, discussioni, proposte

in *Federalismi*, Anno VI - N. 15

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism

Arias Abellán María Dolores

La ordenación jurídica de los recursos financieros en el estatuto de autonomía de Catalunya

in *Revista d'Estudis Autonomics i Federals*, n. 6 , 125-160



El objeto del artículo es el análisis del sistema de financiación establecido en el Estatuto de Autonomía de Cataluña. El trabajo se centra fundamentalmente en el estudio de las competencias atribuidas a la Generalitat respecto de los ingresos públicos, haciendo especial hincapié en los que provienen de los tributos y de las participaciones por ser los más importantes de entre los que son de su titularidad. El artículo trata, por tanto, del régimen de distribución de competencias en esta materia entre el Estado y la Comunidad Autónoma desde la perspectiva constitucional, centrándose en la forma en que se ha incorporado al Estatuto de Autonomía y planteando cuestiones sobre la posible inconstitucionalidad de determinados preceptos, sobre todo respecto de los tributos cedidos y de las participaciones. En particular, se analiza desde esta perspectiva tanto el régimen de la cesión de los impuestos como el correspondiente a los criterios de reparto de las participaciones. Es en estas fuentes de financiación en las que se proyectan fundamentalmente los principios informadores del sistema de financiación de las Comunidades Autónomas establecido en la Constitución, que se centran en el principio de autonomía y en el de solidaridad, convirtiéndose en las reglas sobre las que gira el análisis que se lleva a cabo en este trabajo.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism

Rizzo Leonzio

**Local government responsiveness to federal transfers: theory and evidence
in *International Tax and Public Finance*, Volume 15, Number 3 , 316-337**

Federal transfers can depend on local fiscal capacity which is measured by local tax bases. The aim of this paper is to understand to what extent and how these transfers affect local tax decisions. We develop a model with two provinces producing one mobile good. The good is taxed according to the destination principle. Final consumers decide to buy the good from the province where it is cheaper. The two provinces engage in tax competition. The introduction of scale economies into the shopping technology generates nonlinear tax reaction functions which make it possible to test the effect of a transfer equalizing local tax bases on tax competition in two complementary tax regimes. Used for this purpose are cigarette and gasoline tax data from Canada. In the case of cigarette tax, it is found that nonlinearity in tax competition is almost entirely offset when equalization holds: tax competition in the two tax regimes become closer. The shopping technology for gasoline gives less scope for scale economies, so that equalization does not affect reaction functions.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism

Weyerstrass Klaus, Neck Reinhard

Macroeconomic effects of Slovenia's integration in the Euro Area

in *Empirica: Journal of Applied Economics and Economic Policy*, Volume 35, Number 4 , 391-403

On 1 January 2007, Slovenia entered the Euro Area as the first of the ten new EU member states. By means of simulations with SLOPOL6, a macroeconometric model of the Slovene economy, this paper examines which macroeconomic effects can be expected from this event. It is shown that Euro Area accession brings about temporarily higher real GDP growth, a permanently higher GDP level, more employment, temporarily lower inflation and a permanently lower price level. On the other hand, both public finances and the current account deteriorate.



Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7. Economic and fiscal federalism

Konrad Kai A.

Mobile tax base as a global common

in *International Tax and Public Finance*, Volume 15, Number 4 , 395-414

If countries anticipate international Bertrand competition in tax rates, they may expend effort that makes some of their taxpayers less mobile or increases the mobility of taxpayers elsewhere. Piecemeal evidence on what activities countries use is provided. Such activities are analyzed that interact with Bertrand tax competition if the size of the groups of loyal and nonloyal citizens or investors is endogenous. Further, the implications of tax harmonization and minimum taxes for these types of nonprice competition are considered. Home attachment reduces the intensity of tax competition, but generates a strategic disadvantage for the country that invests much in such home attachment. Harmonization of taxes and high minimum taxes can intensify countries' investment in home attachment.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7. Economic and fiscal federalism

Kirsten H. Heppke-Falk and Guntram B. Wolff

Moral Hazard and Bail-Out in Fiscal Federations: Evidence for the German Länder

in *Kyklos*, August 2008 – Vol. 61 Issue 3

We identify investor moral hazard in the German fiscal federation. Our identification strategy is based on a variable, which was used by the German Federal Constitutional Court as an indicator to determine eligibility of two German states (Länder) to a bail-out, the interest payments-to-revenue ratio. While risk premia measured in the German sub-national bond market react significantly to the relative debt level of a state (Land), we also find that a larger interest payments-to-revenue ratio counter-intuitively lowers risk premia significantly. Furthermore, with increasing values the risk premia decrease more strongly. This is evidence of investor moral hazard, because a larger indicator value increases the likelihood of receiving a bail-out payment. Our findings are robust to a variety of sample changes. In addition, we provide a case study of the recent Federal Constitutional Court ruling on the Land Berlin, which had filed for additional federal funds. The negative response of the court did not lead to a change in financial markets' bail-out expectations. In sum, our results indicate significant investor moral hazard in the sub-national German bond market.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7. Economic and fiscal federalism

Oates Wallace E.

On The Evolution of Fiscal Federalism: Theory and Institutions

in *National Tax Journal*, 61, June , 313-34

In this paper, I want to review this evolution of the theory of fiscal federalism and offer some thoughts on the implications of these new views for the structure and functioning of federal fiscal systems. This will provide an opportunity to draw on the comparative experience of certain countries, an experience that provides some valuable lessons for intergovernmental fiscal behavior. This will also provide a context for a re-examination of one of the basic instruments of federal finance: intergovernmental grants. These grants have, in principle, a basic role to play in fiscal federalism, but, as the literature has made clear, they have been the source of some serious malfunction in federal fiscal systems.



Finally, I want to explore briefly the development and spread of some relatively recent fiscal institutions (such as "rainy-day funds") that have helped to improve the performance of state and local governments.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7. Economic and fiscal federalism

Feld Lars P., Schaltegger Christoph A., Schnellenbach Jan

On government centralization and fiscal referendums

in *European Economic Review*, Volume 52, Issue 4, May 2008 , 611-645

Several authors have argued that a centralization of fiscal powers in a federation is less likely to occur if citizens have to approve a change in the assignments of responsibilities by a popular referendum. This outcome may be due to the fact that logrolling is more difficult under direct than under representative democracy. It may also be caused by citizens' fear that a centralization of fiscal authority facilitates the extraction of rents by the government or the legislature. In this paper, we test the hypothesis that centralization is less likely under referendum decision-making in the unique institutional setting of Switzerland. Using a panel of Swiss cantons from 1980 to 1998, the empirical analysis provides evidence that referendums induce less centralization of fiscal activities.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7. Economic and fiscal federalism

Revelli Federico

Performance competition in local media markets

in *Journal of Public Economics*, Volume 92, Issue 7 , 1585-1594

This paper investigates the impact of tax and public service performance on English local government popularity by using data on local property taxes, service performance ratings and local election results after the introduction of a system of evaluation of local government performance (Comprehensive Performance Assessment). The evidence emerging from estimation of a re-election equation offers a somewhat more rounded portrait of the voter than the conventional fiscal conservative icon, by highlighting the beneficial consequences of public service performance on government popularity and pointing to the role of local media networks (the BBC regional television, local radio and web network) in shaping consensus by spreading tax-related information.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7. Economic and fiscal federalism

Goeminne Stijn, Geys Benny , Smolders Carine

Political fragmentation and projected tax revenues: evidence from Flemish municipalities

in *International Tax and Public Finance*, Volume 15, Number 3 , 297-315

he level of revenues pocketed by a government during the fiscal year often deviates from that projected by this government in its budget. Despite a flourishing literature on, for example, the technical or procedural determinants of such forecast errors, little is yet known about how political stratagems may affect forecast errors. In the present paper, we analyse whether differences in the level of government fragmentation are useful in explaining local government tax revenue forecast errors—controlling for various other factors. Using data on 242 Flemish municipalities for the period



1992–2002, we find that two-party governments are more optimistic than single-party governments. In contrast to our initial expectations, governments with at least three parties are significantly more careful (or less optimistic) in their revenue projections than single- or two-party governments.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7. Economic and fiscal federalism

Arnott Richard, Hochman Oded, Rausser Gordon C.

Pollution and land use: Optimum and decentralization

in **Journal of Urban Economics**, Volume 64, Issue 2 , 390-407

Space matters not only by inducing transport costs but also by mitigating pollution damages. Previous models of pollution either disregard space altogether or presume a predetermined separation between polluters and pollutees. In our model, workers commute to factories and all possible location combinations of housing and industry around a circle are considered. We investigate optimal allocations and their decentralization. The tradeoff between pollution costs and transport costs, along with the non-convexity inherent in spatial models, results in multiple local optima. With negligible commuting costs, the optimal allocation has one industrial and one residential zone. As commuting costs increase, the number of zones of each type increases until an allocation is reached in which housing and industry are completely intermixed. The global optimal allocation is decentralized by imposing a tax per unit area of industrial land at a particular location equal to the total damage caused by the pollution from that unit area, evaluated at the global optimum. Location-specific Pigouvian taxes by themselves are inefficient.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7. Economic and fiscal federalism

Koethenbuerger Marko

Revisiting the “Decentralization Theorem”—On the role of externalities

in **Journal of Urban Economics**, Volume 64, Issue 1 , 116-122

The “Decentralization Theorem” [Oates, W.E., 1972. Fiscal Federalism. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York] is central to the discussion of fiscal federalism. We revisit the role of consumption spillovers in evaluating the merits of (de)centralization. Unlike the general prediction, a higher degree of spillovers may reduce the difference in utility of centralization and decentralization. The non-monotonicity result relates to the difference in expenditures on public consumption. Provided decentralized choices yield higher levels of public expenditure, a rise in the amount of spillovers allows residents to enjoy larger gains in public consumption (and thereby utility) under decentralization relative to centralization.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7. Economic and fiscal federalism

Afonso António

Ricardian fiscal regimes in the European Union

in **Empirica: Journal of Applied Economics and Economic Policy**, Volume 35, Number 3 , 313-334

The prevalence of different fiscal regimes is important both for practical policy reasons and to assess fiscal



sustainability, notably for European Union countries. The purpose of this article is to assess, with a panel data set, the empirical evidence concerning the existence of Ricardian fiscal regimes in EU-15 countries. The results give support to the Ricardian fiscal regime hypothesis throughout the sample period, and for sub-samples accounting for the dates of the Maastricht Treaty and for the setting-up of the Stability and Growth Pact. Furthermore, electoral budget cycles also seem to play a relevant role in fiscal behaviour.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism

Duncombe William , Lukemeyer Anna, Yinger John

The No Child Left Behind Act

in **Public Finance Review**, Volume 36, No. 5 , 381-407

The federal No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) imposes new requirements on state education systems and provides additional education funding. This article estimates education cost functions, predicts the spending required to support NCLB standards, and compares this spending with the funding available through NCLB. This analysis is conducted for Kansas and Missouri, which have similar education environments but very different standards. We find that new federal funding is sufficient to support very low standards for student performance, but cannot come close to funding high standards without implausibly large increases in school-district efficiency. Because of the limited federal funding and the severe penalties in NCLB when a school does not meet its state's standards, states have a strong incentive to keep their standards low. NCLB needs to be reformed so that it will encourage high standards

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism

Hideo Konishi

Tiebout's tale in spatial economies: Entrepreneurship, self-selection, and efficiency

in **Regional Science and Urban Economics**, Volume 38, Issue 5 , 461-477

This paper establishes the existence and efficiency of equilibrium in a local public goods economy with spatial structures by formalizing Hamilton's elaboration of Tiebout's tale. We use a well-known equilibrium concept from Rothschild and Stiglitz in a market with asymmetric information, and show that Hamilton's zoning policy plays an essential role in proving the existence and efficiency of equilibrium. We use an idealized large economy following Ellickson, Grodal, Scotchmer and Zame. Our theorem is directly applicable to the existence and efficiency of a discrete spatial approximation of mono- or multi-centric city equilibria in an urban economy with commuting time costs, even if we allow the existence of multiple qualities of (collective) residences, when externalities due to traffic congestion are not present.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism

Debrun Xavier, Moulin Laurent , Turrini Alessandro, Ayuso-i-Casals Joaquim, Kumar Manmohan S

Tied to the mast? National fiscal rules in the European Union

in **Economic Policy**, Volume 23 Issue 54 , 297 - 362

Numerical fiscal rules implemented at the national level in member countries of the European Union offer useful



information on possible reasons for the growing reliance on such rules, and on their implication for fiscal policy. Our analysis of a survey-based dataset suggests that both the introduction of the EU fiscal framework and country-specific fiscal governance features played a role in triggering introduction of numerical fiscal rules, and that the impact of rules is statistically significant, robust, and quantitatively important. Outcomes and rules may be jointly determined by unobserved political factors, but the evidence suggests that causality runs from rules to fiscal behaviour, and that rules specifically designed to prevent conflicts with the stabilization function of fiscal policy are indeed associated with less pro-cyclical policies.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 8. The Central Bank(s)

Quaglia Lucia

Explaining the Reform of Banking Supervision in Europe: An Integrative Approach

in Governance, Vol. 21, n. 3, July , 439-463

National frameworks for banking and, more generally, financial supervision in various European countries have undergone significant changes in the last decade or so. What explains these supervisory reforms? This work addresses this question by examining the recent reforms in the United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy, engaging in a structured, focused comparison, mainly using process tracing and adopting an analytical framework articulated across three levels of analysis. It is argued that while international and EU factors acted as antecedent variables, establishing the background for the reforms, they were mediated by national factors—to be precise, by two independent variables—that account for distinctive modes and outcomes of reforms. In addition, the institutional strength of the central bank—the intervening variable—can make a difference to the process of reform by either inhibiting or catalyzing change.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 8. The Central Bank(s)

Léonard Jacques

Politique monétaire et stabilisation macro-économique. Les mérites comparés de la BCE et de la FED

in Revue de l'Union européenne/Revue du Marché Commun et de l'Union européenne, n. 521, septembre , 485-489

Based on the finding of a not insignificant difference in the statement of the goals respectively assigned to the FED and to the BCE, this paper wonders, in light of a decade's experience in their monetary policies (1999-2008), about the impacts that can be ascribed to them respectively in terms of nominal growth business stabilisation (GDP growth in value), of actual business (GDP growth in volume) and of inflation. The structural differences that differentiate the real economy in the euro zone from that of the United States explain the relatively conservative behaviour of the ECB compared to that of the FED. In some way, it is such forced conservativeness that explains, in a context that is once again marked by a whole lot of structural rigidities and adjustment failures, that the euro zone can display performance, in terms of relative inflation stability and actual growth, similar to that of the United States.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 8. The Central Bank(s)

Harendra Behera, Vathsala Narasimhan, K.N. Murty

Relationship between Exchange Rate Volatility and Central Bank Intervention



in **South Asia Economic Journal**, Volume 9, No. 1 , 69-84

In a world of high capital mobility, several risks are emerging in the financial markets and the Central Bank intervention has played an important role in managing these risks. In India, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) intervenes in the foreign exchange market to maintain orderly market conditions. This article empirically explores the relationship between Central Bank intervention and exchange rate behaviour in the Indian foreign exchange market. Specifically, the article investigates the effects of RBI intervention on exchange rate level and volatility. Using monthly data for April 1995 through December 2006 and GARCH (1,1) model, it is found that the intervention of the RBI is effective in reducing volatility in the Indian foreign exchange market instead of reversing trend movement of exchange rate. It is also observed that FII investments increase exchange rate volatility in India.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 8. The Central Bank(s)

Campoy Juan Cristóba, Negrete Juan Carlos

Rigidities and Inflationary Bias in a Monetary Union: The Consequences of EU Enlargement

in **Review of Development Economics**, Volume 12, Number 3 , 636-654

The authors analyze how the design of the central bank interacts with the implementation of structural reforms in a monetary union. They show that the first-best is achieved when the common central bank is collectively designed, irrespective of whether or not reforms are cooperatively implemented. On the other hand, in the case where the central bank has been designed, an enlargement of the union worsens the incumbent members' welfare unless the inflation target of the monetary authorities diminishes or the accession countries implement a sufficient level of reforms prior to joining in.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 8. The Central Bank(s)

Gorter Janko , Jacobs Jan, de Haan Jakob

Taylor Rules for the ECB using Expectations Data

in **Scandinavian Journal of Economics**, Volume 110 Issue 3 , 473 - 488

We estimate Taylor rules for the euro area using Consensus Economics data for expected inflation and output growth, and compare these estimates with more conventional specifications in which actual outcomes are used. We find that the ECB takes expected inflation and expected output growth into account in setting interest rates, while in the more conventional model specification, the coefficient of realized inflation is not significantly different from zero.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 9. Local government(s)

Voets Joris, De Rynck Filip

Contextualising City-regional Issues, Strategies and their Use: the Flemish Story

in **Local Government Studies**, Vol. 34, issue 4 , 453 - 470

This paper presents a contextualised analysis of what might be called the city-regional debate. The debate is unfolded in



terms of four types of city-regional issues, eight common strategies to tackle the latter and the use thereof in Flanders. It is concluded that the way in which city-regional issues are dealt with in Flanders can be explained by its regime, consisting of an administrative, political and cultural dimension, in terms of a centralistic policy style combined with a weak institutional position of local governments, by a 'localisation' of regional politics and policies, both dominated by an anti-urban bias

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 9. Local government(s)

Bache Ian, Chapman Rachael

Democracy through Multilevel Governance? The Implementation of the Structural Funds in South Yorkshire in Governance, Vol. 21, n. 3, July , 397-418

This article considers the democratic qualities of multilevel governance at the stage of policy implementation closest to the ground, involving local residents and organizations. Drawing on a case study of the structural funds in South Yorkshire (United Kingdom), it puts forward three models of democracy through which to evaluate the democratic credentials of multilevel governance. The case study illustrates that among the expected complexity and technocracy at this stage of policymaking, there are also experiments in local democracy that have not previously been identified in the academic literature. As such, in the context of deep multilevel governance, there is evidence that while traditional mechanisms of accountability may be undermined, other mechanisms may provide a valuable alternative.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 9. Local government(s)

Leach Steve, Wilson David

Diluting the Role of Party Groups? Implications of the 2006 Local Government White Paper in Local Government Studies, Vol. 34, issue 3 , 303 - 321

This paper argues that the proposals for strengthening local political leadership outlined in the 2006 British government White Paper 'Strong and Prosperous Communities' are based on an unconvincing, methodologically flawed analysis of the benefits of strong individual leadership. The extent to which the continued dominance of the party group is inimical to the exercise of executive political leadership is analysed and a number of scenarios that highlight circumstances in which there is a mismatch between the party allegiance of the leader and the composition of the council are then put forward and the implications for 'strong' political leadership discussed. The conclusion emphasises the importance of a continuing role for local parties and party groups in the post-White Paper era

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Subsection 9. Local government(s)

Curtice John, Seyd Ben, Thomson Katarina

Do Mayoral Elections Work? Evidence from London in Political Studies, Volume 56, Issue 3, October , 653-678

The introduction of directly elected mayors potentially represents a major reform of the operation of local government in Britain. Drawing upon survey data collected at the time of the first two London mayoral elections, this article considers



whether such elections necessarily deliver the advantages claimed for them by their advocates. It addresses three questions: (1) What was the basis of public support for the new institutions; (2) who participated in the London elections, and why; and (3) what accounts for voting behaviour in the London elections? In particular we examine how far the election of a single-person executive helps provide people with a clear choice, encourages citizens to vote on the qualities of individual candidates rather than on their party affiliation, and motivates people to vote on distinctively local issues as opposed to national ones. Our results suggest that while mayoral elections deliver some of the advantages claimed for them, they may be less successful on others. The extent to which directly elected mayors enhance the local electoral process is thus doubtful.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 9. Local government(s)

España Montserrat Ballarín

El finançament dels governs locals en el nou estatut d'autonomia de Catalunya

in Revista d'Estudis Autònoms i Federals, n. 6 , 161-186

En este artículo se exploran, desde una perspectiva jurídica, las vías abiertas por el nuevo Estatuto de Autonomía de Cataluña para innovar en el sistema de financiación de los gobiernos locales. Se empieza describiendo cómo se habían concretado, hasta ahora, la autonomía, la suficiencia y el poder financiero local por el legislador estatal y por el Tribunal Constitucional. Tras considerar la posible prevalencia de las previsiones estatutarias sobre la normativa básica dictada al amparo del artículo 149.1.18 de la Constitución, se analiza con detalle la regulación, bastante ambigua, que se establece en el Estatuto sobre las haciendas locales. Se concluye que, pese a que parece que el Estatuto pretende dotar a la Generalitat de más capacidad para establecer y regular tributos locales, así como de una mayor corresponsabilidad con el Estado para garantizar la suficiencia financiera de los gobiernos locales, quedan muchos aspectos pendientes de concreción. Algunas cuestiones importantes se han aplazado hasta la futura ley catalana de finanzas locales, pero, sobre todo, resultará decisivo el posicionamiento del Tribunal Constitucional sobre si el nuevo Estatuto tiene o no capacidad de innovar en el sistema jurídico-financiero.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 9. Local government(s)

Egner Bjoumrn, Heinelt Hubert

Explaining the Differences in the Role of Councils: an Analysis Based on a Survey of Mayors

in Local Government Studies, Vol. 34, issue 4 , 529 - 544

Political leadership at the local level has attracted growing attention in recent years in parallel with reforms of local government and of the municipal administration, as well as the debate on a shift from government to governance. Considering the power triangle of (i) the mayor, (ii) the municipal administration (executive officers) and (iii) the council, it is surprising that the latter has gained little interest so far. This article analyses how the roles of local councils as representative bodies are assessed by mayors from seventeen European countries and how differences in the perception of councils can be explained. Can differences be explained by institutional settings, the notion of the mayor towards the role of political parties or by the kind of interaction between the mayor and the council - or are specific local conditions and idiosyncratic personal factors crucial?



Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 9. Local government(s)

Sakurai Sergio Naruhiko, Menezes-Filho Naercio Aquino

Fiscal policy and reelection in Brazilian municipalities

in **Public Choice**, Volume 137, Numbers 1-2 , 301-314

This paper uses a new panel of more than 2,000 Brazilian municipalities over 13 years to analyze the influence of public expenditures on the probability of mayors' reelection. We examine Brazilian municipal elections from 1988 to 2000 using a logit fixed-effects model. The results suggest that mayors who spend more during their terms of office increase the probability of their own reelection or of a successor of the same political party. In particular, higher capital spending over the years preceding elections and current expenditures in election years are beneficial to Brazilian incumbent mayors.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 9. Local government(s)

Parisi Stefania

Il "posto" delle fonti locali nel sistema

in **Regioni (Le)**, n. 1 , 155-190

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 9. Local government(s)

Huchon Jean-Paul

Les choix de l'acteur politique régional. (Entretien)

in **Esprit**, n. 348, octobre 2008 , 165-174

La région est-elle le territoire approprié de la métropole ? Le président de la région Île-de-France l'a souvent affirmé. Mais le débat sur le Grand Paris devrait fournir l'occasion de revoir à la hausse les missions de la Région, ses relations avec un État qui se veut plus contrôleur mais aussi avec la mairie de Paris. Bref, il n'est plus concevable d'opposer le Francilien au Parisien.

The choices before a senior regional politician. An interview with Jean-Paul Huchon

Is the region the right spatial format for a metropolis? The president of the Paris region governing council has often said so. But then the debate over Greater Paris should be an opportunity to upgrade the region's mandate, as well as its relationships with a more controlling central government and the Paris town hall. The age-old antagonism between those living around Paris and those within is becoming inconceivable.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government



Subsection 9. Local government(s)

Balanche Fabrice

Les municipalités dans la Syrie baathiste: déconcentration administrative et contrôle politique

in *Revue Tiers Monde*, n. 193, 169-188

La généralisation des municipalités avec des assemblées élues à l'ensemble du territoire syrien, y compris dans les zones rurales, est un moyen pour le régime baathiste de renforcer ses réseaux de clientélisme. Après la révolte des Frères musulmans (1979-1982), il s'agissait aussi de créer des acteurs intermédiaires entre la population et l'État, susceptibles de désamorcer les crises sociales. Les conseils municipaux sont constitués par la petite bourgeoisie baathiste, le plus souvent par promotion interne au sein de l'administration. Le choix des présidents de municipalité par le régime est délicat, car il lui faut éviter que cette fonction ne leur permette d'acquérir une certaine indépendance.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 9. Local government(s)

Granberg Mikael

Local Governance 'in Swedish'? Globalisation, Local Welfare Government and Beyond

in *Local Government Studies*, Vol. 34, issue 3, 363 - 377

In this article local governance in the Swedish context is discussed. A case study of a Swedish city is framed in its historical, national and international context. By locating the redevelopment of an old harbour within a historical context, new insights are brought into the understanding of local governance. Cities are indeed nested. Deteriorating public finances, the deregulation of the economy (nationally and globally), the changed status of the welfare state, the restructuring of industry and the neo-liberal wave all taken together form a formidable challenge. A radical questioning of the values, principles and forms of the Swedish welfare state has tangible impacts on local governance. It is concluded that Swedish municipal actors face the dual challenge of acting efficiently (being sensitive to the needs and demands of local elites), while keeping democratic legitimacy (being sensitive to the needs and demands of all citizens)

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Subsection 9. Local government(s)

Navarro Yáñez Clemente J., Magnier Annick, Ramírez M. Antonia

Local Governance as Government–Business Cooperation in Western Democracies: Analysing Local and Intergovernmental Effects by Multi-Level Comparison

in *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, Volume 32 Issue 3, 531 - 547

The internationalization of economics and politics has forced local governments to develop new context-appropriate strategies; these strategies, characterized by a greater degree of interaction with non-governmental key actors and with the business world in particular, have been termed local or urban governance. This article is intended to illustrate the impact of three factors — local leadership, local political arenas and intergovernmental relationships — on the formation of cooperative networks between local governments and business organizations as one of the basic types of urban governance model. To achieve this, a comparative multi-level analysis presenting the CEO's perspective on such issues was conducted. The results show how local and intergovernmental opportunity costs and leadership are the factors that largely determine the degree of collaboration between local government and business



Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 9. Local government(s)

Khan Shadiullah

Local Governments and Local Elites

in **Local Government Studies**, Vol. 34, issue 4 , 509 - 528

Local government reform 2001 is an important part of the Government of Pakistan's programme for democratic renewal. The main feature of introducing the Local Government System was to empower the people at the grassroots level and to transfer power from the elite to the masses. This paper uses councillors' data from north-western Pakistan to examine the economic and social status of village representatives. Land ownership, high income, education and political connections increase the chances of election to public office at the district and sub-district level, but do not have much impact at the village level. There is evidence of genuine change at union (village) level as the majority of councillors (65 per cent) at this level belong to low-income group and small landowners. So the system has changed the identity of the locally politically dominant group. But, at the same time, results suggest that while local governments units are helpful in creating spaces for a broader range of non-elite community leaders to emerge, elite control of decision making is pervasive. However, it is expected that the presence of non-elite members in the councils may change the allocation of resources in favour of the disadvantaged group with the passage of time, provided elections to councils are held regularly

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Subsection 9. Local government(s)

Hossain Farhad, Helao Tuhafeni

Local governance and water resource management: experiences from Northern Namibia

in **Public Administration and Development**, Volume 28 Issue 3 , 200 - 211

Like many semi-arid countries in Africa, Namibia has been experiencing water shortage for a long period of time. Prior to its independence in 1990, most of Namibia's water points - namely, the boreholes - served white-Namibians (about 7% of the national population of predominantly German descent) and their commercial farming areas. But their water needs have been satisfied at the expense of those indigenous Namibians and their communal areas (where some 80% of the national population originates). Independence, however, brought with it a new hope for the indigenous population: since 1990, the government has been working diligently to reform the country's local governance, and make local government agencies more effective, efficient and responsive to common people and their needs. This article sheds light on how, within the background of the government's decentralisation efforts, the management and distribution of water resources have changed in an independent Namibia, reporting findings from research conducted in a newly emerged village council in the north of the country. Drawing on historical and contemporary practices, we describe and analyse the role of decentralised local government in water resource management in northern Namibia, where today, more than 50% of the national population (i.e. the indigenous Oshiwambo-speaking people) resides.

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Subsection 9. Local government(s)

Estèbe Philippe



L'Île-de-France est-elle un objet de gouvernance ?

in *Esprit*, n. 348, octobre 2008 , 160-165

La petite révolution produite par la loi Chevènement de 1999 sur les établissements publics de coopération intercommunale (EPCI) a-t-elle porté ses fruits ? Si l'Île-de-France découvre comme les autres régions les intercommunalités, la nature peu démocratique des nouvelles élites et l'empilement territorial actuel pèsent sur la manière de gouverner et sur les formes de participation citoyenne. Mais le malaise démocratique est loin d'être un privilège de l'Île-de-France, il est tout simplement hexagonal.

Does the Paris region lend itself well to proper governance?

Has the minor revolution introduced by a 1999 law on co-operation between municipal authorities borne any fruit? Whilst, as any other, the Paris region takes to this type of co-operation, inadequate democracy among the new ruling elites combines with the current superposition of administrative authorities to put both governing methods and civic involvement under pressure. At the same time, inadequate democracy pervades France as a whole, not just the Paris area.

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Subsection 9. Local government(s)

Mark Gary s, Hooghe Liesbet, Schakel Arjan H.

Measuring Regional Authority

in *Regional and Federal Studies*, Volume 18 Issue 2 - 3 , 111 - 121

This article sets out a conceptual basis for measuring regional authority and engages basic measurement issues. Regional authority is disaggregated into two domains (self-rule and shared rule) and these are operationalised in eight dimensions. The article concludes by examining the robustness of this measure across alternative measurement assumptions.

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Subsection 9. Local government(s)

Nyseth Torill, RingholmToril

Municipal Response to Local Diversity: Flexibility in Community Governance

in *Local Government Studies*, Vol. 34, issue 4 , 471 - 487

The Scandinavian countries have a long tradition for networked or partnership-based policy making at the local level. The tradition involves co-operation between local authorities and market actors as well as actors representing civil society. Despite this long-standing tradition, the emerging diversity and complexity of the co-operative relationships challenge the established systems and structures in these countries as well as in countries where such traditions are less developed. The municipalities have been used to the role as the authority in these relations, an authority that is now destabilised and which led to a situation that calls for flexibility. This paper discusses whether the municipalities possess



the flexibility that is often an implicit expectation when entering co-operative relations with the multitude of organisational structures represented in the diversity of Norwegian community councils

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 9. Local government(s)

De Frantz Monika

**New Regionalism Top Down: Mobilizing National Minority Culture
in Regional and Federal Studies**, Volume 18 Issue 4 , 403 - 427

New regionalism has discovered culture as a political instrument for promoting economic development. But where local traditions have come to be associated with failure, backwardness and conflict, these negative images can become a burden for regional development. In addition to its political and economic peripherality, the Austrian province of Burgenland is characterized by a multi-ethnic heritage that has long been threatened by national assimilation. But the transition in neighbouring Central Eastern Europe has motivated Burgenland's politicians to mobilize the fragmented minority culture as an asset for regional development. Despite its weak civic traditions suffocated by political party clientelism, Burgenland illustrates a successful case of a culture-based new regionalism driven by a regional government that is strongly embedded within Austria's centralized federalism. In the absence of endogenous claims for regional autonomy, the government's policy has helped to overcome ethnic divisions by designing intercultural legitimacy from the top down. But cultural new regionalism also entails winners and losers, even in a civic field that has been as little politicized as Burgenland's national minority heritage. The regional elites still face the problem of how to integrate the various civic organizations in the minority field and thus base the regional vision within a bottom-up movement.

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Subsection 9. Local government(s)

Hooghe Liesbet, Marks Gary, Schakel Arjan H.

**Operationalizing Regional Authority: A Coding Scheme for 42 Countries, 1950-2006
in Regional and Federal Studies**, Volume 18 Issue 2 - 3 , 123 - 142

This article sets out a coding scheme for eight dimensions of regional authority across 42 developed countries for the period 1950-2006. The article explicates coding rules, discusses ambiguities of interpretation, and explains how particular regions are coded.

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Subsection 9. Local government(s)

Marks Gary, Hooghe Liesbet, Schakel Arjan H.

**Patterns of Regional Authority
in Regional and Federal Studies**, Volume 18 Issue 2 - 3 , 167 - 181

This paper introduces a new dataset on regional authority in 42 democracies for 1950-2006 and formulates five hypotheses. First, an S-curve effect describing a logistic association between the population of a country and its regional authority. Secondly, a heteroskedasticity effect, in which the variance in regional authority among larger countries is



greater than that among smaller countries. Thirdly, an identity effect, in which the allocation of authority to a jurisdiction is influenced by the relative strength of a population's identity to the community encompassed by the jurisdiction. Fourthly, a democracy effect, which leads democracies to have higher levels of regional authority than dictatorships. Fifthly, an integration effect, which removes a potential economic cost on regionalization by providing a transnational frame for economic exchange.

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Subsection 9. Local government(s)

57-80

Public spending interactions and local politics. Empirical evidence from French municipalities

in **Public Choice**, Volume 137, Numbers 1-2 , Foucault Martial, Madies Thierry , Paty Sonia

This paper aims at testing whether there exist spending interactions between French municipalities by estimating a dynamic panel data model. Our results suggest that there are some interactions between neighbouring municipalities as regards primary and investment expenditures. A positive relationship between municipalities' wage bill and unemployment rates is likely to stress a rise of temporary employment in those municipalities that suffer from social troubles. Further, the estimation results show that these interdependences also exist between cities whose mayors have the same partisan affiliation. Finally, our results confirm the opportunistic behaviour of local governments, which increase all categories of public spending in pre-electoral periods

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Subsection 9. Local government(s)

Pitruzzella Giovanni

Quali poteri normativi per l'autonomia locale?

in **Regioni (Le)**, n. 1 , 3-10

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 9. Local government(s)

Pearce Graham, Mawson John, Ayres Sarah

Regional Governance In England: A Changing Role For The Government's Regional Offices?

in **Public Administration**, June 2008 -Volume 86 Issue 2 , 443 - 463

Debates about the appropriate territorial scales of government to meet the challenges of economic, political and social change have gained momentum in Western Europe in recent years. In the UK, political mobilization has transformed constitutional arrangements in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales. By contrast, in the English regions, a less radical approach has been adopted, but the outcome has been a strengthening of the institutions of regional governance. A key feature has been the enhanced responsibilities of the Government Offices for the Regions, which have been encouraged to build on their traditional administrative functions and adopt a more strategic role. This article explores the Offices' contribution to regional and local governance. Our central argument is that although increasingly expected to act as a bridgehead between national and sub-national government and a focus for regional policy coordination, their



potential role in filling the missing gap in English regional governance has not yet been fully grasped.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 9. Local government(s)

Francesco Merloni

Riflessioni sull'autonomia normativa degli enti locali

in *Regioni (Le)*, n. 1 , 91-112

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 9. Local government(s)

Irina, Verge Tània

Small and Divided Parties in Multi-Level Settings: Opportunities for Regional Government Participation, the Case of Izquierda Unida in Spain

in *South European Society & Politics*, Volume 13, Issue 2, June , 155-173

Izquierda Unida/United Left (IU) has recently moved from its traditional opposition role to a new governing status. Despite lacking governing experience, having a non-pivotal and non-central ideological position, and displaying high degrees of factionalism, IU managed to establish itself as a governing partner for an array of very different parties. This article examines how the opportunities offered by multi-level institutional systems (such as the Spanish state) allow the leaderships of small, radical and divided parties to overcome their governing inexperience, diversify party goals, counteract factionalism and develop a hinge-party profile.

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Subsection 9. Local government(s)

119-126

The fiscal effects of statehood: New Mexico and Arizona, 1903–1919

in *Public Choice*, Volume 137, Numbers 1-2 , 119-126

The residents of US territories often vote against statehood for fear government will use its greater sovereignty to impose a heavier tax burden. On the other hand, public choice theory predicts that fiscal decentralization limits government's size. The financial reports of New Mexico and Arizona were examined before and after statehood in 1912. Graphical and regression analyses of the ratios of receipts and expenditures to property values and US GNP suggest that the relative price of government rose far more in the two new states than in a control state, Nevada, thus supporting the claims of statehood's opponents.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government



Subsection 9. Local government(s)

MacDonald Lynn

The impact of government structure on local public expenditures

in **Public Choice**, Volume 136, Numbers 3-4 , 457-473

Though the relationship between local government structure and expenditure has received considerable attention, there is little consensus as to how the features of representative government affect local expenditure. An exception is city council size, which has consistently been found to be positively related to spending. Previous results rely on cross-sectional estimation which may be subject to omitted variable bias. This paper analyzes three components of municipal governments—the form of government, the size of the city council, and the election method of city councilors. Once fixed effects estimation is employed, the positive relationship between city council size and expenditure disappears.

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Subsection 9. Local government(s)

Toly Noah J.

Transnational Municipal Networks in Climate Politics: From Global Governance to Global Politics

in **Globalizations** , Volume 5, Issue 3, September 2008 , 341-356

In a multilevel and multicentric governance arena, pathways and mechanisms of influence are several and non-state capacities for technical leadership and norm entrepreneurship prove more significant than is the case within a strictly multilateral framework. Among actors with such capacities are municipalities, which multiply their influence through horizontal and vertical relationships. Transnational municipal networks present opportunities for both intermunicipal dialogue and the pooling of global influence, highlighting the presence and influence of the city in the world. This paper examines the collective response of some cities to climate change, exploring the place of cities in global environmental politics through analysis of two transnational municipal networks: the International Council of Local Environmental Initiatives' Cities for Climate Protection and the International Solar Cities Initiative. The article addresses the following questions: How might municipal efforts toward a climate-stable future be significant to the larger issue of ecological justice in global environmental politics? Might cities be able to redefine the rules of the game and take a stand on 'inefficient' norms? After briefly accounting for the relationship between cities and the world, the article characterizes technical leadership as a legitimizing force of and in global environmental governance and norm entrepreneurship as a potential source of contestation and subversion in global environmental politics. The paper describes what cities are globalizing, in terms of pollution, environmental degradation, and risk, and in terms of management and politics. Finally, the article explores the possibility that emerging horizontal and vertical relationships, intermunicipal relationships, and relationships between cities or networks of cities and other scales of governance potentiate legitimizing roles for cities in climate governance and subversive roles in climate politics.

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Subsection 9. Local government(s)

Schakel Arjan H.

Validation of the Regional Authority Index

in **Regional and Federal Studies**, Volume 18 Issue 2 - 3 , 143 - 166



This article validates the Regional Authority Index (RAI) with seven widely used decentralization indices in the literature. A principal axis analysis reveals a common structure. The major source of disagreement between the RAI and the other indices stems from the fact that the RAI does not include local governance, whereas most other indices do. Two other sources of disagreement concern the treatment of federal versus non-federal countries, and countries which have recently regionalized and/or have asymmetrical regions, whereby the more fine-grained RAI captures greater variation. The second part of the article discusses content validity of fiscal indicators.

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Subsection 9. Local government(s)

Wihlborg Elin, Palm Jenny

Who is Governing What? Governing Local Technical Systems-an Issue of Accountability in Local Government Studies, Vol. 34, issue 3 , 349 - 362

The article discusses accountability in governance of local energy and IT systems. The aim is to focus on accountability of local policy making regarding technical systems by comparing consequences when new forms of governance are developed. Governance steering demands and ensures a clear division of responsibility regarding what a network is responsible for, but not regarding who is accountable for the decision making and implementation. On the other hand, in a steering context characterized by government, it is clear who is responsible and accountable for decisions, but the specific issues for which different actors can be accountable are unclear. We argue that demands for clarifications of accountability emerges from the complex modern governance.

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Subsection 9. Local government(s)

Johnson Katherine M.

“The Glorified Municipality”: State formation and the urban process in North America in Political Geography, Volume 27, Issue 4 , 400-417

This article revisits the debate over whether and to what extent the cities of the United States and Canada can be understood as a common ‘North American city’ by reconsidering the role of the their common federal system of government. Drawing on a Marxist theory of the capitalist state and the municipal histories of New York State and the Province of Ontario, the article traces the institutions and patterns of urbanization in the two countries to a dialectic of political conflict between the sub-national states and the industrializing cities, conditioned by federal divisions of sovereignty and grounded in the expanding social property relations of capital. The final section connects this dialectic to historically new conditions for the expanded reproduction of capital, specifically in the constitution of land as a commodity form. It also speculates briefly on the implications of this analysis for a more spatially informed theory of the capitalist state.

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Subsection 9. Local government(s)

Almeida Cerredá Marcos

¿Es necesario un nuevo modelo de controles sobre los entes locales?
in *Revista d'Estudis Autònomic i Federals*, n. 6 , 187-232



El objeto del presente artículo es llevar a cabo un examen del sistema de controles sobre los Entes Locales que existe en la actualidad en España y de las alternativas al mismo que son posibles. Con este objetivo, en primer lugar, se estudian dos cuestiones previas: la delimitación conceptual y taxonómica de los controles administrativos sobre los Entes Locales, y la evolución histórica del sistema español de controles, desde la perspectiva de la tensión existente entre estos y la autonomía local. En segundo lugar, tras el estudio de estas premisas, se analiza, por una parte, cuál es la configuración ideal del esquema de controles sobre los Entes Locales que debe recoger el Ordenamiento español, para lo que se investiga si éste ha de ser preponderantemente judicial o administrativo, y, por otra parte, se trata de determinar a quién le corresponde establecer cuál ha de ser el modelo de control sobre los Entes Locales y cómo se debe llevar a cabo su fijación.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 10. Processes of federalization and decentralization

Ruggiu Ilenia

Il "ritorno" del principio di competenza?

in *Istituzioni del federalismo*, n. 1 , 101

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 10. Processes of federalization and decentralization

Sherlock Ann

A New Devolution Settlement for Wales

in *European public Law*, Volume 14 (2008) Issue 3 , 297-309

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 10. Processes of federalization and decentralization

Chebankova Elena

Adaptive Federalism and Federation in Putin's Russia

in *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol. 60, n. 6, August, special issue "Power and Policy in Putin's Russia " , 989-1009

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 10. Processes of federalization and decentralization

Mitchell Christopher

Advancing the Study of Decentralization and Federalism in Latin America

in *Latin American Politics & Society*, Vol. 50, Nr. 2 , 161 - 174



No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 10. Processes of federalization and decentralization

Duranti Gabriella

Asimmetria e modernizzazione del federalismo in Europa: il caso della riforma dello statuto catalano.

in *Rassegna parlamentare*, n. 1 , 249-279

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 10. Processes of federalization and decentralization

Luther Jörg

Costituzionalismo e regionalismo europeo

in *Regioni (Le)*, n. 6 , 933-958

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 10. Processes of federalization and decentralization

Camarda Lorenzo

Da uno Stato centralista ad una Repubblica delle Autonomie

in *Nuova rassegna di legislazione, dottrina e giurisprudenza*, n. 13-14 , 1362-1363

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 10. Processes of federalization and decentralization

Ciarlo Pietro , Betzu Marco

Dal regionalismo differenziato al regionalismo pasticciato

in *Istituzioni del federalismo*, n. 1 , 67-74

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 10. Processes of federalization and decentralization

Asthana Anand n.

Decentralisation and corruption: evidence from drinking water sector



in **Public Administration and Development**, Volume 28 Issue 3 , 181 - 189

This article presents empirical findings regarding the relationship between decentralisation of provision of water supply and corruption in provision of services. The current policy advice from the international agencies of aiming for decentralisation as an end in itself is questioned. The conventional wisdom that decentralisation brings management closer to the service recipients and is therefore likely to reduce corruption is also disputed. Drawing on a large database from two large Indian states of Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh, the interaction between various actors is analysed. We find that the level of corruption in water supply agencies run by local governments is higher than that in the agencies run by the regional government.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

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Peterlini Oskar

Die Föderalismusentwicklung in Italien und ihre Auswirkungen auf die Sonderautonomien, am Beispiel der autonomen Region Trentino-Südtirol

in **Zeitschrift für Öffentliches Recht**, issue 2, vol. 63 , 189-266

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

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Michael C. Davis

Establishing a Workable Autonomy in Tibet

in **Human Rights Quarterly**, Volume 30, Number 2, May 2008 , 227-258

This article recommends a change in China's policy toward Tibet to better conform to national commitments and international obligations. Since the People's Liberation Army marched into Tibet in the 1950s China has generally imposed its will on the Tibetan people. The 1951 "17-Point Agreement on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet" reflected the view that China was liberating Tibetan territory from imperialist forces. From the Tibetan perspective such "liberation" was imposed and promises of local self-rule were not kept. The emerging communist and totalitarian state that followed the 1949 Chinese revolution proved incapable of allowing genuine Tibetan self-rule. A harsh attitude of domination ensued. The present instrument of Chinese rule is China's national minority policy provided in Article 4 of the Chinese Constitution and China's Law on Regional National Autonomy (LRNA). Though this policy promises local self-rule, the habits of intervention both formally in the political system and in the mechanisms of Communist Party oversight leave Tibetans with very little of the promised legislative and administrative autonomy. Assessing this policy against the backdrop of China's long historical relationship with Tibet and the requirements of international law, this article concludes that China's national minority policy fails to meet its obligations to the Tibetan people. Taking account of standards articulated in the new UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, this article recommends a change of course to establish a more genuine autonomy under Article 31 of the Chinese Constitution relating to the establishment of special administrative regions.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government



Subsection 10. Processes of federalization and decentralization

Italia Vittoria, Camarda Lorenzo

Il sofferto passaggio da uno Stato centralista ad uno Stato di tipo federalista: nota introduttiva
in *Nuova rassegna di legislazione, dottrina e giurisprudenza*, n. 13-14 , 1361

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

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Wood Donna , Klassen Thomas R.

Intergovernmental Relations Post-devolution: Active Labour Market Policy in Canada and the United Kingdom 1996-2006

in *Regional and Federal Studies*, Volume 18 Issue 4 , 331 - 351

Devolution of active labour market policy has been pursued by both the Canadian and UK governments during the past decade and, as a result, new intergovernmental relationships have developed. These are compared, focusing in particular on relationships between the Government of Canada and the Government of the province of Alberta, and the UK Government and the Scottish Executive. The analysis concludes that intergovernmental relations and the workability of the intergovernmental relations system in the two countries are fundamentally different. This is due to distinct features in the structure of the state (the constitution, the number of sub-state governments and the asymmetry between them, how finances are shared, and how power is divided), and in the governing structure for active labour market policy (the degree of decentralization, the power of central government to act, the involvement of actors external to government, and the operation of the intergovernmental machinery) in each country. It is also due to the continued presence in the UK, during the period of this research, of two powerful forces of intergovernmental accommodation not found in Canada—a unitary party system and unified civil service.

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Callejón Francisco Balaguer

La Riforma dello Statuto di autonomia dell'Andalusia nel contesto della pluralità di spazi costituzionali di ambito europeo

in *Federalismi*, Anno VI - N. 17

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 10. Processes of federalization and decentralization

Cuccodoro Enrico

La democrazia territoriale. Spazi costituzionali e nuovi orizzonti di libertà: le dinamiche costituzionali e lo snodo dei poteri centrali e territoriali

in *Nuova rassegna di legislazione, dottrina e giurisprudenza*, n. 11 , 1147-1152



No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 10. Processes of federalization and decentralization

Collot Pierre-Alain

La décentralisation culturelle

in *Revue du droit public et de la science politique en France et à l'étranger*, n. 2 , 335-362

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 10. Processes of federalization and decentralization

Valdés Roberto Blanco

La seconda decentralizzazione spagnola: fra riforma confederale e stato possibile

in *Federalismi*, Anno VI - N. 17

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 10. Processes of federalization and decentralization

Ruggeri Antonio

La “specializzazione” dell’autonomia regionale: se, come e nei riguardi di chi farvi luogo

in *Istituzioni del federalismo*, n. 1 , 21-50

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 10. Processes of federalization and decentralization

Andreu Josep M^a Castellá

Lo Statuto di autonomia del 2006 come (discutibile) strumento per la realizzazione dell'autogoverno della Catalogna

in *Federalismi*, Anno VI - N. 17

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

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Ruiz-Rico Ruiz Gerardo José

Los defensores del pueblo autonómicos tras la reforma de los estatutos de autonomía



in *Revista d'Estudis Autònomic i Federals*, n. 6 , 365-395

En el presente trabajo se analiza el tratamiento que realizan las diferentes reformas estatutarias de la figura del Defensor del Pueblo autonómico. El punto de mira del análisis se centra tanto en la dimensión funcional o competencial, como del status institucional y las relaciones con otros órganos y poderes de la Comunidad Autónoma. En este proceso de incorporación a los nuevos Estatutos de la figura del ombudsman autonómico se ha intentado delimitar con mayor claridad normativa el alcance y la eficacia de su función como instancia de tutela de los derechos. Por otro lado, el estudio entra a examinar los nuevos parámetros normativos de referencia sobre los que se proyectará la actuación del defensor autonómico; en concreto y fundamentalmente los catálogos de derechos estatutarios. Sin duda se encuentra aquí uno de los retos más importantes de futuro para consolidar a esta figura como verdadero instrumento de protección de los derechos sociales de los ciudadanos en cada Comunidad; su verdadero valor normativo se medirá, entre otras formas, a partir de las posibilidades que tenga aquél para garantizar su ejercicio.

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DeFilippis James

Paradoxes of community-building: community control in the global economy

in *International Social Science Journal* , Volume 59, Issue 192, June 2008 , 223-234

This article is about the potential and limits of community control and development (community-building) in the developed world, but most of the references are to the USA. There is a paradox in the contemporary political economy. As the level of the social, political and economic relationships at which communities and cities are embedded has become increasingly globalised – and thereby remote from people in cities and communities – there has been a substantial turn towards the community level as the domain and level at which social, political and economic problems should be solved. The article explores this paradox, beginning with a detailed explanation of contemporary political economy – the increasing economic globalisation existing side by side with political devolution at the community level. This is followed by a discussion of the growth of community-based organisations in the USA, their activities and their histories. From there, the article shifts gears to critique the theories of community that guide most mainstream practices. The article ends with a discussion of alternative forms of community organising and development that lead towards greater community control in the context of capital mobility and economic globalisation.

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Fabre Elodie

Party Organization in a Multi-level System: Party Organizational Change in Spain and the UK

in *Regional and Federal Studies*, Volume 18 Issue 4 , 309 - 329

This article investigates the link between regionalization of the structure of government, regional elections and regionalism on the one hand, and the organization of state-wide political parties in Spain and the UK on the other. It particularly looks at two aspects of the relations between the central and regional levels of party organization: integration of the regional branches in central decision making and autonomy of the regional branches. It argues that the party



factors are the most crucial elements explaining party change and that party leaders mediate between environmental changes and party organization. The parties' history and beliefs and the strength of the central leadership condition their ability or willingness to facilitate the emergence of meso-level elites. The institutional and electoral factors are facilitating factors that constitute additional motives for or against internal party decentralization.

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Koranteng Roger Oppong, Larbi George A.

Policy networks, politics and decentralisation policies in Ghana

in Public Administration and Development, Volume 28 Issue 3 , 212 - 222

Policy-making is a political process involving a network of actors with varied interests. This article uses policy network as an analytical framework to understand the politics of decentralisation policy-making in Ghana from the perspective of interactions among interest groups. The article is based on a research study, which utilised semi-structured interviews and documentary sources in its data collection. It argues that the lack of progress in decentralisation in Ghana can be explained by the politics surrounding government-interest group relations. The article also provides evidence to indicate how varied interests represented within the decentralisation policy networks affected politics and in turn influenced decentralisation policy-making and outcomes.

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Savard Stéphane

Pour « Une politique globale, précise, cohérente et définitive de développement » : Les leaders franco-ontariens et les encadrements politiques fédéraux, 1968-1984

in Politique et sociétés, revue de la Société québécoise de science politique, Vol. 27, no. 1

Cet article analyse la réceptivité des leaders franco-ontariens aux encadrements politiques élaborés par le gouvernement de Pierre Elliott Trudeau de 1968 à 1984. D'emblée, la réaction à la Loi sur les langues officielles de 1969 s'avère très positive, même si des améliorations sont réclamées. En ce qui concerne les initiatives du Secrétariat d'État, les leaders franco-ontariens s'y montrent favorables, tout en surveillant de près les interventions financières et administratives du ministère. En revanche, pour l'encadrement du multiculturalisme élaboré à partir de 1971, c'est le rejet quasi total, celui-ci étant jugé comme un danger pour la promotion du bilinguisme et du biculturalisme. Enfin, l'encadrement de la Charte des droits et libertés suscite des réactions ambivalentes, les leaders franco-ontariens dénonçant le rejet en novembre 1981 de leurs principales recommandations constitutionnelles pour finalement se prévaloir des dispositions juridiques de la Charte pour protéger et promouvoir leurs droits scolaires et autres.

Abstract.

This article analyses the receptiveness of the Trudeau's government policies by Franco-Ontarian leaders from 1968 to 1984. First, the receptiveness towards the Official Languages Act (1969) is positive, even though some critics and improvements are requested. A similar pattern is observed with the Secretary of State's interventions, for which Franco-Ontarian leaders develop positive reactions while keeping an eye on that Department's financial and administrative policies. Franco-Ontarian leaders, wishing to protect the official language policy and encourage their own



conception of biculturalism, are absolutely not in favour of the multiculturalism policy, elaborated from 1971. Finally, Franco-Ontarian's rejection of the constitutional recommendations before and after 1981 and the Franco-Ontarian leaders' legal involvement in the protection and promotion of their school rights, in 1983-1984, results in a complex and moving receptiveness related to the Charter of Rights and Freedoms policy (1982).

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Anzon Demmig Adele

Quale "regionalismo differenziato"?

in *Istituzioni del federalismo*, n. 1 , 51-62

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

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Gambino Silvio

Regionalismi e diritti di cittadinanza. La riforma degli statuti in Spagna e in Italia

in *Federalismi*, Anno VI - N. 17

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

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Brown Scott

Socialism with a Slovak Face: Federalization, Democratization, and the Prague Spring

in *East European Politics and Societies*, vol. 22, n. 3, Summer , 467-495

Exploring the "federalization debate" that occurred in the context of the Prague Spring, this article highlights the diversity of opinions among political elites in Slovakia regarding the federalization and democratization discussions in 1968. The language Slovaks used to call for federalization reveals how they conceive of democracy and democratization, and it shows the variety of meanings Slovaks ascribed to federalization and to the popular slogan, "First federalization, then democratization." Federalization and democratization were mutually dependent in the minds of many Slovaks. The author argues that Slovak political and cultural figures writing in the late 1960s saw federalization as a necessary precondition for democracy; they regarded the nation as one of the basic units of democracy, which led them to champion institutional safeguards for Slovak national rights as a prerequisite for successful democratization.

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Di Cosimo Giovanni

Sui contenuti del regionalismo differenziato

in *Istituzioni del federalismo*, n. 1 , 63 -66

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Carloni Enrico

Teoria e pratica della differenziazione: federalismo asimmetrico ed attuazione del Titolo V

in *Istituzioni del federalismo*, n. 1 , 75-86

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 10.Processes of federalization and decentralization

Soss Joe, Fording Richard C. , Schram Sanford F.

The Color of Devolution: Race, Federalism, and the Politics of Social Control

in *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 52, Issue 3 , 536-553

In this article, we seek to advance scholarship on the origins and consequences of policy devolution by analyzing state decisions to give local authorities control over welfare policy. The first part of our analysis explores the political forces that systematically influence state decisions to cede policy control to lower-level jurisdictions. In this context, we propose a general Racial Classification Model of how race influences social policy choice. Our findings support this model as well as social control perspectives on welfare provision. Building on these results, we then show how modest but consistent racial effects on policy choices concatenate to produce large disparities in the overall policy regimes that racial groups encounter in the federal system. The empirical findings illuminate the fundamental role that federalism plays in the production of contemporary racial disparities and in the recent turn toward neoliberal and paternalist policies in American poverty governance.

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Ziller Jacques

The Delocalisation Issue in France and in a European Union Perspective

in *Regioni (Le)*, n. 1 , 25-52

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

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Smith, Benjamin

The Origins of Regional Autonomy in Indonesia

in *Journal of East Asian Studies* , Volume 8 Number 2 May-August , 211-234

This article argues that, in contrast with prevalent choice-theoretic accounts of institutional origins in new democracies, the passage of Indonesia's regional autonomy laws in 1999 took place despite the interests of powerful political actors rather than because of them. Lacking the past experience to calculate retrospectively the likely electoral payoff from supporting an effort to devolve political power to Indonesia's city and regency governments, New Order-era political elites in Jakarta gambled on the advice of a team of experts. The experts assured them that supporting the effort would give them strong and salient reformist credentials on the eve of free elections. The conclusion of the article suggests that the political origins of regional autonomy in Indonesia have broad implications for the understanding of institutional genesis in new democracies, and that the potential impact of expert advisers is a fruitful focus of future research.

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D'Atena, Antonio

Un senato 'federale' a proposito di una recente proposta parlamentare.

in *Rassegna parlamentare*, n. 1 , 243-248

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 10. Processes of federalization and decentralization

Bin Roberto

"Regionalismo differenziato" e utilizzazione dell'art. 116, terzo comma, Cost. Alcune tesi per aprire il dibattito

in *Istituzioni del federalismo*, n. 1 , 9-20

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system

Malone David M.

An Evolving Security Council

in *Indian Journal of International Law*, volume 47 , issue 4 , 594-615

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system



Saliu Hassan, Omotola Shola

Can Nigeria get a UN Security Council seat?

in *South African Journal of International Affairs* , n. 1, vol. 15, June , 71-85

ABSTRACT: This paper analyses the prospects and problems of Nigeria's aspiration for a seat on an enlarged UN Security Council. Some of the factors that strengthen the country's candidacy include its past experience, e.g. its service as a non-permanent member of the Security Council for three terms, its impressive peacekeeping profile at multilateral and bilateral levels, and its unparalleled African leadership role. The return of the country to the path of democracy after years of successive military regimes has also increased its legitimacy in international affairs. If these credentials are to yield the desired result, the country must contend with the worsening state of national security, the slow pace of economic recovery despite ongoing reforms, the challenges posed by other serious African contenders particularly Egypt and South Africa, and Nigeria's continuing image problem, despite advances in the struggle to address it. This is the paradox for Nigeria's candidacy of the Security Council Seat. The paper concludes with recommendations to address these challenges.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system

Brauch Hans Günter

Conceptualising the environmental dimension of human security in the UN

in *International Social Science Journal* , Volume 59, Issue s1, September 2008 , 19-48

Peace and security are goals of the UN Charter. In 2005, Kofi Annan addressed three pillars of human security: freedom from want, freedom from fear and freedom to live in dignity. This chapter examines two conceptual discussions on human and environmental security in the social sciences and in the UN system, and considers conceptual linkages for a people-centred environmental security concept and the environmental dimension of human security. It assesses the environmental challenges for human security posed by climate change, desertification, water, and natural hazards. It concludes that natural hazards pose manifold threats, challenges, vulnerabilities and risks for human, environmental, national and international security. Addressing environmental dangers to security requires a combination of strategic instruments and policies to reduce the vulnerability to hazards and the risks for affected societal groups. This requires a dual strategy for dealing with the short-term situational impact of extreme weather events and natural hazards and long-term structural impacts of global environmental change.

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Cofelice Andrea

Consiglio Diritti Umani delle Nazioni Unite: tendenze e prospettive del «cantiere di riforme» sulle procedure e sui meccanismi di promozione e protezione dei diritti umani

in *Pace Diritti Umani*, n. 2, anno 4, maggio-agosto

ABSTRACT: The United Nations General Assembly's Resolution 60/251 asked the new-born Human Rights Council both to develop the modalities for the universal periodic review of the fulfilment by each state of its human rights



obligations (par. 5), and to review and, where necessary, improve and rationalise all mandates, mechanisms, functions and responsibilities of the Commission on Human Rights, in order to maintain a system of special procedures, expert advice and complaint procedure (par. 6).

Accordingly, the Council established, since its first session, several working groups in order to accomplish with this mandate. Nevertheless, a thorough analysis of the discussions inside each working group, characterised by a deep divergence among different groups of states on a number of sensible knots, allow to rise doubts about the real consistency between the possible final result of the negotiations and the criteria of rationalisation and efficiency set out in Resolution 60/251. Particularly worrying is the behaviour of certain states that seem determined to take profit from this reform phase to put all the mechanisms and mandates for promotion and protection of human rights under a strict intergovernmental control.

During its fifth plenary session (11-18 June 2007), the Council reached a consensus over an organic reform project, approving without voting Resolution A/HRC/RES/5/1 «Institution-Building of the United Nations Human Rights Council». Even though this text does not definitely conclude the institution-building phase, it is time for the Council to demonstrate to be able to deliver on the expectations it has raised amongst victims of human rights violations.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system

Thym Daniel

Die Europäische Union in den Vereinten Nationen - Der Vertrag von Lissabon fördert Kohärenz und Sichtbarkeit

in **Vereinte Nationen**, issue 3, vol. 56 , 121-126

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system

Benedek Wolfgang

Human security and human rights interaction

in **International Social Science Journal** , Volume 59, Issue s1, September 2008 , 7-17

This contribution analyses the interaction of human rights and human security. First, the author explains the emergence and conceptualisation of human security. By taking into account the actions on both research and policy levels and the human security initiatives by international organisations, such as UNESCO, by governments, NGOs and academia, the contribution sheds light on the potential of a multilayered and multi-player approach to human security. In a second step the author identifies the interrelation and interdependence of human security and human rights. The results of this more theoretical part are then empirically tested in a case study on the interaction of human security and human rights, with a particular focus on the implementation of a human security approach to the right of education. Further, the contribution identifies human security-related best practices. The conclusion argues that, in light of the interdependence of human rights and human security a more holistic and integrative approach is necessary. Their international dimension needs to be complemented by a local focus on human security and human rights. An important step towards this goal is the integration, by states, of human security in national human rights learning curricula.



Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system

Stewart Ngozi F.

**International Protection of Human Rights: The United Nations System
in International Journal of Human Rights (The), Volume 12, Issue 1 , 89-105**

Amid the threat of nuclear war and seemingly endless regional conflicts, peacekeeping has become an overriding concern of the UN. In the process, its activities have emerged as the most visible role associated with the world organisation. The UN is however, much more than a peacekeeper and forum for conflict resolution. Often without attracting attention, the UN and its family of agencies are engaged in a vast array of work that touches every aspect of people's lives and the world. The focus of this paper is on the UN system of protection of human rights. The achievements of the UN notwithstanding, there remain certain loopholes which must be filled especially with respect to its enforcement mechanisms. An attempt has been made in this paper to identify those loopholes and proffer recommendations, which, in the light of certain 'die-hard' human rights violations, are imperative.

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Däubler-Gmelin Herta

**Internationaler Staatsgerichtshof: Erfolge und Defizite. Zum zehnten Jahrestag des römischen Statuts
in Blätter für deutsche & internationale Politik, Juli, 2008 , 78-84**

Vor zehn Jahren wurde in Rom die Gründung des ständigen Internationalen Strafgerichtshofs (IStGH) beschlossen. Dessen „Römisches Statut“ trat am 1. Juli 2002 in Kraft; im Frühjahr 2003 konnte das Gericht seine Arbeit aufnehmen. Damit erfüllte sich eine Forderung, die schon 1872 Gustave Moynier, damaliger Präsident des Internationalen Roten Kreuzes, als notwendige Voraussetzung der Befolgung völkerrechtlicher Konventionen formuliert hatte: Er plädierte für einen ständigen ...

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Couzigou Irène

**La lutte du Conseil de sécurité contre le terrorisme international et les droits de l'homme
in Revue générale de droit international publique, Vol. 112, n. 1 , 49-84**

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system

Johnstone Ian

**Legislation and Adjudication in the UN Security Council: Bringing Down the Deliberative Deficit
in American journal of international law, Vol. 102 , n. 2 , 275-308**



No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system

Hurd Ian

Myths of Membership: The Politics of Legitimation in UN Security Council Reform

in Global Governance, vol. 14, n. 2, april-june , 199.218

ABSTRACT: The need to expand the UN Security Council is usually justified as necessary to update Council membership in light of changes in world politics. The mismatch between the existing membership and the increasingly diverse population of states is said to delegitimize the Council. This rests on an implicit hypothesis about the source of institutional legitimacy.

This article surveys reform proposals and finds five distinct claims about the connection between membership and legitimacy, each of which is either logically inconsistent or empirically implausible. If formal membership is indeed the key to institutional legitimacy, the causal link remains at best indeterminate, and we may have to look elsewhere for a theory of legitimation. We must also look for explanations for why the language of legitimation is so prevalent in the rhetoric of Council reform.

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Lagrange Philippe

Responsabilité des Etats pour actes accomplis en application du Chapitre VII de la Charte des Nations Unies

in Revue générale de droit international publique, Vol. 112, n. 1 , 85-110

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system

Chataway Teresa

Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and the Darfur Hecatombe

in Federalist Debate (The), Year XXI, n. 2, July , 21-25

Darfur is a highly complex political and social context, and is often referred to as a 'human-made' disaster. It is the epicentre of three overlapping circles of an internal armed conflict. First, a war commenced between the Sudanese government in Khartoum and two armed resistance groups, the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). Second, there was a proxy war between Sudan and Chad, with each country hosting and supporting the other's rebel groups. Third, localised conflicts are primarily based on land tensions between sedentary and nomadic tribes.

This conflict originally began in August 2002, when Sudan deployed its armed forces to try to control the insurgency. The operation extended until February 2003 but was unsuccessful. In April 2003, the rebel forces attacked the airport at Al Fashir (North Darfur), inflicting heavy losses on the government. Subsequently, the government ceased peace



negotiations with the rebels, recruited a large number of militia (Janjaweed) and embarked on a full-scale counter-insurgency operation or so-termed 'scorched-earth campaign' that also resulted in 'cultural genocide'.

Of a population of six million, more than 1.5 million persons were displaced; in excess of 200,000 crossed the border into the remote, barren regions of Eastern Chad. Thousands saw their families killed, abducted, abused or raped. Estimates vary, but over 50,000 died.

Incursions by the Janjaweed on Darfur's black African tribes have been regarded as genocide. But 'the international community ignored Darfur for too long, letting it rage out of control'. Only belatedly did the conflict attract international attention. Both the Security Council and General Assembly have been criticised for their position of condoning inaction.

To date, conditions for the displaced Darfurians remain appalling. Lack of food and incessant rains drastically increased the threat of water-borne diseases. Many roads became impassable, and aid distribution was severely hindered. Many relief workers were murdered. In certain areas, air lifts of food and medical supplies were the only means of support. Relief organisations such as Oxfam joined many communities to assist in the struggle against the spread of disease and improve the minimal conditions of survival.

In July and August 2003, Sudan's armed forces together with the Janjaweed attacked the towns of Kodoom, Bindisi and Mukjar. Shortly afterwards, the government and the rebel groups signed a peace agreement in Abeche. However, the rebels continued, and increased, their attacks against the government. The armed forces and Janjaweed resumed military operations, and in December 2003 attacked Arawala (West Darfur). The government blocked the main crossings into Chad, stopped its attacks in West Darfur and in January 2004 concluded all major military operations. After losing control of North and West Darfur, the rebels shifted their action to the South. Sudanese Armed Forces attacked a rebel base in the Sindu Hills, causing residents to flee to Mukjar. The town was subsequently attacked by both the armed forces and Janjaweed. They allegedly killed or tortured dozens of civilians, destroyed private and public property, and pillaged livestock, crops and goods.

The African Union acted as a mediator, and troops from Nigeria and Rwanda were sent to Sudan as members of an African Union peacekeeping force. In April 2004, the government and the rebels signed a ceasefire agreement. However, the rebels continued their attacks in South Darfur, prompting the government to engage in another military operation in December 2004. With the distinct possibility of peace talks breaking down, the United States pressured the Security Council and General Assembly to provide a greater lead to a settlement outline. On 18 September 2004, Security Council Resolution 1564 alleviated the suffering of the Darfurians, particularly through the assistance and document verification provided by African Union personnel. However, that document lacked substance, except for the recommendation that the Secretary-General be authorised to 'rapidly establish an international commission of inquiry to investigate reports of violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law in Darfur, and whether acts of genocide have occurred'.

The threat of sanctions remained if Sudan did not observe this Resolution, or failed to cooperate with the African Union Monitoring Mission in Darfur. No mention was made of humanitarian intervention principles. Rather, this Resolution reaffirmed the UN's commitment to the sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity and independence of Sudan. Khartoum argued that the more outside pressure was applied on it at this sensitive time, the more likely it was to be counterproductive. The wording of the Resolution may suggest that Khartoum's argument was attractive to states, and this in part explains the Security Council's cautious action and world leaders' ambivalence.



Excerpts from Security Council Members' Statements on Security Council Resolution 1564 relating to R2P and Darfur are relevant: 'the situation is totally unacceptable as regards the renewed commitment of the UN in favour of human dignity'; 'there is a need for further and unequivocal actions by the Government of Sudan in carrying out its primary responsibility to extend protection and security to the civilian population'; 'A State has the responsibility to protect its citizens, and, if it is unable or unwilling to do so, the international community - the Security Council - has the moral and legal authority to enable that State to assume that responsibility'; 'there should be no moral hesitation in the Council in taking up its responsibilities'; 'The Security Council cannot neglect its responsibilities'; 'the pressure of the international community has been chiefly responsible for this progress'; 'to protect the people of Darfur, who have been suffering terribly and in a way that is unique in the tragedies of the world today'. A terminology shift has occurred here, with an increased use of the terms 'responsibility' and 'protect' and 'pressure from the international community'. Arguably the statements accord with the definition of state practice in the diffusion stage of the lifecycle of the R2P norm.

However, placing human dignity at the centre of the UN's agenda remains a slow, deliberative process. This could well be expedited as the potential utility of the emerging norm becomes more globally understood, and gains widespread acceptance by the international community. Currently, significant pressure from civil society on some of the major states to exercise their obligation is mounting. Additionally, with Security Council Resolution 1706, the concerted efforts of the World Federalist Movement, Global Policy Forum and Africa Action, the considerable recent literature developed by Evans¹⁰² and academic commentators, the renewed sense of legal obligation necessary to implement the R2P norm is strengthening.

The newly appointed UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon visited Sudan, and stated he had established a position of trust with Sudan's President Bashir. The Secretary-General anticipated his support in the current negotiation process to establish the combined African Union-UN hybrid protection force. In his report to the Security Council on Sudan, he contends that 'the paramount goal for international complementary efforts in the areas of security, political and humanitarian assistance must be to stabilize Darfur sufficiently so that its residents are able to participate in the 2009 midterm elections along with the rest of the country'.

On a positive note, in April 2007 Sudan announced it would allow 3,000 international peacekeepers into Darfur. Some observers contend that Sudan's decision reflects China's increased influence on Khartoum to respond to growing pressures from the international community. The threat of UN sanctions may also have contributed. In addition, there are the arrest warrants issued by the ICC (2 May 2007) for Sudan's Humanitarian Affairs Minister Ahmad Arun and the Janjaweed 'colonel of colonels' Ali Kushayb, who allegedly are 'criminally responsible' for war crimes and crimes against humanity. These warrants list 51 counts for each accused, which include persecution, murder and attacks against civilians, forcible transfer, rape, pillaging, destruction of property, inhumane acts, imprisonment and torture.

The persistence and intractability of this harsh conflict has generated developments which continue to impact on vulnerable civilians. Various initiatives to stabilise the country, and build an effective peace process, have failed. Despite the numerous appeals for urgent action, there is yet no coordinated effort by all the relevant parties to address first and foremost the protection of civilians, or related issues such as power-sharing, wealth, individual compensation and disarmament of the Janjaweed militia, or complex questions concerned with justice. The latter include questions about punitive measures and sanctions for the perpetrators of human rights violations. The current position is that 'with the right policies and increased levels of engagement on the issue, there is potential for Darfur to stabilize within a year. If not, it is almost a foregone conclusion that hundreds of thousands more will be killed on our watch in 2007'.

On the ground, the protagonists are facing the enforcement of Security Council Resolutions 1674 and 1706. Recent



international law developments are relevant to Darfur. The ruling by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the *Bosnia v Serbia* case states that, in principle, states can be held responsible for genocide. The ICJ ruling reaffirms the important distinction between ethnic cleansing and the ultimate crime, genocide. The finding that Serbia failed to prevent and to punish genocide is quite significant because it is the first time in history that an international court has judged a state legally responsible for violating the Genocide Convention. The potential remains for Sudan to be judged responsible for genocide, notwithstanding that such responsibility is extremely difficult to prove as intentional performance by a specific state.

Although there are some clear signs of acceptance of the emerging norm of R2P across all levels of society, its operationalisation still depends largely on the international community grasping the opportunity to redress its failed obligation towards the people of Darfur.

Progress towards a political settlement of the situation in Sudan, including implementation of the United Nations-African Union peacekeeping mission (UNAMID), has been abysmally slow and inconsistent. Darfur remains a litmus test for the new international norm of R2P. The situation has deteriorated due to a proliferation of armed groups, rebel divisions, and escalation of the proxy war between Sudan and Chad. Emerging data over the past year reveal an even grimmer picture for Darfurians who continue to suffer human rights abuses, sexual violence and internal displacement. Recent attacks on humanitarian workers and food convoys are highlighting the growing malnutrition, and increased mortality levels. Two compelling examples are: on internal displacement, a key finding by the Norwegian Refugee Council states that currently Sudan is the country with the highest numbers of IDPs, and on mortality levels, the UN estimates that besides the 200,000 deaths in 2005, an additional 110,000 died during the last two years.

Sudan's unwillingness to address its poor and highly centralised governance, and procrastination in fulfilling its commitment to protect civilians is a clear case that demands a more sustained reaction by the Security Council and the international community. The ruling National Congress Party (NCP) is determined to maintain power and is deferring the agenda for reforms stipulated in the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The CPA is crucial both for its provisions of significant governmental reforms, and democratisation process leading to the 2009 elections. Implementation of the CPA, however, has been hampered in two ways: by the NCP, which continues to undermine those provisions at the national level, and by the southern-based Sudan People's Liberation Movement's uneven process due to its internal divisions and capacity issues. A BBC programme termed the situation 'All talk and no action'. Essentially, the USA, Russia and China are backsliding in their support for UNAMID not only with regard to the contribution of troops, but also with infrastructure, ground transport, helicopters, and other technical equipment. The hybrid force, which took over from the African Union on 31 December 2007, was to be 26,000-strong but to-date only around 9,000 peacekeepers and soldiers are on the ground. Despite the logistical and security difficulties, peacekeepers have resumed their night patrols, and with the improved security Darfurians are gradually gaining confidence in the mission.

From January to March there was an upsurge in violence in West Darfur as government forces carried out a series of coordinated attacks using aerial bombardments and ground forces in an attempt to clear the area of rebel fighters. However, according to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights' report of 20 March 2008, the offensives in January and February in the area north of el-Geneina and the villages of Saraf Jidad, Sirba, Silea and Abu Suruj caused severe losses of civilians and indispensable property. Moreover, consistent information gathered by UNAMID Human Rights Officers indicated that such actions, which failed to distinguish between civilian objects and military objectives, violated the principle of distinction under International Humanitarian Law. Another issue with both political and economic ramifications that needs to be resolved is the contested area of Abyei, which comprises significant oil fields. Regardless



of the remaining reserves, Abyei will retain its importance because of the pipeline infrastructure. The proposed referendum in 2011 aims to establish whether the Abyei district decides to join what might then be an independent South.

With regard to international justice, the government of Sudan has perpetuated an environment of impunity for crimes in Darfur. It is one year since the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued arrest warrants against Ahmad Harun and Ali Kushayb, but they are both still free in Sudan. Harun was promoted to State Minister for Humanitarian Affairs, and Kushayb, who was in custody for other charges in Sudan, was released. To date the Sudanese government has adopted a defiant stance towards the Court and the international community, and shown a blatant disregard for the authority of the Security Council. Khartoum refuses to comply with SC Resolution 1593, and surrender the two indicted criminals for prosecution by the ICC. Significantly, during April 2008 with the approaching anniversary of the warrants issuance, many human rights organisations and NGOs have mobilised jointly under the banner of Justice for Darfur (www.justice4darfur.org). They are sending an urgent call to the UN Security Council, regional organisations and individual governments to confront Sudan over the alleged war criminals and secure their surrender to the ICC. The appeal is also supported by the European Union, two former justice ministers (UK, Canada) and two former chief prosecutors for the International Criminal Tribunals (Yugoslavia, Rwanda).

Clearly the strategy of threats without imposing them is both inadequate and counter-productive. This is so both for the suffering Darfurians, and for the credibility of the international community. The Security Council must provide greater leadership now available through the operationalisation of the R2P norm. Accordingly, the international community needs to redouble its efforts in countering Khartoum's persistent hostility and defiance by addressing the Darfur conflict in the broader context of Sudan. The recent international impetus indicates an exigency for concerted action by the UN, the international community, other actors, such as the European Commission, and even by appointing a single, empowered mediator with the leverage of major states, to achieve the following outcomes:

- ´ Protection for civilians through a full and appropriately resourced deployment of UNAMID.
- ´ Unrestrained humanitarian access to alleviate hunger and reduce mortality.
- ´ Accountability for human rights abuses, and guarantee of safe-return of IDPs.
- ´ Implementation of the CPA to resolve the underlying political and economic issues in Sudan, and thus facilitating the democratisation process in the whole country.

*First appeared as 'Towards Normative Consensus on Responsibility to Protect' in the Griffith Law Review (2007) vol. 16 no. 1 pp. 193-224 (accessible via <http://www.informit.com.au/plustext.html> ISSN1038-3441). The Federalist Debate thanks Griffith University and the journal for their kind permission to republish the above section on Darfur, now updated by the author.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system

Edwards Martin, Scott Kevin, Allen Susan Annah, Irvin Kate

Sins of Commission? Understanding Membership Patterns on the United Nations Human Rights Commission in Political Research Quarterly, n. 3, vol. 61, september , 390-402

ABSTRACT: A prominent liberal explanation for why states join international organizations is to advance norms that such organizations represent. The authors examine the patterns of membership on the now-defunct United Nations



Human Rights Commission (now the UN Human Rights Council). In regions where democratic norms did not hold sway, members were elected to degrade human rights norms. Illiberal states sought seats to shield themselves or neighbors from censure by the Commission. As regions became more democratic, it became harder for states with poor records to be elected and easier for states with better human rights records to be elected.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system

Holland Martin

The EU and the Global Development Agenda

in *Journal of European Integration*, Volume 30, Number 3 / July , 343-362

At the turn of the twenty-first century the international community began to construct a new agenda to address growing global inequalities. The European Union has been a core partner in this movement, which has involved the UN, the World Bank, the IMF, the G8 as well as international activists, such as Bob Geldhof and Bono and the "Make Poverty History" campaign. This article examines the EU's connection to this wider global governance development agenda, particularly in relation to the UN's Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), Africa, Official Development Assistance, debt reduction and untied aid. It explores the link between EU development policy and that of the international community and questions whether the impact is enhanced by complementarity or reduced due to duplication and competition.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system

EI-Masri Samar

The Hariri Tribunal: Politics and International Law

in *Middle East Policy*, Volume 15, Issue 3, Fall , 80-92

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system

Jacobs Dov, Arajärvi Noora

The International Criminal Court

in *Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals (The)*, vol. 7, n. 1 , 115-160

ABSTRACT: This article covers the past two years of the activity of the International Criminal Court. Ten years after the signature of the Rome Statute, the Court has continued investigating situations in four countries (Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, the Sudan and the Central African Republic). The activity of the Court has accelerated, with four indictees in custody in the DRC situation, one public arrest warrant in the CAR situation and two in the Sudan situation. The Court has developed its case law on victim participation and refined its procedural framework, through constant debate between the Prosecutor and the pre-trial chambers. It has also pursued its goal of increasing cooperation with State parties, and raising awareness of the Court through outreach programs. The Court faces difficult challenges in establishing itself as a credible court, balancing the necessary requirements of fairness in a criminal trial and the high expectations of victims and the international community. The recent stay of proceedings and granting of release in the



Lubanga case, which is supposed to be the first trial of the Court, is an illustration of this challenge and the difficulty in finding this balance.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system

Mugraby Muhamad

The Syndrome of One-Time Exceptions and the Drive to Establish the Proposed Hariri Court in Mediterranean Politics, Volume 13, Issue 2, July , 171-194

Based on Lebanese and international juridical sources and the author's long experience in the Lebanese legal system, this article questions the exclusive focus on the murder of Hariri in the ongoing drive to find and try suspects by a special quasi-international court under the aegis of the UN Security Council. It historicizes the judicial procedures for dealing with political crimes in Lebanon and argues that while sincere adoption of universal justice is highly desirable in principle, universal jurisdiction should supplement, and not replace, local judicial systems. The Hariri Tribunal is problematic because it restricts prosecution to Hariri and a small number of related victims. Instead, the paper argues that a more potent and general form of universal jurisdiction should be made available through a combination of Lebanese judicial reform and the creation of an international human rights tribunal with the right of appeal from local courts.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system

Abass Ademola

The United Nations, the African Union and the Darfur crisis: of apology and utopia in Netherlands International Law Review, Vol. 54, issue 3 , 415-440

The United Nations and African Union agreed, late 2006, on conducting a hybrid operation in Darfur, in a remarkable turnaround from the UN's quest to deploy an autonomous force, which, it was anticipated, would take over the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS). This agreement was formalised by Resolution 1769 adopted on 31 July 2007, establishing the United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). In addition to discussing the various implications of the proposed hybrid operation on the law of peacekeeping and collective security law, this article examines the individual response of the AU and UN to the crisis. It investigates the factors that dictated the AMIS's tepid mandate, and argues that the UN's quest for the Sudan's consent, as a precondition for deploying UNAMID was unnecessary, and that the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS)'s original mandate provides a solid legal basis for enforcing the will of the international community in Darfur.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system

Liivoja Rain

The scope of the supremacy clause of the United Nations Charter in International and Comparative Law Quarterly, n. 3, vol. 57, july , 583-612



ABSTRACT: Article 103 of the United Nations (UN) Charter stipulates that the obligations of UN Member States under the Charter prevail, in the event of a conflict, over their obligations under any other international agreement. While this important provision is often mentioned, its precise meaning remains something of a mystery. The present article tries to shed some light on the scope of this 'supremacy clause' by discussing, first, its operation with respect to treaties, and then by looking at its relevance to various other contractual arrangements and to customary international law.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system

Owen Taylor

The uncertain future of human security in the UN

in *International Social Science Journal* , Volume 59, Issue s1, September 2008 , 113-127

Since its original articulation in the 1994 Human Development Report, the concept of human security has been widely used to understand and address post-Cold War threats to international peace and security. However, a review of policy documents using the concept in the United Nations (UN) system finds that human security is at risk of disappearing from the organisational landscape. I argue that this is a result of three interrelated problems with the way human security has been used—the failure to distinguish clearly between the concept and practice of human development and of human security, a lack of differentiation between human rights and human security and a lack of attention to the perils of conceptual overstretch. Two possible solutions are discussed. First, a narrow definition of human security as freedom from organised violence is reviewed and critiqued. Second, a threshold-based conceptualisation of threats to human security is defined and used to address the three problems with the use of human security in the UN system. The chapter concludes that the narrow definition of human security is unnecessarily restrictive, leaving out too many relevant threats, and that the UN system is uniquely positioned to actualise a broad threshold-based conceptualisation.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system

Hastrup Anders

Violating Darfur: The Emergent Truth of Categories

in *Mediterranean Politics*, Volume 13, Issue 2, July , 195-212

The article explores how various institutions and individuals have compiled facts and accounted for the truths about Darfur, with a focus on the referral of named individuals to the International Criminal Court in The Hague. Collecting evidence for the use in the ICC in The Hague is an exercise of translating local events in Darfur to an international vocabulary of judgment and justice. The referral makes the crisis transcend locality and become the responsibility of the international community. By providing a deeper semantic analysis of the meanings associated with international justice, the article explores how it is possible for a local series of atrocities in a remote corner of the Arab world to be recast in the moral vocabulary of a Western judicial system.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system



Zaru Davide

Which Role for the Expected Human Rights Council Expert Advice Mechanism in the Framework of the Reforming United Nations Human Rights System?

in *Pace Diritti Umani*, n. 3, anno 3, settembre-dicembre

ABSTRACT: Il dibattito sullo status, la composizione, il mandato e le modalità di lavoro dell'organo o sistema che potrebbe sostituire la Sotto-Commissione delle Nazioni Unite per la protezione e promozione dei diritti umani costituisce uno degli aspetti più delicati del negoziato relativo alla piena definizione del ruolo e della procedura del Consiglio diritti umani delle Nazioni Unite, processo che – secondo il dettato della Risoluzione dell'Assemblea Generale istitutiva del Consiglio – dovrebbe giungere a dei risultati concreti entro il prossimo 18 giugno 2007. Si ricava una simile conclusione considerando anzitutto l'alto livello di partecipazione e la vivacità degli interventi in seno al Gruppo di lavoro del Consiglio ad hoc sulle cosiddette questioni istituzionali, con riferimento pertanto ai temi della composizione del nuovo sistema di esperti e della procedura di nomina dei suoi membri, questioni evidentemente legate al controllo e all'orientamento politico complessivo da parte del Consiglio sulle sue Procedure speciali e sui suoi eventuali organi sussidiari/funzionali. Ma soprattutto, si rifletta sulle implicazioni per l'intero sistema diritti umani delle Nazioni Unite dell'eventuale successo di tre proposte – formulate dalla Sotto-Commissione nella sua sessione conclusiva tenutasi a Ginevra nell'agosto 2006 – che in particolare innoverebbero il ruolo del previsto meccanismo di assistenza tecnica: 1) la partecipazione dei suoi esperti al processo di Revisione periodica universale (Universal Periodic Review); 2) l'assunzione da parte del sistema di esperti di uno specifico compito di promozione della coerenza nelle attività delle diverse componenti della machinery onusiana dei diritti umani; 3) il configurarsi del nuovo meccanismo di esperti come tramite e collegamento naturale tra i sistemi nazionali per la tutela e promozione dei diritti umani e il sistema universale. Una volta richiamato il significativo ruolo di standard setting e di promozione dei diritti umani svolto dalla Sotto-Commissione nella sua sessantennale attività, il presente contributo si propone quindi di illustrare le posizioni assunte dai diversi attori partecipanti all'esercizio negoziale in parola e di esaminare criticamente le principali proposte di compromesso sino ad ora formalizzate. In conclusione, facendo riferimento al riemergere di posizioni a favore della valorizzazione delle componenti sopra-nazionali del sistema dei diritti umani delle Nazioni Unite, l'autore riflette sulla possibilità e l'eventuale convenienza di istituire un organo collegiale di esperti del Consiglio, analogo alla Commissione di diritto internazionale delle Nazioni Unite, il quale presenti necessariamente un profilo altamente operativo e orientato all'azione.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Iozzo Alfonso

A European Initiative for the International Financial Crisis

in *Federalist Debate (The)*, Year XXI, n. 2, July, 4-6

Globalization has brought about a radical change in the balance of power in the world and in particular it has broken down the "bronze law" that gave 20 percent of world population the use of 80 percent of world resources. Such changes are comparable to the events of the industrial revolution that, after many battles and convulsive phases, resulted in the downfall of the "bronze law" that linked salaries to the minimum survival level.

Similarly the redistribution of international power due to globalization will trigger convulsive phases and confrontations which, if a transitional solution cannot be found, will also lead to conflict and even violence, thereby bringing the process to a stop and sucking the world back to the dark times of autarky and exaggerated nationalism, such as occurred in the years following 1914.



Europe has the ability but also the duty to launch a process aimed at bringing globalization under control, by creating international federal institutions able to negotiate and agree the rules necessary to guarantee a smooth transition to a new world order, and also to ensure that those agreements are respected. The EU must propose an international plan to establish such common rules and practices throughout international institutions dealing with monetary, environmental, energy and agricultural issues; and also to provide the necessary tools for economic and social solidarity to go alongside the creation of an international market. This will bring WTO policies more closely in line with those of the European Community which - together with the creation of the common market - has instituted regional and social funds, and a cohesion policy.

In two of the above mentioned fields Europe has attained its set objectives: food self-sufficiency through the common agricultural policy and monetary unification via the single currency, which guarantees a single market. However, in the energy and environmental sectors the EU has achieved no more than limited and partial results. Only now is it beginning to construct the institutions necessary to fulfil its repeatedly proposed objectives. If the Delors Plan had been activated as originally planned, and in particular the introduction of a Carbon Tax - a proposal which was approved by all member states except Great Britain that blocked it by using its power of veto - the EU today would be far better prepared to contribute to the launch of a truly international environmental policy.

The EU should demand the foundation of an international "Community" for environment and energy able to concentrate research for new energy sources at an international level and endowed with some of the competences allotted to the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), which could be considered as a prototype supranational agency in the environmental and energy sectors. For example, the ECSC could impose taxes on the use of coal and raise loans to finance the re-conversion of the steel industry, the main consumer of this energy source.

The food crisis urgently requires the establishment of a world agricultural policy in order to develop and stabilize production. A renewal of the initiatives activated by the first associative agreements with the African states (using the stabilization funds provided at the time) is an example of how to create a true international market for agricultural products that exploits the productive capabilities of the various continents, making the same products available on a worldwide scale, and thus covering the gaps left by the WTO, and giving the FAO a genuine role.

It is in the monetary sector that the redistribution of international power can give rise to the most acute convulsions. The most effective tool available to any individual state's government is the currency manoeuvre. This enables it to bend globalisation to its own advantage, thus permitting it to avoid paying the price of the redistribution of economic power in progress internationally.

Firstly, while it would be difficult to promote explicit protectionist policies, governments can resort to competitive devaluations which can trigger a real "monetary war". Such a "beggar my neighbour" approach could ultimately lead to the breaking up of the market and a retreat to openly autarkic policies.

However, such a strategy is possible only for economies of notable dimensions, such as that of the United States. It would not be feasible in the EU whose reason for existence is founded on international openness and its promotion at world level.

Secondly, a country whose currency has a wide international circulation, and whose relevant net debt is expressed in that currency, can manoeuvre to export the cost of the inflation created; for just as a state can impose an arcane tax on the owners of its public debt, so a country whose currency is utilised as an international currency can impose such a tax on other countries, thereby effectively reducing the value of their financial assets.

This policy finds its limit in the amount of financial activity with "real" negative earnings that the debtor is prepared to accept. The European states had to stop imposing an "inflation" tax when the opening up of the markets permitted investors to invest in the stable currencies of other countries.

With the creation and success of the European monetary policy, the American dollar-monopoly hit a crisis, for the trend of the states investing in that currency then moving towards diversification in more stable currencies such as the euro became unstoppable.



The beginning of a currency war by the American Federal Reserve is a one-way street with no exit. A monetary war can only temporarily stem the crisis, and in so doing would only make the problem worse. But Europe, having now established full "federal" unity on a monetary basis, now has the responsibility and duty - and indeed is prompted by its own self-interest - to propose a solution to the United States which would enable the management of the transition towards a new distribution of power throughout the world.

Important sectors of European public opinion, of which the main voice is that of France and its President, are requesting the adoption of an analogous reduction of interest rates in reply to the FED policy. But this is wrong. It would not solve the problem and could only cause the importation into Europe of inflation created in America.

It is sufficient to consider that, given that the objective of the exercise is to maintain the cost of the dollar at a low rate in order to export inflation, if the ECB were to follow the FED in reducing interest rates then the FED would lower its rates once again. America would thus no longer need to fear that dollar investors would move into euros for by re-establishing the supremacy of their own currency internationally the USA would be able to continue to finance their deficit "without tears".

If, therefore, the ECB is correct in not participating in this monetary war (in which it would be the inevitable loser) then Europe must at least address the problem of exchange rates. It is in the general interest that Europe and the Asian countries continue to develop commercial exchanges, but this "common market" cannot be undermined by monetary policies. Europe may accept overtures from Asia but, in exchange, the Asian countries must stabilise their own currencies in relation to the euro.

Countries that are net holders of international financial assets (such as some in Asia, or the Arabian oil producing countries) would then have an interest in having a stable currency as a reference point in order to guarantee the value of their investments.

The conditions already exist to proceed towards a profound reorganization of the international monetary system to guarantee the balanced development of globalisation. The list of countries interested in creating a new international system is long, but only Europe - with the euro - is in a position to take the initiative. However, Europe's objective is not to propose substituting the euro for the dollar, but to put the stability of the euro at the disposal of the international community and to construct democratic monetary institutions. The time has come to reverse the choice of a hegemonic currency made at Bretton Woods and to rediscover the Keynesian "bancor" plan. This was the way followed in Europe during the process of monetary unification. German political leaders such as Schmidt and Kohl, did not choose the hegemony of the D-Mark, but rather decided to put the stability of the D-Mark at the service of all Europeans.

As regards exchange rates, the European treaties from Maastricht to Lisbon indicate that the European position propounded in the competent institutions and international conferences is decided by the European Council, based on proposals made by the European Commission in accordance with the ECB. In this regard only those states that have adopted the euro can vote. Council members therefore - that is, the participating EU member states' governments - do not need to ask the ECB to give up their solid currency but, on the contrary, to take the initiative - in accordance with the Treaty provisions - to provide the world with a solid currency.

European citizens must ask the EU's political leaders and in particular the President of the European Commission to assume the political initiative. To this end the Union should promote a monetary conference aimed at creating the basis for a new and profoundly renovated international monetary system.

The conference this time should not be held at Bretton Woods, but in Europe, thus taking a first step towards putting into action the statutory provision of the International Monetary Fund which states that the venue should be where there is the highest quota of participation!

If the Union were able both to promote and itself take the first steps on the road to a solid international currency, this would be the clearest demonstration that, if Europeans unite, they can make an enormous contribution to the creation of a more peaceful world. Once this is attained, it would not then be difficult to propose a unification of forces also in the areas of foreign and security policy.



Proposals such as Security Council reform and the bestowal of a seat on the EU, the creation of a Parliamentary Assembly to democratize the UN, with projects to initiate nuclear disarmament to be set up and run under UN control, and the creation of world civil and military "peace-keeping" and "state-building" forces, would then be far more credible. Europeans have not united their strength in order to create a new army to fight other terrible and bloody wars but, as in the case of the single currency, to create common international institutions capable of attaining the state of "perpetual peace" once foreseen by Kant.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Carmody Chios

A Theory of WTO Law

in **Journal of International Economic Law**, Volume 11, Number 3 , 527-557

The creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1994 has left open the question of whether we can identify a theory of its legal system. A theory should help us to better understand what WTO law is as well as what it should be. This article posits the idea that a theory can be identified if we conceive of the WTO Agreement as protecting expectations about trade, facilitating adjustment to realities encountered in trade, and promoting interdependence. Each of these purposes is implemented under the WTO Agreement by a specific instrument. In the case of expectations it is collective obligations, in the case of realities it is individual rights, and in the case of interdependence it is a combination of the foregoing two, a *lex specialis*. The interaction is emblematic of a deeper division within the treaty between opposing modes of law.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Kavass Igor I.

Azerbaijan's Path towards WTO Accession: Political Concerns, Technical Difficulties, National Attitudes (1997-2006). An Essay in the Form of a Country Report

in **Review of Central & East European Law**, vol. 33, n. 3 , 343-384

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

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CMEA's International Investment Bank and the Crisis of Developed Socialism

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In 1971 the Soviet bloc's Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) created the International Investment Bank (IIB). The IIB was part of a broader effort to adopt market-based reforms in all the East-bloc economies. The bank was designed to promote competition for loans and rigorous vetting of projects, ostensibly resulting in greater CMEA integration and production that met world standards of quality. But this scenario ultimately did not pan out. Instead, the IIB became a mere conduit for Western finance, focusing not on high technology but on natural resource extraction,



particularly the construction of the Soyuz natural gas pipeline. More fundamentally, the IIB could not function properly without market-determined prices and convertible currencies. Although economic authorities in the Soviet bloc fully recognized the constraints on the IIB, they were unwilling to abandon fundamental principles of the Soviet economic system.

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Hallaoui Abdelmajid

Crise du consensus à l'OMC : réforme ou dissolution de l'organisation ?

in *Europe en formation (L')*, n. 347, printemps (avril) , 61-77

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Santarius Tilman

Das Elend der WTO. Für eine Neuerfindung des Welthandels

in *Blätter für deutsche & internationale Politik*, Juni, 2008 , 67-75

Das multilaterale Handelssystem steckt derzeit in seiner tiefsten Krise seit Jahrzehnten. Die Probleme wiegen so schwer, dass es nach vielen Jahren äußerst mühsamer Verhandlungen inzwischen fast nebensächlich geworden zu sein scheint, ob das Ende der Doha-Runde der Welthandelsorganisation (WTO) bald offiziell verkündet wird oder die Verhandlungen weiter vor sich hindümpeln.

Denn längst geht es nicht mehr „nur“ um die Doha-Verhandlungsrunde, sondern es ist die WTO selbst, die zur Disposition steht. Zwar treten nach wie vor Länder der WTO bei, und ihre Streitschlichtungsinstanz trägt laufend Handelskonflikte zwischen Mitgliedsländern aus. Doch die Verhandlungen über eine Weiterentwicklung der Handelsregeln sind durch einen grundlegenden Reformstau gekennzeichnet. Seit ihrer Gründung im Jahr 1994 wurde sie immer wieder von einem Stillstand oder Scheitern der Verhandlungen gebeutelt: Die Ministerkonferenzen in Singapur 1996, Genf 1998 und Hongkong 2005 blieben ohne signifikante Ergebnisse, während die Konferenzen in Seattle 1999, Cancún 2003 und die Gespräche am Sitz der WTO in Genf 2006 und erneut 2007 sogar gänzlich scheiterten. Im Rückblick erscheinen daher gar nicht mehr die Fehlschläge, sondern eher die einmaligen Erfolge, wie etwa der Beginn der gegenwärtigen Verhandlungsrunde in Doha 2001, typisch zu sein.

Die Krise der WTO hat zwei Ursachen: ein Mangel an Vertrauen und eine ideologische Voreingenommenheit. Ein Mangel an Vertrauen besteht deshalb, weil die Länder des Nordens, namentlich die Triade USA, EU, Japan, seit vielen Jahren den Handel mit zweierlei Maß messen: Sie fordern Freihandel mit den Ländern des Südens und beharren gleichzeitig auf Protektionismus und (im Agrarbereich) auf Subventionen für ihre eigene Wirtschaft. Dabei führen sie die Verhandlungen nicht ohne Heuchelei, da sie stets Armutsreduktion, Entwicklungschancen und Wohlstand für alle versprechen.



Die ideologische Voreingenommenheit wiederum zeigt sich daran, dass das übergeordnete Ziel der Verhandlungen immer noch Freihandel und schieres Wirtschaftswachstum lautet. Dabei wird immer deutlicher erkennbar, wie Strategien eines unreflektierten Wirtschaftswachstums immense soziale und ökologische Probleme mit sich bringen, weil sie die Ausbeutung von lokalen Gemeinschaften und natürlicher Umwelt in Kauf nehmen. Erst wenn die WTO aufhört, einer starren Freihandelsideologie zu folgen, und sich stattdessen den tatsächlichen Problemen stellt, wird sie ihre Krise überwinden; erst wenn sie auf multilateraler Ebene Probleme löst, die dem Gemeinwohl dienen und nicht von Staaten im Alleingang angegangen werden können, wird sie wieder einen Konsens der Staatengemeinschaft über ihren Nutzen erreichen.

Im Folgenden möchte ich fünf besonders dringliche Problemlagen beschreiben, aus denen sich Meilensteine für die Neuerfindung einer multilateralen Handelsorganisation ergeben. Ob ein Umbau der WTO in diese Richtung politisch möglich wäre, ist indes offen.

Menschenrechte vor Marktzugang

Bisher haben die WTO (wie zuvor das GATT), binationale und regionale Freihandelsabkommen sowie die internationalen Finanzinstitutionen Internationaler Währungsfonds (IWF) und Weltbank mit ihren Strukturanpassungsprogrammen allein darauf abgestellt, Handelsbarrieren abzubauen und Märkte zu öffnen. Sie stützen sich dabei auf die ökonomische Theorie, der zufolge Zölle, Quoten und sonstige Marktzugangsbarrieren die Preise auf dem eigenen Markt hoch halten und damit auch ineffiziente Produzenten schützen. Die Liberalisierung des Handels dagegen soll helfen, dass sich auf allen Märkten stets die kostengünstigsten Anbieter durchsetzen. Diese Freihandelsstrategie übersieht, dass jenseits aller ausgeschöpften Effizienzpotentiale ein „Verdrängungshandel“¹ einsetzen kann, der den davon betroffenen Menschen ihre Produktions-, wenn nicht gar Lebensgrundlage entzieht.

Am deutlichsten wird dies beim Handel mit Agrarprodukten. In zahlreichen Ländern des Südens haben Billigimporte von Lebensmitteln die inländische Produktion aus Ackerbau und Viehwirtschaft vom Markt gedrängt und bäuerliche Betriebe in den Ruin getrieben. Indonesien beispielsweise hatte vor rund einem Jahrzehnt noch ein gut funktionierendes Agrarwesen, das weitgehend die Selbstversorgung des Landes garantierte. Durch eine Handelsliberalisierung, die dem Land im Zuge der asiatischen Finanzkrise aufgenötigt wurde, stieg die Gesamteinfuhr von Lebensmitteln stark an, bei Sojabohnen sogar um 50 Prozent. Allein im Bereich der Sojaproduktion haben zwei Millionen Menschen den Sojaanbau aufgeben müssen.²

Es erscheint als selbstverständlich, dass eine dem Gemeinwohl verpflichtete Welthandelsorganisation die Menschenrechte schützt und die Armut bekämpft. Tatsächlich erkennt die WTO noch nicht einmal auf dem Papier den Menschenrechtskanon der Vereinten Nationen an, geschweige denn, dass sie sich ihrer aktiven Umsetzung verpflichtet. Regierungen müssen wieder größeren Handlungsspielraum vis-à-vis der bestehenden internationalen Handelsregeln zurückerlangen, so dass sie Zuströme von Produkten, aber auch Dienstleistungen und Direktinvestitionen kontrollieren können, wenn Existenzrechte und Entwicklungspotentiale auf dem Spiel stehen.³ Denn in der rasanten Globalisierung von heute ist die Importsteuerung für Länder zumeist wichtiger als die Exportförderung. Deshalb muss den Ländern wieder mehr Flexibilität in der Anwendung von Zöllen, Quoten sowie preis- und mengenbasierten Schutzmechanismen eingeräumt werden.

Indes muss auf multilateraler Ebene überwacht werden, dass der größere nationale Handlungsspielraum nicht dazu missbraucht wird, Importe ungerechtfertigt zu diskriminieren. Das ist der Schlichtung von Streitfällen in der WTO schon häufig gelungen. Aber nicht erst im Streitfall, sondern im Regelfall wird eine zukunftsfähige Handelsorganisation über begründete nationale Schutzinteressen wachen, anstatt wie bisher bloß den Interessen der Exporteure zum Durchbruch



zu verhelfen.

Den Marktzugang nachhaltig qualifizieren

Gegenwärtig werden Handelsströme nur nach ihrem monetären Wert, nicht aber nach ihrer ökologischen und sozialen Qualität bewertet; denn in der ökonomischen Theorie gilt, dass die Qualität eines Produkts oder einer Dienstleistung einzig durch den Preis abgebildet wird. Deswegen gilt in der WTO die Regel der sogenannten like products: Gleichartige Produkte dürfen nicht aufgrund eines unterschiedlichen Produktionsverfahrens diskriminiert werden. So dürfen beispielsweise zwei T-Shirts nicht mit unterschiedlichen Zollsätzen oder Importquoten belegt werden, auch wenn eines von ihnen mit Kinderarbeit oder aus einer Baumwolle hergestellt worden ist, deren industrieller Anbau unter hohem Pestizideinsatz Feldarbeiter und Umwelt vergiftet hat.

Ein solch undifferenzierter Handel leistet einem Standortwettbewerb Vorschub, der allein auf niedrige Produktionskosten abhebt. Unternehmen verlagern ihre Herstellung in Länder, wo Löhne, Ressourcenpreise, Umwelt-, Gesundheits- und Sozialstandards am niedrigsten sind, um die Produkte anschließend auf die kaufkräftigen Märkte der transnationalen Konsumentenklasse zu reimportieren. Dabei ist es für sie ein betriebswirtschaftlicher Erfolg, wenn sie die Kosten beispielsweise für die Aufrechterhaltung von Infrastruktur oder für den Erhalt der Umwelt auf die Allgemeinheit abwälzen, also aus ihren Produktionskosten externalisieren. Solange Handelsströme nur nach ihrem Preis und nicht nach ihrer Qualität differenziert werden, wird die Globalisierung für Unternehmen nicht nur eine Strategie sein, die Kombination von Produktionsfaktoren zu optimieren, sondern immer auch eine Externalisierungsstrategie.

Doch schon die gegenwärtige Praxis der WTO kennt Ausnahmen von der „Like-Product“-Regel: Diamanten aus Bürgerkriegsregionen dürfen ebenso wenig gehandelt werden wie Kühlschränke mit dem die Ozonschicht zerstörenden FCKW. Was heute Ausnahme ist, muss zur Regel werden. In der Tat wird der Handel erst dann zum Motor für Ökologie und Gerechtigkeit, wenn eine Differenzierung der Produkte nach ihren Produktionsmethoden vorgenommen wird. Textilien aus Sweatshops, die Rechte von Frauen verletzen, Fleisch aus Tierzuchtfabriken, die Wachstumshormone einsetzen, oder Strom aus fossil betriebenen Kraftwerken, die die Atmosphäre aufheizen – solange der Handel mit solchen Waren und Dienstleistungen nicht gänzlich unterbunden werden kann, muss er finanziell belastet und dafür der Handel mit sozial und ökologisch nachhaltigen Gütern begünstigt werden.

Es muss Ländern gestattet sein, den Zugang zu ihren Märkten an Qualitätskriterien zu knüpfen. Ein solches System des „Qualifizierten Marktzugangs“⁴ wird ökologisch und sozial nachhaltig erzeugte Importe aktiv gegenüber konventioneller Ware begünstigen, wenn im eigenen Land die gleichen Standards gelten. Dann kann etwa ein Land, das den nachhaltigen Landbau fördert, den Import von Lebensmitteln aus industrieller Erzeugung mit hohen Zöllen belegen. Ebenso erfordert ein Klimaschutzprogramm, welches die Automobilindustrie zur Produktion spritsparender Autos verpflichtet, dass sparsame Autos günstiger importiert werden dürfen. Auf diese Weise können Länder auswählen, welche Art von Importen ihnen hilft, die eigenen Produktions- und Konsummuster zukunftsfähiger zu machen. Letztlich muss für Exporteure der Zugang zu fremden Märkten als ein Privileg verstanden werden, das man sich erst durch die Einhaltung hoher Sozial- und Umweltstandards verdienen muss. Doch sollte Unternehmen aus Entwicklungsländern in einer Übergangsphase geholfen werden, diese Standards zu erfüllen.

Krisen der Terms of Trade vorbeugen

Während im Jahr 2005 50 Länder, angeführt von Deutschland, China, Russland und Saudi-Arabien, teilweise enorme Handelsbilanz-Überschüsse erwirtschaftet haben, wiesen 114 Länder Handelsbilanz-Defizite aus, die in den USA, Großbritannien, Spanien und der Türkei am höchsten ausfielen. Defizite wie Überschüsse sind strukturell zwar nicht zu vermeiden, und sie können sich durch frei flottierende Wechselkurse über die Jahre auch wieder ausgleichen.



Geschieht das nicht, muss der Ausgleich durch entsprechende Maßnahmen angestrebt werden. Länder, die stets mehr exportieren als importieren, erwirtschaften Überschüsse an ausländischen Devisen, während Länder, die stets mehr importieren als exportieren, leicht in einen Devisenmangel geraten. Wenn dann nicht anderweitig Kapital ins Land fließt, etwa über Investitionen, können diese Länder zu Schuldnerstaaten werden.

Gemäß der ökonomischen Theorie folgt einem Devisenmangel zwar eine Abwertung der Währung eines Landes, wodurch Exporte international wettbewerbsfähiger gemacht und dadurch Mehreinnahmen an Devisen erzielt werden können. Doch in der Realität hat dieser Regelkreislauf oft nicht funktioniert – auch deswegen, weil viele Länder sich aufgrund einer existenziellen Importabhängigkeit gezwungen sehen, ihre Währung an den US-Dollar oder den Euro zu binden. Ihnen bleibt nur, sich im Ausland zu verschulden, um ihre Importe bezahlen zu können. Vor allem ärmere Länder haben mit chronisch negativen Handelsbilanzen zu kämpfen; einige von ihnen können nicht einmal ausreichend Devisen für lebenswichtige Importgüter wie Medikamente oder Nahrungsmittel aufbringen. Zudem haben die Finanzkrisen in Mexiko 1994, in mehreren Ländern Asiens 1997/1998, in Argentinien nach 1999 und viele weitere größere und kleinere Finanzkrisen, bei denen ganze Länder ihren wirtschaftlichen Bankrott erklären mussten, vorgeführt, welche verheerenden Folgen ein Handelssystem zeitigen kann, dass keinen Ausgleich der Bilanzen anstrebt.

Schon John Maynard Keynes, der in den 40er Jahren die Verhandlungen zur Gründung der Bretton-Woods-Institutionen leitete, hatte einen Mechanismus vorgeschlagen, bei dem eine international unabhängige Verrechnungsstelle, die International Clearing Union (ICU), einen Handelsbilanzausgleich zwischen den Nationen erwirken sollte.⁵ Die ICU sollte eine neue Währung einführen, den Bancor, in der alle Im- und Exporte am Weltmarkt zu bezahlen wären. Jedem Land stünde beim Umtausch der eigenen Währung in den Bancor ein gewisser Überziehungskredit zu; wird dieser jedoch überschritten, würde die ICU einen Strafzins für das Land verhängen. Auch Ländern mit Zahlungsbilanzüberschüssen, wie etwa Deutschland, könnte ein Strafzins auferlegt werden, damit sie ihre Überschüsse im Zaum halten; oder Überschüsse ab einer bestimmten Höhe könnten konfisziert und der Finanzierung von Aufgaben des internationalen Gemeinwohls zugeführt werden (Programme zur Armutsreduktion, Finanzierung der UN-Institutionen o.Ä.).

Obwohl Keynes' Vorschlag heute wie damals phantastisch anmutet, könnten die wachsenden Bilanzdefizite vieler Länder, nicht zuletzt auch der USA, in nicht allzu weiter Ferne zu einer weltwirtschaftlichen Instabilität führen, die einen Ausgleich der Handelsbilanzen auch im Interesse der mächtigen Staaten und der Exportüberschuss-Länder erscheinen lassen wird.

Systemische Vorzugsbehandlung für ärmere Länder

Derzeit gleicht der Weltmarkt einer Fußballliga, in der ein Verein der Kreisliga gegen den vielfachen Meister FC Bayern München antreten müsste – und das auf einem Feld, bei dem die Hobbyfußballer bergauf gegen die Münchener Profis spielen müssen. Im Welthandel spielen tatsächlich starke und schwache Spieler in der gleichen Liga – und die Regeln begünstigen dazu noch die starken Länder, denn diese haben die Regeln so gestaltet, dass doppelte Standards gelten. Zahlreiche Länder des Südens, von Kenia bis Indonesien, von Kamerun bis Chile, wurden gezwungen, ihre Märkte weit zu öffnen für die Industriegüter des Nordens, während die USA, Japan, die EU und andere Industriestaaten weiterhin hohe Zölle auf Agrargüter erheben und obendrein mit massiven Subventionen die eigene landwirtschaftliche Produktion maximieren. Dieser Protektionismus auf dem Agrarmarkt bei gleichzeitiger wirtschaftlicher Übermacht auf dem Markt für Industriegüter und Dienstleistungen hat in der Vergangenheit viele Länder des Südens zu Verlierern des Welthandels gehören. Eine Studie zur Folgenabschätzung der gegenwärtigen Verhandlungsrunde der WTO in Doha prognostiziert, dass die meisten der am wenigsten entwickelten Länder, insbesondere die Länder Subsahara-Afrikas, mit dem



nächsten Liberalisierungsschub im Welthandel erneut zu Verlierern werden, während die größten volkswirtschaftlichen Gewinne von den Industriestaaten und einigen aufstrebenden Schwellenländern eingefahren werden.⁶

Auch Ökonomen, die der Theorie des Freihandels anhängen, vertreten mittlerweile die Ansicht, dass Entwicklungsländer im Wettbewerb mit wirtschaftlich starken Ländern eine hinreichend lange Übergangsphase benötigen, in der sie sowohl ihre Märkte schützen dürfen als auch von den Industrieländern einseitig einen vergünstigten Marktzugang eingeräumt bekommen.⁷ Seit Entwicklungsländer in den 60er Jahren dem GATT beigetreten sind, haben sie stets eine Welthandelspolitik gefordert, die ihnen angesichts ihrer ökonomischen Schwäche Startvorteile einräumt. Doch die sogenannte Sonder- und Vorzugsbehandlung, die das gewähren sollte, wurde nie umfassend durchgesetzt, sondern bestand bloß aus partiellen und nur korrigierenden Maßnahmen.

Fairness hingegen wäre erst geboten, wenn die Regeln der WTO schwache Staaten systematisch begünstigen. Dafür muss sich die Sonder- und Vorzugsbehandlung zu einer „systemischen Sonderbehandlung“ wandeln, das heißt sie muss ein integrales Strukturmerkmal des Handelsregimes werden.⁸ So können Länder nach verschiedenen Kriterien – wie Ausmaß der Armut, Pro-Kopf-Einkommen, Anteil am Welthandel usw. – in unterschiedliche Kategorien eingeteilt werden. Ein Land mit mittlerem Einkommen wie Algerien würde dann eine Sonderbehandlung durch die EU erfahren, während es seinerseits Niger gegenüber zur Sonderbehandlung verpflichtet wäre. Eine solche Bestimmung würde nicht nur helfen, die Kluft zwischen Nord und Süd zu verringern, sondern auch dazu beitragen, die rasch wachsenden Ungleichheiten zwischen den Entwicklungs- und Schwellenländern auszugleichen.

Fairen Wettbewerb sichern

Konzentrationsprozesse geschehen auch in nationalen oder lokalen Märkten, wenn die Politik nicht interveniert. Doch je größer der Markt, desto größer wird das Problem. Erst die weltweite Liberalisierung der Finanz- und Gütermärkte seit Ende der 70er Jahre hat einer Konzentration von Unternehmen über Ländergrenzen hinweg Vorschub geleistet, wie sie bis dahin nicht möglich war. Im Ergebnis entstanden einige hundert transnationale Konzerne, deren jährlicher Umsatz das Bruttoinlandsprodukt ganzer Länder in den Schatten stellt. Der Weltkonzern Wal-Mart beispielsweise machte im Jahr 2006 308 Mrd. US-Dollar Umsatz, während das Bruttoinlandsprodukt der 42 hoch verschuldeten Entwicklungsländer (HIPC) zusammen nur 262 Mrd. US-Dollar betrug.

Zum anderen steigt mit der „Zusammenlegung“ von nationalen Märkten zu einem gemeinsamen globalen Markt gleichzeitig die Zahl der kleinen Unternehmen und verwundbaren Produzenten gegenüber den Marktriesen. Der weltgrößte Agrarhandelskonzern, das US-Unternehmen Cargill, muss sich das Handelsgeschäft für Weizen, Mais, Geflügel und vielen anderen Produkten nur mit einer Handvoll Konkurrenten teilen. Daher können diese Unternehmen ihre Marktmacht und damit die Abhängigkeit der Millionen Bäuerinnen und Bauern weltweit ausnutzen, um Preise zu manipulieren, Wertschöpfung aus den ländlichen Ökonomien abzuziehen, und Standards zu diktieren, die es insbesondere den kleinen Produzenten unmöglich machen, mitzuhalten.⁹ Im Bereich der Computerproduktion haben einige wenige transnationale Konzerne, die zusammen nahezu 90 Prozent des Herstellungsmarkts für Laptops kontrollieren, regelmäßig nach nur wenigen Jahren ihre Zulieferer gewechselt, um maximale Profitmargen zu erzielen, während die Zulieferer samt ihrer Arbeiterinnen und Arbeiter in Malaysia, Indonesien oder Mexiko ohnmächtig und arbeitslos zurückblieben.¹⁰ Im Welthandel mangelt es offensichtlich nicht nur an Fairness zwischen den Ländern, sondern gerade auch zwischen den Marktakteuren.

Mehr noch: Es gibt auf internationaler Ebene keine unabhängige Institution, die der Monopol- und Kartellbildung auf dem Weltmarkt entgegenwirkt. Die Bildung einer derartigen „Monopolkommission“, die internationale Fusionen und Aufkäufe kontrolliert und den unlauteren Wettbewerb sanktioniert, ist dringend geboten.



Ein Welthandelsregime, das sich der Fairness und Nachhaltigkeit verschreibt, wird darüber hinaus eine ausgewogene Verteilung von Gewinnen entlang grenzüberschreitender Wertschöpfungsketten sichern. Dabei kann es von der Fair-Trade-Bewegung lernen. Seit über drei Jahrzehnten zeigt sie, wie grenzüberschreitende Wertschöpfungsketten qualitativ hochwertige Produkte zu fairen Preisen für die Produzenten und mit hohen Sozialstandards im Produktionsprozess hervorbringen können. Warum sollten Fairhandelsverträge nicht für alle Unternehmen zur Bedingung gemacht werden, die am Welthandel teilnehmen möchten?

Es ist offensichtlich, dass die Problemlagen und Herausforderungen in einer globalisierten Welt eine starke multilaterale Handelsorganisation unverzichtbar machen. Denn dieser obliegen Aufgaben, die nicht darin bestehen, Handelsströme zu deregulieren, sondern Handelsströme zu regulieren: Wo Menschenrechte auf dem Spiel stehen, sollte sie nationale Schutzinteressen über das Interesse von Exporteuren stellen; damit der Übergang in die solare Wirtschaft gelingt, sollte sie sozial- und umweltverträgliche Handelsströme begünstigen; um zur Stabilität der Finanz- und Devisenmärkte beizutragen, sollte sie chronische und kumulierte Handelsbilanzdefizite und -überschüsse verhindern; um die Kluft zwischen armen und reichen Nationen zu verringern, sollte sie schwächeren Ländern Vorteile einräumen; und um unlauteren Wettbewerb der starken Marktakteure zu verhindern, sollte sie Kartellbildung und Marktkonzentration überwachen.

Die WTO erfüllt in ihrer gegenwärtigen institutionellen Verfassung nicht die Voraussetzungen für ein solches Rahmenwerk. Insofern wird die Doha-Runde, selbst wenn sie doch noch zu einem Abschluss gebracht werden sollte, in keinem Fall ein Erfolg. Wenn die Verhandlungsrunde indes endgültig scheitert, besteht möglicherweise endlich eine Chance für die grundlegende Reform der Handelsregeln. Sollte dies eintreten, dann könnte es gut sein, dass künftige Historiker im Rückblick das Scheitern der Doha-Runde nicht als Rückschlag betrachten, sondern als Fortschritt.

1 Vgl. Gero Jenner, *Die arbeitslose Gesellschaft. Gefährdet Globalisierung den Wohlstand?* Frankfurt a.M. 1997, S. 83 ff.

2 Arze Glipo und J. Ignacio, *Public Sector Intervention in the Rice Sector in Indonesia: Implications on Food Security and Farmer's Livelihoods*, in: *State Intervention in the Rice Sector in Selected Countries: Implications for the Philippines*, Quezon City 2005.

3 Kevin P. Gallagher (Hg.), *Putting Development First: The Importance of Policy Space in the WTO and IFIs*, London 2005.

4 Hannes Lorenzen, *Qualified Market Access. How to include environmental and social conditions in trade agreements*. EcoFair Trade Dialogue Discussion Paper No. 5, 2007, www.ecofair-trade.org.

5 Susan George, *Zurück zu Keynes in die Zukunft*, in: „Le Monde Diplomatique“, 1/2007, S. 18 f.

6 Sandra Polaski, *Winners and Losers: Impact of the Doha Round on Developing Countries*, Washington 2006.

7 Vgl. Joseph Stiglitz und Andrew Charlton, *Fair Trade For All: How Trade Can Promote Development*, Oxford 2005.

8 Vgl. Wolfgang Sachs und Tilman Santarius, *Slow Trade – Sound Farming. Handelsregeln für eine global zukunftsfähige Landwirtschaft*, Berlin und Aachen 2007.

9 Sophia Murphy, *Concentrated Market Power and Agricultural Trade*. EcoFair Trade Dialogue Discussion Papers No. 1, 2006, www.ecofair-trade.org. Vgl. Irene Schipper und Esther de Haan, *CSR Issues in the ICT Hardware Manufacturing Sector*. SOMO ICT Sector Report, Amsterdam 2005; Andreas Manhart und Rainer Grießhammer, *Soziale Auswirkungen der Produktion von Notebooks*, Freiburg 2006.



Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Finger J. Michael

Developing Countries in the WTO System: Applying Robert Hudec's Analysis to the Doha Round
in *World Economy*, Volume 31, Number 7, 887-904

In his 1987 *Developing Countries in the GATT System*, Robert Hudec concluded that the identity of developing countries in the GATT system was primarily a matter of their demanding non-reciprocal and preferential treatment, developed countries responding grudgingly to those demands and that this situation had been unfruitful either to support developing country reforms or to discipline developed country restrictions aimed at developing countries. Hudec was pessimistic about the relationship becoming more productive, but his expression of despair offered a glimmer of hope: 'There are those who believe that the GATT has become so committed to the current policy that the only way to change it would be to start a new organization'. A new organisation was started, the World Trade Organization, but has the WTO achieved what Hudec hoped a new organisation might? At the 1987-95 Uruguay Round, developing country leaders acted as Hudec had hoped. They used international rules and bindings as leverage to support their own internally-driven reforms; to overcome generations of accumulated protection, to lock in reforms against the backsliding that had undone previous reforms. Dealing with the Uruguay Round's 'unbalanced outcome' and the overlapping 'implementation problem' have shaped the Doha Round, but the negotiations have misconceived and mismanaged both issues. Rather than seeking to identify their real economics, the negotiations have gone back to the traditional idea of special and differential treatment. Perhaps the largest cost of this mismanagement is that in many developing countries the unilateral momentum for liberalisation has waned. To the extent that the Doha negotiations have drawn attention away from the domestic issues that were the basis of developing country liberalisation - and enhanced the status of negotiators relative to the leaders who fought at home for reform - they have contributed to that waning.

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Kissack Robert

EU Actorness in the International Labour Organization: Comparing Declaratory and Voting Cohesion
in *Global Society*, Volume 22, Issue 4, October, 469-489

This article presents data on the voting records of the European Union (EU) Member States and the frequency of EU common statements in both technical (standard-setting) and political (scrutiny) issues in the International Labour Organization (ILO) between 1973 and 2007. By contrasting voting cohesion to declaratory cohesion, it advances the literature by demonstrating that contrary to theoretically informed predictions, political coordination is more successful than technical coordination. It explores the reasons for this through an analysis of different forms of actorness, namely the opportunity to act within the ILO, the presence of the EU through its Member States, and the capability of the policy-making apparatus to produce cohesive outputs. It concludes that the socialisation of Geneva-based diplomats is the most important variable explaining the relative success of political coordination, while the unfamiliarity of seconded national officials to Geneva with EU coordination explains the reduced effectiveness of technical cooperation.

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Subacchi Paola



From Bretton Woods onwards: the birth and rebirth of the world's hegemon
in *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* , Vol. 21, n. 3, September , 347-365

Will the dollar soon lose its key international currency status? In this article I argue that neither the emergence of the Euro nor geopolitical issues threaten the future of the dollar. The world's central banks may slow down their accumulation of dollars, but are unlikely to put an end to the dollar standard regime. I also caution against confusing the international role of the dollar as the supreme store of value with its two other roles—as the dominant international unit of account and medium of exchange. These latter two functions do not change abruptly, meaning, once again, that there is no immediate threat to the future of the dollar. The article also discusses similarities between today's dollar standard and the Bretton Woods regime, and conclude that the complexity of today's system is such that it cannot just be defined as a repetition of the Bretton Woods system, or 'Bretton Woods 2'.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

McKenzie- Francine

GATT and the Cold War: Accession Debates, Institutional Development, and the Western Alliance, 1947–1959
in *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Volume 10, Issue 3 - Summer , 78-109

Historical accounts of the Cold War usually relegate the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to footnotes, if they acknowledge the GATT at all. This article examines the impact of the Cold War on the institutional development of GATT, showing how geopolitical considerations influenced decisions about whether to grant membership in GATT to Communist and non-aligned countries. The accession debates in GATT also reveal the multicentered dynamic of the Western alliance, exposing a variety of views about whether the Cold War was a battle to be waged or a condition of global international relations to be accepted. But if the GATT could not evade the Cold War, its secretariat also manipulated Cold War circumstances, beliefs, and priorities to strengthen the institution. The result of the GATT accession debates was to reposition the GATT as a forum and instrument of the Western alliance, rather than the universal organization it was supposed to be, and to impart new meaning to the process of liberalizing world trade.

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Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Heymann Monika C. E.

International Law and the Settlement of Investment Disputes Relating To China
in *Journal of International Economic Law*, Volume 11, Number 3 , 507-526

This article examines how international investment law can be used to resolve investment disputes in China. After a general overview over the basic structure of international investment law, it explores the international legal rules applicable to foreign investors in China and Chinese investors in third countries. It focuses on China's obligations under the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of other States; the Convention establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, the WTO/GATT-regime and bilateral investment treaties. It thereby illustrates China's cautious approach to international arbitration and other international standards relating to the protection of foreign investors and the current trend in Chinese politics to turn to international law to protect its investors



in third countries. The article concludes that—also caused by increasing Chinese outward investment—the international investment regime relating to China has left its infant stage and provides remedies for foreign investors in China and Chinese investors abroad

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Cooke Abigail M., Curran Sara R., Linton April, Schrank Andrew

Introduction: Agriculture, Trade, and the Global Governance of Food in Globalizations, Volume 5, Issue 2, June 2008, 99-106

For most of human history, people consumed what they produced and produced what they consumed. The current era is notable, however, in that more people than ever before are no longer directly involved in the production of their own food. Instead, they are connected, usually through extensive and opaque webs, to disparate and distant production locales (Smith, 1998, p. 208).

Innovations in transportation, food preservation, and logistics are at least partly responsible for the emergence of long-distance trade relations that have fostered interdependence among food producers and consumers around the globe. Ironically, however, long-distance trade in food has proven unsettling to both producer and consumer communities (McMichael, 1998; Young, 2004). In producing communities, the globalization of food markets has disrupted traditional social arrangements, putting the environment and livelihoods at risk. Among consumers, particularly in the developed world, concerns over the origins and nutritional values of food products have spawned public interest, public outcry, and even a search for alternatives. Nearly every week, one finds articles in major newspapers and news magazines about different aspects of food systems, particularly when they are not functioning well. Several recent books have tried to help people understand the systems well enough to make informed choices about their own participation as consumers.¹

Food is not and never has been traded in a vacuum. A series of laws, norms, customs, and contracts decisively influence the myriad ways in which food is both produced and consumed (see, e.g., Thompson, 1971). As the distance between producers and consumers grows, however, the food regulatory apparatus not only expands geographically but diversifies in scope (Phillips, 2006). Some regulatory institutions are the products of national and international policy: regional trade agreements, multilateral environmental treaties, individual aid conditions, and the like. Others are the outgrowth of private initiative, whether supply- or demand-driven. Examples include producer cooperatives, consumer movements, and more traditional arrangements like communal risk-sharing institutions.

This special issue examines the changing global governance of food. By 'governance' we mean 'the institutionalized economic processes that organize and coordinate activity among a wide variety of economic actors' (Campbell & Lindberg 1990, p. 636). These actors range from vulnerable peasants in West Africa to upwardly mobile professionals in Northeast Asia; from North American trade negotiators to Central American coffee growers; and from fishermen in the Pacific to families in the Pacific Palisades. They are united neither by class, nationality, nor culture. But they are united by something far more central to the human condition: the production and consumption of food.

Part 1 includes studies that address the complicated interconnections in the global food system and the inevitable feedback effects through which people and places tied to that system are buffeted by globalization. The 'global complexity' (Urry, 2003) that characterizes this system suggests that we should not be surprised by unintended



outcomes including—but not necessarily limited to—powerful responses to processes like the opening up of new commercial opportunities, the unexpected emergence of new trade nodes, and sudden shifts in the volume and nature of traded products. This part of the collection also highlights a second, critical dimension of complexity theory: the importance of local actors in socially and geographically bounded communities who play a variety of different roles—i.e., gatekeeper, facilitator, or barrier—and thereby mediate the globalization of agriculture. Finally, Part 1 of this special issue suggests that the stakes are high in terms of managing global complexity on behalf of local livelihoods and the environment.

Given the intensity of local outcomes, many actors and institutions attempt to intervene in and respond to the complexity of global food markets. These efforts come in the form of both public and private governance mechanisms. In the second and third parts of this collection the authors address a mix of public and private interventions in the global food web. There are multiple government and intergovernmental efforts to 'organize and coordinate' the production and consumption of food in the current era of globalization. As the division of agricultural labor expands, food commerce intensifies, and traditional norms and customs fall by the wayside, public officials with a variety of often contradictory motives step in and attempt to fill the regulatory gap. Agencies and institutions like the World Bank, the United Nations, the General Treaty on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and the World Trade Organization (WTO) loom large here but so do local policymakers who are forced to confront the changing global food regime head on—and thus find themselves in a juggling act with the fates of their communities, their careers, and their ecosystems in their hands.

There are also private alternatives to governmental and intergovernmental regulation including producer cooperatives, ethical trade initiatives, and environmental labeling. While nongovernmental organizations arguably take pride of place in the various accounts, they are by no means acting in isolation. They respond to—and at times compete or collaborate with—social movements on the one hand and for-profit enterprises on the other. And in so doing they occasionally eke out a tentative victory for social and environmental justice.

The studies in this special issue illuminate not only the proverbial food webs that connect most of the world's people but the various mechanisms that govern their growth, reproduction, and transformation. The authors explore key links in food chains through which consumers can learn where and how their food is produced and producers can begin to contextualize their condition. Where do farm products wind up? Who trades, transforms, and transports them along the way? And who wins and who loses in the process? Questions such as these are not only in the forefront of every study but have never been more salient. International treaties and institutions like the North American Free Trade Agreement, the European Union, and the Montreal Protocol are exercising ever-greater influence over the production and consumption of food products. And conflicts between producing and consuming nations threaten to undermine not only international organizations like the WTO but bilateral trade relations as well.

In addition to underscoring the political and economic complexity of the international food trade, however, our collection lends insight into the social origins and local impacts of a wide array of voluntary or private governance regimes that are no less central to the health and well-being of the world's people and ecosystems. Examples include ethical trade initiatives and corporate social responsibility campaigns that are adopted in response to consumer movements; informal migration networks that carry ideas as well as people and thereby foster the growth of innovative, if voluntary, institutions; and the more traditional labor and risk-pooling institutions they tend to complement or displace.

Informal institutions such as these can reproduce, amplify, counteract, or fall victim to the governmental and intergovernmental approaches and therefore demand study in their own right. By tracing linkages from points of production to points of consumption, and focusing upon an array of public and private governance mechanisms,



therefore, this collection sets the stage for a new generation of scholarship that will encourage productive engagement among a wide audience of scholars, students, activists, practitioners, and of course the general public.

The food and agricultural trades are not only interesting and important in their own right but also lend insight into the broader processes of globalization that are impinging on all of our lives. In three different ways, at least, food provides a tangible, exciting, and grounded research site for understanding the mechanisms governing global transactions across the political, social, economic, ecological, and cultural landscape in the twenty-first century. First, food is intimately and fundamentally related to biological, ecological, and human well-being and the globalization of the world food order tends to threaten each of these values. As agricultural commerce intensifies, and not only producers and consumers but an array of anonymous brokers, agents, and service providers become increasingly dependent on each other, the complexity and vulnerability of the system as a whole grow in turn—as recent scandals over food safety and public health clearly illustrate. The study of food thus forces us to confront the issues of individual, social, and environmental sustainability simultaneously and in a mutually consistent manner (Khan, 1995).

Second, food is, in Karl Polanyi's felicitous phrasing, a 'fictitious commodity' (2001 [1944], cited in McMichael, 1992, p. 360, footnote 1)—that is, a good that is not originally produced for sale. Fictitious commodities are rarely privatized and commercialized without social and political struggle. And the moral and rhetorical appeal of a 'reasonable price' for food is no less powerful today than in the eighteenth century, when food riots that would eventually be studied by E. P. Thompson were 'triggered off by soaring prices, malpractices among dealers, or by hunger' (1971, pp. 78-79 as well as p. 135). As a result, the study of food illuminates the unavoidably social—and thus potentially malleable or even manageable—nature of globalization.

Third, agriculture is simultaneously place-bound and internationally integrated (McMichael, 1998). Efforts to trace the production, transformation, distribution, and consumption of food therefore demand research agendas that situate localities within global networks and facilitate our capacity to see the forest and the trees by zooming from the global to the local and back to the global. In short, our need for food is a constant; how we acquire food is a variable; and the production, commercialization, and consumption of food therefore offer an invaluable window onto the globalization of the world we inhabit.

This collection was originally commissioned and produced for an interdisciplinary conference sponsored by the Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies, the Princeton Environment Institute, and the Woodrow Wilson School for Public and International Affairs entitled *Trading Morsels, Growing Hunger, Decimating Nature: Linking Food and Trade to Development and the Environment*. The current volume incorporates a selection of those papers and several thematically related additions that explicitly address the nature and consequences of food governance regimes.

The authors were asked to produce papers that concentrated on at least one food commodity, its governance regime, the place in which it is produced or consumed, and the consequences for human and ecological well-being. As a result, the contributions explore both the production and consumption of what we eat and drink, as well as their manifold interconnections. The collection as a whole provides a theoretically consistent analysis of the contemporary global food regime and its implications for sustainability and social justice.

Part 1 elaborates the concept of global complexity in the world food system and illustrates examples of local dynamics where global connections originate or touch down. It begins with Sara Curran and Abigail Cooke's historical study of cassava production in Thailand. Their case illustrates a major limitation of the trade policies enshrined in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and more recently the WTO: these regulatory initiatives do not consider how global



trade systems might interact with other social systems. The surprising surge in Thai cassava production and its equally surprising continuity (and continued impacts on the Thai environment and growing inequality) point to the importance of looking at actors and institutions outside official trade governance mechanisms. The intense local effects of this booming trade in both the producing and consuming countries indicates the importance of digging into places to understand how they influence and are changed by global connections.

Judith Carney's analysis of rice policies in the Gambia also illustrates the intense local impacts of global complexities, with particular attention to the results of multiple policy shifts and their historical residues. Over the past four decades, she argues, international agencies have emphasized rice production, import-substitution ('food security'), and cheap imports ('comparative advantage') in rapid succession at enormous social, environmental, and human cost in West Africa. Current efforts to raise production are more hopeful in that they focus on New Rice for Africa (Nerica), an unpatented cross between Asian and African rice that can be grown without fertilizers. But they are unlikely to overcome the legacy of years of mismanagement and abuse—at least not in short order.

Andrew Schrank's analysis of the latent conflict between political imperatives at home and geopolitical objectives overseas underscores the complexity of US agricultural and trade policies—and the limits to a purely sectoral account of their evolution. While American policymakers agreed to defend the prices of domestically grown sugars and sweeteners in the 1980s, and thereby deprived the Caribbean Basin of a vital source of employment and foreign exchange earnings, they simultaneously agreed to compensate their vulnerable neighbors with aid and trade preferences, and thereby engendered an unanticipated process of export diversification. One cannot understand the growth of nontraditional exports from the Caribbean Basin, he therefore concludes, without first understanding the protection of traditional producers and farm products in the US at a time of intense geopolitical rivalry.

Sjur Kasa looks at recent dietary changes in Northeast Asia. Kasa traces the growth of beef consumption in Japan and Korea to the efforts of US-based, but globally powerful agricultural trade associations and their lobbyists. He shows that both bilateral and global trade policies tend to 'favor strong producer interests at the expense of wider concerns for environmental sustainability.'

Together these papers highlight the myriad connections and often unexpected dynamics of complex food systems. These dynamics are global in scale but local in impact. They inevitably generate distinct consequences—some beneficial, others detrimental—for people and the environments of specific places. The very intensity of these local impacts, whether they are good, bad, or a mixture of both, hints at the high stakes involved in integration into global food webs. These high stakes mean not only that the consequences of insertion into a global web are worthy of investigation, but also that we should pay attention to how local actors have responded to the challenges and opportunities of international integration and thereby mediated its consequences.

Part 2 turns to the branding and certification efforts that have emerged, at least in part, as a response to global complexity. Susana Aparicio, Sutti Ortiz, and Nidia Tadeo explore the intersection of trade policies and industry norms as new standards and accompanying certification requirements are foisted upon growers of lemons and sweet citrus in Argentina. They challenge the assumption that the high costs of compliance with the quality standards imposed by northern governments and the certification procedures demanded by northern vendors adversely affect the earnings of farm laborers. In Argentina, field hands can profit from both good agricultural practices and the more orderly managerial practices demanded by certifying authorities. For growers, compliance raises the transaction costs entailed in the use of cheap labor. By the same token, however, Aparicio and her colleagues note that growers offered wage increases only after the unionized workers threatened to strike and that the improved wages did not pull laborers out of poverty, since in



counter-seasonal horticultural export industries the period of employment is usually short.

Rebecca Goldberg provides an overview of global networks in the fisheries trade, including a summary of trends in the types and amounts of trade over the last decade. Her discussion of certifying efforts and also scientific research and innovation offers potentially fruitful, if necessarily limited, interventions. Her discussion reveals global complexity, highlighting a hidden trade of wild fish used as feed for aquaculture. She cautions against an overly simplistic idea of direct value chains involving only harvesting in one area and consumption in another; the linkages and dynamic effects are decidedly more complicated and thus threaten both the ecological and economic sustainability of fisheries.

Michael Morrissey offers a more optimistic account of interventions in coastal fisheries in the US Pacific Northwest. His analysis reveals that collaborations between government, trade associations, and environmental groups have resulted in successful quality, branding, and marketing initiatives in wild salmon and troll-caught albacore fisheries. And he thus underscores the need for collaboration and public-private partnerships—especially among small and mid-sized fishing enterprises that might otherwise succumb to international competitive pressure.

Like the studies in Part 1 and Goldberg's contribution, Louis Lebel, Phimphakan Lebel, Po Garden, Dao Huy Giap, Supaporn Khрутmuang, and Sachiko Nakayama's study of shrimp aquaculture in Thailand reveals the variety of actors with a stake in the global shrimp market and the corresponding complexity of their connections. Actors and organizations like farmers, agri-businesses, input and service providers, and retail outlets compete with each other for control of value-added activities using a variety of tools including, but not limited to, certification schemes. Lebel and his colleagues examine the success of these efforts and the effects of these efforts on several Thai villages with farms, revealing, again, the intense impacts of global complexity, and also the role of existing institutions in mediating the dynamic impacts on the various localities.

Part 3 examines a different set of approaches or responses to global complexity, focusing on ethical trade initiatives. Fair Trade is perhaps the most widely known ethical trade standard and all of the cases in this section address it. There are other initiatives and approaches, often pursued in conjunction with Fair Trade, to attempt to mitigate the challenges to small producers and their local environments as they are swept up in global markets. April Linton's analysis of sustainable coffee initiatives offers a somewhat hopeful outlook by showing how, in the midst of a worldwide coffee crisis in which prices fell to levels that cannot support small-scale production for families or living wages for their workers, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and specialty coffee companies have promoted transparent and sustainable exchanges between producers and buyers. Though they have very different approaches to development, both business- and Fair Trade-oriented NGOs that work directly with small farmers are achieving similar sustainability outcomes.

Thomas V. Dietsch and Stacy Philpott explore the link between science and eco-friendly certifications in the coffee industry. They argue that meaningful certifications that protect habitat and ensure a fair wage to coffee producers can best be achieved through greater cooperation among various certification projects and academic scientists from different disciplines studying globalization processes. There are significant opportunities for social and natural scientists to work together, and for more collaboration between non-profit organizations that promote certifications.

Christopher Bacon, V. Ernesto Mndez, Mara Eugenia Flores Gmez, Douglas Stuart, and Sandro Ral Daz Flores' analysis of Fair Trade coffee looks at on-the-ground results for Nicaraguan smallholder coffee farmers who are part of Fair Trade networks. Bacon and his colleagues evaluate the degree to which selling in Fair Trade markets benefits these farmers, using the UN Millennium Development Goals as the standard for progress. They document several positive outcomes for Fair Trade producers and their families, including greater household savings and higher rates of



school enrollment. But they also recognize that all small-scale coffee producers face severe livelihood insecurities, including food insecurity, and that to promote real sustainability Fair Trade must factor in the true cost of coffee production in the places where it is being produced.

So far, Part 3 focuses on trade in goods to the exclusion of other aspects of globalization. Jessa Lewis and David Runsten raise another issue: is Fair Trade coffee production sustainable given the intensity and growth of international migration from coffee-producing communities in Mexico? Their findings are consistent with the basic tenets of sociological theories of migration: For families, participation in Fair Trade networks is not an alternative to migration; it is an added source of income and risk diversification. Lewis and Runsten's research suggests that when members of coffee-growing families migrate to the United States, they do so at least in part to provide operating capital for their coffee farms. This in turn raises coffee labor costs and undermines the sustainability of coffee production.

William Moseley examines three initiatives to improve the lot of black South Africans who are part of the country's wine industry: Fair Trade wine, worker-produced wine, and black-owned wineries. His study explores the potential of these arrangements to create real change in labor conditions and the welfare of historically disadvantaged farm workers. In comparison to other agricultural sectors in South Africa, the wine industry is an especially interesting case because of its economic importance, growing export potential and history of white dominance.

The final study in this special issue, by Catherine Dolan, offers a necessary critique of Fair Trade initiatives in Kenyan tea production. She notes that the initiatives in question grew out of consumer concerns over the conditions under which tea was cultivated and imposed standards over the heads—rather than with the collaboration—of local growers. She also illuminates how the structure of the Kenyan tea market impedes Fair Trade goals. Understanding how unequal power relationships have shaped Fair Trade and how these standards are exercised reveals the localized particularities and contradictions of neoliberal development.

These case studies include relatively successful and unsuccessful examples of mitigating the negative effects of insertion into global food markets. One basis for success appears to be collaboration between regulatory officials and agencies—whoever they may be—and producers and their organizations. Where producers are given a positive and material stake in the regulatory regime, they are simultaneously better able and more willing to participate in an ongoing way. Where regulations and standards are imposed over the heads of producer groups, however, they tend to combat, circumvent, or fall victim to the governance arrangements, with perverse consequences for people, communities, and ecosystems.

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Notes

1 See, for example, Brian Halweil's *Eat Here* (2004), Marion Nestle's *What to Eat* (2006), Michael Pollan's *The Omnivore's Dilemma* (2006) and *In Defense of Food* (2008), Peter Singer and Jim Mason's *The Ethics of What We Eat: Why Our Food Choices Matter* (2007), and even Kim Barnouian and Rory Freedman's *Skinny Bitch* (2005).



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Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Jacquet Stéphanie

L'OMC, victime de la nouvelle distribution de la puissance mondiale?

in *Revue de l'Union européenne/Revue du Marché Commun et de l'Union européenne*, n. 521, septembre , 481-484

With the failure of the last ministerial meeting in Geneva, one may be compelled to doubt that the Doha cycle will have a successful outcome. In addition to agriculture having been the focus of the negotiators' attention, there does not seem to be enough progress made on industrial goods and services to allow to reach an agreement. Apart from such



sector-related contention, isn't the WTO a victim of the changes to the balance of power, with new emerging competitors (India, Brazil...)? In that context, industrialized countries and emerging countries are prompted to take protectionist stands thereby preventing the Doha cycle from making any progress. In addition, those same countries strengthen their strategic positioning through preferential trade agreements.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Faure Guy

La Banque asiatique de développement et les jeux d'influence chinois et japonais

in *Transcontinentales*, n. 6, juillet , 107-124

The Asian Development Bank provides an overview of the new developments on China's "selfinterested multilateralism". It also allows us to verify certain assumptions about the future of Sino- Japanese relations, often reduced to a presupposed inevitable conflict of interests that would lead to a struggle between two Asian powers for regional hegemony. Since joining ADB in 1986, China has come a long way within this institution. In the case of the Greater Mekong Subregion development, a flagship programme of the bank, Chinese and Japanese visions differ. Will they contradict each other or converge? Finally, the diplomatic "styles" of China and Japan are poles apart. Will they come together in a common approach to a more efficient and more consensual "soft diplomacy"?

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Richez-Baum Béatrice

La réforme de l'OMC comme opportunité pour définir la stratégie commerciale globale de l'Union européenne

in *Revue de l'Union européenne/Revue du Marché Commun et de l'Union européenne*, n. 520, juillet-août , 416-419

The European trade policy has not been given much long-term reflection; the think tanks dedicated to it are rare, and the lack of institutionalism in the relations between the European Commission and businesses does not make it any easier for a global vision for the future to emerge. Beyond the promotion of European standards, valued by European Commissioner Peter Mandelson, it is essential for Europe to have long-term trade goals and to practise proselytism on its vision of globalisation. Otherwise, it could end up tagging along in a commercial policy of blind conformity or adaptation. The future of the World Trade Organisation must be where its trade strategy is anchored. Does the European Union want to make the WTO a stabiliser and arbiter of international trade or rather a world governance body? Another issue is the way in which the diversity of the WTO member States is to be adapted to their diverse needs and interests. The Union's commitment concerning these subjects can only further its own trade choices.

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Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Harrison James

Legal and Political Oversight of WTO Waivers

in *Journal of International Economic Law*, Volume 11, Number 2 , 411-425

This article discusses the legal and political processes available within the WTO for the scrutiny and oversight of



waivers. These procedures include the initial approval procedures, as well as procedures for overseeing the implementation of waivers once they have been approved. It is submitted that the certain aspects of a waiver are inherently political and the principal mechanisms for their oversight are through the political organs of the WTO. Dispute settlement is, however, available as a tool for determining whether or not a WTO Member has complied with the substantive terms and conditions of a waiver. In this light, this article considers the legal status of waivers in the context of dispute settlement. It concludes that waivers are best characterized as exceptions so that the state invoking the waiver bears the burden of proving that the terms and conditions have been met. The article also suggests that there is no need for a narrow interpretation of waivers and that the customary international law rules of treaty interpretation should apply.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Krätke Michael R.

Nach dem Gipfel - und alle Fragen offen

in **Blätter für deutsche & internationale Politik**, August, 2008 , 5-8

Es war ein Krisengipfel, der an die Anfänge vor 33 Jahren erinnerte. Um der Weltwährungskrise, der ersten Ölkrise und dem Aufbegehren der „Dritten Welt“ zu begegnen, kamen 1975 die Staats- und Regierungschefs der sechs führenden Industrienationen der westlichen Welt in Rambouillet zum informellen Kamingsgespräch zusammen. Mittlerweile sind die jährlichen Plaudertreffs des zur G 8 erweiterten exklusiven Herrenclubs die weltweit größte Politshow. Drei Tage lang spielten die Chefs der G 8-Staaten in Toyako auf der Insel Hokkaido Weltregierung. Die hätte wahrlich genug zu tun. Globale Krisen, wohin man blickt: Die drohende Klimakatastrophe, die Energiekrise, die Nahrungsmittelkrise, und, last not least, eine internationale Finanzkrise, die sich seit August vorigen Jahres in Schockwellen ausbreitet.

Globale Probleme lassen sich nur in globaler Kooperation der Beteiligten lösen. Diese Banalität wurde vor und während des Gipfels unablässig wiederholt. Aber wenn ein elitärer und exklusiver Zirkel von Großmächten dem Rest der Welt Lösungen der Weltprobleme vorgeben will, muss er nicht nur intern kooperationsfähig sein, sondern vor allem über Problemdiagnosen und -lösungen verfügen, die dem Rest der Welt halbwegs einleuchten. Denn die „informelle Weltregierung“ der G 8 verfügt – außer ihren Mehrheiten bzw. Vetopositionen in IWF, Weltbank und WTO – über keine Machtmittel, um den Rest der Welt zur Kooperation zu zwingen. Ohne die sogenannten Schwellenländer, insbesondere die neuen Industrieländer der G 5 (China, Indien, Mexiko, Brasilien, Südafrika) geht gar nichts mehr. Seit 2001 werden sie daher zu den G 8 geladen, zu Konsultationen, die im Verlauf des „Heiligendamm-Prozesses“ immer weiter ausgebaut werden sollen, um die G 5-Länder in Entscheidungen über die globale Klimaschutzpolitik einzubinden.

Diesmal kamen Australien, Malaysia und Südkorea hinzu, zu Konsultationen über die Afrikapolitik waren die Vertreter sieben afrikanischer Staaten (Algerien, Äthiopien, Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal, Südafrika und Tansania) geladen. So war der Gipfel mit 22 Teilnehmerländern (plus Vertretern zahlreicher internationaler und supranationaler Organisationen, darunter die UNO, die EU und die Afrikanische Union) der größte in der Geschichte der G 7/G 8.

Blumige Beschlüsse – G 8 in der Legitimationskrise

Noch größer ist allerdings die Enttäuschung, die die blumigen Beschlüsse der versammelten Politprofis provoziert haben. Immerhin 60 Mrd. Yen (364 Mio. Euro) hat das weltpolitische Spektakel den japanischen Steuerzahler gekostet. Der Gastgeber hatte Klimaschutz und Armutsbekämpfung ganz oben auf die Agenda gesetzt. Viel ist dabei nicht



herausgekommen – außer einer weiteren Krise, nämlich der Legitimationskrise der G 8 selbst. Auf keine der akuten Krisen der Weltwirtschaft, auf keines der fundamentalen Probleme der gegenwärtigen Weltunordnung haben die G 8 eine nur halbwegs adäquate Antwort gegeben. Die Mächtigen der Welt, allesamt bekennde Neoliberale, in Dogmen befangen, den „Sachzwängen“ des Weltmarkts hörig, begreifen weder die Ursachen der Krisen, in denen die Weltwirtschaft steckt, noch die Dramatik der Gesamtlage. Sie sind der Weltpolitik in Zeiten des entfesselten globalen Kapitalismus schlicht nicht gewachsen.

Zuerst verkündeten die G 8-Staaten, die vor einem Jahr in Heiligendamm noch jede quantitative Festlegung ängstlich vermieden hatten, sie hätten sich darauf geeinigt, die Emissionen von Treibhausgasen zu halbieren. Allerdings erst bis zum Jahre 2050 und ohne das Bezugsjahr zu benennen, an dem die angepeilte Reduzierung zu messen wäre. Das reicht jedoch nicht einmal, um die Erderwärmung unter der Marke von zwei Grad Celsius zu halten. In Heiligendamm wollte man das Ziel einer Halbierung des CO₂-Ausstoßes nur „prüfen“, jetzt will man die hehre „Vision des Ziels“ mit allen Beteiligten im Rahmen der Klimaschutzkonvention der UNO „erwägen und annehmen“ – ohne Angabe des Bezugsjahrs 1990, das die UN und alle Experten für notwendig halten, von dem aber die Japaner nichts wissen wollten; ohne Angabe von Zwischenzielen; ohne irgendwelche konkreten Verpflichtungen für die einzelnen G 8-Länder, die zusammen immerhin über 62 Prozent der weltweiten CO₂-Emissionen produzieren. Und das alles unter dem Vorbehalt, dass die Schwellen- und Entwicklungsländer mitziehen müssten – ein weiteres weit offenes Hintertürchen auf amerikanischen Wunsch.

Während uns die Arktis wegschmilzt, während der Klimawandel sich rasant beschleunigt und uns die Zeit für wirksame Aktionen davonläuft, werden alle verbindlichen Entscheidungen auf die lange Bank geschoben – auf den nächsten Verhandlungsmarathon, der Ende 2009 in Kopenhagen stattfinden soll, um endlich zu einer Fortsetzung des Kyoto-Protokolls zu kommen.

Mit beeindruckender Frechheit haben die versammelten „Visionäre“ der G 8 versucht, die Vertreter der Schwellenländer auf ihre Linie zu bringen. China, Indien und die übrigen Schwellenländer haben der G 8 die Gefolgschaft verweigert. Ganz uncharmant haben sie die führenden Industrieländer daran erinnert, dass diese für mindestens 60 Prozent der weltweiten Emissionen von Treibhausgasen verantwortlich sind. Die größten Klimasünder, voran die USA, die das Wissen, die Technologie und das Geld dazu haben, sollten gefälligst im Klimaschutz vorangehen und sich ehrgeizigere Reduktionsziele setzen.

Weil die Schadstoffemissionen in den letzten Jahren dramatisch gestiegen sind, belasten heute die Amerikaner das Klima mit über 20 Tonnen CO₂ pro Kopf, die Inder gerade mal mit einer Tonne. Daher ist gegen die Forderung der G 5, die G 8 sollten den Ausstoß von CO₂ bis 2020 um wenigstens 20 bis 40 Prozent reduzieren, nichts einzuwenden. Auch die Forderung der Schwellenländer, die G 8 sollten mit deutlichen Signalen vorangehen und ihre gemeinsamen Treibhausgasemissionen bis 2050 um 80 bis 95 Prozent reduzieren, ist völlig berechtigt. Ohne eine klare Angabe konkreter Reduktionsziele für die kommenden Jahre, samt Zwischenzielen und Kontrollmechanismen, drücken sich die G 8-Staaten einmal mehr vor der eigenen Verantwortung.

Knackpunkt Kernenergie

Bei den Umweltschutzorganisationen herrschte zu Recht Wut und Enttäuschung weltweit. Von „Zeitverschwendung“, von „leeren Worthülsen“, vom kompletten „Versagen der weltweit größten Industrieländer angesichts der Klimaherausforderung“ ist die Rede. Statt sich auf die notwendigsten Maßnahmen für den weltweiten Klimaschutz zu einigen, haben die Vertreter der größten Klimasünder der Welt einmal mehr unter Beweis gestellt, dass sie viel von Verantwortung reden, aber nur zu verantwortungslosem Nicht-Handeln imstande sind.



Im Mittelpunkt der Diskussion stand stattdessen das Comeback der Kernenergie. Mit Rücksicht auf Angela Merkel wurde auf ein offenes Plädoyer für die Kernkraft als Lösung für das Klimaproblem verzichtet, obwohl die G 8-Chefs längst vom Atomfieber angesteckt sind. Die Atomindustrie darf sich die Hände reiben. Hierzulande steht der Atomkompromiss auf der Kippe.

Zur dritten Ölkrise fiel den G 8-Regierungschefs nicht einmal ein, Vertreter der Erdöl produzierenden Länder einzuladen. Von denen verlangen sie allerdings mehr Öl – höhere Förderung und den Ausbau der Förderungskapazitäten. Irgendwie soll auch eine verbesserte Energieeffizienz dazu führen, dass die weiterhin steigenden Energiepreise der Weltwirtschaft nicht schaden. Das ganze Problem – wo kommen die Explosionen der Öl- und sonstigen Energiepreise her? Wie geht man mit der Macht der Erdölproduzenten, -händler und -spekulanten um? – wurde vertagt: auf eine Folgekonferenz, deren Termin niemand kennt.

Globaler Hunger: Das große Schweigen

Auf die rasante Steigerung der Nahrungsmittel- und Rohstoffpreise, auf die Ernährungskrise, auf den wachsenden Hunger in den armen Ländern der Welt, wurde mit demonstrativer Besorgnis und der hübschen Worthülse von der „globalen Partnerschaft“ reagiert. Einstweilen wird geprüft, beispielsweise ob internationale Lebensmittelreserven hilfreich sein könnten – ein schlechter Witz. Riesige Getreidespeicher zu füllen, Nahrungsmittel im großen Stil zu horten – eine sichere Methode, um die Preisinflation anzuheizen. Mit solchen Schnapsideen versucht man der Debatte um die notwendigen Agrarreformen in den Industrie- wie in den Entwicklungsländern aus dem Weg gehen.

Mehr freier Welthandel, also schleunigster Abschluss der auf Eis gelegten Doha-Welthandelsrunde und verstärkter Einsatz der Gentechnologie, so lauteten die Vorschläge von Bundeskanzlerin Merkel. Gegen den steigenden Einsatz von Biokraftstoffen, eine der wesentlichen Ursachen für die Erhöhung der Lebensmittelpreise um 83 Prozent seit 2005, mithin für die Welternährungskrise, gab es ein Lippenbekenntnis. Die EU – kein stimmberechtigtes Vollmitglied der G 8 – fordert da weit mehr, allerdings ohne Erfolg.

Erstaunlich auch, worüber nicht geredet wurde. Die versammelten Weltenlenker taten, als sei die internationale Finanzkrise, die sich seit dem Sommer 2007 in Schockwellen ausbreitet, längst ausgestanden. Angela Merkel bemerkte: „Wir haben eine subprime crisis gehabt. Heute läuft die irgendwie wieder aus“. Mitnichten. Wenige Tage nach dem Abschluss des Gipfels ging die Finanzkrise in den USA mit einer Welle von Pleiten bei den größten Hypothekenfinanzierern des Landes in die nächste Runde.

Die G 8 haben vor dem Problem der internationalen Finanzkrise schlicht gekniffen. Sie haben die Transparenzregeln des Financial Stability Forum abgenickt und nicht den leisesten Versuch gemacht, die völlig gegensätzlichen Politiken der Notenbanken in den USA und in Europa zu koordinieren. Sie glauben nach wie vor an die „Selbstheilungskräfte“ der Finanzmärkte und die „Autonomie“ der Zentralbanken. Kein Wort daher über die jüngste Welle der Spekulation mit Nahrungsmitteln und Rohstoffen an allen Weltbörsen, kein Wort über die Rolle der Warenterminspekulation bei der gegenwärtigen Ölpreisrallye, kein Wort über den weltweiten Währungskrieg. Obwohl die Vertreter Indiens zugegen waren, des Landes, das vor kurzem den Terminhandel mit einer Reihe von Nahrungsmitteln kurzerhand verboten hat – und damit bisher nicht schlecht gefahren ist. Nichts – außer dem Einfluss der Wallstreet und der City of London – konnte die G 8 eigentlich hindern, dem indischen Beispiel zu folgen. Alle wissen, dass die Armut in der Welt immer dramatischere Formen annimmt – auch wenn sie absolut und in Pro-Kopf-Einkommen gemessen etwas zurückgeht. Aber weltweit hungern Millionen Menschen; fast ein Drittel der Weltbevölkerung hat keinen Zugang zu sauberem Trinkwasser; Epidemien wie HIV/Aids, Malaria, Tuberkulose breiten sich aus, weil den armen Ländern die Mittel zur



Prävention und Behandlung fehlen.

Afrika und die gesamte Entwicklungshilfe standen auf der Agenda – wie vor einem Jahr. Und wieder einmal haben die G 8 demonstriert, dass sie im besten Fall bereit sind, ihre vor Jahren gegebenen Versprechen zu bestätigen. Eine pure Selbstverständlichkeit – dass die G 8 die seit langem zugesagte Steigerung der Entwicklungshilfe für Afrika um 25 Mrd. US-Dollar bis 2010 erfüllen wollen – wurde als Erfolg gefeiert. Man hätte sich lieber dafür entschuldigen sollen, dass von dieser wahrlich nicht stolzen Summe bisher nur etwas über drei Mrd. Dollar in Afrika angekommen sind. Ebenso peinlich ist die Bestätigung der schon im Vorjahr überfälligen Zusage, die versprochenen 60 Mrd. Dollar für die Bekämpfung von HIV/Aids, Malaria und Tuberkulose in den nächsten fünf Jahre zur Verfügung zu stellen. Bei der Umsetzung der übrigen Milleniumsentwicklungsziele, beispielsweise bei der Wasserversorgung, gab es auch keine Bewegung.

Die Weltwirtschaft steht auf der Kippe – auf alle drängenden Fragen der Gegenwart sind die Regierungschefs der G 8 eine klare Antwort schuldig geblieben. Mit jedem gebrochenen Versprechen verlieren sie an Glaubwürdigkeit, mit jeder verpassten Chance, ihrer Führungsrolle gerecht zu werden, untergraben sie ihren Führungsanspruch. Kein Zweifel, der Club der Superreichen und Mächtigen steckt in einer schweren Legitimationskrise.

Wer braucht diesen Club noch? Ist er vielleicht nur zu klein geworden, hat er nur die falschen Mitglieder? Wenn China oder Indien jede Klimaschutzpolitik der G 8 unterlaufen können, wenn die G 8 ohne die OPEC keine Energiepolitik machen können, welche Bedeutung hat sie dann noch? Auch wenn die G 8 noch immer fast 14 Prozent der Weltbevölkerung repräsentieren und fast zwei Drittel des Weltsozialprodukts erzeugen, eine solche „informelle Weltregierung“ neben den und gegen die Vereinten Nationen braucht niemand außer den politischen und ökonomischen Eliten der beteiligten Länder. China ist in der Weltwirtschaft erheblich wichtiger als Italien oder Kanada, Mexiko oder Indien liegen deutlich vor Russland.

Großbritannien und Frankreich haben dafür plädiert, die Gruppe der Acht um die G 5 zu erweitern, die wichtigsten Schwellenländer zu Vollmitgliedern zu befördern. Sogar von einer G 16 war die Rede. Deutschland und Japan, die beiden Länder, für die die G 8 die einzige weltpolitische Bühne bietet, waren strikt dagegen. Erst einmal müsse der Verein seine Hausaufgaben im kleinen Kreis machen, und eine „Wertegemeinschaft“ sei er obendrein.

Die Vertreter der Schwellenländer waren darüber allerdings gar nicht beleidigt. Sie sind keineswegs erpicht darauf, in den illustren Kreis der Mächtigen aufgenommen zu werden. Auch diesmal haben sie, China und Indien voran, ihren mittlerweile enormen Einfluss auf die Weltpolitik demonstriert. Sie bestimmen die Agenda mit; sie sind gesuchte Verhandlungspartner; ohne sie lässt sich keines der Weltprobleme lösen, aber für die Scheinlösungen und rhetorischen Manöver der G 8 sind sie nicht haftbar zu machen. Dank ihrer Opposition gegen die G 8 sind die G 5 heute besser organisiert und treten geschlossener auf als je zuvor. Als Mitglieder eines erweiterten Großmächte-Clubs wären sie diese Machtposition schnell wieder los. Bevor es deshalb zu einer G 13 oder G 16 kommt, müssen die G 8 erst beweisen, dass sie zu einem ernsthaften Dialog, auch zu Kompromissen mit diesen Ländern imstande sind.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Pauwelyn Joost

New Trade Politics for the 21st Century



in *Journal of International Economic Law*, Volume 11, Number 3 , 559-573

Once the Doha Round is concluded, or officially dead, the time will be ripe for a long term reflection on the future of the world trading system. The world has changed dramatically since the GATT's creation in 1947. Yet, 60 years later, the WTO has not adapted itself to these changes. Although commentators tend to focus on internal changes and reforms, most importantly are the external, real world changes that took place in the last 60 years. These changes range from historically low tariffs, an increased financial integration between countries, more diversification in world trade shares and proliferation of preferential trade agreements, to the unbundling of the production chain, the prevalence of unilateral trade liberalization, the emergence of new flanking policies and, crucially, a shift in the forces opposing free trade. These external shocks and changes are already leading to, and require, a 'new trade politics', both within countries and at the international level.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Henckels Caroline

Overcoming Jurisdictional Isolationism at the WTO-FTA Nexus: A Potential Approach for the WTO

in *European Journal of International Law*, Vol. 19, n. 3 , 571-600

The proliferation of free trade agreements which share dispute settlement jurisdiction with the WTO has added to claims of disintegration within international trade law. Recent WTO jurisprudence is indicative of the limits of WTO members' ability to invoke provisions of an FTA as a 'jurisdictional defence' where the dispute implicates trade measures under both WTO and FTA rules. Such uncertainty in the law has the potential not only to create issues of incoherent jurisprudence, but also to threaten the stability and predictability of the multilateral trading system. These issues are likely to continue to arise as FTAs continue to grow in abundance while the Doha round is stalled. Based on analysis of a selection of state-state disputes before other fora such as the International Court of Justice, this article argues that in the interest of the effective administration of justice, the WTO's judicial organ should use its inherent power of comity to decline to exercise jurisdiction so that the dispute can be resolved by an FTA tribunal where a dispute is inextricably connected with a dispute under an FTA and that exercising jurisdiction would not be reasonable in the circumstances.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Helleiner Eric

Political determinants of international currencies: What future for the US dollar?

in *Review of International Political Economy*, Volume 15 Issue 3 2008

In recent years, the economic determinants of international currency status have attracted growing attention among economists. But what about the political determinants? This paper proposes a framework or taxonomy for thinking about this question. It identifies two distinct channels - one indirect and one direct - through which politics can influence the international standing of a currency. In the former category, politics is important through its impact on three key economic determinants of international currencies: confidence, liquidity, and transactional networks. In the latter category, politics matters more directly when a currency's international status is supported by states for reasons unrelated to these economic determinants. The paper explores briefly how these two channels of political influence might influence the dollar's future as an international currency. This exploration is not designed to provide a new



definitive answer to the question of the dollar's future, but rather the goal is to highlight the various ways that political scientists can widen analyses of this topic.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Gherari Habib

Règles de l'Organisation Mondiale du Commerce et Accords commerciaux régionaux. Le bilatéralisme conquérant ou le nouveau visage du commerce international

in *Revue générale de droit international publique*, Vol. 112, n. 2, 255-294

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Naím Moisés

The Coming Euroinvasion

in *Foreign Policy*, Issue 166, May / June

I am not worried about rich Arabs; it's the French who worry me." This was the response from a businessman in Clovis, California, reacting to my comment that the U.S. government was concerned about the influence of foreign-owned sovereign wealth funds.

"Why are you worried about the French?" I asked.

"They just bought the largest company here," he replied. "Life will now change for all of us—that company has been an important part of this community for years." He was referring to Pelco, a Clovis-based manufacturer of video security systems that was recently acquired by Schneider Electric, a French company.

There is nothing special about Pelco's sale; foreign companies buy American ones all the time and vice versa. This transaction was far smaller than the United Arab Emirates' \$7.5 billion investment in Citigroup or China's \$3 billion investment in the Blackstone Group, a major financial company. Except that this transaction is part of a trend that, though still largely unnoticed, will soon rear its head: The United States is poised to receive a massive—perhaps unprecedented—inflow of large- and medium-size European investors. Everything from corporate behemoths to family-owned companies are about to come to America on a corporate buying spree. Call it the Euroinvasion. Not only will many U.S. companies now have European owners, but the American marketplace will witness an infusion of new foreign competitors that will manufacture their products in the United States. They will use their new American base both to export to the world—including back to their own European market—and to serve the U.S. market from inside its borders. Such a trans-Atlantic shift will have an enormous impact on Europe's levels of employment and exports. Inevitably, the move will also ignite a political firestorm on both sides of the Atlantic. European politicians will denounce the companies for "exporting jobs" to America, while U.S. politicians, already rattled by the threat of foreign competition, will be infuriated by what they will brand as "the foreign takeover of America." CNN anchor Lou Dobbs will be foaming at the mouth.



Why is this happening now? The plummeting U.S. dollar has made the move across the Atlantic affordable for many European companies. And this may be a once-in-a-lifetime chance to relocate: American companies have rarely been so cheap. Five years ago, a German or Spanish company that coveted a U.S. competitor worth \$500 million needed roughly 430 million euros to purchase it. Today, it would take just 316 million euros to buy a company worth half a billion dollars.

European companies are not just being pulled to America by a cheaper dollar. They are also being pushed away from Europe by a business environment that is not as attractive as that in the United States. For many companies, moving across the Atlantic is the fastest and cheapest way to cut costs and become more competitive. The average hourly manufacturing wage in Europe is 16 percent higher than in the United States. Social insurance and payroll taxes are far steeper in Europe. As are energy costs: the average price of a kilowatt-hour for industrial usage in Europe is roughly 60 percent more than in the United States. Transportation costs are higher, too. And the cost advantages of operating in the United States don't stop there. Land is still far cheaper in the United States. An acre of rural land in the United States will cost you an average of \$1,900. The same plot of land will cost you \$5,700 in Germany, \$6,650 in Spain, and \$14,600 in Denmark.

Every year, competition in the global economy becomes fiercer. Although some European companies may set up shop in Asia or Eastern Europe—which can be even cheaper than the United States—most still view the United States as the corporate Mecca. As the CEO of an Italian manufacturing company recently told me, “I cannot afford not to move to the U.S. if I want my family's company to survive. It will not only be cheaper, but it will also place me and my engineers in the middle of a large cluster of leading-edge technology companies and in the largest market in the world. We will keep some design operations in Italy, but everything else goes to Massachusetts.”

Some manifestations of the Euroinvasion are already visible. Germany's ThyssenKrupp is investing \$3.7 billion in a steel plant in Alabama. France's Alstom, a manufacturer of high-speed trains and turbines, is building a major factory in Tennessee. Other European companies like Italy's Fiat have decided to reenter the U.S. market after a 13-year hiatus, and BMW is substantially expanding its manufacturing presence. Recently, the market value of Spain's Banco Santander surpassed the value of Citigroup, the standard bearer of the U.S. banking industry. It will be only natural for European banks like Santander to expand their presence in the United States by taking advantage of the fact that many U.S. financial institutions have become far cheaper as a result of the subprime crisis. But the Euroinvasion will be much more than a few headline-grabbing mega-deals. It will consist of thousands of smaller transactions in which midsize European companies swoop in to buy American companies for what will seem like a bargain.

It is going to be impossible for American politicians to stop the Euroinvasion. European politicians will be equally helpless in preventing their companies from moving to the United States. While stopping a few large investments by foreign government-owned funds in American ports, defense industries, and oil companies may be possible, preventing thousands of private companies from investing in the United States is not. Although difficult economic times always create political opportunities for demagogues and populists, America is far from ready to repeal capitalism. And stopping the Euroinvasion would require nothing short of that.

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Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Rajan Raghuram G.

The Future of the IMF and the World Bank



in *American Economic Review*, Vol. 98, No. 2, May 2008 , 110-115

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Lombardi Domenico

The governance of the World Bank: Lessons from the corporate sector

in *Review of International Organizations (The)* , n. 3, vol. 3, september , 287-323

ABSTRACT: The World Bank Group (WBG) is a multilateral organization as well as a large financial conglomerate. The debate on its governance, however, has mainly focused on how to ensure more inclusive decision-making by strengthening the voice and representation of its entire membership. The WBG's governance as a set of arrangements that enable the principal (shareholders) to oversee the agent (management) has so far been overlooked, even though the adequacy of such arrangements is relevant in all institutions wherein shareholders delegate to management the achievement of organizational objectives. In reviewing the institutional, historical, and current underpinnings of the WBG's decision-making, we elaborate on the extent to which the Group follows best-practice corporate governance standards that have been designed with the aim of improving shareholders' oversight. Drawing from a methodology developed by the IFC, an entity of the WBG, we analyze the Group's internal governance, highlighting which aspects are furthest from (or closest to) current financial-sector best practices. In so doing, we provide a framework for prioritizing the most critical areas in which the WBG's governance falls short of private-sector standards, and we identify the nature of possible remedies.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Lemierre Jean

The questions facing Europe's development bank

in *Europe's World*, Issue 9, Summer

The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development was founded following the collapse of communism, and has turned out to be a resounding success. Jean Lemierre, who is stepping down after eighty years as its president, urges the EBRD's shareholders to be true to its founding principles.

<http://www.europesworld.org/EWSettings/Article/tabid/191/ArticleType/articleview/ArticleID/20666/Default.aspx>

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 3. Security communities and organizations

Tow, W.T.

Asia's Competitive "Strategic Geometries": The Australian Perspective

in *Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs*, Volume 30, Number 1, April , 29-51



Recent changes of government in Australia and Japan, and a pending one in the United States, signifies a historical crossroads in these three allies' security politics in the Asia-Pacific region. In recent years, all three countries have tended to rationalize their strategic collaboration on the need to build innovative and competitive-oriented "strategic geometries" as a means to counter China's growing power and to meet new types of threats in the region. Yet the Australian Government under John Howard simultaneously pursued a hedging strategy, exploiting its growing economic relationship with China while strengthening its diplomatic and strategic profile with the United States. Despite Tokyo's own substantial economic relationship with Beijing, recent Japanese leaders were unable to pursue the same type of "dual track" strategy to the same extent as Howard. With Kevin Rudd's election as the new Australian Prime Minister and Yasuo Fukuda's ascent to power in Japan, prospects for Australia and Japan to cultivate more independent politico-security ties with Beijing have strengthened. If so, the evolving regional security postures of both these US allies may compel the United States to reassess its own traditional skepticism towards multilateral security groupings in the region.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 3. Security communities and organizations

Wivel Anders

Balancing against threats or bandwagoning with power? Europe and the transatlantic relationship after the Cold War

in *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* , Vol. 21, n. 3, September , 289-305

The United States has played an important role in European security since the early 20th century. From the time of the end of the Cold War, this role has changed as a consequence of the lack of a common territorial threat and the overwhelming power of the United States relative to Europe. How have European states responded to the challenges of the American world order? Are they adapting their security policies to match the challenges of US security policy and the American world order? What are the implications of the European response for the transatlantic relationship? This article seeks to describe and explain European security behaviour in the American world through the prism of two realist theories: balance of power realism and balance of threat realism. Despite sharing a common starting point in realist assumptions, each theory allows us to tell a different story about Europe's position in the American world order as well as the opportunities and challenges it faces.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 3. Security communities and organizations

George Mulgan, A.

Breaking the Mould: Japan's Subtle Shift from Exclusive Bilateralism to Modest Minilateralism

in *Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs*, Volume 30, Number 1, April , 52-72

Neorealists argue that Japan's response to the rise of China has been to draw closer to the United States in order to balance Chinese power. In practice, the Koizumi and Abe administrations differed in their responses to the growth of Chinese power in East Asia. While Prime Minister Koizumi sought to consolidate the US-Japan alliance, Prime Minister Abe adopted a dual-track approach, combining enhanced bilateralism with enhanced regionalism. Although buttressing the US-Japan alliance, this strategy aimed to balance China by building a containment coalition with other Asia-Pacific



states. Japan's signing of a security declaration with Australia in March 2007 was an important element of Abe's strategy, and marked a subtle shift in Japanese security policy from exclusive bilateralism to modest minilateralism. Although congruent with US strategic interests, this move supported Prime Minister Abe's ambition to exercise more autonomous influence over the regional security order.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 3. Security communities and organizations

de Ayala José Enrique

**Carta de Europa: La OTAN y la defensa europea
in Política Exterior, 123**

Sin avances en la Política Exterior y de Seguridad Común, la defensa colectiva de la Unión Europea seguirá en manos de la OTAN, pese a que no todos los países de la UE son miembros de la Alianza. En los Balcanes, Afganistán, Asia Central o Rusia se pone de manifiesto la necesidad de que la Unión desarrolle una verdadera Política de Seguridad y Defensa.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 3. Security communities and organizations

Bailes Alyson

**Cold War lessons for security policy today
in Europe's World, Issue 9, Summer**

Nuclear armageddon was such a potent threat that it yielded disarmament deals and the OSCE's collective approach to European security. But Alyson Bailes warns that not just pillars but "whole bastions" of European security architecture have now crumbled away.

<http://www.europesworld.org/EWSettings/Article/tabid/191/ArticleType/articleview/ArticleID/20741/Default.aspx>

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 3. Security communities and organizations

Head Naomi

**Critical Theory and its Practices: Habermas, Kosovo and International Relations
in Politics, Vol. 28, Issue 3, October, 150-159**

Developing the 'applied turn' in critical theory and Habermasian discourse ethics, this article explores whether a communicative ethics approach enables us to examine the justifications for and legitimacy of actions taken by states during NATO's intervention in Kosovo. By focusing on the deliberations which took place in the UN Security Council over Kosovo from March 1998 to June 1999 and the negotiations at Rambouillet in 1999, it will be shown that there are patterns of exclusion, coercion and illegitimacy which not only challenge the claims to legitimacy of the



intervention and of the interveners, but indicate the critical power of a communicative framework.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 3. Security communities and organizations

Green, M.J.; Twining, D.

Democracy and American Grand Strategy in Asia: The Realist Principles Behind an Enduring Idealism

in Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs, Volume 30, Number 1, April , 1-28

Has democracy promotion been discredited as a central theme of American foreign policy after the US experience in Iraq? Many American critics and friends overseas appear to believe so. It would be wrong, however, to believe that the ideational approach of American foreign policy will diminish, particularly in Asia. First, there is not in fact a tension between the United States' material power and its ideals as a democracy. Second, post-Bush leaders identify and embrace the promotion of bilateral and multilateral cooperation among Asia-Pacific democracies as central to the United States' regional strategy. Third, and most important, democracy promotion and security cooperation among like-minded democracies will remain a central objective of American foreign policy in Asia because those elements magnify American power and facilitate US goals. In short, the ideational balance of power in Asia directly affects the material balance of power. This article examines these trends in American policy in Asia, the outlook for greater strategic and diplomatic cooperation among regional democracies, and the implications for the region, including China and ASEAN, of a US democracy-based approach to Asia policy.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 3. Security communities and organizations

Rickli Jean-Marc

European small states military policies after the Cold War: from territorial to niche strategies

in Cambridge Review of International Affairs , Vol. 21, n. 3, September , 307-325

This article looks at the evolution of European small states' military policies after the Cold War. Traditionally, small states faced a security dilemma between favouring influence and guaranteeing sovereignty. These security options were embodied by the strategy of alliance and the policy of neutrality. This article argues that in today's unipolar world small states' security policy must be cooperative either in the form of joining a security institution or an ad hoc coalition. This has two consequences for small states' military policies. These can either favour niche or lead/framework nation strategies. This in turn, depends on the strategic ambitions of the small states, which are ultimately mediated by their strategic culture. This article concludes by looking at the military policies of Cold War neutral states after the Cold War.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 3. Security communities and organizations

Steinbock Dan

NATO and Northern Europe: From Nordic Balance to Northern Balance

in American Foreign Policy Interests, Vol. 30, Issue 4 , 196-210



Through the cold war, the bipolar order between the United States and the Soviet Union was reflected by the “Nordic balance” between the Nordic NATO members (Norway, Denmark, Iceland) and the nonmembers (Sweden, Finland). Today Northern Europe is broader, rapidly integrating, prosperous, and one of the most competitive regions worldwide. Nordic balance has been surpassed by a more fluid northern balance. Because of the ongoing enlargement of the European Union and NATO and the role of a resurgent Russia, security issues remain vital in the region. Over time tensions may be reduced by a shared focus on the Baltic Sea region's joint economic, political, and security interests. In the near term Sweden and Finland will deepen NATO cooperation even as they continue to debate NATO membership.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 3. Security communities and organizations

Schwab George

NATO and Transatlantic Security: An Overview

in *American Foreign Policy Interests*, Vol. 30, Issue 3 , 131-135

Assessing the nature of the threat posed by militant Islamic fundamentalism and contemporary Russia in the context of inquiring into NATO's disposition to fulfill a global mission as well as regional missions leads to answers that underscore the observation that a strong NATO will continue to keep Europe at peace.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 3. Security communities and organizations

Desker Barry

New Security Dimensions in the Asia-Pacific

in *Asia Pacific Review*, Volume 15 Issue 1 , 56-75

The rise of China provides a major challenge to the United States, the undisputed hegemon in the Asia-Pacific region since the second world war. This development provides regional states with an opportunity to shape the regional security architecture by adopting an inclusive approach to China. The role of the Association of Southeast Asian States (ASEAN) tends to be under-estimated by Western scholars who often see the European model as the only approach to regional integration. This paper discusses the significant achievements of ASEAN in serving as a catalyst for the establishment of regional institutions. Such institutions could serve as instruments for the management of China's relations with Japan and India. It is contended that the emergence of Asian powers, especially China, will result in a challenge to the Washington Consensus of Western norms and values focusing on individual rights which have governed international institutions. The rise of China is likely to see the application of a Beijing Consensus emphasising the balance between individual rights and social obligations, which would resonate positively in the region. In the twenty-first century, global institutions will need to reflect the norms, values and practices of global society and not just Atlantic perspectives.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 3. Security communities and organizations

Buro Andreas

OSZE statt NATO: Alternativen zur Gewalteskalation

in *Blätter für deutsche & internationale Politik*, Oktober, 2008 , 77-81



Am Ende des Ost-West-Konflikts sprachen Politiker viel vom „Gemeinsamen Haus Europa“, das Ost und West in enger Partnerschaft miteinander verbinden sollte. „Als US-Außenminister James Baker bei KP-Generalsekretär Michail Gorbatschow am 8. Februar 1990 um dessen Zustimmung für den Verbleib des wiedervereinigten Deutschlands in der NATO warb, versicherte Baker, es werde ‚keine Ausweitung der gegenwärtigen NATO-Jurisdiktion nach Osten geben‘. Gorbatschow setzte nach: ‚Jede Erweiterung ...

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 3. Security communities and organizations

Sion Liora

Peacekeeping and the Gender Regime

in **Journal of Contemporary Ethnography** , vol. 37, n. 5, October , 561-585

This article addresses the issue of women participation in peacekeeping missions by focusing on two North Atlantic Treaty Organization Dutch peacekeeping units in Bosnia (SFOR8) and Kosovo (KFOR2). I argue that soldiers are ambivalent toward what is perceived the "feminine" aspects of peace missions. Although peacekeeping is a new military model, it reproduces the same traditional combat-oriented mind-set of gender roles. Therefore Dutch female soldiers are limited in their ability to perform and contribute to peace missions. Both peacekeeping missions and female soldiers are confusing for the soldiers, especially for the more hypermasculine Bulldog infantry soldiers. Both represent a blurred new reality in which the comfort of the all-male unit and black-and-white combat situations are replaced by women in what were traditionally men's roles and the fuzzy environment of peacekeeping. At the same time, both are also necessary: peacekeeping, although not desirable, has become the main function for Dutch soldiers, and women are still a small minority, although they gain importance in the army. Present government policy prescribes a gender mainstreaming approach to recruiting, partly due to a lack of qualified male personnel, especially after the end of the draft in 1996.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 3. Security communities and organizations

Rolfe, J.

Regional Security for the Asia-Pacific: Ends and Means

in **Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs**, Volume 30, Number 1, April , 99-117

Despite calls over the years for the Asia-Pacific region, or some subset of it, to develop a regional security regime, no deliberate action to achieve this has been taken. This paper considers the possible ends of a regional security regime and the means towards achieving them. The ends themselves would differ according to whether any regime focused on security, traditionally and narrowly conceived, on comprehensive security or on human security. No matter which approach is taken, if the regime is to be successful in any sense beyond that of rhetoric, some of the region's cherished norms such as non-intervention as that is currently interpreted will have to be at least modified, if not completely scrapped. Even if the region collectively decides it needs a security regime and can agree on its ends, there are many alternative ways of achieving the ends and the processes of working out detailed rules will be difficult and time-consuming. None of this is to say that establishing a regional security regime will be impossible. It is to say that it will involve a lot of work, and a lot of compromise by state policy-makers.



Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 3. Security communities and organizations

Bisley, N.

Securing the “Anchor of Regional Stability”?: The Transformation of the US-Japan Alliance and East Asian Security

in Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs, Volume 30, Number 1, April , 73-98

Over the past decade, the US-Japan alliance has been strengthened and subtly but substantively transformed. In response to a range of domestic changes and new international challenges, a relationship that was becoming frayed in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War has been rejuvenated and re-tooled with significant consequences for East Asia's strategic setting. This article provides a critical analysis of this process with two ends in mind. First, it provides a systematic overview of the changes, their sources and what they mean for the alliance partners and their security interests. It argues that the US-Japan alliance now has two distinct functions, one relating to regional stability and the other focusing on shared global strategic aims. The alliance is in good health, but its continued vitality will require careful management. Second, it assesses the regional consequences of this change and argues that while alliance enhancement has been intended to promote mutual and regional security there is reason to doubt whether the latter goal has been served through the enhancement process.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 3. Security communities and organizations

Chau Andrew

Security Community and Southeast Asia: Australia, the U.S., and ASEAN's Counter-Terror Strategy

in Asian Survey , Volume 48, Number 4 July/August , 626–649

This article evaluates the notion of an ASEAN Security Community. ASEAN's community building initiative is examined in the context of regional, sub-regional, and national policy strategies to address a shared regional threat of transnational terrorism. The article examines under which circumstances constructivist norms and institutions generate denser networks of cooperation.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 3. Security communities and organizations

Symon, A.

Southeast Asia's Nuclear Power Thrust: Putting ASEAN's Effectiveness to the Test?

in Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs, Volume 30, Number 1, April , 118-139

The possibility of nuclear power in Southeast Asia to help meet huge growth in electricity demand has suddenly risen in government planning. Vietnam, Indonesia and Thailand have plans for nuclear power generation while Malaysia and the



Philippines are studying the option. These plans and possibilities raise a gamut of economic, environmental and security issues and fears which policy makers are only beginning to grapple with. As in other parts of the world, both where there are established nuclear generation industries and where there are not, nuclear power is being turned to as a possible solution to meeting demand when the cost of traditional fossil fuels used for generation, coal and natural gas, are rising steeply, and in a way that mitigates against contribution by fossil fuel combustion to the greenhouse effect and predicted global warming. But how governments in Southeast Asia go about implementing nuclear power is still far from clear. Optimal development from economic, environmental and security points of view would argue for a cooperative approach via the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), possibly through an ASEAN nuclear power authority. So far, plans for nuclear power generation are fairly limited when considered against total projected power demand. But they may be the precursor to a much greater commitment to nuclear power if first plants are successfully developed. Managing the development of nuclear power will be a major test of ASEAN's maturity and effectiveness.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 3. Security communities and organizations

Minuto Rizzo Alessandro

The Transformation of the Atlantic Alliance and the European Union

in *Rivista di Studi Politici Internazionali*, Volume 75, n. 2, aprile-giugno , 272-285

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 3. Security communities and organizations

Bardos Gordon N.

The new political dynamics of southeastern Europe

in *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, vol. 8, n. 3 , 171-188

Southeastern Europe is going through its most profound period of change since Slobodan Milosevic's overthrow in 2000. The pillars supporting Balkan stability over the past decade - the large US military presence in the region, the promise of foreseeable EU accession, and the international consensus on agreements guaranteeing Balkan stability (such as the Dayton Peace Agreement, UN Security Council Resolution 1244, and the Ohrid Accords in FYR Macedonia) - are under attack or are being increasingly questioned. Meanwhile, no new security architecture has been erected, while several new developments, including Russia's return to the Balkans and the creation of two new states, is throwing new unknown strategic variables into the Balkan security equation. Without serious re-engagement by the EU and the US in the region, southeastern Europe's democratic and market transitions could still be derailed.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 3. Security communities and organizations

Serfaty Simon

The pressures for a new Euro-Atlantic security strategy

in *Europe's World*, Issue 9, Summer



Divided on a wide range of issues, the 32-members of the Euro-Atlantic community need more than ever to assert their shared security aims, says Simon Serfaty. He argues that Europe must not wait for America to take the lead.

<http://www.europesworld.org/EWSettings/Article/tabid/191/ArticleType/articleview/ArticleID/21138/Default.aspx>

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 3. Security communities and organizations

Smith Julianne, Williams Michael

Threats from Within: Four Challenges Inside the NATO Alliance
in *International Spectator (The)*, Vol. XLIII, n. 3, July - September , 21-26

Common wisdom is that NATO's future hinges solely on the outcome of the International Security Assistance Force mission in Afghanistan. While the state of Afghanistan will impact the future of the Alliance for better or for worse, it will not be the sole or even primary factor to influence the future of NATO. In many ways, Afghanistan has become an excuse for the Alliance to ignore some of the in-built problems of the organisation. The allies' inability to define clearly the nature of the Alliance and its core missions, a lack of capability and poor funding, topped off by exceedingly weak and troubled relations with other international organisations, particularly the European Union, all pose significant challenges that the alliance must address to remain relevant, coherent, and equipped to engage effectually in future operations.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 3. Security communities and organizations

Scheffer Jaap de Hoop

Towards fairer burden-sharing in NATO
in *Europe's World*, Issue 9, Summer

It's not only in Afghanistan that some NATO allies shoulder a greater share of defence costs and responsibilities, says NATO's Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer. He explains how the problem is now being addressed, and stresses that the alliance offers the best solution to the problem, even though it may never be "totally fair".

<http://www.europesworld.org/EWSettings/Article/tabid/191/ArticleType/articleview/ArticleID/20475/Default.aspx>

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 3. Security communities and organizations

Dumoulin André

Traité de Lisbonne. De l'assistance mutuelle à la défense mutuelle: oscillations et interprétations
in *Revue de l'Union européenne/Revue du Marché Commun et de l'Union européenne*, n. 519, juin , 351-355

The comparative study of the mutual assistance clause featured in the Treaty of Lisbon with other legal obligations of mutual defence (NATO and WEU) leads to a series of issues regarding the extent of its application, its interpretation, and the extent to which it may be called upon. The power of the Atlantic Alliance, the differences in commitment, the statutes of the Union's member States and the degree of automatic reaction make the area of solidarity more complex,



all the more so because this comes in to play where the response to terrorism is concerned. In the absence of clarification, flexibility remains appropriate from the moment that is the States giving the "interpretation" and "fixing" the rules of the game.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 3. Security communities and organizations

Fitzpatrick Mark

**US-India Nuclear Cooperation Accord: Implications for the Non-proliferation Regime
in Asia Pacific Review**, Volume 15 Issue 1 , 76-85

Members of the IAEA Board and of the Nuclear Suppliers Group may need to decide this year whether to go along with the US proposal to allow nuclear cooperation with India despite its non-NPT status. Permitting nuclear sales to India would have important geo-strategic benefits by strengthening its partnership with the US. Yet granting India an exception to nuclear supply guidelines would also have significant non-proliferation disadvantages by weakening the NPT. Whether it would assist India's nuclear weapons development is unclear. If India were to agree voluntarily to cap its production of fissile material, this would rectify the greatest lost opportunity of the US-India nuclear agreement. The non-proliferation benefits that the Bush Administration has claimed for the accord, such as that it brings India into consensus on the Iran nuclear issue, are neither guaranteed nor long-lasting. Perhaps the best that can be said is that the transparency the accord will bring to some aspects of the Indian nuclear program could contribute to arms control measures in the future.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 3. Security communities and organizations

Calleo David P.

**Why EU and US geopolitical interests are no longer the same
in Europe's World**, Issue 9, Summer

American and European policymakers have taken divergent paths of late because they have interpreted key trends differently, writes David P. Calleo. He traces the developments that have divided the formerly close Atlantic partners and assesses the outlook for the relationship.

<http://www.europesworld.org/EWSettings/Article/tabid/78/Default.aspx?Id=0e38b09b-a00b-4168-bee2-ef4b0ad18ab8>

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 3. Security communities and organizations

Shepherd Laura J.

**'To save succeeding generations from the scourge of war': the US, UN and the violence of security
in Review of International Studies (The)**, Vol. 34, Issue 2, April , 293-311

This investigation explores the ways in which discourses of security functioned to allow military intervention in Iraq to become 'thinkable', and how these actions serve to reconfigure not only the identities of states – the US and Iraq – but also the characteristics of the international as a spatial and conceptual domain. In the weeks preceding the military



intervention in Iraq, significant negotiations were conducted between the US government and the UN that were commented on extensively in press statements and other documents released by both parties. Drawing on UNSC Resolutions, public debates and academic analyses, in this article I analyse the relations between the US and the UN in the build-up to the Iraq war, making two related claims.

First, I argue that each discourse is organised around a particular logic of security. By 'logics of security', I mean the ways in which various concepts are organised within specific discourses of security. That is, each competing conceptualisation of security has a distinct primary focus, referent object and perspective on the arrangement of the international system. The ways in which these claims are made, the assumptions that inform them, and the policy prescriptions that issue from them, are what I refer to as 'logics of security'. Second, I argue that the intervention in Iraq, a violence undertaken in the name of 'security', has functioned to reproduce the international as a spatial and conceptual domain according to the logic of a highly conventional narrative of sovereignty, and, ultimately, of state identity.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Kraska James C

Global And Going Nowhere: Sustainable Development, Global Governance & Liberal Democracy
in *Denver Journal of international law and policy*, Vol. 34, issue 2 , 247

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Aksu Eşref

"Perpetual Peace": A Project by Europeans for Europeans?
in *Peace & Change*, issue 3, vol. 33, july , 368-387

ABSTRACT: Immanuel Kant's classic essay Perpetual Peace has famously informed much of the neoliberal "democratic peace" scholarship in International Relations over the past few decades. It has also influenced contemporary notions of cosmopolitanism and global governance. We need to realize, however, that Kant's essay is only one representative of the eighteenth-century European thought on perpetual peace. Several other writers have produced their own versions of the perpetual peace ideal. This article surveys some notable eighteenth-century perpetual peace proposals from a specific perspective: it seeks to find out the attitude of these various proposals toward non-European peoples. It asks, in other words, whether and to what extent non-Europeans were "included" in the eighteenth-century European visions of a perpetual peace.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Buzan Barry

A Leader Without Followers? The United States in World Politics after Bush



in **International Politics** , Volume 45, Issue 5, September , 554-570

This paper argues that while the US might retain the desire, and up to a point the material capacity to lead, it is likely to find itself increasingly without followers. Partly this is because the US is less accepted as a model, partly it is because of differences on specific policies, and partly it is because of the changing foundations of legitimacy in international society. The big issues likely to dominate the international agenda in the coming years are more likely to decrease than to increase the willingness of others to follow the US. The waning of US leadership is not just a consequence of the particular incompetence of the Bush administration over the last 8 years, though that has surely amplified the problem. It reflects deeper changes that make global hegemony by any single power, or even by the West collectively, decreasingly legitimate.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Marchetti Raffaele

A matter of drawing boundaries: global democracy and international exclusion

in **Review of International Studies (The)**, Vol. 34, Issue 2, April , 207-224

This article defends the case for a global extension of democracy by deploying a cosmo-federalist theory. As a response to the current state of international exclusion, the radical project of stretching the paradigm of democratic inclusion to the extreme limits encompassing the whole of mankind, is here presented. The article begins by taking position for a choice-based version of consequentialism that generates a principle of political justice centred on political participation. From this, a political project is developed that envisages a cosmopolitan system where all world citizens are included within a scheme of a direct representative participation under an overarching authority governing the process of democratising world affairs. Crucial in this is the establishment of an all-inclusive authority to legitimately delineate jurisdictional boundaries and a multilayered system of political interaction.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Chester Charles C., Moomaw William R.

A taxonomy of collaborative governance: a guide to understanding the diversity of international and domestic conservation accords

in **International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics**, Volume 8, Number 3, September , 187-206

Partially in response to the increasing complexity of governance structures in the international environmental arena, international scholars have adopted a distinction between "Type 1" and "Type 2" international agreements. The former refer to agreements between governments, whereas the latter refer to agreements between governments and nonstate actors. While useful, this distinction offers only a partial taxonomy of the diversity of collaborative governance, and fails to incorporate "Type 3" dynamics among nonstate actors. As an initial attempt at sorting out the wide array of collaborative governance structures both domestically and across international borders, we propose a 3 × 3 matrix based on two typologies, one institutional (governmental, collaborative, nonstate), the other geopolitical (domestic, transborder, interstate/transnational). The result is a classification system of nine types of both domestic and international governance. In addition to identifying fundamental differences among the myriad forms of governance, the matrix reveals how the "softening of sovereignty" occurs in practice.



Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Bäckstrand Karin

Accountability of Networked Climate Governance: The Rise of Transnational Climate Partnerships in Global Environmental Politics, Volume 8, Issue 3, August , 74-102

Public-private partnerships (PPP) have been advanced as a new tool of global governance, which can supply both effective and legitimate governance. In the context of recent debates on the democratic legitimacy of transnational governance, this paper focuses on accountability as a central component of legitimacy. The aim of this paper is to map transnational climate partnerships and evaluate their accountability record in terms of transparency, monitoring mechanisms and representation of stakeholders. Three types of partnerships are identified with respect to their degree of public-private interaction: public-private (hybrid), governmental and private-private. Most of the climate partnerships have functions of advocacy, service provision and implementation. None are standard setting, which indicates that governmental actors are less willing to “contract out” rule-setting authority to private actors in the climate change. Some partnerships, such as the World Summit on Sustainable Development climate partnerships and Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects represent “new” modes of hybrid governance with high degree of public-private interaction. However, many partnerships, not least the voluntary technology agreements such as the APP, rest on “old” form of governance based on the logic of lobbying, corporatism, co-optation and interstate bargaining. Private (business-to-business) climate partnerships are to varying degrees geared toward quantitative targets in the Kyoto Protocol. The accountability record is higher for hybrid climate partnerships, such as the CDM, due to extensive reporting and monitoring mechanisms, while lower for the governmental networks, such as voluntary technology agreements. Partnerships do not necessarily replace or erode the authority of sovereign states, but rather propels the hybridization and transformation of authority that is increasingly shared between state and nonstate actors.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Pariotti Elena

Attori non-statali, internazionalizzazione dei diritti umani e responsabilità sociale delle imprese in Pace Diritti Umani, n. 2, anno 3, maggio-agosto

ABSTRACT: In the globalization age law presents two basic features: (1) it is characterised by an ever less hierarchical framework; (2) non-state actors have been playing an increasing role in rule making, as it is showed by the emerging of the new *lex mercatoria*. Such features do not matter for international private law only, but also for the process of human rights internationalization, which is developing through interconnections among transnational law and public international law trends.

This new picture brings about some relevant changes involving the overcoming of the classical view that international law speaks to States and international organisations only. Obligations are increasingly placed to private actors as well. In face of these processes, transnational corporations (TNCs) are viewed as strategic actors, capable to give global echo to the standards they agree to. Here the problems is whether and how private governance regimes, which stem from contractual relations among «global» private actors, allow to be mitigated by imperative norms, which should be created and applied even against what would be desirable for the parts involved. This is the problem of the emerging of something like the *jus cogens* in transnational law.



TNCs' obligations seem to lie at the borderline between ethics and law and the increased role played by soft law in international legal system contributes to make the two spheres conflate. Synergies among international law, corporate management patterns, and ethics stem both from a great amount of soft law sources that concern transnational corporations' conduct.

The paper addresses the overlap between soft law regulation and corporate social responsibility paradigm. It aims at assessing whether this very convergence could be a proper path to enforce private actors' legal liability for human rights when operating beyond their home state.

Since human rights are the key notion of this interplay, such issue is strongly connected to another one, concerning whether and at which conditions human rights may be regarded as endowed with horizontal effect. Human rights function as normative criteria for identifying TNCs' stakeholders and for justifying their claims. The reference to human rights contained in corporate social responsibility (CSR) model implies that both negative and positive correlative rights are ascribed to corporations.

The analysis aims at showing that the interplay between law and ethics should be differently assessed depending on which kind of correlative duty is at stake. With regard to negative duties, CSR initiatives risk weakening the impact of international law, which is endowed with resources to recognize the horizontal effect of human rights. For the same reason, the soft law concerning TNCs' conduct contribute to confusion, by presenting the respect of rights, independently from the kind of correlative duties involved, as an aim that corporations may voluntarily undertake. On the contrary, when positive duties are at issue, to the extent that horizontal effect cannot be assumed, CSR initiatives as well as soft law measures turn out to be much more useful. Nevertheless, it should not be neglected that in this case private actors' role should be narrower and strictly subordinate to the programmes worked out by institutional actors.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Kaul Inge

Auf dem Weg zum Weltstaat?

in *Internationale Politik*, n. 7-8, 63. Jahrgang, Juli-August

ABSTRACT: Erst Blockierer, jetzt Vermittler: Unter dem Zwang weltweiter Krisen und dem Druck, globale öffentliche Güter wie Frieden, Klima- und Finanzstabilität bereitzustellen, ändert der Nationalstaat seine Rolle. Mehr und mehr verzahnen sich binnenländisches Handeln und internationale Anforderungen – die politische und soziale Globalisierung folgt der ökonomischen.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Gardner Anne-Marie

Beyond standards before status: democratic governance and non-state actors

in *Review of International Studies (The)*, Vol. 34, Issue 3, July, 531-552

Are international standards of democratic governance applied to sub-state actors as well as to states? By examining the international response to self-determination claims, this article demonstrates that the international community does indeed hold sub-state groups accountable to such standards. Claimant groups that have internalised human rights and



democratic norms are more likely to receive international support in the form of empowerment (promoting some form of self-governance). Through a comparison of the Kosovars' quest for self-determination with the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians' claim, the article suggests that 'standards before status' is neither unique to Kosovo nor a deviation from the pre-1999 international response to that claim.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Zlatko Sabic

Building Democratic and Responsible Global Governance: The Role of International Parliamentary Institutions in Parliamentary Affairs , Volume 61, Number 2, April , 255-271

The emergence and growth of international parliamentary institutions (IPIs) is a phenomenon that needs a comprehensive evaluation. Their members, parliamentarians, are increasingly interested in participating in these institutions, which explains the dynamic growth of IPIs over the last few decades. IPIs also have a long history. The first among them, the Inter-Parliamentary Union, was founded in 1889. As IPIs have the potential to establish themselves as a contributor to a more democratic and transparent global governance, the enthusiasm for creating them is puzzling, because parliamentarians are primarily expected to follow the local, rather than international agenda. Other problems may have a negative impact on activities of IPIs, such as the lack of continuity, institutional memory and funding. What, then, is the rationale behind the creation of IPIs? What are the returns that justify the investment of parliamentarians' time and energy in these institutions?

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Krause Keith

Building the agenda of human security: policy and practice within the Human Security Network in International Social Science Journal , Volume 59, Issue s1, September 2008 , 65-79

The Human Security Network (HSN) represented an innovative attempt at flexible multilateralism, working with a small group of like-minded states. This article traces its origins and evolution, in particular, in the campaign to ban anti-personnel land mines) and examines the process of developing and implementing policy-in and beyond the HSN. The HSN struggled to develop a coherent and focused human security agenda and distinguished itself somewhat from other international efforts to define human security. In several different areas (like small arms, the "responsibility to protect" and the civilian protection agenda) the HSN can be shown to have been at the genesis of several concrete initiatives. It has been somewhat less successful at institutionalising its interactions, and in embedding a vision of human security in the foreign policies of participating states. Finally, the article explains how a full appreciation of the impact of the HSN requires examining not just its formal diplomatic and political efforts (which have had limited results), but its broader contribution (along with many other actors) to the setting of the human security agenda worldwide.



Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Thompson Scott

Can Might Make Right? The Use of Force to Impose Democracy and the Arthurian Dilemma in the Modern Era in Law and contemporary problems, Volume 71 Spring 2008 Number 2 , 163-184

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

G. JOHN IKENBERRY

China and the Rest Are Only Joining the American-Built Order in New Perspectives Quarterly, Vol. 25, Issue 3, Summer , 18-21

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Haas Peter M.

Climate Change Governance after Bali in Global Environmental Politics, Volume 8, Issue 3, August , 1-7

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Vlcek William

Competitive or Coercive? The Experience of Caribbean Offshore Financial Centres with Global Governance in Round Table (The): the Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs, Volume 97, Issue 396, June , 439-452

This article examines the readiness to be internationally competitive on the part of small vulnerable economies through a consideration of Caribbean offshore financial centres. More specifically, it analyses the space for decision making to enhance the competitiveness of financial service provision permitted by the increased institutionalization of global financial governance. The promulgation of international standards and best practices for the operation of financial services has moved beyond the concerns with global financial stability and supervision (a predominant concern in the late 1990s) to focus on measures against terrorist financing today as states seek to achieve a measure of security through financial surveillance and discipline. Collectively, increased governance produces increased costs for national financial supervisory authorities, which over-extends in particular the capacity and capability of small jurisdictions. To combine these regimes of governance with initiatives to establish an international 'level playing field' in financial services



produces a competitive environment that privileges the larger developed economies. From this perspective, it is less a matter of competition and more a case of coercion, which then lessens the opportunity to structure an internationally competitive small economy using offshore financial services as one avenue towards economic development. At the same time, the nature of the states system continues to provide a space in which offshore financial centres may compete

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Bellamy Alex

Conflict Prevention and Responsibility to Protect

in Global Governance, vol. 14, n. 2, april-june , 135-156

ABSTRACT: Although the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty identified the responsibility to prevent as the single most important aspect of its report *The Responsibility to Protect*, most scholarly and political attention has been given to the concept's reaction component rather than to its prevention component. This article aims to correct this imbalance by examining progress with, changes to, and attitudes toward the responsibility to prevent since the publication of the commission's report in 2001. It seeks to explain the relative neglect of prevention in debates about *The Responsibility to Protect*, arguing that the answer can be found in a combination of doubts about how wide the definition of prevention should be, political concerns raised by the use of prevention in the war on terrorism, and practical concerns about the appropriate institutional locus for responsibility. The article moves on to identify some basic principles that might help advance the responsibility to prevent.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Beadsworth Richard

Cosmopolitanism and Realism: Towards a Theoretical Convergence?

in Millennium: Journal of International Studies, n. 1, vol. 37, august , 69-96

ABSTRACT: On both theoretical and analytic accounts, cosmopolitanism and realism seem destined to bypass each other, one entering, at best, the normative dimension of social science, the other, stressing its positive dimension. In this article, I want to suggest that this opposition needs to be unsettled for future theorization and (perhaps) practice of world politics. Taking these two schools of thought is exemplary since their respective theoretical modalities and tenets seem so far opposed. Arguing for convergence between them constitutes part of an emerging attempt, on the part of political philosophers, theorists and international relations scholars today, to recast the conceptual landscape of international relations in response to present complexities of political agency. This convergence is here situated in terms of: (1) the legitimacy of power; (2) the increasing immanence of justice to power in an interdependent world; and (3) the importance of moral leadership in the world political domain. The article is theoretical in modality and diction; outstanding empirical questions are posed once these points are made.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Depledge Joanna



Crafting the Copenhagen Consensus: Some Reflections

in Review of European Community & International Environmental Law, Volume 17, Issue 2, August , 154-165

The 2007 Bali Climate Conference launched a 'meta-negotiation' of unprecedented scale and complexity. Culminating in 2009, climate change delegates must now define the next round of targets for the Kyoto Protocol developed country parties, and comparable provisions for the USA. Most dauntingly, negotiators must also devise a new architecture for further 'action' by developing countries under the Convention. This paper reflects on the key challenges involved in crafting a consensus at the climate conference in 2009 in Copenhagen. In particular, it explores options for reaching agreement with the USA and developing countries, suggesting a transition phase up to 2020. For developing countries, the paper outlines a possible 'choose and no-lose' approach, along with options for increased financing. The paper concludes by looking beyond 2009, emphasizing that, given the complexity of the negotiations, a work programme post-Copenhagen will be needed.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Müller Till

Customary Transnational Law: Attacking the Last Resort of State Sovereignty

in Indiana Journal for Global Legal Studies, Volume 15, issue 1, winter , 19-47

ABSTRACT: In the Westphalian State, Customary International Law (CIL) has traditionally been informed by high-level state action among close neighbors. However, it is no longer a foregone conclusion that CIL is resistant to the influences of greater globalization and transnational government and non-governmental action. As the interaction among and between national governments and non-governmental organizations increases in frequency, breadth, and physical distance, we are asked to reconsider the formation of modern CIL. Ultimately, the ever increasing importance of transnational cooperation, both in traditional governance and non-governmental action, necessarily informs modern CIL. The resultant body of law may appropriately be described as Customary Transnational Law.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Alter Karen J.

Delegating to International Courts: Self-Binding vs. Other-Binding Delegation

in Law and contemporary problems, Volume 71 Winter 2008 Number 1 , 37-76

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Karlberg Michael

Discourse, Identity, and Global Citizenship

in Peace Review, vol. 20, n. 3, july , 310-320



No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Oberthir Sebastian, Roche Kelly Claire

EU Leadership in International Climate Policy: Achievements and Challenges

in International Spectator (The), Vol. XLIII, n. 3, July - September , 35-50

Climate change has taken centre stage in European and international politics. Since the second half of the 1980s, the EU has established itself as an international leader on climate change and has considerably improved its leadership record. The Union has significantly enhanced both its external representation and its internal climate policies. However, implementation and policy coherence, coordination of EU environmental diplomacy, an evolving international agenda, EU enlargement, and a still precarious EU unity remain major challenges. Shifts in underlying driving forces and advances of EU domestic climate and energy policies nevertheless support the expectation that the EU will remain a progressive force in international climate policy for some time.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Okereke Chukwumerije

Equity Norms in Global Environmental Governance

in Global Environmental Politics, Volume 8, Issue 3, August , 25-50

Contestations over justice and equity in international environmental regimes present striking evidence of the struggle to create institutions for global environmental governance that are based on widely shared ethical standards of responsibility and accountability. Focusing on two key equity norms—the common heritage of mankind (CHM) and common but differentiated responsibility (CDR)—this paper highlights four factors that affect the influence of moral responsibility norms in global environmental regimes: (i) source and force of articulation; (ii) nature of issue-area; (iii) “moral temper” of the international community; and (iv) “fitness” of norms with the prevailing neoliberal economic idea and structure. Consequent upon the argument that the most important of all these factors is the “fitness” with the extant neoliberal order, the paper questions the assumptions of the burgeoning constructivist scholarship that tends to overemphasize the independent role of intersubjective beliefs in international politics. Further, it is suggested that the abiding “responsibility deficit” in institutions for global environmental governance is due mostly to the successful co-optation of equity norms for neoliberal ends.

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Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Hellmann Gunther, Herborth Benjamin

Fishing in the mild West: democratic peace and militarised interstate disputes in the transatlantic community

in Review of International Studies (The), Vol. 34, Issue 3, July , 481-506

According to many of its proponents, the proposition that democracies do not fight each other is ‘as close as anything we have to an empirical law’. However, there have been several incidents among solidified liberal democracies where



force was threatened or even used. Since these inter-democratic militarised interstate disputes (MIDs) almost always took place in the context of fisheries disputes, we examine two of these conflicts in detail: the cod wars between Iceland and Britain between the 1950s and the 1970s and the turbot war between Canada and Spain. We ask why these fisheries conflicts became militarised in the first place but did not escalate further. In both cases it was actually the presumed impossibility of a more violent escalation which led the parties to use force in the first place. Moreover, the (limited) use of force was almost always accompanied by the efforts of the parties involved to achieve some formalisation of international rules in the context of expanding regimes. Having demonstrated how some of the more prominent causal mechanisms stipulated by democratic peace theorists fail to convincingly account of these cases, we refrain from concluding that any of this falsifies the democratic peace proposition. However, in conclusion we do call into question the premises of the falsificationist methodology underlying much of the democratic peace debate on both theoretical and methodological grounds. Reframing the democratic peace proposition in terms of a large-scale process of desecuritisation, we contend, allows us to understand better how democratic interstate interaction remains inherently conflictive and possibly still subject to process of resecuritisation.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Christie James

From Gettysburg to Global Governance

in Federalist Debate (The), Year XXI, n. 1, March , 11-14

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Whitaker Beth Elise

Funding the International Refugee Regime: Implications for Protection

in Global Governance, vol. 14, n. 2, april-june

ABSTRACT: Despite the abundance of literature on international regimes, little attention has been given to how they are funded and the impact of funding on regime performance. This article examines how donor funding has affected the underlying principle of protection in the international refugee regime. It focuses on the case of Tanzania, where refugee protection standards have declined consistently over the past twelve years, and argues that a shortage of funding within the regime has contributed to the shift in government policy in several ways. To the extent that funding cuts have had an influence on declining protection standards, this case suggests that resource shortages may cause practice within an international regime to become inconsistent with its underlying principles, thus weakening the overall regime.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Caney Simon

Global Distributive Justice and the State

in Political Studies, Volume 56, Issue 3, October , 487-518



Many hold that the state has normative significance because its borders define the scope of egalitarian principles of distributive justice. On this view egalitarian principles of distributive justice should be applied within the state but should not be adopted at the global level. This article examines two reasons for accepting this view and for rejecting global egalitarianism, and finds both wanting. It then presents three challenges to any view that holds that the scope of principles of distributive justice should be determined by the boundaries of the state. It concludes by noting four distinct ways in which the state has normative significance, each of which can be endorsed by global egalitarians.

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Mulder Herman

**Global economic “architecture” is no longer fit for purpose
in Europe’s World**, Issue 9, Summer

In an era of rapid population growth, global society can only prosper if economic growth increases welfare and well-being on a sustainable and inclusive basis, says Herman Mulder. For this to work, the world needs governments, business and civil society to collaborate in new institutions which are “fit for purpose”.

<http://www.europesworld.org/EWSettings/Article/tabid/191/ArticleType/articleview/ArticleID/20776/Default.aspx>

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Limbach Jutta

**Globalization of Constitutional Law through Interaction of Judges
in Verfassung und Recht in Ubersee**, issue 1, vol. 41 , 51-55

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Francois Venter

**Globalization of Constitutional Law through comparative Constitution-making
in Verfassung und Recht in Ubersee**, issue 1, vol. 41 , 16-31

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Pahl-Wostl Ckaudia, Gupta Joyeeta, Petry Daniel

Governance and the Global Water System: A Theoretical Exploration



in **Global Governance**, vol. 14, n. 4, october-december , 419-435

ABSTRACT: Public policy on water has long been approached in the context of a locality, a country, or a river basin. However, scientific evidence now provides compelling arguments for adopting a global perspective on water management. This article argues that water governance today needs a multilevel design, including a significant global dimension. The discussion defines global water governance, highlights the implications for multilevel governance, and examines global water governance through the lens of governance typologies. The analysis along the categories of globalization/regionalization, centralization/decentralization, formality/informality, and state/nonstate actors and processes reveals that current global water governance is a fragmented, mobius-web arrangement. The article concludes by considering possible future trajectories of global water governance.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Spence Chris, Kulovesi Kati, Gutiérrez María, Muñoz Miquel

Great Expectations: Understanding Bali and the Climate Change Negotiations Process

in **Review of European Community & International Environmental Law**, Volume 17, Issue 2, August , 142-153

This article reviews the December 2007 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Bali. It considers expectations for the meeting and whether the event delivered on these expectations. It also evaluates the long-term context of the meeting and examines the discussions in Bali on the post-2012 period (when the Kyoto Protocol's first 'commitment period' expires). The article finds that the Bali meeting did not necessarily meet public expectations or respond directly to the latest scientific assessments calling for urgent action. However, the article also finds that Bali was successful in the context of the prevailing political and diplomatic realities and the immense complexity of the climate change challenge – a problem that does not lend itself to a 'quick fix' solution. The article concludes that Bali produced a solid outcome that gives direction to future talks and sets a clear deadline for their completion. Finally, it argues that, contrary to some experts' opinion, the lack of detail in the Bali outcome may prove to be a strength rather than a weakness, since it provides flexibility to negotiators as they try to craft a consensus by the end of 2009.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Jung Jai Kwan

Growing supranational identities in a globalising world? A multilevel analysis of the World Values Surveys

in **European Journal of Political Research**, issue 5, vol. 47, august , 578-609

ABSTRACT: Abstract. Are globalisation and regional integration producing a postnational identity among a wide variety of publics? Using the World Values Surveys (WVS), this article shows that there is a global pattern in public attitudes toward supranational identity: the younger the respondent, the more supranational. Yet a life-cycle effect, as opposed to a generational one, underlies this pattern. A multilevel analysis confirms this age effect on supranational identification in 43 countries covered in the recent wave of the WVS, but provides little support for the idea that a country's integration into the global economy and world society promotes supranational attachments among mass publics, especially youths. Regional integration and globalisation appear either complementary or contradictory to this identity shift, depending upon how ordinary citizens perceive their country's involvement in the processes of regional integration and globalisation, respectively.



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Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Grigorescu Alexandru

Horizontal Accountability in Intergovernmental Organizations

in Ethics and International Affairs, n. 3, vol. 22, fall , 285-308

ABSTRACT: Many intergovernmental organizations (IOs) have recently established offices of internal oversight. Yet scandals such as the one surrounding the Oil-for-Food Program in the United Nations have revealed serious flaws in the design of these institutions, especially their lack of independence from top administrators of the bureaucracies that they are supposed to oversee. This study argues that this is due, in great part, to the initial use of an imperfect domestic model. It shows that, in addition to using a flawed model as a starting point for negotiations, states and IO officials intentionally weakened oversight offices even more. The study argues that member-states need to quickly give such offices increased independence in order to make them more effective and to avoid the continued erosion of the legitimacy of IOs.

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Tocci Nathalie, Mikhelidze Nona

How to Engage with Political Islam? Lessons from Europe

in International Spectator (The), Vol. XLIII, n. 3, July - September , 67-83

Since the late 1980s, research on political Islam has been much in vogue in Europe and the US. This phenomenon is typically viewed as an expression of religion rather than of politics. Precisely because of the assumed "religious" underpinnings of political Islam, most Western attempts to engage with Islamists often remain trapped in an attempt to test their "democratic credentials". By focussing on what Islamists think about democracy, many studies have ignored the political, social and economic contexts in which Islamists operate. Accounting for the political underpinning of Islamist movements can both help understand their political evolution and open up fruitful avenues for comparative analysis. For this reason, attention is turned to Europe to seek best practices of external engagement with domestic opposition movements in authoritarian contexts, such as Western engagement with opposition actors in Franco's Spain, Kuchma's Ukraine and Shevardnadze's Georgia.

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Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Robinson Mark

Hybrid States: Globalisation and the Politics of State Capacity

in Political Studies, Volume 56, Issue 3, October , 566-583

This article seeks to re-conceptualise the notion of state capacity in order to develop a formulation that better approximates the realities of contemporary developing states. Four strands of argument are developed in the article. First, it identifies the critical factors shaping contemporary processes of state transformation, centred on analysing the significance of globalisation, democratisation, liberalisation and the new security agenda. Second, it interrogates the



limitations of the dominant technocratic approach to state reform. Third, the article examines the limitations of approaches to state capacity building predicated on the 'command-hierarchy' approach, contrasting this with the 'influence-network' model centred on forms of engagement with multiple actors and institutions operating outside the boundaries of centralised, national states. Fourth, and in contrast to the influence-network approach, the article advances the notion of a spectrum of hybrid state forms, each associated with differing types of capacity that relate to the structural characteristics of contemporary states that are changing in response to globalisation and other exogenous factors.

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Skjærseth Jon Birger, Wettestad Jørgen

Implementing EU emissions trading: success or failure?

in International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Volume 8, Number 3, September , 275-290

This article assesses and explains the implementation of the EU emissions trading scheme (EU ETS). It argues that implementation in terms of ambitiousness has been only moderately successful so far, but significant differences between the Member States are also observed. Similarities and differences are then explained within a multi-level governance approach emphasizing the need to search for explanations at national, EU, and global levels. The EU ETS case shows that the multi-level governance approach can be as relevant for understanding implementation as for explaining policy-making. In addition to factors located at the national level, the decentralized nature of the EU scheme itself is important for understanding how the system works in practice. At the global level, the link to the Clean Development Mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol is particularly important for determining how well the EU ETS will perform in the future.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Harris Paul G.

Implementing climate equity: the case of Europe

in Journal of Global Ethics, Volume 4, Issue 2, August 2008 , 121-140

For over two decades, international environmental equity - the fair and just sharing of the burdens associated with environmental changes - has been the subject of much debate by philosophers, activists and diplomats concerned about climate change. It has been manifested in many international environmental agreements, notably the Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol. The question arises as to whether it is being put into practice in this context. Are the requirements of international environmental equity merely words and principles in international instruments, or are they having a practical effect on the policies of state governments? This article aims to start answering these questions. It examines whether the European Union (EU) and its member states are sharing the burdens of climate change. The article introduces equity in the context of the climate change agreements and looks at some normative and practical considerations. It suggests that Europe has been a leader on international equity in the climate change negotiations over the last decade, and it points to what European states and the EU have done to take on some of the burdens of climate change. Europe's actions are briefly assessed from practical and normative perspectives. Europe is doing more than any other part of the world to address climate change and to share the burdens associated with it. Nevertheless, Europe is not doing as much to address this problem as it can and should do. Both



practical and normative imperatives demand more urgent action by Europe to implement climate equity.

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Zürn Michael

Institutionalisierte Ungleichheit in der Weltpolitik. Jenseits der Alternative „Global Governance“ versus „American Empire“

in *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, Heft 4, 48. Jahrgang, Dezember , 680-804

ABSTRACT: Sowohl Realisten als auch Institutionalistinnen haben ihre Sichtweisen über das internationale System in den letzten 15 Jahren radikalisiert. Die einen sprechen nicht mehr nur von Bipolarität und Hegemonie, sondern von Unipolarität und Imperium; die anderen nicht mehr nur von Regimen und Institutionen, sondern von Global Governance und Konstitutionalisierung. Dabei können beide Lager durchaus mit guten Gründen auf reale Entwicklungen verweisen. Es fehlt aber an konzeptionellen Perspektiven, die dieser doppelten Entwicklung im internationalen System — der zunehmenden Dominanz der USA und der wachsenden Bedeutung globaler Normen — gerecht werden. Denn erst zusammengenommen ergibt sich ein angemessenes Bild: Es scheint nämlich etwas Drittes, ein „rechtlich stratifiziertes Mehrebenensystem“ zu entstehen.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Hathaway Oona A.

International Delegation and State Sovereignty

in *Law and contemporary problems*, Volume 71 Winter 2008 Number 1 , 115-190

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Hahn Henning

Kosmopolitismus ohne Grenzen? Neuere Literatur zur globalen Gerechtigkeit

in *Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung*, Band 62, Heft 4, 2008

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Habermas Jürgen

La costituzionalizzazione del diritto internazionale e i problemi di legittimazione che deve affrontare una società mondiale giuridicamente costituita

in *Iride*, numero 1, gennaio-aprile 2008 , 5-24



No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Focarelli Carlo

La dottrina della "responsabilità di proteggere" e l'intervento umanitario

in *Rivista di diritto internazionale*, vol. XCI, fascicolo 2 , 317-347

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Tsoukalis Loukas

La globalizzazione, l'euro e la governance globale

in *ItalianiEuropei*, n. 3

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Le Prestre Philippe

La gouvernance internationale de l'environnement: une réforme évasive (Note)

in *Etudes Internationales*, 2, Giugno 2008

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Padoan Pier Carlo

La nuova globalizzazione è sostenibile? Riflessioni sul ruolo dell'Europa

in *ItalianiEuropei*, n. 3

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Hennebert Marc-Antonin, Dufour-Poirier Mélanie



Les syndicats et la transnationalisation des entreprises : le cas des alliances syndicales internationales
in *Nouvelles pratiques sociales*, Volume 20, numéro 2, printemps 2008 , 52-65

Unions' concerns in regards to the growing power of multinational companies urgently prompt them to instigate the construction of a new countervailing power meant to spread out its influence on a transnational basis. As a consequence, several unions have over the years been involved in developing international alliances. After mentioning the historical development of these alliances, we will put forward the many obstacles that happen to slow down their formation. We will then tackle the phenomenon of their upsurging in the actual context of globalization, highlighting their potential contribution to the emergence of a union renewal.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

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Bourque Reynald

L'action syndicale internationale et transnationale dans le contexte de la mondialisation

in *Nouvelles pratiques sociales*, Volume 20, numéro 2, printemps 2008 , 37-51

This article examines the transformations of unionism at the international and transnational levels over the last three decades. In the context of the growing influence of multinational firms on the world economy, this period is characterized by the emergence of new forms of international and transnational union action in order to ensure the protection of worker rights within these firms. Our analysis focuses on the evolution of structures and strategies of international union organizations, and on transnational union cooperation in the contexts of European Union and NAFTA.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

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Peretz Pauline, Lafont Rapnouil Manuel

L'union des démocraties : un semblant de multilatéralisme sans légitimité?

in *Esprit*, n. 347, août/septembre 2008 , 75-86

When democracies come together: A semblance of multilateralism, but no legitimacy?

Is the UN failing because democratic countries have to make do with all the authoritarian governments in the rest of the world? Should we not act accordingly and set up a new-fangled global union for democracies only? The idea is developing in the United States despite its many, unsuspected faults.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

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Kuperman Alex



Mitigating the Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons from Economics

in *Global Governance*, vol. 14, n. 2, april-june , 219-240

ABSTRACT: The emerging norm of humanitarian intervention, or the Responsibility to Protect, resembles a social insurance policy to protect ethnic groups against genocide and ethnic cleansing. If a state perpetrates such genocidal violence, the norm calls for a payout—up to and including military intervention— to protect the group and ensure its security, often by enhancing its autonomy from the state. Unfortunately, this leads to a common pathology of insurance—moral hazard—whereby the expected payout for a loss unintentionally encourages excessively risky or fraudulent behavior. Thus, some militants may rebel despite the risk of provoking state retaliation, because they expect any resulting atrocities to attract intervention that facilitates their rebellion. This article summarizes recently published evidence for this dynamic, explores the feasibility of adapting insurance strategies that mitigate moral hazard, and then proposes a reform of humanitarian intervention based on the most feasible of these adapted strategies.

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Berg Sanford, Horrall Jacqueline

Networks of regulatory agencies as regional public goods: Improving infrastructure performance

in *Review of International Organizations (The)* , n. 2, vol. 3, june , 179-200

ABSTRACT: Networks of sectoral regulatory agencies provide regional public goods (RPGs). In developed and developing countries, the telecommunications, energy, and water sectors have been re-structured (frequently liberalized) and reformed over the past two decades. Often with seed money from international organizations and donor countries, regulatory leaders at newly created commissions sought to learn from neighboring countries. Regional networks provided vehicles for sharing data and best-practice techniques, developing studies, providing training, distributing regulatory materials, and organizing meetings. Three properties of publicness of RPGs influence the provision of RPGs: non-rivalry of benefits, non-excludability of non-payers, and the aggregation technology. External donor funding and the mix of characteristics have influenced the pattern of network activities.

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Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Baratta Joseph

Of Global Democracy and Global Government

in *Federalist Debate (The)*, Year XXI, n. 1, March , 43-46

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

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Dingwerth Klaus

Private Transnational Governance and the Developing World: A Comparative Perspective

in *International Studies Quarterly*, issue 3, vol. 52, september , 607-634



ABSTRACT: While private authority beyond the state has become a popular theme of academic writing, the role of stakeholders in the Southern hemisphere as objects and subjects of private transnational governance has rarely been addressed in the literature. To fill this gap, this article examines three private transnational governance (PTG) schemes in the field of global sustainability politics and their relation to the South. The analysis shows that, contrary to common assumptions, PTG schemes exert a significant influence on Southern stakeholders. They shape the meaning of key normative concepts, induce discursive shifts that constrain the ways in which sustainability politics may or may not be framed, and establish new regulatory frameworks to which Southern actors need to respond. Yet, while Northern interests are well represented, the representation of Southern stakeholders remains low. It is particularly low in knowledge-centered elements of the governance schemes. In contrast, where issues are explicitly framed in political terms and where decision-making processes extend across multiple levels, the quality of Southern representation increases.

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Lloyd Robert

Promoting Global Accountability: The Experiences of the Global Accountability Project

in Global Governance, vol. 14, n. 3, july-september , 273-282

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Heins Volker

Realizing Honneth: redistribution, recognition, and global justice

in Journal of Global Ethics, Volume 4, Issue 2, August 2008 , 141-153

The purpose of this article is to explore the potential contribution of Axel Honneth's critical theory of recognition to empirical and normative debates on global justice. I first present, very briefly, an overview of recent theories of global distributive justice. I argue that theorists of distributive justice do not pay enough attention to sources of self-respect and conditions for identity formation, and that they are blind toward the danger of harming people's sense of self even by well-intentioned redistributive policies. Honneth's theory suffers from complementary shortcomings; it is anti-technocratic but largely oblivious to the global nature of many contemporary justice claims. Given this situation, I seek to broaden the theory's scope by outlining transnational extensions of the recognition principles of love, rights and solidarity identified by Honneth. In conclusion, I show how utilizing a broadened conceptualization of the struggle for recognition allows us to better understand the changing logic of justice-oriented foreign policies.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Scholte Jon Aart

Reconstructing Contemporary Democracy

in Indiana Journal for Global Legal Studies, Volume 15, issue 1, winter , 305-350



ABSTRACT: Democratic practice varies historically, and transformations of the societal context require accompanying reconstructions of democracy if “rule by the people” is to remain meaningful. Contemporary society is witnessing particularly profound changes in underlying structures of space, governance, and identity. Fundamental reconsideration of democracy is therefore also needed. This article first develops a generic understanding of democracy; next elaborates on currently unfolding transformations of geography, regime, and community; and then develops a five-faceted reconstruction of democracy to meet these changed circumstances. This prescription entails: (1) reconceptualizing democracy, shifting away from obsolete assumptions of territorialist space, statist regulation, and nationalist identity; (2) refashioning civic education to empower all citizens to act in this new situation; (3) building effective institutional mechanisms of public accountability in respect of an emergent polycentric mode of governance; (4) effecting progressive structural redistributions of resources and power in order that all stakeholders in contemporary public policy issues have more equal opportunities of political participation; and (5) nurturing positive practices of intercultural recognition, communication, and negotiation.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Held David

Redefinir la gobernabilidad global: !Apocalipsis cercano o reforma!

in *Analisis politico* , Vol. 21, issue 62 , 58-74

En este artículo, el autor describe y sustenta los tres problemas globales que requieren solución más urgente. Luego explica los retos en gobernanza que es necesario superar para la solución de tales problemas. Después de describir las tendencias contemporáneas en materia de gobernanza global, el artículo propone unas fórmulas para fortalecerla en las cuales la ciudadanía y la democracia se ven mutuamente fortalecidas. Por último, nos advierte sobre la urgencia de la implementación de tales reformas para evitar enfrentarnos a un apocalipsis actual o simplemente cercano.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Esty Daniel C.

Rethinking Global Environmental Governance to Deal with Climate Change: The Multiple Logics of Global Collective Action

in *American Economic Review*, Vol. 98, No. 2, May 2008 , 116-121

The article discusses the multiple logics of global collective action in regards to climate change and environmental governance. The author takes a look at the legal and policy issues related to global environmental governance that he believes are essential to mitigate climate change. The author also examines the case for the Global Environmental Organization (GEO) to respond to climate change and different supranational environmental challenges. The article also discusses the problems with the existing international environmental regime, and the main functions that a GEO needs to be able to perform.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy



Abèlès Marc

Rethinking NGOs: The Economy of Survival and Global Governance

in *Indiana Journal for Global Legal Studies*, Volume 15, issue 1, winter , 241-258

ABSTRACT: This article explores the concept of “global politics,” an evolving set of systems that undermine our traditional view of government. These underlying systems, including Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), exert great influence on the power and actions of nation-states. Thus, while current global politics are largely dependent on the actions and strategies of nation-states, nation-states are not the only actors at work. The article argues for a view of global politics that takes these other systems, particularly NGOs, into account.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Chanda Nayan

Runaway Globalization Without Governance

in *Global Governance*, vol. 14, n. 2, april-june , 119-126

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Saxer Marc

Security Governance in a Post-sovereign World

in *Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft*, Heft 3, 2008 , 28-42

ABSTRACT: In a growing number of states, the monopoly of force has eroded. On a systemic level, the validity of an international order based on sovereign states comes into question if a growing number of these states are merely fictional. Efforts by the international community to restore order and stop mass atrocities have created new forms of »soft« sovereignty, ranging from all-out international protectorates to forms of »supervised sovereignty« and »subsidiary transitional sovereignty.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Archibugi Daniele

Serve una Lega delle democrazie?

in *Reset*, Numero 108, Luglio / Agosto

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Epstein David , O'Halloran Sharyn



Sovereignty and Delegation in International Organizations

in *Law and contemporary problems*, Volume 71 Winter 2008 Number 1 , 77-92

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Walker Neil

Taking Constitutionalism Beyond the State

in *Political Studies*, Volume 56, Issue 3, October , 519-543

In recent years, the idea that constitutional modes of government are exclusive to states has become the subject both of sustained challenge and of strong defence. This is due to the development at new regional and global sites of decision-making capacities of a scale and intensity often associated with the demand for constitutional governance at state level, to the supply at these same new sites of certain regulatory institutions and practices of a type capable of being viewed as meeting the demand for constitutional governance, as well as to a growing debate over whether and in what ways these developments in decision-making capacity and regulatory control should be coded and can be constructively engaged with in explicitly constitutional terms. The aim of the article is threefold. It asks why taking the idea and associated ethos and methods of constitutionalism 'beyond the state' might be viewed as a significant and controversial innovation, and so in need of explanation and justification – a question that requires us to engage with the definition of constitutionalism and with the contestation surrounding that definition. Secondly, taking account of the various arguments that lie behind these definitional concerns, it attempts to develop a scheme for understanding certain key features of constitutionalism and of its post-state development that is able to command broad agreement. Thirdly, and joining the concerns of the first two sections, it seeks to identify the key current tensions – or antinomies – surrounding the growth of post-state constitutionalism with a view to indicating what is at stake in the future career of that concept.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Mace M.J.

The Bali Road Map: Can it Deliver an Equitable Post-2012 Climate Agreement for Small Island States?

in *Review of European Community & International Environmental Law*, Volume 17, Issue 2, August , 183-195

The ambition and architecture of the post-2012 climate change regime will be critical to the survival of many small island developing nations, many of which are low-lying, vulnerable to the impacts of sea-level rise and exposed to increasingly frequent and severe extreme weather events. This paper highlights the key outcomes sought by the Alliance of Small Island States in the international negotiating process on the post-2012 regime and compares these calls with what has been achieved thus far. The paper concludes that while little progress has been made to date, useful avenues for progress do exist if only the political will can be found.



Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Kavalski Emilian

The Complexity of Global Security Governance: An Analytical Overview

in Global Society, Volume 22, Issue 4 ,October , 423 - 443

By suggesting predictable and controllable patterns of development, the literature on global governance seems to simplify the world for decision-making tractability. In this respect, security narratives often remain analytically frozen, while the dynamics of global life are not. Relying on complexity thinking, this article both comments on the construction and potential reconstruction of the concept of security as it relates to the question of global governance and engages with the cognitive multiplicity of the notion of global security governance. Such an exploration suggests the need for the complexification of the discourses and practices of security governance through the adaptive contingency of “security as resilience”, which rejects the detachment between human and natural systems and the ability of the former to control the latter. The argument is that the logic of “security as resilience” is more appropriate than the conventional logic of “security as control”. In policy terms, therefore, the complexity of global security governance intimates an ability to cope with vulnerabilities, defy adversity and construct a new proficiency in response to the uncertainty, cognitive challenges, complex unbounded risks and the need for continuing adaptation prompted by the alterations in global life.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Bradley Curtis A., Kelley Judith G.

The Concept of International Delegation

in Law and contemporary problems, Volume 71 Winter 2008 Number 1 , 1-36

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Hassel Anke

The Evolution of a Global Labor Governance Regime

in Governance, Vol. 21, n. 2, April , 231-251

During the last decade, the approach by businesses and governments toward labor and social issues at the global level has fundamentally changed. Industrial relations are rapidly internationalizing by developing new actors and forms of governance to deal with the regulation of labor. This article looks at the evolution of self-regulatory standards in the global labor governance debate. Key is that notwithstanding problems with the lacking legal framework of global regulation and enforceability, patterns of local self-regulation, norm-setting, and international codes lead not only to higher expectations of the behavior of transnationally operating firms but also to an indirect pattern of regulation. The article argues that particularly the adoption of the core labor standards by the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the setup of the Global Compact by the UN serve as points of convergence. A plethora of voluntarist initiatives that converge over time toward a shared understanding of labor standards is part of the transformation of global labor governance institutions.



Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Singh Robert

The Exceptional Empire: Why the United States Will Not Decline — Again
in International Politics, Volume 45, Issue 5, September, 571-593

Is the United States inevitably in decline? After the foreign policy controversies of the George W. Bush years, a new consensus declares the end of American dominion. In this article this conventional wisdom is challenged. The US constitutes an 'exceptional empire' and, despite the recent rise of powers such as the EU, China and India, the four foundations of this distinctive empire remain robust. First, the US still exhibits global predominance in hard power. Second, the essentially unipolar international order shaped by Washington remains resilient. Third, neither the rise of 'anti-Americanism' nor the alleged decline of US 'soft power' endanger its predominance. Fourth, the US political class is committed to preserving American primacy after Bush. No other power is currently in range of competing with the US for global influence. Moreover, each faces powerful internal weaknesses and external threats at least as significant as those facing the US. America's global predominance in hard and soft power do not translate into omnipotence. Nor does predominance promise an error-free foreign policy. The US nonetheless continues to defy both history and theory.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Couso Javier

The Globalization of Latin American Constitutional Law
in Verfassung und Recht in Ubersee, issue 1, vol. 41, 56-60

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Mason Michael

The Governance of Transnational Environmental Harm: Addressing New Modes of
Accountability/Responsibility
in Global Environmental Politics, Volume 8, Issue 3, August, 8-24

Transboundary and global environmental harm present substantial challenges to state-centered (territorial) modalities of accountability and responsibility. The globalization of environmental degradation has triggered regulatory responses at various jurisdictional scales. These governance efforts, featuring various articulations of state and/or private authority, have struggled to address so-called "accountability deficits" in global environmental politics. Yet, it has also become clear that accountability and responsibility norms forged in domestic regulatory contexts cannot simply be transposed across borders. This special issue explores various conceptual perspectives on accountability and responsibility for transnational harm, and examines their application to different actor groups and environmental governance regimes. This introductory paper provides an overview of the major theoretical positions and examines some of the analytical challenges raised by the transnational (re)scaling of accountability and responsibility norms.



Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Scheffer David

The Growing Relevance and Enforceability of Corporate Human Rights Responsibility
in *Northwestern University Journal of International Human Rights*, issue 2, vol. 6, spring

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Nine Cara

The Moral Arbitrariness of State Borders: Against Beitz
in *Contemporary Political Theory*, Vol. 7, n. 3, August , 259-279

In this paper, I critically examine an important premise in theories of global distributive justice that, despite its widespread influence, has remained largely unexamined. This is the claim that state borders are morally arbitrary with respect to a just distribution of goods. I examine two common arguments for this claim, the argument that state borders are historically unjust and therefore morally arbitrary; and the argument first made by Charles Beitz that the conditions of a fair, hypothetical social contract (such as the Rawlsian original position) would not include knowledge of one's location with respect to the distribution of natural resources between state borders. I argue that there are good reasons to reject both arguments. Beitz's immense contribution to international justice can be gauged by the fact that it is difficult to find a contemporary work on global justice that does not reference his arguments in *Political Theory and International Relations* (Beitz, 1979). Although some authors find Beitz's cosmopolitan theory objectionable, no author has, to my knowledge, criticized Beitz's pivotal arguments that our placement in the distribution of natural resources is morally arbitrary. The aim of this paper is to do just that.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Bellamy Alex

The Responsibility to Protect and the problem of military intervention
in *International Affairs* , issue 4, vol. 84, july , 615-639

ABSTRACT: The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) has come a long way in a relatively short space of time. From inauspicious beginnings, the principle was endorsed by the General Assembly in 2005 and unanimously reaffirmed by the Security Council in 2006 (Resolution 1674). However, the principle remains hotly contested primarily because of its association with humanitarian intervention and the pervasive belief that its principal aim is to create a pathway for the legitimization of unilateral military intervention. This article sets forth the argument that a deepening consensus on R2P is dependent on its dissociation from the politics of humanitarian intervention and suggests that one way of doing this is by abandoning the search for criteria for decision-making about the use of force, one of the centre pieces of the



International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 2001 report that coined the phrase R2P. Criteria were never likely to win international support, the article maintains, and were less likely to improve decision-making on how best to respond to major humanitarian crises. Nevertheless, R2P can make an important contribution to thinking about the problem of military intervention by mitigating potential 'moral hazards', overcoming the tendency of international actors to focus exclusively on military methods and giving impetus to efforts to operationalize protection in the field.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Evans Gareth

The Responsibility to Protect: An Idea Whose Time Has Come ... and Gone?

in *International Relations*, n. 3, vol. 22, september , 283-298

ABSTRACT: How far did the unanimous agreement on the responsibility to protect at the 2005 UN World Summit really mark the international community's acceptance of a new norm supporting collective action — including ultimately military action — when governments through either incapacity or ill-will fail to protect their own people from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity? This article describes the rapid initial emergence and acceptance of the concept, but also the subsequent denial and evasion by a number of governments of the commitments they signed up to in 2005. It addresses the five main conceptual misunderstandings and misapprehensions evident in the public debate that need to be overcome if the argument in support of the responsibility to protect is to be won.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Campbell Craig

The Resurgent Idea of World Government

in *Ethics and International Affairs*, n. 2, vol. 22, summer , 133-142

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Burgess J. Peter

The ethical challenges of human security in the age of globalisation

in *International Social Science Journal* , Volume 59, Issue s1, September 2008 , 49-63

The moral innovation of human security is also its terrible Achilles' heel. In a world of globalisation, where the values of the global view are imposed upon most people with the force of necessity, the concerns of individuals resist global action. At the very moment when individual concerns are put on the agenda, the possibility for achieving anything local is nearly erased by individual weakness in a world of massive collective interests. What can the particular interests of individuality make claim to in such a strong environment of universality? The aim of this chapter is to discuss the ethical dimensions of the concept of human security in a principled discussion of ethics and international relations. It starts with the evolution of the concept of human security, its use in international policy and its philosophical history. It ends with a discussion of the paradoxes of different philosophical positions with respect to the concept.



Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Moghdam Valentine M., Elveren Dilek

The making of an international Convention: culture and free trade in a global era
in *Review of International Studies (The)*, Vol. 34, Issue 4, October , 735-753

In October 2005, UNESCO's General Conference adopted the Convention on the Protection of the Diversity of Cultural Contents and Artistic Expressions. The intense debates around the Convention, the defeat of the US position, and the compromises reached illustrate the shifting nature of global politics and the importance of the 'culture question' in global governance, but also confirm a hierarchy in the mandates of intergovernmental organisations. In this article we describe the making of this particular international convention, what we define as the 'liberal' versus the 'culturalist' positions among UNESCO's member-state delegations, and the relevance of world polity and world-systems theories with respect to the international order. The article draws on our observations, a close reading of relevant UNESCO documents, and interviews with UNESCO officials and delegates.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Newell Peter

The political economy of global environmental governance
in *Review of International Studies (The)*, Vol. 34, Issue 3, July , 507-529

This article develops a political economy account of global environmental governance to improve upon our understanding of the contemporary conduct of environmental politics and to clarify thinking about the potential for, and barriers to, effective environmental reform. By elaborating the key contours of a political economy account on the one hand and opening up to critical enquiry prevailing understandings of what is meant by 'global' 'environmental' and 'governance' on the other, such an approach is able to enhance our understanding of the practice of environmental governance by emphasising historical, material and political elements of its (re) constitution and evolution.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Dellapenna Joseph, Gupta Joyeeta

Toward Global Law on Water
in *Global Governance*, vol. 14, n. 4, october-december , 437-453

ABSTRACT: With increasing recognition of a global crisis in water resources, it becomes relevant to ask whether existing legal systems can make serious contributions to the management of the earth's water resources. This article examines the evolution of national water law and its key features, the coevolution of international water law, and a new focus in the twenty-first century to develop global water law against a backdrop of growing pluralism in water governance. In the past, national and international water law has generally reflected prevailing social beliefs and state



practice rather than shaped them. However, contemporary developments in national and international water law suggest that an emergent global law is increasingly shaping practice instead of merely reflecting it. This global law seeks proactively to influence future water management, rather than being limited by past decisions.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Marchetti Raffaele

Toward a World Migratory Regime

in *Indiana Journal for Global Legal Studies*, Volume 15, issue 2, summer , 471-487

ABSTRACT: Increasing transnationalism challenges the predominant statist treatment of migration and citizenship. Global, indeed cosmopolitan, citizenship offers an alternative to open border policies and global migratory management that focuses on the extent to which political agents are free to move and join different societies. Multilayered citizenship and multileveled political membership encourages a supranational institution dedicated to global deliberation. Such a migratory regulatory system and new admission criteria developed under the universal membership regime ensure the grant of civil, social, and political rights to all migrants.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Cakmak Cenap

Transnational Activism in World Politics and Effectiveness of a Loosely Organised Principled Global Network: The Case of the NGO Coalition for an International Criminal Court

in *International Journal of Human Rights (The)*, Volume 12, Issue 3 , 373-393

The article discusses the role of the NGO Coalition for an ICC, a loosely organized principled network established to promote a fair, independent and strong permanent international criminal court, in the creation of the world's first permanent judicial institution vested with the authority to deal with the worst crimes. The study further identifies the basic features of the Coalition and assesses its impact on world politics and its implications for global governance.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Ben-eliezer Uri, Kemp Adriana

Transnational Social Movements, Civil Society, and a Secret State: The Idea of a Nuclear-free World through Israel's Vanunu Affair

in *Social Movement Studies*, Volume 7, Issue 2, September 2008 , 149-166

Studies on transnational social movements in world risk society tend to emphasize their centrality and effectiveness as the result of two major transformations: the decline of the nation-state as a primary locus of power and sovereignty, and the rise of assertive civil societies' subpolitics. Drawing on the 'Vanunu affair' (the Israeli technician who was sentenced to eighteen years in prison for making public Israel's nuclear secrets), and the reactions it elicited at the local and global levels, the article analyzes the obstacles that may prevent the effective influence of anti-nuclear transnational social



movements, and their difficulties in contributing to global framing. These obstacles are related mainly to the cultural politics of a 'secret state' that constructs national sovereignty, and mobilizes the local civil society, by means of nuclear secrecy and opacity.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Macdonald Terry

What's So Special about States? Liberal Legitimacy in a Globalising World

in Political Studies, Volume 56, Issue 3, October , 544-565

Throughout the history of liberal thought, questions about political legitimacy concerned with the protection of individual rights and the entrenchment of democratic public decision making have typically focused on the structure and conduct of state-based institutions. Normative political theorists have so far said less, however, about the prospects for achieving liberal legitimacy via new non-state forms of political organisation involving powerful actors such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and transnational corporations (TNCs). The goal of this article is to present a preliminary theoretical assessment of the prospects of non-state institutions for delivering liberal political legitimacy in the context of globalisation. It asks: is there anything special about the various institutional forms associated with 'states' and 'sovereignty', or should these be superseded by some new public institutional order more suited to our era of globalisation? It is argued that while certain institutional characteristics of states will remain essential for achieving liberal political legitimacy in a globalising world, state-based institutional forms will be unable to deliver such legitimacy alone. Non-state forms of regulation and democratic decision making are increasingly essential for securing political legitimacy in a globalising world, but they have certain inherent weaknesses relative to state institutions. In light of this, global political legitimacy could perhaps best be achieved through the development of hybrid regulatory and democratic institutions, with selected characteristics of both state and non-state institutional forms. Questions about how best to develop such hybrid institutions should therefore receive more attention than they have done so far from normative political theorists.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Mahbubani Kishore

When Western Interests Trump Values

in New Perspectives Quarterly, Vol. 25, Issue 3, Summer , 23-28

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Koremenos Barbara

When, What, and Why do States Choose to Delegate?

in Law and contemporary problems, Volume 71 Winter 2008 Number 1 , 151-193



Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Cooper Scott, Hawkins Darren, Jacoby Wade, Nielson Daniel

Yielding Sovereignty to International Institutions: Bringing System Structure Back In
in *International Studies Review*, issue 3, vol. 10, september , 501-524

ABSTRACT: In this paper, we identify authority as an important dimension of variance among international institutions. Essentially, the greater the authority of international institutions, the more sovereignty states have yielded to them. Highly authoritative institutions can make decisions that legally bind domestic governments on specified issues even without those governments' consent. Over the past 20 years, scholars have viewed the evolution of international institutions largely through the lens of state motives. We argue that it is time to think more systematically about the role of the structure of the international system. Two factors that impact international structure—previously existing institutions and the presence of systemic shocks—can complement theories of actor motives to better account for the level of sovereignty yielded to authoritative international institutions. We illustrate the potential importance of including structural variables by applying the argument to sets of cases in currency cooperation and human rights. We find that structural factors increase the probability of states yielding sovereignty to international institutions, though structural factors are only a permissive cause of institution formation.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Rodotà Stefano

A Bill of Rights for the Internet Universe

in *Federalist Debate (The)*, Year XXI, n. 1, March , 15-17

Almost at the same time as a UN commission in New York City was passing the proposal for a moratorium on the use of the death penalty with an historic vote, in Rio de Janeiro the representative of the same United Nations was closing the big Internet Governance Forum stating that the many problems to be faced in this network require an Internet Bill of Rights. These two events, which may look unrelated and qualitatively very distant can be placed side by side for three reasons. In both cases, the importance of a global policy for rights has leapt forward. In both cases, we are not in the presence of a final point of arrival, but of a process requiring ingenuity and political determination. In both cases, the outcome has been made possible by a far-sighted Italian initiative.

As far as the death penalty is concerned, it was a matter of honoring a cultural primogeniture, almost a historical duty, in the name of Cesare Beccaria and Tuscany, the first State in the world to abolish the death penalty, "convenient only to barbarian people", as the Grand-Duke Pietro Leopoldo declared in 1786! The Internet situation is quite different, as Italy can certainly not be considered a leading country in the field of scientific and technological innovation. And yet this is precisely where a movement started from two years ago, that has progressively involved ever wider sectors everywhere, thus demonstrating that a good culture is necessary to a good policy. Which policy? The final outcome in Rio was possible also because a joint declaration was made one day before by the Brazilian and the Italian governments suggesting the Internet Bill of Rights as the instrument for guaranteeing freedom and rights in the widest public space



that mankind has ever known.

However, this very significant development now requires adequate capability of taking action. In the discussions leading to the declaration, the Brazilian Minister of Culture, Gilberto Gil, has explicitly mentioned the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. We are faced with a situation that is becoming paradoxical. Still underestimated and opposed by some in Europe, the Charter is becoming a constant reference for those who are committed to the establishment of a new system of rights protection worldwide; so much so that US scholars speak of a "European dream" that is replacing their "American dream". It is time, then, for the European Union to be fully aware of its force and responsibility towards the entire "human community", as explicitly written in the Preamble of the Charter of Rights. Precisely because we are aware of the limits of Europe's influence, its political future is ever more clearly connected to its being able to be the protagonist in this planetary "struggle for rights".

In this perspective, the Internet Bill of Rights provides a valuable opportunity. Just because an unexpected support has come from the UN, the newly-started process must be made strong and concrete. I would list the first stages of its development. The Italo-Brazilian declaration is open to adhesion from other countries. This is not an easy operation. But the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs has proved to be very clever in guiding the process towards the moratorium on the death penalty, so that one may believe that he will not grasp this new opportunity with indifference.

An easier course of action would be, similarly to what happened for the moratorium, to work for turning the Italian initiative into a more general stand of the European Parliament. In this case, however, a more general question arises. While the Charter of Fundamental Rights is going to become legally binding, and is looked at as a model, the European Commission is taking initiatives that, even with the use of questionable procedural expedients, greatly restrict the protection of fundamental rights; one example concerns the collection and storage of personal data. It is necessary to get out of such an institutional schizophrenia, where grand proclamations on rights are too often contradicted by real and significant restrictions, dangerous for democracy and technically unnecessary or disproportionate.

A third path of action concerns the United Nations itself. Not long ago Google, aware of the necessity to ensure better personal data protection, proposed to institute a "Global Privacy Counsel" at the UN. This suggestion was taken up because it gives a concrete opportunity for starting a reflection over the UN presence in that sector in the future. But, above all, this proposal is posing a more general problem. In the course of the past year we have witnessed a vigorous activism in the economic world. In addition to Google's proposal, there was a joint initiative by Microsoft, Google, Yahoo! and Vodafone, which announced the publication by the end of the year of a Chart for the protection of freedom of expression on the Internet. In July, Microsoft presented its Privacy Principles. But is it possible to leave the protection of fundamental rights on the Internet to the initiative of private subjects only, who will tend to provide just the guarantees compatible with their interests and who, in the lack of other initiatives, will appear as the only "institutions" capable to act? Can we accept a privatization of the Internet governance or is it indispensable to have a plurality of actors at the most various levels discuss and work out common rules, according to a model defined, exactly, as multi-stakeholder and multi-level?

The Internet Bill of Rights is not conceived by those who have envisaged and are promoting it, as a transposition into the Internet sphere of the traditional logic of international conventions. The choice of the old formula of the Bill of Rights has a symbolic force, it underlines that the aim is not to restrict freedom on the web but, on the contrary, to maintain the conditions for letting it continue to prosper. To do so, "constitutional" guarantees are required. Let us not forget that Amnesty International has denounced the increase of cases of censorship, "a virus that can change Internet's nature, making it unrecognizable" unless adequate measures are taken. But, in conformity with Internet's nature, the recognition



of principles and rights cannot fall from the sky. It must be the result of a process, of a large participation of a plurality of subjects, who have already taken the form of "dynamic coalitions", groups of different kind spontaneously born on the web; they have found in Rio the first opportunity to exchange ideas, work together, have a direct influence on decisions. In the course of such a process, it will be possible to achieve partial results, combine self-regulation codes with other forms of discipline, establish common regulations for particular world areas, as once again shown by the European Union, the world region where the protection of rights is more advanced.

Traditional objections - who is the legislator? which judge will enforce the proclaimed rights? - belong to the past, as they do not take into account that "the avalanche of human rights is sweeping away the last trenches of State sovereignty", as Antonio Cassese quite rightly wrote, commenting the vote on the death penalty. At the very moment the Internet Bill's progress accelerates, a change will have occurred already. A new cultural model, originating from the awareness that the Internet is a world with no boundaries, will start to be visible. A model that will further the circulation of ideas and could immediately constitute a reference for the "global community of courts", the crowd of judges who, in the most diverse systems, are currently faced with the problems posed by the scientific and technological innovation; it will thus give voice to those fundamental rights that represent today the only power that can be opposed to the force of economic interests.

It is no Utopia, nor an escape forward. Even today, one day after the Rio Conference, many people are already at work and the program for the coming months is clear: inventory of the "dynamic coalitions" and creation of a platform allowing dialogue and cooperation; inventory of the many existing documents, to find which principles and rights could be the bedrock of the Internet Bill of Rights (a list is already in the Italo-Brazilian declaration); drafting of a first blueprint to be discussed on the web. The sowing was good. But the harvest will come if fervent spirits support future actions.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Etzioni Amitai

A Global, Community Building Language?

in **Federalist Debate (The)**, Year XXI, n. 2, July , 16-20

The merits and demerits of a global language

Adopting a global language would greatly reduce the transaction costs of conducting business across national borders¹. It would greatly facilitate the transmission of knowledge. It would help people of different backgrounds understand each other more readily and might curtail hostility and contribute to conflict resolutions and more generally to peace. Some even hope that "prejudices and stereotypes would be dismantled or differentiated, and more flexible cooperation (not merely in the context of the economy) would become possible²". Many a sociologist, however, would warn that increased communication among groups can actually increase conflict. One can though take it for granted that a global language would reduce gross misunderstandings when international agreements and treaties and laws are given different means as result of being translated into a variety of languages.

In an age where the benefits of a global language are not actively considered, some examples from the European Union highlight these merits. As of January 1, 2007 the EU has 27 member states and 23 official languages³. The EU stresses the importance of multilingualism among its citizens, explaining:

languages are not a mere means of communication. They contribute to a better knowledge of other European cultures



and have a real potential for a deeper understanding between European citizens. Multilingualism policy aims at ensuring multiculturalism, tolerance and European citizenship. Widespread general competence in foreign languages also plays its part in keeping xenophobia and intolerance at bay. We have to understand each other if we want to reap the full benefits of the cultural, social, and economic richness of our continent⁴.

However given that no one can learn all the languages of the EU, if more and more European would learn the same second language, this would greatly enhance such an understanding. However no movement is underway to choose such a shared second language.

The absence of an official, shared EU language causes a significant portion of the total EU budget, \$1.3 billion a year, to be dedicated to interpretation and translation of the official transcripts, documents, court rulings and regulations into all the 20 official languages⁵. In addition to exacting considerable costs, numerous misunderstandings arise because of subtle and not so subtle differences in interpretations result from these multiple translations. This point is illustrated by a simple example. The European Central Bank (ECB) is required to use all EU languages for official purposes⁶. In 2006, ECB president Jean-Claude Trichet outlined a change in policy using the simple words "strong vigilance". Translated across the various languages the words communicated different positions. In Spanish these terms were translated as *extrema vigilancia*, which sounds much stronger than the English original and could lead Spanish observers to worry that, "the central bank is facing galloping inflation". Thus, even with a team of terminologists dedicated to the task of carefully parsing official bank language, it is difficult to preserve nuance across the numerous languages in which the ECB must produce official statements and reports⁷.

At the same time, introducing a shared regional language, let alone a global one, runs into the fact that language constitutes a key element of the identity, bonds, history, and culture of many existing communities, whether national or merely ethnic groups within a nation. This fact is used to oppose a shared language in numerous circumstances.

Far from seeking to embrace a shared language, many national and ethnic communities are deeply committed to protect and even promote their particularistic tongue. Thus, since the 1970's many of the Bretons of France have sought to revive their native language; they view Breton as an important element of the culture of the Brittany region that has been endangered due to French linguistic hegemony⁸. Endeavors to promote Catalan in the four Spanish provinces and French in Quebec further exemplify efforts to preserve identity by protecting a particularistic language from a more widely shared one. Opposition to English is especially strong as it is associated with American military and cultural imperialism.

In short, although the merits of a shared language can be readily outlined, the sociological and communitarian foundations of the opposition are at least equally strong. Hence the quest for a shared language best take, and has taken, a rather different course.

Particularism and Universalism

It is a serious sociological misunderstanding to assume that people are either dominated by local, particularistic values or by universal ones, such as those encased in the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It is best to consider a society as a community of communities, not one that holds X millions individuals, as a two or multiple tier social structure⁹. The said integration is achieved by dividing loyalties and identifications between those where more encompassing entities takes precedence (e.g. the nation, in most matters concerning relations with other nations) versus those in which the smaller communities govern (for instance, in the US, a good part of the curriculum of a given school). There are considerable variations in the ways national and local communities share people's commitments and



affections, but most if not all societies have at least two layers of such commitments.

This model of a two-tier structure, of layered loyalties and identities, the combination of local and cosmopolitan culture, provides a model for a global language that will have many of the benefits of such a tongue and be much less damaging to the extant constitutive role of language to particularistic communities. Following such a societal design one would seek not to replace particularistic languages that are constitutive of various communities, but add a universal language to them, a second language that all would share. For instance, the French could continue to study and speak French as the "mother" tongue, enjoy all the subtleties of its literature, particular imagery, nuances, and identity-affirming content. However, when communicating with members of other societies, they would draw on one and the same shared language. (To put it differently, the model of layered loyalties and identities views the global language as additive, rather than as a language that would replace particularistic ones. These particularistic languages serve constitutive roles in communities; seeking to displace these languages would be subtractive¹⁰). This approach may seem very plausible, even self evident, until one notes that it requires that the second language taught and used by all nations would have to be one and the same one. If this development is to take place, it would require a major change in public policies of many nations, we shall see shortly.

English: The de facto lingua terra

Which language would best serve as the second, global language? In effect, this decision has already been made, although not as a result of any meeting of any deliberative body. As is well known, English has become de facto the global language, although numerous nations still resist its use - often because they conflate protection of their primary language with a need to reject a shared secondary one. The fact that English has not been recognized as the said global language is highlighted by the fact that although members of the EU very often communicate with one another in English¹¹, they not only maintain the use of 23 primary, particularistic languages but have not agreed on a secondary one. Thus in 2002, the heads of state or governments at the Barcelona European Council called for "a sustained effort to improve the mastery of basic skills, in particular by teaching at least two foreign languages from a very early age"¹². Any two.

One may say that Chinese is in actuality the language more people speak than English, and hence it is the proper terra lingua. However, we are looking not for the largest number of people who speak to other members of their nation or civilization with a particular language, but the number of those who use a given language to communicate across borders and cultures. Here English - whether desired or not - has reached a level that makes it difficult to image how it could be replaced¹³. Nearly a quarter of the world's population (between 1.2 and 1.5 billion people) are fluent or competent in English¹⁴. An article entitled, "The new Latin: English dominates in academe" reports:

Ninety-five percent of the 925,000 scientific articles published in thousands of major periodicals in 1997 were written in English, according to Eugene Garfield, founder of the Science Citation Index, which tracks science publications. But only half of the English articles originated in English-speaking countries. The trend toward publishing in English began after World War II and has accelerated over the past 20 years¹⁵.

Increasingly multinational corporations and comparatively smaller companies with a global clientele increasingly use English as their working language. Among the companies that participate in this trend are French luxury goods' LVMH Mo't Hennessy Louis Vuitton and Italian appliance maker Indesit Company (formerly Merloni Elettrodomestici). European aircraft manufacturer Airbus' working language has been English since it was established¹⁶. The German postal service, Deutsche Post World Net, is increasingly using English as its working language.



Thus, de facto English has established itself as the global language, as the second language for many nationalities, who maintain their primary "mother" tongue.

Policy implications

To review our discussion up to this point, before turning to its policy implications: (a) Instead of trying to find one language that all people will adopt, the world is leaning toward maintaining various national and ethnic languages and using English as second language for cross national communications. This combination allows nurturing local cultures as well as the flourishing of the international realm. (b) The choice of English has economic and cultural benefits for nations whose citizens speak English as their first language. These can be countered to some extent but not eliminated. (c) Accepting the remaining tilt seems preferable compared to the alternatives of having no shared language or trying to institute a universal primary language.

The question hence arises what are the implications of the preceding analysis for policy-makers. Clearly which languages are taught in a given school system, can be used to communicate with public authorities, are recognized as the basis of treaties and other legal documents, are employed on a variety of communication devices from street signs to ballots, are all subject to public policy. Public policy hence plays a key role in determining whether the development of a global language is accelerated or slowed down.

For instance, in Quebec the provincial government attempted to erode the use of English and promote French forcefully with the Charter of the French Language. Amongst other rules, this 1977 law required commercial signs in French to replace multilingual signs in English and French, as well as English-only signs. The Canadian government defended this bill before the Supreme Court of Canada¹⁷ and the UN Human Rights Committee¹⁸. Ultimately, a compromise resulted where both English and French were permitted, though the French must be markedly predominant¹⁹. The Office

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Bergsten C. Fred

A Partnership of Equals

in **Foreign Affairs**, July/August 2008 Vol. 87, Number 4

Beijing is shirking its responsibilities to the global economy. To encourage better behavior, Washington should offer to share global economic leadership.

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Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Knight Karl

A pluralistic approach to global poverty

in **Review of International Studies (The)**, Vol. 34, Issue 4, October , 713-733

A large proportion of humankind today lives in avoidable poverty. This article examines whether affluent individuals and governments have moral duties to change this situation. It is maintained that an alternative to the familiar accounts of transdomestic distributive justice and personal ethics put forward by writers such as Peter Singer, John Rawls, and



Thomas Pogge is required, since each of these accounts fails to reflect the full range of relevant considerations. A better account would give some weight to overall utility, the condition of the worst off, and individual responsibility. This approach provides robust support to global poverty alleviation.

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Malamud Carlos

América Latina en el espejo de la globalización

in *Nueva Sociedad*, n. 214 , 68-74

China capta 30% de la inversión privada del mundo en desarrollo, mientras que Brasil apenas accede a 7%. Desde 1990, América Latina redujo la pobreza de 48,3% a 35,1%, mientras que en Vietnam hoy no llega a 15%. Pese al crecimiento económico y los avances sociales de los últimos años, América Latina está lejos de encontrar un camino adecuado para insertarse eficazmente en la globalización. El artículo sostiene que esto se debe a las visiones equivocadas, teñidas de nacionalismo y populismo, que prevalecen en la región.

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Kacowicz Arie M.

América Latina en el mundo: globalización, regionalización y fragmentación

in *Nueva Sociedad*, n. 214 , 112-123

Las relaciones entre América Latina y el resto del mundo están condicionadas por la asimetría respecto de los países más poderosos, un entorno de seguridad caracterizado como zona de paz y un contexto económico marcado por la herencia neoliberal y la apertura comercial. En este marco, América Latina ha adoptado tres caminos diferentes: la apertura al mundo, la regionalización mediante los procesos de integración y la articulación de vínculos transregionales a través de tratados de libre comercio, en general con Estados Unidos. Las diferencias entre países y las superposiciones demuestran que la región carece de una estrategia única y coherente de inserción en el mundo globalizado.

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Hershberg Eric

América Latina fragmentada. Economía y empleo en la era de la globalización

in *Nueva Sociedad*, n. 214 , 152-161

Los resultados decepcionantes de las políticas del Consenso de Washington llevaron a que América Latina buscara otras opciones, que pueden dividirse en tres modelos distintos de desarrollo y de inserción en el mundo globalizado: en el norte de la región, la continuidad neoliberal en el marco de alianzas comerciales con Estados Unidos; en el Cono Sur, políticas macroeconómicas ortodoxas combinadas con estrategias de reindustrialización, en un intento por



construir una "globalización con rostro humano". Y en algunos países andinos, ensayos de transformación económica más radical. El artículo argumenta que, en el fondo, lo que está en juego en todos los casos es el carácter futuro del capital y su relación con el Estado y el trabajo, que definirán la forma en que la región se insertará en el mundo.

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Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Scott Palmer David

América Latina: estrategias para enfrentar los retos de la globalización
in *Nueva Sociedad*, n. 214 , 104-111

Aunque la asimetría y la dependencia siguen condicionando su desarrollo, América Latina ha implementado una serie de estrategias para enfrentar los retos de la globalización: la negociación de Tratados de Libre Comercio, la diversificación de los mercados para sus exportaciones, los estímulos a los productos no tradicionales y las iniciativas regionales o subregionales de construcción de mercados comunes. Aun aquellos gobiernos que rechazan los efectos de la globalización no tienen más remedio que mantenerse dentro de ella, aunque enfatizando el rol del Estado. En suma, las estrategias para insertarse en el mundo no suponen una novedad absoluta, sino más bien un intento de acomodarse mediante iniciativas pragmáticas y realistas que permitan lograr sus objetivos nacionales a través del aprovechamiento de los espacios que hoy ofrece la globalización.

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Scognamiglio Pasini Carlo

Bretton Woods: le origini della globalizzazione
in *Aspenia*, n. 42, "Religione e Politica" , 246-256

No abstract available

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Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Olabe Antxón, González Mikel

Cambio climático, una amenaza para la seguridad global
in *Política Exterior*, 124

Movimientos de población, escasez de recursos alimentarios y necesidades de desarrollo para la mayoría de los países son algunos de los riesgos para la seguridad internacional derivados del cambio climático. La alteración del clima crea un escenario desconocido y con impactos graves sobre los sistemas humanos. La arquitectura institucional y las medidas adoptadas en las dos últimas décadas no han sido suficientes para reconducir el problema. La comunidad internacional debe modificar la calificación de este problema para considerarlo una crisis emergente de seguridad global.

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Brunkhorst Hauke

Demokratische Solidarität in der Weltgesellschaft

in **Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte**, Band 21, 2008

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Demokratische Solidarität in der Weltgesellschaft

Hauke Brunkhorst

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Einleitung

Klassiker der Soziologie wie Emile Durkheim oder Talcott Parsons haben Solidarität als "Maß" für die "noch zusammenhaltbare Verschiedenheit" der Gesellschaft verstanden.[1] Moderne Gesellschaften sind hoch differenziert, in hoch spezialisierte Funktionsbereiche, Wertsphären und Kulturen zerfallen, die einander fremd und unverständlich bleiben. Die moderne Gesellschaft könnte als das definiert werden, was sie nach Auffassung der politischen Mehrheit des Bundestags nicht sein soll, aber doch unverrückbar ist: eine riesige Ansammlung von Parallelgesellschaften. Kaum war der Begriff in den Abendnachrichten des Fernsehens, konnte es jeder sofort sehen: Nicht nur die Türken, auch Bundesinnenminister Wolfgang Schäuble und die politische Klasse, die sich bei jedem Fernsehinterview selbst drinnen in der Stadt lokalisiert, um zu den Menschen draußen im Lande zu reden, ist Angehöriger einer Parallelgesellschaft; die Menschen bilden ganz offensichtlich eine andere, und der Vorstandschef der Deutschen Bank, Josef Ackermann, und die Gesellschaft des internationalen Finanzkapital eine weitere Parallelgesellschaft.

Zur Person

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Das Erstaunliche an der modernen Gesellschaft ist aber nicht die Tatsache, dass sie in zahllose Parallelgesellschaften zerfällt, sondern dass sie dabei trotzdem zusammenhält und auch noch viel leistungsfähiger und funktionstüchtiger ist als alle früheren Gesellschaften zusammengenommen. Auch diese Gesellschaften kannten zwar schon lange Parallelgesellschaften (Adel und Volk, Bürger und Fremde, Stadt und Land), aber sie haben sich zumindest in einem übergreifenden Weltbild (Religion, Mythos) selbst als Einheit dargestellt, und sie waren auch tatsächlich, vergleicht man sie mit der Gesellschaft des 20. Jahrhunderts, relativ homogen. Dafür waren sie aber nicht nur weit weniger leistungsfähig, auch ihr Zusammenhalt war trotz der größeren Homogenität der Gesellschaft nicht stärker, sondern schwächer. Schon Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts hat einer der Gründungsväter der modernen Soziologie, Herbert Spencer, diese Beobachtung zu einem Gesetz generalisiert, das wahrscheinlich das einzige unangefochtene Naturgesetz ist, das die Soziologie in ihrer mehr als 150-jährigen Geschichte je entdeckt hat: Die funktionale Stabilität einer Gesellschaft steigt mit wachsender Heterogenität, und sie fällt mit wachsender Homogenität.[2] Je mehr Parallelgesellschaften sie hat, umso stabiler ist die Gesellschaft, und wer politische Programme entwickelt, um Parallelgesellschaften zu "integrieren", wie der deutsche Innenminister, gefährdet, was er bewahren möchte: ihre Stabilität und Leistungsfähigkeit. In der Demokratie - und das ist ein wesentlicher Aspekt demokratischer Solidarität, die nicht nur dem Verfassungsfreund, sondern auch dem Verfassungsfeind gilt - darf er das natürlich, sollte es aber wissen.

Die Überlegungen Spencers und Durkheims, die Parsons und Luhmann weiterentwickelt haben, beruhen auf einer einfachen Analogie: Die Organe des menschlichen Körpers könnten verschiedener nicht sein, und doch halten sie den Körper zusammen: Tausende von Parallelorganen. Dasselbe gilt für die Organe der modernen Gesellschaft, ihre Funktionssystemen und Spezialeinrichtungen, und deshalb spricht Durkheim ganz unromantisch von organischer Solidarität.

Romantischer inspirierte Autoren wie Karl Marx oder Hannah Arendt hingegen sind, obwohl beide von der Richtigkeit des Spencer-Durkheim'schen Gesetzes vollkommen überzeugt sind, an einem ganz andern Begriff praktischer Solidarität interessiert, die beide gerne am Beispiel revolutionärer Solidarität erläutern. Diese Form der Solidarität entsteht überhaupt erst in Reaktion auf Zustände empörenden Unrechts. Aber auch in diesem Fall sind nicht Einheit und Perfektion die Quellen der Solidarität, sondern politischer Widerspruch und sozialer Konflikt.

Demokratische Solidarität kann nun als komplexe Verbindung der organischen mit der praktischen Solidarität verstanden werden. Sie bemisst sich an der Fähigkeit einer Rechtsgenossenschaft, die revolutionäre Solidarität der *pouvoir constituant*, der verfassungsgebenden Gewalt des Volkes durch eine institutionelle Differenzierung des Rechtserzeugungs- und Umsetzungsprozesses (Organisationsverfassung, Gewaltenteilung) zu erhalten und zu erneuern.[3] Während die organische Solidarität also ihr Maß an noch zusammenhaltbarer Verschiedenheit hat, ist das Maß praktisch-revolutionärer Solidarität die Aufhebung unerträglicher und unzumutbarer Unterschiede und Ungleichbehandlungen, und demokratische Solidarität verbindet durch ein "Recht, das demokratische Politik ermöglicht", [4] das eine mit dem anderen, die Gleichheit mit der Verschiedenheit, oder anders formuliert: den Kampf gegen die Ungleichheit mit der Anerkennung der Verschiedenheit.

Überall, wo der konstitutionelle Zusammenhang zwischen praktischer und organischer Solidarität, zwischen Gleichheit und Verschiedenheit zerreißt, kommt es zu Legitimationkrisen. Sie entstehen immer dann, wenn die funktionsnotwendige Solidarität im Zusammenhalt der Spezialeinrichtungen die Entstehung normativ unerträglicher Unterschiede in der sozialen Lebenswelt nicht verhindern kann oder gar zur Folge hat. Die Geschichte der modernen Gesellschaft Europas hat schon viele Legitimationskrisen erlebt. Sie haben viel mit dem zu tun, was Marx die Entfesselung aller Produktivkräfte durch die bürgerliche Gesellschaft genannt hat. Seit dem 16. Jahrhundert sind aber nicht nur die materiellen Produktivkräfte explodiert, sondern auch alle kommunikativen Energien fundamentalistischer



Religionen (Protestantismus), öffentlichen Administrativmacht (Staatsräson) und der freien Arbeits-, Geld und Immobilienmärkte (moderner Kapitalismus) entbunden worden. Das hat regelmäßig zu nicht mehr kontrollierbaren Ausbrüchen von Gewalt und Unterdrückung geführt und eine Serie blutiger Revolutionen und Aufstände zur Folge gehabt. Es bedurfte der historisch einzigartigen Machtkonzentration des republikanischen Nationalstaats, der in den Stürmen dieser Revolutionen entstanden ist, um die Explosion der Energien funktionaler Differenzierung in kontrollierte Kettenreaktionen (und damit unkalkulierbare Krisen in kalkulierbare Risiken) zu überführen. Dem Nationalstaat ist es erst im Zuge seiner demokratischen Konstitutionalisierung gelungen,

1. die Freiheit der Religion zusammen mit der Freiheit von der Religion zu institutionalisieren und damit Aufklärung und Religion gleichermaßen als Solidaritätsquellen zu erschließen;
2. die Freiheit von der öffentlichen Gewalt mit der Freiheit des öffentlichen Lebens ins Gleichgewicht zu bringen und den Staatsapparat der demokratischen Solidarität der Bürgergesellschaft zu unterwerfen, und schließlich
3. die Freiheit der Märkte zusammen mit der Freiheit von den negativen Externalitäten des Kapitalismus zu gewährleisten.

Die Leistung demokratischer Solidarität bestand in der Exklusion von Ungleichheit (Rudolf Stichweh). Vom frühen 19. bis zur Mitte des 20. Jahrhunderts war der moderne Staat jedoch auf die Regionalgesellschaften Europas, Amerikas und Japans beschränkt, und der Imperialismus war dem souveränen Nationalstaat keineswegs fremd, gehörte vielmehr zu dessen innerstem Wesen. Das hat sich freilich seit dem Ende des Zweiten Weltkriegs grundlegend geändert. Seit 1945 haben sich die Gewichte in einem breiter werdenden Segment der Staatenwelt immer weiter zugunsten der Demokratie verschoben, um deren Existenz schließlich zwei Weltkriege geführt wurden, und fast überall haben sich die Normtexte von Verfassungen durchgesetzt, die zumindest auf dem Papier gebieten, bestehende Herrschaft nicht mehr nur zu begrenzen, sondern als Herrschaft Beherrscher demokratisch neu zu begründen. Demokratische Solidarität ist, so scheint es, on the road zu einem universellen Völkerrechtsprinzip.

Normativ integrierte Weltgesellschaft

Bis in die Mitte des 20. Jahrhunderts bestand die dunkle Kehrseite der regional und auf die rechtliche Gleichheit der eigenen Staatsangehörigen beschränkten, nationalstaatlichen Exklusion von Ungleichheit in der auch rechtlich zementierten Ungleichheit für diejenigen Individuen, Organisationen und politischen Regimes, die nicht der nordwestlich zentrierten Staatenwelt angehörten. Einen juristisch zwingenden Anspruch auf den globalen Ausschluss von Ungleichheiten gab es nicht.

Das hat sich nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg dramatisch geändert. Zwar sind massive Menschenrechtsverletzungen, sind die soziale Exklusion ganzer Weltregionen und empörende Ungleichbehandlungen nicht verschwunden. Aber jetzt erst werden Menschenrechtsverletzungen, Rechtlosigkeit und politische und soziale Ungleichheit als unser eigenes Problem verstanden, das jeden Akteur der Weltgesellschaft betrifft, und erst jetzt gibt es ernsthafte und rechtlich bindende Ansprüche auf die globale Exklusion von Ungleichheit.[5] Jetzt erst kann die durch wachsende Verschiedenheit erzeugte Ungleichheit als rechtlich unzumutbar bezeichnet und als Rechtsverletzung, die "überall gespürt wird" (Kant), erfahren werden. Insofern kann man mit Jürgen Habermas und Stichweh heute von einer normativ integrierten Weltgesellschaft sprechen.

Die ursprünglich nur für den westlichen Nationalstaat konstitutive Exklusion von Ungleichheit ist heute zur gemeinsamen öffentlichen Angelegenheit aller Völkerrechtssubjekte, der Staaten, der internationalen Regierungs- und



Nichtregierungsorganisationen, der Völker und individuellen Weltbürger geworden. Diese werden damit zu einem globalen politischen Publikum, zu einer Weltöffentlichkeit, zu einer Weltrepublik ohne Weltstaat. Die alten Völkerrechtsordnungen des Augsburger Religionsfriedens, der Pax Westfalia und des Wiener Kongresses, die im staatswillenspositivistisch gesonnenen 19. und frühen 20. Jahrhundert ihr staatsrechtliches Credo noch im "logischen Imperialismus" (Hans Kelsen) souveräner Einzelstaaten hatten und deshalb wechselseitig den egozentrischen Anspruch erheben konnten, jeweils Herren allen Rechts zu sein, ist der *civitas maxima* einer Weltrechtsgemeinschaft gewichen, die normativ über den heute nicht einmal mehr verfassungsautonomen Staaten steht. Es gibt heute ein hoch differenziertes globales System der Gewaltengliederung, in dem die Staaten und ihre transnational stärker oder schwächer vernetzten Organgewalten ihren Part neben und unter den übrigen Organen der Fortbildung, Anwendung und Durchsetzung des Völkerrechts übernommen haben. Mit dieser Entwicklung reagiert die internationale Gemeinschaft bereits auf den wachsenden, strukturellen Solidaritätsbedarf der funktional differenzierten und normativ integrierten Weltgesellschaft.

Annahme einer konstitutiven Weltkultur

Die Weltgesellschaft ist nicht nur ein Produkt des europäisch-nordwestlichen Imperialismus, sondern verdankt sich ebenso autochthonen zivilisatorischen Parallelentwicklungen anderer Weltregionen. Die regionalen Gesellschaften sind heute alle gleich weit von allen vormodernen Gesellschaften entfernt und alle gleichermaßen modern. Damit bricht die ideologisch immer geläufige Identifikation von Verwestlichung und Modernisierung wissenschaftlich in sich zusammen.

Heute sind ausnahmslos alle menschlichen Individuen von Schul- und Markterfolg abhängig. Alle sozialen, kulturellen, politischen und regionalen Unterschiede, die unsere Lebenschancen sehr ungleich verteilen, ändern nichts daran, dass das Lebensschicksal einer und eines jeden, spätestens seit Vernichtung der letzten Hauswirtschaften, überall der hohen Selektivität dieser beiden Systeme unterworfen ist. Die Basis, die Gesellschaftsstruktur funktionaler Differenzierung ist überall dieselbe, und die Zwangsmitgliedschaft in Schulen und Unternehmen erzeugt zusammen mit den anderen Diskursmächten der modernen Gesellschaft und ihres Staats, der Polizei, den Kliniken, dem Militär, dem Gefängnis usw. das moderne Disziplinarindividuum (Foucault).

Zusammen mit dem materiellen Sein ändert sich auch das kollektive Bewusstsein und Wissen der Weltgesellschaft, "wälzt sich der ganze, ungeheure Überbau langsamer oder rascher um" (Marx). Die einzelnen menschlichen Individuen sind nicht nur der äußeren Zwangsindividualisierung durch die überall gleiche Sozialstruktur ausgesetzt, sondern eine durch und durch säkulare Weltkultur formt die säkularen ebenso wie die (überwiegend) nichtsäkularen Lebenswelten, die intrinsischen Motive und die *habits of the heart* im Sinne eines modernen - sei es kommunitaristischen ("asiatische Werte"), sei es liberalen ("westliche Werte") - Individualismus und Rationalismus. Dadurch aber geraten die vielen verschiedenen und besonderen, regional und lokal geprägten, religiös bestimmten oder atheistischen, liberalen oder paternalistischen Herkunftskulturen in Abhängigkeit von global abrufbarem kulturellem Wissen und säkularen Wertorientierungen.

Binnen kürzester Zeit haben sich individualistische und konsumistische Lebensstile ubiquitär verbreitet, in fundamentalistischen Armuts- ebenso wie in liberalen Reichtumsregionen. Gut beobachtbar ist die globale Kulturrevolution gerade am religiösen Fundamentalismus. Statt sie zu bewahren und zu erneuern, vernichtet und dekontextualisiert er die religiösen Traditionen, instrumentalisiert er sie politisch, individualisiert und atomisiert er sie bis zur Perversion des (hoch individualistischen) Selbstmordattentats.



Der Überbau formt auch die Basis. Nur durch die Annahme einer konstitutiven Weltkultur lässt sich nämlich, wie John W. Meyer und die empirischen Untersuchungen der Stanford School gezeigt haben, die überraschend hohe Einheitlichkeit der weltgesellschaftlichen Akteure (Individuen, Staaten, Organisationen) überhaupt verstehen. Man muss sich nur einmal nicht fragen, warum alles so verschieden, sondern, warum es so gleich ist, und dann sieht man sofort eine sehr weit gehende, erst wenige Jahrzehnte alte Übereinstimmung der Wertorientierungen und der Sozial- und Sozialisierungstechniken. So kommt bei der Reform staatlicher Bildungseinrichtungen fast überall das 6-3-3-Schema der Schulstufen zur Anwendung, wird fast überall zur selben Zeit der schülerzentrierte Unterricht eingeführt. Das Recht nahezu aller Staaten ist weitgehend positiviert und akademisch professionalisiert. Verfassungs- und einfaches Recht sind getrennt. In kürzester Zeit ist fast überall eine ausgedehnte und einflussreiche Verfassungsrechtssprechung entstanden. Die Regierungen gleichen sich in ihren basalen Institutionen fast wie ein Ei dem andern, überall Minister und Staatssekretäre, überall Bildungs- und Umweltministerien, auch wo das reine Geldverschwendung ist. Fast überall haben wir Antidiskriminierungsquoten, Frauenrechte, und die politischen Führer aller Länder, egal ob sie Kommunisten oder Kapitalisten, religiöse Fundamentalisten oder laizistische Atheisten sind, versprechen überall Fortschritt, Wachstum, Frieden, Umweltschutz und soziale Gerechtigkeit. Die Programme sind fast austauschbar, und überall besteht dieselbe Kluft zwischen progressivistischer Rhetorik und hinterher hinkender Realisierung. Das eine mal ist sie Ansporn zu weiterer Anstrengung (USA), das andere mal Grund zur Resignation (Brasilien). Die regionalen Besonderheiten sind Differenzierungen der einen Weltkultur.

Civitas Maxima - Verfassung der Weltgesellschaft

Wenn auch die am Beginn der globalen Rechtsrevolution nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg angefeindeten, verspotteten und verhöhnten Protagonisten der civitas maxima, des Völkerbunds, des Weltrechts und der Demokratie wie Hans Kelsen oder Georges Scelle am Ende gegen Carl Schmitt und Hans Morgenthau Recht behalten haben, so ist die civitas maxima, in und mit der wir heute leben müssen, doch weit davon entfernt, in guter Verfassung zu sein. Die Verfassung der Weltgesellschaft ist vielmehr ein Netzwerk aus Rechten und Organisationsnormen, die den Widerspruch von demokratischer Solidarität und hegemonialer Weltstaatlichkeit, der die heutige Welt durchzieht, in sich abbilden. Die Macht der konstitutionell zumindest halbwegs gebändigten Hegemonialmächte wächst überall auf Kosten der demokratischen Solidaritäten. Die durch Konstitutionalisierung steigende Fähigkeit der multikulturellen, hoch individualisierten und immer weiter spezialisierten Gesellschaft, wachsende Verschiedenheit noch zusammenzuhalten, wird von immer unerträglicher werdenden Unterschieden des Kapitals und der Arbeit, der Eingeschlossenen und der Ausgeschlossenen, der Macht, des Glaubens, des Wissens, der Rechte usw. begleitet.

Die strukturelle Kopplung von Politik, Recht und Wirtschaft im Weltverfassungerecht hat zwar dazu geführt, dass zumindest das Annexionsverbot in fast allen Krisen und kriegerischen Konflikten effektiv durchgesetzt und Angriffskriege, wenn nicht vermieden, so doch erfolgreich illegalisiert und entsprechend sanktioniert werden konnten. Auch Kelsens Hoffnung auf einen Weltstaat hat sich in der schwächeren Form einer dezentrierten Weltstaatlichkeit verwirklicht, die Staatsfunktionen schon lange nicht mehr nur intergouvernemental ergänzt, sondern vielfach durch Leistungen der internationalen Gemeinschaft substituiert.[6]

Die Konstitutionalisierung des Völkerrechts ist weit von einer Realisierung ihres eigenen, normativen Anspruchs auf globale Exklusion von Ungleichheit entfernt. Die Unerträglichkeit dieser Ungleichheiten ist es, für deren Kompensation das vorhandene Potential organischer Solidarität nicht ausreicht und die in dem Maße die rächenden Gewalten revolutionärer Solidarität ebenso herausfordert, in dem sie die versöhnende Kraft nationalstaatlich gebundener, demokratisierter Solidarität überfordert.



Mit der Etablierung weltstaatlicher Strukturen schwindet die Fähigkeit des Nationalstaats, Ungleichheit wirksam auszuschließen. Das hat vor allem drei Ursachen, die ineinander greifen, sich wechselseitig verstärken und die vorhandenen Solidaritäten überfordern:

1. Die Globalisierung der Geld-, Arbeits- und Immobilienmärkte hat die state embedded markets des nationalen Spätkapitalismus in die market embedded states des globalen Turbokapitalismus verwandelt, und der auf diese Weise dekonstitutionalisierte Kapitalismus stürzt den demokratischen Sozialstaat des Westens, noch während er gerade über den diktatorischen des Ostens heiter triumphiert, in eine tiefe Krise.[7] Die Freiheit der Märkte entfesselt sich erneut - fast wie es bei Marx im Buche steht - auf Kosten der Freiheit von ihren negativen Externalitäten.

2. Was dem Kapitalismus recht ist, ist der Religion billig. Die fundamentalistischen Sekten und Netzwerkreligionen und die katholische Kirche, die seit fast tausend Jahren mit weltstaatsartigen Organisationsformen experimentiert haben, sind die großen Globalisierungsgewinner, die protestantischen Staatskirchen ihre Verlierer. Die zweite große Transformation hat die state embedded religions des souveränen Nationalstaats in die religion embedded states eines weltstaatlichen Systems verwandelt, dessen staatliche und überstaatliche Organgewalten auch zusammen nicht ausreichen, um die Weltreligionen produktiv zu institutionalisieren. Die anarchische Freiheit der so dekonstitutionalisierten Religionen entwickelt sich seitdem auf Kosten der Freiheit von der Religion.

3. Nicht nur Kapitalismus und Religion, auch die öffentlichen Exekutivgewalten haben sich inter-, trans- und supranational vernetzt, aus ihren verfassungs- und staatsorganisationsrechtlichen Verankerungen losgerissen und dekonstitutionalisiert. Die dritte große Transformation verwandelt die state embedded public powers in power embedded states.[8] Seit geraumer Zeit wirken z.B. die im Sicherheitsrat vereinigten Exekutivgewalten unmittelbar auf das Leben der einzelnen Bürgerinnen und Bürger ein. So sanktioniert der UN-Sicherheitsrat - in diktatorischer Einheit von legislativer, judikativer und exekutiver Gewalt - seit Beginn der 1990er Jahre Einzelpersonen, Unternehmen und private Vereinigungen bis hin zum listing of terror suspects einschließlich Hausarrest und freezing ihrer Konten - ohne dass es dagegen bislang auch nur im nachhinein ausreichende, legal remedies gäbe. Das ist ein gutes Beispiel der Substitution von Staatsfunktionen durch internationale Organisationen und ein weiteres Beispiel unerträglicher Ungleichbehandlung: Wachstum der Freiheit der öffentlichen Gewalt auf Kosten der Freiheit von der öffentlichen Gewalt.

Die Rekonstitutionalisierung von Kapitalismus, Religion und öffentlicher Gewalt kann der Nationalstaat aus eigener Kraft nicht mehr leisten. Auch die hoch spezialisierten und eng an die Funktionssysteme gebundenen, globalen Verfassungsregimes sind dazu bislang nicht imstande. Aber neue Regionalregimes vom Typus der Europäischen Union könnten zum Retter der überall bedrohten demokratischen Solidaritäten werden. Sie bündeln wie Staaten Funktionen und konstituieren - anders als die Weltgemeinschaften - territorial begrenzte, eigene Bürgerschaften.[9] Sie könnten deshalb die nötige Macht erzeugen und demokratisch legitimieren, die für das re-embedding von Kapitalismus, Religion und öffentlicher Gewalt erforderlich ist. Eine Entwicklung, die in diese Richtung geht, zeichnet sich jedoch bislang noch nicht ab, und das nicht nur wegen des verlorenen Verfassungsreferendums, dessen Vertrag, nachdem er an den Bürgern gescheitert ist, nun ohne sie und ohne das Wort Verfassung verabschiedet wird.[10] In diesem technokratischen Verfahren des bypassing public opinion spiegelt sich eine Strukturschwäche des inter-, trans- und supranationalen Rechts, die ich abschließend noch kurz beleuchten möchte.

Direktorale Richtlinienkompetenz in der Weltgesellschaft



Die vereinigten Exekutivgewalten könnten zwar jenseits des Nationalstaats die Macht erzeugen, die nötig wäre, um die Freiheit der Märkte, der Religionen und der öffentlichen Gewalten zu rekonstitutionalisieren und das Versprechen der globalen Rechtsrevolution einzulösen, Ungleichheit überall, wo Menschen leben, auszuschließen. Aber ihnen fehlt dazu das Interesse. Ihr demokratisch legitimierte Interesse an Machtsteigerung führt die vereinigten Exekutivgewalten nämlich mit den andern global players, frequent travellers und professionels, mit Unternehmensvorständen, mächtigen Nichtregierungsorganisationen, Medien-tycoons und Fernsehstars zu einer neuen transnationalen Klasse mit eigenen, demokratisch nicht mehr legitimierten Klasseninteressen, eigenem Habitus und symbolischem Kapital zusammen. Der aktive cosmopolitanism of the few trennt sich vom passiven cosmopolitanism of the many.[11]

Diese Transformation eines demokratisch legitimierten in ein nicht mehr demokratisch kontrolliertes Handeln wird durch die im Vergleich zum demokratischen Rechtsstaat großen Lücken und die hohe Elastizität internationalen, auch des europäischen Rechts, möglich. Sie begünstigt die Substitution zwingenden Rechts durch informelle Herrschaft. Die legale degeneriert zur konkreten Rechtsordnung (Carl Schmitt). So treffen sich die Chefs der großen Zentralbanken regelmäßig hinter verschlossenen Türen in den Räumen einer Baseler Privatbank und legen durch rein informelles, aber hoch wirksames soft law die Richtlinien der globalen Finanz- und Geldpolitik fest. Von den Streitereien auf den G8- und Euro-Gipfeln berichten die Nachrichtensender, nicht aber darüber, dass die mächtigsten Staatschefs sich in den meisten Punkten ihrer immer länger werdenden Agenden einig sind und längst so etwas wie eine direktoriale Richtlinienkompetenz in der Weltgesellschaft ausüben. Die Proteste, die regelmäßig jene Gipfeltreffen begleiten, sind vielleicht ohnmächtig und oft schlecht begründet, aber sie machen das Legitimationsproblem der Weltgesellschaft für alle sichtbar. Was sie erkennen lassen, ist der Riss in der demokratischen Legitimationskette (Wolfgang Böckenförde), den der Zaun symbolisiert, der die eingeschlossene Exekutivgewalt von der ausgeschlossenen Bürgermacht trennt. Mehr noch als ein demokratisches, klafft ein institutionelles Defizit zwischen denen draußen und denen drinnen. Kein Gesetzgeber hat den lose assoziierten Vereinigungen und Gipfeltreffen der Exekutiven, frequent travellers und global players Kompetenzen zugeschrieben. Kein Verwaltungsgericht ist für ihre vollkommen freie Assoziation zuständig. Wo als Ergebnis der Beratungen keine gesetzliche Norm, sondern nur ein Protokoll verfasst wird, kommt kein Kläger, kommt kein Richter, und die Allzuständigkeit des Parlaments verstummt.

Nehmen wir ein harmloses Beispiel aus dem Hochschulalltag. MA, BA, Akkreditierungskommissionen, Evaluierungen, ECTS-Punkte, Vernichtung akademischer Arbeitszeit für Verwaltungstätigkeiten, für die Professoren, Assistenten usw. nicht qualifiziert sind, geschweige denn bezahlt würden, Hochschulräte, in denen die landesüblichen Unternehmer mit Sitz und Stimme vertreten sind, kurz: der Bologna-Prozess. In dieser oberitalienischen Stadt haben sich Minister und Staatssekretäre, Experten Europas aus EU und Anrainern und ein private-public-Partner als Vertreter der Bürgergesellschaft, die Gesandtschaft des Bertelsmannkonzerns, eines schönen Tages ohne Organkompetenz, spontan, informell und völlig legal getroffen, über die Reform der europäischen Universität geplaudert, diskutiert, gearbeitet und der Öffentlichkeit auf der anschließenden Pressekonferenz ein Ergebnisprotokoll präsentiert: ein Protokoll ohne Rechtsverbindlichkeit, keinen völkerrechtlich bindenden Vertrag, der vor seiner Umsetzung noch der parlamentarischen Ratifizierung bedurft hätte, kein europäisches Gesetz, keine Richtlinie, keine Entscheidung, keine Verordnung, noch nicht einmal eine unverbindliche Empfehlung oder Stellungnahme gemäß Art. 249 EGV, sondern eine kollektive Meinungsäußerung, bestenfalls institutionell ortloses soft law. Aber das hat es in sich. Es entfaltet legislative Wirkung, weil es keine formelle Rechtskraft hat. Es wird in ganz Europa, EU plus Anrainernstaaten klag- und diskussionslos umgesetzt und führt in kürzester Zeit zur vollständigen Umwälzung des europäischen Universitätssystems. Da sag noch mal einer, die Politik sei nicht handlungsfähig. Während die Wissenschaftler, die zwar mittlerweile jedes korporative Selbstbewusstsein verloren haben, aber immer noch zu zahlreicher Individualkritik motiviert sind, sich in den Feuilletons den Mund fusselig reden, vollzieht die hoch bewegliche zweite Gewalt das bypassing der öffentlichen Meinung.



Wie macht die politische Klasse das? Mit einer simplen Herrschaftstechnik, die in der EU gang und gäbe ist: Die Minister kommen nach Hause, berichten vom Protokoll und erklären, wegen Brüssel müsse das ganze eins zu eins umgesetzt werden. Und es wird umgesetzt. Das zur nachgeordneten Behörde degradierte Parlament kann nichts machen und fügt sich "feig, kleinlaut, muthlos" (Marx) zur fälligen Abstimmung, 93,99 Prozent Ja-Stimmen, ein Volkskammerbeschluss. Der Minister ist es nicht gewesen, Brüssel ist's gewesen und nimmt alle Schuld auf sich: das christliche Europa. Nur die Kommissare der Brüsseler Behörde wundern sich am Ende über Legitimationseinbußen und beschimpfen nach dem verlorenen Verfassungsreferendum das Volk. Wo doch alles so schön geklappt hatte, und eines vor allem: Die vereinigten Exekutiven Europas und ihr Bürgervertreter Bertelsmann haben ihre transnationale Klassenmacht wieder einmal ein kräftiges Stück weit vergrößert, ihren Handlungsspielraum jenseits der Gesetzesbindung erweitert, ungeahnte Kompetenzen dazu gewonnen, ihre vielerlei Chancen in der Politik und im Leben verbessert. Einen technisch perfekter funktionierenden Sachzwang hätte Helmut Schelsky nicht erfinden können.

Die ursprüngliche Akkumulation informeller Macht, die sich heute an der Arbeit des Europäischen Rats ebenso gut beobachten lässt wie am Beispiel des Baseler Bankenausschusses oder der G8-Gipfel usw., ermöglicht der transnationalen Klasse das geräuschlose bypassing aller organisationsrechtlich prozeduralisierten Legitimationsmechanismen. Informelle Beschlüsse ohne bindenden Charakter wirken wie das altrömisch republikanische senatus consultum: ein Ratschlag ohne formelle Gesetzeskraft, dem sich trotzdem niemand entziehen kann. Im Vorspann zur Vorlage der Schleswigholsteinischen Landesregierung für ein neues Hochschulgesetz, Abschnitt A, Absatz 2 ließt sich das dann parlamentarisch unwidersprochen so: "Der Bolognaprozess mit seinen 45 Mitgliedstaaten setzt Standards, die auf der Ebene des jeweiligen Landes umgesetzt werden müssen."

In dieser Situation ist jeder Schritt zur Formalisierung informeller Macht ein Gewinn für die Demokratie, denn nur "zwingendes Recht befreit von informeller Herrschaft." (Christoph Möllers) Es stärkt den cosmopolitanism of the many. Er schwächt den cosmopolitanism of the few.

Fußnoten

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- 2 Vgl. Herbert Spencer, First Principles, § 154; s. a. Principles V (Political Institutions), § 454, London 1882.
- 3 Vgl. Hauke Brunkhorst, Solidarität. Von der Bürgerfreundschaft zur globalen Rechtsgenossenschaft, Frankfurt/M. 2002.
- 4 Christoph Möllers, Verfassung - Verfassungsgebung - Konstitutionalisierung, in: Arnim von Bogdandy (Hrsg.), Europäisches Verfassungsrecht, Heidelberg 2003, S. 3 ff.
- 5 Vgl. Regina Kreide, Globale Politik und Menschenrechte. Macht und Ohnmacht eines politischen Instruments, Frankfurt/M. 2008.
- 6 Vgl. Matthias Albert/Rudolf Stichweh (Hrsg.), Weltstaat und Weltstaatlichkeit, Wiesbaden 2007.
- 7 Vgl. Wolfgang Streek, Sectoral Specialization: Politics and the Nation State in a Global Economy, paper presented on the 37th World Congress of the International Institute of Sociology, Stockholm 2005.
- 8 Nicht zuletzt deshalb bedarf es umso dringlicher einer vollständigen Verfassung der globalen Rechtsgenossenschaft.
- 9 Vgl. Christoph Schönberger, Föderale Angehörigkeit, Habilitationsschrift, Freiburg 2005.
- 10 Vgl. Gertrude Lübke-Wolf, Die Internationalisierung der Politik und der Machtverlust der Parlamente, in: Hauke Brunkhorst (Hrsg.), Demokratie in der Weltgesellschaft, Sonderheft der Sozialen Welt 2008.



11 Vgl. Craig Calhoun, The Class Consciousness of Frequent Travelers, in: The South Atlantic Quarterly, (2002) 4, S. 869 - 897.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Behr Hartmut

Deterritorialisation and the Transformation of Statehood: The Paradox of Globalisation

in Geopolitics, Vol. 13, n. 2, April , 359-382

Since the end of the Cold War, states and civil societies face a radically different security situation. In addition to state-to-state threats, transnational security issues have risen to previously unknown relevance. I will argue that - in order to create effective counter-policies against transnational threats - states must transform fundamental principles of traditional statehood according to the logic of global deterritorialisation. To develop this argument, the nature of changed security will be analysed which itself can be found in de-territorialisation: transnational actors withdraw from the territorial principles of traditional security, as best epitomised by transnational terrorism. Consequently, 'national security', developed according to the territorial 'inside'-'outside'-logic of the state, no longer counters those actors. States must elaborate deterritorial strategies. This development causes a transformation of the state since territoriality is the basic principle of modern statehood. Thus, the reassertion of the state in global security unveils a paradox: to react to deterritorialised security and to reassure their power in global politics, states must overcome their traditional principles of territorial politics and further the development of deterritorialisation.

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Schröter Harm G.

Economic culture and its transfer: an overview of the Americanisation of the European economy, 1900-2005

in European Review of History - Revue Européenne d'Histoire, Volume 15, Issue 4, August

Americanisation is the (selected and adapted) transfer of values from the US to Europe. While this model is well established in cultural history, economist and economic historians had difficulties with this concept. However, the book's title 'Culture Matters!' is the latest insight of distinguished economists such as Michael E. Porter, Jeffrey Sachs, Francis Fukuyama and others.¹ The contributors to this issue not only agree, but try to provide an answer to the question that is asked in the subtitle of the book: 'How Values Shape Human Progress'. More precisely, they ask how American values influenced European economic performance during the twentieth century. Europe experienced three major waves of Americanisation: in the 1920s, during the boom-phase 1949-1973, and finally from about 1985 until the present day. By using Americanisation as a cultural concept, as well as describing the waves, why they occurred can also be explained: the Europeans were eager to learn how to improve their economy during phases in which the US excelled not only in the economic field but also in others (politics, military strength, etc.). Thus, it can be understood how and why rationalisation swept over Europe as a wave in the 1920s, and why the US film industry became dominant; why during the boom European countries set up business schools; why firms changed their systems of government; and finally why since about 1985 Europeans have embarked on a process of privatisation and de-regulation. Thus, Americanisation gives us a better understanding of what has happened and is still happening with us Europeans - and why. The general trend



was to become less cooperative and more competitive in all aspects. Why did Americanisation occur in waves? Already by 1914 some branches of American industry were superior to their European competitors. Selected European firms successfully adopted US standards. But what caused the three waves was not action by a couple of individual businesses: it needed a general feeling of American superiority. Cultural, political, military and financial strength provided the background for each of the waves, while they petered out when this background was no longer existent: during the world economic crisis of the 1930s, in the 1970s with the Vietnamese War, and at the time of the financial and oil crises. Americanisation started again when, with the breakdown of socialism, the US emerged as the world's sole hegemonic power, due to the US IT industry, and American ideas on private property and in the financial sector, all of which pressed for less cooperative and more exclusive, private ways of doing business and conducting one's personal life. The contribution shows how rationalisation spread in Europe during the 1920s. For the boom-period 1950-1973, the showcases are the Marshall Plan, mass distribution including the introduction of self-service and market research, management education, de-cartelisation, foreign direct investment and specific changes within internal organisation of enterprise. The last wave is explained by the changed role of finance, both in private life and in the economy, and in technological change. All these changes over time were entrenched in a handful of American values. It was the deepening of these values in the US themselves that, in combination with an upswing of political, military, cultural and economic power, prepared the next wave of Americanisation.

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Lozano Bartolozzi Pedro

El nuevo escenario de la sociedad de la información en un mundo global.

in *Revista Electrónica de Estudios Internacionales*, Numero 15/2008

No abstract available

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Dauderstädt Michael

Equidad social en la Europa globalizada

in *Nueva Sociedad*, n. 215 , 129-146

La experiencia de la Unión Europea, la región del mundo que más ha avanzado en la integración de los mercados nacionales y la construcción de instancias supranacionales, arroja importantes enseñanzas acerca de la relación entre equidad e integración. En la ue, la desigualdad se ha incrementado como consecuencia del ingreso de nuevos miembros, en general más pobres, pero también como resultado del impacto de la globalización y las decisiones económicas adoptadas en el ámbito nacional. La historia de la ue demuestra que, para lograr más equidad social, es necesario tanto revertir la tendencia a la creciente desigualdad intraestatal como acelerar la convergencia interestatal. Para ello es necesario fortalecer la coordinación macroeconómica y pensar en nuevos instrumentos, como un impuesto o un seguro de desempleo europeos.

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Saksena Jyotika, Anderson Liam

Explaining Variation in the Use of NTBs in Developed Countries: The Role of Political Institutions in International Politics , Volume 45, Issue 4, July , 475-496

Despite the much-touted celebration of the successes of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization in liberalizing free trade, these successes have been limited due to the increasing use of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) as a form of 'protectionism in disguise.' Among advanced industrial economies, the use of NTBs varies considerably. The purpose of this paper is to explain what accounts for this variation. We locate the issue of international trade in its appropriate theoretical context — as a two-level game in which politicians simultaneously face pressure at the international level to fulfill commitments to international free trade agreements, and domestic pressures for protectionist relief. We conduct a statistical analysis using a simple, multivariate regression model examining data at three points in time, 1988, 1993, and 1996, to highlight the causes of the rise in NTBs and variation in their usage. We hypothesize that PR-based systems are associated with lower rather than higher levels of NTBs.

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Artis Michael J., Hoffmann Mathias

Financial Globalization, International Business Cycles and Consumption Risk Sharing in Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Volume 110 Issue 3 , 447 - 471

In spite of two decades of financial globalization, consumption-based indicators do not seem to signal more international risk sharing. We argue that the fraction of idiosyncratic consumption risk that gets shared among industrialized countries has actually increased considerably over the period 1980–2000 and, in particular, during the 1990s—from around 30 to more than 60 percent. However, standard consumption-based measures of risk sharing—such as the volatility of consumption conditional on output or international consumption correlations—have been unable to detect this increase because consumption has also been affected by the concurrent decline in the volatility of output growth in most industrialized countries since the 1980s. First, the volatility of output at business-cycle frequencies has declined by more than has the volatility of permanent fluctuations. Since consumption reacts mainly to permanent shocks, it appears more volatile in relation to current changes in output. This effect seems to have offset the tendency of financial globalization to lower the volatility of consumption conditional on output. Second, because the variability of permanent global shocks has also fallen, international consumption correlations have also generally not increased as financial markets have become more integrated.

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Tshibwabwa Kuditshini Jacques

Global governance and local government in the Congo: the role of the IMF, World Bank, the multinationals and the political elites in International Review of Administrative Sciences , June 2008, Volume 74, No. 2 , 195-216

This article follows in the wake of the territorial dynamic of globalization. It highlights the interactions between local government and an asymmetric global competitiveness in a country where the wealth of mining and forestry resources are under the control of the neo-liberal players of globalization (multinational companies, IMF, World Bank) and the



Congolese political and military elites, thanks in particular to the privatization of land and the natural resources of the entities decentralized by the new mining, forestry and investment codes. Having become a real means of generating artificial revenues for the aforementioned players, these new pieces of legislation dispossess the Congolese local governments upstream, not only financially but also economically and materially and thus undermine their development capacity.

Points for practitioners

In the light of the data produced and analysed in this study, the government practitioners should be aware of the fact that global competitiveness as it has emerged today has severe effects on the natural resources and the economies of the local governments of developing countries, and those of the DRC in particular. This competitiveness, favoured by new mining and forestry codes, profits the foreign multinational companies that are better endowed in terms of capital and cutting-edge technological equipment. Furthermore, these pieces of legislation have become a source of profiteering for the Congo's political elites. Repealing all this imposed legislation and introducing new reforms are the most effective means of fighting against this ever-changing competitiveness and against all forms of profiteering.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Apter David E.

Globalisation and the politics of negative pluralism

in International Social Science Journal , Volume 59, Issue 192, June 2008 , 255-268

Using Africa as an example, the author suggests how globalisation in the form of innovative and capitalist intensive technology marginalises labour while creating a technically informed elite. The division between them represent social cleavages based on high risk and functional polarisation, both of which lead to divisive rather than mediating forms of pluralism. In such instances interests become elevated to principles, particularly around parochial affiliations, loyalties and jurisdictions, not to speak of propensities to violence.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Gasparini Alberto

Globalisation, Reconciliation and the Conditions for Conserving Peace

in Global Society, Volume 22, Issue 1, January , 27-55

This paper analyses the relationship between globalisation and peace. The first part focuses on the diachronic process by which world globalisation developed after the Peace of Westphalia by means of the mechanical and subsequently



organic formation of globalisation. Globalisation is analytically conceptualised as a global market of instrumentalities in which everything, like the lingua franca, is common - culture, communication, transport. Globalisation is then analysed with reference to peace and conflicts. A starting point is the observation that globalisation needs peace and pacified environments, whereas peace does not depend on globalisation. To show this the author discusses the polysemy of peace, generated by the peace of tradition and modernity and the peace of good and goods. In terms of practical relations a key role is played by how these various conceptions of peace relate to ultimate and intermediate values. The range of conceptions of peace is applied to a model of four categories of national society and each of these categories is placed in relation with another, since these reciprocal relations are the condition generating world globalisation. The result of the comparison is that globalisation produces conflict because the different conceptions of peace prevalent in each society are unable to enter into dialogue with each other. In the real world contemporary globalisation is made possible and effective by a range of engines (political and military centres, and peacemaking centres-international organisations), control functions (individuals, organisations, public opinion, a worldwide creative "multitude") and instruments (reconciliation, negotiation, a tendency in relations for intermediate values to prevail over ultimate values).

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Hepp Andreas

Globalisierung der Medien und transkulturelle Kommunikation

in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, Band 39, 2008

Quelle:

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Globalisierung der Medien und transkulturelle Kommunikation

Andreas Hepp

Kurzbeschreibung:

Die Etablierung digitaler Medien im Kontext der Globalisierung der Medien macht transkulturelle Kommunikation möglich. Am Beispiel der europäischen Öffentlichkeit werden die hier liegenden Herausforderungen verdeutlicht.

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Einleitung



Im Jahr 1977 veröffentlichte der britische Soziologe Jeremy Tunstall das Buch "The Media are American". Während in Europa viele technische und kulturelle Innovationen im Bereich der Massenmedien stattfanden, wurden diese in den USA erfolgreich industrialisiert - war das Hauptargument des Autors. Rund 30 Jahre später, nämlich 2008, erschien nun Tunstalls Buch "The Media were American". Die Kernthese dieses Buchs lautet, dass sich seit den 1980er Jahren so viel im Hinblick auf Medien in ihrem globalen Kontext geändert hat, dass das Argument, die Medien seien amerikanisch, nicht mehr aufrecht erhalten werden kann. So hat man eine Zunahme kulturübergreifender Kommunikation - kurz: transkultureller Kommunikation[1] -, jedoch wird diese nicht einfach von den USA aus dominiert, sondern es bestehen hier wesentlich komplexere Kommunikationsbeziehungen.

Zur Person

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In der Fernsehserienproduktion haben beispielsweise Lateinamerika (durch die dortigen Telenovelas) oder Europa (mit seinen Fernsehformaten wie Big Brother oder Who wants to be a Millionaire) bzw. Indien (mit seiner Filmproduktion) gegenwärtig international einen größeren Stellenwert als amerikanische Produkte in diesen Ländern. Eine besondere Rolle spricht Jeremy Tunstall allerdings digitalen Medien (WWW, E-Mail, Mobiltelefon etc.) zu, wenn er formuliert: "Telecommunications (not mass media) has the most global potential - since the Internet, consumer credit, and plain old phone calls use telecommunications networks." [2]

Globalisierung der Medienkommunikation

In diesem Beitrag möchte ich die bemerkenswerte Entwicklung, auf die Tunstall hier Bezug nimmt, zum Ausgangspunkt nehmen, um auf Herausforderungen der Globalisierung der Medienkommunikation und der transkulturellen Kommunikation einzugehen. Die einleitenden Bemerkungen machen dabei deutlich, dass ich 'neue Medien' und 'Internet' nicht isoliert betrachten möchte, sondern im Ensemble mit den 'traditionellen' Medien. Dahinter steht der Gedanke, dass sich unsere alltägliche Aneignung von Medien nicht auf Einzelmedien bezieht, sondern dass wir beispielsweise im Internet die Webseiten zu Big Brother in Bezug auf die gleichnamige Fernsehsendung nutzen oder wir uns per E-Mail oder am (Mobil)Telefon sowohl über unseren Alltag als auch über die Inhalte einer letzten Soap Opera oder Nachrichtensendung austauschen. Wir können also die digitalen Medien weder losgelöst von unserem weiteren Handeln noch von weiteren traditionellen elektronischen Medien sehen. Dies trifft gerade dann zu, wenn wir uns für soziale Beziehungen interessieren, für die Medienkommunikation ja nur ein Aspekt ist.

Doch was können wir uns genau unter 'Globalisierung der Medien' und 'transkulturelle Kommunikation' vorstellen? Wenn wir mit dem Ausdruck Globalisierung der Medien(kommunikation) beginnen, so helfen die zitierten Überlegungen von Jeremy Tunstall bereits weiter. Fasst man seine Argumente im Kern zusammen, so bedeutet Globalisierung mit Bezug auf Medien nicht, dass hier einzelne (beispielsweise amerikanische) Medien(konzerne) 'die Welt kontrollieren'. Eher geht es um 'Vernetzung' oder 'Konnektivität durch Medienkommunikation'. Entsprechend können wir



Globalisierung der Medienkommunikation verstehen als den vielschichtigen Prozess einer fortschreitenden Zunahme weltweiter Kommunikationsbeziehungen.[3] Vielschichtig ist der Prozess insofern, als wir ihn nicht auf ein Medium oder eine Gruppe von Medien - beispielsweise die digitalen Medien - reduzieren können. Die Globalisierung der Medienkommunikation im oben skizzierten Sinne wird von Internet und Mobilkommunikation ebenso 'getragen' wie von (Satelliten)Fernsehen und Film. Vielschichtig ist der Prozess aber auch, weil wir beispielsweise aus der Dominanz einzelner Konzerne auf der Ebene der Produktion keine Schlussfolgerungen in Bezug auf die Medienprodukte oder deren alltägliche Aneignung ziehen können. Allerdings bleibt die Globalisierung der Medienkommunikation - wie die Diskussion um den Digital Divide gezeigt hat[4] - auch ein in sich hoch ungleicher Prozess.

Bei einer Betrachtung von transkultureller Kommunikation geht es nun um eine Auseinandersetzung mit kulturübergreifenden Kommunikationsbeziehungen in diesem zunehmend globalen Kommunikationsnetzwerk. Dass hierbei nicht einfach von interkultureller oder internationaler Kommunikation gesprochen wird, verweist darauf, dass mit der Globalisierung der Medienkommunikation verschiedene Kommunikationsräume entstanden sind, die sich gerade nicht auf Staaten oder Nationalkulturen herunterbrechen lassen. Exemplarisch kann man hier an den Kommunikationsraum Europa denken - der, sofern man in ihm eine transnationale europäische Öffentlichkeit ausmacht, zentral für die Legitimation der EU bei den Bürgerinnen und Bürgern ist. Oder man kann an den Kommunikationsraum von Diaspora-Gemeinschaften denken, also von Migrantinnen und Migranten, die über verschiedene Länder hinweg verstreut leben und eine eigenständige Vergemeinschaftung ("Deutschtürken", "britische Asiaten" usw.) bilden. 'Transkulturell' hebt an dieser Stelle also darauf ab, dass kulturelle Kommunikationsräume jenseits traditioneller Nationalkulturen betrachtet werden, die transnational sein können (beispielsweise den Kommunikationsraum Europas), aber auch von Nationen abkoppelnde kulturelle Phänomene (Diasporagemeinschaften).

Wie zentral eine Beschäftigung mit solchen Fragen der transkulturellen Kommunikation ist, verdeutlichen die genannten Beispiele: In der Politik wie auch in der Ökonomie haben wir seit vier Jahrzehnten eine fortschreitende Europäisierung. Gleichzeitig wird der Entwicklung einer europäischen Öffentlichkeit aber eine deutliche Trägheit unterstellt.[5] Es zeigt sich, wie relevant es ist, danach zu fragen, was transkulturelle Kommunikation für die Konstitution einer europäischen Öffentlichkeit leisten kann. Eine ähnliche Relevanz der Beschäftigung mit transkultureller Kommunikation wird deutlich, wenn man sich das Beispiel der Diasporagemeinschaften näher anschaut: Geht man von den Daten der "International Organization for Migration" aus, so ist jede 35. Person auf der Welt ein Migrant oder eine Migrantin. Ungefähr 192 Millionen Menschen leben jenseits ihres Geburtslands (sind also Migranten 1. Generation), wobei sich die weltweiten Migrationszahlen seit den 1960er Jahren um ca. 2,9 Prozent pro Jahr steigern.[6] Auch hier rückt die Frage in den Vordergrund, welchen Beitrag Medienkommunikation für den kulturellen Zusammenhalt von Diasporagemeinschaften, aber auch für deren Einbezug in die aufnehmenden Länder leisten kann. Fragen transkultureller Kommunikation sind damit kein Randphänomen, sondern betreffen die zentralen Herausforderungen der Gegenwart. Und bei solchen Problemlagen ist der Gebrauch digitaler Medien fest mit dem traditioneller Medien verwoben.

Doch wie will man solche komplexen Zusammenhänge systematisch betrachten? Eine Möglichkeit ist, bei den Vergemeinschaftungen als dauerhafte soziale Beziehungen selbst anzusetzen - Nationalgemeinschaften, Migrationsgemeinschaften etc. -, denen wir uns zugehörig fühlen. Durch Medien ist es allgemein einfacher geworden, solche Vergemeinschaftungen 'translokal' - also über den eigenen lokalen Lebenskontext hinaus - aufrechtzuhalten. Dadurch, dass medienvermittelte translokale Kommunikationsräume durch die nationalen Sendegebiete des Rundfunks und nationalen Verbreitungsgebiete von Zeitungen bis in die 1970er Jahre hinein insbesondere national-territorial waren, galt und gilt für viele Menschen die Nation bis heute als die zentrale translokale, unter anderem durch Medien vermittelte Vergemeinschaftungsform. Mit der Globalisierung der Medienkommunikation ist diese Situation allerdings wesentlich komplexer geworden. Dies lässt sich anhand von Abbildung 1 veranschaulichen (vgl. PDF-Version).



Abbildung 1 verdeutlicht, dass zwar auch in Zeiten der Globalisierung von Medienkommunikation die Nation eine entscheidende Bezugsgröße bleibt. Das betrifft insbesondere den Bereich der politischen Kommunikation, in dem territoriale Nationalstaaten ein nach wie vor zentraler Referenzpunkt für politische Entscheidung sind. Daneben haben aber auch andere Formen der translokalen Vergemeinschaftung an Relevanz gewonnen. Hierunter finden sich auch die bereits angeführten Beispiele, nämlich zum einen die EU als Nationenbund und der ihr entsprechende Kommunikationsraum, zum anderen die Migrationsgemeinschaften der Diaspora: Gruppen, die trotz ihrer Verstreuung über verschiedene Territorien eine (nicht selten medial vermittelte) gemeinsame ethnische Identität wahren. Um einen tieferen Einblick in Fragen der transkulturellen Kommunikation zu erhalten, sollen im Weiteren beide Beispiele näher betrachtet werden.

Transkulturelle Großregion: Europäische Öffentlichkeit als Beispiel

Kontextualisiert man das Beispiel Europas weiter im Hinblick auf Fragen der Globalisierung von Medienkommunikation, so wird - jenseits aller bestehenden Besonderheiten Europas - ein Muster deutlich: Mit der Globalisierung geht weniger die Etablierung einer 'Weltkommunikation' oder 'Weltöffentlichkeit' einher, wie es manche Theoretiker vermuten,[7] sondern vielmehr die Etablierung großregionaler Kommunikationsräume. Immer wieder genannte Beispiele für solche großregionalen Kommunikationsräume sind Lateinamerika, der Raum von Nordamerika und Australien, der chinesische Großraum sowie - wie ich hier argumentieren möchte - der "Kommunikationsraum Europa".[8] Für solche transkulturellen Großräume wurden verschiedene Namen geprägt, angefangen von - bei einer Betonung auf Sprache - "geolinguistischen Regionen"[9] bis hin zu - in Kritik eines solchen Sprachfokus' und mit einer ökonomischen Betonung - "geokulturellen Märkten".[10] Über Einzeldifferenzen hinweg kann man als konstitutives Element solcher transkulturellen Großregionen festhalten, dass bei ihnen die innere kommunikative Vernetzung mittels verschiedener Medien dichter ist, wie auch die innere kulturelle Nähe größer ist als die jeweils außerhalb vorfindbare. Transkulturelle Großregionen bleiben also intern kulturell gebrochen (beispielsweise durch Nationen), grenzen sich jedoch gleichwohl extern gegenüber anderen Regionen ab.

Doch wie konkretisiert sich transkulturelle Kommunikation innerhalb solcher Großregionen? Will man diese Frage beantworten, so wird es notwendig, einzelne Großregionen im Detail anzuschauen. Dies möchte ich im Weiteren in Bezug auf den Kommunikationsraum Europa tun und dies weiter konkretisieren, nämlich im Hinblick auf die öffentliche europäische politische Kommunikation - kurz: im Hinblick auf die Etablierung einer transnationalen europäischen Öffentlichkeit. Die Ergebnisse der empirischen Forschung, auf die ich mich dabei stütze, werden im Rahmen des Forschungsprojekts "Die Transnationalisierung von Öffentlichkeit am Beispiel der EU" erhoben, das Teil des Bremer Sonderforschungsbereichs "Staatlichkeit im Wandel" ist.[11]

Insgesamt weisen unsere Forschungsergebnisse auf den widersprüchlichen Befund einer segmentierten europäischen Öffentlichkeit hin. Konkret wird diese in einer standardisierten inhaltsanalytischen Auswertung der Meinungsbeiträge (Leitartikel, Kommentare, Kolumnen, Gastbeiträge, Interviews und sonstige Beiträge mit meinungsbezogenem Inhalt) führender Qualitätszeitungen aus den Ländern Deutschland (FAZ), Großbritannien (The Times), Frankreich (Le Monde), Österreich (Die Presse) und Dänemark (Politiken). Die Inhaltsanalyse umfasst den Zeitraum von 1982 bis 2003, wobei in Siebenjahresintervallen je zwei künstliche Wochen der Berichterstattung ausgewertet wurden. Die Kodierung erfolgte im Hinblick auf (a) die Thematisierung nationaler, europäischer und darüber hinausgehender inter-/supranationaler Institutionen bzw. die Aufmerksamkeit, die diese genießen; (b) die wechselseitige Beobachtung der Untersuchungsländer; (c) die Herkunft der Sprecher sowie (d) die Wir-Bezüge als Indikatoren von geteilter kollektiver



Identität.

Im Kern fasst die Formulierung "segmentierte europäische Öffentlichkeit" den Befund, dass sich zwar eine transnationale europäische Öffentlichkeit konstituiert, diese aber gleichwohl über die höheren kommunikativen Verdichtungen nationaler Öffentlichkeiten stark segmentiert bleibt. Die Befunde im Einzelnen werden im Folgenden in Stichpunkten formuliert (vgl. Abbildung 2 der PDF-Version).

1. Brüssel beobachten: Für den Untersuchungszeitraum lässt sich zeigen, dass sich die öffentliche Aufmerksamkeit für EU-Politik über alle Untersuchungsländer hinweg von 2 auf 9 Prozent der meinungshaltigen Artikel verdreifacht hat. Gleichzeitig bleibt der Fokus auf nationale Politik bei rund 35 Prozent konstant, der Fokus auf weitergehende internationale Politik sinkt leicht von 15 auf gut 10 Prozent. Wenn man weitere Befunde wie die steigende Thematisierung von EU-Politiken als Nebenthema einbezieht, so lässt sich argumentieren, dass sich durch einen ‚geteilten Blick‘ nach Brüssel eine transnationale Öffentlichkeit konstituiert. Im Vergleich dazu fällt allerdings auch auf, dass der nationale Selbstbezug einen deutlich höheren und auch konstanten Stellenwert hat. Die Transnationalisierung von Öffentlichkeit führt also nicht zu einem "Abbau" nationaler Öffentlichkeit.

2. Grenzüberschreitend diskutieren: Ein anderer Befund ergibt sich, wenn man in den Vordergrund rückt, wie sich die wechselseitige Beobachtung der nationalen Öffentlichkeiten in den verschiedenen Zeitungen artikuliert. Hier zeigt sich in der Inhaltsanalyse, dass bis 2003 keine Zunahme der Diskussion über andere europäische Länder in den meinungshaltigen Artikeln zu verzeichnen war (ca. 20 Prozent gegenüber ca. 50 Prozent Berichterstattung über das eigene Land). Ähnliche Aussagen (auch im Hinblick auf Prozentanteile) können für den Bezug auf Meinungen und Positionen von Sprechern aus anderen europäischen Staaten gemacht werden. Letztlich ist über diesen Befund das Konzept der Segmentierung europäischer Öffentlichkeit hergeleitet: Während der "Blick nach Brüssel" zunimmt, stagniert der 'Austausch' untereinander.

3. Mit Europa identifizieren: Eine Analyse der Repräsentation von Identität in der Meinungspresse mittels standardisierter inhaltsanalytischer Verfahren ist methodisch nicht unproblematisch. Eine mögliche Operationalisierung besteht in der Auswertung von Wir-Bezügen im Hinblick einerseits auf die eigene Nation, andererseits auf Europa, das heißt die Selbstpositionierung der Sprecher entweder als Angehörige einer Nation oder als Europäer. Hier lassen sich im Untersuchungszeitraum geringfügige Veränderungen einer leichten Abnahme nationaler Wir-Bezüge (von ca. 43 auf 37 Prozent) bei einer gleichzeitigen leichten Zunahme europäischer Wir-Bezüge (von unter einem auf ca. 5 Prozent) ausmachen. Die Tendenz der Entwicklung einer europäischen Identität ist - zumindest im Hinblick auf die Wir-Bezüge in der untersuchten Meinungsberichterstattung - also nur gering ausgeprägt.

Der bereits angeführten fortschreitenden Europäisierung von Wirtschaft und Politik geht folglich nicht in gleichem Maße mit der Entstehung einer transnationalen europäischen Öffentlichkeit einher. Um das in der Segmentierung europäischer Öffentlichkeit aufscheinende Beharrungsvermögen nationaler Öffentlichkeiten im Bereich politischer Kommunikation zu erklären, wird in der Forschung auf soziokulturelle Differenz verwiesen, oder wie es Bernhard Peters formuliert: "Öffentlichkeiten haben einen sozialen und kulturellen Unterbau, der nicht allein aus Medienmärkten und Medienorganisationen besteht."^[12] Die unterschiedlichen nationalen politischen Diskurskulturen innerhalb Europas scheinen also zentral für die Erklärung der Segmentierung europäischer Öffentlichkeit zu sein. Gleichzeitig lassen sich umgekehrt Ansätze der Etablierung einer europäischen politischen Diskurskultur ausmachen. Doch was kennzeichnet die verschiedenen nationalen politischen Diskurskulturen? Und im Hinblick auf welche Aspekte entwickelt sich eine europäische politische Diskurskultur? Diese Fragen untersuchen wir aktuell durch verschiedene Länderstudien. Erst über ein besseres Verständnis dieser politischen Diskurskulturen - so unsere Hypothese - lässt sich die Segmentierung



der europäischen Öffentlichkeit angemessen erklären.

Deterritoriale Vergemeinschaftungen: Das Beispiel kommunikativer Mobilität in Diasporas

Das zweite Beispiel für Prozesse transkultureller Kommunikation - die Medienkommunikation in Migrationsgemeinschaften der Diaspora - ist gänzlich anders gelagert, erscheint aber ebenso zentral für ein Verständnis der Globalisierung der Medien bzw. der transkulturellen Kommunikation. Innerhalb der bisherigen Migrationsforschung standen Massenmedien im Hinblick darauf im Zentrum, welchen Beitrag sie für die „Integration von Migranten in Nationen leisten.“^[13] Mit fortschreitender Globalisierung der Medienkommunikation wurde die Lage aber vielfach komplexer: Einerseits haben seit den 1980er Jahren Angehörige von Diasporagemeinschaften auch in der „Fremde“ beispielsweise über Satellitenfernsehen oder Videos einfachen Zugriff auf massenmediale Inhalte in ihrer Sprache. Andererseits waren in Diasporagemeinschaften seit langem „neotraditionale“, „kleine Medien“ zentral:^[14] Zirkulierende Newsletter, selbst fabrizierte Audio- und Videokassetten oder Briefe haben auch bisher die Diasporagemeinschaften „zusammengehalten - und an deren Stelle sind nun mit fortschreitender Globalisierung der Medienkommunikation zunehmend digitale Medien wie WWW, E-Mail, Chat und Mobiltelefon getreten. Dieser Wandel hat uns veranlasst, in dem von der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft finanzierten Projekt „Integrations- und Segregationspotenziale digitaler Medien am Beispiel der kommunikativen Vernetzung von ethnischen Migrationsgemeinschaften“ die Vernetzung der Diasporagemeinschaften von Türken, Russen und Marokkanern in Deutschland zu untersuchen.^[15] Unsere ersten, vorläufigen und sich auf ausgewählte türkische Gruppen beziehenden Ergebnisse weisen dabei darauf hin, dass die in der alltäglichen Etablierung digitaler Medien greifbar werdende Globalisierung der Medienkommunikation eine „kommunikative Mobilität“ in der Diaspora ermöglicht - kurz: eine mehr oder weniger intensive kommunikative Vernetzung, während man selbst als Migrant oder Migrantin in Bewegung ist. Dabei scheinen die Vernetzungspraktiken der Diaspora-Angehörigen insbesondere auf drei Punkte abzuheben, nämlich erstens auf deren Transmedialität, zweitens auf den Druck kommunikativer Mobilität und drittens schließlich auf die segmentierte kommunikative Vernetzung.

1. Transmedialität der Vernetzung: Von uns bisher geführte qualitative Interviews und qualitative Netzwerkkarten - Zeichnungen, wie Migrantinnen und Migranten ihre kommunikative Vernetzung mit digitalen Medien selbst sehen (Abbildung 3) - zeigen, dass aus dem Blickwinkel der Befragten unterschiedliche Gruppen von Kommunikationspartnern der zentrale Bezugspunkt der kommunikativen Vernetzung sind. Es geht um deren persönliche Kommunikationsnetzwerke, nicht um die Grenzen unterschiedlicher Medien. Die kommunikative Konnektivität zu den unterschiedlichen Gruppen von Menschen ist transmedial in dem Sinne, dass sie über verschiedene Medien realisiert wird. Einzelne Medien haben hierfür unterschiedliche Potenziale.

So werden unterschiedliche Medien dazu verwendet, verschiedene Aspekte lokaler Mobilität zu gestalten. Beispielsweise werden E-Mail, WWW und das Telefon tendenziell dazu gebraucht, biografische lokale Mobilität (örtliche Mobilität im Lebensverlauf) zu managen: Diese Medien machen es einfacher, auch bei bestehenden räumlichen Distanzen insbesondere mit Familienmitgliedern und Freunden in Kontakt zu bleiben, entweder auf der Ebene personaler Kommunikation (E-Mail, Telefon) oder auf der Ebene von gemeinschaftsbezogener Kommunikation (beispielsweise über so genannte WWW-Ethno-Portale). Zusammen mit dem Medium E-Mail erscheint das Mobiltelefon als das Medium, mit dem situative lokale Mobilität (örtliche Mobilität im Tages-, Wochen- und Monatsverlauf) gemanagt wird, indem es die Möglichkeit eröffnet, direkt mit Leuten in Kontakt zu sein während man in Bewegung ist. Eine weitreichende lokale Mobilität, wie wir sie bei Migrantinnen und Migranten finden, wird erleichtert durch die Aneignung verschiedener Medien, um eigene Kommunikationsnetzwerke und damit auch Vergemeinschaftungen translokal



aufrecht halten zu können.

2. Druck kommunikativer Mobilität: Wenn wir die unterschiedlichen, von uns bisher untersuchten Fälle vergleichen, bekommen wir einen erstaunlichen Einblick, erfahren, was Druck zur kommunikativen Mobilität heißt. Es fällt auf, dass jede interviewte Person seine oder ihre eigene Motivation, digitale Medien und hierin insbesondere das Mobiltelefon zu besitzen, als durch andere vermittelt beschreibt. Bei diesen kann es sich um die unmittelbare Familie handeln - die gerade in Migrantengruppen nach wie vor einen sehr hohen Stellenwert einnimmt. Druck kann aber auch etwa von Mitgliedern der Migranten-Hip-Hop-Jugendkultur kommen oder aus dem beruflichen Umfeld.

Wenn wir diese Ergebnisse auf unsere Überlegungen zur kommunikativen Mobilität rückbeziehen, wird deutlich, in welchem Maße die Aneignung des Mobiltelefons an lokale Mobilität gebunden ist. Hier geht es zuerst einmal um ganz allgemeine Aspekte, wie den, dass das heutige Berufsleben zunehmend durch Mobilität und die damit verbundene Notwendigkeit der Erreichbarkeit in Bewegung gekennzeichnet ist. Darüber hinaus scheinen aber auch weitere Aspekte des Drucks kommunikativer Mobilität für die interviewten Angehörigen der türkischen Diaspora zu bestehen, die mit deren kultureller Zugehörigkeit zusammenhängen: Das Mobiltelefon ist für diese auch eine Technologie, die es ihnen ermöglicht, mit der Familie bzw. (Migranten-)Jugendkultur in einer intensiven kommunikativen Verbindung zu bleiben - und ein gewisser Druck dazu wird in diesem kulturellen Kontext mit dem Mobiltelefon verbunden. Insgesamt kommt dem Verbunden-Sein durch das Mobiltelefon eine wichtige Rolle im Alltagsleben der von uns Befragten zu. Digitale Medien sind als Technologien gerade auch verbunden mit der Erwartung, innerhalb von Diaspora-Gemeinschaften kommunikativ vernetzt zu sein, in denen biografische Mobilität wie auch lokale Mobilität vergleichsweise hoch sind.

3. Segmentierte kommunikative Vernetzung: Im Hinblick auf Gesamtfragen der kommunikativen Vernetzung verweisen die Ergebnisse unserer bisherigen Forschung darauf, welchen Stellenwert kommunikative Mobilität für jeden der Interviewten hat: Sie wollen in Verbindung bleiben, insbesondere mit ihren Freunden, Familien und anderen Mitgliedern ihrer Diaspora, die verstreut über Deutschland und andere Länder leben. Mit verschiedenen digitalen Medien wird dieses in Verbindung bleiben zunehmend einfach gestaltbar.

Vor diesem Hintergrund können wir - und dies ist der Punkt, der an dieser Stelle insbesondere interessiert - die oben bereits angesprochenen Tendenzen zu einer Segmentierung der kommunikativen Vernetzung ausmachen. Gemeint ist damit, dass die kommunikative Vernetzung nicht fokussiert ist auf einen globalen Kosmopolitismus, der als (eine) mögliche Folge einer gerade mit den digitalen Medien fortschreitenden Globalisierung der Medienkommunikation gerne diskutiert wird.[16] Vielmehr ist sie ausgerichtet auf bestehende kulturelle Segmente wie die Familie, Freundschaftsnetzwerke oder das Netzwerk der türkischen Diaspora insgesamt. Dabei hat mit den digitalen Medien diese kommunikative Vernetzung einen deterritorialen Horizont, das heißt sie erstreckt sich über verschiedene soziokulturelle Territorien hinweg.

Folgerungen: Herausforderungen transkultureller Kommunikation

Wie lassen sich nun solche unterschiedlichen Forschungsergebnisse, wie sie bisher referiert wurden, insgesamt einordnen? Sie verweisen zunächst einmal auf die Komplexität gegenwärtiger transkultureller Kommunikationsbeziehungen: Es reicht nicht mehr aus, sich damit auseinanderzusetzen, wie durch Medien eine kommunikative Integration in einen Nationalstaat erfolgen kann bzw. wie zwischen Nationalstaaten kommuniziert wird. Mit der Globalisierung der Medienkommunikation haben wir vielfältige transkulturelle Kommunikationsbeziehungen, die es in ihrem Kontext kritisch zu betrachten gilt. Dabei haben wir gesehen, dass es in Bezug auf Vergemeinschaftung



nicht sinnvoll ist, digitale Medien isoliert zu betrachten. Wir kommen weiter, wenn wir deren Analyse in die Auseinandersetzung mit anderen Medien einbetten. Oder bezogen auf den Titel des Themenhefts "Neue Medien - Internet - Soziale Beziehungen" formuliert: In dem Moment, wo wir Fragen der "sozialen Beziehungen" im Hinblick auf die Globalisierung der Medien in den Fokus rücken, sind wir gezwungen, die Betrachtung neuer Medien und des Internets weiter zu kontextualisieren.

Die bisherigen Argumente verweisen aber auch auf konkrete Herausforderungen, die es im Hinblick auf transkulturelle Kommunikation geben (kann). So besteht eine grundlegende Herausforderung darin, existierende kulturübergreifende Kommunikationsbeziehungen in ihrer Vielfalt ernst zu nehmen und zu erfassen. Dabei hat transkulturelle Kommunikation ein großes Potenzial, ist doch mit ihr die Möglichkeit verbunden, kulturenübergreifende Kommunikationsräume zu schaffen. Diese bieten beispielsweise - etwa in Bezug auf die europäische Öffentlichkeit - Möglichkeiten transkultureller Verständigung oder - in Bezug auf Diasporas - die Möglichkeit der Stabilisierung ethnischer Vergemeinschaftung, während man selbst in Bewegung sind. Umgekehrt kann transkulturelle Kommunikation aber auch Probleme bereiten - angefangen von (einfachen) Missverständnissen bis hin zu ausgewachsenen (Kommunikations)Konflikten. Ein prominentes Beispiel hierfür war im Jahr 2006 die Karikaturen-Serie "Muhammeds ansigt" ("Das Gesicht Mohammeds") in der dänischen Tageszeitung "Jyllands-Posten", die - verbreitet über ein im Internet und persönliche Netzwerke zirkulierendes Dossier - in verschiedenen muslimischen Ländern, aber auch in Europa Proteste auslöste. An diesem Beispiel wird das Konfliktpotenzial deutlich, das dadurch entsteht, dass auch an regionale bzw. nationale Publika adressierte Medienprodukte prinzipiell transkulturell verfügbar sind. Gerade solche Konflikte zeigen uns, dass wir Medienkommunikation nicht (mehr) in einem engen nationalen Rahmen denken dürfen. Vielmehr ist ein sorgfältiger Blick auf transkulturelle Kommunikation notwendig, wenn man den mit der Globalisierung der Medien einhergehenden Herausforderungen angemessen begegnen möchte.

Fußnoten

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- 2 Vgl. Jeremy Tunstall, *The Media Were American: U.S. Mass Media in Decline*, New York 2007.
- 3 Vgl. für eine solche Definition Andreas Hepp, *Transkulturelle Kommunikation*, Konstanz 2006, S. 67.
- 4 Vgl. Pippa Norris, *Digital Divide. Civic Engagement, Information Poverty and the Internet Worldwide*, Cambridge 2001.
- 5 Vgl. Jürgen Gerhards, *Europäisierung von Ökonomie und Politik und die Trägheit der Entstehung einer europäischen Öffentlichkeit*, in: Maurizio Bach (Hrsg.), *Die Europäisierung nationaler Gesellschaften*, Opladen 2000, S. 277 - 305.
- 6 Vgl. für diese und weitere Informationen zu Migration <http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/lang/en/pid/3> (30.5. 2008).
- 7 Vgl. beispielsweise Norbert Bolz, *Weltkommunikation*, München 2001; Miriam Meckel, *Kommunikative Identität und Weltöffentlichkeit*, in: *Publizistik*, 43 (1998), S. 362 - 375. Anmerkung der Redaktion: Siehe auch den Beitrag von M. Meckel in dieser Ausgabe.
- 8 Vgl. Hans J. Kleinsteuber/Thorsten Rossmann (Hrsg.), *Europa als Kommunikationsraum. Akteure, Strukturen und Konfliktpotenziale in der europäischen Medienpolitik*. Unter Mitarbeit von Arnold C. Kulbatzki und Barbara Thomaß, Opladen 1994; und die Beiträge in Lutz Erbring (Hrsg.), *Kommunikationsraum Europa*, Konstanz 1995.
- 9 Vgl. John Sinclair/Elizabeth Jacka/Stuart Cunningham, *Peripheral Vision*, in: dies. (Hrsg.), *News Patterns in Global Television*, Oxford 1996, S. 1 - 32.
- 10 David Hesmondhalgh, *The Cultural Industries*, London-Thousand Oaks-New Delhi 2002, S. 180f.
- 11 An dem Projekt sind - neben mir - folgende Personen beteiligt: Michael Brüggemann, Katharina Kleinen-von Königslöw, Swantje Lingenberg, Johanna Möller und Hartmut Wessler. Zu den im Weiteren umrissenen



- Forschungsergebnissen vgl. Michael Brüggemann/Stefanie Sifft/Katharina Kleinen von Königslöw/Bernhard Peters/Andreas Wimmel, Segmentierte Europäisierung. Trends und Muster der Transnationalisierung von Öffentlichkeiten in Europa, in: B. Peters (Hrsg.), Der Sinn von Öffentlichkeit. Frankfurt/M. 2007, S. 298 - 321, sowie Hartmut Wessler/Bernhard Peters/Michael Brüggemann/Katharina Kleinen von Königslöw/Stefanie Sifft, Transnationalization of Public Spheres, Basingstoke 2008.
- 12 Bernhard Peters, Der Sinn von Öffentlichkeit. Frankfurt /M. 2007, S. 363.
- 13 Vgl. beispielsweise Horst Pöttker, Soziale Integration. Ein Schlüsselbegriff für die Forschung über Medien und ethnische Minderheiten, in: Rainer Geißler/ders. (Hrsg.), Massenmedien und die Integration ethnischer Minderheiten in Deutschland, Bielefeld 2005, S. 25 - 43.
- 14 Vgl. Daniel Dayan, Media and Diasporas, in: Jostein Gripsrud (Hrsg.), Television and Common Knowledge, London-New York 1999, S. 22.
- 15 An dem seit Juni 2008 laufenden Projekt sind neben mir Cigdem Bzdag und Laura Suna beteiligt. Die folgenden Argumente stützen sich auf erste vorläufige Forschungsergebnisse. Vgl. hierzu Andreas Hepp, Kommunikative Mobilität in der Diaspora: Eine Fallstudie zur kommunikativen Vernetzung der türkischen Minderheiten-Gemeinschaft, in: Merz, (2007) 6, S. 36 - 46.
- 16 Vgl. John Tomlinson, Globalization and Culture, Cambridge-Oxford 1999, S. 181 - 207.

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Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Teichman Judith

Globalización e integración: visiones en pugna

in *Nueva Sociedad*, n. 214 , 124-132

Desde la colonización, la inserción de América Latina en el mundo se produjo a partir de la exportación de productos primarios o bienes elaborados a partir de ellos, en general destinados a los mercados de Europa y Estados Unidos. En esencia, esta realidad se mantuvo a lo largo de los años y no ha podido ser modificada por los intentos de integración iniciados en los 60, que buscaron incrementar el comercio intrarregional. En la actualidad, las diferentes posiciones acerca de la globalización, desde la postura más radical de Hugo Chávez hasta las visiones más matizadas del gobierno de Brasil, generan desafíos para la integración latinoamericana y su inserción en el mundo. Palabras claves: economía, globalización, integración, desigualdad, América Latina.

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Pakkasvirta Jussi

Globalización, agrobusiness, América Latina y...¿ Finlandia?

in *Nueva Sociedad*, n. 214 , 133-142

La globalización, además de crear redes de información planetarias y negocios globales, ha revalorizado las materias primas que constituyen las tradicionales exportaciones de América Latina. El auge del agrobusiness es parte de este proceso, dentro del cual se ubica la decisión de cada vez más empresas nórdicas de trasladar sus plantas de celulosa al sur del planeta. Esto ha generado conflictos como el que enfrenta a Argentina con Uruguay y ha debilitado la imagen del modelo de bienestar nórdico, valorado en América Latina como un ejemplo mundial de solidaridad. Pero,



afortunadamente, la globalización genera también efectos positivos, como la emergencia de nuevas formas de conciencia global que se expresan en redes planetarias de resistencia de la sociedad civil.

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Law David S.

Globalization and the Future of Constitutional Rights

in *Northwestern University Law Review*, Vol. 102, issue 3 , 1277-1350

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

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Jan Nederveen Pieterse

Globalization the next round: Sociological perspectives

in *Futures*, issue 8, vol. 40, october , 707-720

ABSTRACT: The twenty-first century momentum of globalization is markedly different from the twentieth century globalization (a new geography of trade, weaker hegemony, and growing multipolarity) and presents major questions. Is the rise of East Asia, China and India just another episode in the rise and decline of nations, another reshuffling of capitalism, a relocation of accumulation centers without affecting the logics of accumulation? Does it advance, sustain or halt neoliberalism? The rise of Asia is codependent with neoliberal globalization and yet unfolds outside the neoliberal mold. What is the relationship between zones of accumulation and modes of regulation? What are the ramifications for the global inequality? What does sociology contribute to this question?

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Grossvald Curran Vivian

Globalization, Legal Transnationalization and Crimes Against Humanity: the Lipietz Case

in *American Journal of Comparative Law*, vol. 56 - n. 2 , 403-422

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

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Khanna Parag

Here Comes the Second World

in *New Perspectives Quarterly*, Vol. 25, Issue 3, Summer , 13-17

No abstract available



Section B) Global governance and international organizations

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Linares Juan Carlos

Hired Hands Needed: The Impact Of Globalization And Human Rights Law On Migrant Workers In The United States

in *Denver Journal of international law and policy*, vol. 34, issue 3 , 321-352

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

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Schefold Dian

I comuni tedeschi e la globalizzazione

in *Regioni (Le)*, n. 1 , 11-24

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

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Holloway Sarah

International Merger Control: Globalization Or Global Failure?

in *Denver Journal of international law and policy*, vol. 34, issue 3 , 353-372

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Kirkpatrick Colin, Scriciu S. Serban

Is trade liberalisation bad for the environment? A review of the economic evidence

in *Journal of Environmental Planning and Management*, Volume 51, Issue 4, July , 497-510

The continued growth in world trade and investment flows has led to a renewed interest among researchers and policy makers in the potential impact that trade liberalisation policy may have on the environment. The aim of this paper is to provide a balanced and accessible summary of the findings of recent economic research on the impact of growth in international trade and investment on environmental quality.



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Sánchez Moral Simón; Calatrava Ascensión, Melero Guilló Andrés y Ana

Las funciones comando de Madrid en la economía global: una aproximación a través del proceso de atracción de capital extranjero

in *EURE - Revista latinoamericana de estudios urbano regionales*, Vol. 31 n. 94 , 25-44

El dinamismo de la metrópoli de Madrid y su intensa reestructuración territorial vienen siendo explicados desde la globalización y el cambio tecnológico, abriendo con ello el debate sobre su condición de ciudad global. Una vez precisados los límites del concepto de acuerdo con el debate internacional, este trabajo se asoma a la cuestión desde la perspectiva de la atracción de capital extranjero. El análisis de algunas fuentes estadísticas inéditas confirma la elevada concentración sectorial en las llamadas funciones comando (servicios financieros y servicios avanzados a las empresas). Su acusada concentración en la ciudad central, a pesar de la competencia de nuevas formas de acomodación en la zona metropolitana colindante (parques empresariales, ciudades financieras...), son aspectos a incorporar a la reflexión sobre el crecimiento equilibrado y sostenible de Madrid y de otras metrópolis en la actual fase de desarrollo capitalista

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Caselli Marco

Measuring... What? Notes on Some Globalization Indices

in *Globalizations* , Volume 5, Issue 3, September 2008 , 383-404

The article examines some of the instruments devised to measure globalization, in particular the CSGR Globalisation Index and the A.T. Kearney/Foreign Policy Globalization Index. The article begins by comparing the features and results of these instruments, and then highlights their strengths and weaknesses. The two most significant weaknesses are as follows. The first consists in what Beck has called 'methodological nationalism': the fact that attempts are made to study an essentially transnational phenomenon on a national basis. The second weakness resides in the problems—in terms of the completeness, adequacy, and timeliness of information—of the database used to calculate these indices. Also to be emphasized is that analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of these indices cannot be separated from the purpose for which they have been devised. In other words, there is no one 'best' instrument in absolute terms; rather there is an array of instruments with which to pursue particular knowledge goals. Finally, discussion of the techniques used to measure the phenomenon provides an occasion to raise considerations concerning the nature of globalization.

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Yue Jianyong

Peaceful Rise of China: Myth or Reality?

in *International Politics* , Volume 45, Issue 4, July , 439-456

The 'rise of China' discourse involves two critical issues: whether China is rising or has risen? If the answer is yes, will



China be a status quo power or a revisionist power? The sustained rapid economic growth in the last three decades seemed to have confirmed the rising trend of China as a potential global power. There is definitely little suspicion about a rising China nowadays and attention is predominantly focused on whether China will be rising peacefully. I doubted the oversimplified assertion on the 'China rising' issue. The remarkable economic growth did provide the foundations of China's rise, but the growth itself was problematic. I would argue from international political economy perspective that the way in which China was integrated into the global economic system enabled its economic 'success' in growth terms but blocked its industrialization which was the real foundation of the rise of any great power in modern world history. China's rhetoric on 'peaceful rise' precisely revealed its deepening dependence on the international system dominated by the US, whereby its intentions to sustain current neo-liberalist economic development model for the purpose of legitimation of the authoritarian regime. The paradox is, though China has neither the intention nor the capability to challenge the order of existing international system and does hope to seek a peaceful rise within the international framework, the maintaining of an unprofitable economic growth model, or one of a 'technologyless industrialization', will inevitably exacerbate the constraints of market and resource bottlenecks and thus make China's economic growth hard to sustain. This would heighten tensions and even increase the likelihood of conflicts between China and the developed world which would in turn be destabilizing to the international system within which the US intends to transform China into a responsible stakeholder that will play by the rules. Thus, the so-called 'peaceful rise' is nothing but a wishful illusion.

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Barbero Jesús Martín

Pensar nuestra globalizada modernidad: desencantos de la socialidad y reencantamientos de la identidad in Iberoamericana. America Latina – España – Portugal, Vol. 8, n. 30 , 137-153

No abstract available

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Dupas Gilberto

Pobreza, desigualdad y trabajo en el capitalismo global

in **Nueva Sociedad**, n. 215 , 62-78

El análisis de la pobreza y la desigualdad debe ser puesto en el contexto más amplio de las nuevas condiciones globales. El capitalismo actual ha cambiado radicalmente categorías económicas clásicas como el trabajo, hoy considerado un costo variable susceptible de ser ajustado, y el conocimiento, que adquirió más importancia al tiempo que se masificaba. Si el modelo empresarial de posguerra era Ford y el de los 90, Microsoft, el de hoy es Wal-Mart, con sus productos baratos procedentes de China y sus empleos basura. Este nuevo contexto de empresas globales y trabajo flexible es particularmente relevante para América Latina, que si bien goza de una prosperidad inédita debido al auge de las commodities, sigue siendo la región más desigual del planet

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Harewood Susan



Prolegomenon: Glocality at the bus terminal: space and the enactment of transnational citizenships
in *Social Identities*, Volume 14, Issue 4, July 2008 , 465 - 472

This paper is an initial examination the significance of spatial relations to the constitution of transnational citizenships. Specifically, the paper explores practices of place and space in a Barbadian bus terminal. This terminal is a rich site at which citizens, migrants, state managers and economic elites contest the meanings of both Barbadian citizenship and the Caribbean regional integration movement. It is an integration movement prompted, in part, by the imperatives of globalization - trading blocs are a matter of survival. Yet the movement of people that is facilitated by this regional project is made even more complex by those colonial legacies of international migrations - forced and otherwise - which have shaped race relations in the region.

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St John Graham

Protestival: Global Days of Action and Carnivalized Politics in the Present

in *Social Movement Studies*, Volume 7, Issue 2, September 2008 , 167-190

Investigating the significance of carnivalized methods of protest in the present, this article explores the characteristics and recent history of the protestival, the carnival of protest which has flourished with the advent of the alter-globalization movement. Heir to the carnivalized politics of the 1960s, and drawing from radical avant-garde movements and guerrilla theatre, the 'protestival' inherits much from the kinds of 'symbolic challenges' thought posed by post-1960s social movements. Immediately downstream from Reclaim the Streets, demonstrating a resurgence of autonomism, anarchism and direct democracy, and developing within the context of global opposition to neo-liberalism and the War on Terror, the Global Day of Action would become the template for popular direct action: in particular those events nominated 'Carnivals Against Capitalism' or 'For Global Justice'. While new social movement theorists have recognized the significance of movement cultural politics, new approaches are needed to understand the festal and carnivalesque character of the contemporary activism. Recently scholars have indicated that summit sieges, autonomous convergences and other recent reflexive events constitute transnational 'carnivalesque rituals', politico-religious 'pilgrimage' destinations, or spatial reconfigurations critical to the renewed opposition to capitalism. The 'protestival' provides an ambiguously nuanced heuristic sufficient to comprehend those performative moments simultaneously transgressive and progressive, against and for, by which the marginal may take their grievances to the physical and symbolic centres ('summits') of neo-liberalism, where alternative logics and spectacles are performed. Unpacking its expositional and revelatory logic, the article uncovers the roots of the 'protestival', undertaking an exploration of intentional carnival, festal hacktivism, direct theatre, tactical frivolity and (un)masking to reveal a significant action template in the present.

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Drainville André C.

Resistance to globalisation: the view from the periphery of the world economy

in *International Social Science Journal* , Volume 59, Issue 192, June 2008 , 235-246

Social forces at the core of the world economy were sheltered from world-ordering processes for more than a century



before being abruptly exposed in the current phase of globalisation. In this context, resistance appears as a new political movement, with its own finalities and tactics, and a proper – if insubstantial – subject of reference (the "we" who are part of the anti-globalisation movement everywhere). Another world is possible, but to make it happen we must use proper politics. At the periphery, social forces have always constituted themselves in their meeting with world order. "We", whoever we may be, have been there before. Against this history, current resistance is not defined by the political form it now may be taking or the subject on whose behalf a different world order is now envisioned or argued for, but in relation to how other social forces at other moments have defined their connection to world order. Informed by these complementary perspectives, we can better understand the depth of present resistance to neo-liberal globalisation, and think about ways to marshal its transformative potential.

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Cohen Jean L.

Rethinking Human Rights, Democracy, and Sovereignty in the Age of Globalization

in Political Theory , Volume 36, n. 4, August , 578-606

The traditional conception construes human rights as moral rights all people have due to some basic feature or interests deemed intrinsically valuable. This comported well with the revival of the discourse of human rights in the wake of atrocities committed during WWII. It served as a useful referent for local struggles against foreign rule and domestic dictatorship in the 1980s. Since 1989, human rights discourse acquired a new function: the justification of sanctions, military invasions, and transformative occupation administrations by outsiders, framed as enforcement of international law against violators. The traditional conception doesn't fit this new function, hence the efforts to counter-pose a "political" to the "traditional" approach. This essay analyzes two recent versions of the political conception, and argues for a third. The thesis is that sovereign equality and human rights are normative principles of our dualist international system and both are needed to construct a more just version of that system.

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Eudaily Sean Patrick, Smith Steve

Sovereign Geopolitics? - Uncovering the "Sovereignty Paradox"

in Geopolitics, Vol. 13, n. 2, April , 309-334

This paper reconsiders the importance of the sovereign state in contemporary geopolitics. The role of the state in an era of globalisation and devolution is a concern that has gained considerable attention in recent geographical scholarship. What has received less attention is how the state has historically functioned as a device that conflated the linked concerns of sovereignty and territoriality. The authors argue that there exist a number of "sovereignty paradoxes" that inhibit the interdisciplinary analysis of the interrelations between sovereignty, territoriality, and state power. Thus, reconsidering sovereignty and territoriality informs both how the state emerged as an important unit of geographical analysis historically, and why the state has become such a problematic concept in contemporary geopolitics. This work has implications for understanding popular struggles over civil liberties, foreign policy, and justice for indigenous peoples.



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Leisering Lutz

**Soziale Globalisierung? Die Entstehung globaler Sozialpolitik
in Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte**, Band 21, 2008

Quelle:

<http://www.bpb.de/publikationen/OYGTFO.html>

Soziale Globalisierung? Die Entstehung globaler Sozialpolitik

Lutz Leisering

Inhalt

Einleitung

Globale Sozialpolitik ist evolutionär unwahrscheinlich

Der Ursprung globaler Sozialpolitik

Ideen, Normen und Ziele globaler Sozialpolitik

Akteure und Institutionen globaler Sozialpolitik

Instrumente globaler Sozialpolitik

Soziale Globalisierung - unterschätzt und überschätzt

Einleitung

Bei "Globalisierung" denkt man meist an die Verdichtung weltwirtschaftlicher Beziehungen und die wachsende informationelle Vernetzung der Welt. Zunehmend wird jedoch auch eine "soziale" Dimension der Globalisierung eingefordert, um den sozialen Ungleichheiten und Unsicherheiten zu begegnen, die mit wirtschaftlicher Globalisierung einhergehen.[1] Auf der Ebene der Nationalstaaten war der Wohlfahrtsstaat eine Antwort auf vergleichbare Folgeprobleme kapitalistischer Entwicklung. Können wir damit rechnen, dass sich eine ähnliche Entwicklung auf globaler Ebene wiederholt? Kann Sozialpolitik oder gar Wohlfahrtsstaatlichkeit - ähnlich wie die anderen Kerninstitutionen des Westens, Rechtsstaat, Markt und Demokratie - zu einem weltweiten Fanal werden? Oder bedeutet "Globalisierung", wie weithin angenommen, primär die Ausbreitung neoliberaler, ökonomistischer Denkweisen und Praktiken?

Zur Person



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"Soziale Globalisierung" kann sehr unterschiedliche Bedeutungen haben. Im vorliegenden Beitrag fragen wir nach der unwahrscheinlichsten Form sozialer Globalisierung, die dem westlichen Begriff von Sozialpolitik entspricht: nach der Verbreitung individueller Rechtsansprüche auf Sozialleistungen - monetäre Transfers und soziale Dienstleistungen - und von Schutzrechten. Bob Deacon hat im ersten systematischen Lehrbuch des Forschungsgebietes Globale Sozialpolitik[2] die These einer socialisation of global politics formuliert, übersetzbar als "Sozialpolitisierung" der Weltpolitik. Damit ist eine zunehmende Prominenz sozialer und ökologischer Fragen gegenüber den älteren sicherheitspolitischen Fragen in der Weltpolitik gemeint. Wie real ist diese "Sozialpolitisierung"? Konkret: Inwieweit gibt es auch auf Weltebene "soziale" Ideen, Institutionen und sozialpolitische Instrumente?[3]

Globale Sozialpolitik ist evolutionär unwahrscheinlich

Der Ursprung staatlicher Sozialpolitik in west- und nordeuropäischen Ländern zeigt die regionale und kulturelle Begrenzung der Idee des Wohlfahrtsstaats an. Zugleich verweist dieser Ursprung auf die enge Bindung von Sozialpolitik an die Form des Nationalstaats. Vieles deutet darauf hin, dass eine Verbreitung von Sozialpolitik über ihre westlichen Ursprungsländer hinaus nicht sehr wahrscheinlich ist.

Zum einen befindet sich ausgebaute Sozialpolitik in Form des Wohlfahrtsstaates selbst in westlichen Ländern in einer Krise. Insbesondere wird ein Bedeutungsverlust oder doch -wandel des Nationalstaats festgestellt, womit auch Sozialpolitik als an die Form des Nationalstaats gebundener Politiktypus gefährdet wäre. Zum anderen lassen Strukturmerkmale der Weltgesellschaft die Idee globaler Sozialpolitik oder gar eines globalen Wohlfahrtsstaats als unwahrscheinlich erscheinen. Auf Weltebene gibt es keinen Staat, so dass ein Wohlfahrtsstaat schon per definitionem nicht existieren kann. Globale Sozialpolitik im Sinne einzelner sozialpolitischer Maßnahmen könnte trotzdem existieren, jedoch wären diese Maßnahmen in Ermangelung einer zentralen Entscheidungsinstanz nicht mit gleicher Verbindlichkeit und Flächendeckung ausgestattet wie nationale soziale Politiken. Schließlich wird wirtschaftliche Globalisierung in sozialer Hinsicht oft als ein race to the bottom und Sozialdumping beschrieben. In Bezug auf die neuen Demokratien und emerging markets in Ostasien besagt dieses Argument, dass deren Erfolg gerade auf einem Verzicht auf Wohlfahrtsstaatlichkeit basiere.

Des Weiteren ist eine Globalisierung von Sozialpolitik kulturell nicht erwartbar.[4] Aufklärung und Rationalismus, Christentum und die Ideen der europäischen Arbeiterbewegungen gelten als ideelle Quellen des europäischen Wohlfahrtsstaats. Diese fehlen in anderen Kulturen, ebenso wie die "Staatstraditionen", die die europäischen Wohlfahrtsstaaten nachhaltig geprägt haben.

Der Ursprung globaler Sozialpolitik

Es ist wenig bekannt, dass die Idee globaler Sozialpolitik bereits in den späten 1930er und 1940er Jahre im politischen



Raum begründet wurde. Hauptprotagonisten waren Großbritannien und die USA. Kaufmann spricht von einem "Wohlfahrtinternationalismus":[5] Die von Roosevelt und Churchill 1941 vereinbarte Atlantik-Charta, die Erklärung von Philadelphia der Internationalen Arbeitsorganisation (ILO) von 1944, die Charta der Vereinten Nationen von 1945 und die Allgemeine Erklärung der Menschenrechte von 1948 formulierten erstmals - mit dem Anspruch universaler, weltweiter Geltung - die Idee sozialer Menschenrechte und einer auf soziale Ziele ausgerichteten internationalen Ordnung. Die Programmatik des Wohlfahrtinternationalismus wurde also bereits vor der Entwicklung nationaler Wohlfahrtsstaatlichkeit formuliert, die erst nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg stattfand. Was ist aus dem Wohlfahrtsinternationalismus der 1940er Jahre geworden?

Zunächst: Was ist mit "global" im Ausdruck "globale Sozialpolitik" genau gemeint? Die Entstehung der Weltgesellschaft nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg ist mit einer Erhöhung der Zahl der Nationalstaaten einhergegangen. In dieser Hinsicht ist "globale Sozialpolitik" nicht nur auf einer internationalen und transnationalen Ebene zu suchen, sondern auch in Nationalstaaten. Auch die Ausbreitung westlicher Formen staatlicher Sozialpolitik auf nicht-westliche, weniger modernisierte Nationalstaaten kann als Teil globaler Sozialpolitik` verstanden werden. Die Verbreitung westlicher Sozialpolitik in nicht-westlichen Ländern, sogar die Entstehung "neuer Wohlfahrtsstaaten", ist z.B. für Ostasien empirisch nachgewiesen worden.[6] Diese Länder sind nicht nur emerging markets, sondern auch entstehende oder bereits entstandene Wohlfahrtsstaaten. Nationale Wohlfahrtsstaatlichkeit scheint sich also weltweit auszudehnen. Wie aber steht es mit genuin globaler Sozialpolitik als Teil einer neuen internationalen Ordnung?

Deacons These soziologisch spezifizierend, scheint es mir sinnvoll, von globaler Sozialpolitik nur zu reden, wenn eine Ausdifferenzierung und Institutionalisierung von Sozialpolitik auf drei Ebenen beobachtbar ist: der Ebene von Ideen, Normen und Zielen; der Ebene von Akteuren und Institutionen sowie der Ebene politischer Maßnahmen und Instrumente. Erst eine substantielle Präsenz "sozialer" Elemente auf allen drei Ebenen rechtfertigt die Rede von globaler Sozialpolitik. In vielen Ländern des Südens gibt es soziale Leistungssysteme; diese beschränken sich aber oft auf privilegierte, regierungsnahen Gruppen. Zudem fehlt eine ausgeprägte, politisch-rechtlich verankerte normative Verpflichtung auf Wohlfahrtsziele.

Ideen, Normen und Ziele globaler Sozialpolitik

Es gibt ausgeprägte globale soziale Ideen und Normen, die dem normativen Gefüge der Weltgesellschaft einen 'sozialen' Stempel aufdrücken. Erstens sind internationale soziale Standards und Rechte zu nennen, insbesondere soziale Menschenrechte. Grundlegend ist der Internationale Pakt für wirtschaftliche, soziale und kulturelle Rechte der Vereinten Nationen von 1966 ("Sozialpakt"). Auf der Ebene von Weltregionen sticht die Europäische Sozialcharta des Europarats von 1961 (revidiert 1996) hervor. Schließlich sind die zahlreichen arbeitsbezogenen Konventionen der Internationalen Arbeitsorganisation (International Labour Organization, ILO) zu nennen, zuletzt kodifiziert als "Kernarbeitsnormen" (1998). Auch entwicklungspolitische Ziele werden zunehmend in Kategorien von Rechten der Menschen in den Zielländern formuliert. Menschenrechtsschutz ist zu einer eigenen Politik geworden, die sich mehr und mehr auch auf soziale Menschenrechte erstreckt und in die Aktivitäten internationaler Organisationen einfließt.[7] Auch Armut wird zunehmend als Menschenrechtsfrage definiert.

Zweitens sind globale normative und kognitive Leitvorstellungen wesentliche Elemente globaler Sozialpolitik und der Weltgesellschaft generell. Leitvorstellungen haben einen 'weicheeren' Charakter als Recht und sind teilweise nur Semantiken, die von der Wirklichkeit vieler Länder entkoppelt sein können.[8] Leitvorstellungen werden jedoch weltweit von Nationalstaaten und subnationalen Akteuren geltend gemacht und können auf diese Weise unter Umständen sogar



stärker wirken als Rechtsnormen. Abu Sharkh[9] wies nach, dass die ILO-Konventionen zum Verbot von Kinderarbeit wirksam waren, aber weniger durch unmittelbare Befolgung der Konventionen, sondern durch öffentliche Thematisierung des Problems und Mobilisierung durch Nichtregierungsorganisationen (NROs). Sozialpolitisch einschlägig sind insbesondere die globale Idee kollektiver, nationaler "Entwicklung" und die Idee individueller Bildbarkeit. Zu den globalen Leitvorstellungen zählen auch spezielle institutionelle Modelle wie das Mehr-Säulen-Modell in der Alterssicherung, das vor allem durch die Weltbank weltweit verbreitet wurde.

Drittens ist eine globale soziale Öffentlichkeit entstanden, die ein Medium für die Entstehung, Entwicklung und Verbreitung sozialer Ideen bildet. De Swaan[10] hat die Entstehung eines "sozialen Gewissens" als ein Merkmal nationaler Wohlfahrtsstaatlichkeit identifiziert. Auf Weltebene ist ein solches soziales Gewissen bereits in Umrissen erkennbar. Sozial relevante Weltereignisse werden zunehmend wahrgenommen, etwa durch soziale Bewegungen. Dies gilt besonders für einzelne Ereignisse wie globale Gesundheitsprobleme und Epidemien (zuletzt AIDS, SARS, Vogelgrippe) und humanitäre Katastrophen wie der Tsunami. Es bilden sich aber auch auf Dauer gestellte globale soziale Diskurse heraus, so in Bezug auf Kinderarbeit, Zwangsarbeit und Gefangenearbeit, manifest in Zertifikaten für ohne Kinderarbeit hergestellte Teppiche oder Proteste gegen Sportschuhe, die in chinesischen Gefängnissen hergestellt wurden.

Akteure und Institutionen globaler Sozialpolitik

Es gibt keinen Weltstaat, aber dezentrale, zerklüftete Arrangements von Akteuren und Steuerungsformen in der Weltpolitik. In der Literatur wird von global governance - 'Regieren ohne Regierung' - gesprochen, in Bezug auf Sozialpolitik von global social governance.[11] Es ist eine bunte Vielfalt von Akteuren identifizierbar, die sich mit sozialpolitischen Fragen beschäftigen: Sie können gouvernemental (an Nationalstaaten gebunden) oder nicht-gouvernemental (transnational) sein; organisiert oder nicht-organisiert (mit fließenden Grenzen); können unterschiedlichen funktionalen Sphären der Weltgesellschaft angehören und können schließlich auf unterschiedlichen sozialräumlichen Ebenen der Weltgesellschaft angesiedelt sein. Ordnungspolitisch lassen sich vereinfachend gouvernementale, zivilgesellschaftliche und privatwirtschaftliche Akteure unterscheiden.

Akteure und Institutionen können in unterschiedlicher Weise einen "sozialen" Charakter haben: Sie können funktional auf soziale Fragen wie Arbeit und Gesundheit spezialisiert sein - so mehrere Teil- und Sonderorganisationen des UN-Systems, vor allem die Internationale Arbeitsorganisation (ILO) mit Schwerpunkt auf Arbeit, die Weltgesundheitsorganisation (WHO), die Ernährungs- und Landwirtschaftsorganisation (FAO) und die im Bildungsbereich engagierte UNESCO. In anderen Organisationen ist die soziale Orientierung Teil einer breiteren Funktionsausrichtung, so in der Weltbank, dem Internationalen Währungsfonds (IWF) und der Welthandelsorganisation (WTO). 'Sozialpolitisierung' kann auf unterschiedliche Weise stattfinden: Akteure können sozialpolitische Fragen als neues Betätigungsfeld entdecken, so die globale soziale Bewegung Attac. Akteure können auch die sozialpolitischen Aspekte ihres Handelns verstärken, so im Laufe der letzten Jahrzehnte die Weltbank.[12]

Unter den gouvernementalen Akteuren sind an erster Stelle die internationalen Regierungsorganisationen zu nennen. Dies sind vor allem die zahlreichen Organisationen im System der Vereinten Nationen. Auf der Ebene von Weltregionen sind supranationale Einheiten zu nennen, im engeren Sinne nur die Europäische Union (EU). Der soziale Charakter der EU - ob die EU ein "soziales Europa" sein soll - ist umstritten. Schließlich ist der ältere und größere Europarat durch seine Menschenrechtsaktivitäten ebenfalls ein wesentlicher weltregionaler sozialpolitischer Akteur. Zu den gouvernementalen globalen Akteuren mit sozialpolitischer Relevanz sind auch internationale Gerichtshöfe zu zählen,



vor allem der Europäische Gerichtshof für Menschenrechte in Straßburg, der dem Europarat zugeordnet ist, und der Europäische Gerichtshof der EU in Luxemburg.

Eine besondere Form von Globalität wird durch nationale Entwicklungsorganisationen verkörpert,[13] so in Deutschland die Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) und das Ministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (BMZ). Sozialräumlich zwischen nationalen Entwicklungsorganisationen und internationalen Organisationen wie Weltbank und ILO stehen regionale Entwicklungsbanken, besonders die Afrikanische und die Asiatische Entwicklungsbank. Ein Tätigkeitsschwerpunkt der Asiatischen Entwicklungsbank (ADB) ist beispielsweise der Bereich Sozialhilfe.

Unter den nicht-gouvernementalen Akteuren gibt es ein breites Spektrum (zivil-)gesellschaftlicher Akteure. Einige dieser Organisationen - wie auch nationale Entwicklungsorganisationen - scheinen sich breiter und spezifischer sozialen Themen zuzuwenden, also über das Ziel der Armutsbekämpfung hinaus spezifische sozialpolitische Programme voranzutreiben und sich auch in die Beratung zur Sozialgesetzgebung einzuschalten. Dabei findet seit längerem ein Umschwung von klassischer, asymmetrischer "Hilfe" und Armutsbekämpfung zu einer auf Rechte, Inklusion und Partizipation zielenden Entwicklungsstrategie statt. Individuelle Anrechte sind aber ein wesentliches Element moderner westlicher Wohlfahrtsstaatlichkeit.

Weitere zivilgesellschaftliche Akteure sind diverse transnationale Akteure, Akteursverbände und Netzwerke, etwa Ärztevereinigungen wie Médecins Sans Frontière, Vereinigungen von Sozialadministratoren wie die International Social Security Association (ISSA) und internationale Wissenschaftsvereinigungen, etwa die International Sociological Association (ISA) mit sozialpolitisch einschlägigen Untergliederungen, und globale Think Tanks.

Schon in nationalen Wohlfahrtsstaaten spielen privatwirtschaftliche Akteure eine wichtige Rolle, mehr noch in der Weltgesellschaft. Das Pendant zu betrieblicher Sozialpolitik ist auf globaler Ebene die "corporate social responsibility" oder "corporate social governance", also die freiwillige Selbstverpflichtung auf Sozialstandards in internationalen Unternehmen. Des Weiteren haben sich auch auf internationaler Ebene private Anbieterfirmen formiert, haben sich globale "Wohlfahrtsmärkte" gebildet. Dies gilt insbesondere für den Bereich Gesundheit und Pflege in Form internationaler Krankenhausgesellschaften und Pharmakonzerne. Im Bereich der Alterssicherung globalisieren sich die Anbieter von Finanzdienstleistungen und Vorsorgeprodukten. Ein großes und zunehmendes Gewicht haben globale Unternehmensberatungen, die auch in sozialen Sektoren tätig sind.[14]

Zur Vielfalt der Akteursarten kommt die Vielfalt der sozialräumlichen Ebenen von Weltgesellschaft, auf denen sie zu verorten sind, hinzu: Weltebene, weltregionale Ebene, nationalstaatliche Ebene und subnationale Ebene. Entsprechend ist mit komplexen Beziehungsstrukturen zwischen den Akteuren zu rechnen. Deacon sieht "soziale Weltregionen", vor allem die EU, aber auch andere Weltregionen, als wichtige Formen globaler Sozialpolitik.[15] Alles in allem gibt es in der Akteursdimension deutliche Elemente globaler Sozialpolitik, deren Ausprägung zuzunehmen scheint.

Instrumente globaler Sozialpolitik

In westlichen Wohlfahrtsstaaten und in der EU können vier Instrumente oder Maßnahmetypen staatlicher Sozialpolitik unterschieden werden: Versorgung (z.B. Schulesen), Umverteilung (z.B. Sozialhilfe und Sozialversicherung), Regulierung (rechtlichen Rahmung etwa des Arzneimittelmarktes) und 'weiche Steuerung'. Versorgung und Umverteilung sind die klassischen Instrumente des Wohlfahrtsstaats. Weiche Koordinierung findet sich ausgeprägt in



der EU, vor allem in Form der so genannten offenen Methode der Koordinierung (OMK). Sind diese vier Formen sozialpolitischer Maßnahmen auch auf globaler Ebene identifizierbar?

Ähnlich wie bei der EU gibt es auf globaler Ebene keine versorgenden und auch keine umverteilenden Instrumente und Maßnahmen. Versorgung Maßnahmen treten nur in einer Form auf, die der Merkmale institutionalisierter Wohlfahrtsstaatlichkeit entbehrt, nämlich als vorübergehende Hilfe im Fall von Naturkatastrophen, humanitären Katastrophen und, getragen vom Hochkommissar der Vereinten Nationen für Flüchtlinge (UNHCR), für Flüchtlinge. Umverteilung findet in großem Umfang statt im Rahmen der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit, die früher "Entwicklungshilfe" genannt wurde. Auch Spendenaufrufe und -aktionen internationaler Organisationen im Fall von Katastrophen bewirken eine globale Umverteilung. Dies sind jedoch kollektive Umverteilungen zwischen Regionen und Kollektivitäten, nicht zwischen individuellen Bürgern, wie es im Begriff der Umverteilung in westlichen Wohlfahrtsstaaten impliziert ist. Auch fehlt ein individueller Rechtsanspruch, der konstitutives Element westlicher Sozialpolitik ist.

Der Schwerpunkt globaler sozialpolitischer Maßnahmen scheint in den Bereichen Regulierung und weiche Koordinierung zu liegen, ähnlich wie in der EU. Wesentliche Formen der Regulierung sind die Verfahren vor internationalen Gerichtshöfen. Regulierend wirken auch die Prozeduren und Streitschlichtungsverfahren der WTO. Menschenrechte liegen im Überlappungsbereich von Regulierung und weicher Koordination. Weiche Koordinierung findet statt in den Menschenrechtsverfahren der Vereinten Nationen und des Europarats, die Berichte, Ortsbegehungen und Stellungnahmen von NROs beinhalten. Auch die ILO kennt derartige Verfahren zur Kontrolle und Durchsetzung ihrer Konventionen. Sehr weiche' Koordination findet schließlich statt in Form internationaler Gipfeltreffen und internationaler Zieldeklarationen, zuletzt die Millennium Development Goals (2000). In dem Maße, wie derartige Verfahren und Erklärungen geeignet sind, eine Öffentlichkeit zu erzeugen und Verpflichtungen zu definieren, die von zivilgesellschaftlichen Akteuren eingefordert werden können, kann weiche Steuerung durchaus wirksam sein. Die erwähnte Verminderung von Kinderarbeit ist hierfür ein Beispiel. Insgesamt ist festzuhalten, dass der Kernbereich westlicher sozialpolitischer Maßnahmen (Versorgung, Umverteilung) auf globaler Ebene fehlt, dass aber regulierende und weich koordinierende Maßnahmen recht breit entwickelt sind.

Soziale Globalisierung - unterschätzt und überschätzt

Wiederholt sich also die westeuropäische Entwicklung des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts - Aufbau von Sozialpolitik zwecks Abarbeitung der Folgeprobleme kapitalistischer Entwicklung - im 21. Jahrhundert auf globaler Ebene? Tatsächlich konnten wir auf allen drei Ebenen, die wir untersucht haben - Ideen, Akteure, Instrumente - Elemente globaler Sozialpolitik identifizieren: substantielle, aber in ihrer Umsetzung begrenzte sozialpolitische Ideen; ausgeprägte und vielfältige sozialpolitische oder sozialpolitisch relevante Akteure; aber im Vergleich zu nationaler Sozialpolitik wenige sozialpolitische Instrumente. Auf allen drei Ebenen scheinen die sozialpolitischen Elemente eher zuzunehmen. Beobachtbar ist auch eine Verbreiterung globaler Sozialpolitik - von Armutsbekämpfung zu Alterssicherung und Gesundheit, neuerdings auch zu sozialer Grundsicherung[16] sowie zu Arbeitslosenunterstützung und Arbeitsmarktpolitik.

Genuin globale Sozialpolitik ist operativ jedoch begrenzt - der Schwerpunkt des weltweiten Ausbaus von Sozialpolitik liegt derzeit weiter auf nationalstaatlicher Ebene. Dass Sozialpolitik in Übergangs- und Entwicklungsländern seit den 1980er Jahren enorm ausgebaut wird, ist wenig bekannt. Dies ist auch eine Form globaler Sozialpolitik, zumal sie wesentlich von globalen Akteure wie ILO und Weltbank angestoßen ist.



Diese eher optimistische Sicht relativiert verbreitete Auffassungen wachsender globaler Verelendung und Ökonomisierung im Zuge "neoliberaler" wirtschaftlicher Globalisierung. Tatsächlich ist Armut in den 1990er Jahren in allen Großregionen des Südens zurückgegangen außer in Afrika südlich der Sahara. Der Fokus auf Elend in Afrika ist selektiv. Die pessimistische Sicht auf den Prozess der Globalisierung unterschätzt, in welchem Umfang sozialpolitische Institutionen weltweit bereits aufgebaut worden sind. Die Welt wird ökonomisiert und gleichzeitig 'sozialpolitisiert'. Auch in der Geschichte westlicher Nationalstaaten ist die Entstehung von Sozialpolitik häufig nicht wahrgenommen worden, da sie von der auffälligeren Entwicklung von Märkten überlagert wurde. Tatsächlich ist globale Sozialpolitik breit gesellschaftlich verankert - ihre Ideen und Akteure kommen, wie gezeigt, aus vielen Bereichen: aus Politik, Recht, Medizin, Wissenschaft, Religion und auch aus der Wirtschaft. Auch zukünftig kann mit weiterem Ausbau globaler Sozialpolitik gerechnet werden: Entwicklungspolitik wird zunehmend sozial- (statt nur struktur-) politisch ausgerichtet,[17] und mit der neueren Menschenrechtspolitik ist weltpolitisch ein Instrument erwachsen, das auch soziale Belange der Menschen nachhaltig stützt.

Zugleich sind wesentliche Gegenkräfte und Grenzen globaler Sozialpolitik nicht zu verkennen. Umfangreiche sozialpolitische Maßnahmen haben erhebliche Legitimationsbedarfe, aber es gibt keinen demokratischen Weltstaat, der Legitimität erzeugen könnte. Der auch in internationalen Organisationen einflussreichste Staat, die USA, hat den Sozialpakt von 1966, der soziale Menschenrechte verbindlich macht, nicht unterschrieben. Auffällig ist auch, dass die globale Sozialpolitik einen Überschuss an Rhetorik aufweist. Insoweit werden im sozialdemokratischen Ruf, die neoliberale wirtschaftliche Globalisierung durch eine soziale Globalisierung zu zähmen`, die Möglichkeiten globaler Sozialpolitik teilweise auch überschätzt. Die entstehende globale Sozialpolitik ist anders als die aus europäischen Sozialstaaten vertraut: Sie ist eher projektförmig als bürokratisch, eher marktregulierend als versorgend`, eher sozialtechnologisch als sozialdemokratisch, eher individualisierend als korporatistisch, eher zivilgesellschaftlich und privatwirtschaftlich als etatistisch und eher rechtlich als politisch verfasst. Die Idee, die traute deutsche Sozialstaatlichkeit auf den Globus zu verbreiten, könnte sich - ähnlich und mehr noch als die Idee eines "sozialen Europa" - als "bismarckdeutsche Illusion" erweisen, wie Ralf Dahrendorf in einem Interview im Jahre 2005 in Hinblick auf die Zukunft Europas gesagt hat.

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Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

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The End Of The Globalization Debate: A Review Essay

in *Harvard Law Review*, Vol. 121 · April 2008 · No. 6 , 1528-1554

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

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The End of Liberal Globalization

in *World Policy Journal*, n. 4, vol. 24, winter , 1-9

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Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

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The Institutionalization of Solidarity and Globalization: The Case of Darfur

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This article uses the suffering in Darfur and the world's responses to it to discuss how contemporary solidarity and globalization is characterized by an institutionalization that contains elements of both extension and limitation. The extension thesis is supported by the involvement of international institutions such as the UN, the EU, and the AU. It also draws support from the involvement of civil society organizations. The limitation thesis is supported by observations of state activities, which do not always adhere to cosmopolitan norms. The limitation thesis is also strengthened by the fact that civil society organizations played a relatively marginal role in the debate and that those who did take part were a small group of large professional organizations. This leads to the conclusion that solidarity and globalization risk becoming de-popularized and de-democratized. On the other hand, it is also remarked that this institutionalization of civil society responses is an advance because it allows a routine professional response to distant suffering.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Bigo Didier, Carrera Sergio, Guild Elspeth, Walker R.B.J.

The changing landscape of European liberty and security: the mid-term report of the CHALLENGE project in International Social Science Journal , Volume 59, Issue 192, June 2008 , 283-308

The article offers a critical assessment of the liberties of citizens and others living in the EU and the way in which they are affected by the proliferation of discourses about insecurity, and government and transnational agencies practices of reassurance, protection and coercion enacted in the name of the safety of citizen or their collective security, in which information about their identity is exchanged through new techniques of surveillance and control. It analyses first the apparent radicalisation of specific forms of transnational political violence and its effects on liberal policies. Next it assesses the threat assessments produced through technologies of risk management and the development of new technologies of surveillance. Third it describes the changing forms taken by the logic of suspicion and practices of exception and derogation, especially in relation to established understandings of the rule of law, to the multidimensional and continuous reframing of the enemy. It then discusses the impact of this on the rights and freedoms of citizens and foreigners, and finally it assesses the relation between the internal and external impact of illiberal practices, especially in the context of transatlantic relations but also of an increasingly interconnected world order, and the place of the EU in this world.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

European Economy News

The euro in the world

in European Economy News, June 2008 - Issue 10

Session II of the Brussels Economic Forum explored the global position of the euro, charting its rise to international prominence, its current status, and the opportunities and challenges which lie ahead. Leading figures from the world of policy-making and finance were at hand to give their expert opinions and expectations.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations



Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Padoa Schioppa Tommaso

Thinking of Internationalization

in Federalist Debate (The), Year XXI, n. 2, July, 9-12

Internationalization is a process that my generation saw progressing at an accelerating pace, and whose rewards it harvested and is still harvesting, but which today is causing concern to most people, as every day also its distressing aspects are displayed before our eyes. Anyone who as a child has seen the ruins of war finds in internationalization a reason for hope and security; but what shall think of those who, being young, have no memories of war? A few words, first, on the term "nation". Today "homeland", "nation" and "State" are matching terms. But we shall not forget that such matching - in language and then in institutions - is a recent achievement; it comes from the Napoleonic era and the culture of Romanticism. An ancestor of ours of six or seven generations ago, should he awake from the sleep of death, would call internationalization the increase of trade between Lombardy and Piedmont. The form of the nation-State, founded on the idea that absolute independence is the guarantee of liberty and peace, originated in Europe in the 19th century and spread to the whole planet during the last century, although that idea soon showed to be deceptive and a source of tragedies. Today we count in the world about two hundred nation-States, almost all of them doggedly sticking to the illusion of unlimited sovereignty. Three principles you should have in store concerning the issue of internationalization: identity, competition and politics.

Identity is multiple

First principle: the identity of each individual is multiple. There is no incompatibility between being Milanese, Lombard, Italian, European and, finally, citizen of the world.

On the contrary, multiple belongings constitute the very individuality of each of us. This statement has a very concrete meaning. The identity of each individual is that mix of qualities, inclinations, interests, beliefs, blemishes, frailties, temperament traits, life experiences, hopes that makes him an individual, that is, a unique and unrepeatable entity. And that mix is one thing with being part of many communities. No one of its components fully defines the experience and the awareness of ourselves that are our hallmark; in no one could we identify ourselves to an exclusive degree without losing, let it not seem a play of words, our identity.

Well, acknowledging that principle shall bring out the awareness that our belonging in the community that we call today national is not in contradiction with, nor lessens our belonging in other communities, be they the narrower ones centered around our hometown or region, or the wider ones on a continental or planetary scale.

Among the latter, the European community is today the most present in our everyday life: suffice it to mention the many Brussels laws which prevail over national laws, the euro, the Erasmus project and the migrations within the Union. But we strongly feel that we also belong in the global community, to which we are tied by both the universal thrust of our moral convictions and, more and more, the threats to climate and the biosphere that can only be countered on a world scale.

In the wealth of our multiple belongings, feeling oneself Italian can, even must, find an appropriate place. I am convinced that, among the most serious faults Italy has suffered from in its short history as a community organized in a unitary State, there is the difficulty to find the right measure of national ambition, i.e. how to place itself in the balance point between indifference, even negation, of any sense of national belonging, and, on the other hand, a heated nationalism, which led to defeat and humiliation. Giving the correct importance to one's ties with the national community is, for a young Italian, less natural than for a youngster of the same age in another country.

Accepting competition

Second principle: we must accept international competition. Should I suggest an interpretation of the idea implied in the word "internationalization", I would formulate it thus: a peaceful intensification of the relations between countries. Neither armed clash, nor mutual isolationism; instead, exchange and competition.



Today, the intensification of relations between countries is, to a non-small degree, the consequence of economic and technical progress: goods, people, crime, know-how, images move on a planetary scale, rapidly and at low-cost. Scholars have recollected other situations in human history which -with respect to their time - can be qualified as "globalization", and have highlighted the differences with the present one. Those epochs have been followed by others when the world fragmented again into isolated communities.

We do not know whether the current globalization process too can be reversed. It may well be that today's technology has simultaneously given mankind the tools for destroying the planet and taken away those for going back to a fragmentation into isolated communities, as happened after the fall of the Roman Empire or after the First World War. We are led to think so by the quasi-impossibility to stop the migration waves, and also by how easily a young expert in Internet-surfing could sidestep the filters that Google had accepted to put up for its Chinese users.

That is the reason why we can and must ask ourselves at what conditions the internationalization in progress can continue without giving rise to conflicts and destructions. Internationalization cannot be stopped or rejected; we must make it, as we use to say, sustainable.

It is often stated that international relations differ from those practiced within the borders of a State, due to the fact that the former can be settled through the force of arms. With reason, the use of arms is associated with hatred, because the latter is both a cause and a consequence of the former. A very popular slogan among the students of my generation was urging to "make love, not war". Can we let us be guided by that slogan and say that the condition for making internationalization sustainable is the advent of universal, or global, love? Judging from the atmosphere in most condominium assemblies I would say no. In my opinion, the twofold condition is a different one: that competition be accepted, and that it be subject to the ruling of a higher political order.

The impulse to excel, to do better than others, to win, is called by psychiatrists aggressiveness, by economists animal spirit. We have to believe not only that eradicating it from human nature (i.e. not from a single man, like Prince Myshkin or Billy Budd, but from all living people) is impossible; it is even reasonable to believe that its disappearance is not much desirable, and that the moral thing to do is to control it and direct it towards doing good, not to suppress it.

Relations among human communities move between the two extreme models of conflict and union. At one extreme, war; at the other extreme, competition. On the one side, conflict, open war, the lack of any law but force: the force of arms, of deceit, of money, of intimidation. On the other, institutions, goals, shared instruments. Competition, in its various forms, is placed at some point in the intermediate area: it is a contest where armed conflict is replaced by a commercial struggle as a means for establishing the primacy of one competitor over the other.

Trade is not always "soft", as Montesquieu defined it in contrasting it with wars triggered by passions. It, and with it the competition through which it is generally practiced, can often be carried out in harsh, violent, ruthless ways: by stealing inventions from one's opponent, by pushing him out of the market through dumping practices, by corrupting governments in order to get orders, by exerting political pressures to support national enterprises. The commonly used metaphors highlight how competition could be placed quite close to the first of the two extremes of war and union: war of prices, invasion of a market, trading assault, cut-throat competition, and so on.

Such strong words must not surprise, most of all if we consider that they apply of course to competition between enterprises, but even more so to competition between countries. On being successful in the competition between countries development and wealth depend: also for Italy, the periods of a sizable improvement of its standard of living have always coincided with a good performance of its foreign accounts.

The economic order implies a political order

Third principle: the economic order implies a political order. Peace is not to be established by suppressing, in individuals and in human communities, the impulse to excel, to do better than others, to win. Instead, it is to be established by bringing about a situation, an order, where those impulses continue to express themselves, but subject themselves to rules; rules that are rooted in ethical principles (do not kill, do not steal, do not bear false witness), and whose recognition, however, has a practical usefulness too.



That situation is competition. However, in order for it not to degenerate into war, it needs strong rules; and those can only be given by politics, by a strong political power. In fact, to issue rules is a task peculiar to the political sphere, not to the sphere of the market.

The European area is where, for the first time in history, international competition has taken on a truly peaceful form. War among nations has been replaced with a contest, through renounces of portions of national sovereignty, and the establishment of a supra-national power that institutes and ensures the free movement of goods, services, capitals and people. Competition with agreed-to rules has become a single market, a common physical, economic, juridical, conceptual space.

In the global arena, the issue of rules, hence of politics, is still far from a satisfactory solution. Globalization is the great change that upsets our lives, although we cannot fully understand its nature and implications. Extreme and opposed interpretations have been put forward. That of its opponents, who make it the ultimate cause of all of today's evils, the terrain where the capitalists' greed is getting loose. Or that of its supporters, who consider it the wonderful mechanism which, setting free the forces of the market, universally spreads wealth, liberty, democracy and tolerance.

In my opinion, the two interpretations have in common the same error: they see the economy as the only bedrock of the social order. I believe, instead, that globalization is posing a challenge of an essentially political nature, namely, one concerning the difficulty of ruling it in peaceful ways with rules that shall move it away from the model of war and shift it closer and closer to the model of contest. The search - intellectual and practical - of instruments for ruling globalization is the fundamental challenge affecting the destiny of each of us. Without adequate institutions and means, which international cooperation alone can provide, globalization will not be ruled. And if it will not be ruled, we shall suffer from it and finally we will revolt against it. And it is very unlikely that the revolt will not assume repressive and violent forms. Reading the names of the young students of this Technical University fallen in the First World War, one cannot but think that their infancy and adolescence were spent in a world of peace and globalization, not dissimilar from today's. The illusion that that world was going to last was of short duration. Soon they realized that they had been able to enjoy it, but not to prepare the instruments and institutions necessary to rule it. The passage from contest to war was very fast. Difficult as it may be, the challenge of internationalization can be won if we will be able to face it on the political plane, with determination and clear-sightedness.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Smith Andrea

Transnationalism and the Immigrant: Continuity or Paradigm Shift?

in **Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power**, Volume 15, Number 4, July , 462-481

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Schumann Harald, Grefe Christiane

Weltkrieg oder Weltgesellschaft

in **Blätter für deutsche & internationale Politik**, Juni, 2008 , 50-67

Nie zuvor waren die Völker und Nationen der Menschheit einander so nah. Unablässig überqueren Informationen und Kapital die Ozeane zwischen Europa, Amerika und Asien. Neue Technologien ermöglichen die Verständigung im



Sekundentakt und den schnellen Transport über alle Grenzen hinweg. Der internationale Handel erstreckt sich bis in die letzten Winkel aller Kontinente. Tausende von Unternehmen bauen weltweite Produktions- und Vertriebsketten auf. An den Knotenpunkten des Informationsnetzes in ...

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 1. Theory of regional integration processes

Sánchez Marcelo

Implications of Monetary Union for Catching-up Member States

in *Open Economies Review*, Volume 19, Number 3 , 371-390

We examine the implications of monetary union for macroeconomic stabilization in catching-up participating countries. We allow member states' supply conditions to differ, especially with regard to sectoral characteristics. Sectoral productivity shocks of the type associated with the Balassa–Samuelson effect tend to hamper the stabilization properties of a currency union. In the face of aggregate supply disturbances, the stabilization costs of renouncing monetary autonomy diminish with a steeper supply curve (as induced by higher trade openness) and—barring idiosyncratic shocks—with a larger reference country size, more homogeneous supply slopes and a higher preference for price stability.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 1. Theory of regional integration processes

Grinols Earl L., Silva Peri

Industrial targeting in free trade areas with policy independence

in *Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue Canadienne d'Economique*, Volume 41, Number 3 , 796-816

We investigate the limits of a mechanism for free trade area (FTA) formation that simultaneously satisfies internal industrialization targets. For arbitrary targets, we find necessary and sufficient conditions that guarantee that the mechanism is efficient for member countries individually, even if other members do not implement the efficient policy. When the objective is conservative - designed to protect the level of industrialization previously achieved by the target industry - member countries are guaranteed gains from the efficient policy and their FTA participation. The analysis covers cases with transportation costs and explains why minimally restrictive rules of origin support efficiency and policy independence.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 1. Theory of regional integration processes

Sbragia Alberta

Review Article: Comparative Regionalism: What Might It Be?

in *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Volume 46 Issue s1, September 2008 , 29-49

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes



Subsection 1. Theory of regional integration processes

Élise Massicard

Régionalisme impossible, régionalisation improbable La gestion territoriale en Turquie à l'heure du rapprochement avec l'Union européenne

in *Revue d'études comparatives Est-Ouest*, Vol. 39, n. 3, Octobre, Régionalisation et régionalismes d'Ouest en Est , 172-203

L'ouverture des négociations d'adhésion de la Turquie a coïncidé avec d'importantes réformes des pouvoirs locaux. Si elles répondent en partie à des demandes assez floues de l'Union européenne, ces réformes s'inscrivent avant tout dans des logiques internes. Bien qu'elles renforcent l'échelon intermédiaire, elles n'entraînent pas de régionalisation en raison, notamment, d'une tradition politicoinstitutionnelle centraliste enracinée qui fait obstacle à tout régionalisme. Ces changements institutionnels laissent perdurer les caractéristiques essentielles du système politico-administratif ; c'est principalement par la mise en place de politiques régionales d'après le modèle européen que certains changements pourraient survenir dans la configuration territoriale des ressources. Par ses résistances et adaptations, la Turquie semble suivre la voie des nouveaux membres de l'UE.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 1. Theory of regional integration processes

Solingen Etel

The Genesis, Design and Effects of Regional Institutions: Lessons from East Asia and the Middle East

in *International Studies Quarterly*, issue 2, vol. 52, June , 261-294

ABSTRACT: Why do regional institutions emerge, what accounts for their variation in design, and what are their effects? Several conceptual and epistemological perspectives—neorealism, neoliberal-institutionalism, constructivism, and domestic politics—provide competing and complementary answers to these questions. I focus on regional organizations as productive arenas for developing contingent propositions on institutions more generally. The purpose is to advance cross-paradigmatic dialogue in two ways: through sensitivity to scope conditions and to institutional genesis, forms, and effects, in an effort to transcend axiomatic debates that often conflate different dependent variables. The empirical analysis includes the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the Arab League. The main findings from these cases suggest that understanding the nature of dominant domestic coalitions is often crucial for explaining incentives to create, design, and fine-tune the effects of institutions. However, this is mainly the case when the consequences of creating or designing institutions for power distribution, transaction costs, and norms are negligible or hard to estimate. In many cases these consequences are sizeable, reducing the explanatory influence of domestic coalitions. The latter often provide no more than permissive conditions for the emergence, design, and effect of institutions. Their influence is most decisive in explaining institutional genesis but is often underdetermining in explaining their design.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 1. Theory of regional integration processes

Reh Christine

The convention on the future of Europe and the development of integration theory: a lasting imprint?

in *Journal of European Public Policy* , Volume 15 Issue 5 2008 , 781-794

The Convention on the Future of Europe not only attracted public and political attention, but quickly reached



centre-stage in the academic debate about European integration. Six years after the Convention was set up, this article asks whether this flourishing field of research chiefly permits insights into an idiosyncratic institution, or whether the Convention served as a catalyst for more enduring developments in integration theory. Arguing in favour of the latter, the article demonstrates that EU scholars have used the Convention to refine our theoretical understanding in three areas: (1) domestic preference formation; (2) international negotiations; and (3) deliberative democracy and constitutional design. The reviewed literature follows a predominant trend in integration theory, namely to 'import' established approaches from comparative politics, international relations and democratic theory rather than to theorize the Union's nature and the process of supranational integration as a single case. In turn, some of the contributions discussed below generate conceptual, methodological and theoretical insights that could be 'exported' back into political science more generally.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 1. Theory of regional integration processes

Gil-Pareja Salvador, Llorca-Vivero Rafael, Martínez-Serrano José Antonio

Trade effects of monetary agreements: Evidence for OECD countries
in *European Economic Review*, Volume 52, Issue 4, May 2008

This paper analyses the effects of monetary agreements on trade flows using a sample of 25 OECD countries over the period 1950–2004. We find that these agreements have boosted intra-bloc trade. This result especially applies to the case of the euro. More importantly, in contrast to regional trade agreements, all monetary agreements analysed show evidence of trade-creating effects with third countries. Finally, only the euro shows a symmetric impact for the trade-creating effect with non-members, that is, using the euro promotes both the Eurozone's exports and its imports to non-Eurozone markets to a similar extent.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 2. Cooperations and integration in Africa and in the Middle East

Chandan Sukant

Africa United against EU Arrogance

in *Federalist Debate (The)*, Year XXI, n. 1, March , 23-27

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 2. Cooperations and integration in Africa and in the Middle East

Franke Benedikt

Africa's Evolving Security Architecture and the Concept of Multilayered Security Communities

in *Cooperation and Conflict*, n. 3, vol. 43, september , 313-340

ABSTRACT: Following decades of feeble attempts, Africa's states have recently made great strides in establishing an elaborate security architecture to tackle the continent's many perils. I argue that the emergence and particular structure of this architecture and its institutional layers are best described by the constructivist concept of multilayered security communities. While this concept is based on the original idea of security communities by Karl Deutsch and its later



adaptation by Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, it recognizes the increasing prominence of elaborate multi-level security cooperation in the developing world and the difficulties of the original theoretical framework to account therefor. Consequently, it combines security community terminology with notions such as organized complementarity and multi-level governance to do conceptual justice to systems like Africa's decentralized collective security arrangement.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 2. Cooperations and integration in Africa and in the Middle East

Soko Mills

Building regional integration in Southern Africa: South African Customs Union as a driving force?

in *South African Journal of International Affairs*, n. 1, vol. 15, June, 55-69

ABSTRACT: The unveiling of the new South African Customs Union (SACU) Agreement in 2002 inaugurated new democratic institutional structures for SACU. The revised SACU Agreement provides for accession by new members. Although not new, the idea of expanding SACU has gained currency in recent years. It has been suggested that enlarging SACU could overcome the 'spaghetti bowl' problem of overlapping regional membership of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries. In spite of its allure, however, enlarging SACU membership is likely to run into difficulties as negotiations about the common revenue pool and the common external tariff become bogged down by attempts to accommodate the needs and interests of countries at different levels of development. It would also spark debate about how the revenue-sharing formula should be restructured and extended to new members. Moreover, whether SACU can act as a driver of regional integration will depend on the extent to which South Africa, the regional power, can translate its hegemonic position into a leadership role.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 2. Cooperations and integration in Africa and in the Middle East

Haacke Jurgen, Williams Paul D.

Conclusions: security culture and transnational challenges - ECOWAS in comparative perspective

in *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, Volume 26, Issue 2, April

Drawing upon the various contributions to this special issue, this concluding article reflects upon the ways in which a shared security culture has influenced how the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has responded to transnational challenges. It then attempts to contextualise the ECOWAS approach by providing a brief comparative analysis of how other regional arrangements in Africa and Asia have addressed transnational challenges.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 2. Cooperations and integration in Africa and in the Middle East

Beckmann Markus

Governance durch Selbstbindung? Wider die Ausbeutungsspiele afrikanischer Eliten

in *Zeitschrift für Politik*, Jahrgang 55, Heft 2, 2008, 199-221

Abstract

This paper discusses NePAD's African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) as an instructive case of political self-commitment. Recently, the APRM has been heavily criticized. Building on the theoretical approach of economic



ethics and normative institutional analysis, the article seeks to delineate the systematic potential of political commitment strategies such as the APRM. The paper shows that the neo-patrimonial political system in many African states corresponds to a stable economic underdevelopment equilibrium. A simple model illustrates that the systematic logic of the APRM is to overcome this quasi-prisoners' dilemma through the self-commitment of political elites. In the field, however, the APRM so far fails to constitute a powerful self-commitment. Yet, in the face of limited statehood, most African states lack alternative and better mechanisms of political commitment. Against this background, the article spells out recommendations as to how to strengthen the APRM as a more credible commitment device.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 2. Cooperations and integration in Africa and in the Middle East

van Leeuwen Mathijs

Imagining the Great Lakes Region: discourses and practices of civil society regional approaches for peacebuilding in Rwanda, Burundi and DR Congo

in *Journal of Modern African Studies* , Volume 46, Issue 03, September , 393-426

The idea has gained ground in recent years that, as conflicts in the countries of the Great Lakes Region are strongly interlinked, regional approaches are necessary to resolve them. This interest in regional dimensions of conflict and peacebuilding also gains currency in other parts of the world. Attention to regional approaches is reflected in the efforts of international organisations and donors to promote civil society peacebuilding. They assume that regional cooperation and exchange between civil society organisations contribute to peace, and provide an alternative to single-country interventions or regional diplomatic initiatives. This paper explores how such assumptions work out in practice. Experiences in the Great Lakes Region show that local and international organisations have difficulty in analysing the regional character of conflict and arriving at collaborative regional strategies. Moreover, local civil society organisations are deeply embedded in the politics of regional conflict. Consequently, the shift to regional peacebuilding approaches remains more theoretical than practical. This paper suggests that international supporting organisations need to adjust their ambitions in regional peacebuilding, but nonetheless have roles in fostering regional identification among civil society organisations.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 2. Cooperations and integration in Africa and in the Middle East

Kofele Kale Ndiva

Participatory rights in Africa: a brief overview of an emerging regional custom

in *Netherlands International Law Review*, Volume 55, Issue 2 , 233-259

International law has long recognized the right to vote in elections as a fundamental democratic right and the act of voting as the most basic form of popular participation. In post-conflict African countries as well as those struggling to make the transition from single-party autocratic rule to multiparty democracies, competitive elections have become the barometer for measuring how close they are to this goal. Yet, across Africa this internationally-protected right to vote is under siege as elections have been transformed into elaborately staged events designed to hoodwink external donors. Rather than serving as a measure of democratic participation, the act of voting in a disturbingly sizeable number of African countries has been used by cynical political leaders to provide their authoritarian regimes with a veneer of



legitimacy. Despite these hiccups, this article argues that a careful review of state practice in the continent reveals an emerging regional customary law norm in support of the right to popular participation.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 2. Cooperations and integration in Africa and in the Middle East

Matšaseng Kopano

Price flexibility in the common monetary area

in South African Journal of Economics (The), Volume 76 Issue 2 , June 2008

This paper examines the presence of flexibility within the common monetary area (CMA) as compared to a selected group of Southern African Development Co-operation (SADC) countries. The study tests for the readiness of SADC countries towards macroeconomic convergence and monetary unification. The methods followed examine the concept of (relative) purchasing power parity and test for the speed of adjustment of prices after a shock. The results suggest that the level of price flexibility is high within the CMA as opposed to the control group. The implication is that the CMA arrangement has managed to foster price flexibility among its member countries. Furthermore, Botswana could be a potential candidate for a monetary union with the CMA group.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 2. Cooperations and integration in Africa and in the Middle East

Williams Paul D. , Haacke Jurgen

Security culture, transnational challenges and the Economic Community of West African States

in Journal of Contemporary African Studies, Volume 26, Issue 2, April , 119-136

This special issue explores how one particular regional organisation, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), has defined certain transnational issues as security threats and how it has addressed them. In this introductory article, we begin by providing an overview and analysis of some of the most important transnational security challenges facing West Africa. Specifically, we discuss some of the problems raised by cross-border insurgencies, health challenges, organised criminal activities, terrorism and environmental degradation. We then examine the different levels at which actors have responded to these challenges. The section 'Security culture: shaping the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) response?' sets out our approach to thinking about the concept of security culture and asks whether it might be relevant to understanding how and why ECOWAS has focused on responding to certain transnational security challenges and not to others. The final section provides an overview of the other articles in this issue.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 2. Cooperations and integration in Africa and in the Middle East

Jenkins, Peter A.

The Economic Community Of West African States And The Regional Use Of Force

in Denver Journal of international law and policy, vol. 35, issue 2 , 333

No abstract available



Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 2. Cooperations and integration in Africa and in the Middle East

Gebe Boni Yao

The quest for a union government of Africa: reflections on the vision and the realities of political integration in South African Journal of International Affairs , n. 1, vol. 15, june , 41-53

ABSTRACT: The study examines the perennial effort by African leaders and their people to attain a union government of Africa and eventually, a United States of Africa. Amidst a history of actual work and pragmatic choices by Pan-Africanists in the past who demonstrated better commitment and industry to this vision, the project cannot be dismissed as frivolous. Details of the recent Accra Declaration that concluded the African Union Summit in July 2007 reveal inherently difficult choices that African leaders have to make. These include tackling issues of sovereignty, territoriality, national laws versus sub-regional and African Union protocols that pervade constitutional arrangements across the continent. Issues of finance, engaging the African people, the political will and commitment of political elites are vital ingredients for the integration effort. The study reflects on the demand for a radical approach in attaining outcomes but opts for moderation backed with pragmatic choices. Even then, the regional economic communities (RECs), considered pillars of the integration process, must be well structured and given pronounced visibility and viability in order to achieve results.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 2. Cooperations and integration in Africa and in the Middle East

Olson Robert

Turkey's Relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council from 2003 to 2007: New Paradigms?
in *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Volume 19, Number 3, Summer , 68-87

In this essay I seek to document and analyze the relations between Turkey and the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) -- Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Uman -- during the period from 2003 to 2007. I focus especially on their increased trade, economic, and political relations after the US invasion and occupation of Iraq on 19 March 2003. Bulent Aras has discussed the growth of Turkey and GCC relations during the 1990s up to 2003.1 Aras attributed the increase in Turkey and GCC relations to several factors: the ongoing Iraqi crisis, Turkey's European Union membership proces.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 2. Cooperations and integration in Africa and in the Middle East

Lecoutre Delphine

Vers un gouvernement de l'Union africaine ? Gradualisme et statu quo v. immédiatisme
in *Politique Etrangère*, n. 3, autumn

Tant que l'Union africaine demeurera une organisation de coopération, et la Commission un simple secrétariat, le gouvernement de l'Union ne pourra prendre forme. L'objectif du renforcement de l'exécutif de l'Union africaine est affirmé de manière récurrente depuis 2005, dans toutes les rencontres continentales. Quelle forme peut prendre ce renforcement ? Le débat est ouvert entre les partisans du passage immédiat au gouvernement africain, et ceux d'un



gradualisme sauvegardant au maximum les souverainetés étatiques. Il renvoie à la conception même de ce que doit être à l'avenir l'"unité" africaine.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 3. Cooperations and integration in Central and North America

Colares Juscelino F.

An Empirical Examination of Product and Litigant-Specific Theories for the Divergence Between NAFTA Chapter 19 and US Judicial Review

in *Journal of World Trade*, Volume 42 Issue 4 , 691- 722

Empirical analysis of NAFTA panel review has shown that panels reverse US agency trade remedy determinations twice as often as US courts. Recent studies have eliminated case selection and other hypotheses as potential explanations for this divergence. In this article, Probit regressions show that case docket differences, such as type of import or litigant identity, also cannot account for this discrepancy. As NAFTA panels must apply the same law and standards of review as the US courts they replace, this divergence presents serious questions regarding US Congressional acquiescence to the operation of NAFTA panels and encourages discussion of the role or absence of popular preferences in the trade policy process

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 3. Cooperations and integration in Central and North America

Meilke Karl, Rude James, Zahniser Steven

Is 'NAFTA Plus' an Option in the North American Agrifood Sector?

in *World Economy*, Volume 31, Number 7 , 925-946

With the implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) nearly complete, there are concerns that the easy gains in efficiency have been achieved and that additional steps towards the economic integration of the member countries are required. This poses a distinct challenge to the NAFTA governments, since the agreement did not create trinational institutions with the supranational authority to facilitate the deepening of the new trading environment. In any initiative to further the economic integration of the NAFTA countries, agriculture will be a difficult sector in which to make progress. However, at an aggregate level, the support provided directly to agricultural producers by the NAFTA governments is similar, as are tariffs at an aggregate level. All three countries have devised income support programmes that contain a countercyclical element. In each of these areas, as well as in the operation of 'green box' programmes that are consistent with the member countries' obligations to the World Trade Organization, cooperation and consultation among the NAFTA members would seem crucial if they are to achieve greater integration in the agrifood sector. This article examines the opportunities and challenges facing the NAFTA members as they seek further integration in the agrifood sector.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 3. Cooperations and integration in Central and North America

Pastor Robert A.

The Future of North America. Replacing a Bad Neighbor Policy



in **Foreign Affairs**, July/August 2008 Vol. 87, Number 4

On January 20, 2009, if not before, a new national security adviser will tell the incoming president of the United States that the first two international visitors should be the prime minister of Canada and the president of Mexico. Almost every new president since World War II has followed this ritual, because no two countries in the world have a greater impact economically, socially, and politically on the United States than its neighbors. The importance of Canada and Mexico may, however, come as a surprise to most Americans, as well as to the new president. In the presidential campaign, instead of discussing a positive agenda for North America's future, the candidates have focused critically on two parts of that agenda, the 14-year-old North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and immigration. And overall, one could conclude from listening to the campaign that Iraq is key to U.S. national security, China is the United States' most important trading partner, and Saudi Arabia and Venezuela supply most of the United States' energy.

None of these propositions is true. For most of the past decade, Canada and Mexico have been the United States' most important trading partners and largest sources of energy imports. U.S. national security depends more on cooperative neighbors and secure borders than it does on defeating militias in Basra.

The new president will take office at a low moment in U.S. relations with its neighbors. The percentage of Canadians and Mexicans who have a favorable view of U.S. policy has declined by nearly half in the Bush years. The immigration debate in Congress and the exchange between the two leading Democratic presidential candidates on who dislikes NAFTA more has left a bitter taste in the mouths of Canadians and Mexicans. The ultimatum issued by Senators Hillary Clinton (D-N.Y.) and Barack Obama (D-Ill.) to Canada and Mexico -- renegotiate NAFTA on U.S. terms, or else -- hardly displayed the kind of sensitivity to the United States' friends that they have promised. On the other side, Senator John McCain (R-Ariz.) has offered such an unvarnished defense of NAFTA that it would appear he feels nothing more is needed. Moreover, although an author of legislation on immigration reform, McCain retreated from such reform after being harshly criticized. CNN's Lou Dobbs' reports on the disastrous effects of illegal immigration and trade seem to have had a more profound effect on the national debate than many people have thought. Indeed, the candidates seem to have accepted Dobbs' variation on Hobson's choice -- either reject NAFTA or suffer decline as a candidate and as a nation.

Sadly, the United States' leaders are looking backward at NAFTA rather than forward by articulating a new vision of shared continental interests. NAFTA has become a diversion, a piñata for pandering pundits and politicians -- even though it succeeded in what it was designed to do. It dismantled trade and investment barriers, and as a result, U.S. trade in goods and services with Canada and Mexico tripled -- from \$341 ...

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 4. Cooperation and integration in Central and Latin America

Harris Richard L.

Alternativas latinoamericanas frente a la globalización y el capitalismo

in **Nueva Sociedad**, n. 214 , 47-53

El desarrollo de América Latina se encuentra condicionado por la influencia de EEUU, el creciente poder de las empresas transnacionales y los condicionamientos de los organismos multilaterales. Sin embargo, en los últimos años comenzó a surgir un movimiento de resistencia al neoliberalismo y la globalización, tal como evidencia el giro político a la izquierda registrado en muchos países y la multiplicación de redes y organizaciones progresistas de la sociedad civil. En este contexto, América Latina tiene la oportunidad de profundizar la integración regional como camino para construir un mundo multipolar y más justo.



Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 4. Cooperation and integration in Central and Latin America

Mathias Suzeley Kalil, Guzzi André Cavaller, Giannini Renata Avelar

Aspects of regional integration on defense in South Cone

in *Revista Brasileira de Política internacional* , Vol. 51 – No 1/2008

Our objective in this paper is to argue the relations between civilians and military in the process of consolidation of the democracy in the South America, Argentina and Brazil in particular and how these countries promoting the integration in the defense and security areas. The perspective adopted is that the stability degree in civilian-military relations directly happens on the development of the cooperation in regional security and of course on stability of the Latin American democracy.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 4. Cooperation and integration in Central and Latin America

Mendes Marra Teresinha

Brasil y la integración sudamericana a comienzos del Siglo 21

in *Estudios internacionales : revista del Instituto de Estudios Internacionales de la Universidad de Chile*, Vol. 40 / 2008 / Nr 159

The paper offers an historical analysis of South American international relations from the standpoint of the scope and limits of physical and political integration of the continent at the beginning of the 21st century. The study of Brazilian foreign policy focuses on President Lula's Administration, the change of strategy of United States vis a vis Brazil, relations with Latin America and both advances and obstacles in the field of Latin American integration.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 4. Cooperation and integration in Central and Latin America

Ramsaran Ramesh, Hosein Roger

CARICOM: Some Salient Factors Affecting Trade and Competitiveness

in *Round Table (The): the Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs*, Volume 97, Issue 396, June , 355-375

The article examines economic performance in the CARICOM Region against the background of the challenges facing the growth of both regional and international trade. It argues that CARICOM has not only failed to create the expected dynamic in intra-regional trade but has also failed to lay the groundwork for a competitive and efficient manufacturing sector that could exploit foreign market opportunities in an increasingly transparent global economy. A strategy for greater competitiveness needs to embrace a broad range of non-price factors.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 4. Cooperation and integration in Central and Latin America

Soares Maria Susana Arrosa

Cultural diplomacy in Mercosul



in *Revista Brasileira de Política internacional* , Vol. 51 – No 1/2008

Cultural issues have little role in Mercosur. The rich cultural heritages of the member states are little known and are not used as a means for building cooperation and trust between the populations. The results achieved in the Meetings of Mercosur Ministers for Culture reveal the absence of cultural diplomacy in the member countries and in the bloc, the priorities of which are commercial.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 4. Cooperation and integration in Central and Latin America

Pizarro Roberto

El difícil camino de la integración regional

in *Nueva Sociedad*, n. 214 , 24-34

La integración regional, en el pensamiento de Raúl Prebisch y la Cepal, se concebía como una herramienta esencial para generar mercados ampliados que permitieran apuntalar la industrialización y reducir la dependencia. El artículo afirma que, a 50 años de los primeros esfuerzos integracionistas, los resultados son decepcionantes. Las exportaciones intrarregionales apenas alcanzan 15% del total y los intentos por convertir a América Latina en una zona de libre comercio, con aranceles externos comunes y disciplinas comerciales homogéneas, han fracasado. Sin embargo, en la nueva etapa de globalización, marcada por el ascenso de China y la India, la integración sigue siendo un proyecto irrenunciable.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 4. Cooperation and integration in Central and Latin America

Rivas Eduardo

Escenarios de integración regional, Mercosur

in *Geosur : publicacion mensual* , 335-336 , 31-33

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 4. Cooperation and integration in Central and Latin America

Gómez-Mera Laura

How 'new' is the 'New Regionalism' in the Americas? The case of MERCOSUR

in *Journal of International Relations and Development*, Volume 11, Number 3, September , 279-308

'New Regionalism' (NR) approaches have emphasized the qualitative differences between the more recent wave of regionalism and regional integration attempts in the post-World War II period. This article assesses the extent to which these claims to newness are empirically justified in the specific case of MERCOSUR, the largest regional trade bloc in Latin America. It argues that, consistent with NR perspectives, regionalism in South America since the 1990s has been part of a broader process of national and global economic transformation, which has influenced the character of the process of integration itself. Yet, a careful examination of MERCOSUR suggests that the extent of its newness should not be overstated. MERCOSUR remains a state-led, primarily commercial initiative, and its evolution and sustainability



have been fundamentally linked to strategic factors and power configurations at the regional and hemispheric levels. Based on these empirical findings, the article challenges the usefulness of the analytical and theoretical separation between NR and mainstream international relations approaches and illustrates the ways in which their insights can be combined and complemented in the explanation of contemporary regionalism.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 4. Cooperation and integration in Central and Latin America

Trotignon Jérôme

L'impact des accords de libre-commerce entre pays latino-américains. Les enseignements d'un modèle de gravité en données de panel

in *Economie Appliquée*, N. 2

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 4. Cooperation and integration in Central and Latin America

Vilalva Mario

La infraestructura física y la energía. Dos pilares para la integración regional

in *Estudios internacionales : revista del Instituto de Estudios Internacionales de la Universidad de Chile*, Vol. 40 / 2008 / Nr 159

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 4. Cooperation and integration in Central and Latin America

Zöpel Christoph

La integración sudamericana como requisito para la independencia

in *Nueva Sociedad*, n. 216 , 25-34

La autonomía real de un Estado en el sistema internacional depende de diferentes factores: la cantidad de habitantes, su potencia económica y su capacidad para resolver conflictos y evitar la violencia interior, lo que a su vez está relacionado con los niveles de igualdad social. En el mundo de hoy, solo unos pocos Estados o bloques integrados –Estados Unidos, la Unión Europea, China e India– cumplen estas condiciones. En este marco, los países sudamericanos, con la posible excepción de Brasil, difícilmente logren su autonomía plena, por lo que la integración regional –a través de la articulación de los mercados, la construcción de instituciones supranacionales y la integración monetaria– es el único camino posible

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 4. Cooperation and integration in Central and Latin America

Davydov Vladimir M.

Las chances de América Latina en el mundo que viene



in **Nueva Sociedad**, n. 214 , 75-86

El orden mundial está cambiando, del sistema unipolar generado tras el fin de la Guerra Fría a otro caracterizado por la emergencia de múltiples actores internacionales. Un mundo distinto, en el que los avances tecnológicos conviven con la revalorización de los recursos energéticos y los altos precios de los alimentos. ¿Cómo puede insertarse América Latina en este nuevo orden? El artículo sostiene que la eficacia de la estrategia dependerá de la capacidad para adaptar los viejos esquemas de integración, acordar posiciones regionales comunes en los foros en los que se define la regulación internacional y reformar los Estados para ponerlos a la altura de los nuevos desafíos. Todo esto es esencial para superar el gran déficit de la pobreza y la desigualdad, avanzar en la modernización económica y hacerse un lugar en un mundo cada vez más globalizado, competitivo y complejo.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 4. Cooperation and integration in Central and Latin America

Vasapollo Luciano, Herrera Rémy

Mouvements de masse et organisation de classe en Amérique latine aujourd'hui. Alba, sortie du FMI, Bancosur et "socialisme du XXIe siècle"

in **Pensée (La)**, Fascicule 2008/355 , 45-55

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 4. Cooperation and integration in Central and Latin America

Vigevani Tullo, Favaron Gustavo de Mauro, Ramazzini Haroldo JR et al.

The role of regional integration for Brazil: universalism, sovereignty, autonomy and elites' perception.

in **Revista Brasileira de Política internacional** , Vol. 51 – No 1/2008 , 5-27

The aim of this article is to analyse the role of Mercosur for the Brazilian foreign policy. We will discuss the perception of the Brazilian elites concerning the regional integration process. The defense of the principle of intergovernmentalism is related to the conception of Mercosur's place in the set of Brazilian international relations. The huge valuation of some principles, as universalism and sovereignty, ends up by affecting the deepening of integration. The hypothesis of this paper is that the Mercosur structure would be related with part of Brazilian elite's perceptions. Our argument is that the current structure is insufficient to guarantee the dynamics of the integration.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area

Jurgen Ruland; Anja Jetschke

40 years of ASEAN: perspectives, performance and lessons for change

in **Pacific Review (The)** , Volume 21, Issue 4 , 397–409

In this introduction, the editors trace the increasing theoretical diversity of ASEAN research and discuss the contributions to this issue against the current state of the art. Contributions confirm the post-Asian crisis advancement of constructivist scholarship, but by also analyzing ASEAN from the Liberal and English school perspectives, the articles



assembled in this issue nevertheless stand for theoretical pluralism. This article continues to open a governance perspective and, against this background, attests to ASEAN's marked success in pacifying an erstwhile turbulent world region but also to ASEAN's much more ambiguous record in responding to the new challenges associated with globalization.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area

Masron Tajul Ariffin, Yusop Zulkornain

AFTA, Income Growth, and Income Convergence in ASEAN

in *International Trade Journal*, Volume 22, Issue 3, 290 - 314

The rapid economic growth experienced by the core ASEAN members (comprised of Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia) since the 70s was generally attributed to openness policies adopted by the respective governments. Despite this contention, however, there is little evidence to suggest that greater openness will eventually lead to a convergence of the member countries, particularly with the present of external shocks. The introduction of ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) in 1992 was also partly an attempt to hedge the region from external shock, while possibly further promoting economic development in the region. This study, therefore, is an attempt at examining in greater detail the impact of AFTA and openness on ASEAN economic growth, in the present of external shock. The results indicate that convergence in ASEAN is conditional upon several control variables taking place, in addition to openness. Additionally, while AFTA has a positive effect on economic growth, its impact on convergence is somewhat ambiguous in the presence of external shocks.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area

Heribert Dieter

ASEAN and the emerging monetary regionalism: a case of limited contribution

in *Pacific Review (The)*, Volume 21, Issue 4, 489 - 506

Monetary regionalism - along with bilateral trade agreements - is receiving significant attention in Asia. This article analyzes its development since 2000 with specific reference to the role of ASEAN. It discusses the general rationale for monetary and financial cooperation, the Chiang Mai process, the rivalry between China and Japan, the potential exchange rate regime for the region including monitoring and surveillance, the evolution of regional bond markets, as well as the institutional dimension of monetary regionalism. The analysis confirms that monetary regionalism in Asia will be a complex endeavor and will - if at all - only be achieved in the long run. ASEAN will be able to function as a catalyst for monetary regionalism, but China and Japan are the more important players. Without their (joint) effort, ASEAN will not be able to achieve significant change in monetary and financial affairs.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area

Moranda Noel

ASEAN at 40: Prospects for Community Building in Southeast Asia

in *Asia Pacific Review*, Volume 15 Issue 1, 36 - 55



In 2007, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations attempted to celebrate its 40th founding anniversary with a bang as it was about to set another milestone, which is the signing of the ASEAN Charter. However, the celebration was overshadowed by the political crisis in Myanmar following the military's crackdown on protesting monks and their democratic supporters. The inability of ASEAN to influence events in that country became the focus of public attention in the region and the international community. Even the much-vaunted milestone of finally having an ASEAN Charter was a major disappointment for many in Southeast Asia as the final document signed by ASEAN leaders was everything but bold, forward-looking, and transformative. It became an object of criticism mainly by some think tanks and civil society groups in the region because it paled in comparison to the recommendations of the Eminent Persons Group that drafted the blueprint of what the ASEAN Charter should look like. This article describes the major milestones and turning points of ASEAN's regionalism project over the last forty years. It also attempts to identify the major issues and challenges to ASEAN's community building efforts in the future. The main argument of this article is that ASEAN's continuing relevance to the people of the region can be ensured only if it seriously opens up to greater participatory regionalism. Only then can ASEAN be transformed into a truly people-centered organization.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area

Jorn Dosch

ASEAN's reluctant liberal turn and the thorny road to democracy promotion
in *Pacific Review (The)* , Volume 21, Issue 4 , 527 - 545

New liberal spaces in several Southeast Asian countries have created a window of opportunity for non-state actors to lobby for the promotion of democracy and human rights in ASEAN. Democratically elected governments cannot ignore the voices of their constituencies and consequently promote liberal values at the regional level. This is mainly the case for Indonesia and the Philippines, and the other member states find it difficult to close their eyes to liberal agendas. Both Jakarta and Manila follow a foreign policy strategy of reforming ASEAN into an organization that actively subscribes to democratic values, as the process of negotiating the ASEAN Charter demonstrated. The charter gives evidence of the group's cautious liberal turn as it explicitly identifies the rule of law, good governance, democratic principles and constitutional government as essential elements of political order. However, it is a long way from the cautious acceptance of general democratic values to the active promotion and regional enforcements of rules based on these norms. In view of the diversity of political systems and ideologies within ASEAN, it comes as no surprise that the association as a collective actor is unable to agree on any meaningful strategy as to how to support and respond to political change. ASEAN's failure to use diplomatic leverage to pressure its member Burma for political reforms is a case in point. At the same time ASEAN does not impede democracy, and future analysts might be looking back on the commitment to core democratic values in the ASEAN Charter as the pre-stage of regional-democracy promotion.

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Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area

Emmerson Donald K.

ASEAN's "Black Swans"
in *Journal of Democracy* , Volume 19, Number 3, July , 70-84

In November of 2007, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) celebrated its fortieth birthday at a gathering of the organization's ten member states in Singapore. It was a celebration eclipsed by news of the military junta's brutal



repression of protests in Burma, an ASEAN member. The task of plotting a way forward for ASEAN has been punctuated by this and other improbable events, such as the March 2008 electoral losses of Malaysia's ruling coalition and the catastrophic upheaval unleashed by Cyclone Nargis in Burma. Yet these "black swans" have unexpectedly produced opportunity for reform and democratization in the region.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area

Ambrosio Thomas

Catching the "Shanghai Spirit": How the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Promotes Authoritarian Norms in Central Asia

in *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol. 60, n. 8, October , 1321-1344

This article examines how the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) seeks to undermine democratisation in Central Asia. Prior studies of the interplay between international organisations and democracy have tended to examine only one half of this relationship: whether, how, and under what circumstances do international organisations promote democracy? However, the opposite has been largely ignored: how do international organisations sustain autocracy? Authoritarian governments are increasingly adopting policies aimed at preserving their political power and the SCO represents an additional strategy in this regard: utilising multilateral cooperation to defend themselves against regional or global democratic trends. As such, the 'Shanghai Spirit' may be a sign of things to come as autocratic leaders become more bold in their rejection of democratic norms.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area

de Martino Luigi

Désillusions des donateurs ? La coopération internationale en Asie centrale. Un état des lieux

in *Revue Tiers Monde*, n. 193 , 131-144

Cet article esquisse un état des lieux des relations entre Occident et Asie centrale post-soviétique. En 1991, la disparition du système politique et économique soviétique a été une expérience traumatique tant pour les gouvernements que pour les populations. Le contact direct avec les gouvernements occidentaux entraînait une modification des clés de lecture généralement utilisées à l'Ouest pour appréhender ces sociétés. Les relations entre Occident et Asie centrale sont passées en quinze ans par différentes phases : découverte et illusions, puis relative désillusion et partiel désengagement de l'Occident. Depuis 2005, la coopération internationale occidentale semble être de plus en plus marginalisée, Russie, Chine et Inde devenant des acteurs incontournables du développement économique et politique de la région.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area

Fink Carsten , Molinuevo Martín

East Asian Free Trade Agreements in Services: Key Architectural Elements

in *Journal of International Economic Law*, Volume 11, Number 2 , 263-311



Since the mid-1990s East Asian countries have negotiated 25 free trade agreements (FTAs) with a services component. There are important architectural differences in these agreements, which ultimately affect their value in promoting transparency, fostering the credibility of trade policies, and advancing market opening in services. This article reviews key architectural choices, focusing on the approach towards scheduling commitments, the treatment of investment and the movement of natural persons, rules of origin, provisions for the settlement of trade dispute, and selected deeper integration issues. In doing so, it assesses the advantages and drawbacks of different architectural approaches and discusses a number of lessons learned.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area

Astrid Fritz Carrapatoso

Environmental aspects in free trade agreements in the Asia-Pacific region

in Asia Europe Journal, Volume 6, Number 2 / June , 229-243

The trade and environment interface has become a topic of growing importance. Until the early 1990s, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and its successor, the World Trade Organisation (WTO), were the major forums to address the relationship between trade and the environment. Significant progress in this area has not yet been made. Since the 1990s, environmental issues have been addressed by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and in recent times by trans-regional and bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) such as the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement (SEP), the U.S.–Singapore FTA (USSFTA), the Canada–Chile FTA or the New Zealand–Thailand Closer Economic Partnership Agreement (CEP). Not only questions on the effectiveness of FTAs in global and regional environmental governance arise but also on the various actors involved in these negotiations. The question here is whether the integration of environmental issues in FTAs is a top-down approach, leaving the negotiations and implementation of environment cooperation frameworks in the hands of governments, or whether environmental arrangements are the result of a multi-stakeholder dialogue, consequently committing governments, the private sector and civil society to the objective of making trade and environmental policies mutually supportive. This article seeks to address these questions by analysing environmental issues and stakeholder participation in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Trans-Pacific SEP and the New Zealand–Thailand CEP.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area

John Ravenhill

Fighting irrelevance: an economic community 'with ASEAN characteristics'

in Pacific Review (The) , Volume 21, Issue 4 , 469 - 488

Contrary to expectations at the time, the financial crises of 1997-98 may have strengthened ASEAN. The backlash against a perceived unsympathetic Western response put ASEAN at center stage in new regional cooperative arrangements. Moreover, the rivalry between China and Japan for regional leadership has led them both to seek to negotiate regional partnerships with ASEAN as a whole. ASEAN, however, faces new challenges - particularly from rapid economic growth in China and India, and from the proliferation of preferential trade agreements (PTAs). ASEAN has made only slow progress in economic cooperation, which has fallen further behind schedule. The private sector makes little use of ASEAN's preferential arrangements because they afford little advantage over most-favored-nation



tariffs. ASEAN has failed to address 'deeper integration' issues - the removal of 'beyond border' barriers to trade. Some of the bilateral PTAs that ASEAN countries have negotiated with extra-regional partners go further in removing barriers than ASEAN's own arrangements. ASEAN members continue to eschew binding commitments. Liberalization under ASEAN's auspices has not been sufficiently significant to encourage business groups to invest substantial resources in lobbying for deeper integration.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area

Shaun Narine

Forty years of ASEAN: a historical review

in Pacific Review (The) , Volume 21, Issue 4 , 411 - 429

This paper assesses the historical development of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). During its 40 year history, ASEAN has achieved limited success in influencing the normative environment of Southeast Asia. ASEAN has helped shape institutional development in the Asia Pacific, particularly since the 1990s. It remains at the center of Asia Pacific regionalism. However, ASEAN's diverse membership and its need to maintain the fundamental principle of non-intervention limit its ability to reform. ASEAN's future is closely tied to its role in facilitating the emergence of China as a global power.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area

Katada Saori N.

From a supporter to a challenger? Japan's currency leadership in dollar-dominated East Asia

in Review of International Political Economy, Volume 15 Issue 3 2008

The dollar dominance in East Asia has depended on its regional support. Japan's supportive policy toward the dollar, however, shifted in the late 1990s as the Japanese government began to address the region's heavy dependence on the dollar, which was regarded as one (but an important one) of the causes of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis (AFC), by promoting the use of the yen in the region and regional monetary initiatives. Despite emerging signs of those challenges, Japan's domestic resistance and the region's power rivalry between Japan and China still makes the dollar the currency of choice in the medium term future.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area

Perera M.S.S.

Impact of the Indo-Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement on the Sri Lankan Economy

in South Asia Economic Journal, Volume 9, No. 1 , 1-50

The Indo-Lanka Free Trade Agreement (ILFTA), which was signed in December 1998 at the highest political level, and its subsequent implementation in March 2000 marked an important milestone in India–Sri Lanka relations, and in trade relations in particular, as it concretized and paved the way for closer economic integration. This article provides a quantitative assessment of the impact of the ILFTA on macroeconomic variables, welfare and output focusing on the Sri



Lankan economy. In addition, the study investigates the impact of trade liberalization on trade structure, bilateral trade between Sri Lanka and India and trade partners of Sri Lanka. We perform simulations using the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model Version 6, to quantify the impacts of liberalized trade between Sri Lanka and India. The GTAP is a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the world economy.

The results indicated that both Sri Lanka and India will experience welfare gains from the ILFTA. Moreover, it was evident that the Indo-Lanka full trade liberalization scenario ensures higher welfare to both the countries than the Indo-Lanka FTA with negative lists. Hence, the scenario with negative lists could be treated as a second best solution as 'with-negative-lists' scenario where both the countries could not reap the maximum benefits under the FTA. The simulation results demonstrate that trade diversion effects are not much significant due to trade liberalization between the two countries. The industry analysis reflected that the industries, such as metal products, paper products and publishing, electronic equipment, chemical, rubber and plastic products, machinery and equipment necessities and other primary products will benefit due to the ILFTA. However, it could be seen that the industrial sector is benefiting more than the agricultural sector due to trade liberalization between the two countries.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area

Farasat Shadan

India's Quest for Regional Trade Agreements: Challenges Ahead

in Journal of World Trade, Volume 42 Issue 3 , 433-460

Backed by high economic growth, India has been entering into numerous regional trade agreements (RTAs) in the past few years. This article carries out a holistic analysis of these RTAs in light of India's commitments at the World Trade Organization (WTO). The thrust of the article is on the challenges India's RTAs currently face. An examination of India's RTAs reveals that many of them may not be fully consistent with the applicable WTO rules. Additionally, the article reveals an 'implementation deficit' in respect of India's RTAs. The article suggests changes to the existing Indian foreign trade policy, so as to make India's regional trade endeavours complimentary to the multilateral process at the WTO.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area

He Kai

Institutional Balancing and International Relations Theory: Economic Interdependence and Balance of Power Strategies in Southeast Asia

in European Journal of International Relations , Vol. 14, n. 3, september , 489-518

ABSTRACT: This study integrates elements of neorealist and neoliberal theories with a model of institutional balancing that identifies the conditions under which this form of soft balancing occurs. Institutional balancing, i.e. countering pressures or threats through initiating, utilizing, and dominating multilateral institutions, is a new realist strategy for states to pursue security under anarchy. The interplay between the distribution of capabilities and strong economic interdependence shapes states' decisions on when and how to employ this strategy. Historical examples include:



inclusive and exclusive efforts by Third World states and the superpowers to organize voting blocs in the UN during the Cold War; inclusive institutional balancing of ASEAN states to constrain China and ensure US support in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) after the Cold War; exclusive institutional balancing of ASEAN states against the US in the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) summit after the Southeast Asian financial crisis. These examples illustrate the logic of institutional balancing under the conditions of bipolarity, incipient multipolarity, and unipolarity.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area

Rozman Gilbert

Internationalism and Asianism in Japanese Strategic Thought from Meiji to Heisei
in Japanese Journal of Political Science, Volume 9, Issue 2, August , 209-232

Around 1907, 1987, and 2007 Japan faced a crossroads in defining internationalism and Asianism, determining their relative priorities, and assessing their relevance for national identity. Similarities can be found in the far-reaching changes occurring in Japan's external environment in the three periods and in the importance of setting a new direction for strategic thinking. Misjudgments in the first two periods are reviewed in order to draw lessons for responding to today's challenges. A distorted outlook on internationalism led to rejection of shifts in US thinking welcomed elsewhere in the global community. Now as attention focuses on debates over the Six-Party Talks as a test of internationalization and over the East Asian Community and regionalism as a test of Asianism, it is possible that the riveting impact of the 'abductions' issue, as with the 'Northern Territories' issue 20 years earlier, will remain a symbol that trumps a strategic approach toward Asia at a moment of far-reaching regional reorganization. Shortcomings in dealing with the concepts internationalism and Asianism are connected; at the very time the Japanese struggle with one, they are also at an impasse over the other. The same set of factors may be at work: an absence of agreed principles on which to anchor foreign policy; fragmented strategic thinking that loses sight of interconnections and the big picture; and national identity that excessively separates Japan from global forces that transform politics and society and that narrowly compartmentalize the historical developments that shaped relations with Asian countries without capturing the fundamental regional dynamics.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area

Gregory W. Noble

Japanese and American Perspectives on East Asian Regionalism
in International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Volume 8, Number 2, May , 247-262

Regular convening of East Asian summits and rising concerns about the American dollar have heightened interest in Asian cooperation. Japan will necessarily play a central role in regional endeavors, and the United States must at least acquiesce if regional coordination is to progress. Among American accounts, the most theoretically elaborate and systematically comparative analysis is *A World of Regions*, while *Remapping East Asia* provides the most authoritative overview of recent developments. Japanese-language studies of East Asian regionalism agree that regional cooperation is far less institutionalized and rule-based in East Asia than in Europe, but they include a wider range of opinion about the desirability and feasibility of cooperation. Skeptics on the right warn that efforts to create a regional community would weaken the United States–Japan alliance, undermine universal values, and cede regional leadership to China. Optimists on the left counter that regional cooperation holds out the only hope for ameliorating nationalist conflicts. Most numerous



are centrists arguing for active cooperation on economics and the environment, but only cautious moves on politics and security. Despite their caution, Japanese authors convey a sense that changes to the American-led global and regional order are occurring and likely will continue.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area

Bordone Sandro

La Shanghai Cooperation Organization

in Politico (II), n. 218, anno LXXIII, maggio-agosto

ABSTRACT: China, Russia and the Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Kirghizistan, Tagikistan and Uzbekistan formed the Shanghai Co-operation Organization (SCO) in 2001. China's backing for an SCO charter, permanent secretariat and anti-terrorism centre for the past three years reflects its desire to strengthen the SCO in countering United States influence in Central Asia. Diplomatically, China fears that the American presence means that regional states will be less accommodating in China's political demands. Economically, China worries that the United States' support for American petroleum companies will compromise Chinese efforts to wrest concessions from Central Asian governments. Security-wise, with bases close to China's western borders, Washington can assist Beijing in flushing out Xinjiang separatists or terrorists operating in Central Asia, or put military pressure on China, should it be perceived as a threat. The American presence and the resurgent Russian involvement in Central Asia seem to have put China's influence in the region on the defensive.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area

Injoo Sohn

Learning to Co-operate: China's Multilateral Approach to Asian Financial Co-operation

in China Quarterly (The), Volume 194, June, 309-326

This study explains the ideational sources of China's proactive multilateral diplomacy towards Asian financial co-operation by employing a learning thesis. Challenging prominent materialist explanations (power-transition thesis, realist balancing thesis and economic utility thesis), this study argues that the collective learning of Chinese policy elites through cognitive dissonance, feedback effects and transnational persuasion explains much of the change in China's relational identity and philosophical beliefs regarding regional co-operation. These prior ideational shifts helped to determine China's behaviour change from its muted opposition to Asian financial co-operation in the 1990s to its active support of regional financial co-operation in the early 2000s, as evidenced in the emergence of the Chiang Mai Initiative, Chinese–Japanese–South Korean trilateral financial co-operation and the Asian Bond Fund Initiative. Chinese learning also suggests that more fundamental changes in China's national preference may make its support for Asian financial co-operation more consistent and stable in the foreseeable future than sceptics might anticipate.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area



Mely Caballero-Anthony

Non-traditional security and infectious diseases in ASEAN: going beyond the rhetoric of securitization to deeper institutionalization

in *Pacific Review (The)* , Volume 21, Issue 4 , 507 - 525

The transnational security challenges posed by non-traditional security (NTS) issues like pandemics are pushing ASEAN to deepen regional security cooperation. However, unless regional efforts at addressing complex NTS threats like pandemics are reinforced by a more holistic, human security approach, many of the current initiatives will remain inadequate.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area

Timo Kivimäki

Power, interest or culture - is there a paradigm that explains ASEAN's political

in *Pacific Review (The)* , Volume 21, Issue 4 , 431 - 450

This article attempts to build on insights on scholarship that tries to explain the successfulness of ASEAN and tries to produce some tested conclusions on what it is that explains ASEAN's success best. This is done by using slightly stricter criteria of explanation that has been used before and by exploiting the newest quantitative data on conflicts. Stricter explanation is attempted through greater care in defining the variables of explanation, as well as by trying to avoid the Western biases that many of the existing international relations theories have.

When explaining how ASEAN manages to reach many of its political objectives, the focus in this article is on material realities as well as perceived and constructed ones. The explanation attempts to be careful in assessing what is to be explained. This is why this article first defines the criteria of success by looking at what it is that ASEAN attempts to do and then employs the quantitative data to see whether the existence of ASEAN is correlated to the desired outcomes. At the end of this article, the concluding explanation of ASEAN will be relativized by looking at the new challenges to which ASEAN should or could respond. The elitism of the 'old ASEAN Way' will need to give way to a more broad-based approach to stability, if ASEAN wants to remain relevant as an organization in the future.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area

Morrison Charles E. et al.

Renewing the Pacific Partnership

in *Estudios internacionales : revista del Instituto de Estudios Internacionales de la Universidad de Chile*, Vol. 40 / 2008 / Nr 159

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area

Jones David Martin

Security and democracy: the ASEAN charter and the dilemmas of regionalism in South-East Asia



in *International Affairs* , issue 4, vol. 84, july , 735-756

ABSTRACT: In November 2007, the heads of the ten member governments of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) signed a charter that will, once ratified, give the association a legal personality. The charter, significantly, requires more of its members than a reassertion of the traditional ASEAN norm of non-interference and the practice of consensus. The charter lists a number of novel goals among the organization's purposes: 'to strengthen democracy, enhance good governance and the rule of law, and to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms.' In view of the wide economic and political disparities between the member states of ASEAN, this article examines whether strengthening democracy would in fact facilitate ASEAN's goal of becoming an integrated political, economic and security community. Rather than enhancing an integrated community, democratization would arguably create a faultline between the more politically mature and economically developed states and a northern tier of less developed, authoritarian single-party dominant regimes in South-East Asia. Moreover, given China's emerging political and economic importance to the region, such a strategy would, as if by an invisible hand, draw the more authoritarian ASEAN states into China's less than democratic embrace. This article concludes that rather than strengthening democracy, ASEAN's charter needs urgently to reinforce practices of rule governance and mechanisms of market integration to enhance both ASEAN's economic profile as well as the region's autonomy.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area

Richard Stubbs

The ASEAN alternative? Ideas, institutions and the challenge to 'global' governance

in *Pacific Review (The)* , Volume 21, Issue 4 , 451 - 468

Over the last 40 years ASEAN has developed a set of goals and norms with regard to the conduct of regional and international relations that provide an alternative paradigm to the dominant contemporary Western liberal approach to 'global' governance. ASEAN's alternative paradigm is rooted in Asia's cultures and the region's colonial and Cold War experiences. Using an historical institutionalist approach, the analysis details the paradigm's central features - the importance of neutrality; sovereignty and territorial integrity; the peaceful settlement of disputes; informal, non-confrontational negotiations; and the promotion of domestic stability and social harmony - which together underscore the importance of state autonomy and non-interference in the affairs of other states. The paradigm's influence in global affairs has increased markedly in recent years, most notably as the ASEAN-China linkage has matured and China has given its strong support to ASEAN's approach to the conduct of international relations. This turn of events suggests that the ASEAN paradigm presents a significant challenge to Western hopes for a common approach to 'global' governance.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area

Hansen, Flemming Splidsboel

The Shanghai Co-operation Organisation

in *Asian Affairs*, Volume 39 Issue 2 , 217 - 232

No abstract available



Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area

Dushni Weerakoon; Jayanthi Thennakoon

The South Asian Free Trade Agreement

in *Journal of South Asian Development (The)*, Volume 3, No. 1, June

The South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA), due to have been implemented starting July 2006, has adopted a negative list approach permitting member countries to potentially exclude a substantial share of intraregional trade from the tariff liberalisation process. This study finds that the excluded trade amounts to nearly 53 per cent of current import trade amongst South Asian countries, bringing into question the future prospects for meaningful economic cooperation under a regional framework. At the very least, if the SAFTA treaty had built on the existing bilateral FTAs in the region, it would eventually have come to supersede such agreements. Unfortunately, the regional initiative has lagged well behind the bilateral process, and is likely to be overtaken by alternative strategic trade policy initiatives cropping up in the region. It seems likely that attempts at economic integration of the South Asian region under the SAARC framework is liable to fragment.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area

Ravenhill John

The move to preferential trade on the Western Pacific Rim: some initial conclusions

in *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 62, n. 2 / June , 129-150

Since the turn of the century the Asia-Pacific region has become the most active location for the negotiation of preferential trade agreements (PTAs)—a dramatic change from the period before the financial crises of 1997-98. Substantial variance in scope exists among the more than 80 PTAs currently being implemented, negotiated or which are under study in the region. Those involving the United States are by far the most comprehensive. At the other end of the spectrum are those involving ASEAN and China, which are largely 'aspirational' in their provisions. This variance points to the range of economic and political objectives that PTAs serve. Regardless of the comprehensiveness of their coverage, the overall economic effects of the new PTAs is likely to be small given the prevailing low level of tariffs, the intervention of other factors such as fluctuating exchange rates, the proliferation of agreements (which removes the advantages they accord individual partners), and the unwillingness of governments to liberalise 'sensitive' sectors. Few of the agreements move substantially beyond existing WTO provisions. The proliferation of PTAs not only has tended to shift attention and resources away from negotiations at the global level but also runs the risk of fragmenting the 'pro-liberalisation' coalition in countries that have signed multiple agreements.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area

Maryanne Kelton

US economic statecraft in East Asia



in **International Relations of the Asia-Pacific**, Volume 8, Number 2, May , 149-174

Linkage politics in the US were revived after the terrorist attacks in 2001 as the US endeavored to bolster its position in the international system. This paper examines current US economic statecraft in East Asia, particularly through the use of the preferential trade agreement instrument. As the US encounters increasing threats in the region through China's economic and military expansion, the emergence of Islamic militancy, and continuing tensions on the Korean peninsula, it is attempting to reinforce its strategic position through the economic reinforcement of its bilateral politico-military alliances. However, as the establishment of its recent free trade agreements has revealed, neo-mercantilist politics, as motivated by US Congressional attention to domestic lobbying, present a risk to this strategy. It is possible that this tendency to economic nationalism, as evidenced in the Australia–US Free Trade Agreement, will detract from the broader purpose of reinforcing the US strategic position in the region.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area

Feinberg Richard

Voluntary multilateralism and institutional modification: The first two decades of Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)

in **Review of International Organizations (The)** , n. 3, vol. 3, september , 239-258

ABSTRACT: The voluntary multilateralism and consequent institutional weaknesses that have characterized Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) since its inception in 1989 are explained by the multiple geo-political fractures that characterize the Asia Pacific, as well as bureaucratic constraints and the missed opportunities to incorporate civil society. The history of APEC is the on-going creative struggle between ambitious multilateralists and national-sovereignty realists. While APEC has fallen short of its most ambitious goals, it has achieved some notable results in the cognitive diffusion of values and information, policy innovation to promote economic integration, and institutional modification in response to trial-and-error learning and to global shocks. The normative conclusions suggest additional institutional reforms and substantive agendas consistent with a flexible, evolving voluntary multilateralism.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area

Zhang Zhaoyong , Sato Kiyotaka

Whither A Currency Union in Greater China?

in **Open Economies Review**, Volume 19, Number 3 , 355-370

The paper attempts to evaluate the prospect of creating a currency union in the “Greater China” economic area. Despite of the political deadlock and military confrontation in the Taiwan Strait, the Greater China area has experienced rapid and spontaneous regional integration in the past decades as a result of increasingly cross-border trade, foreign direct investment (FDI), technology contracts, and other arrangements in accordance with changes in comparative advantage and industrial upgrading in these economies. In this study, we focus on the symmetry in shocks that is perceived as one of the major preconditions of a currency union. In contrast to the previous studies, we investigate the time-varying correlation of supply, REER and monetary shocks by using the Kalman filter technique to assess the dynamic changes in structural similarity and convergence among the Greater China economies. We also examine the costs of forming a currency union in the area due to the loss of monetary autonomy in each economy. Our results suggest that there is a



rising structural symmetry between the Greater China economies, and this area has become increasingly a better candidate for a monetary union.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Joerges Christian

Integration through de-legalisation?

in *European Law Review*, Vol. 33, n. 3 , 291-312

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Demesmay Claire

L'Allemagne face à l'Europe de Nicolas Sarkozy

in *Politique Etrangère*, n. 2 -été

Le « retour » promis de la France en Europe était d'abord attendu par l'Allemagne. Le rôle de Nicolas Sarkozy dans la négociation finale du traité de Lisbonne a paru de bon augure. Reste pourtant pour Berlin un doute: Paris sera-t-il un partenaire fiable ou fera-t-il cavalier seul? Et plusieurs questions: la France prendra-t-elle le chemin de véritables réformes économiques internes, et acceptera-t-elle que son projet méditerranéen réintègre pleinement la logique européenne

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Schwarzer Daniela

La présidence française de l'Union européenne

in *Politique Etrangère*, n. 2 -été

La France s'est fixé un ambitieux programme pour sa présidence de l'UE. Mais au-delà des priorités affichées (PESD, immigration, énergie, réforme de la PAC, etc.), Paris devra présider à la mise en place institutionnelle et politique du traité de Lisbonne ratifié. Ceci ne pourra se faire qu'en jouant de multiples partenariats, en particulier avec l'Allemagne. L'expérience de la dernière présidence de l'UE par l'Allemagne peut d'ailleurs fournir à Paris nombre d'enseignements utiles.

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Subsection 6. The European unification process

Szamuely Helen

"Do you like the EU?" − The pollsters' puzzling conclusions

in *Europe's World*, Issue 9, Summer



Eurobarometer's findings when measuring opinion in the EU can produce misleading results, warns Helen Szamuely of the UK's Bruges Group think-tank. She traces the confusions in public opinion between "European values" and the EU itself.

<http://www.europesworld.org/EWSettings/Article/tabid/191/ArticleType/articleview/ArticleID/20557/Default.aspx>

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Ciampi Carlo Azeglio

"Non sono sogni vani"

in *Rivista di Studi Politici Internazionali*, Volume 75, n. 2, aprile-giugno , 265-271

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Kassim Hussein

'Mission impossible', but mission accomplished: the Kinnock reforms and the European Commission

in *Journal of European Public Policy* , Volume 15 Issue 5 2008 , 648 - 668

The Kinnock reforms have unsurprisingly attracted attention, but important aspects have been overlooked in existing accounts. Closer inspection reveals three puzzles: an atypical pattern of administrative change, where a 'big bang' reform followed four decades of inaction; the adoption of a more radical set of measures by the Commission than was demanded of it; and the successful implementation of a far-reaching reform programme in defiance of the expectations of leading theories of administrative change. This article argues that these puzzles contradict the conclusion suggested by a casual reading of the developments. They reveal not an arrogant institution oblivious to its shortcomings and forced to change by external diktat, but an organization in a reform predicament: aware of its failings, but unable to remedy them through its own action. When crisis forced member governments to intervene, the Commission in a case of self-reform under delegation seized the 'once-in-a-generation' opportunity to implement an internal reform agenda.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Müller Jan-Werner

A European Constitutional Patriotism? The Case Restated

in *European law journal*, September 2008 - Volume 14 Issue 5 , 542-557

Especially since the failure of the European Constitutional Treaty, the idea of a European constitutional patriotism has become subject to ever more intense criticism. This article argues that many of the criticisms of the idea of a European constitutional patriotism have been based on philosophical misunderstandings (both of the notion of constitutional patriotism as such, and of the role it could play in Europe) or rely on implausible empirical claims. Accordingly, the normative idea of constitutional patriotism is first clarified; second, the article discusses some of the most common normative and empirical traps when trying to 'transfer' constitutional patriotism from a domestic nation-state context to



the supranational level, as well as the tendency to overburden constitutional patriotism with expectations of solidarity and deliberative democracy; third, an EU-specific post-sovereign, pluralist version of constitutional patriotism is defended against critics who see even such a vision as insufficiently sensitive to value pluralism and cultural diversity.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Knudsen Ann-Christina, Rasmussen Morten

A European political system in the making 1958-1970. The Relevance of Emerging Committee Structures
in *Journal of European Integration History*, vol. 14, n. 1 , 51-67

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Gillingham John

A Theoretical Vacuum: European Integration and Historical Research Today
in *Journal of European Integration History*, vol. 14, n. 1 , 27-34

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Lavenex Sandra

A governance perspective on the European neighbourhood policy: integration beyond conditionality?
in *Journal of European Public Policy* , Volume 15 Issue 6 2008 , 938-955

Inspired by the experience of Eastern enlargement, much of the academic debate on EU external relations and the European neighbourhood policy conceives of external influence in terms of the Union's ability to induce third countries' adaptation to predetermined EU norms and regulations. This article introduces a more structural perspective on EU external influence that scrutinizes the institutional extension of sector-specific governance frameworks beyond EU membership. Whereas the traditional notion of influence only focuses on the shift of the EU's regulatory boundary, extended governance involves also the opening up of organizational structures within the relevant policy field. These new forms of horizontal flexible integration are made possible through the internal flexibilization of the modes of policy-making within the EU, and, in particular, the advent of network governance. Despite its integrative potential, case studies from three policy sectors also document that, under current circumstances, extended network governance is not void of hegemonic traits.

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Subsection 6. The European unification process

Sedelmeier Ulrich



After conditionality: post-accession compliance with EU law in East Central Europe
in *Journal of European Public Policy* , Volume 15 Issue 6 2008 , 806-825

The European Union's pre-accession conditionality was very effective in prompting the alignment of the post-communist candidate countries with EU law. As the conditional membership incentive was the main factor driving alignment, the changing incentive structure after accession suggests that - ceteris paribus - post-accession compliance with EU law will deteriorate. Data on infringements of EU law allow us a first insight into whether this negative scenario has materialized. The data suggest that, far from constituting an 'eastern problem', virtually all of the new member states outperformed virtually all of the old members during the first four years of membership. To explain this unexpectedly good performance, further research should focus on two factors, both related to the experience of pre-accession conditionality: a greater susceptibility of the new member states to shaming and an institutional investment in legislative capacity.

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Subsection 6. The European unification process

Martinico Giuseppe- Filippo Fontanelli

Alla ricerca della coerenza: le tecniche del del "dialogo nascosto" fra i giudici nell'ordinamento costituzionale multi-livello

in *Rivista trimestrale di diritto pubblico*, n. 2 , 351-388

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Melchionni Maria Grazia

Alle origini dell'Atto unico europeo

in *Rivista di Studi Politici Internazionali*, Volume 75, n. 1, gennaio-marzo , 103-109

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Zahariadis Nikolaos

Ambiguity and choice in European public policy

in *Journal of European Public Policy* , Volume 15 Issue 4 2008

Amending rational institutionalist accounts of EU policy, I use the multiple streams perspective and examples from several policy sectors to explore the impact of two elements of policy choice: policy windows and the dynamics of coupling. I argue that policy outputs are neither exclusively rational nor solely a function of institutional design; rather they depend heavily on a complex interaction between problems, solutions, and politics during fleeting open windows of opportunity. Policy windows pose limitations to rational policy-making by framing the context within which choice is made, while the notion of coupling stresses the impact of entrepreneurial politics and strategies in EU policy-making.



The analysis illuminates the limitations of rationality in explaining policy choice, the role of political power in the absence of institutional hierarchies, and the impact of ideas, institutions, and entrepreneurs in the EU policy process.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Sassatelli Monica

An Interview with Alessandro Ferrara: Europe, Authenticity and Unavailable Identities
in *European Journal of Social Theory*, Volume 11, No. 3, August 2008 , 421-437

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Leczykiewicz Dorota

Analysis and Reflections - Constitutional conflicts and the third pillar
in *European Law Review*, Vol. 33, n. 2 , 230-242

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Guarino Giuseppe

Análisis y crítica del “Eurosistema” desde la perspectiva del Tratado de Lisboa
in *Revista de Derecho Constitucional Europeo* , n. 9

El autor analiza los problemas existentes en la organización del «Eurosistema», que impiden a la Unión Europea estar a la vanguardia mundial tanto en los niveles económico como de innovación y desarrollo tecnológico. Sitúa el problema central en la excesiva rigidez de los criterios de convergencia, que no pueden adaptarse a las cambiantes circunstancias económicas mundiales por estar regulados mediante normas vinculantes de naturaleza constitucional. El problema no es la supuesta incompatibilidad del Estado social con el sistema de libre mercado. El autor, comparando la economía alemana con la estadounidense, demuestra que el gasto social contribuye más al desarrollo que el gasto militar.

La ralentización del crecimiento de la Unión Europea tras la implantación del «Eurosistema» se debe, según Guarino, a varios problemas que se suman a la falta de flexibilidad del sistema comunitario. En primer lugar, a la preponderancia de la estabilidad sobre el crecimiento en la política económica y monetaria del BCE. En segundo, a la escasez de los fondos destinados a la inversión pública con que cuenta la Unión Europea frente a los Estados Unidos y a otros Estados que están a la cabeza del proceso de innovación y tienen fuertes crecimientos (China o India). Y por último, a la división existente en la UE, en la que un gran número de Estados miembros no están ni quieren estar dentro del «Eurosistema».

Siendo el «Eurosistema» un paso más hacia el objetivo principal de la UE que es la integración entre los pueblos de



Europa, dicho objetivo se encuentra en peligro. El autor hace una llamada a que desde la Academia se luche por un nuevo consenso de todos los Estados miembros, para lograr que la UE logre sus objetivos y reencuentre su papel histórico de referente mundial.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Scotti V.R.

Approvata la modifica costituzionale che recepisce il Trattato di Lisbona
in *Diritto pubblico comparato ed europeo*, n. 2 , 615 ss.

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Stumpf Felix, Büchting Markus

Arbeitnehmerrechte im Sinkflug. Wie der europäische Gerichtshof die Gewerkschaftsmacht aushebelt
in *Blätter für deutsche & internationale Politik*, Juni, 2008 , 83-91

Die sogenannte Ruffert-Entscheidung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs (EuGH) vom 3. April 2008 hat für großes Aufsehen gesorgt – leider jedoch fast nur in gewerkschaftlichen Kreisen.¹ Der Europäische Gewerkschaftsbund redet von einem „besorgniserregenden Fall“, nach Auffassung des DGB gefährdet der EuGH „den sozialen Frieden in Europa“, und die IG Bau sieht darin gar einen „Schritt hin zum Raubtierkapitalismus“. Tatsächlich geht die Bedeutung der Entscheidung weit über ...

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Subsection 6. The European unification process

Christiansen Thomas, Vanhoonhacker Sophie

At a critical juncture? Change and continuity in the institutional development of the council secretariat
in *West European Politics*, vol. 31, n. 4, july , 751-770

ABSTRACT: This article provides a historical institutionalist perspective on the General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers-an institution that has expanded significantly over the course of the integration process and whose role in the institutional politics of the EU has been recognised as significant in the recent literature on the subject. Charting the history of the institution, we demonstrate the way in which the original institutional design contributed to a particular trajectory which can be understood as a 'path-dependent' development. However, we also identify recent developments which can be seen as a break with the historical legacy of the Secretariat-an observation which raises the question as to whether the institution is at a critical juncture in its development. The article closes with an examination of the present and future challenges the Council Secretariat is facing at this time.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process



Priebe Reinhard

Beitrittsperspektive und Verfassungsreformen in den Ländern des Westlichen Balkans
in *Europarecht*, volume 43, issue 3, 2008 , 301-319

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Moore Carolyn

Beyond Conditionality? Regions from the New EU Member States and their Activities in Brussels
in *Comparative European Politics*, n. 2, vol. 6, july , 212-234

ABSTRACT: Even before the 2004 European Union (EU) enlargement, regional authorities from Poland and the Czech Republic began establishing regional representative offices in Brussels alongside their counterparts from 'old' member states. Today, only a handful of regions from these new member states have not opened some form of representative bureau in the city. As informal institutions, regional representations never formed any part of EU 'conditionality' on accession; however, by drawing on the experience of regions from the EU15, through a process of 'lesson-drawing' institutional import, the new regional actors in Poland and the Czech Republic have moved to adopt this model of regional engagement. This article finds that the motivations for opening these offices come from the regions themselves, with encouragement from partner regions across the EU ('bottom up' impetus) rather than being promoted by Commission incentives or national governments' encouragement ('top down' impetus). This highlights the fundamental importance of a Brussels presence within any region's strategy of engaging with Europe.

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Subsection 6. The European unification process

Epstein Rachel A., Sedelmeier Ulrich

Beyond conditionality: international institutions in postcommunist Europe after enlargement
in *Journal of European Public Policy* , Volume 15 Issue 6 2008 , 795 - 805

According to the dominant incentive-based explanation, European Union (EU) conditionality has been particularly effective when the EU offered a credible membership incentive and when incumbent governments did not consider the domestic costs of compliance threatening to their hold on power. However, after the EU's eastern enlargement the influence of international institutions could then be expected to decrease in three different contexts: (i) the new member states after accession; (ii) the current candidate countries; and (iii) the postcommunist countries in the European neighbourhood policy. Yet although the incentive-based explanation receives support in some issue areas, in others, external influence is more enduring than predicted. To the extent that our understanding of the power of incentives is complicated by post-enlargement findings, there are new avenues for research into the full range of mechanisms that international institutions have at their disposal for influencing target states.

Section C) Regional integration processes



Subsection 6. The European unification process

Suvarierol Semin

Beyond the myth of nationality: Analysing networks within the European commission
in *West European Politics*, vol. 31, n. 4, July, 701-724

ABSTRACT: Literature on the European Commission refers to the influence of nationality in the functioning of the Commission and, in particular, to the reliance on networks based on nationality, but it fails to provide much evidence apart from anecdotes. This empirical study takes a systematic approach by applying concepts from organisational network analysis to examine the networking patterns of Commission officials and to explore the effect of nationality therein. The data clearly show that nationality is not a significant factor in shaping officials' task-related informal networks. While variables related to nationality and socialisation fail to explain the variation, the size of the member state in terms of the number of officials it has and whether the contacts occur within the Directorate-General determine whether an official relies on compatriots for information and advice. The organisational structure of the Commission renders nationality irrelevant for its daily work.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Louis Jean-Victor

Bilan d'une réforme. De l'Acte unique européen à la CIG 2007
in *Cahiers de Droit Européen*, n. 5-6, 559 - 572

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Balint Tim, Bauer Michael, Knill Christoph

Bureaucratic change in the European administrative space: The case of the European commission
in *West European Politics*, vol. 31, n. 4, July, 677-700

ABSTRACT: In this article, we compare bureaucratic change in the European Commission with developments in the public administrations of the member states of the European Union using two standard features of the study of comparative public administration: the degree of politicisation of the higher management and the degree of openness of the career system. The empirical data shows that the Commission started as a public administration in the Continental tradition and over time partially moved towards the Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian models. At the same time, the majority of the member states remained rather stable with regard to their position along the two administrative dimensions under study. We argue that none of the mechanisms commonly invoked to explain organisational change-functional adaptation, path dependency, isomorphism or policy windows-can convincingly account for the complete pattern and the magnitude of change that we observe in the case of the European Commission. While we find no convincing support for the relevance of functional adaptation or path dependency, the concepts of isomorphism and policy windows provide a more promising basis for understanding at least some aspects of the empirical development.

Section C) Regional integration processes



Subsection 6. The European unification process

de Ayala José Enrique

Carta de Europa. Malos tiempos para la UE
in *Política Exterior*, 125

A la paralización institucional provocada por el rechazo del Tratado de Lisboa en el referéndum irlandés, hay que sumar una profunda crisis económica –probablemente la más grave desde hace décadas– así como una cierta regresión de los valores y de los avances sociales causada por determinadas políticas, tanto nacionales como comunitarias, que ponen en cuestión algunos aspectos del modelo europeo.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Bini Smaghi Lorenzo

Central Bank Independence in the EU: From Theory to Practice
in *European law journal*, July 2008 - Volume 14 Issue 4 - , 446-460

This article provides an overview of the practical problems which arise in ensuring the effective independence of central banks in the EU, drawing on the European Central Bank's consultative experience. Four aspects of central bank independence are discussed separately: functional, institutional, personal and financial. The possible issues raised by central bank involvement in prudential supervision are touched upon. The main conclusion of the article is that a set of legal provisions is generally not sufficient to ensure proper central bank independence; a culture of respect for independence, including its limits, among all parties involved is essential.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Hartley Keith

Collaboration and European Defence Industrial Policy
in *Defence and Peace Economics*, Volume 19 Issue 4 August 2008 , pages 303 – 315

Traditionally, the EU has protected its national defence industries (through Article 296). There are now policy initiatives to create a European defence equipment market (EDEM) and a European defence technology and industrial base (EDTIB). This article assesses these policy initiatives. It considers the EU as an inefficient defence market and also considers the opportunities for creating an efficient defence industrial policy. Collaboration has been a distinctive feature of European defence industrial policy and a case study of the Typhoon is presented and assessed. Finally, criteria for assessing the strengths and weaknesses of the EDTIB are presented.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Hurelmann Achim

Constructing Multilevel Legitimacy in the European Union: A Study of British and German Media Discourse
in *Comparative European Politics*, n. 2, vol. 6, july , 190-211



ABSTRACT: While normative debates about the legitimacy of the European Union (EU) have reached a high level of sophistication, we know considerably less about the Union's legitimacy in an empirical sense, that is, about the ways in which its institutions are assessed in the population. This article argues that the survey-oriented methods commonly used to study such assessments have a number of deficiencies, and that they should therefore be complemented by research that focuses on political communication. One advantage of this approach is that it can better map constructions of multilevel legitimacy: assessments that establish linkages between the legitimacy of the EU and that of its member states. This article demonstrates the utility of this approach by examining media debates in Great Britain and Germany. It sheds new light on the construction of legitimating and delegitimizing assessments of EU institutions, on the criteria used in them, as well as on the ways in which evaluations of the EU are related to evaluations of its member states.

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Subsection 6. The European unification process

Münch Richard

Constructing a European Society by Jurisdiction

in *European law journal*, September 2008 - Volume 14 Issue 5 , 519-541

From a sociological point of view, European integration is specifically a process of transforming deeper structures of solidarity, legal order and justice away from the segmentally differentiated European family of nations and towards an emerging European society. This transformation is the subject matter to be explained (explanandum) in this article by a set of mutually supporting explanatory factors (explanans) with the example of jurisdiction by the European Court of Justice: (1) establishing formal legitimate power of European jurisdiction in order to complement and form the driving force of international labour division: preliminary reference, supremacy and direct effect of European law; (2) establishing a substantial conception of control in the field of legal discourse: free movement and non-discrimination; (3) enforcing a genuinely European legal order against national varieties of law by establishing a dominant European legal community; (4) making transnational sense of legal change by legitimating Europeanised law in terms of advancing justice as equality of opportunity across and within nations, as opposed to equality of results within nations accompanied by inequality of opportunity across nations.

Section C) Regional integration processes

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Amato Giuliano

Dalla Convenzione al Trattato di Lisbona

in *Rivista di Studi Politici Internazionali*, Volume 75, n. 1, gennaio-marzo , 110-115

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Breuer Marten

Das Recht auf Individualbeschwerde zum EGMR im Spannungsfeld zwischen Subsidiarität und Einzelfallgerechtigkeit



in *Europäische Grundrechte zeitschrift*, issue 6-9, vol. 35 , 121-125

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Dehousse Renaud

Delegation of powers in the European union: The need for a multi-principals model

in *West European Politics*, vol. 31, n. 4, july , 789-805

ABSTRACT: Whereas a principal-agent model has widely been used to analyse the establishment of manifold autonomous agencies at the European level, it fails to capture some key elements of this process, such as the recurrent inter-institutional struggle of agency institutional design or the Commission's basic ambivalence vis--vis independent regulators. In contrast, acknowledging the absence of a clearly defined principal in the EU enables us to understand the relative weakness of existing agencies and the multiplicity of controls to which they are subjected. In such a system, strong EU regulators are unlikely to be established.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Karlsson Christer

Deliberation at the European Convention: The Final Verdict

in *European law journal*, September 2008 - Volume 14 Issue 5 , 604-619

Negotiations in Amsterdam 1996 and Nice 2000 resulted in deadlocks impossible to break. The failure of these Intergovernmental Conferences gave rise to demands for a new and improved process of treaty reform. The answer offered by the European Council in Laeken was to create a Convention with a mandate to prepare the next reform of the treaties. The broad composition of this Convention raised hopes for a process not exclusively defined by bargaining on behalf of national interests, but rather a more open process where actors would be prepared to listen to each other's arguments. Today, we find two divergent images of deliberation in this body. The first sees the Convention as a deliberative success story; the second argues bargaining dominated the proceedings. However, this far the empirical evidence in support of either claim has been inconclusive. On the basis of interviews with 28 conventioners, this article ventures a 'final verdict' on the matter, arguing that deliberation was, indeed, a defining characteristic of the proceedings.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Hurrelmann Achim

Demokratie in der Europäischen Union: Eine Bestandsaufnahme

in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, Band 32, 2008

Quelle:



<http://www.bpb.de/publikationen/EGO7ST.html>

Demokratie in der Europäischen Union: Eine Bestandsaufnahme
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Einleitung

Als Joschka Fischer im Mai 2000 mit seiner Rede in der Berliner Humboldt-Universität die europäische Verfassungsdebatte eröffnete, stellte er den Begriff der "Finalität" europäischer Integration in den Mittelpunkt: Nach fünfzig Jahren der Integration in kleinen Schritten, so Fischer, sei es nun an der Zeit, sich über den Endzustand des Integrationswerks Gedanken zu machen.[1] Acht Jahre später, nach dem spektakulären Scheitern des Verfassungsprojekts und der erneuten Ablehnung des Nachfolgevertrags von Lissabon im irischen Referendum am 12. Juni 2008, sind groß angelegte Konzepte über den Zielzustand der EU aus der Mode gekommen. In der politischen und wissenschaftlichen Europadiskussion hat ein neuer Pragmatismus Einzug gehalten.

Zur Person

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Zumindest vorerst muss die EU auf Grundlage der umständlichen Regeln des Vertrags von Nizza weiter funktionieren. Selbst wenn der Lissabonvertrag noch in Kraft treten sollte, dürfte er auf absehbare Zeit die letzte grundlegende Reform des europäischen Vertragswerks gewesen sein. Weitergehende Visionen sind nicht länger Gegenstand öffentlicher Debatten.

Die Ratifizierungskrise des Lissabonvertrags ist vor diesem Hintergrund ein Anlass, die Frage nach dem Demokratiedefizit der EU erneut aufzuwerfen: Verfestigt sich durch die Reformunfähigkeit der EU ein Gemeinwesen, in dem technokratische Regulierung und intergouvernementales Verhandeln die Selbstbestimmung der Bürgerinnen und Bürger so weit zurückdrängen, dass nicht mehr als ein bedeutungsloses Frustventil in Gestalt der Europawahlen übrig bleibt? Oder ist die Union demokratischer als ihr Ruf? Welche Demokratisierungsschritte brächte der Lissabonvertrag,



welche wären darüber hinaus noch denkbar? Mein Beitrag wendet sich diesen Fragen in drei Schritten zu: Zunächst gibt er einen Überblick über die bestehenden Möglichkeiten demokratischer Einflussnahme in der EU; dann bewertet er, inwiefern diese defizitär zu nennen sind; schließlich diskutiert er Potenziale für eine weitere Demokratisierung europäischer Politik.

Drei Kanäle demokratischer Einflussnahme

Zu Beginn einer Analyse über Demokratie in der EU sollte man sich klar machen, dass die Union keineswegs das undemokratische Monstrum ist, als das sie in bestimmten euroskeptischen Diskursen dargestellt wird. Vielmehr existieren eine ganze Reihe von Verfahren, über die die Bürgerinnen und Bürger Einfluss auf EU-Entscheidungen nehmen können. Drei Kanäle demokratischer Einflussnahme sind zu unterscheiden:

(a) Der offensichtlichste Kanal verläuft über das direkt gewählte Europäische Parlament, das ausdrücklich konzipiert ist zur Repräsentation der Bürgerinnen und Bürger auf europäischer Ebene. Die Kompetenzen des Parlaments bei der Verabschiedung europäischer Rechtsakte sind in den vergangenen Vertragsreformen stetig ausgeweitet worden, und der Lissabonvertrag sieht eine weitere Ausweitung vor. In den meisten Politikbereichen ist das Parlament mittlerweile im Mitentscheidungsverfahren am Gesetzgebungsprozess beteiligt, was bedeutet, dass gegen seinen Willen kein Rechtsakt zustande kommen kann.

Wo unterscheiden sich die Kompetenzen des Europäischen Parlaments überhaupt noch von denen nationaler Parlamente? Erstens kann es Rechtsakte nicht formell initiieren; dies ist das Monopol der Europäischen Kommission. Zweitens gibt es nach wie vor Bereiche, in denen es nicht die volle Gesetzgebungskompetenz besitzt, sondern vom Ministerrat überstimmt werden kann. Auch bei Inkrafttreten des Lissabonvertrags gälte dies etwa für die Steuerharmonisierung, die Gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik, sowie bestimmte Bereiche der Innen- und Justizpolitik. Drittens hat das Parlament nur eingeschränkte Befugnisse hinsichtlich der Wahl und Kontrolle der Europäischen Kommission: Zwar muss es die Kommission mehrheitlich bestätigen, es kann aber keinen direkten Einfluss auf die Nominierung ihrer Mitglieder nehmen und eine einmal ins Amt gewählte Kommission nur mit Zweidrittelmehrheit abwählen.

Diese Kompetenzmängel des Europäischen Parlaments sind aber nicht das Hauptproblem dieses Kanals demokratischer Einflussnahme. Vielmehr ist es vor allem der Charakter der Europawahlen, der einen Schatten auf die demokratische Qualität des Parlaments wirft. In Europawahlen treten nationale Parteien an, die Wahlkämpfe sind dominiert durch nationale Themen, und die Wählerinnen und Wähler nutzen diese Wahlen vor allem zur Abrechnung mit nationalen Regierungen (wenn sie sich überhaupt beteiligen).

Karlheinz Reif und Hermann Schmitt haben die Europawahlen daher schon zu Beginn der 1980er Jahre als "Wahlen zweiter Ordnung" beschrieben, und diese Analyse behält nach wie vor ihre Gültigkeit.[2] Das bedeutet, dass die Europaparlamentarierinnen und -parlamentarier ganz überwiegend aufgrund von Erwägungen gewählt werden, die wenig mit ihrer späteren Rolle als Mitgesetzgeber auf europäischer Ebene zu tun haben. Es ist fraglich, ob das Europäische Parlament unter diesen Bedingungen wirklich als demokratischer Repräsentant der Bürgerinnen und Bürger funktionieren kann.

(b) Der zweite Kanal demokratischer Einflussnahme in der EU verläuft über nationale Wahlen, nationale Parlamente und nationale Regierungen hin zum EU-Ministerrat, der als Entscheidungszentrum noch machtvoller ist als das Parlament.



Dieser Mechanismus mitgliedstaatlicher Repräsentation ermöglicht die demokratische Einflussnahme der Bürgerinnen und Bürger über politische Prozesse in den Mitgliedstaaten, jenseits des Europäischen Parlaments.

Auch hier ergeben sich Probleme. Erstens spielen EU-bezogene Themen auch bei nationalen Wahlen keine wichtige Rolle, und sie werden in den Medien nicht mit größerer Breitenwirkung diskutiert. Zweitens haben mitgliedstaatliche Regierungen selbst bei Themen, die in der Öffentlichkeit Interesse erregen, einen großen Handlungsspielraum im Ministerrat. Denn nationale Parlamente, die Kerninstitutionen mitgliedstaatlicher Demokratie, haben oft Probleme, Entscheidungsverfahren auf EU-Ebene nachzuvollziehen und schrecken zudem davor zurück, die eigene Regierung durch allzu detaillierte Vorgaben im Prozess der Aushandlung europäischer Rechtsnormen einzuschränken.[3] Wenn das Verhandlungsergebnis den Wünschen wichtiger Wählergruppen nicht entspricht, kann die Schuld immer noch auf andere europäische Regierungen geschoben werden; schließlich werden Entscheidungen im Ministerrat meist mit qualifizierter Mehrheit getroffen. Auch der Kanal mitgliedstaatlicher Repräsentation stellt also nicht sicher, dass die Präferenzen der Bürgerinnen und Bürger tatsächlich Eingang in europäische Entscheidungen finden.

(c) Neben dem Europäischen Parlament und nationalen politischen Prozessen verläuft ein dritter Kanal demokratischer Einflussnahme über die europäische Zivilgesellschaft, die besonders von der Europäischen Kommission gezielt in EU-Entscheidungsprozesse eingebunden wird. Viele Autorinnen und Autoren erkennen ein erhebliches demokratisches Potenzial in solchen Verfahren der policy-spezifischen, funktionellen Repräsentation, die die von einer Entscheidung betroffenen Interessengruppen frühzeitig beteiligen.[4]

Auch bei diesem Einflusskanal ist zweifelhaft, ob er eine unverzerrte Verbindung zwischen den Präferenzen der Bürgerinnen und Bürger und EU-Entscheidungen sicherstellt. Erstens sind die von der Kommission konsultierten Interessenvertreter in aller Regel professionelle Lobbyistinnen und Lobbyisten, deren Positionen nicht unbedingt eine Abbildung gesellschaftlicher Interessen darstellen. Zweitens bleibt es letztlich der Kommission überlassen, wie sie auf die im Konsultationsprozess zum Ausdruck gekommenen Positionen tatsächlich reagiert.

Positionen zum europäischen Demokratiedefizit

Jeder der drei Kanäle europäischer Demokratie ist also mit spezifischen Problemen behaftet. Stellt ihr Zusammenspiel trotzdem ein angemessenes Maß an Demokratie sicher? Eine Antwort auf diese Frage hängt davon ab, wie man Demokratie definiert. In der gegenwärtigen wissenschaftlichen Diskussion argumentieren vor allem Vertreterinnen und Vertreter zweier Stränge der Demokratietheorie gegen die These eines Demokratiedefizits der EU:

Erstens ist die sogenannte "realistische" Demokratietheorie zu nennen, die in der EU-bezogenen Diskussion vor allem von Giandomenico Majone und Andrew Moravcsik vertreten wird.[5] Für beide bedeutet Demokratie in erster Linie die Verhinderung von Machtmissbrauch. Gemessen an diesem Kriterium ist die EU demokratisch, denn die konsensorientierte Form der Entscheidungsfindung und die Vielzahl von Vetospielern stellen sicher, dass Macht zahlreichen Kontrollen und Beschränkungen unterliegt.

Zweitens kommen auch einige Vertreterinnen und Vertreter der deliberativen Demokratietheorie, etwa Charles Sabel und Klaus Eder, zu einem positiven Fazit über die demokratische Qualität der EU.[6] Dies mag überraschen, denn die deliberative Demokratietheorie, geprägt von Jürgen Habermas, gilt gemeinhin als besonders anspruchsvoll. Viele EU-bezogene Anwendungen interpretieren die Theorie jedoch in einer wenig anspruchsvollen Weise: Demokratie bedeutet für sie die Existenz von Verfahren, die sicherstellen, dass alle relevanten Argumente für oder gegen bestimmte



Entscheidungen abgewogen werden können; während es zweitrangig ist, ob alle Bürgerinnen und Bürger selbst Zugang zu solchen Abwägungsprozessen haben. Aus dieser Perspektive betrachtet ist die EU demokratisch, weil an ihren Entscheidungen eine Vielzahl von Akteuren beteiligt sind - die EU-Bürokratie, nationale Regierungen, nationale und europäische Parlamente, Interessengruppen usw. -, die sehr unterschiedliche Perspektiven einbringen.

Aus meiner Sicht beruhen diese Positionen jedoch auf einer verkürzten Konzeption von Demokratie. Denn Demokratie sollte mindestens zweierlei bedeuten: Erstens müssen alle Bürgerinnen und Bürger die Möglichkeit haben, an Prozessen der kollektiven Selbstbestimmung als Gleiche zu partizipieren - und das bedeutet auch, nach dem Prinzip *one person, one vote* an Entscheidungen mitzuwirken.[7] Zweitens müssen die Bürgerinnen und Bürger politische Eliten für deren Verhalten rechenschaftspflichtig machen können (im Englischen spricht man von *accountability*), und das beinhaltet, dass man Entscheidungsträger gegebenenfalls durch Abwahl sanktionieren kann.[8]

Die Grenzen der Demokratie in der EU werden deutlich, wenn man die drei Kanäle demokratischer Einflussnahme an diesen Kriterien misst. In den ersten beiden Kanälen - Europäisches Parlament und mitgliedstaatliche Politik - ist durch allgemeine und gleiche Wahlen auf europäischer und nationaler Ebene immerhin die gleiche Partizipation der Bürgerinnen und Bürger sichergestellt, auch wenn der substanzielle Einfluss dieser Partizipation auf die letztlich erzielten Politikergebnisse zweifelhaft sein mag.

Probleme ergeben sich jedoch insbesondere hinsichtlich der Gewährleistung von Rechenschaftspflicht. Bei Mitgliedern des Europäischen Parlamentes wird diese dadurch unterminiert, dass es in Europawahlen in aller Regel gar nicht um deren Beitrag zu europäischen Entscheidungen geht, sondern um nationale Politik. Bei mitgliedstaatlichen Regierungen ist die Rechenschaftspflicht für die im Ministerrat getroffenen Entscheidungen ebenfalls begrenzt, da sich intergouvernementale Verhandlungsprozesse wie geschildert einer Kontrolle durch nationale Parlamente und Öffentlichkeiten oft entziehen.

Beim dritten Kanal demokratischer Einflussnahme, der funktionellen Repräsentation von Interessen durch die europäische Zivilgesellschaft, ist sogar keines der beiden Demokratiekriterien erfüllt: Die Beteiligung von Interessenverbänden und zivilgesellschaftlichen Organisationen in den Konsultationsverfahren der Europäischen Kommission gewährleistet keine gleichgewichtige Partizipation aller Bürgerinnen und Bürger. Rechenschaftspflicht ist ebenfalls nicht sichergestellt, denn die Kommission ist nicht verpflichtet, die Positionen der konsultierten Gruppen tatsächlich in Entscheidungsvorschläge einfließen zu lassen.

Eine zusätzliche Komplikation ergibt sich daraus, dass die meisten Entscheidungen in der EU nicht von einer der drei Kerninstitutionen - Parlament, Ministerrat und Kommission - allein getroffen, sondern zwischen den drei Institutionen ausgehandelt werden. Das hat den Vorteil, dass für ein und dieselbe Entscheidung alle drei Kanäle demokratischer Einflussnahme relevant werden können. Der Nachteil ist jedoch, dass die wichtigsten Streitfragen europäischer Politik letztlich erst in Vermittlungsverfahren zwischen den drei Institutionen entschieden werden - hinter verschlossenen Türen und in Verfahren, die weder die direkte Partizipation der Bürgerinnen und Bürger noch die Herstellung von Rechenschaftspflicht ermöglichen. Mit anderen Worten: Wenn es wirklich ernst wird, halten politische Eliten in der EU das Heft fest in der Hand. All dies bedeutet nicht, dass sie ohne Kontrolle schalten und walten können: Parlament, Ministerrat und Kommission kontrollieren sich gegenseitig, und auch die Medien nehmen von der EU mehr Notiz als noch vor wenigen Jahren. Aber wie bereits gesagt: Die Kontrolle von Macht allein bedeutet noch keine Demokratie.

Optionen einer Demokratisierung der EU



Diese Überlegungen führen zu der Frage, welche Möglichkeiten es gibt, um dem europäischen Demokratiedefizit abzuhelpfen. Welche Veränderungen sieht der Lissabonvertrag in dieser Hinsicht vor? Welche weiteren Optionen wurden in diesem Vertrag nicht aufgegriffen? Erneut ist es sinnvoll, die drei Kanäle demokratischer Einflussnahme zu betrachten:

(a) Wie die bisherige Analyse gezeigt hat, kann die Rechenschaftspflicht europäischer Entscheidungsträger über das Europäische Parlament nur dann effektiver sichergestellt werden, wenn die Bürgerinnen und Bürger ihr Partizipationsverhalten ändern. Denn letztlich hängt es von den Wählerinnen und Wählern ab, ob Europawahlen Wahlen zweiter Ordnung bleiben, oder ob Parteien gezwungen werden, Europawahlkämpfe über europäische Themen zu führen. Für ein besseres Funktionieren des Europäischen Parlamentes als demokratischer Vertretung der Bürgerinnen und Bürger kommt es also weniger auf institutionelle Reformen an als auf die Ausbildung europäischer Identitäten und eines europäischen politischen Interesses in der Bevölkerung. Wenn dies gelänge, wäre die volle Parlamentarisierung der EU möglich - das Europäische Parlament könnte auf Kosten der anderen Einflusskanäle wirklich zur zentralen Institution europäischer Demokratie werden.

Lässt sich auf eine solche Europäisierung von Identitäten und Verhaltensmustern der Bürgerinnen und Bürger gezielt Einfluss nehmen? Die gescheiterte Europäische Verfassung war ein Versuch, genau das zu tun: ein Projekt der Identitätsbildung. Der Name "Verfassung", die wertgeladene Sprache der Präambel, die Verfassungsartikel über die Ziele, Werte und Symbole der Union, der prominente Platz der Grundrechtecharta - all dies sollte die Konturen der EU als politisches Gemeinwesen deutlicher machen, mithin ihre "Finalität" zumindest grob skizzieren, und der Verfassung selbst eine Rolle als Bezugspunkt für ein stärkeres europäisches Bürgerbewusstsein sichern.[9]

Das Scheitern der Verfassung zeigt die Grenzen einer solchen Identitätsbildungsstrategie auf: Ein großer Teil der europäischen Bevölkerung ist (noch) nicht bereit, eine mit den klassischen Insignien des Staates auftretende EU zu akzeptieren. Zudem gibt es erhebliche Unterschiede zwischen verschiedenen nationalen Sichtweisen der europäischen Integration und daraus abgeleiteten Erwartungen an die EU. Diese Unterschiede machen es unmöglich, die Merkmale und philosophischen Grundlagen der Union in Verfassungsartikel zu gießen, ohne Widerstände in bestimmten Mitgliedstaaten oder Bevölkerungsgruppen hervorzurufen. Konstitutionelle Prinzipienklärungen sind als Mechanismen der Identitätsbildung daher ungeeignet.

Einige Beobachterinnen und Beobachter halten jedoch eine alternative Strategie zur Identitätsbildung für vielversprechend: Könnte man nicht, so fragen sie, die Kompetenzen des Europäischen Parlaments so radikal ausweiten, dass die Bürgerinnen und Bürger es sich nicht länger leisten können, die Europawahlen zu ignorieren - und somit zwangsläufig europäische Identitäten ausbilden?[10] Dies wäre etwa dadurch möglich, dass man die Europäische Kommission wie in parlamentarischen Regierungssystemen aus der Mehrheit des Europäischen Parlaments bildet und von dessen fortwährender Unterstützung abhängig macht. Während die Kommission derzeit in parteipolitischer Hinsicht gemischt ist, weil nationale Regierungen jeweils Personen der eigenen politischen Richtung nominieren, würde die Kommission dann die Mehrheit des Europäischen Parlaments repräsentieren.

Auch mit Blick auf diese Strategie einer "Identitätsbildung durch Politisierung" ist Skepsis angebracht. Dies gilt erstens aus historischen Gründen: Seit der ersten Direktwahl des Europäischen Parlaments 1979 sind dessen Kompetenzen stetig gewachsen, die Wahlbeteiligung bei Europawahlen ist aber in den meisten Mitgliedstaaten gesunken. Zweitens ist ein wichtiges theoretisches Argument zu berücksichtigen: Angesichts der Schwäche europäischer Identitäten ist es zweifelhaft, ob Mehrheitsentscheidungen in der EU - sei es in Sach- oder in Personalfragen - auch bei der Minderheit



Akzeptanz finden würden. Denn erst das Bewusstsein der Zusammengehörigkeit zwischen Mehrheit und Minderheit stellt sicher, dass solche Entscheidungen von der überstimmten Minderheit nicht als Fremdbestimmung empfunden werden.[11] Vor diesem Hintergrund muss eine Abkehr vom Konsensprinzip nicht notwendigerweise identitätsbildend wirken, sondern könnte im Gegenteil die Basis des europäischen Einigungswerks zerstören.

(b) Bietet der zweite Kanal demokratischer Einflussnahme, der über die nationalen Regierungen und ihre Rolle im Ministerrat verläuft, bessere Bedingungen für eine Demokratisierung der EU? Eine Demokratisierungsstrategie, die hier ansetzt, hat insbesondere einen Vorteil: Die gesellschaftlichen Rahmenbedingungen für Demokratie sind auf der nationalen Ebene besser als auf der europäischen, weil politische Partizipationsformen und Identitäten der Bürgerinnen und Bürger nach wie vor in erster Linie auf den Nationalstaat ausgerichtet sind.

Welche Möglichkeiten gäbe es aber, die demokratische Rechenschaftspflicht von Regierungen für ihr Verhalten im Ministerrat zu stärken? Zwei wichtige Schritte in diese Richtung sind im Lissabonvertrag enthalten: Erstens soll die Transparenz von Verfahren im Ministerrat dadurch erhöht werden, dass der Rat grundsätzlich öffentlich tagt, wenn er in gesetzgeberischer Funktion tätig ist. Zweitens sollen die Kontrollmöglichkeiten nationaler Parlamente ausgeweitet werden, indem ihnen ein besserer Zugang zu Gesetzgebungsdokumenten und die Möglichkeit eines Einspruchs gegen geplante europäische Rechtsakte gewährt werden.

Darüber hinausgehend wären weitere Reformen denkbar, die aber eher auf mitgliedstaatlicher denn auf europäischer Ebene ansetzen müssten. Insbesondere wäre zu überlegen, wie die Kontrolle nationaler Parlamente über das Verhalten ihrer Regierungen im Ministerrat verbessert werden kann - die Möglichkeiten reichen von der Erteilung expliziter Verhandlungsmandate bis zur Beteiligung von Abgeordneten in den nationalen Delegationen.[12] Doch auch hier stößt die Demokratisierung an Grenzen: Wie schon geschildert, brauchen nationale Regierungen, um effektiv verhandeln zu können, einen gewissen Spielraum, der durch Mandatierung nicht allzu sehr eingeengt werden darf. Die Erteilung von realistischen Verhandlungsmandaten wird ferner dadurch erschwert, dass der Ministerrat nach Abschluss der eigenen Entscheidungsfindung zunehmend gezwungen ist, Einvernehmen mit dem Europäischen Parlament herzustellen. Nach dem Abschluss aller Verhandlungen bleibt den nationalen Parlamenten aber nur die extreme - und in der Praxis kaum realistische - Möglichkeit, die eigene Regierung wegen ihrer Verhandlungsführung zu stürzen.

Zudem ist daran zu erinnern, dass alle Reformen zur Erhöhung der Rechenschaftspflicht jeweils nur hinsichtlich der "eigenen" nationalen Regierung greifen können. Wenn im Ministerrat mit qualifizierter Mehrheit entschieden wird, laufen sie ins Leere: Es gibt keine Möglichkeit, die Regierungen anderer Mitgliedstaaten zu sanktionieren, wenn diese die eigene Regierung überstimmen. Die Ausweitung qualifizierter Mehrheitsentscheidungen ist daher aus demokratiethoretischer Sicht nicht zwingend als Fortschritt anzusehen.

(c) Wie steht es schließlich mit dem dritten Kanal demokratischer Einflussnahme, der europäischen Zivilgesellschaft? Die bestehenden Verfahren zivilgesellschaftlicher Beteiligung sind nur sehr beschränkt geeignet, dem europäischen Demokratiedefizit abzuhelpfen. Zwar lässt sich ihre Transparenz und Formalität erhöhen, und die EU-Kommission hat sich in den vergangenen Jahren ernstlich um beides bemüht, indem etwa Konsultationsverfahren nun öffentlich ausgeschrieben werden und Listen von in Brüssel tätigen Vereinigungen im Internet abrufbar sind. Aber die gleiche Partizipation aller Bürgerinnen und Bürger und eine mit Sanktionsmöglichkeiten versehene Rechenschaftspflicht lassen sich auf diesem Wege nicht herstellen.

Vielversprechender erscheint eine andere Form der direkten Beteiligung der Bürgerinnen und Bürger, nämlich europaweite Referenden. Dabei denke ich ganz ausdrücklich nicht an Verfassungsreferenden über die "Finalität" der



europäischen Integration, denn diese führen in erster Linie dazu, Konflikte zwischen widersprüchlichen Zielvorstellungen weiter zu verschärfen. Eher aussichtsreich sind dagegen direktdemokratische Mechanismen zur Entscheidung von Sachfragen europäischer Politik.

Der Lissabonvertrag geht einen kleinen Schritt in diese Richtung mit der Einführung eines europäischen Bürgerbegehrens, das aber wenig mehr ist als eine Möglichkeit zur Äußerung eines Gesetzgebungsvorschlags, über den dann im üblichen Verfahren befunden wird. Das Bürgerbegehren ließe sich ausweiten zu einem vollwertigen Bürgergesetzgebungsverfahren. Noch interessanter ist die Idee von Heidrun Abromeit, nach dem Vorbild der Schweiz ein direktdemokratisches Veto gegen EU-Entscheidungen möglich zu machen.[13] Die genaue Ausgestaltung eines solchen Bürgervetos, insbesondere die Frage der anzuwendenden Quoren, ist natürlich alles andere als unkompliziert. Die Grundlogik aber ist überzeugend: Angesichts der Schwierigkeit, Entscheidungsträger auf europäischer Ebene in demokratischen Verfahren für ihre Entscheidungen rechenschaftspflichtig zu machen, sollte es den Bürgerinnen und Bürgern zumindest möglich sein, bestimmte Entscheidungen politischer Eliten zu verhindern oder rückgängig zu machen.

Fazit

Obwohl die Ratifizierung des Vertrags von Lissabon Fortschritte auf dem Weg zu einer demokratischen Union bedeuten würde, bliebe die demokratische Qualität der EU, bemessen an den Kriterien der Partizipation und der Rechenschaftspflicht, auch nach seinem Inkrafttreten defizitär: Politik auf europäischer Ebene entzieht sich der vollen Kontrolle durch die Bürgerinnen und Bürger. Dieses Fazit ist umso ernüchternder, als es kaum erfolgversprechende Optionen für eine Demokratisierung der EU gibt. Hinsichtlich der direkten Repräsentation der Bürgerinnen und Bürger über das Europäische Parlament sind institutionelle Reformen kontraproduktiv, und es bleibt auf die Ausbildung eines veränderten Partizipationsverhaltens in der Bevölkerung zu hoffen. Hinsichtlich der mitgliedstaatlichen Repräsentation über den Ministerrat ließen sich auf nationaler Ebene parlamentarische Kontrollmöglichkeiten verbessern. Hinsichtlich der Beteiligung der europäischen Zivilgesellschaft ist die Eröffnung zusätzlicher Partizipationsmöglichkeiten über europäische Sachreferenden denkbar. Die "demokratische Finalität" der EU mag somit noch nicht erreicht sein, doch in die noch möglichen Reformen sollten keine übertriebenen Erwartungen gesetzt werden: Die Komplexität von EU-Entscheidungsverfahren, die nötig ist, um der Diversität der europäischen Bevölkerung gerecht zu werden, verschließt sich einfachen Patentlösungen.

Fußnoten

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Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Terhechte Jörg Philipp

Der Vertrag von Lissabon: Grundlegende Verfassungsurkunde der europäischen Rechtsgemeinschaft oder technischer Änderungsvertrag?

in *Europarecht*, volume 43, issue 2, 2008, S. 143-189

Die Europäische Union hat sich von ihrer Verfassungskrise erholt – und das schneller als mancher Kritiker erwartet hat. Mit der Unterzeichnung des Vertrags von Lissabon im Dezember 2007 ist ein neues Kapitel der europäischen Integrationsgeschichte aufgeschlagen worden, dessen Bedeutung kaum überschätzt werden kann. Der Vertrag von Lissabon („Reformvertrag“) greift konzeptionell und inhaltlich zu ganz überwiegenden Teilen auf den gescheiterten Verfassungsvertrag zurück und bewahrt so eine Reihe grundsätzlicher Weichenstellungen, die schon ursprünglich mit dem Verfassungsvertrag erfolgen sollten. Steht er aber auch für eine Neuausrichtung der Grundordnung der Union? Stärkt er zentrale Verfassungsfunktionen oder ist er nur ein „technischer Vertrag“? Um es auf den Punkt zu bringen: Kann von einer neuen grundlegenden Verfassungsurkunde – also letztlich der neuen Verfassung – der europäischen Rechtsgemeinschaft gesprochen werden? Die nachfolgenden Ausführungen werden den Vertrag von Lissabon und die mit ihm einhergehenden Änderungen im Kontext seiner Entstehungsgeschichte und in Hinblick auf die grundsätzlichen Aufgaben, die er wahrnehmen soll, analysieren und auch im Lichte des bisherigen europäischen Konstitutionalisierungsprozesses kritisch hinterfragen.

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Subsection 6. The European unification process

Gambino Silvio

Derechos sociales, Carta de derechos fundamentales e integración europea
in *Revista de Derecho Constitucional Europeo* , n. 9

El desarrollo de los derechos sociales y su protección jurídica en los ordenamientos estatales nos ha conducido desde los clásicos postulados liberales de las primeras constituciones a los patrones jurídico-constitucionales de los Estados modernos. En este artículo se realiza un estudio de las diferentes formas de protección de tales derechos concretados en las constituciones de los Estados miembros de la UE, y sus diferencias jurídicas con los derechos fundamentales de carácter universal y absoluto. Del mismo modo, en la Unión europea el desarrollo y protección de los derechos sociales fundamentales dispuestos en las diferentes convenciones europeas y en la Carta de derechos fundamentales de la Unión Europea es una pieza fundamental para la transformación de la originaria Comunidad económica europea en una Unión política inspirada en los principios fundamentales propios del Estado social y democrático de derecho

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Subsection 6. The European unification process

De Ruiter Rik

Developing Multilateral Surveillance Tools in the EU
in *West European Politics*, vol. 31, n. 5, september , 896-914

ABSTRACT: The development of the infrastructure of the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) is an unaddressed topic in scholarly debates. On the basis of secondary literature on the European Employment Strategy, it is hypothesised that a conflict between an incentive and reluctance to act on the EU level on the side of member states limits the choice for a policy instrument to the OMC, and is a driving force behind the development of its infrastructure. From empirical findings on the OMC e-Europe it shows that for the development of the infrastructure of an OMC on a policy field, a need for an instrument has to be present that can neutralise the conflict between an incentive and reluctance to act on the EU level.

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Subsection 6. The European unification process

Beck Ulrich

Die 50-jährige Unbekannte
in *Internationale Politik* , n. 7-8, 63. Jahrgang, Juli-August

ABSTRACT: Zuweilen gleicht die Europäische Union einer geheimnisvollen älteren Dame ohne Namen und Ziel. Ihr fehlt ein politisches Narrativ – vorläufig gibt es nur ein negatives. Die große Chance der EU heißt „kosmopolitische Realpolitik“: Sie könnte ein Paradigma dafür entwickeln, wie sich globale Gefahren durch zwischenstaatliche Kooperation angehen lassen.

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Vobruba Georg

Die EU am Ende der Erweiterung. Mit der Europäischen Nachbarschaftspolitik zur abgestuften Integration



in **Blätter für deutsche & internationale Politik**, August, 2008 , 49-57

Mit dem irischen „Nein“ zum Vertrag von Lissabon am 12. Juni d. J. hat der europäische Einigungsprozess einen weiteren empfindlichen Rückschlag erlitten. Inzwischen scheint, schenkt man den aufgeregten Kommentaren Glauben, sogar die Existenz der Europäischen Union auf dem Spiel zu stehen. Doch wer an dieser Absage und dem „Nein“ der Franzosen und Niederländer zur EU-Verfassung im Jahre 2005 die Krise der Europäischen Union festmacht, greift analytisch zu kurz. Bereits die ...

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Gerhards Jürgen, Hans Silke

Die Grenzen Europas aus der Perspektive der Bürger

in **Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte**, Band 35-36

Quelle:

<http://www.bpb.de/publikationen/3HJD00.html>

Die Grenzen Europas aus der Perspektive der Bürger

Jürgen Gerhards / Silke Hans

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Einleitung

Der Prozess der europäischen Integration ist seit der Gründung der damaligen Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft 1957 durch zwei Merkmale gekennzeichnet: einerseits eine zunehmende Vertiefung mit einer Übertragung ehemals nationaler Souveränitätskompetenzen auf die Europäische Union (EU) und eine Ausdehnung der Politikfelder, für die die EU zuständig ist, und andererseits eine schrittweise Erweiterung der Anzahl der Mitgliedsländer. 1973 traten Großbritannien, Dänemark und Irland der Gemeinschaft der sechs Gründungsmitglieder bei; 1981 folgte Griechenland, 1986 Portugal und Spanien, 1995 Österreich, Schweden und Finnland. Eine quantitativ und qualitativ andere Dimension hatte die Osterweiterung der EU. 2004 sind zehn Länder der EU beigetreten, 2007 folgten Bulgarien und Rumänien. Die institutionalisierten Grenzen der EU sind heute durch die Grenzen der 27 Mitgliedsländer definiert.



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Geht es nach den Plänen der EU, ist der Prozess der Erweiterung aber in keiner Weise abgeschlossen. Die Türkei, Kroatien, Mazedonien, Montenegro, Bosnien-Herzegowina, Serbien und Albanien stehen als (potentielle) Beitrittskandidaten vor der Tür und bitten um Einlass. Andere Länder würde die EU gerne aufnehmen, diese wollen selbst aber nicht oder noch nicht Mitglieder werden. Während frühere Erweiterungsrunden von den Bürgerinnen und Bürgern begrüßt oder zumindest toleriert wurden, scheint der "permissive Erweiterungskonsens" spätestens seit der so genannten Osterweiterung verbraucht zu sein. Immer lauter werden Stimmen derer, die auf ein Ende des Erweiterungsprozesses drängen und eine Überforderung der EU-Institutionen und der Bürger Europas prognostizieren. Die Debatte über die Aufnahme der Türkei zeigt dies mit aller Deutlichkeit. Die Ablehnung des Vertrags über eine europäische Verfassung durch die Franzosen und die Niederländer im Jahr 2005 ist von vielen Beobachtern auch als ein Veto gegenüber der Erweiterungspolitik der EU interpretiert worden.[1] Die Meinungen der Bürger sind damit zu einer relevanten Bezugsgröße für das Entscheidungshandeln der Eliten im Hinblick auf eine zukünftige EU-Erweiterung geworden. Aus diesem Grund stehen die Einstellungen der Bürgerinnen und Bürger der 27 Mitgliedsländer der EU bezüglich ihrer Erweiterung im Mittelpunkt unserer Analyse. Welche Länder würden die Bürger gerne in der EU begrüßen und welche möchten sie nicht aufnehmen? Wo sehen sie die Grenzen der Union und in welchem Maße unterstützen sie die Erweiterungspolitik der EU?[2] Wir skizzieren die Erweiterungspolitik der EU und den Status der Beitrittsverhandlungen mit den einzelnen Ländern und analysieren dann auf der Basis einer Eurobarometerumfrage, ob und in welchem Maße sich die Bürger der EU für eine Mitgliedschaft dieser Länder aussprechen und damit die Erweiterungspolitik der EU stützen. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die Zustimmung zur Aufnahme neuer Länder je nach Land, nach dem gefragt wurde, stark variiert. Und auch die Bürger in den 27 Ländern unterscheiden sich in dem Ausmaß, mit dem sie sich für eine Erweiterung aussprechen. Wir gehen deswegen in einem dritten Schritt der Frage nach, wie man die Unterschiede in der Bereitschaft, neue Länder aufzunehmen, erklären kann.

Die Erweiterungspolitik der EU und die potentiellen Beitrittskandidaten

Wir unterscheiden auf der Basis der von den Ländern unternommenen Schritte im Hinblick auf einen EU-Betritt und den konkreten Stand der Verhandlungen drei Gruppen von Ländern, die zu Mitgliedsländern der EU werden könnten.[3]

1. "Willkommene Länder", die aber selbst zögerlich sind, ob sie Mitglied werden wollen. Dazu zählen die EFTA-Länder Schweiz, Norwegen und Island.[4] Die Schweizer Bürger haben sich zuerst 1992, dann in einer zweiten



Volksabstimmung 2001 gegen eine EU-Mitgliedschaft ausgesprochen. Die in der Folge der Ablehnung verabschiedeten bilateralen Abkommen I und II (1999 und 2004) dienen der weiteren Annäherung der Schweiz an die EU-Mitgliedsländer. Zudem sprachen sich die Bürger der Schweiz 2005 für den Beitritt zum Schengener Abkommen aus.

Ganz ähnlich gestaltet sich das Verhältnis der EU zu Norwegen. Norwegen hielt 1972 und 1994 Referenden über den EU-Beitritt ab, die aber von der Bevölkerung abgelehnt wurden. Seitdem basieren die Beziehungen zwischen Norwegen und der EU auf der norwegischen Zusammenarbeit mit der EFTA und der Teilnahme am Europäischen Wirtschaftsraum (EWR). Norwegen unterzeichnete zudem einen Assoziierungsvertrag zum Schengener Abkommen, arbeitet auf dem Gebiet der Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik eng mit der EU zusammen und beteiligt sich an Ausgleichszahlungen, um wirtschaftliche und soziale Unterschiede in den EU-Ländern abzumildern.

Islands Europapolitik basiert wie die Norwegens vorrangig auf der Zusammenarbeit mit der EFTA sowie der Teilnahme am EWR. Außerdem trat Island dem Schengener Abkommen bei. Ein EU-Beitritt ist in Island eine politisch umstrittene Frage und wird von der aktuellen Regierung in näherer Zukunft nicht angestrebt. Ein Grund dafür sind Befürchtungen hinsichtlich der Nutzungsrechte von Fischgründen. Jüngere Meinungsumfragen weisen jedoch auf eine Mehrheit für einen EU-Beitritt in der Bevölkerung hin.

2. Die Beitrittskandidaten: Die Türkei und Kroatien haben von der EU den offiziellen Status eines Beitrittskandidaten erhalten. Kroatien hatte 2003 seinen Beitrittsantrag eingereicht. Die ursprünglich für 2004 vorgesehenen Beitrittsverhandlungen wurden zunächst bis 2005 verschoben, da sich die kroatische Regierung anfangs nicht an die Bedingung der ausnahmslosen Zusammenarbeit mit dem UN-Kriegsverbrechertribunal in Den Haag gehalten hatte. Seit Oktober 2005 läuft das "Screening-Verfahren", das heißt, der Abgleich der kroatischen Gesetzgebung mit dem gemeinschaftlichen Besitzstand der EU, seit Juni 2006 die Eröffnung der verschiedenen Verhandlungskapitel. Die Verhandlungen werden wahrscheinlich 2009 abgeschlossen, so dass eventuell 2011 der Beitritt erfolgen kann.

Der Zeitpunkt des Beitritts der Türkei ist hingegen ungewiss. Im Oktober 2005 eröffnete die EU offiziell die Beitrittsverhandlungen. Das anschließende "Screening-Verfahren" wurde im Herbst 2006 abgeschlossen; derzeit laufen die Eröffnungen der verschiedenen Verhandlungskapitel. Anschließend ist es Aufgabe der Kommission, festzustellen, ob die Beitrittskapitel abgeschlossen sind. Nach Zustimmung durch das Europäische Parlament kann der Rat der EU-Regierungen die Verhandlungen für abgeschlossen erklären und ein Beitrittsdatum festlegen. Allerdings muss ein möglicher Vertrag in allen EU-Mitgliedsstaaten ratifiziert werden. Hier besteht die Möglichkeit für einige Mitgliedsländer, den Beitritt der Türkei zu verhindern. So wird in Frankreich und in Österreich zur Frage der Mitgliedschaft der Türkei wahrscheinlich ein Referendum durchgeführt werden.

3. Die potenziellen Beitrittskandidaten: Die Integration der Länder des westlichen Balkans ist Ziel der Erweiterungspolitik der EU. Diese Staaten werden von der EU als potenzielle Beitrittskandidaten bezeichnet.[5] Mit ihnen wird zunächst ein Stabilisierungs- und Assoziationsabkommen (SAA) abgeschlossen, um sie mit finanzieller Hilfe der EU Schritt für Schritt politisch und wirtschaftlich für eine Integration in die EU vorzubereiten, bevor sie den offiziellen Status eines Beitrittskandidaten erhalten.

Als erstes Land unterzeichnete Mazedonien bereits 2001 das Stabilisierungs- und Assoziationsabkommen. Mazedonien ist auch das erste Land aus der Gruppe der potentiellen Beitrittskandidaten, das mittlerweile den Status eines Beitrittskandidaten erhalten hat, ohne dass die Beitrittsverhandlungen allerdings schon begonnen hätten. Bosnien-Herzegowina nahm 2005 Gespräche mit der EU über ein Stabilisierungs- und Assoziationsabkommen auf; im



Dezember 2007 fand die Paraphierung des Abkommens statt. Montenegro ist erst im Juni 2006 unabhängig geworden; die Anerkennung der EU erfolgte unmittelbar. Die Verhandlungen zu einem SAA wurden bereits 2006 abgeschlossen, das Abkommen wurde im März 2007 paraphiert. Seine Ratifizierung ist bisher noch nicht abgeschlossen. Die 2003 mit Albanien aufgenommenen Verhandlungen über ein Stabilisierungs- und Assoziationsabkommen mündeten in der offiziellen Unterzeichnung im Jahr 2006. Die Ratifizierung ist auch hier noch nicht abgeschlossen. Schwieriger gestalten sich die Verhandlungen mit Serbien, da sich das Land zum einen nicht an die Vereinbarung der uneingeschränkten Zusammenarbeit mit dem Internationalen Strafgerichtshof in Den Haag gehalten hat, zum anderen die EU-Politik der Anerkennung eines unabhängigen Kosovo als massive Einmischung in die eigene Souveränität interpretiert. Im November 2007 wurde das SAA paraphiert, allerdings fand die Unterzeichnung bisher nicht statt. Durch die Parlamentswahlen im Mai 2008, in dem sich die pro-europäische Partei von Präsident Boris Tadic durchsetzen konnte, sind aber die Weichen für eine Annäherung zwischen Serbien und der EU gestellt.[6]

Die Einstellungen der Bürger

In welchem Maße die Bürger der 27 Länder der EU die Erweiterungspolitik der EU unterstützen und wo sie die Grenzen der EU definieren, analysieren wir im Folgenden auf der Basis einer Sekundäranalyse einer Eurobarometerbefragung (Eurobarometer 66.1).[7] Die Befragung wurde 2006 mit Personen ab 15 Jahren durchgeführt. Die Stichproben sind für das jeweilige Land repräsentativ und variieren zwischen 503 Personen in Zypern und 1526 Personen in Deutschland. Unsere Analyse beschränkt sich auf die Bürger der 27 Mitgliedsländer der EU. Im Zentrum unserer empirischen Auswertung steht folgende Frage: "Sagen Sie mir bitte für jedes der folgenden Länder, ob Sie dafür oder dagegen wären, dass es Teil der Europäischen Union wird". Wir analysieren die Zustimmungen zu einer Mitgliedschaft in der EU für diejenigen Länder, die wir oben in drei Gruppen zusammengefasst haben.

Tabelle 1 (vgl. PDF-Version) gibt die Zustimmung zu einer Mitgliedschaft der Schweiz, Norwegens und Islands wieder. Wir haben die Zustimmungsraten in den 27 EU-Ländern zu vier Kategorien zusammengefasst. Die erste Kategorie umfasst alle 27 EU-Länder; "EU-15" bezeichnet die 15 so genannten alten Mitgliedsländer der EU, "Beitritt I" die zehn Staaten, die im Zuge der Osterweiterung 2004 beigetreten sind und "Beitritt II" umfasst Bulgarien und Rumänien.[8] Da sich in einer separaten Faktorenanalyse herausgestellt hat, dass Befragte, die sich für bzw. gegen die Mitgliedschaft eines der drei Länder ausgesprochen haben, in aller Regel auch für bzw. gegen die Mitgliedschaft der anderen beiden Länder sind, haben wir zusätzlich den Mittelwert aus den prozentualen Zustimmungsraten gebildet.[9] Die Menschen nehmen bezüglich der Frage, wer Mitglied in der EU werden soll, offensichtlich nicht individuelle Länder oder geografische Regionen wahr (die Schweiz, Island und Norwegen sind geographisch recht unterschiedlich positioniert), sondern operieren mit generalisierten Einstellungsmustern.

Wie die Ergebnisse zeigen, ist die Zustimmung zu einer Mitgliedschaft der Schweiz, von Norwegen und Island in der EU sehr hoch. Aus der Perspektive der Bürger könnten die drei Länder lieber heute als morgen Bestandteil der Union werden. Auch die Zustimmungsraten in den einzelnen Ländern (Ergebnisse werden hier nicht ausgewiesen) sind sehr hoch. Es gibt kein Land, in dem sich nicht mindestens zwei Drittel der Bevölkerung für eine Mitgliedschaft der drei Länder aussprechen. Dabei fällt die Zustimmung in den Ländern, die selbst erst 2004 und 2007 Mitglieder der EU geworden sind, besonders hoch aus. Von einer Erweiterungsmüdigkeit der Bürger der EU kann im Hinblick auf die Schweiz, Norwegen und Island nicht die Rede sein. Ganz anders sehen die Befunde aus, wenn man die Einstellungen der Bürger zu den anderen beiden Gruppen betrachtet (vgl. Tabelle 2 der PDF-Version).

1. Die Zustimmung zu einem Beitritt der Türkei und der sechs Balkanländer ist deutlich geringer als die Zustimmung zur



Schweiz, Norwegen und Island. Nur die Mitgliedschaft von Kroatien wird von ca. 60 Prozent aller EU-Bürger begrüßt. Kroatien erreicht auch in allen Länderaggregatskategorien und in fast allen 27 Ländern eine mindestens 50-prozentige Zustimmung.

2. Für die anderen Balkan-Staaten gilt, dass sie zwar im Durchschnitt der 27 EU-Länder eine knappe Mehrheit für eine Mitgliedschaft erhalten (Albanien liegt mit 40,3 Prozent darunter), die Einschätzungen variieren aber zwischen den drei Aggregatsgruppen erheblich. Während die zuletzt beigetretenen Länder Rumänien und Bulgarien klare Fürsprecher einer Erweiterung sind, ist die Unterstützung in den Ländern, die 2004 Mitglieder der EU geworden sind, deutlich geringer, liegt aber im Durchschnitt noch über der 50-Prozent-Marge. In den EU-15-Ländern erreicht keines der potentiellen Beitrittsländer des Balkans eine unterstützende Mehrheit von 50 Prozent, die Zustimmung zu einem Beitritt Serbiens und Albanien liegt sogar nur bei einem guten Drittel der Bevölkerung.[10]

3. Die Türkei stellt unter allen zukünftigen Mitgliedsländern einen Sonderfall dar. Nur ca. ein Drittel aller EU-Bürger möchte, dass das Land Mitglied der EU wird. Nur in vier Ländern (Rumänien, Bulgarien, Portugal und Schweden) gibt es eine Mehrheit für einen Beitritt der Türkei, in den anderen 23 Ländern wird das 50-Prozent-Quorum nicht erreicht, zum Teil sehr deutlich unterschritten.

4. Dieses Bild einer gespaltenen öffentlichen Meinung bestätigt sich auch auf Länderebene: Wir haben den Mittelwert der Zustimmung zur Mitgliedschaft der verschiedenen Länder in Tabelle 2 (vgl. PDF-Version) berechnet, da wir in einer separaten Analyse festgestellt haben, dass diejenigen Bürger, die sich für die Mitgliedschaft eines der Länder aussprechen, sich in aller Regel auch für die Mitgliedschaft der anderen Länder aussprechen.[11] Da die Mitgliedschaft Kroatiens eine relativ hohe Zustimmung genießt und damit einen Ausnahmefall darstellt, haben wir Kroatien in der Mittelwertberechnung nicht berücksichtigt. Vor allem für Österreicher, Deutsche, Luxemburger, Italiener, Briten und Franzosen hat die jetzige EU die Grenzen der Erweiterung nach Süd- und Osteuropa erreicht. Nur ca. ein Drittel der Bevölkerung in diesen meist bevölkerungsreichen und politisch gewichtigen Ländern spricht sich für eine Aufnahme von Montenegro, Mazedonien, Bosnien, Serbien, Albanien und die Türkei aus. Die Zustimmung zu einer Aufnahme der Türkei fällt besonders gering aus, in Deutschland, Zypern, Luxemburg liegt sie sogar unter 20 Prozent, in Österreich nur bei 5,6 Prozent.

Fassen wir unsere deskriptiven Ergebnisse kurz zusammen: Während die Institutionen der EU eine Erweiterung und damit eine Grenzverschiebung der EU betreiben, findet diese Politik nur zum Teil Rückhalt in der Bevölkerung. Eine Mitgliedschaft der Schweiz, Norwegens und Islands wäre aus der Perspektive der Bürger der EU unproblematisch und auch der wohl bald anstehende Beitritt Kroatiens wird, wenn auch in deutlich geringerem Maße, mehrheitlich begrüßt. Anders verhält es sich mit den anderen Ländern des ehemaligen Jugoslawiens, mit Albanien und vor allem der Türkei. Im Hinblick auf letztere gibt es eine zum Teil erhebliche Inkongruenz zwischen der Beitrittspolitik der EU und den kognitiven Grenzdefinitionen der Bürger. Der Umsetzung der Erweiterungspolitik stehen somit die Einstellungen der Bürger entgegen, die zudem durch Referenden den Erweiterungsprozess aufhalten können. Um diese Einstellungen zu verändern und die Zustimmung der Menschen zur Erweiterungspolitik zu gewinnen, ist es wichtig zu verstehen, aus welchen Gründen viele Menschen einer Erweiterung ablehnend gegenüber stehen.

Erklärung der Unterschiede

Warum sprechen sich manche Bürger für eine Erweiterung der EU aus und stützen damit die Politik der EU während andere lieber die Grenzen der jetzigen EU institutionalisiert sehen möchten? Zur Beantwortung dieser Frage formulieren



wir in einem ersten Schritt mehrere Hypothesen und überprüfen diese dann auf ihre Richtigkeit.[12]

1. Ökonomische Nachteile: Die Länder des Balkans und die Türkei sind im Vergleich zu vielen EU-Mitgliedsländern, vor allem im Vergleich zu den EU-15, deutlich schlechter ökonomisch entwickelt, was sich in einer Vielzahl von Indikatoren, zum Beispiel im Bruttosozialprodukt pro Kopf manifestiert. Da die EU das Ziel der Strukturkonvergenz ihrer Mitgliedsländer verfolgt, wird eine Mitgliedschaft der neuen Länder wahrscheinlich mit Transferzahlungen von den reichen EU-Ländern hin zu den neuen ärmeren Ländern und damit mit höheren Steuern in den reicheren Ländern verbunden sein. Wir vermuten, dass die Bürger diese finanziellen Kosten erahnen und dass dies ihre Einstellung zur Erweiterung beeinflusst. Entsprechend gehen wir davon aus, dass die Unterstützung für eine Erweiterung bei Personen, die aus Ländern kommen, die zu den Nettozahlern der EU gehören, geringer ausfällt als bei Personen, die in Nettoempfängerländern leben (Hypothese 1).[13]

Die mit einer Erweiterung verbundenen Vor- und Nachteile können allerdings recht asymmetrisch unter den Bewohnern ein und desselben Landes verteilt sein.[14] Eine Mitgliedschaft der neuen Länder in der EU wird, auch wenn Übergangsfristen verabredet werden, für diese die Teilhabe an der Freizügigkeitsregel und damit die Möglichkeit der Abwanderung von Arbeitskräften eröffnen. Wir vermuten, dass Personen und Bevölkerungsgruppen, die durch mögliche Einwanderungen aus anderen Ländern Nachteile für ihre eigenen Chancen auf dem Arbeitsmarkt und für ihre ökonomische Position antizipieren, sich eher gegen eine Erweiterung aussprechen. Die Einwanderung nach Westeuropa war bisher vor allem von niedrig qualifizierten Personen aus ärmeren Ländern geprägt. Hier treten sie auf dem Arbeitsmarkt in Konkurrenz zu niedrig qualifizierten inländischen Arbeitnehmern. Die besser verdienenden Bürger dürften hingegen eher von der erhöhten Konkurrenz auf dem unteren Segment des Arbeitsmarktes profitieren, weil die Lohnkonkurrenz wahrscheinlich zu Preisnachlässen auf Waren und Dienstleistungen führt. Wir haben zwei Variablen in die Analysen aufgenommen, welche die unterschiedlichen Interessenlagen der Bürger messen: Die Variable arbeitslos/nicht arbeitslos und das Bildungsniveau des Befragten.[15] Wir erwarten, dass Arbeitslose und Personen mit niedriger Bildung sich eher gegen eine Erweiterung aussprechen als andere (Hypothese 2).

2. Migration und kulturelle Bedrohung: Durch die Mitgliedschaft der Türkei und der Balkanländer möglicherweise ausgelöste Migrationsbewegungen in die wohlhabenderen Länder der EU sind nicht nur mit ökonomischen Nachteilen für bestimmte Bevölkerungsschichten verbunden, sondern auch mit Ängsten vor einer Bedrohung der eigenen Lebensweise und Kultur. Dies gilt in aller Regel nicht, wenn die Migranten aus Ländern kommen, die - wie im Falle der Schweiz, Norwegens und Islands - dem Einwanderungsland kulturell ähnlich sind. Für die Balkanländer und die Türkei gilt nun, dass sie nicht nur ökonomisch schwächer entwickelt sind als die meisten EU-Länder, sondern zum Teil auch in einer anderen kulturellen und religiösen Traditionslinie stehen.[16] Wir vermuten, dass manche Bürger Migrationen aus den potentiellen Mitgliedsländern als eine Bedrohung der eigenen kulturellen Selbstständigkeit interpretieren. Entsprechend prüfen wir (Hypothese 2), ob Befragte, die Migranten als kulturelle Bereicherung interpretieren, sich eher für eine Erweiterung aussprechen als Personen, die Migranten eher als Bedrohung ansehen. Wir analysieren zusätzlich, ob Personen, die in Ländern mit einem hohen Ausländeranteil leben, sich eher gegen eine Erweiterung aussprechen als Personen in Ländern mit einem geringeren Ausländeranteil.[17]

3. Erweiterung versus Vertiefung: Der Entwicklungsprozess der Europäischen Union ist, wie wir in der Einleitung skizziert haben, durch eine schrittweise Erweiterung und eine Zunahme der Vertiefung andererseits gekennzeichnet. Manche Beobachter des Prozesses und manche Politiker sind der Ansicht, dass es spätestens seit der so genannten Osterweiterung zu einem Zielkonflikt zwischen diesen beiden Prinzipien gekommen ist.[18] Die Institutionen der EU sind, so die These, mit den 27 Mitgliedsländern jetzt schon überfordert, die Entscheidungsprozesse sind überkomplex, intransparent und ineffektiv geworden. Der Zielkonflikt zwischen Erweiterung und Vertiefung lässt sich nur auflösen - so



das Argument -, in dem sich Europa entweder für eine weitere Vertiefung oder für eine Erweiterung entscheidet. Wir gehen entsprechend davon aus, dass Personen, die sich für eine weitere Vertiefung der EU aussprechen, eher gegen eine Aufnahme neuer Mitgliedsländer sind (Hypothese 3). Unter Vertiefung verstehen wir in diesem Zusammenhang die Ausdehnung der Politikfelder, für die nicht mehr allein der Nationalstaat, sondern die EU zuständig sein soll.[19]

Ergebnisse und Schlussfolgerungen

Insgesamt können wir mit Hilfe unserer unabhängigen Variablen die Einstellungen der Bürger zu einer Erweiterung der EU um die fünf Balkanländer und die Türkei gut vorhersagen (vgl. Tabelle 3 der PDF-Version). Etwa ein Viertel der Unterschiede zwischen Personen hinsichtlich ihrer Einstellungen zur EU-Erweiterung sind mit den von uns verwendeten Variablen erklärbar.

Die These, dass diejenigen, die wahrscheinlich durch die Erweiterung ökonomische Nachteile in Kauf nehmen müssen, eher gegen eine Öffnung der EU für weitere Länder sind, hat sich bestätigt. Der starke positive Effekt für die Netto-Empfängerländer weist darauf hin, dass das Gefühl, bisher von einer EU-Mitgliedschaft profitiert zu haben, die Erweiterungsbereitschaft positiv beeinflusst. Auch eine höhere Bildung führt zu einer positiveren Einstellung gegenüber dem EU-Beitritt der Balkanländer und der Türkei. Das spricht für unsere Hypothese, dass sich Menschen mit höherer Bildung weniger einer möglichen Konkurrenz durch niedrig qualifizierte Einwanderer aus zukünftigen Mitgliedsstaaten ausgesetzt sehen. Allerdings gibt es zwischen Arbeitslosen und Nichtarbeitslosen keine Unterschiede in der Einstellung zur Erweiterung. Auch unsere Annahme, dass die Einstellung zur EU-Erweiterung von der Bewertung der Konsequenzen von Migrationsbewegungen abhängt, wird durch die Daten bestätigt. Menschen, die Einwanderung als eine Bereicherung für ihr Land ansehen, sind viel deutlicher für die EU-Mitgliedschaft der Balkanstaaten und der Türkei als diejenigen, die Einwanderung eher als Bedrohung erleben. Auch die tatsächlichen Erfahrungen der einzelnen Länder mit Migrationsbewegungen spielen eine Rolle. Je höher der Anteil der Ausländer an der Bevölkerung eines Landes, desto negativer ist die Einstellung der Bevölkerung gegenüber der zukünftigen Erweiterung. Nicht bestätigt hat sich hingegen die Hypothese, dass es in der Wahrnehmung der Bürger einen Zielkonflikt zwischen einer zukünftigen Vertiefung und Erweiterung der EU gibt. Entgegen der Annahme sind diejenigen, die eine Vertiefung befürworten, auch für die Erweiterung der EU um die Balkanstaaten und die Türkei. Offensichtlich gibt es eine generalisierte Einstellung der Bürger zur Europäischen Union. Fällt diese positiv aus, dann unterstützen die Menschen sowohl die Erweiterung als auch die Vertiefung der EU, ohne einen Zielkonflikt zwischen beiden Prozessen wahrzunehmen.

Fassen wir die Ergebnisse unserer Analysen zusammen: Die Erweiterungspolitik der EU findet nur zum Teil die Unterstützung der Bevölkerung der 27 Mitgliedsländer. Während die Schweiz, Norwegen und Island und mit Einschränkungen auch Kroatien als Mitgliedsländer in der EU willkommen sind, sprechen sich die Menschen in vielen Ländern der EU eher gegen den Beitritt der Balkanländer und der Türkei aus. Vor allem im Hinblick auf die Türkei gibt es eine erhebliche Inkongruenz zwischen der Beitrittspolitik der EU und den Einstellungen der Bürgerinnen und Bürger. Unsere Kausalanalyse legt den Schluss nahe, dass sich diese Einstellungen nur in eine positive Richtung verändern werden, wenn die Menschen davon überzeugt sind, dass der Erweiterungsprozess nicht mit finanziellen Kosten für die jetzigen Mitgliedsländer verbunden ist und nicht zu Migrationen von den Beitrittsländern in die wohlhabenden Mitgliedsländer führen wird.

Fußnoten

1 Vgl. Heinz Kramer, Wie "erweiterungsmüde" ist die EU?, in: SWP-Aktuell, (2007) 16, März 2007, in:



www.swp-berlin.org/common/get_document.php?asset_id=3819 (14. 5. 2008).

2 Zum Verhältnis von Elitenhandeln und Einstellungen der Bürger bezüglich einer Erweiterung der EU vgl. Sylke Nissen, Who wants Enlargement of the EU? Support for the Enlargement among Elites and Citizens in the European Union, in: Czech Sociological Review, 39 (2003), S. 757-772.

3 Die im Folgenden zusammengetragenen Informationen über den momentanen Stand der Verhandlungen der EU mit den verschiedenen potentiellen Beitrittsländern stammen aus verschiedenen Quellen: 1.

www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/de/Laenderinformationen/LaenderReiseinformationenA-Z.jsp (14. 5. 2008); 2.

www.euractiv.com/de/erweiterung (14. 5. 2008); 3. http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Beitrittskandidaten_der_EU (14. 5. 2008).

4 Vgl. Johannes Varwick/Jana Windwehr, Norwegen und Schweiz als Modellfälle für differenzierte Integration?, in: APuZ, (2007) 43, S. 15-20. Anm. d. Redaktion: EFTA steht für European Free Trade Association (Europäische Freihandelsassoziation). Außer den drei genannten Ländern gehört ihr noch Liechtenstein an.

5 Vgl. Dominik Tolksdorf/Milka Vilovski, EU Beitrittsprozess der westlichen Balkanstaaten vor einer ungewissen Zukunft. Vier Szenarien zu den Entwicklungen in Südosteuropa und der EU, CAP Analyse 7 2007, in: www.cap.lmu.de/download/2007/CAP-Analyse-2007-07.pdf (14. 5. 2008).

6 Das Kosovo hat erst im Februar 2008 seine Unabhängigkeit erklärt. Die meisten Länder der EU haben das Kosovo als unabhängigen Staat anerkannt oder beabsichtigen, dies in naher Zukunft zu tun, einige haben dies aber verweigert (Slowakei, Rumänien, Spanien und Zypern). Ohne eine Anerkennung durch alle Staaten der EU ist der Abschluss eines Assoziationsabkommens nicht möglich.

7 Der Datensatz ist über das Zentralarchiv für empirische Sozialforschung erhältlich. Informationen über die Eurobarometer-Studien können unter www.gesis.org/en/data_service/eurobarometer/index.htm abgerufen werden.

8 Jedes Land geht mit einem um die Bevölkerung gewichteten Faktor in die Aggregatskategorien ein.

9 Angegeben ist hier der Mittelwert der Zustimmung in Prozent, gebildet aus der Zustimmung zum EU-Beitritt der in der Tabelle befindlichen Länder.

10 Die Prozentsatzwerte der Zustimmung für die einzelnen Länder können wir hier aus Platzgründen nicht darstellen. Sie finden sich unter www.polsoz.fu-berlin.de/soziologie/arbeitsbereiche/makrosoziologie/mitarbeiter/lehrstuhlinhaber/dateien/tabellen_APuZ.pdf

11 Angegeben ist hier der Mittelwert der Zustimmung in Prozent, gebildet aus der Zustimmung zum EU-Beitritt der in der Tabelle befindlichen Länder.

12 Für eine gute Darstellung der Argumente für und gegen eine Erweiterung vgl. Kai-Olaf Lang/Daniela Schwarzer, Die Diskussion über die Aufnahmefähigkeit der EU. Nötige Zwischenschritte oder Ende der Erweiterung, SWP-Studie, (2007) 31, Dezember 2007, in: www.swp-berlin.org/common/get_document.php?asset_id=4558 (18. 5. 2008). Bei der Formulierung der Hypothesen orientieren wir uns u.a. an der Studie von Jeffrey A. Karp und Shaun Bowler, die Einstellungen zur Osterweiterung analysiert haben. Vgl. Jeffrey A. Karp/Shawn Bowler, Broadening and deepening or broadening versus deepening: The question of enlargement and Europe's hesitant Europeans', in: European Journal of Political Research, 45 (2006) 3, S. 369-390.

13 Die Codierung der entsprechenden Variable ist 0 = Nettozahler und 1 = Nettoempfänger. Nettoempfänger sind alle ab 2004 beigetretenen Staaten sowie Griechenland, Irland, Portugal und Spanien.

14 Vgl. zum Folgenden Jürgen Gerhards, Free to move? The acceptance of free movement of labour and non discrimination among citizens of Europe, in: European Societies, 10 (2008) 1, S. 121-140.

15 Arbeitslosigkeit: 0 = nicht arbeitslos, 1 = arbeitslos. Bildung: Alter zum Zeitpunkt der Beendigung der (Aus-)Bildung. Werte größer als 25 wurden auf den Wert 25 gesetzt.

16 Mit der Türkei und Albanien, aber auch mit Bosnien-Herzegowina würden Länder beitreten, deren Bevölkerung



dominant muslimisch ist, in Serbien, Mazedonien, Montenegro ist die Bevölkerung mehrheitlich orthodoxen Glaubens.
17 Variable Einstellung zur Migration: Zustimmung zur Aussage, dass Einwanderer eine Bereicherung für das eigene Land sind. 1 = stimme gar nicht zu, 2 = stimme eher nicht zu, 3 = stimme eher zu, 4 = stimme voll und ganz zu. Variable Ausländeranteil: Angabe pro Land in Prozent.
18 Vgl. K. Lang/D. Schwarzer (Anm. 12).
19 Dazu gehören die Fragen, ob man für oder gegen eine gemeinsame Währung, eine gemeinsame Außenpolitik, eine gemeinsame Verteidigungspolitik und eine europäische Verfassung ist. Diese Fragen wurden zu einem Index kombiniert, bei dem hohe Werte für eine positive Einstellung zur Vertiefung stehen.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Ehrenzeller Bernard, Reisner Annegret

Die Konstitutionalisierung von Bologna: Sonderfall oder Modell der Weiterentwicklung des kooperativen Foederalismus?

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Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Kajnc Sabina

Die slowenische EU-Ratspräsidentschaft 2008

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Die slowenische EU-Ratspräsidentschaft 2008

Sabina Kajnc

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Einleitung

Von der slowenischen Ratspräsidentschaft im ersten Halbjahr 2008, welche die erste Trio-Präsidentschaft (von Deutschland, Portugal und Slowenien) komplettierte, haben sich sowohl Analytiker, Politiker Sloweniens und anderer Länder als auch die Medien von Anfang an eher wenig erhofft.[1] Konkrete Erwartungen wurden jedoch hinsichtlich der Durchsetzung der "Superpriorität" der slowenischen Präsidentschaft gestellt: die Staaten des Westbalkans einen Schritt näher an die Europäische Union (EU) zu bringen. Unter den europäischen politischen Eliten dominierte der symbolische Wert der slowenischen Präsidentschaft.

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Es war die erste Präsidentschaft aus den Reihen der 2004/2007-Erweiterungsländer, das heißt zum ersten Mal führte ein ehemals kommunistisches Land, das erst nach dem Ende des Kommunismus in Europa entstanden war und - mit der Ausnahme Luxemburgs - zugleich das kleinste Land der Mitgliedstaaten ist, die EU.

Im vorliegenden Beitrag geht es darum, einzuschätzen und zu bewerten, wie Slowenien den EU-Vorsitz ausgefüllt hat. Vor dem Hintergrund der Ausgestaltung vorangegangener Präsidentschaften werden die spezifischen Vorteile, Schwächen und Stärken des slowenischen Ratsvorsitzes herausgearbeitet. Es folgt eine Bewertung der Leistung der slowenischen politischen Eliten und deren Diplomatie bei der Lösung der als oberste Prioritäten formulierten Aufgaben. Slowenien hatte sich für seine Ratspräsidentschaft fünf Prioritäten gesetzt:

1. Koordinierung der Ratifikation des Lissabon-Vertrages in den Mitgliedstaaten;
2. Lancierung des neuen Zyklus der erneuerten Lissabon-Strategie;
3. Energie- und Klimapakete;
4. neuer Schub in der Politik der EU zum westlichen Balkan und
5. interkultureller Dialog.

Neben der Übernahme der Führungsrolle Sloweniens in der Westbalkanpolitik der EU bestanden die weiteren zwei Herausforderungen darin, das Verhandlungsmandat der Kommission für das neue Abkommen mit Russland und Einigkeit nach der Unabhängigkeitserklärung des Kosovo zu erreichen.

Spielraum der slowenischen Ratspräsidentschaft

Die Rolle des EU-Vorsitzes ist vertraglich und politisch festgeschrieben, was sich auf verschiedene Staaten - je nach deren eigenen Charakteristiken - unterschiedlich auswirkt.[2]

Erstens: Der Vorsitz ist zeitlich auf sechs Monate begrenzt. Im Vergleich mit einem durchschnittlichen Regierungsmandat in westlichen Demokratien, und unter Berücksichtigung der Komplexität des



Entscheidungsprozesses auf EU-Ebene, erweist sich die zur Verfügung stehende Zeitspanne als sehr kurz. Jede Präsidentschaft übernimmt den Vorsitz während zahlreicher, bereits laufender legislativer und politischer Prozesse, die sich auch über ihre Amtszeit hinaus ausdehnen. Unerwartete Ereignisse, mit denen es sich während der Präsidentschaft auseinandersetzen gilt, können die eigene Agenda (stark) beeinflussen. Die Verträge schreiben die Pflichten und Funktionen der Organisation, die Koordinierung der Ratsgeschäfte (inklusive der Beziehungen zu der Kommission und dem Europäischen Parlament), die Vermittlung, Initiative und Steuerung sowie Vertretung nach außen fest. Darüber hinaus bleibt die Rolle der Nationalvertreter erhalten, da der den Vorsitz innehabende Staat ein Mitglied der EU ist und auch die eigenen Interessen schützen soll.[3]

Zweitens: Im politischen Sinne ist die Präsidentschaft durch die Vielfalt der Interessen der anderen Akteure, Mitgliedstaaten sowie EU-Institutionen - alle mit wohlverworbenen Ansprüchen - und durch formelle wie informelle Prozeduren eingeschränkt. Hinzu kommen landesspezifische Begrenzungen jedes Mitgliedstaates. Kleine Staaten wie Slowenien sehen sich vor allem durch ihre vergleichsweise kleinen Kapital- und Personalressourcen begrenzt. Slowenien stellte 62 Millionen Euro für seine Präsidentschaft zur Verfügung. Zum Vergleich: Deutschland hatte einen Haushalt von 112 Millionen Euro für seinen EU-Vorsitz im Jahr 2007; Österreich im Jahr 2006 87 Millionen Euro; Frankreich, das den EU-Vorsitz am 1. Juli 2008 übernommen hat, plant 190 Millionen Euro auszugeben.

Auch die slowenische Verwaltung ist im Verhältnis zu den Verwaltungen anderer Länder viel kleiner. Um mit den erhöhten Belastungen der Präsidentschaft zurechtzukommen, mussten ungefähr 300 Aushilfsbeamte eingestellt und über 250 Studenten als Aushilfskräfte hinzugezogen werden, von denen manche erhebliche Verantwortungen übernahmen. Hinzu kommt, dass Slowenien in einigen Mitgliedstaaten noch immer sehr kleine oder gar keine sowie weltweit nur ganz wenige Botschaften unterhält, was seine Fähigkeiten, bilaterale Kontakte mit den Mitgliedstaaten und Drittländern in den Hauptstädten zu knüpfen und zu pflegen, behindert. In Ljubljana kümmerte sich ein Desk-Officer um mehrere Dossiers gleichzeitig. Slowenien entschied sich für das so genannte Brüssel-basierte Modell der Ratspräsidentschaft (im Unterschied zum Hauptstadt-basierten Modell). In der Folge musste das Personal der Ständigen Vertretung in Brüssel um das Vierfache auf etwa 160 Angestellte aufgestockt werden.

Verglichen mit anderen Ländern, die wie beispielsweise Deutschland in ihrer Ständigen Vertretung in Brüssel unter normalen Bedingungen 175 Angestellte haben, war die Personaldecke dünn. Auch hinsichtlich der institutionellen Erfahrungen und des Verwaltungswissens war bzw. ist die slowenische Regierung benachteiligt, hat sie doch erst in der Zeit der Beitrittsverhandlungen europapolitische Erfahrungen sammeln können. Hinzu kommt, dass viele erfahrene Diplomaten der Verwaltung nicht mehr zur Verfügung standen, da diese nach den Verhandlungen eine andere Arbeit außerhalb der Verwaltung übernommen hatten.

Drittens: Die Rolle der Präsidentschaft ist natürlich auch mit Vorteilen verbunden, und jeder Mitgliedstaat hat seine spezifischen Charakteristiken, die sich in der Funktion des Vorsitzes positiv niederschlagen können. So haben kleinere Staaten weniger spezifische Interessen als große, weshalb sie bei vielen Entscheidungen glaubwürdiger erscheinen können. Dadurch sind ihre Chancen, einen Kompromiss unter den Mitgliedern zu erreichen, größer. Ihre kleinen Verwaltungen haben auch eine positive Seite: Die persönlichen Beziehungen unter den Beamtinnen und Beamten, die nach einem Jobwechsel erhalten bleiben, sind enger, und die Strukturen sind nicht so streng hierarchisch, was die vertikale Kommunikation erleichtert. Kleinere Staaten sind oft auch in ihren Beziehungen zu anderen Mitgliedern sowie zu Drittländern historisch und bilateral weniger belastet. Das erleichtert es ihnen, glaubwürdige Kompromisse vorzuschlagen und zu schließen.

Auf Grund der geringeren Erwartungen an eine große, initiativreiche Präsidentschaft können sie sich bei der



Prioritätensetzung auf Bereiche konzentrieren, in denen sie sich einen Wissens- und Verhandlungsvorteil erarbeitet haben. Hinzu kommt, dass kleinere Länder während der sechs Monate Amtszeit oft auch starke innenpolitische Unterstützung erhalten.

So wurde in Slowenien am 17. Mai 2007 ein "Übereinkommen zur Zusammenarbeit der politischen Parteien, der Gruppe der unabhängigen Abgeordneten und der Repräsentanten der nationalen Minderheiten in der Nationalversammlung der Republik Slowenien für die erfolgreiche Umsetzung der Vorbereitungen und der EU-Präsidentschaft" geschlossen. Mit Ausnahme der Oppositionsparteien Liberaldemokratie Sloweniens und der Slowenischen Nationalpartei haben sich alle Parlamentsparteien zu diesem Übereinkommen, später "Nichtangriffspakt" genannt, verpflichtet.[4]

Slowenien hat auf Grund seines partikulären Interesses oberste Priorität auf den Fortschritt in der Westbalkanpolitik der EU gesetzt. Auf Grund der historischen Beziehungen, der geographischen Nähe und der Sprachkenntnisse sollte das Land für die Führungsrolle in der europäischen Westbalkanpolitik besonders geeignet sein, solange es zwischen seinen Interessen und den europäischen Zielen in diesem Bereich objektiv manövrieren und die eigene Glaubwürdigkeit nicht verlieren würde. Hinsichtlich der "Priorität Klimaschutz und Energie" war Slowenien insofern absolut glaubwürdig, als es einer der am stärksten liberalisierten Staaten - im Sinne der Abspaltung der Transportnetze von den Energiekonzernen - ist, auch keine ausgeprägte Schwerindustrie besitzt und damit auch keine Sonderinteressen auf diesem Gebiet hat.

Eine der größten Herausforderungen stellte für die slowenische Verwaltung die Einigung der Mitglieder in Bezug auf ein Kommissionsmandat für die Verhandlungen über ein neues Abkommen mit Russland dar. Hier besaß Slowenien gute Voraussetzungen: Seine Beziehungen zu Russland sind ausgewogen, historisch nicht belastet, was nicht bei allen neuen Mitgliedern der Fall ist, und es hat auch keine ungelösten Probleme mit jenen Mitgliedstaaten, deren Stellungnahmen zu Russland von der Kompromisslinie abweichen.

Mit ihren, durch die Beitrittsverhandlungen erfahrenen Beamten, von denen einigen Aufgaben in den EU-Institutionen übernommen hatten, konnte die slowenische Verwaltung nicht direkt rechnen. Die Arbeit der Kommissare in der Kommission folgt nicht primär nationalen, sondern vorwiegend europäischen Interessen. Aber die slowenische Regierung konnte doch mit einer besonders guten Zusammenarbeit im Bereich der Lissabon-Strategie mit dem Kabinett von Kommissar Janez Potocnik rechnen.

Kleinere Staaten verhalten sich auf Grund ihrer kleineren Verwaltungen aufgeschlossener gegenüber der Hilfe des Ratssekretariates und der Kommission. Der vorsitzende Staat kontrolliert die Arbeit des Rates, beschließt die Sitzungsperioden und die Tagesordnung jeder Sitzung und legt auch die Schlussfolgerungen vor. Durch direkte Zusammenarbeit mit dem Ratssekretariat können weitere Vorteile seiner Führungsrolle genutzt werden: Das Ratssekretariat kennt die Stellungnahmen anderer Akteure, verfügt über ein Gefühl für die angemessenen Verhandlungstaktiken und hat ein detailliertes Wissen über die Prozeduren; und es steht im Dienste des vorsitzenden Staates. So bietet es ihm die vertraulichen "notes au Président", die Stellungnahmen anderer Mitgliedstaaten und Institutionen, Rats schläge zu Verhandlungstaktiken und eingehende Beschreibung des zu verhandelnden Problems und bereitet auch die Schlussfolgerungen vor. Weiterhin profitiert die Präsidentschaft auch von den so genannten "confessionals", den bilateralen Treffen mit einem Mitgliedstaat, um dessen "wahren Interessen" kennenzulernen. Diese sind nur der Präsidentschaft bekannt, erhellen so den Raum des Möglichen für den Kompromissfindungsprozess und bieten weitere Verhandlungsperspektiven, insbesondere horizontal zwischen verschiedenen Politikfeldern.[5]

Zusammengefasst geht es bei einer Präsidentschaft darum, mit eigenen Schwächen ebenso bewusst umzugehen wie mit eigenen Stärken, um so die Fähigkeit zu erlangen, sich auch in schwierigen Situationen zu bewähren, und mögliche



Hilfsquellen zu identifizieren, um diese zum eigenen Vorteil und damit zugleich dem der Gemeinschaft zu nutzen.

Eine ganz dezente Arbeit

Während der slowenischen Präsidentschaft konnte das dringliche Thema "Energie- und Klimapakete" einen Schritt vorangetrieben werden. Der Kompromiss, der letztendlich am 6. Juni 2008 im Rat beschlossen wurde, ist zwar nicht optimal zu nennen, aber er ist ein Kompromiss, wie viele andere in der EU. Er ermöglicht es der EU, sich im Energiebereich der Versorgungssicherheit zu widmen. Das Netz der Stabilisierungs- und Assoziierungsverträge mit den südosteuropäischen Staaten ist geknüpft, die Region befindet sich wieder an der Spitze der EU-Agenda, und der Dialog um eine Visa-Liberalisierung wurde mit allen Staaten der Region in Gang gesetzt. Der neue Programmzyklus der erneuerten Lissabon-Strategie wurde beim März-Gipfel lanciert, und die EU ist nach der Unabhängigkeitsdeklaration des Kosovo nicht aufgelöst worden. Der Health check der gemeinsamen Agrarpolitik ist fortgeschritten, die Nachbarschaftspolitik in großem Maße ausgewogen, Beziehungen mit Afrika und Asien, auf welche die Trio-Partner Portugal und Deutschland großen Wert gelegt haben, stehen weiterhin in der EU ganz oben auf der Agenda.

Das sind nur einige der nach sechs Monaten slowenischer EU-Ratspräsidentschaft erzielten Ergebnisse. Es wäre sicher falsch zu behaupten, Slowenien hätte diese Fortschritte im Alleingang erreicht. Vielmehr verweisen diese zugleich auf einen "normalen Verlauf der Politik", auf eine funktionierende Organisation und auf die gute Zusammenarbeit zwischen dem vorsitzenden Land, dem Ratssekretariat und der Kommission. Einen etwas breiteren Spielraum für die Einschätzung der Arbeit der Ratspräsidentschaft erlaubt ein Blick auf die erklärten Prioritäten.

Slowenien hat seine Prioritäten in enger Zusammenarbeit mit dem Trio und dem Ratssekretariat festgelegt. Das Ergebnis war eine Mischung aus Notwendigem, Unumgänglichem, Persönlichem und Offensichtlichem.

Die Energie- und Klimafragen und die Lissabon-Strategie gehören zu den beiden ersten (das Notwendige und Unumgängliche), ebenso die Koordinierung der Ratifizierung des Vertrages von Lissabon in den Mitgliedstaaten. Dass weitere Schritte zu einer Annäherung des Westbalkans an die EU eine der obersten Prioritäten Sloweniens während seiner Präsidentschaft sein würde, stand außer Zweifel. Die fünfte der eingangs genannten Prioritäten, der interkulturelle Dialog, lag dem slowenischen Außenminister, Dimitrij Rupel, besonders am Herzen. Als Kultursoziologe erschien ihm Slowenien, geographisch an der Kreuzung des Mittelmeers, Balkan und Mitteleuropa liegend, für die Lancierung eines solchen Dialogs als besonders geeignet.

Zwei der größten Herausforderungen des slowenischen EU-Vorsitzes stellten - wie oben schon erwähnt - die Erzielung der Einigung der Mitgliedstaaten bezüglich eines Kommissionsmandats für die Aufnahme der Verhandlungen über ein neues Abkommen mit Russland, und der mögliche Zerfall Europas dar, als es mit der Unabhängigkeitserklärung des Kosovo konfrontiert wurde.

Die Koordinierung der Ratifizierungen des Lissabon-Vertrages wurde als Priorität vielleicht etwas ungeschickt formuliert (ebenso die erste Maßnahme: der Ratschlag des slowenischen Premierministers Janes Jansa an Portugal, das Referendum zur Ratifizierung besser nicht abzuhalten). Hierbei handelt es sich prinzipiell um eine innenpolitische Angelegenheit jedes Mitgliedstaates. Der Ratifizierungsprozess in den Parlamenten der Mitgliedstaaten hat sich aber insgesamt relativ gut entwickelt. Die Ratifizierung des Vertrages im Unterhaus des britischen Parlaments am 11. März 2008 war eine gute Nachricht, welche die Hoffnungen auf die Ratifizierung im Unterhaus des polnischen Sejm am 2. April 2008 aufrecht erhielt. Demgegenüber sorgte der Rücktritt des irischen Ministerpräsidenten Bertie Ahern für



Aufregung, die sich später als berechtigt erwies. Um den Zeitplan und das slowenische Engagement bei der Koordinierungsrolle positiv beurteilen zu können, hätten laut Premierminister Janes Jansa 20 Länder den Vertrag ratifizieren müssen. Die Zahl wurde erreicht.[6]

Obwohl oft berichtet und kritisiert wurde, dass viele Entscheidungen auf EU-Ebene, welche die Ratifizierung in Irland negativ hätten beeinflussen können, vertagt wurden - die Ratifizierung in Irland befand sich außerhalb der Reichweite der Koordinierungsrolle des Vorsitzes und auch außerhalb jedes europäischen Einflusses.

Der als fünfte Priorität genannte "interkulturelle Dialog" enthielt keine ausformulierten Ziele. Es ging dabei um die Symbolik und die Steigerung des Bewusstseins für die Vielfalt der Kulturen. Mehrere Veranstaltungen zum Thema wurden in Slowenien und anderen Ländern organisiert. Als die Regierung die Organisation des im Rahmen der Veranstaltungen geplanten Roma-Kongresses auf Grund der verspäteten Anmeldung - was durchaus ein glaubwürdiges Argument war - ablehnte, löste das Kritik über die Glaubwürdigkeit Sloweniens hinsichtlich der gesetzten Prioritäten aus.[7] Jedoch wurde das Motto des interkulturellen Dialogs horizontal in relevanten Dossiers, in der Arbeit des Rates, von Seiten des slowenischen Vorsitzenden, der Ratsgruppen sowie von Seiten höherer Diplomaten konsistent als Referenz genutzt. Jenseits jeder Symbolik hat sich die slowenische Regierung, insbesondere Premierminister Janes Jansa, mit Blick auf diese Priorität stark für die Errichtung einer Europa-Mittelmeer-Universität mit dem Sitz in der slowenischen Küstenstadt Piran eingesetzt. Die Universität wurde am 9. Juni 2008 feierlich eingeweiht.

Die Erneuerung der Lissabon-Strategie wurde debattenlos auf dem März-Gipfel beschlossen. Die Schaffung der "fünften Grundfreiheit" - freier Verkehr von Wissen - ist eine Folge guter Zusammenarbeit mit der Kommission, besonders mit dessen Kommissar Janez Potoènik. Jedoch konnten kritische Stimmen damit nicht beruhigt werden, besonders jene aus dem Europäischen Parlament, die schon bei der Auswahl der Prioritäten und später auch im Laufe der Präsidentschaft einen Mangel an sozialen Aspekten im Programm der slowenischen Ratspräsidentschaft beklagten.

Das "Energie- und Klimapaket" stellte für jeden Mitgliedstaat eine harte Bewährungsprobe dar. Die knappe Zeit zwischen der Veröffentlichung des Kommissionsberichts im Januar 2008 und dem Gipfel im März 2008 wurde in der Öffentlichkeit oft als die größte Herausforderung bzw. als größtes Hindernis genannt. Dieser Engpass erwies sich aber als vorteilhaft: Dass die Mitgliedstaaten nicht genug Zeit zum Studium der Unterlagen hatten, ermöglichte die Präsidentschaft, auf die Karte der Kommissionsexpertise zu setzen. Damit ist es ihr gelungen, beim März-Gipfel, der sich fast nur mit diesem Thema (und ein wenig noch mit dem französischen Vorschlag einer Mittelmeerunion) befasste, auf höchster Ebene der Regierungschefs eine offene Debatte zu leiten, und so den Raum für einen möglichen Kompromiss auszuloten. Der Kompromissvorschlag der Präsidentschaft wurde am 6. Juni 2008 dem Transport-, Telekommunikations- und Energierat vorgelegt - und von diesem gebilligt. Auch wenn es sich dabei in Bezug auf die Ziele der Union in der Energie- und Klimapolitik nicht um eine optimale Lösung handelt, wurde doch rechtzeitig ein Kompromiss erzielt.[8]

Ein wichtiges Ziel der slowenischen Präsidentschaft bestand darin, das Mandat der Kommission für die Aufnahme der Verhandlungen über ein neues Abkommen mit Russland zu erreichen. Viele neue Mitgliedstaaten waren von der Ernsthaftigkeit des slowenischen Engagements überrascht. Slowenien sah sich auf Grund seiner guten Beziehungen und unbelasteten Geschichte besonders gut dazu in der Lage, den Vorsitz mit einer symbolischen Eröffnung der Verhandlungen über ein neues Abkommen beim EU-Russland Gipfel - dem letzten großen Ereignis der Präsidentschaft - abzuschließen. Die russische Verwaltung setzte große Hoffnungen auf den slowenischen Vorsitz. Für sie war es psychologisch wichtig, dass zum ersten Mal eine slawische Regierung den Vorsitz hatte, was nichts an ihrer harschen Kritik der slowenischen Behandlung des Kosovo-Problems änderte.



Ein russischer Diplomat bezeichnete Slowenien als das Problem. Die Motivation, das Verhandlungsmandat zu erreichen, war dafür umso größer. Nachdem Polen sein Veto aufgehoben hatte, war Litauen der einzige Mitgliedstaat, der noch stärker zu einem Kompromiss bewegt werden musste. Der slowenische Außenminister, Dimitrij Rupel, startete eine Mission, die an die Zwangsdiplomatie einiger Großmächte erinnerte. Zusammen mit dem schwedischen Außenminister Carl Bildt und dessen polnischen Kollegen Radoslaw Sikorski besuchte er in Vilnius den litauischen Premierminister Gediminas Kirkilas und Außenminister Petras Vaitekunas. Mit der Karte der litauischen Freundschaft zu Georgien in der Hand drohte er nach der Eskalation der Beziehungen zwischen Georgien und Russland mit der Absage einer Erkundungsmission nach Tbilisi.

Einen Tag später flogen alle vier Außenminister zusammen nach Tbilisi, Minister Dimitrij Rupel mit litauischen Konzessionen in der Tasche.[9] Das merkwürdige Trio hat ein wenig Verdrossenheit unter den europäischen Partnern verursacht, aber da es sich um interne europäische Politik und nicht um ein besonderes Format in der Außenvertretung der EU handelte, konnte Slowenien kein Regelbruch vorgeworfen werden.

Die Unabhängigkeitserklärung des Kosovo war keine Überraschung; es war längst klar, dass eine Einstimmigkeit bezüglich der Anerkennung des Kosovo (das Recht, das die Mitgliedstaaten - und nicht die EU - besitzen) unter den Mitgliedern schwer möglich sein würde. Die Europäische Gemeinschaft hatte sich bereits bei der Frage der Anerkennung Sloweniens und Kroatiens im Jahr 1991 gespalten und Slowenien wollte eine Wiederholung vermeiden. Dimitrij Rupel betonte mehrmals, wie wichtig es sei, sich in dieser Frage zu einigen. Die einzig mögliche Lösung bestand darin, die Einigkeit auf einer anderen Ebene, nicht bei der Anerkennung selbst, zu erzielen. Sich einig zu sein, dass man sich nicht einigen kann, wie sich die Ratsbeschlüsse zu diesem Thema lesen mögen, mag in diplomatischen Kreisen als leere Floskel erscheinen. Aber es ist sicher glaubwürdiger, das Gewicht und die Aufmerksamkeit von "diplomatischem Gerede" hin zu engagierten und sachlichen Maßnahmen zu verschieben.

Schwerpunkt Westbalkan?

Sachlichkeit in der Westbalkanpolitik war für Slowenien äußerst wichtig. Dass die weiteren Schritte in Richtung einer Annäherung des Westbalkans an die EU eine der großen Prioritäten Sloweniens während seiner Präsidentschaft sein würden, stand von vornherein fest. Im Gegensatz zu den anderen Hauptprioritäten der slowenischen Präsidentschaft (mit der Ausnahme des interkulturellen Dialogs) ist die Politik gegenüber dem Westbalkan weniger an andere politische und legislative Prozesse in der EU gebunden; sie stößt eher auf unterschiedliche Prinzipien und Interessen. Bei der Führung in diesem Bereich musste sich Slowenien sowohl mit unerwarteten wie auch befürchteten Prozessen auseinandersetzen, ohne den allgemeinen Rahmen der Westbalkanpolitik der EU zu verlassen.

Wie eingangs erwähnt, schien Slowenien wegen seiner gemeinsamen Geschichte, Sprachkenntnisse und geographischen Nähe für die Führung der EU in ihrer Westbalkanpolitik besonders geeignet. Der slowenische Außenminister Dimitrij Rupel hatte wiederholt darauf hingewiesen, dass es in Europa an Kenntnissen über das Gebiet mangle. Nicht alle waren davon überzeugt, dass Slowenien über diese verfüge. Selbst der slowenische Präsident, Danilo Türk, äußerte seine Zweifel an der besonderen Kompetenzen Sloweniens auf diesem Gebiet, zumindest was die Kosovo-Frage angehe. Die slowenische Regierung versuchte, dem unter anderem mit der Gründung eines Forschungszentrums (Zentrum für die europäische Perspektive) und zahlreicher anderer Aktivitäten zu begegnen. Es wurde frühzeitig - schon in der zweiten Hälfte 2005 - damit begonnen, eine Strategie gegenüber dem Westbalkan für die Zeit des Vorsitzes zu entwickeln. Dimitrij Rupel reiste im späten Oktober 2007 nach Belgrad, Skopje und Pristina und



verpflichtete Slowenien zur Unterstützung Serbiens und der Ehemaligen Jugoslawischen Republik Mazedonien[10] in ihren Bemühungen, den nächsten Schritt bei der Annäherung an die EU zu tun, sowie zur Unterstützung einer weiteren Erweiterung der Union. Das Außenministerium hatte einige Tage vorher eine Erklärung bezüglich der slowenischen Prinzipien und Ziele in ihrer Westbalkanpolitik veröffentlicht, in der es die Wichtigkeit Serbiens für die Stabilität in der Region betonte und dem Land eine breite Unterstützung anbot. Die Unterstützung Sloweniens wurde auch durch ein Schreiben des Premierministers Janes Jansa an den Europäischen Rat im vergangenen September deutlich. Darin plädierte Jansa unter anderem für eine schnelle Annäherung Serbiens an die EU. Das mag im Rahmen der EU-Politik ungeschickt gewesen sein und wurde in Brüsseler Kreisen kühl aufgenommen, aber es zeigte Serbien, dass Slowenien bereit ist, sich ernsthaft einzusetzen. Mit Blick auf die Unabhängigkeitsbestrebungen des Kosovo wurde der slowenischen Regierung bald bewusst, dass sie zwischen traditioneller Unterstützung des Kosovo und den wirtschaftlichen und anderen Interessen Serbiens wädeln müsste, möglichst ohne an Glaubwürdigkeit in der Europapolitik zu verlieren.

Erstens: Die Kosovo-Frage sollte von der Frage der Schließung eines Assoziierungsabkommens mit Serbien auf der Tagesordnung getrennt behandelt werden. Das wurde ohne Gegenstimmen an den zwei Treffen des Rates für Allgemeine Angelegenheiten und Außenbeziehungen in Januar und Februar beschlossen.

Zweitens: In der Kosovo-Frage war eine Einigkeit in der EU dringend erforderlich, wenn deren Balkanpolitik nicht wieder in die Kritik geraten und die EU als handlungsunfähig dargestellt werden sollte und wenn die Region nicht (viel stärkeren) Kräften - einer Fünfer-Gruppe (Frankreich, Deutschland, Italien, Großbritannien und die USA), dem Amt des Hohen Repräsentanten oder der Lenkungsgruppe des Rates für die Umsetzung des Friedens - überlassen werden sollte. Damit wären womöglich weitere Prozesse in der Westbalkanpolitik der EU gefährdet. Das ist, wie schon oben gezeigt, gelungen.

Drittens: Es durfte nicht dazu kommen, dass Serbien von seinem Weg nach Europa abweicht. Viel Kreativität wurde besonders rangniedrigen Diplomaten abverlangt und mit Erfolg eingesetzt, um die Präsenz Serbiens in Brüssel beizubehalten. Erst danach konnte sich die slowenische Präsidentschaft allein auf ihre Ziele konzentrieren.

Die beiden wichtigsten Ziele in Bezug auf den Westbalkan bestanden darin, den Ring der Assoziierungsabkommen mit allen Staaten der Region zu schließen und den Dialog über Visa-Liberalisierungen mit allen zu beginnen. Beide Ziele wurden, wenngleich nicht ohne Mühe, erreicht. In Januar 2008 scheiterte die Unterzeichnung des Abkommens mit Serbien am niederländischen Veto. Das politische Abkommen, das auf Initiative Großbritanniens und der Niederlande vorbereitet worden war, wurde - zur Erleichterung vieler - von Seiten Serbiens abgelehnt. Ein neuer Kompromiss, der die Unterzeichnung des Abkommens erlaubte, ohne die etablierten Prinzipien aufgeben zu müssen, gelang später. Das Abkommen wird erst dann in Kraft treten, wenn es alle EU-Mitgliedstaaten, überzeugt von der serbischen Zusammenarbeit mit dem Internationalen Strafgerichtshof für das ehemalige Jugoslawien, ratifizieren. Die Polizeireform, die das letzte Hindernis zur Unterzeichnung des Abkommens mit Bosnien und Herzegowina darstellte, wurde - in ihrer geschwächten Form - endlich akzeptiert. Die Vorbereitung des Abkommens hat länger gedauert als sich die Präsidentschaft gewünscht hatte. Die Übersetzung in alle EU-Amtssprachen und in die drei Sprachen in Bosnien und Herzegowina wurde schließlich vollzogen; das Abkommen war Ende Mai 2008 unterschriftsbereit.

Neben diesen beiden wichtigsten Erfolgen sind während der slowenischen Präsidentschaft auch viele sektorale Initiativen lanciert und einige Projekte realisiert worden. Die so genannte Bled-Initiative inkorporierte die Staaten des Westbalkans in den europäischen Rahmen der Zusammenarbeit im Bereich des Zivilschutzes. Um den wirtschaftlichen Fortschritt in der Region zu beschleunigen, wurden Vorbereitungen für einen Westbalkaninvestitionsrahmen getroffen.



Auch die Verhandlungen über den Vertrag zur Gründung einer Verkehrsgemeinschaft mit den Ländern des Westbalkans begannen in dieser Zeit. Schließlich wurde die Absichtserklärung zur Gründung einer Regionalschule für Verwaltung von Beamten aus Albanien, Montenegro, Serbien, Bosnien und Herzegowina, Kroatien, Mazedonien und Kosovo unterzeichnet.

Fazit

Die Arbeit in der EU ist während des slowenischen Vorsitzes ganz normal verlaufen. Von kleineren Ungeschicklichkeiten abgesehen, wurden keine größeren Fehler gemacht. Damit unterscheidet sich die slowenische Präsidentschaft nicht von anderen Präsidentschaften. Es lässt sich also festhalten, dass Slowenien dem symbolischen Wert seiner Präsidentschaft voll entsprochen hat. Das junge Land, sich seiner Schwächen (vielleicht zu) bewusst, ist einerseits mit vielen Themen eher zu bescheiden umgegangen und setzte sich andererseits (manchmal auch zu aggressiv) engagiert für die Erreichung der Ziele im Bezug zum Westbalkan ein. Die Hauptziele wurden erreicht, zahlreiche Initiativen und Projekte erfolgreich lanciert. Der Präsidentschaft ist es allerdings nicht gelungen, Mazedonien dazu zu bewegen, die notwendigen Schritte zur Festsetzung eines Anfangsdatums der Beitrittsverhandlungen einzuleiten. Es bleibt weiterhin viel Arbeit, um die Region politisch und wirtschaftlich voranzubringen, und Slowenien sollte gelernt haben, wie es als "ganz normaler" EU-Mitgliedstaat auf die Westbalkanpolitik der EU und die EU-Politik im Allgemeinen einwirken kann.

Fußnoten

- 1 Vgl. Kai-Olaf Lang/Tomislav Marsic, Eine Präsidentschaft der ruhigen Hand? Anspruch und raue Wirklichkeit des slowenischen Ratsvorsitzes, in: SWP-Aktuell, 2008/A 12, Berlin 2008; in: Charlemagne: A Balkan Fable), The Economist, 6. Dezember 2007.
- 2 Der vorliegende analytische Rahmen bezieht sich auf die Abhandlung in Sabina Kajncs, Slovenian Presidency: coming about of the 16th member-state, Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid 2008 (i. E.). Der Artikel konzentriert sich auf die Zusammenarbeit im Rahmen der Trio-Präsidentschaft.
- 3 Vgl. zu den Rollen der Ratspräsidentschaft Helen Wallace/ Geoffrey Edwards, European Community. The Evolving Role of the Presidency of the Council, in: International Affairs, 53 (1976) 4, S. 535 - 550; Daniela Kietz/Volker Perthes, Handlungsspielräume einer EU-Ratspräsidentschaft. Eine Funktionsanalyse des deutschen Vorsitzes im ersten Halbjahr 2007, SWP Studie 24, Berlin 2007.
- 4 Innenpolitische Unsicherheit, inklusive eines Misstrauensvotums vom November 2008 und die bereits während der Präsidentschaft begonnene Wahlkampagne für die Parlamentswahlen im September 2008 stellen den Wert dieses Übereinkommen jedoch in Frage. Vgl. Danica Fink-Hafner/Damjan Lajh, The 2008 Slovenian EU Presidency. A New Synergy for Europe?, A Midterm Report, Stockholm 2008.
- 5 Vgl. Jonas Tallberg, The Power of the Presidency: Brokerage, Efficiency and Distribution in EU negotiations, in: Journal of Common Market Studies, 42 (2004), S. 999 - 1022.
- 6 Obwohl bis Ende Juni nur elf Staaten ihre Ratifikationsurkunde bei der italienischen Regierung in Rom hintergelegt haben.
- 7 Vgl. Irena Brinar, Slovenia's EU Presidency: ‚Si.nergy for Europe` , ARI 41, Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid 2008.
- 8 Dass es nicht um eine optimale Lösung ging, wurde schnell vom Europäischen Parlament bestätigt, als es bei der Plenarsitzung am 18. Juni 2008 den Kompromiss ablehnte und sich für den Originalvorschlag der Kommission aussprach.
- 9 Zwei Tage später, am 13. Mai 2008, konnte die Einigkeit auf der Ebene der Ständigen Vertreter wieder nicht erreicht werden. Der litauische Ständige Vertreter musste noch einmal die Hauptstadt konsultieren. Am 26. Mai 2008 wurde



dann Einigkeit im Rat für Allgemeine Angelegenheiten und Außenbeziehungen hergestellt.

10 Wenn im Folgenden nur von Mazedonien die Rede ist, ist immer die Ehemalige Jugoslawische Republik Mazedonien gemeint.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Bauer Michael W.

Diffuse anxieties, deprived entrepreneurs: Commission reform and middle management
in *Journal of European Public Policy* , Volume 15 Issue 5 2008 , 691 - 707

There is consensus that the Kinnock reform changed the European Commission considerably. However, scholars have focused mainly on describing the process, content, and scope of the reform. There is as yet little empirical research about the effects this reform may have. This paper puts forward an argument as regards the link between reform effects and policy output. In order to do so, it focuses on the new role of middle management, i.e. the heads of unit. A survey of more than 100 heads of unit of policy-making Directorates-General serves as the empirical basis. The data indicate a substantial ambiguity of the heads of unit towards recent organizational change. As a consequence of the reform, the Commission will probably become more inward-looking and previously crucial policy entrepreneurs will have less time and other resources for advocating policy content than in the past.

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Direct democracy and the European Union? is that a threat or a promise?
in *Common Market Law Review* , issue 4, vol. 45 , 929-940

No abstract available

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Direct democracy and the European Union? is that a threat or a promise?
in *Common Market Law Review* , issue 4, vol. 45 , 929-940

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

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Culpepper Pepper D., Fung Archon

Do all bridges collapse? Possibilities for democracy in the European Union
in *Politische Vierteljahresschrift* , Heft 4, 48. Jahrgang, Dezember , 730-739



ABSTRACT: Aus dem Scheitern des EU-Verfassungsvertrages abzuleiten, dass jegliche Reform, die auf steigende Bürgerbeteiligung zielt, in der Europäischen Union zum Scheitern verurteilt sei, wäre verfrüht. Mit seiner stringenten Zurückweisung des Verfassungsprojekts begeht Andrew Moravcsik diesen Fehler. Seine Behauptungen, gestützt auf das, was er empirische Sozialwissenschaft nennt, gehen weit über die Erkenntnisse hinaus, die über demokratische institutionelle Innovationen vorliegen. Partizipative Methoden wie z. B. konsultative Bürgerversammlungen können die Ansichten der Bürger durchaus artikulieren und dazu beitragen, die demokratische Legitimität der EU zu verankern. Wir wissen nicht, ob solche Methoden in der Lage sind, das Demokratiedefizit der EU zu beheben, aber wir wissen sehr wohl, dass die empirische Sozialwissenschaft sich noch nicht abschließend zu dieser Angelegenheit geäußert hat. Es ist daher besser, das demokratische Potenzial solcher Methoden zu untersuchen, als solche Versuche von vornherein zurückzuweisen.

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Padoa-Schioppa Antonio

Dopo il voto irlandese

in *Mulino (il)*, n. 4, luglio-agosto, 2008

ABSTRACT: È possibile una doppia geometria istituzionale per l'Unione europea. Una scelta del genere renderebbe compatibile l'attuale assetto istituzionale e decisionale (ma anche quello del trattato di Lisbona) con l'iniziativa di un nucleo di Paesi dell'Unione che intendano adottare per tutte le politiche di competenza dell'Unione – in particolare per bilancio, fiscalità, politica estera, difesa, ambiente, incluse le future riforme dei trattati – il principio maggioritario e il ruolo di codecisione del Parlamento europeo. In questo modo ciascuno degli Stati dell'Unione si troverebbe a dover scegliere tra l'adesione, il recesso e l'opting out, ma preannunciando in caso di rifiuto l'intento di dare vita a un nuovo trattato limitato ai soli Stati proponenti. Il che presuppone una rinnovata volontà politica pro-europea da parte di alcuni governi (tra i quali Francia e Germania) e la promozione attiva di un diverso rapporto tra la sovranità popolare e le scelte dell'Unione europea.

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Collignon Stefan

Dopo la Strategia di Lisbona, un programma di riforme democratiche e progressiste

in *ItalianiEuropei*, n. 3

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Jacqué Jean-Paul

Du Traité constitutionnel au Traité de Lisbonne. Tableau d'une négociation

in *Revue du droit public et de la science politique en France et à l'étranger*, n.3 , 822-831

No abstract available



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Charles-Le Bihan Danielle, Moriceau Aurélie

Du Traité constitutionnel au Traité modificatif de Lisbonne. Deuxième partie: Coups de projecteur "sur les valeurs de l'Union"

in *Revue de l'Union européenne/Revue du Marché Commun et de l'Union européenne*, n. 519, juin , 356-364

In the terms of article 2 TUE as reformed by the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Union is based on values which its aims to promote on internal and international levels. These values make up its identity and any European State wishing to become a Member is required to respect them. Thus these values, pursuant to article 2 TUE, are a priori common values for Member States. Is the enumeration of article 2 TUE exhaustive? And are these values really common with regard to the new legal context established by the Treaty of Lisbon? Two contributions (Danielle Charles Le Bihan, "Services d'intérêt économique général et valeurs communes"; Aurélie Moriceau, "Le Traité de Lisbonne et la Charte des Droits Fondamentaux"), each in their own way, provide partial answers to these questions.

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Bosse-Platière Isabelle, Michéa Frédérique, Hervé Alan

Du Traité constitutionnel au Traité modificatif de Lisbonne. Troisième partie: Coups de projecteur "sur l'efficacité de l'Union"

in *Revue de l'Union européenne/Revue du Marché Commun et de l'Union européenne*, n. 520, juillet-août , 442-450

The mandate of the IGC 2007 invited it to write up a treaty to modify current treaties, in particular with a view to "reinforce the effectiveness of the enlarged Union". The issue of the Union's effectiveness is of course intimately connected with the voting terms decided on for the adoption of acts, legislative or otherwise. How the Treaty of Lisbon decides on qualified majority voting thus quite naturally forms part of the points addressed in this issue. If the two other points, relating to jurisdictions on the one hand and to the primacy of the Union's law on the other; on the face of it, appear to be less closely related to the question of effectiveness, they are nonetheless far from having no impact on some of its declensions. The way primacy is envisaged is indeed likely to have consequences for the penetration power of the Union's law in national legal orders, that is to say, in some way, for the effectiveness of this law. In the same way, The Union meeting more or less successfully, more or less rapidly, the various objectives assigned to it, depends on the lot assigned to the Union's jurisdictions. There again, the Union's effectiveness is implicitly at stake.

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Delcourt Christine, Le Barbier-Le Bris Muriel

Du traité constitutionnel au traité modificatif de Lisbonne. Quatrième partie - Coups de projecteur "sur la démocratisation de l'Union"

in *Revue de l'Union européenne/Revue du Marché Commun et de l'Union européenne*, n. 521, septembre , 490-498

The Irish no, far from questioning the timeliness of a reflection on the Treaty of Lisbon, increases the advantage thereof,



in some way. Ideed, it prompts questions on the contemplated Union operation democratisation terms. That is precisely the subject discussed in this fourth section. Thus the purpose of the following two contributions is to assess the scope of some changes introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon, which are intimately related to the democracy issue.

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European Economy News

EMU: looking forward to the next decade

in *European Economy News*, June 2008 - Issue 10

The overall mood was one of resounding success as the Brussels Economic Forum got under way with its first session, 'Growth and Employment in Europe – Assessing Ten Years of EMU'. Figures past and present from the history of the euro came together to discuss achievements and unfinished business arising from EMU's historic first decade.

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European Economy News

EMU@10

in *European Economy News*, June 2008 - Issue 10

As we celebrate the first decade of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) we should remember that the launch of EMU and the euro ten years ago marked a watershed in European integration.

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Peers Steve

EU Criminal Law and the Treaty of Lisbon

in *European Law Review*, Vol. 33, n. 4 , 507-529

No abstract available

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Baldwin Richard

EU Institutional Reform: Evidence on Globalization and International Cooperation

in *American Economic Review*, Vol. 98, No. 2, May 2008 , 127-132

The article investigates the impact of economic integration within the European Union (EU) on economic policymaking of member nations. After a brief discussion of how EU decision-making functions, the author surveys qualitative evidence of integration within the EU, then presents a model for the supply and demand of EU laws, which he estimates using annual data for the period 1985-2002. He concludes that economic integration within Europe has encouraged member



nations to more closely cooperate on economic policymaking.

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Schimmelfennig Frank

EU political accession conditionality after the 2004 enlargement: consistency and effectiveness

in *Journal of European Public Policy* , Volume 15 Issue 6 2008 , 918 - 937

Has the EU's political accession conditionality changed after the enlargement of 2004 against the backdrop of apparent 'enlargement fatigue' and domestic obstacles in the remaining non-member countries? Based on an empirical analysis of non-member eligibility and EU discrimination, this article concludes that EU enlargement policy has remained consistently linked to compliance with basic democratic norms in the target countries. The recent drawbacks in the negotiations of the EU with Croatia, Serbia, and Turkey have been caused by issues of national identity related to legacies of ethnic conflict that are likely to create high political costs to the target governments. As a result, whereas consistency has remained high, effectiveness is reduced. The findings confirm the continuing relevance of the external incentives model of EU conditionality after the recent enlargement

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Syrpis Phil -Novitz Tonia

Economic and social rights in conflict: political and judicial approaches to their reconciliation

in *European Law Review* , Vol. 33, n. 3 , 411-426

No abstract available

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López Escudero Manuel

El Banco Central Europeo en el Tratado de Lisboa

in *Revista de Derecho Constitucional Europeo* , n. 9

Al encontrarse aún la Unión Económica y Monetaria en plena fase de implantación, es lógico que el proceso de reforma del derecho originario abierto con la elaboración del Tratado Constitucional y parece que cerrado con el Tratado de Lisboa no haya introducido modificaciones revolucionarias en su articulación jurídica. No obstante, el Tratado de Lisboa sí aporta algunas modificaciones respecto al Sistema Europeo de Bancos Centrales y al Banco Central Europeo, que son objeto de análisis en este trabajo.

El Tratado de Lisboa integra al BCE en el marco institucional de la Unión y lo incluye entre las instituciones (nuevo art. 13.1 TUE), aunque su funcionamiento únicamente se regula en el TFUE, junto con las disposiciones detalladas sobre las demás instituciones. De esta manera se pone fin a una controversia doctrinal y se clarifica la ubicación del BCE en la estructura institucional de la UE.



Otra novedad es la inclusión en el apartado primero del artículo 282 TFUE del concepto de Eurosistema, acuñado por el propio BCE para referirse al conjunto formado por el BCE y los bancos centrales nacionales de la zona euro. El Eurosistema es el responsable de la política monetaria única y su inclusión está en consonancia con el reforzamiento que el Tratado de Lisboa lleva a cabo respecto a la autonomía de los países de la zona euro.

No obstante, los objetivos, la independencia y los poderes del BCE permanecen casi intactos con el Tratado de Lisboa, ya que se trata de un banco central joven y en plena fase de afirmación, que acaba de cumplir sus diez primeros años de vida con notable éxito.

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Maestro Buelga Gonzalo

El Tratado de Lisboa y la Constitución económica
in *Revista de Derecho Constitucional Europeo* , n. 9

Este trabajo pretende hacer balance del debate sobre la constitución económica en los Tratados, tal y como resultan de la reforma de Lisboa. La reflexión incorpora una doble perspectiva: la de la constitución económica, estricto sensu, y la del "modelo social europeo". Debe destacarse la continuidad de la constitución económica con las versiones anteriores de los Tratados, sin que quepa otorgar una especial trascendencia a la fórmula "economía social de mercado altamente competitiva". Más aún, la reciente jurisprudencia del TJCE evidencia la fuerte centralidad del mercado en el modelo, introduciendo una asimetría, incluso, entre las libertades económicas y la libre circulación de trabajadores. La constitución económica multinivel evidencia la tensión entre la intervención económica disciplinaria, tendente a la protección del modelo y la relación interterritorial, concebida como espacio de competencia. De la que se resiente la integración social.

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Álvarez Rubio Juan José

El Tratado de Lisboa y la plena comunitarización del espacio de libertad, seguridad y justicia
in *Revista Electrónica de Estudios Internacionales*, Numero 15/2008

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

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Häberle Peter

El Tratado de Reforma de Lisboa de 2007
in *Revista de Derecho Constitucional Europeo* , n. 9

En este trabajo se realiza un análisis de las características esenciales del Tratado de Lisboa, suscrito el 13 de diciembre de 2007 y cuya entrada en vigor estaba prevista para el 1 de enero de 2009 (antes del referéndum de ratificación celebrado en Irlanda el 12 de junio de 2008, con resultado negativo). Por un lado, se señalan sus aspectos



negativos, entre los que se destacan la supresión del término «Constitución», la eliminación de los símbolos constitucionales y la pérdida de sistemática en relación con el Tratado Constitucional, lo que le aleja de la ciudadanía. Se indica, no obstante, por el autor, que la Teoría constitucional europea no está vinculada por las definiciones que realicen los redactores de Tratados y que los nuevos Tratados son materialmente constitucionales. Igualmente, se hace notar que la eliminación de los símbolos constitucionales carece de eficacia, ya que siguen siendo los símbolos de la Unión Europea. Por lo que se refiere a los aspectos positivos, se señalan también diversas aportaciones como son, entre otras, la confirmación de los valores y objetivos de la Unión, la determinación del carácter jurídicamente vinculante de la Carta de los Derechos Fundamentales, las reformas institucionales y la profundización en el proceso de democratización. En definitiva, se valora al Tratado de Lisboa como un texto de transición que puede marcar un nuevo anillo de crecimiento constitucional de la Unión, a pesar de sus deficiencias. El Tratado no reduce, sino que incrementa la competencia de una «Teoría constitucional europea» que, ciertamente, en última instancia, deberá ser escrita desde la perspectiva de los 27 Estados miembros y sus correspondientes comunidades científicas nacionales.

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Arnold Rainer

El Tratado de Reforma de Lisboa: algunas reflexiones desde la perspectiva alemana
in *Revista de Derecho Constitucional Europeo* , n. 9

Después del fracaso del Proyecto de Constitución Europea y del subsiguiente bloqueo al proceso de integración europea, la Presidencia alemana del Consejo consiguió volver a activarlo por medio del Tratado de Reforma de Lisboa, un procedimiento internacional tradicional de reforma de los Tratados originarios, del que se suprimen los elementos característicos de la estatalidad que sí que aparecían en la Constitución. El autor analiza en este artículo en qué aspectos se manifiesta principalmente la influencia alemana en esta fase de la integración europea: la protección de los derechos fundamentales, sobre todo a través de la Carta Europea de Derechos Fundamentales de la Unión, a un nivel que se corresponde con el garantizado en la Ley Fundamental de Bonn; el reparto de competencias entre la Unión Europea y los Estados Miembros, con el principio de subsidiariedad como correctivo más político que jurídico; y el respeto a la estructura constitucional básica de cada Estado Miembro como elemento esencial integrante de su identidad y límite a la actuación del poder comunitario

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Haghighi Sanam S.

Energy Security and the Division of Competences between the European Community and its Member States
in *European law journal*, July 2008 - Volume 14 Issue 4 - , 461-482

Securing energy supply for Europe has been for decades at the forefront of the energy policies of individual European Community member countries. However, dealing with energy issues in general and securing energy supply in particular is a new phenomenon within the EU's regulatory framework. One important issue which has not yet been discussed by legal scholars and which has been questioned repeatedly by energy experts, is the question who is actually responsible to guarantee security of energy supply in Europe? Is it the European Community alone? Is it the Member States alone? Or is it both? This question cannot be answered without a detailed legal analysis of the EU law in general, and EU law on division of competences between the Community and the Member States in particular. This article seeks to highlight



the complications of this area of law within the EU and expand it to cover the energy sector in order to determine who and under what circumstances is responsible for guaranteeing security of energy supply for the consumers within the EU borders.

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Peterson John

Enlargement, reform and the European Commission. Weathering a perfect storm?

in *Journal of European Public Policy* , Volume 15 Issue 5 2008 , 761-780

Peterson John

The European Commission may be the world's most powerful international administration. However, the notion that it has been in decline since the resignation of the Santer Commission in 1999 has become accepted wisdom. This analysis asks whether radical internal reforms and the European Union (EU) enlargements of 2004-07 add up to a sort of perfect storm, accelerating the Commission's decay. Recent changes have been dramatic and, in some ways, traumatic. Yet, in some respects, the internal reforms and enlargement are likely to yield a more modern Commission better able to add value to new forms of network governance. Ultimately, there is evidence to suggest that the Commission has become a more intergovernmental institution: less autonomous but more integrated into the EU system. Crucially, however, the very notion of 'intergovernmental' requires redefinition in the new EU.

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Belke Ansgar, Spies Julia

Enlarging the EMU to the east: what effects on trade?

in *Empirica: Journal of Applied Economics and Economic Policy* , Volume 35, Number 4 , 369-389

he purpose of this article is to assess the implications of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) accession of eight Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) on their share of EMU-12 imports. Overcoming biases related to endogeneity, omitted variables and sample selection, our results indicate that the common currency has boosted intra-EMU imports by 7%. Under the assumption that the same relationship between the explanatory variables and imports will hold for EMU-CEEC trade, we intend to predict the future impact of the Euro. Our findings suggest that except for the least integrated countries, Poland, Latvia and Lithuania, all CEECs can expect increases in the EMU-12 import share.

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Política Exterior

Europa saldrá del atolladero

in *Política Exterior* , 124



Lo ocurrido en Irlanda es un grave inconveniente y una nueva frustración, pero no modificará las grandes bases de Europa. No confundimos los deseos con los hechos: sería excesivo que 862.415 votos de una isla atlántica retorciera el brazo de 500 millones de europeos, asociados en un proyecto de civilización. Quizá la UE necesite dar dos ambiciosas zancadas antes de 2010. Un avance decisivo, por una parte, en su política exterior y de seguridad. Por otra, una respuesta de todos los europeos: no de una fracción mínima de ellos, sino de centenares de millones de ciudadanos. Si en los 27 países miembros se contestara a una misma pregunta, sí o no al Tratado de Lisboa, sólo en ese caso podría hablarse de un gran respaldo popular.

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Kiyak Mely

Europa: Die Villa mit fünf Sternen - Essay

in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, Band 35-36

Quelle:

<http://www.bpb.de/publikationen/HU0G0L.html>

Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte (APuZ 35-36/2008)

Europa: Die Villa mit fünf Sternen - Essay

Mely Kiyak

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Sichtbare und unsichtbare Grenzen

Trugbilder

Einleitung

Das erste Mal begegnete mir Europa als Synonym, als ich mit meinem Onkel auf einer Wolldecke in einem anatolischen Tal lag. Mit einem Grashalm im Mundwinkel murmelte er:

Europa ist eine Villa mit fünf Sternen. Und was bringt Dein Vater Jahr für Jahr mit? Parfümierte Seife! Ich brauche modernes Werkzeug, von mir aus kann er die Geräte vorher auch eincremen.

Aber Onkel, Papa wohnt nicht in Europa, sondern in Deutschland. Vielleicht ist das der Grund.



Deutschland, Europa, wo ist da der Unterschied?

Zur Person

Mely Kiyak

Geb. 1976; Studium am Deutschen Literatur-Institut Leipzig; freie Journalistin, u.a. für "Die Zeit", "Frankfurter Rundschau", "Die Welt" und "Spiegel Special".

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Mein Onkel verstand Europa immer geografisch. Demzufolge wären die 3 Prozent der Türkei, die sich auf der europäischen Kontinentalplatte befanden, ebenfalls Europa. Der europäische Teil von Istanbul wäre genauso Europa wie Schweden. Im europäischen Istanbul lebten und leben Menschen aus besseren sozioökonomischen Schichten, in Schweden sowieso. Und was diesen Kontinent charakterisierte, diese Villa mit fünf Sternen war für meinen Onkel das entscheidende Merkmal wohl Wohlstand. Europa ist von Anatolien aus betrachtet ein Synonym für finanzielle Sorglosigkeit.

Der in der Türkei lebende Teil der Verwandtschaft hat nie wirklich glauben können, dass mein Vater in Deutschland nie um die Mittagszeit auf einer Woldecke lag und über die Welt nachdachte. Er arbeitete in der Fabrik und sparte Geld. Der Großteil eines Jahreseinkommens wurde für den jährlichen Aufenthalt in der Türkei verbraucht; in den siebziger und achtziger Jahren für die langen Autofahrten quer durch Europa und für Mitbringsel in Form von Cremes, Kaffee und Seife; ab den neunziger Jahren für Flüge und Geschenke, für die man Strom brauchte: Bohr- und Kaffeemaschinen, Weckradios und Epiliergeräte. Mit besonderem "Wohllwollen" wurden Geräte der Marken Grundig, Krupp, Braun und Bosch quittiert. Als es in der Türkei schließlich in jedem Haushalt ein Fernsehgerät mit Sattelitenschüssel und damit Empfang in die ganze Welt gab, kam mein Vater in Bedrängnis. In einer deutschen Spielshow bestand das Highlight darin, dass die Kandidaten am Ende ihre Gewinne aus einem Regal voller Waren auswählen konnten: von Schmuck, Besteckkästen und feinstem Porzellan bis hin zu Videokameras, Rasenmähern und Waschmaschinen. Die Verwandtschaft sah auf verwackelten Fernsehbildern, was das Warenlager Europa im Angebot hatte. Endgültige Ruhe kehrte erst ein, als mein Vater gesundheitlich angeschlagen in Frührente ging - seitdem lebt er wieder für einen großen Teil des Jahres in bescheidenen Verhältnissen in seiner Heimat. Europa ist für ihn nun ein Reiseziel, das er andersherum bereist: als Besucher, wieder mit Seife im Gepäck, dieses Mal unparfümierte und naturreine, weil sich die Art zu pflegen in Europa geändert hat.

Man kann die Villa Europa "buchen", entweder als einfaches Einzelzimmer, oder als großzügige Superior Suite. Die Währung heißt Duldung, Aufenthaltsgenehmigung oder Pass. Das Luxusdomizil hat sich in den vergangenen fünfzig Jahren zwar nicht geografisch, wohl aber politisch vergrößert. Die Ausstattung ist seitdem immer prächtiger geworden. Mit Wohlstand hat es begonnen. Hinzugekommen sind Frieden, Freiheit und Stabilität. Diese Termini sind auf den Werbeseiten der Europäischen Union nachzulesen. Die EU ist eine der angesehensten Societies der Welt, der Lions-Club unter den feinen organisierten Gesellschaften. Doch Europa ist noch viel mehr. Es ist eine konfuse Sehnsucht, die kopflos, abenteuerlustig und mutig macht. Oder ein Weg, den man verzweifelt zugehen bereit ist; auch unter dem Risiko, zu sterben. Wie sonst ist zu erklären, dass Tausende Menschen jährlich in kleinen überfüllten Booten, in Lastwagen versteckt, oder im Lagerraum von Flugzeugen ihr Leben aufs Spiel setzen und ihre Heimat verlassen? Was ist Europa für diese Menschen?



Sichtbare und unsichtbare Grenzen

Es mutet merkwürdig an, dass die Generation meines Vaters die gleichen Absichten hegte, wie die Einwanderer heute aus Krisengebieten und der "Dritten Welt". Erst einmal ankommen, Arbeit finden, Geld sparen, Familien in der Heimat unterstützen und wenn sich die Lebenssituation dort verändert hat oder eine finanzielle Basis für einen Neuanfang geschaffen ist, wieder zurückkehren. So sehen die Pläne von Wirtschaftsflüchtlingen aus. Gastarbeiter waren auch nichts anderes als Wirtschaftflüchtlinge. Doch für die, die den Weg nach Europa gefunden haben, muss es ein Schock gewesen sein, zu erfahren, dass dieses Europa ganz anders ist, als sie es sich ausgemalt hatten. Ganz gleich, ob man zuvor auf einer Wolldecke im anatolischen Tal gelegen hat, in einem Reisfeld stand oder auf einem verminten Stück Land in der afrikanischen Steppe von diesem Europa träumte.

Der Einwanderer aus einem Land außerhalb der europäischen Grenze wird Europa immer anders beschreiben, als der Spanier sein Spanien beschreiben würde. Und es macht auch einen Unterschied, ob der Europäer Europa bereist oder innerhalb von Europa immigriert. Der italienische Tourist wird Deutschland immer anders schildern als der italienische Immigrant. Die Grenzen der Europa-Erfahrungen verlaufen nicht nur zwischen den Nationalitäten, sondern richten sich auch nach dem Status, mit dem sich jemand in Europa aufhält.

Auf europäischem Boden wurden immer schon unterschiedliche Sprachen mit regionalen Dialekten gesprochen. Allein der deutsche Sprachraum wurde erst hunderte Jahre nach offizieller Einführung der deutschen Sprache in drei unterschiedliche Länder aufgeteilt. Die nationalstaatlichen Grenzen decken sich nicht mit den sprachlichen, kulturellen oder wirtschaftlichen. Innerhalb dieses Europas sind nicht nur Menschen über Grenzen gezogen, sondern, wie es der Migrationsforscher Klaus J. Bade einmal formulierte, Grenzen wurden auch über Menschen gezogen.

Wenn heute in Europa von Europa gesprochen wird, dann ist damit die Union gemeint. Sie ist ein fragiles Konstrukt. Auf diesem Kontinent hat es im Laufe seiner Geschichte unterschiedliche Gesellschaftsordnungen gegeben. Aus Königreichen und Fürstentümern wurden Nationalstaaten. Nur so kann man verstehen, dass es in einigen europäischen Staaten noch Könige, Kronprinzen und Prinzessinnen gibt - Europa ist auch ein Märchenland. Manche Staaten verwalten Länder, die sich auf anderen Kontinenten befinden, wie Martinique, Réunion, die Azoren und viele andere Inseln, die auf allen Weltmeeren verstreut sind. Auch das ist Europa, ein Staatenverbund, der sich seiner Demokratien rühmt und die Paläste und ehemaligen Kolonien dabei vergisst.

Die Mehrheit der Europäer ist christlich, die zweitgrößte Religionsgruppe ist die der Muslime. Wer nach Europa will, dem ist das erst einmal egal. Wer jedoch als Muslim in Europa lebt, der bemerkt, dass es einige sichtbare und einige weniger sichtbare Grenzen gibt. Eine gemeinsame europäische Identität ist dort am besten zu erkennen, wo es eine größtmögliche Übereinstimmung von Abgrenzung gegenüber Anderem gibt. Zu Zeiten des Kalten Krieges verlief die Abgrenzungslinie zwischen den Staaten, oder besser den politischen Machthabern dies- und jenseits des Eisernen Vorhanges. Heute verlaufen die kollektiven Abgrenzungen zwischen den religiösen Gemeinschaften. Der common way of life beinhaltet in erster Linie die freiheitlichen Werte. Und sie werden kollektiv-europäisch als bedroht betrachtet. Jedes Land, das eine beachtliche Anzahl von muslimischen Bürgerinnen und Bürgern hat, führt den Diskurs um den Kampf zur Erhaltung der europäischen Werte auf ähnliche Weise. Die europäischen Werte, Gleichheit, Demokratie, Aufklärung, Religionsfreiheit, Gleichstellung zwischen Mann und Frau usw. werden als Superlativ des christlich abendländischen Lifestyle gesehen. Das Andere, Fremde muss kontrolliert, beäugt, in Schach gehalten werden. Dass jedoch der Andere mit seinem Glauben zu einer modernen, europäischen und damit heterogenen Identität beitragen könnte, so weit ist Europa noch lange nicht. Im Moment sind viele noch hysterisch damit beschäftigt, die Grenzen



zwischen den Religionen zu ziehen, weil sie meinen, dass Europas schwer erkämpfte Werte von Freiheit und Demokratie durch die Anerkennung anderer Glaubensgemeinschaften ins Wanken geraten könnten.

Die EU ist eine strenge Erziehungsberechtigte, deren Erziehungsauftrag weit über die europäischen Grenzen hinausgeht. Das, was Europa als Erfolgsrezept für sich selbst in Anspruch nimmt und als Demokratie nach westlichem Vorbild bezeichnet wird, wenn nötig, durch die Beteiligung an militärischen Einsätzen auch exportiert. Der Frieden auswärts, so die These, garantiert Frieden und Stabilität zu Hause. Das gilt auch für Wohlstand. Die Kehrseite der Medaille ist, dass der Zuzug von Immigrationswilligen Menschen nach Europa auch mit der Lebensweise der Europäer zu tun hat. Wirtschaftliche und ökologische Kreisläufe ziehen sich quer über die Landkarte; begriffen hat man das in Europa schon längst, aber zu einer europäischen Identität gehört unbedingt, dass man das Problem zwar diskutiert, aber keinesfalls lösen möchte - jedenfalls ungern für den Preis, dass man Lebensweise und Komfort aufgeben muss.

Was wäre mit den Tausenden von Menschen, die nach Europa wollen, wenn sie alles über diesen Kontinent wüssten, wenn man sie über das Gute und das Schlechte aufklären würde, über das Liebenswerte und Paradoxe, das Schöne und das Ungerechte, würden sie es sich noch einmal überlegen? Wenn man sie beispielsweise in deutsche Asylbewerberheime genauso wie in deutsche Supermärkte blicken ließe? Wenn sie Zugang zu allen Informationen in ihrer Sprache bekommen könnten, würden sie dennoch ihr Land verlassen? Wenn sie verstehen würden, dass Armut relativ ist? Dass Neid und Missgunst Eigenschaften sind, die auch dort existieren, wo es Menschen materiell gut geht? Und dass Solidarität nicht automatisch dort beginnt, wo jemand genug zu essen hat und krankenversichert ist? Dass es in Europa Europäer erster, zweiter, dritter und soundsovielter Klasse gibt?

Trugbilder

So wie es zwischen Menschen Beziehungen gibt, die auf Vorurteilen basieren, so gibt es sie auch zwischen europäischen Nationen. Aus unerklärlichen Gründen gibt es in Europa Nationen, auf die man herabschaut. Bulgarien und Rumänien sind zum Beispiel Länder, denen man nicht so viel zutraut wie Frankreich. Es gibt aber auch Staaten, von denen man so gut wie nichts weiß, und deshalb werden sie nie als Vorbilder genannt. Estland ist so ein junger Staat, über den viele in Deutschland nur wenig wissen. Dass Estland vor allem durch Modernität, Jugend und Innovation geprägt ist, kann sich im alten Kerneuropa kaum einer vorstellen. Das sind Attribute, die man eher skandinavischen Ländern zuordnet. Deutschland gilt als ein wohlhabendes Land, in dem niemand verhungern muss. Dass zwischen deutscher Nachkriegszeit und neuerlichen Suppenküchen nur ungefähr fünfzig Jahre liegen, hat sich noch nicht in allen Ländern herumgesprochen. Oder dass man in Süditalien zwar "lustiger" leben kann, es Norditalienern wirtschaftlich aber besser geht.

Wissen das afrikanische Flüchtlinge, wenn sie in Lampedusa ankommen? Was erzählt man sich unter Immigrationswilligen darüber, was passieren wird, wenn sie Europa erreichen. Über Italien, die Kanaren oder den Ural? Und was wissen sie über die legalen Arbeitsimmigranten? Kennen sie deren Klagen darüber, dass sie Europa als Club empfinden, in den sie nie als ebenbürtige Mitglieder aufgenommen worden sind? Und wenn sie es wüssten, würden sie nicht dennoch kommen, all die Menschen, für die Europa am Ende doch ein Synonym für Sorglosigkeit ist?

Europa ist nicht die Festung, als die es gerne gesehen wird. In Europa gibt es Hunger, Armut, Rechtsunsicherheit und Korruption. Die Villa mit fünf Sternen bedarf einer ständigen Renovierung. Sie hat herrschaftliche Aufgänge, aber auch Dienstboteneingänge. Manche Zimmer haben einen herrlichen Blick, andere sind dunkel, muffig und nass. Es gibt armes Personal und parfümierte Bewohner. Der Garten hat verwilderte Ecken, aber auch solche, die picobello in



Schuss sind. Europa sieht aus jeder der vier Himmelsrichtungen anders aus; je nach Lichtverhältnissen erstrahlt es oder liegt im Schatten. Und es wird vor allem immer eine Villa sein, in die es Einzüge und Auszüge geben wird. Ein Blick in die Geschichte zeigt, dass die Grundstücksmarkierungen sich immer wieder geändert haben. Was gestern noch der entfernte Osten war, kann morgen schon ins Zentrum gerückt sein. Am Ende kann man nur mit Bestimmtheit sagen, dass Europa immer ein Kontinent war und ein Kontinent bleiben wird. Das Andere, das Hinzukonstruierte, das mal Reich oder Fürstentum genannt wurde und nun Union genannt wird, zieht seine Grenzen, wie es seine stärksten Mächte gerade brauchen.

Die Europäische Union wächst, ihre Grenzen verändern sich, genauso wie ihre Population. Integration unter Wahrung der kulturellen Identitäten scheint hierbei die größte Herausforderung zu sein. Menschen, die nie ihre Heimat verlassen haben, schieben diese Aufgabe von sich und verstehen sie als Bringschuld des Hinzugezogenen. Der Lauf der Migrationsgeschichte hat gezeigt, dass die Hausherren gerne unter sich bleiben und den Status quo beibehalten wollen. Wären die Hausherren im Laufe der Jahrhunderte mit dieser Haltung immer erfolgreich gewesen, es gäbe dieses heutige Europa mit all seiner Vielfalt an Sprachen, lokalen Eigenheiten, Kulturen und Religionen nicht. Europa war zu keiner Zeit homogen, es hat letztendlich davon profitiert, dass seine Grenzen durchlässig waren. Es war stets Nutznießer der Immigration, und auch davon, dass alle existierenden Kulturen und Sprachen Resultat einer gemeinsamen Entwicklungsgeschichte gegenseitiger Beeinflussung sind. Es ist so banal wie wahr: Menschen verlassen ihre Heimat und suchen sich eine neue; manchmal finden sie ein neues Zuhause, manchmal kehren sie an ihre Herkunftsorte zurück. Manche finden ihr Glück, manche suchen noch danach, manche kehren um.

Mein Onkel jedenfalls liegt heute noch gerne auf seiner Decke in Anatolien, kaut an einem Grashalm und kann sich an seine Sätze vor zwanzig Jahren nicht erinnern.

- Dein Vater hat einen großen Fehler gemacht, als er die Türkei damals verlassen hat. Kein Stückchen Seife, kein Geld dieser Welt ist es wert, seine Heimat zu verlassen. Das habe ich immer gesagt, Du kannst Dich sicher erinnern.

- Ja sicher, Onkel, das hast Du immer schon so gedacht.

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Subsection 6. The European unification process

Schilling Walter

**Europa: Programmierter Machtverlust
in Europäische Rundschau**, Heft 2, 2008

No abstract available

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Spirova Maria

**Europarties and party development in EU-candidate states: The case of Bulgaria
in Europe-Asia Studies**, vol. 60, n. 5, July, 791-808



This article examines the direct impact of Europarties on domestic party development, taking the case of Bulgaria when it was a European Union (EU) candidate country. It combines arguments from party theory and the Europeanisation literature and focuses on the overlap of these two fields of study and it investigates the direct impact of Europarties on the choice of electoral strategies made by political parties in candidate states. The study begins by proposing an analytical model that explains the electoral behaviour of political parties based on traditional propositions in comparative party studies. Then it proposes to view international impact as an additional constraint on that behaviour. The main argument is that, in certain situations, Europarties have intervened in domestic party politics and have played a role in the decision of parties to choose certain electoral strategies. It is suggested therefore, that viewing party electoral behaviour purely from the perspective of domestic politics would not only be misleading, but would also lead us to expect behaviour that might not have been a possible alternative for the parties at a given point in time.

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Juniper Tony

**Europe needs to change its whole approach to sustainability
in Europe's World**, Issue 9, Summer

The EU's preoccupation with its global competitiveness is more than cancelling out its measures to protect the environment, says Friends of the Earth's Tony Juniper. He calls for a radical reassessment of sustainability policies in Europe.

<http://www.europesworld.org/EWSettings/Article/tabid/191/ArticleType/articleview/ArticleID/20411/Default.aspx>

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Bourne Angela

**Europe, Constitutional Debates and the Spanish State of Autonomies
in Perspectives on European Politics and Society**, vol. 9, n. 3, September , 383-300

This paper examines recent debates on the European Union's (EU) constitution and their impact on territorial politics in Spain. Analysis of the preferences and participation of autonomous communities and minority nationalist parties in treaty decision processes and the 2005 Spanish referendum, addresses questions about the mobilization of territorial actors, their ability to influence politics beyond the state, political cleavages on EU issues and the role of European integration in domestic disputes on nationalities questions. I argue that innovations in EU treaty processes provided new access for some Spanish territorial actors, but treaty outcomes reflected their limited impact. Ethno-territorial and ideological cleavages present in domestic politics on territorial matters extended to EU issues with territorial dimensions. Finally, while constitutional treaty debates provided minority nationalist leaders with opportunities to articulate distinctive political profiles both at home and abroad, scope for consensual accommodation of national differences within Spain by way of European integration made little progress.

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Sarkozy Nicolas, Redaction

Europe: L'engagement Francais- Entretien
in *Politique internationale*, n. 120, été

As France takes over the presidency of the Council of the European Union, Nicolas Sarkozy outlines his vision of tomorrow's Europe. For the French president, Europe offers a model for the rest of the world and a process unprecedented in history. Long preoccupied with its own construction, the European Union has now reached maturity. With the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty - albeit momentarily suspended due to the Irish "No" vote - it will have the institutions it needs to be more visible and influential in the international arena. But to be effective, Europe will have to shed its complexes. Against the United States, Europe holds its own economically, as well as in other areas such as global warming, where it is a leader. Militarily, Europe is not doing too badly either. For Nicolas Sarkozy, strengthening NATO's role goes hand in hand with the construction of a Europe with powerful defense capabilities. Finally, a project close to his heart is the Mediterranean Union, which will get under way in mid-July.

http://www.politiqueinternationale.com/revue/article.php?id_revue=120&id=729&content=synopsis

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Licková Magdalena

European Exceptionalism in International Law

in *European Journal of International Law*, Vol. 19, n. 3 , 463-490

For Member States of the European Union, participation in this supranational organization has increased the number of difficulties in the international arena. Occasionally, the expanding legislative activity of the European institutions reaches out beyond the borders of the European legal system and incidentally affects the EU Member States' autonomous relations with third parties. Consequently the EU and its members, often with success, seek third parties' consent to exceptional treatment. Because of their number and significance, such derogations have inspired this article to inquire into their expansion and legal status under international law. Even though the EU-related exceptions have not created an international customary rule, the article observes that European integration shapes international rules in diverse fields and adjusts them to its needs. Since European integration is designed to administer and regulate an increasing number of issues, the autonomous international obligations of the EU Member States may become an obstacle. Because the European Union is likely to continue using special treatment in the future, it is important to assess how far the supranational exception can go in order to accommodate all interests at stake.

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Rottiers Stijn

European Union Constraints on Regional Social Policy Making: The Pioneering Case of Flemish Care Insurance and its General Consequences

in *Regional and Federal Studies*, Volume 18 Issue 4 , 353 - 373

Scholars have, in recent times, given the regional politics of welfare the attention it deserves in today's multi-level policy framework. However, a closely related topic is still ignored—the impact of EU policy on regional social policy making



within the European member states. Starting from the pioneering case of Flemish care insurance, and briefly touching upon other decentralized social policies in EU member states, this article explores how EU regulations seriously constrain social policy making in a decentralized polity framework.

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Pollak Johannes, Puntscher Riekmann Sonja

European administration: Centralisation and fragmentation as means of polity-building?
in **West European Politics**, vol. 31, n. 4, July , 771-788

ABSTRACT: The creation of a unified administrative space is part and parcel of all polity-building processes. We hold that the accelerating agencification in the European Union has created a complex administrative space characterised by simultaneous centralisation and fragmentation. Due to the fact that the finality of integration is open-ended, this complexity is not just a passing occurrence but a defining moment of the EU. Administrative cooperation within and outside primary law, the establishment of a growing number of agencies with divergent powers, scope, and depth support this claim. Hence, we witness a development which impacts considerably on the democratic quality of the Union. The area of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters serves as a case in point. This article discusses potential problems which might arise from the creation of regulatory agencies in light of classical theories of representative democracy and their constitutional frameworks governing the member states as well as the Union.

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Pine Melissa

European integration: a meeting ground for history and political science? A historian responds to Andrew Moravcsik
in **Journal of European Integration History**, vol. 14, n. 1 , 87-104

No abstract available

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Jones Alun, Clark Julian

Europeanisation and Discourse Building: The European Commission, European Narratives and European Neighbourhood Policy
in **Geopolitics**, Vol. 13, n. 3, July , 545-571

Europeanisation is a legitimising process through which the European Union strives to gain meaning, actorness and presence internationally. However, this process continues to be described in less than complimentary ways as ambiguous, incomplete, unsettled, or impotent. We contend that it is the contradictory demands of negotiating order at the 'internal' and 'external' levels both operationally and normatively which critically affect the EU's ability to achieve presence and actorness in international affairs. In this paper we focus upon the role of the European Commission in the external projection of Europeanisation towards the Mediterranean with an emphasis upon the discursive construction,



performance and survival of Europeanisation. We show the ways in which the external projection of Europeanisation produces fuzziness and messiness in which the Mediterranean emerges as both a chaotic conception and site of chaos.

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Kitus Andro

Europeanization, democratic deficit and the constitutional debate in Estonia

in *Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research*, Volume 21, Number 2 / June , 111-129

Using the tools of quantitative as well as qualitative discourse analysis, the article examines the patterns of politicization and Europeanization of the Estonian print media debate on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE) during the reflection period between June 2005 and July 2007. The study arrives at the conclusion that the motive of deliberation behind the reflection period was channelled into an old habit of preferring efficiency, speed, and rationality over the principles of democratic deliberation and participation. Although a certain level of horizontal Europeanization of the media debate was detected, this was accompanied by a low level of politicization, resulting in a passive mode of argumentation and a minimum degree of debate

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Nauschnigg Franz

Europäische Integration und Österreich

in *Europäische Rundschau*, Heft 2, 2008

No abstract available

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Mau Steffen

Europäische Solidaritäten

in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, Band 21, 2008

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Europäische Solidaritäten

Steffen Mau

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Eigennuttsolidarität



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Potentiale und Grenzen der paneuropäischen Solidarität

Einleitung

Solidarität bezeichnet einen Zusammenhang zwischen Individuen oder gesellschaftlichen Gruppen, der sich durch eine besondere Form von Verbundenheit und wechselseitiger Verpflichtung auszeichnet.[1] Er steht für spezifische Formen sozialer Kooperation, die auf Bindungen innerhalb eines kollektiven Zusammenhangs und daraus hervorgehenden Gemeinwohldefinitionen zurückgehen.[2] Als wichtige Merkmale eines Solidaritätszusammenhangs gelten, dass gegenseitige Hilfe gegeben wird, dass es eine spezifische Legitimität der jeweiligen Gemeinschaft und ihrer spezifischen Ziele gibt und dass der Solidaritätszusammenhang nicht einfach objektiv gegeben, sondern von den solidarisch Verbundenen auch wahrgenommen und für bedeutsam gehalten wird.[3] Solidarität wird in vielen Kontexten geübt, so in der Familie, in Freundeskreisen, sozialen Klassen oder auch dem Nationalstaat. Der Nationalstaat gilt gemeinhin als der Ort, in welchem sich besonders umfassende Solidaritätszusammenhänge entwickeln konnten, so beispielsweise durch wohlfahrtsstaatliche Umverteilungssysteme. In der Literatur ist deshalb von der "Nationalisierung der Solidaritätspraktiken"[4] gesprochen worden.

Zur Person

Steffen Mau

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In der Diskussion um die Perspektiven der Europäisierung ist häufig von der Notwendigkeit europäischer Solidarität die Rede. Politische und wirtschaftliche Integrationsbestrebungen, also Formen der "kalten Integration", reichen in den Augen vieler Beobachter nicht aus, um der Europäischen Gemeinschaft Sinn und Legitimität zu verleihen. Wenn Zugehörigkeit, Kollektivität und solidarische Verpflichtung nationalstaatlich organisiert sind, ist supranationale Solidarität aber keine Selbstverständlichkeit. So unterschiedliche Autoren wie Lepsius[5], Offe[6], Streeck[7] und Münch[8] bescheinigen Europa einen Mangel an Solidarität und empfehlen daher Zurückhaltung bei der Aneignung von weitergehenden Solidaritätspflichten jenseits des Nationalstaates. Da das europäische Gebilde nicht die gleichen Binnenstrukturen hinsichtlich Gemeinsamkeit und normativ-politischer Verfassung aufweist wie die Nationalstaaten, gilt es ihnen als unwahrscheinlich, dass sich die EU als Solidaritätszusammenhang etablieren kann.



Welche Solidarität?

Bevor man die Frage nach den Integrationsperspektiven im Lichte dieser skeptischen Sicht auf die europäischen Solidaritätsressourcen abschließend beantwortet, lohnt es sich, das Konzept der Solidarität weiter zu differenzieren und über die aufs Gemeinschaftliche reduzierte Fassung zu erweitern. Wir möchten daher verschiedene Solidaritätstypen unterscheiden, nämlich Eigennutzsolidarität, Verbundenheitssolidarität, Bürgersolidarität, Bewegungssolidarität und Mitgefühlssolidarität. In den folgenden Abschnitten werden diese unterschiedlichen Solidaritätstypen genauer beschrieben und es wird gefragt, inwiefern sich Solidarität des jeweiligen Typus auf der europäischen Ebene verorten lässt.

Eigennutzsolidarität

Der Begriff der Eigennutzsolidarität erscheint zunächst als ein Paradox, bricht er doch mit der zuvor angedeuteten Verbindung von Solidarität und Gemeinwohl. Ein Teil der Literatur zur sozialen Solidarität schlägt in der Tat vor, Solidarität als besondere Form sozialer Kooperation zu verstehen, die aus der Interdependenz von Interessen entsteht.[9] Wenn rationale Akteure bestimmte soziale Güter produzieren wollen, dann müssen sie miteinander kooperieren. Gruppensolidarität entsteht, wenn diese Güter außerhalb des Kooperationsarrangements nicht verfügbar sind und wenn der Zugang zu ihnen effektiv kontrolliert werden kann. Je abhängiger die einzelnen Kooperationsteilnehmer von den Resultaten der Kooperation und je schwieriger es ist, die Ziele außerhalb der Gruppe zu erreichen, desto größer ist die Bereitschaft, eigene Ressourcen einzubringen und auch Umverteilungen zu tolerieren.

Übertragen auf die Europäische Union bedeutet dies, dass ein größerer Grad an Verflechtung und die Verdichtung von Austauschbeziehungen die Interdependenz von Interessen erhöht und damit auch Formen von eigeninteressierter Solidarität möglich machen. So kann die Interdependenz zwischen den wohlhabenden und den ärmeren Mitgliedsstaaten dergestalt sein, dass die reicheren Teilnehmer befürchten müssen, dass die relative Armut anderer Mitglieder negative Externalitäten freisetzt, die auch sie betreffen. Wenn beispielsweise starke Wohlstandsgefälle Probleme für die wohlhabende Seite mit sich bringen, ist es im Sinne 'eigennütziger Hilfe' durchaus rational, durch Transfers und Investitionen für Prosperität und Wohlstand in den ärmeren Regionen zu sorgen.[10]

Innerhalb der EU gibt es umfangreiche Umverteilungen zwischen armen und reichen Ländern und Regionen im Rahmen der Struktur- und Regionalpolitik, die genau auf solche interessenpolitische Argumente zurückgeführt werden können. Diese machen immerhin ein Drittel des EU-Haushalts und rund 308 Milliarden Euro für die Finanzperiode 2007 - 2013 aus.[11] In der Literatur ist hervorgehoben worden, dass sich die Kohäsionspolitik als ausgefeiltes System von side-payments verstehen lässt, die von reicheren Ländern an ärmere Länder gezahlt werden, um ihnen die Zustimmung zu intensivierter ökonomischer Integration abzurufen und weniger, um spezifische Bedürfnisse zu befriedigen.[12] Da die wohlhabenden Länder starke Präferenzen hinsichtlich Marktbildung haben und die ökonomisch schwächeren Länder über eine relativ gute politische Vetoposition verfügen, konnten die ärmeren Länder Strukturhilfen einfordern. Zugleich können große Wohlstandsgefälle Probleme für die reicheren Länder hervorrufen, zum Beispiel wenn Inflationsdruck ausgelöst wird oder wenn große Unterschiede im Arbeitslosigkeitsniveau und Wohlstand Wanderungsanreize setzen, die die Zielländer dieser Wanderungen als problematisch wahrnehmen. Die reichen EU-Mitglieder mögen auch aus diesem Grund bereit sein, die Kosten der Regionalpolitik zu tragen.



Verbundenheitssolidarität

Die zweite Konzeption von Solidarität betont die Zusammengehörigkeitsgefühle zwischen den Mitgliedern sozialer Gruppen, die Solidarität nach sich ziehen können. Gefühle sozialer und emotionaler Nähe und Sympathie bilden hier "die entscheidenden Grundlagen für das solidarische Verhalten der einzelnen Mitglieder untereinander und für den Zusammenhalt der Gruppe".[13] Große solidarische Dichte entsteht typischerweise in kleinräumigen sozialen Gemeinschaften. Wir haben aber eingangs schon ausgeführt, dass solidarische Verbundenheit auch in sozialen Großkollektiven entstehen kann. Insbesondere der nationale Wohlfahrtsstaat ist eine solche Form der Großgruppensolidarität, stabilisiert und zusammengehalten durch gemeinsame Wurzeln, eine gemeinsame Erfahrungsgeschichte und darauf aufbauende Identitätsbestände.

Auch hier lässt sich wieder fragen, ob die Europäische Union für diese Art der Solidarität in Frage kommt. In den meisten kritischen Stellungnahmen zum Mangel der Solidaritätsressourcen wird vor allem auf diese Gemeinschaftssolidarität abgehoben.[14] Für weitergehende Solidaritätsbestrebungen bedürfte es einer vorgängig vorhandenen Basis der Gemeinsamkeit, die hilft, die nationalen Egoismen zu überwinden. Der sehr plastische Begriff der "umverteilungsfesten Identität"[15] unterstreicht, dass erst das Vorhandensein einer europäischen Identität das Maß an Zustimmung bringt, die erforderlich ist (Voraussetzung dafür ist), um eine bestimmte Opferbereitschaft auch im Hinblick auf die Kosten der Einigung zu erzeugen.

Ganz zentral für die EU-Unterstützung ist deshalb, dass die Menschen sich kognitiv und emotional mit Europa verbunden fühlen. Es gibt allerdings eine große Skepsis, was das Vorhandensein einer kollektiven Identität der Europäer angeht. Dies vor allem deshalb, weil die Nationalstaaten in der Vergangenheit eine große normative Integrationsdichte entwickelt haben und im Laufe der Jahrhunderte ein exklusives Bindungsverhältnis mit "ihren" Bürgern aufbauen konnten. Deshalb ist es schwierig, sich eine europäische Identität vorzustellen, welche die nationale Identität einfach ablöst. Daten des Eurobarometers zur europäischen Identität weisen darauf hin, dass für eine Mehrheit der in den Mitgliedsländern Befragten der europäische Bezug eine Rolle spielt, sich aber nur eine Minderheit ausschließlich mit Europa identifiziert. In der Regel tritt Europa als zusätzliche Identifikationsebene hinzu und ersetzt die nationale nicht. Dadurch ist aber nicht ausgeschlossen, dass auch europäische Verbundenheitssolidarität entstehen kann, allerdings ist diese weitaus weniger belastbar als die nationale Solidarität. Dass das Glas eher halb voll als halb leer ist, zeigt sich aber daran, dass die europäische Identität mit der Dauer der Mitgliedschaft ansteigt und dass das transnationale Vertrauen über die Zeit wächst.[16]

Auch bei der zwischenstaatlichen politischen Kooperation spielen Identitätsfragen oder Fragen der Verbundenheit eine Rolle. Die konstruktivistische Theorie internationaler Beziehungen stellt heraus, dass Ideen, Werte und Zugehörigkeiten einen eigenständigen Einfluss auf das Verhalten von Staaten in internationalen Kooperationsbeziehungen haben.[17] Dabei wird davon ausgegangen, dass auch kooperierende Staaten und deren Repräsentanten sich an intersubjektiv geteilten Normen orientieren, die durch den Austausch und die Entstehung sozialer Beziehungen hervorgebracht werden. Für die Europäische Union können sich solche Argumente durchaus als tragfähig erweisen, weil durch den Grad an Interdependenz und die Etablierung von supranationalen Institutionen das Kriterium eines gemeinschaftlichen Zusammenhangs doch recht weitgehend erfüllt ist.[18] Greifen wir noch einmal auf das Beispiel der EU-Regionalpolitik zurück, dann wird klar, dass die Legitimation der Forderungen nach transnationalen Umverteilungen auch dadurch erhöht wurde, dass die rückständigen Regionen sich auf Normen der Gemeinschaft berufen konnten, und dass die wohlhabenden Länder diese Argumente anerkannten. So unterstreicht schon der Erste Kohäsionsbericht, dass "große Disparitäten in einer Gemeinschaft nicht toleriert werden können, wenn der Begriff der Gemeinschaft einen Sinn haben soll".[19] Mit dem politischen Instrument der Strukturfonds werden die "Bedürfnisse der Verlierer des Gemeinsamen



Marktes"[20] aufgegriffen und ihnen wird zu verstehen gegeben, dass sie bei der europäischen Integration nicht in dauerhafte Nachteilpositionen zurückfallen.

Bürgersolidarität

Ein dritter Typus lässt sich als (Staats)Bürgersolidarität kennzeichnen. Ihm liegt zugrunde, dass moderne Solidarität sich nicht nur auf spezifische Formen der Verbundenheit und Kooperation zurückführen lässt, sondern auf ein republikanisches Modell, welches eine Staatsbürgerrolle begründet. Für moderne Gesellschaften gilt generell, dass die in ihnen vorherrschenden Solidaritätsbeziehungen weitgehend verrechtlicht und entpersonalisiert sind. Statt unmittelbare Interessen und Gefühle sind es über die Staatsbürgerrolle institutionell vermittelte Rechte und Pflichten, die das Handeln anleiten. Parsons verstand den gemeinsamen Status als Grundlage für eine neue Form von Solidarität, die durch wechselseitige Anerkennung geprägt ist.[21]

Auf der EU-Ebene hat sich mit der Unionsbürgerschaft eine neue Form sozialer und politischer Inkorporation herausgebildet, die durch den herkömmlichen Begriff der nationalen Bürgerschaft nicht mehr gedeckt ist. Die damit verbundenen Rechte sind Freizügigkeitsrechte, die den Aufenthalt und die freie Mobilität in den EU-Mitgliedsstaaten zusichern, politische Rechte wie das Recht, bei Kommunal- und Europawahlen zu wählen und gewählt zu werden, und das Recht auf diplomatischen und konsularischen Beistand. Die Unionsbürgerschaft verstärkt die Dissoziation von Nationalstaatlichkeit und Bürgerschaft, ersetzt aber die nationale Staatsbürgerschaft nicht, so dass man von einer Koexistenz nationaler und supranationaler Bürgerschaft ausgehen muss.[22] Soweit die Rechte und Pflichten des Individuums von seiner Nationalität unabhängig definiert werden, wird auch der Grundgedanke transnationaler Solidarität gestärkt. Es kann deshalb angenommen werden, dass eine Erweiterung der Unionsbürgerrechte auch dazu beiträgt, dass sich "die Europäische Gemeinschaft zu einem supranationalen Gemeinwesen und damit zu einer Sphäre supranationaler Solidarität entwickelt".[23]

Für unser spezifisches Thema der europäischen Solidarität sind natürlich die sozialen Rechte von besonderer Bedeutung. In vielen Bereichen wie z.B. bei Antidiskriminierung, Gleichstellungsfragen und im Arbeitsrecht hat die europäische Rechtssprechung dafür gesorgt, dass einheitliche Standards europaweit gelten und einklagbar sind. Die Organisation und Finanzierung der kollektiven Sicherungssysteme ist aber immer noch die Domäne des Nationalstaates. Unter den Bedingungen ungehinderter Mobilität und des Nicht-Diskriminierungsgebotes zwischen EU-Bürgern gilt aber, dass die Leistungsansprüche des Wohlfahrtsstaates allen EU-Mitbürgern, sofern sie auf dem Territorium leben oder sich dort aufhalten, offen stehen. Damit wird das Solidaritätskollektiv weniger über nationale Zugehörigkeiten bestimmt als vielmehr über den Aufenthalt innerhalb eines bestimmten Territoriums. Selbst wenn diese Veränderungen quantitativ noch unbedeutend bleiben, so implizieren sie doch eine im Sinne zunehmender Europäisierung zu interpretierende Öffnung des Solidaritätshorizontes.

Bewegungssolidarität

Der Begriff der Solidarität ist weiterhin mit Formen der sozialen Mobilisierung und des Protests verbunden. Die von Marx hervorgehobene Unterscheidung von Klasse an sich und Klasse für sich hebt darauf ab, dass sich ein solidarischer Zusammenschluss zwischen Angehörigen einer Klasse nicht automatisch ergibt, sondern dieser erst konstituiert werden muss. Klassensolidarität ist eine spezifische Form des kollektiven Handelns, bei der Formen der Verbundenheit und des Zusammenstehens aus dem Erkennen gleicher Interessenlagen heraus entstehen. Schon früh ist auch in diesem



Kontext die Frage aufgekommen, ob diese Art der Solidarität nicht eine internationale sein und nationale Grenzen überwinden müsse, besonders eindringlich ausgedrückt im "Proletarier aller Länder vereinigt Euch" des Kommunistischen Manifests.

Mit Blick auf traditionelle Kollektivakteure wie Gewerkschaften zeigt sich, dass diese sich schwer tun, einen gemeinsamen europäischen Ansatz zu entwickeln, weil unterschiedliche Politiken sehr unterschiedliche Auswirkungen auf ihr spezifisches nationales Klientel haben können.[24] Allerdings formiert sich auch sichtbarer übergreifender Protest in Europa, und dies vor allem in Reaktion auf Prozesse der Liberalisierung und Deregulierung und oft als Gegenentwurf zur EU des Gemeinsamen Marktes. Die Euromärsche oder die Euro Maydays gegen Erwerbslosigkeit, ungeschützte Beschäftigung und Ausgrenzung sind Beispiele dafür, dass sich mit der Europäisierung neue Formen der politischen Mobilisierung herausbilden.[25] Dies sind zivilgesellschaftliche bottom-up Bewegungen für ein soziales Europa. Auch die nationalen Gewerkschaften und der europäische Gewerkschaftsverband ETUC (European Trade Union Confederation) haben inzwischen Anstrengungen unternommen, um auf der europäischen Ebene ihren Einfluss geltend zu machen und gemeinsame Ziele zu verfolgen. Wir sehen erste Anzeichen dafür, dass im Zuge der europäischen Organisation von gewerkschaftlichen Kollektivakteuren auch nationale Interessen überformt und umdefiniert werden. Ein Beispiel ist die gewerkschaftliche Mobilisierung gegen die Dienstleistungsrichtlinie (Bolkestein-Richtlinie). Die polnischen Gewerkschaften beispielsweise übernahmen die Position des europäischen Dachverbandes und forderten eine Harmonisierung der Sozialstandards, um Sozialdumping in den westlichen Mitgliedsländern zu verhindern.[26] Hier waren es die organisatorische und kommunikative Vernetzung der nationalen Gewerkschaften miteinander, die es möglich machten, dass sie sich auf längerfristige und gemeinsame Ziele verpflichteten.

Mitgefühlssolidarität

Wir haben bisher Solidaritätsformen diskutiert, die aus einem realen oder unterstellten sozialen Zusammenhang resultieren. Analytisch davon zu trennen ist die "Solidarität unter Fremden",[27] bei der weder eine gemeinschaftliche Bindung noch ein gemeinsamer Lebens- bzw. Kooperationszusammenhang unterstellt werden kann. Die Solidarität des Mitgefühls basiert auf einer humanitären Haltung gegenüber Menschen in Not, relativ unabhängig von spezifischen Bindungen, und steht für "Verbundenheit trotz Differenzen, trotz Ungleichheit".[28]

Diese Art von Solidarität kann ausgelöst werden, wenn man sich beispielsweise in die Notlage von anderen Personen oder Gruppen hineinversetzt. Im Unterschied zu den sozialen Nahverhältnissen mit ihren naturwüchsigen Solidarverhältnissen bedarf es im Falle des solidarischen Engagements für soziale und räumlich distanzierte Gruppen einer freien Entscheidung, die sich auf Gründe beruft.

Für diese Art der Solidarität lässt sich nicht so ohne weiteres eine europäische Spezifik ableiten. Trotz großer Disparitäten zwischen den Mitgliedsländern gehört Europa immer noch zu den Wohlstandinseln in einer globalisierten Welt. Die großen humanitären Katastrophen spielen sich jenseits der Grenzen der Europäischen Union ab. Sobald es aber Notsituationen innerhalb Europas gibt, wird auch Hilfe und Unterstützung gegeben - privat, durch Hilfsorganisationen, durch die Regierungen oder die EU selbst. Oft kommen Argumente der humanitär und der gemeinschaftlich motivierten Solidarität gleichzeitig in Anwendung, so bei der EU-Hilfe für Griechenland bei der Bekämpfung der verheerenden Waldbrände im Sommer 2007.

Solidarität, die sich auf konkrete Notlagen bezieht, wird in Europa aber nicht nur spontan organisiert, sondern ist auch Basis institutioneller Hilfesysteme. Im Dezember 2006 hat die EU mit dem Globalisierungsfonds, der immerhin mit 500



Millionen Euro ausgestattet ist, ein neues Instrument geschaffen, welches "Opfern der Globalisierung" in den Mitgliedsländern helfen soll. Dieser beinhaltet eine einmalige und spezifische Unterstützung für Maßnahmen der Wiedereingliederung bei über 1000 Entlassungen innerhalb eines kürzeren Zeitraums. Aufgelegt wurde er vor allem, um demonstrieren zu können, dass die EU nicht nur die wirtschaftliche Integration vorantreibt, sondern auch bei sichtbaren negativen Folgen der Globalisierung solidarische Hilfe gewährt. Hier wird auf Notsituationen ausgerichtete Solidarität vor allem dafür eingesetzt, um Legitimität zu gewinnen und das Image der EU zu verbessern.

Man kann die Sicht auf humanitär orientierte Solidarität aber noch erweitern, wenn man nicht nur auf interne Solidarität zwischen den Mitgliedsländern und Bürgern der EU abhebt, sondern auch auf europäische Solidarität "mit dem Rest der Welt".[29] In diesem Kontext ist behauptet worden, dass es einen unauflösbaren Zusammenhang zwischen "interner" und "externer" Solidarität gibt: Da es in Europa eine Kultur der Solidarität gibt, sind die Europäer in besonderer Weise bereit, sich auch im internationalen Kontext zu engagieren.[30] So argumentiert auch das Büro der EU für humanitäre Hilfe (ECHO): "Humanity and solidarity are among the core values of the European Union, which is why the bloc is one of the largest humanitarian donors in the world."[31] Zwar ist nur ein Teil der aus den europäischen Ländern fließenden Hilfe vergemeinschaftet, aber nach Angaben von ECHO stellt die Europäische Kommission fast 30 Prozent aller weltweit für humanitäre Hilfe aufgebrachten Mittel, während die Summe der Einzelaufkommen der Mitgliedsländer weitere 25 Prozent beträgt. Die Kehrseite dieser "Hilfe nach außen" ist die soziale Schließung Europas, durch die vielen Menschen der Zugang zu Europa, und damit die Aufnahme in die solidarische Gemeinschaft, verwehrt wird.

Potentiale und Grenzen der paneuropäischen Solidarität

Diese Differenzierung des Konzepts der Solidarität war ein Versuch, die so häufig geführte Klage über einen Mangel an europäischer Solidarität gegen den Strich zu lesen. Unrecht haben diejenigen, die europäische Solidarität für ausgeschlossen und unwahrscheinlich halten, aber ebenso diejenigen, die einfach von einer am nationalstaatlichen Vorbild ausgerichteten Herausbildung europäischer Solidarität ausgehen. In jeder Hinsicht, in sozialer, politischer, ökonomischer und kultureller, aber eben auch im Hinblick auf Solidarität ist und bleibt Europa ein Gebilde sui generis. Was die zukünftige Entwicklung von Solidarität angeht, so ist es nicht einfach, eine empirisch gesättigte Prognose abzugeben. Generell gilt, dass Institutionen und politische Praktiken Motivationen transformieren und identitätsstiftend wirken können, aber auch, dass die Möglichkeiten der politischen Erzeugung und Manipulation von Solidaritätsorientierungen begrenzt sind, da diese in recht langfristigen und komplexen Prozessen generiert werden. Der politische Vorgriff auf zu erwartende Solidaritätszuwächse ist ein Balanceakt, bei dem immer das Risiko der Überforderung der Solidaritätsbereitschaft besteht. Aber ohne diesen Vorgriff ist eine Selbstbindung an den politischen Status quo vorprogrammiert.

Nicht unerwähnt bleiben soll, dass es eine grundlegende Spannung zwischen nationaler Solidarität und europäischer Solidarität dergestalt geben kann, dass die dichte Form nationaler Vergemeinschaftung die Erweiterung des Solidaritätshorizontes auf Europa erschwert. Claus Offe hat davor gewarnt, dass die Entgrenzung von Solidaritätspflichten dazu führen kann, dass sich die Teilnehmer der Integration überfordert fühlen und sich größere Akzeptanzprobleme ergeben.[32] Zugleich können dann neue Fragmentierungen entstehen, wenn die Eliten und die Bevölkerungen unterschiedlich weite Solidaritätshorizonte aufweisen, mit den Eliten als paneuropäisch verbunden und Bevölkerungen, die sich immer noch national orientieren.[33] Schließlich besteht die Gefahr, dass die EU, soweit sie sich als "solidarischer Akteur" in Szene setzt, die hervorgerufenen Erwartungen und Ansprüche nicht wirklich befriedigen kann und damit Enttäuschungen hervorruft. Diese Aspekte zwingen dazu, Solidaritätshorizonte nur mit Augenmaß zu erweitern, im Korridor zwischen den Erfordernissen der vertieften Integration und den vorhandenen



Solidaritätsbereitschaften der Europäer.

Fußnoten

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Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Garbarino Carlo, Del Sole Alessandra

Evoluzione della giurisprudenza comunitaria in materia di imposte dirette: quali prospettive?

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Subsection 6. The European unification process

Loth Wilfried

Explaining European Integration: The contribution from Historians

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Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Quaglia Lucia

Financial Sector Committee Governance in the European Union

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This paper examines the working of the 'Lamfalussy committees' in the banking and the securities sectors, asking whether these are 'technical' committees or 'parapolitical' ones. These committees are composed of experts (national civil servants) discussing regulatory and supervisory issues in a technical policy area — financial services. However, the issues discussed have political salience. It is argued that these committees of experts tend to be argument-based (level 2) and evidence-based (level 3), even though politics, as opposed to expertise, enter the policy process under specific circumstances. This combination of politics and expertise originates a distinctive type of informal governance.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Ruggeri Antonio

Fonti europee e fonti nazionali al giro di boa di Lisbona: ritorno al passato o avventura nel futuro?

in *Diritto pubblico comparato ed europeo*, n. 1 , 124-141

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Brizzi Riccardo

Francia, sei mesi per l'Europa

in *Mulino (il)*, n. 4, luglio-agosto, 2008 , 708-720

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Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Horvath Anna

From Policy to Politics? Informal Practices within the Social Protection Committee after the Enlargement

in *Journal of European Integration*, Volume 30, Number 4 / September , 545-561

Informal institutional changes take place at different levels in the European Union (EU) within all types of governance arrangements, especially after such significant events as EU enlargements. These adjustments not only influence the operation of informal networks, but also the functioning of more or less formal institutions. This article analyses informal institutional changes within the Social Protection Committee (SPC) — a committee that operates within the framework of the Open Method of Coordination — after the 2004 enlargement. As specialized committees form an important part of the policy-making process in the European Union, analyses on the impacts of recent EU enlargements are not complete without examining how the inclusion of new member states influenced these arenas of decision-making. Based on a



micro-level analysis of institutional reinterpretation and change, the article argues that enlargement has been leading to informal changes in working practices within the SPC, which have the potential to affect both social governance in the EU and policy outcomes in the long run.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Youngs Richard

Fusing Security and Development: Just Another Euro-platitude?

in *Journal of European Integration*, Volume 30, Number 3 / July , 419-437

This article reveals that the European Union has made some modest progress towards according concrete substance to the security-development link. In particular, an increased focus on supporting governance reforms acts as a potential link between security and development objectives within several layers of European policies. However, what the link means in practice is still contested. Few in the EU would doubt that security and development go together; but differences abound over what this implies for the allocation of finite resources and the nature of diplomatic engagements. The EU still has no clearly thought-out vision of the balance or direction of causality between these two policy goals, but rather an ad hoc approach based on the rather easy assumption that "all good things go together".

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Brill Heinz

Geopolitische Motive und Probleme des europäischen Einigungsprozesses

in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, Band 32, 2008

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Geopolitische Motive und Probleme des europäischen Einigungsprozesses

Heinz Brill

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Einleitung

Die vorliegende Studie analysiert die Rolle und Bedeutung der Europäischen Union (EU) in den internationalen Beziehungen. Dabei steht die Frage im Mittelpunkt, ob die EU ein Pol in einer multipolaren Welt mit einer eigenständigen Strategie sein kann. Die Europäische Union sei, so lautet ihre eigene Sicherheitsstrategie im Jahr 2003, "zwangsläufig ein globaler Akteur, sie müsse aber ihre strategischen Ziele aktiver verfolgen".[1] Dabei ist ihr erstes Handlungsfeld der europäische Kontinent, aber auch die Beziehungen zu den anderen Akteuren der Welt müssen zunehmend in die konzeptionellen und strategischen Überlegungen einbezogen werden. Es wird kritisch hinterfragt, inwiefern die EU als Akteur auf globaler Ebene in Teilbereichen als "Global Player" erfolgreich agiert.

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Die Bewertung der Positionen der einzelnen europäischen Staaten macht deutlich, dass der europäische Einigungsprozess im Hinblick auf die Finalisierung erhebliche Interessenunterschiede aufweist, dies sowohl im Binnen- als auch im Außenverhältnis der EU. Im Binnenverhältnis geht es um die "innereuropäische Machtbalance";[2] im Außenverhältnis stellt sich die Frage, wie die Beziehungen zu anderen Großräumen und Staaten im Rahmen einer multipolaren Weltordnung gestaltet werden sollen. Geopolitische Interessen der EU wurden bisher offiziell nicht definiert. Bestimmt wurde nur die Form, in der diese wahrgenommen werden können. Die EU bildet auch in dieser Hinsicht eine große Herausforderung an die politischen Eliten Europas, den "Pol" und die "Interessen" der EU als weltpolitischen Akteur zu orten.

Die Europäische Union ist ein Sonderfall bei der Analyse von Akteuren im internationalen System. Sie ist kein Staat, aber auch mehr als eine "klassische" internationale Organisation. Ihre Grundlage sind zwischenstaatliche Verträge, die aber die Souveränität der vertragsschließenden Staaten erheblich einschränken.[3] Nach Einschätzung der realen Lage wird der "Staatenzusammenschluss" in der EU ein Europa der Nationalstaaten sein. Denn die Option "Staatenbund" weist sowohl bei den Führungsstaaten als auch bei der Mehrheit der EU-Staaten die höhere Akzeptanz aus.

Motive für den europäischen Einigungsprozess

Victor Hugo[4] prophezeite in seiner Eröffnungsrede zum Pariser Friedenskongress von 1849, dass dereinst die Nationen des europäischen Kontinents unter Wahrung ihrer Individualität zu einer "höheren Einheit" verschmelzen werden. Der Tag werde kommen, so der Schriftsteller und Politiker, an dem der Austausch von Ideen und Gütern die Auseinandersetzung auf dem Schlachtfeld ersetzen werde. Der Visionär prägte als einer der Ersten den Begriff von den



"Etats Unis de l'Europe" ("Vereinigte Staaten von Europa").

Nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg wurde die Europa-Idee für weitere Kreise populär. Der österreichische Graf Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi gründete 1923 in Wien die Paneuropa-Union. Coudenhove-Kalergi skizzierte in seinem Buch "Paneuropa"[5] ein umfassendes Programm zur europäischen Einigung. Dabei ging er in klassisch geopolitischer Argumentation von der Überzeugung aus, dass sich die Welt zukünftig, vor allem aufgrund des technischen Fortschritts, in großräumigen Zusammenhängen organisieren werde und dass das in Einzelstaaten zersplitterte kontinentale Europa vier Großmächten gegenüberstehe: den USA, Russland bzw. der Sowjetunion, Großbritannien und Ostasien. Europa, das seine einstige Weltgeltung durch den Krieg verloren habe, gleichzeitig aber als einziger Großraum noch nicht politisch und wirtschaftlich organisiert sei, müsse nun ebenfalls ein "politisch-wirtschaftliches Zweckbündnis" bilden, um sich gegenüber den anderen Großräumen behaupten zu können. Aber erst nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg konnten die Pläne für das "Projekt Europa" in konkrete operative Politik umgesetzt werden.

Ausschlaggebend waren für die westeuropäischen Staaten zunächst sicherheitspolitische, historisch-politische und geoökonomische Motive, um nicht völlig in die Abhängigkeit der damaligen Hegemonialmächte USA und UdSSR zu geraten. Denn die Interessen der beiden Supermächte überlagerten lange Zeit jede selbständige politische Aktion des alten Europa. In geoökonomischer Hinsicht von besonderem Interesse und motivierend für den weiteren Zusammenschluss der europäischen Staaten waren unter anderem die Schriften des französischen Publizisten Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber. Er veröffentlichte im Jahre 1967 das Buch "Die amerikanische Herausforderung", in dem er die These vertrat, dass Amerika den alten Kontinent mit seiner weit fortschrittlicheren Wirtschaftsorganisation bald überflügeln werde. Die große Schockwelle, die dieses Buch auslöste, machte den Autor europaweit bekannt.

Den Zusammenschluss der europäischen Staaten politisch zu begründen, scheiterte zweimal: Zuerst war Großbritannien 1949 dagegen, dass der neugegründete Europarat in Straßburg als Zweck und Ziel unter anderem "die Schaffung einer europäischen Autorität" haben sollte. Dann stimmte die französische Nationalversammlung im Jahre 1954 gegen eine "Europäische Verteidigungsgemeinschaft" - und damit gegen die "Politische Union". Seither wird die Einigung Europas primär ökonomisch vorangetrieben.

Dieser Mangel an politischer Priorität ließ sich auch zu Beginn der 1990er Jahre nicht beheben.[6] Noch am 6. November 1991, einen Monat vor der entscheidenden Konferenz von Maastricht über die Zukunft Europas, sagte der damalige Bundeskanzler Helmut Kohl sinngemäß im Deutschen Bundestag: Zunächst müssten die Grundlagen für eine gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik gelegt werden; das sei das unerlässliche Gegenstück zur Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion. Die Vorstellung sei abwegig, die Gemeinschaft auf Dauer ohne den Status einer "Politischen Union" gestalten zu wollen. In Maastricht aber beugte sich Kohl der traditionellen EU-Logik, wonach die Ökonomie die Politik schon irgendwie mitziehen werde.

Damit war die europäische Einigung in der Form, wie sie in Westeuropa in den 1950er Jahren begann und seit dem Ende der 1980er Jahre einen Quantensprung erlebte, hinsichtlich ihrer historisch-konkreten Antriebe und Rahmenbedingungen substantiell anderer Art als die Vorgaben der ersten Ideengeber.[7] Zusammenfassend können folgende Motive für den europäischen Einigungsprozess für wesentlich erachtet werden:

- # Einbindung des deutschen Potentials: "Kontrolle durch Integration";
- # Lehren aus den selbsterstörerischen Kriegen des 20. Jahrhunderts;
- # Europa als "Dritte Kraft" zwischen den Weltmächten USA und UdSSR;
- # Europa - Pol in einer multipolaren Welt;



- # Schaffung eines wirtschaftspolitischen Großraums im Zeitalter der Globalisierung;
- # Neue Supermacht im weltpolitischen Kräftegleichgewicht.

Europa - "Weltmacht im Werden"

Auf den ersten Blick scheint es paradox, in einer Zeit großer Europa-Skepsis die Frage nach der Führungsrolle des Kontinents in der Welt aufzuwerfen. Dennoch setzen sich die Experten der internationalen Akteure - nicht zuletzt aufgrund der permanenten Erweiterungsdiskussion - von Zeit zu Zeit mit Fragen auseinander wie: Kann die EU die Führungserwartungen erfüllen? Oder kann die EU gar zu einer Weltmacht aufsteigen?

Werner Weidenfeld[8] und die Autoren der "Neun-Länder-Studie von TNS Emnid"[9] begründen den Status einer Weltmacht an Hand folgender Kriterien:

- # Territoriale Größe und Bevölkerungszahl;
- # Herausragende wirtschaftliche Macht;
- # Politische Stabilität und Führungsfähigkeit;
- # Kulturelle Anziehungskraft;
- # Hohes Niveau in Forschung und Bildung (Erfindungsgeist, Innovation, Patente);
- # Energie und Rohstoffreichtum;
- # Militärische Macht;
- # Übernahme globaler Ordnungsfunktionen.

Legt man diese Kriterien an, nimmt die EU im Vergleich zu den "Welt"- bzw. "Großmächten" einen der vorderen Plätze ein. Allerdings fehlt ihr noch die Bündelung der politischen Interessen, die politische Geschlossenheit und die Ordnungserfahrung. Europa ist deshalb eine "Weltmacht im Werden".

Die permanente Erweiterung der EU in der Kritik

Die Europäische Union reicht seit 2007 vom Atlantik bis zum Schwarzen Meer. Circa eine halbe Milliarde Menschen lebt auf dem Territorium der EU-Staaten. Welche Zukunftsvision hat die erweiterte EU? Kann sie wirklich zu einer integrierten großen Macht werden, oder wird sie in konzentrische Kreise rund um eine Pioniergruppe aus Frankreich und Deutschland zerfallen? Niemand kann schlüssig sagen, wo genau Europas Grenzen verlaufen. Niemand weiß, wer am Ende dazugehören soll und wer auf keinen Fall. Eine schrankenlose Erweiterung degradiert die Union zur Freihandelszone ohne politische Einheit. Europa bedarf vielmehr der Stärkung seiner Identität und seiner politischen Handlungsfähigkeit, wenn es auf längere Sicht gegenüber anderen Machtblöcken wie Nordamerika und China bestehen will. Keine Frage: Um zu stärkerer "Identität" und "Handlungsfähigkeit" zu gelangen, muss die EU eine territoriale Überdehnung vermeiden.

Mit diesem Postulat ist allerdings ungeklärt, ob die Türkei Vollmitglied der EU werden kann. Sollte dies der Fall sein, dann stellt sich eine weitere, aber viel zu lange verdrängte Debatte über die geographischen, kulturellen, geostrategischen und politischen Grenzen Europas. Denn wer heute über die diese rasoniert, meint die Grenzen eines



Bundes demokratischer Staaten mit dem Namen "Europäische Union"; zwar weiß man, dass Europa und EU nicht identisch sind, aber man hält doch für möglich, dass sie durch künftige Erweiterungen des Staatenbundes deckungsgleich werden könnten.[10] An den Fällen der beiden eurasischen Staaten Türkei und Russland lässt sich indessen zeigen, dass die Frage der europäischen Südost- und Ostgrenze nur politisch, nicht aber geographisch oder historisch-kulturell gelöst werden kann.[11] Nähme die EU in ferner Zukunft beide Staaten auf, dann verlöre sie selbst das Anrecht auf ihren Namen und ihre Identität.

Der deutsche Außenminister Frank-Walter Steinmeier hat im November 2006 mit dem Wort "paradox" den Zustand der Europäischen Union charakterisiert: Europa sei eine Erfolgsgeschichte, und trotzdem befinde es sich in einer Krise. Ausdruck dieser Krise sei die "dramatisch" gewachsene Euroskepsis.[12] Diese vieldiskutierte EU-Krise gliedert sein Amtsvorgänger Josef Fischer in drei Teile:

- # eine Vereinigungskrise, in der nationale Interessen europäische Solidarität verdrängen;
- # die Verbindung aus EU-Erweiterung und Globalisierung, aus der allgemeine Verunsicherung und soziale Abstiegsängste in der Bevölkerung erwachsen;
- # und eine Identitätskrise, die von den negativen Referenden in Frankreich und den Niederlanden ausgelöst worden sei. Die Identitätskrise kreise um die Kernfrage, was die EU überhaupt sein soll: eine Freihandelszone[13] oder ein politisches Projekt.

Die alte Identität ist passé, eine neue hat die EU noch nicht gefunden. Unter den derzeitigen Problemen ragt die permanente Ausdehnung der EU hervor. Ob sich die Größe auch in adäquate Macht umsetzen wird, ist eine noch offene, zugleich aber die ausschlaggebende Frage der Zukunft. Denn wenn die EU nur groß, aber nicht stark wird, dann verliert sie, was sie durch die Beitritte zu gewinnen hoffte.[14] Die politischen Planer der EU sind sich offenbar keiner geopolitischen Grenzen bewusst, sie denken sich - wie Herbert Kremp kritisch anmerkt - "kataraktförmig in bloße Weite. Die eine Seite dieser wahren Affäre besteht darin, dass schiere Größe nicht integrierbar ist im Sinne einer Verfassung, die ja über den konventionellen Staatsvertrag hinausreichen soll, und dass sich dadurch die zweite Seite entfaltet: Geopolitische Großgebilde sind von Natur konfliktrichtig, ihre Neigung zu Binnenstreit und Fremdkoalition unvermeidlich, fast natürlich." [15] Die Geschichte ist voller Szenarien des Untergangs, die aus Überforderung und Überdehnung großer politischer Räume entstanden sind. Nur wenn die gewaltigen Probleme Europas beim Namen genannt werden und in die Erweiterungsdebatte politischer Realismus einkehrt, hat Europa als weltpolitischer Akteur eine Chance. Denn die geografische Erweiterung verändert die EU viel stärker als ihre Protagonisten wahrhaben wollen. Die Gemeinsamkeiten sind kleiner, die Unterschiede viel größer geworden. Eine Union, die von Portugal bis Rumänien und von Finnland bis Griechenland reicht, droht zu einer kleinen UN zu werden: entscheidungsunfähig und wirkungslos.[16]

Europas angrenzende Räume

Für Europa sind drei Ergänzungs- bzw. Verbindungsräume von besonderem Interesse:

- # der Eurasischer Raum;
- # der Euro-Atlantische Raum und -
- # der Mittelmeerisch-Afrikanische Raum.



Gegenüber den Akteuren in all diesen Räumen ist die EU zur

Wahrung der Interessensphären;
Stabilisierung instabiler Räume;
Aufbau eines Sicherheitsgürtels
gefordert.

Grundsätzlich liegt ein stabiles und friedliches geografisches Umfeld im ureigenen Interesse Europas. Im März 2003 hat die EU-Kommission in einem ersten geostrategischen Dokument die gewünschten Beziehungen zu den zukünftigen EU-Anrainerstaaten skizziert.[17] Inhalte dieser Europa-Strategie sind der Aufbau von Nachbarschaftspolitiken zur Ukraine, zu Moldawien und Weißrussland und zum gesamten Mittelmeerraum, das heißt Algerien, Ägypten, Jordanien, Israel, Libanon, Syrien, Marokko, den palästinensischen Autonomiegebieten, Tunesien und Libyen. Es ist der Versuch, konkrete Kooperationsangebote wie Freihandelszonen zu unterbreiten, ohne eine Beitrittsperspektive zu eröffnen.[18]

Wie konnten Gerhard Schröder und Jacques Chirac dem "Größenwahn" (Helmut Schmidt)[19] erliegen, dass die EU nur mit der Türkei als Vollmitglied ein weltpolitischer Akteur sein könne? Eine solche geostrategische Überdehnung mit Rückfall in eine große Freihandelszone liegt zwar im Interesse der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika und Großbritanniens, aber nicht im Interesse einer sich weiter vertiefenden EU und ihrer Bürgerinnen und Bürger. Der derzeitige französische Präsident Nicolas Sarkozy, der einen EU-Beitritt der Türkei strikt ablehnt, erklärte bereits Anfang Februar 2007 während einer Rede in Toulon, dass eine Mittelmeer-Union realisiert werden sollte, in der auch Ankara zu einer tragenden Säule werden könnte.[20] Die Anrainerstaaten der EU sollen mit den nordafrikanischen Staaten und der Türkei nicht nur Handel treiben, sondern ein System der kollektiven Sicherheit aufbauen. Wie Sarkozy weiter sagte, sei sein Vorschlag auch Europas Antwort auf den türkischen Wunsch nach einer Vollmitgliedschaft in der EU; denn die Türkei sei kein europäisches Land, aber ein großes Mittelmeer-Land.[21] Die EU hingegen könne sich nicht permanent erweitern. Sollten Sarkozys Ideen in den EU-Staaten auf Resonanz stoßen, würde der Türkei eine weitere Option im Rahmen der europäischen Nachbarschaftspolitik geboten.

EU - Global Player mit Defiziten

Die EU ist heute ökonomisch ein "Global player", politisch und strategisch hingegen weist sie in dieser Rolle jedoch ein erhebliches Defizit auf. Die EU gewinnt zwar immer mehr an Gewicht in den Krisenregionen der Welt durch die Kombination aus ziviler und militärischer Konfliktlösung; dennoch ist ein idealistischer Grundzug ihrer Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik aus Mangel an Stärke und Geschlossenheit unverkennbar. Aus diesem Grund werfen kritische Beobachter wie der amerikanische Politologe Robert Kagan der EU mangelnde "Machtpolitik" vor. In seinem viel beachteten Essay "Power and Weakness" ("Macht und Ohnmacht") argumentiert Kagan, dass Europa im 21. Jahrhundert mehr Nachdruck auf Machtpolitik legen muss, um in der harten Realität der internationalen Beziehungen bestehen zu können. "Die friedliche europäische Integration", so Kagan, "erweist sich als die Feindin der globalen Rolle Europas".[22] In der Tat sollten sich die europäischen Führungsmächte mit ihren "Think Tanks" über kurz oder lang mit der Frage auseinandersetzen: was für eine Art Weltmacht die Europäische Union sein soll. Geeint spricht die EU nur zu allgemeinen Angelegenheiten. In den Kernfragen der Weltpolitik hält sie sich auffallend zurück.

Unipolare versus multipolare Weltordnung



Der Aspekt der Sicherheit ist für Europa von großer Bedeutung. Fragen der europäischen Sicherheitspolitik betreffen heute nicht nur die Situation im Inneren des Staatenbündnisses, sondern vor allem auch seine Rolle in der Welt. Damit ist Sicherheit eine Gestaltungsaufgabe von globaler Dimension geworden. Der Wegfall der Bipolarität nach dem Ost-West-Gesetz hat zu gravierenden Veränderungen auf der internationalen Akteursebene geführt. Seit dem Ende des Ost-West-Konflikts ist die von George Bush Senior proklamierte "Neue Weltordnung" ein Schwerpunkt der internationalen Diskussion. Zahlreiche politische Autoren haben sich an dem Streit um eine "unipolare" oder eine - von Russland, China, Indien und der EU favorisierte - "multipolare" Weltordnung beteiligt. Aufgrund ihrer geopolitischen Lage, ihres Selbstverständnisses, ihrer wirtschaftlichen und wissenschaftlich-technologischen Ressourcen sind auf absehbare Zeit aber allein die USA in der Lage, eine Weltmachtrolle zu spielen. Alle potenziellen "Gegenmächte" sind nicht mehr oder noch nicht stark genug, die Pax Americana herauszufordern. Während die USA eine unipolare Weltordnung anstreben, plädieren die großen Regionalmächte für eine multipolare Weltordnung, in der sie ihre Interessen - seien sie national oder multinational begründet - besser vertreten können. Im Streit um eine neue Weltordnung nehmen die europäischen Führungsmächte zur "Multipolaritätsthese" folgende Grundpositionen ein:

Frankreich: Der bisher deutlichste Widerspruch innerhalb des transatlantischen Raumes zu den neuen Weltordnungsvorstellungen der USA kommt aus Paris. Die Opposition gegen "Unipolarität", wie die Stellung der USA als "Hypermacht" und unerwünschte Alternative zur angestrebten "Multipolarität" bezeichnet wird, führt in EU und NATO Frankreich an. Ob die Regierung Sarkozy eine Kehrtwendung vollziehen wird, ist zur Zeit noch offen.

Großbritannien: Umfassend legte der damalige britische Premierminister Tony Blair seinen Standpunkt zur Diskussion um eine neue Weltordnung in einem Interview mit der "Financial Times" am 28. April 2003 dar. Er fand zu dramatischen Formulierungen, als er zu Frankreichs Position einer "multipolaren" Weltordnung gefragt wurde, mit Europa als einem wichtigen Macht-Gegenpol zu den USA. Wörtlich sagte Blair: "Ich möchte nicht, dass Europa sich in Opposition zu den USA definiert. Das wäre gefährlich und destabilisierend. Solche neuen multipolaren Zentren würden sich sehr schnell zu rivalisierenden Machtzentren entwickeln mit der Tendenz, sich gegenseitig auszuspielen, wie wir das im Kalten Krieg hatten." Die Strategie, die von Großbritannien im Rahmen seiner Allianzpolitik favorisiert wird, kann in zwei Grundsätzen zusammengefasst werden: Erstens: Beibehaltung der "special relationship" zu den USA; zweitens Stärkung Europas in Partnerschaft zu den USA. Die politische Elite Großbritanniens vertritt bis heute (Gordon Brown) die Auffassung: Eine Befürwortung der Multipolaritätsthese durch die Mehrheit der EU-Staaten würde zu einer weiteren Desintegration in den transatlantischen Beziehungen führen und eine "Euro-Atlantische Gemeinschaft" verhindern. Damit erteilt sie einer "Balance of Power"-Politik mit Europa als Rivalen der USA (das "multipolare" Modell) eine klare Absage.

Deutschland: Die deutschen Regierungen handelten - mit Ausnahme der Regierung Schröder/Fischer - nach der Devise des "Sowohl-als-Auch" mit der Maßgabe in der Sicherheitspolitik "in dubio pro America!" Eine Prioritätsetzung wurde vermieden.

Fazit: Die unterschiedlichen Positionen der drei europäischen Führungsmächte zur "Multipolarität" spiegeln auch ihre Interessenwahrnehmung in internationalen Organisationen wider - sei es EU, NATO oder UNO.

Die Frage einer gemeinsamen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik, kurz: nach Europas Rolle in der Welt, stellte sich erstmals anlässlich des Maastrichter Vertrages von 1992. Die Mitgliedstaaten, heißt es darin, "enthalten sich jeder Handlung, die den Interessen der Union zuwiderläuft oder ihrer Wirksamkeit als kohärente Kraft in den internationalen Beziehungen schaden könnte." Der Satz klingt inzwischen wie ein Hohn. Nicht nur die machtpolitische Rolle Europas in der Welt, sondern auch seine inneren Machtstrukturen sind heute Streitpunkt. Vorbei sind die Zeiten, als die christdemokratische



Idee eines Kerneuropas, Chiracs Vorstellung einer groupe pionier oder Fischers Forderung vom Gravitationszentrum in einer rasch wachsenden Gemeinschaft den Gegensatz verdecken konnten. Die "verstärkte Zusammenarbeit", wie sie der Vertrag von Nizza seit Jahren ermöglicht, erzeugt vermehrte Konflikte und Dissonanzen.

In einer Zeit des weltpolitischen Umbruchs könnte Europa zu einem internationalen Akteur werden. Doch als Voraussetzung für weltpolitisches Handeln fehlt Europa nicht nur ein operatives Zentrum, es mangelt vor allem - mit Ausnahme von Großbritannien, Frankreich und in gradueller Abstufung Deutschland - an strategischem Denken. In der EU muss diese Denkkategorie noch enttabuisiert und gefördert werden. Nicht die zahlreichen Institutionen sind die Antworten auf die drängenden Fragen, wie der Vorschlag eines europäischen Außenministers, sondern der politische Wille. Vom Europäischen Rat, der eigentlich die politischen und strategischen Zielvorstellungen vorgeben sollte, ist wenig zu erwarten. Es sind die diese drei großen Länder (EU-3), die ihre Konzepte in den Entscheidungsprozess der EU einbringen. Hier zeigt sich der Unterschied zwischen den USA und der EU in der Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik. In den USA gibt es eine außenpolitische Elite, die global denkt, amerikanische Interessen definiert^[23] und politische Mehrheiten organisiert, um weltweit die Belange des Landes zu fördern. Der EU hingegen fehlt der politische Wille bzw. Konsens, strategische Konzepte und Visionen zu entwickeln.

Europa - "Weltmacht neuen Typs"

Die Europäische Union hat im Binnen- und Außenverhältnis im wesentlichen drei Aufgaben zu bewältigen: inneres Gleichgewicht herzustellen und zu bewahren; Handlungsfähigkeit als globaler Akteur zu gewinnen und von den EU-Bürgern akzeptiert zu werden.

Denn "der alte Kontinent ist nicht" - wie Günter Verheugen in seinem Erfahrungsbericht (2005) betont - "zum Niedergang verurteilt". Der langjährige EU-Kommissar ist vielmehr der Meinung, dass das 21. Jahrhundert durchaus noch ein europäisches Jahrhundert werden könne und "Europa ein unabhängiger und selbstbewusst handelnder globaler Akteur, eine Weltmacht neuen Typs, wenn die Europäer es wollen und wenn sie endlich verstehen, dass sie ihr Schicksal in die eigenen Hände nehmen müssen." Voraussetzung für gemeinsames Handeln ist allerdings, dass die Einzelinteressen der Mitgliedstaaten mit einem europäischen Gesamtinteresse in Übereinstimmung gebracht werden können. Eine solche Zielsetzung ist nötig, wenn Europa zwischen den Kraftzentren des 21. Jahrhunderts nicht untergehen will.

Fußnoten

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Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Guérot Ulrike

Getting the Franco-German engine back into gear

in **Europe's World**, Issue 9, Summer

Although enfeebled, the Franco-German relationship is still the main driving force in the EU, says Ulrike Guérot. The challenge now is not just to revive it, but to make it the basis for a broader leadership mechanism.

<http://www.europesworld.org/EWSettings/Article/tabid/191/ArticleType/articleview/ArticleID/20944/Default.aspx>

Section C) Regional integration processes

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Dinan Desmon

Governance and Institutional Developments: Ending the Constitutional Impasse

in **Journal of Common Market Studies**, Volume 46 Issue s1, September 2008 , 71-90

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Bandelow Niels C.



Government Learning in German and British European Policies

in *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 46, Issue 4, August 2008 , 743-764

Why do some governments change their policies toward European integration while other national positions endure? Governments may change their policies even while the governmental parties remain the same. This article focuses on the explanatory capacities of policy learning, and thereby develops some contra-intuitive theses concerning the impact of political systems. Under some circumstances even the existence of many veto-players with opposite belief systems may increase the probability of learning.

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Bandelow Niels C.

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in *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 46, Issue 4, August 2008 , 743-764

Why do some governments change their policies toward European integration while other national positions endure? Governments may change their policies even while the governmental parties remain the same. This article focuses on the explanatory capacities of policy learning, and thereby develops some contra-intuitive theses concerning the impact of political systems. Under some circumstances even the existence of many veto-players with opposite belief systems may increase the probability of learning.

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Subsection 6. The European unification process

St Clair Bradley Kieran

Halfway house: The 2006 comitology reforms and the European parliament

in *West European Politics*, vol. 31, n. 4, july , 837-854

ABSTRACT: Although rejecting it in principle, the European Parliament has implicitly accepted the comitology system. In 2001, it agreed with the other institutions that financial services legislation adopted under co-decision could be limited to basic principles, with the adoption of detailed rules being delegated to the Commission, the so-called 'Lamfalussy arrangements'. In return, the Commission proposed a reform of the comitology system, though Parliament had to resort to different tactics to overcome the Council's reluctance to take a decision. Notwithstanding significant legal and political constraints, in July 2006 the institutions agreed on a new scrutiny procedure which gives both Parliament and the Council the possibility to block the adoption of draft implementing measures of general scope which amend basic legislation. The new procedure improves the democratic control over an important category of secondary legislation, though it leaves this question open as regards the other procedures.

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Jouyet Jean-Pierre

How France intends to meet all those EU presidency expectations

in *Europe's World*, Issue 9, Summer



From immigration to defence, from social to environmental issues, there are high expectations throughout the EU for France's stint in the chair. Its Europe Minister Jean-Pierre Jouyet previews the presidency agenda.

<http://www.europesworld.org/EWSettings/Article/tabid/191/ArticleType/articleview/ArticleID/21083/Default.aspx>

Section C) Regional integration processes

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Büchs Milena

How Legitimate is the Open Method of Co-ordination?

in **Journal of Common Market Studies**, Vol. 46, Issue 4, August 2008

This article argues that the OMC's legitimacy can be improved only by strengthening parliamentary channels of input-legitimacy since output-legitimacy alone is inappropriate and cannot be achieved without input-legitimacy. In addition, concepts and practices of direct 'stakeholder' participation currently applied within the OMC are insufficient in strengthening input-legitimacy.

Section C) Regional integration processes

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Shields Stuart

How the East Was Won: Transnational Social Forces and the Neoliberalisation of Poland's Post-Communist Transition

in **Global Society**, Volume 22, Issue 4, October, 445-468

The article proposes a Gramscian account of Poland's transition to a market economy. It considers what has generated, sustained, and legitimated neoliberal hegemony and illustrates how neoliberal ideas attained a hegemonic position through the development of a particular class and national state project. It uncovers where the agents of this process are visible by contrasting two waves of post-communist reform that have contributed to the reconfiguration of the Polish political economy in the current conjuncture of global restructuring. Firstly, it focuses on the centrepiece of neoliberal efforts to constitute hegemony in the shape of the "shock therapy" reform programme and then on the later application of a highly selective form of Europeanisation. Finally the article considers which social forces have offered the most effective resistance to neoliberalism in an appraisal of the recent populist turn in Polish politics.

Section C) Regional integration processes

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Fahey Elaine

How to be a Third Pillar guardian of fundamental rights? The Irish Supreme Court and the European arrest warrant

in **European Law Review**, Vol. 33, n. 4, 563-576

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Pinelli Cesare

I diritti fondamentali in Europa fra politica e giurisprudenza

in *Politica del diritto*, n. 1 , 45-68

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Section C) Regional integration processes

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Piciocchi Pietro

I recenti orientamenti della Corte di giustizia in materia di politiche sociali

in *Diritto pubblico comparato ed europeo*, n. 2 , 960 ss.

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Section C) Regional integration processes

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Del Gaizo Danilo

Il Trattato di Lisbona tra bocciature referendarie e ratifiche parlamentari: i nodi della rappresentatività democratica e dell'integrazione politica

in *Federalismi*, Anno VI - N. 15

Section C) Regional integration processes

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Napolitano Giorgio

Il futuro dell'Europa

in *Mulino (il)*, n. 3, maggio-giugno, 2008 , 535-543

ABSTRACT: L'11 febbraio 2008, il Presidente della pubblica Giorgio Napolitano è stato nominato, su proposta della Scuola di Studi internazionali, professore onorario di Studi europei e internazionali dell'Università di Trento. Pubblichiamo la Lectio Magistralis tenuta dal Presidente per l'occasione, interamente dedicata alle prospettive della costruzione di un'Europa comune.

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Tufano Maria Luisa

Il giudice comunitario e i rapporti tra diritto comunitario, diritto UE e diritto penale



in **Studi sull'integrazione europea**, Anno III, n. 1 , 93-103

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

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Pirni Alberto

Il nesso sfera pubblica - democrazia, eredità e compito per l'Europa

in **Ragion Pratica**, numero 1, giugno 2008 , 191-210

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Di Pasquale Patrizia

Il riparto di competenze tra Unione europea e Stati membri

in **Diritto pubblico comparato ed europeo**, n. 1 , 60-68

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Section C) Regional integration processes

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Morviducci Clara

Il ruolo dei Parlamenti nazionali

in **Diritto pubblico comparato ed europeo**, n. 1 , 83-93

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Section C) Regional integration processes

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Bellamy Richard, Castiglione Dario

Il ruolo della democrazia nell'Unione europea

in **Ragion Pratica**, numero 1, giugno 2008 , 115-130

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la Sablière Jean-Marc de

Il semestre di Presidenza europea di Nicolas Sarkozy



in **Affari Esteri**, Anno XL, n. 159 , 501-508

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Passaglia Paolo

Il trattato che adotta una Costituzione per l'Europa. Due anni dopo.

in **Foro Italiano**, 2007 , 19-23

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Subsection 6. The European unification process

Bronzini Giuseppe

Il trattato di Lisbona: funzionerà il "compromesso dilatorio"?

in **Questione giustizia**, fasc. 2

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Section C) Regional integration processes

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Schn-Quinlivan Emmanuelle

Implementing organizational change - the case of the Kinnock reforms

in **Journal of European Public Policy** , Volume 15 Issue 5 2008 , 726-742

This article furthers Kassim's analysis of change in the Commission as a result of the Kinnock administrative reforms. Delving into the innermost parts of the organization, it takes the analysis to a meso-level in order to give a more fine-tuned account of the scope of change in two functionally distinct Directorates-General (DGs), DG TREN and DG REGIO. Based on official documents and a series of 32 semi-structured qualitative interviews with Heads of Units, this paper aims to tell the story of reform in action. Using the lens of translation of policy into action, it looks at the dynamic of change and explains why the implementation of the Commission-wide Kinnock reforms has produced varying degrees of change in DG REGIO and DG TREN. It concludes that supportive leadership is the key element which explains ownership of the reform by officials and therefore effective change.

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Roose Jochen

In nächster Nähe so fern? Grenzübergreifende Regionalberichterstattung als Aspekt von europäischer Integration

in **Zeitschrift für Soziologie**, Jahrgang 37, Heft 4, August 2008



So Close and Still So Far? Cross-Border Local and Regional Newspaper Reporting as an Aspect of European Integration

Summary: In the context of European integration, the growing unimportance of national borders is currently being discussed in the social sciences. Approaching the discussion empirically, this article analyzes trans-border regional newspaper reporting in German border regions. To what extent are events in a neighboring country covered by local newspapers issued in towns situated close to the respective border as compared to events within Germany? The frequency of appearance of city names is measured, controlled against their size and distance from the place of publication of the newspaper. It is shown that events on the German side of the border are covered far more frequently than events in neighboring countries. Among neighboring countries, events in Luxembourg and Austria get most coverage, while events in Belgium receive the least attention. To explain these differences, three hypotheses are tested. Findings show that the intensity of economic exchange and the duration of EU-membership have no effect. However, the mutual language competences, measured as the likelihood of a German from the border region and a neighboring foreigner being able to communicate in one of the respective mother tongues, partly explain the differences in coverage of events beyond the border.

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Kaiser Wolfram, Leucht Brigitte

Informal politics of integration: Christian Democratic and Transatlantic Networks in the Creation of ECSC core Europe

in *Journal of European Integration History*, vol. 14, n. 1 , 35-49

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Section C) Regional integration processes

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Howarth David

Internal Policies: The Commission Defends the EU Consumer

in *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Volume 46 Issue s1, September 2008 , 91-107

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Van Der Harst Jan

Introduction: History and theory

in *Journal of European Integration History*, vol. 14, n. 1 , 5-8

No abstract available



Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Bauer Michael W.

Introduction: Organizational change, management reform and EU policy-making

in *Journal of European Public Policy* , Volume 15 Issue 5 2008 , 627-647

If it remains true that the Commission is an essential component within the process of EU policy-making, changes in the organizational basis of this key actor are likely to have broader implications. Adopting this vantage point the article discusses the potential for advancing our theoretical and empirical understanding of the EU policy process by analysing the recent administrative reforms in the European Commission. It is argued that studying internal reform is particularly important as it structures and conditions the capacities and subsequently the impact of the Commission as an actor in EU policy-making. Put simply, organizational changes do affect policy outputs. Hence, studying organizational change in the form of administrative modernization - be it as a dependent or independent variable - should become an important task also for students of EU policy-making.

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Medvedev Alexander

Is Gazprom's strategy political?

in *Europe's World*, Issue 9, Summer

The widespread view in Europe that Gazprom is a "political weapon of the Kremlin" is wrong, says top Gazprom executive Alexander Medvedev. He argues that it is the European Commission's energy thinking that is cause for concern.

<http://www.europesworld.org/EWSettings/Article/tabid/191/ArticleType/articleview/ArticleID/21177/Default.aspx>

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O'Neill Jim

It's time Europe got its economic policy act together

in *Europe's World*, Issue 9, Summer

Goldman Sachs' research chief Jim O'Neill says that while the euro's financial performance has been good, monetary union hasn't fulfilled its economic promise. It is time for Europe to act more boldly, both inside the eurozone and on the world stage.

<http://www.europesworld.org/EWSettings/Article/tabid/191/ArticleType/articleview/ArticleID/20366/Default.aspx>

Section C) Regional integration processes

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Monar Joerg



Justice and Home Affairs

in **Journal of Common Market Studies**, Volume 46 Issue s1, September 2008 , 109-126

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Section C) Regional integration processes

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Sabatino Alfonso

Kosovo: After Serbia's Refusal, a Strong European Initiative is Needed!

in **Federalist Debate (The)**, Year XXI, n. 1, March , 31-34

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

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L'Europa dell'opting out

in **Queste istituzioni**, n. 148 , III-VII

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

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de Benoist Alain

L'Europa tra delusione e speranza

in **Diorama**, n. 287, febbraio , 1-16

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Section C) Regional integration processes

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Toulemon Robert

L'Europe a besoin de symboles

in **Europe en formation (L')**, n. 347, printemps (avril) , 81-84

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

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Horehajova Maria, Marasova Jana



L'Union à la recherche d'un modèle social

in *Revue de l'Union européenne/Revue du Marché Commun et de l'Union européenne*, n. 519, juin , 388-392

Although Lisbon agenda clearly defines the objectives of the European Social Policy their realization is one of the most problematic issues of European integration. There is no doubt that the open method of coordination contributes to improvement of this situation. Nevertheless, determination of national competencies and centralisation of some of them is still a controversial issue. If social justice is one of the principles the European social policy is built on, then it is necessary to reveal the true sense of this value. As a human virtue it should encourage individuals to respect rights of others and to be responsible for the relatives. Historical evolution proves that social protection provided by welfare state does not make an efficient substitution for individual engagement. Independent and responsible economic subjects, individuals and businesses are supposed to play the most important role in construction of European Social Model

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Baratta Roberto

L'eccezione di sicurezza nazionale e i 'defence procurement' nell'Unione europea

in *Studi sull'integrazione europea*, Anno III, n. 1 , 75-92

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

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Porena Daniele

L'evoluzione dei rapporti tra ordinamento interno ed ordinamento internazionale alla luce della revisione costituzionale e della recente giurisprudenza della Corte Costituzionale

in *Federalismi*, Anno VI - N. 15

Section C) Regional integration processes

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Pollicino Oreste, Sciarabba Vincenzo

La Carta di Nizza oggi, tra "sdoganamento giurisprudenziale" e Trattato di Lisbona

in *Diritto pubblico comparato ed europeo*, n. 1 , 101-123

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

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Pesole Luciana



La Corte Costituzionale ricorre per la prima volta al rinvio pregiudiziale. Spunti di riflessione sull'ordinanza n.103 del 2008

in *Federalismi*, Anno VI - N. 15

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

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Barbier-Gauchard Amélie

La concurrence fiscale dans l'Union européenne

in *Politique Etrangère*, n. 2 -été

Le marché unique européen permet la libre circulation du travail et du capital. Mais le principe de subsidiarité renvoie les décisions fiscales au bon vouloir des autorités nationales. La concurrence fiscale qui se développe ainsi entre les membres de l'Union peut avoir nombre d'effets dommageables. Pour les combattre, on peut imaginer de recourir à l'harmonisation ou à la coordination. C'est bien cette dernière voie qui semble privilégiée par la Commission européenne

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Mezzetti Luca

La nuova Costituzione europea

in *Diritto pubblico comparato ed europeo*, n. 1 , 77-82

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Chieffi Lorenzo

La participación de las autonomías regionales en la elaboración de las decisiones comunitarias: de la gestión de los fondos estructurales a la reciente reforma introducida por el Tratado de Lisboa

in *Revista de Derecho Constitucional Europeo* , n. 9

El presente trabajo expone el marco de actuación y desarrollo de las posibilidades de intervención de las regiones y entes locales italianos en los ámbitos de adopción de las decisiones y ejecución de las políticas europeas. El estudio comienza resaltando la importancia otorgada a los poderes regionales y locales en el Tratado de Lisboa, así como el progresivo proceso de impulso y revaloración de la participación de las autonomías regionales y locales como vía para mejorar la eficacia y la comprensión de la acción comunitaria y, sobre todo, para acercar los ciudadanos al proceso de integración europea. Igualmente gran parte de este estudio se dedica a analizar el sistema y los programas para el desarrollo de las políticas de cohesión económica y social y el importante papel desempeñado por los entes autónomos en el desarrollo de estas políticas europeas, mediante la ejecución de los programas y la gestión de las ayudas destinados al objetivo de la cohesión económica y social. Por último, se precisa la posición de las regiones y entes



locales italianos ante el proceso de adopción de decisiones europeas tras la reforma constitucional del Título V y algunas de las peculiaridades que dificultan la ejecución de las políticas europeas de cohesión por los entes autónomos en Italia

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Subsection 6. The European unification process

Moschella Graziella

La politica europea di sicurezza e difesa

in *Nuova rassegna di legislazione, dottrina e giurisprudenza*, n. 9-10 , 1081-1135

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Section C) Regional integration processes

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Acosta Sánchez Miguel A.

La primera misión de mantenimiento de la paz de la UE: la misión de observación de la Unión Europea (MOUE) en los Balcanes (1991-2007)

in *Revista Electrónica de Estudios Internacionales*, Numero 15/2008

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Berenguer Fuster Luis

La reforma de la política de competencia en la UE y su incidencia en el sistema español

in *Cuadernos europeos de Deusto*, n. 38 , 51-80

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

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Van Raepenbusch Sean

La réforme institutionnelle du traité de Lisbonne: l'émergence juridique de l'Union européenne

in *Cahiers de Droit Européen*, n. 5-6 , 573 - 622

No abstract available

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Subsection 6. The European unification process

Bronzini Giuseppe



Lavoro e tutela dei diritti fondamentali nelle politiche europee del del "dopo Lisbona"

in *Politica del diritto*, n. 1 , 141-164

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Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Gouzy Jean-Pierre

Le Congrès de l'Europe (7-10 mai 1948)

in *Europe en formation (L')*, n. 347, printemps (avril) , 7-16

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Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Roux Jerome

Le Conseil constitutionnel et le controle de constitutionnalité du Traité de Lisbonne: bis repetita?

in *Revue Trimestrielle de droit européen*, n. 1 , 5-28

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Oberdoff Henri

Le Traité de Lisbonne: une sortie de crise pour l'Union européenne ou plus?

in *Revue du droit public et de la science politique en France et à l'étranger*, n.3 , 774-786

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Gaudin Hélène, Rousseau Dominique

Le droit constitutionnel européen en débat

in *Revue du droit public et de la science politique en France et à l'étranger*, n.3 , 721-730

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Ferraro Fabio



Le fonti del diritto dell'Unione europea

in *Diritto pubblico comparato ed europeo*, n. 1 , 69-76

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

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Considère-Charon Marie-Claire

Le non de l'Irlande au traité de Lisbonne

in *Politique Etrangère*, n. 3, autumn

Le camp du oui, uni, regroupait en Irlande les grands partis politiques, le patronat, une grande partie des syndicats, les principaux médias. Disparate, la coalition du non allait de la gauche radicale aux catholiques fondamentalistes, mais elle exprimait une perception nouvelle de la vulnérabilité de l'économie irlandaise à la mondialisation. Le non irlandais témoigne aussi d'une défiance vis-à-vis des institutions européennes, dont toute solution future devra tenir compte.

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Marhold Hartmut

Le potentiel intégrateur du développement soutenable pour l'Union européenne

in *Europe en formation (L')*, n. 348, été (juillet) , 7-22

full text available at <http://www.cife.eu/UserFiles/File/EEF/348/HM-EEF348.pdf>

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Cagiati Andrea

Le potenziali capacità dell'Occidente

in *Affari Esteri*, Anno XL, n. 159 , 555-563

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Lang Alessandra (a cura di)

Le procedure per l'allargamento dell'Unione europea: anno 2007

in *Diritto pubblico comparato ed europeo*, n. 1 , 36 ss.

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Chiti-Batelli Andrea

Le riflessioni di un federalista sull'indipendenza del Kosovo

in *Affari Esteri*, Anno XL, n. 159 , 596-602

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Azoulai Loic

Le role constitutionnel de la Cour de justice des Communautés européennes tel qu'il se dégage de sa jurisprudence,

in *Revue Trimestrielle de droit européen*, n. 1 , 29-46

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Orosco LL. M. Perrine, Cats Julien

Le traité de Lisbonne: un tournant pour l'Europe de la défense? Analyse des impacts du Traité de Lisbonne en matière de défense

in *Revue de l'Union européenne/Revue du Marché Commun et de l'Union européenne*, n. 520, juillet-août , 420-431

The European Council of the 13th December in Lisbon brought about the signing of an "amended Treaty" by the heads of state and government. This new treaty revives the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and renames the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC) to Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). It should come into force on 1st January 2009. If important changes are to be expected from the new tools established in terms of the European policy of security and defence, the general institutional developments enabled by this new treaty should greatly alter the way European defence projects are conceived as much as how they are implemented.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Herland Michel

Les frontières optimales de l'Europe : une question d'éthique

in *Europe en formation (L')*, n. 347, printemps (avril) , 45-60

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process



Defrance Corine

Les jumelages franco-allemands

in *Vingtième Siècle*, n. 99

Bien qu'on compte aujourd'hui près de deux mille cinq cents jumelages entre la France et l'Allemagne, ceux-ci sont restés longtemps un objet négligé de l'historiographie. Pourtant, depuis le 40e anniversaire du traité de l'Élysée, en 2003, ils suscitent un regain d'intérêt, lié au débat sur le rôle que les collectivités territoriales et la société civile doivent jouer dans les relations transnationales. En retraçant l'histoire des premiers jumelages franco-allemands – véritable innovation de l'après-guerre –, il s'agit de mettre en lumière le rôle des acteurs non étatiques dans les relations bilatérales et la démocratisation des échanges franco-allemands. C'est à ce niveau qu'il faut rechercher les facteurs et les étapes du processus de rapprochement et de réconciliation qui devait permettre à Charles de Gaulle et Konrad Adenauer de signer le traité d'amitié en 1963. Mais ces jumelages, majoritairement conclus entre des villes de RFA et de France, concernèrent aussi, dans une moindre mesure, des villes est-allemandes. Aussi, dans une première partie, il s'agira de repérer les cadres organisationnels, les réseaux dans lesquels ces appariements s'inscrivent et les milieux qui les ont portés : quelles furent les raisons de l'engagement dans ce type d'action ? Dans un second temps, il s'agira de reconstituer le paysage des jumelages bilatéraux jusque dans les années 1970, pour identifier et analyser les phases, les blocages et les spécificités régionales de ces jumelages.

ABSTRACT

Although there are now nearly 2,500 partnerships between French and German towns, they have long been neglected in the historiography of Franco-German relations. However, since the 40th anniversary of the Élysée-Treaty in 2003, there has been a new interest in city partnerships in connection with debate on the role of territorial bodies and civil society in transnational relations. In retracing the history of the first French-German pairings – a genuine innovation of the postwar years – it throws light on the role of non-state actors in bilateral relations and the democratization of French-German contacts. It is at this level that we can find the steps of the process of rapprochement and reconciliation and the factors behind it that enabled de Gaulle and Adenauer to sign the 1963 friendship treaty. But although most of the city partnerships were formed between French and West German towns, there were also a smaller number of partnerships with East German towns as well. The first part of this article examines the organizational framework and the social context in which the partnerships were established: what are the networks and the reasons for such an engagement? In the second part, the landscape of the French-German partner cities up to the 1970s will be reconstructed to identify and analyze the different phases, difficulties and regional specificities of these pairings.

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Vignes Daniel

Lorsqu'on essaie de faire le point... sur le référendum de l'Irlande. Quelques raisons pour comprendre qu'ils aient dit non

in *Revue de l'Union européenne/Revue du Marché Commun et de l'Union européenne*, n. 520, juillet-août, 413-415

No abstract available

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La Malfa Giorgio

L'Unione Europea – Una storia non ufficiale di Riccardo Perissich

in *Aspenia*, n. 42, "Religione e Politica" , 266-276

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

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De Stefani Paolo

L'esecuzione delle sentenze della Corte di Strasburgo dei diritti umani: panorama europeo e sviluppi recenti nella giurisprudenza italiana

in *Pace Diritti Umani*, n. 2, anno 3, maggio-agosto

ABSTRACT: Beginning from the Broniowski v. Poland case ([GC], 2004), the European Court of Human Rights has developed a case-law aimed at reinforcing the provision of Article 46 of the 1950 Convention.

According to Article 46, State Parties undertake to abide by the final judgments of the Court, that is, when a violation were found, to grant full compensation (*restitutio in integrum*) to the individual. Besides the most obvious obstacles raised by States and grounded on political unwillingness or domestic structural deficiencies, a major impediment to the actual execution of Strasbourg's judgments can be the attitude of the judiciary, an independent branch of the State not subject to the executive. In particular, a final decision of a national judge is not likely to be reformed by the declaratory judgment of the Strasbourg's Court.

This may result into a deeply unsatisfactory situation for the individual, whose prejudice is not fully vindicated through the equitable measure referred to in Article 41. A large number of European States have introduced legislation allowing for the national courts to re-open a case (especially in criminal matters) after the Court of Human Rights found a procedural (Article 6) and/or substantial infringement of the Convention. The Council of Europe, since its Recommendation (2000)2, has strongly supported such a trend. Some States have reached an equivalent result through the case-law of their supreme or constitutional courts. Italy stands among the few States still lacking a proper legislation on the re-opening or re-viewing of a case amounting to *res iudicata* found in breach of the Convention. The essay examines briefly the Council of Europe States' positions vis-à-vis this issue, the failed efforts of the Italian Parliament to adopt a legislation, and the possible new avenues disclosed by the 3 October 2006 judgment of the Cassation Court (Somogyi case) and, possibly, by a forthcoming pronouncement of the Italian Constitutional Court Dorigo case). The author pledges for a more active role of domestic judges in implementing the Strasbourg's judgments whenever possible, according to *lex lata*, and the reform of the relevant norms of the code of criminal procedure, as a part of a comprehensive European Convention implementation act.

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Pack Doris

Make the western Balkans the EU's next prize

in *Europe's World*, Issue 9, Summer

Kosovo's declaration of its independence makes the disintegration of Yugoslavia complete. Doris Pack, looks at the prospects for its successor states, some of which have already taken the road to EU membership with others hoping to.



She wants them to join the European family as soon as possible.

<http://www.europesworld.org/EWSettings/Article/tabid/191/ArticleType/articleview/ArticleID/20530/Default.aspx>

Section C) Regional integration processes

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Pollicino Oreste

Mandato di arresto europeo e principi costituzionali degli Stati membri: un profilo giurisprudenziale alla ricerca di un punto di equilibrio interordinamentale

in *Diritto pubblico comparato ed europeo*, n. 2 , 997 ss.

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Hofmann Herwig

Mapping the European administrative space

in *West European Politics*, vol. 31, n. 4, july , 662-676

ABSTRACT: The European administrative space is the area in which increasingly integrated administrations jointly exercise powers delegated to the EU in a system of shared sovereignty. Its development has been evolutionary and fluid. Its structures have been established on a case-by-case basis in different policy areas. Despite this differentiation, the phenomenon of administrative cooperation has led to an 'integrated administration' in the form of an intensive and often seamless cooperation between national and supranational administrative actors and activities. This article explores the reasons for and consequences of this development.

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Carbone Maurizio

Mission Impossible: the European Union and Policy Coherence for Development

in *Journal of European Integration*, Volume 30, Number 3 / July , 323-342

The principle of policy coherence has been the object of a contentious debate in the European Union's external relations, though discussions have been limited mainly to its foreign policy and its ability to speak with one voice in the international arena. Despite being institutionalized in the Treaty of Maastricht, policy coherence for development (PCD), which implies taking into account the needs and interest of developing countries in non-aid policies, failed to make headway in the EU, remaining the unheeded concern of some NGOs and a small group of member states. A change in direction occurred in the early 2000s when the European Commission, taking advantage of a number of favourable conditions and using an astute strategy, managed to set an ambitious agenda for the EU. This article, nevertheless, shows that promoting PCD risks being a 'mission impossible' for whoever attempts it due to the interplay of various issues and interests, the different commitment to international development of the member states, and the EU's institutional framework.



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Inotai András

Mixed thoughts of an EU newcomer

in *Europe's World*, Issue 9, Summer

After a promising start, the European Union's enlargement process appears to be losing some of its momentum. András Inotai argues that if Europe is to retain its global influence then it must overcome that sense of "enlargement fatigue", continue to reform and develop a clearer vision and mission for the 21st century.

<http://www.europesworld.org/EWSettings/Article/tabid/191/ArticleType/articleview/ArticleID/20337/Default.aspx>

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Sciannella Lucia G.

Morte e reincarnazione di una Costituzione: dal "Constitutional Treaty" al "Reform Treaty"

in *Diritto pubblico comparato ed europeo*, n. 1 , 142 ss.

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Germond Basil

Multinational Military Cooperation and its Challenges: The Case of European Naval Operations in the Wider Mediterranean Area

in *International Relations*, n. 2, vol. 22, june , 173-191

ABSTRACT: In order to cope with current security challenges, such as regional conflicts, humanitarian disasters or terrorist threats, European states in the post-Cold War era make important use of naval forces within a complex multilateral framework. However, the issues relating to European navies have rarely been tackled in the literature on multilateral military cooperation. Therefore this article aims to fill the gap by studying the nature of the European post-Cold War multilateral naval framework, and taking it as a case study to illustrate the current issues facing multinational military cooperation. To do so, the article focuses on the wider Mediterranean region, since most of the security challenges identified by the Europeans are now localized in this area.

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Duchesne Sophie, Frogner André-Paul

National and European Identifications: A Dual Relationship

in *Comparative European Politics*, n. 2, vol. 6, july , 143-168



ABSTRACT: Different authors show opposing results concerning the relationship between national and European identities. This article confirms empirically that identification with Europe is directly and yet paradoxically related to national identifications. It also shows that the relationship established between these two identifications has changed over the last two decades in a consistent way. The changes in this relationship are interpreted as a consequence of the dual process at stake when people identify with a territorially based community. The first process refers to the sociologically and politically determined individual disposition to feel like a member of a community rather than an isolated individual: it is cumulative as far as identification with nations and with Europe is concerned. The other dimension, on the contrary, is exclusive: it results from the sociological and political process of community building which is made easier by the delimitation of the community, and is hence fuelled by pointing out some significant 'other' such as the European Union. These two processes interact in such a way that the relationship between the two levels of identification is often difficult to spot which explains why there is considerable debate on whether a strong sense of national identity leads the way to European identity or prevents it.

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Král, Richard

National normative implementation of EC Regulations: An exceptional or rather common matter?
in *European Law Review*, Vol. 33, n. 2 , 243-256

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Longo Francesca

New Governance and Multiple Identities

in *Pace Diritti Umani*, n. 1, anno 4, gennaio-aprile

ABSTRACT: Il tema della governance è uno tra i mainstreamings degli studi sull'Unione Europea. L'evoluzione di quest'ultima in termini di produzione normativa, capacità regolatoria e complessità istituzionale, ha permesso l'adozione di questo concetto quale chiave di lettura di un sistema che, pur in assenza di un governo nella sua forma classica, svolge pienamente funzioni di governo.

Nonostante il moltiplicarsi delle teorie e degli approcci che utilizzano la governance come riferimento per descrivere i complessi meccanismi di potere all'interno dell'Unione, tuttavia non si è ancora raggiunto un accordo unanime su una definizione che possa connotare definitivamente questo concetto. Mayntz (1999) nota che l'uso più diffuso di questo termine sta a indicare un nuovo modello di governo che si distingue dal controllo gerarchico e che è caratterizzato da un processo di formulazione delle regole basato sulla cooperazione e sull'interazione tra le autorità e gli attori non statuali nel quadro di reti decisionali miste pubblico-private.

Il saggio parte dall'assunzione che il processo di formazione del senso di identità è strettamente connesso con la partecipazione politica. Maggiore è la possibilità data agli attori di partecipare ai processi di formazione della politica, maggiore sarà l'incentivo all'identificazione degli stessi attori con il sistema politico.

A tal fine il lavoro si concentra sul concetto di governance, con l'obiettivo di verificare se nell'Unione Europea è possibile sviluppare un «modo di governare» che facilita il consolidarsi di identità multiple nei cittadini dell'Unione. A tal fine sono



analizzati i principali «Modes of Governance » attualmente attivati nell'UE al fine di verificare la loro incidenza sullo sviluppo del concetto di cittadinanza che, adottando la prospettiva di Bellay, viene scomposta in tre elementi chiave: appartenenza, diritti e partecipazione.

Partendo dal presupposto che solo i meccanismi politico-istituzionali che garantiscono la partecipazione di tutti i gruppi sociali presenti nel territorio interessato ai processi decisionali di alcune politiche rilevanti ai fini del mantenimento dell'identità, incentivano lo sviluppo delle tre componenti della cittadinanza, si arriva a concludere che solo il metodo comunitario, la cui applicazione ha dato vita al modello della multilevel governance, che permette la partecipazione per tutto il ciclo di policy ai diversi gruppi territoriali e sociali, incentiva lo sviluppo dell'identità.

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Brunazzo Marco, Domorenok Ekaterina

New Members in Old Institutions: The Impact of Enlargement on the Committee of the Regions in Regional and Federal Studies, Volume 18 Issue 4 , 429 - 448

All EU institutions have recently faced the challenge of enlargement, the impact of which has not been limited to a change in the number of officials present or languages utilized. The transformation called into question the capacity of the common institutions to maintain an institutional identity and to absorb new members, integrating them properly into the institutional structures and procedures. The Committee of the Regions (CoR) is distinguished among the EU institutions for the broad range and variety of interests represented, a feature often identified as an obstacle for the smooth and effective work of the institution. In this context, the process of enlargement, which has substantially increased the CoR's membership and made the diversity of interests even broader, inevitably triggers the expectation of a growing degree of conflict in the Committee's internal policy-making process. The working hypothesis here is that enlargement has increased the level of internal conflict in the CoR and contributed to a further split of interests and the creation of new interest groups.

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Chandler David

Normative Power and the Liberal Peace: A Rejoinder to John O'Brennan in Global Society, Volume 22, Issue 4 ,October , 519-529

This rejoinder to John O'Brennan reasserts the case that the EU enlargement process has a depoliticising effect, which weakens the connections between Western Balkan states and their societies. It suggests that O'Brennan's response is more apologia than analysis; evading issues raised by asymmetrical relations of power between the EU and Western Balkans states. Here the EU is idealised, with the ascribed status of a "normative actor" projecting power merely through "soft power" mechanisms. The points raised in rejoinder seek to clarify that the more "muscular" use of conditionality and direct management of policy reforms inevitably limit the possibilities for public and political debate and consensus-making. Moreover, they distance political elites from their societies. In particular, the use of political conditionality is highlighted, to demonstrate that whether "hard" powers of imposition or "soft" powers of conditionality are used matters less to those on the receiving end of external imposition than to the EU itself, which has attempted to distance itself from its use of executive powers in the region.



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Lethi Marko

Northern Dimension: Mapping Alternative Geostrategies For Europe

in **Heartland – Eurasian Review of Geopolitics**, n. 2, "The Polar Game" , 120-127

The Nordic regional initiative is like an emblem of difficulty for the European Union. The eternal tension between regionalism and centralism. The difficult relationship with Russia. Has the season of increased vengeance dawned?

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Zowislo-Grünewald Natascha

On Europe's Representation: A Symbolic Interpretation of Rejecting the Constitution

in **PS: Political Science & Politics** , Vol. 41, Issue 3, July , 551-555

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

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Galí Jordi, Monacelli Tommaso

Optimal monetary and fiscal policy in a currency union

in **Journal of International Economics**, Volume 76, Issue 1, September 2008

We lay out a tractable model for the analysis of optimal monetary and fiscal policy in a currency union. The monetary authority sets a common interest rate for the union, whereas fiscal policy is implemented at the country level, through the choice of government spending. In the presence of country-specific shocks and nominal rigidities, the policy mix that is optimal from the viewpoint of the union as a whole requires that inflation be stabilized at the union level by the common central bank, whereas fiscal policy has a country-specific stabilization role, one beyond the efficient provision of public goods.

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Costanzo Pasquale

Oscillazioni della “forma di governo” dell’Unione europea nel “Traité simplifié compliqué”

in **Diritto pubblico comparato ed europeo**, n. 1 , 45-59

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes



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Fragola Massimo

Osservazioni sul Trattato di Lisbona tra Costituzione europea e processo di "decostituzionalizzazione".
in *Diritto comunitario e degli scambi internazionali*, n. 1 , 205-230

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Mayer Sebastian

Path dependence and Commission activism in the evolution of the European Union's external energy policy
in *Journal of International Relations and Development*, Volume 11, Number 3, September , 251-278

The European Council has instigated an energy policy for Europe, largely in order to address external challenges and to ensure a more reliable flow of hydrocarbons into the European Union. This article seeks to explain why member-states have apparently decided to delegate a number of significant responsibilities to the European Commission within this new energy framework. Evaluating the explanatory power of Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Historical Institutionalism, it is argued that the Commission has played an active role in expanding its initially vague and modest energy related powers to a degree originally not envisaged by member-states. Beyond seizing on external crises, it has utilized path-dependent dynamics to capture authorities and to establish itself as a significant international player in the energy field. Evolving informal rules and Commission practices have significantly paved the way for formal assignments. They have gained credibility, and were eventually considered acceptable from a member-state perspective.

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Pond Elisabeth

Policing Kosovo: The challenges awaiting EULEX
in *Europe's World*, Issue 9, Summer

Bringing the rule of law to Kosovo's entrenched crime culture isn't going to be easy, warns Elizabeth Pond. But she believes the EU's peacekeepers have advantages that were denied its predecessor the "unloved UNMIK".

<http://www.europesworld.org/EWSettings/Article/tabid/191/ArticleType/articleview/ArticleID/20858/Default.aspx>

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Grosche Günter, Puetter Uwe

Preparing the Economic and Financial Committee and the Economic Policy Committee for Enlargement
in *Journal of European Integration*, Volume 30, Number 4 / September , 527-543

The European Union's Economic and Financial Committee (EFC) and Economic Policy Committee (EPC) are crucial forums for close policy dialogue between the member states, the Commission and the European Central Bank. In



preparing the work of the Council and providing policy expertise, the committees exercise considerable influence over decision-making in the field of European economic policy coordination. Enlargement has been a challenge to the functioning of these two expert groupings, which are often characterized as closed and secretive. In response to an enlarging membership, both committees revised their formal membership rules. This article argues, however, that analysing the impact of enlargement on the functioning of the two committees requires close attention to the set of informal practices and routines which have characterized the working methods applied prior to enlargement. Factors such as the turnover rate in membership and the transparency of the organizational structure therefore become increasingly important. The article cautions against a further formalization of decision-making procedures in response to potential problems in the post-enlargement context.

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Valenti Stefano

Proposte per una maggiore efficacia del meccanismo di controllo della Convenzione europea dei diritti dell'uomo: il ruolo del Commissario per i Diritti Umani del Consiglio d'Europa e delle Istituzioni nazionali per i diritti umani

in *Pace Diritti Umani*, n. 2, anno 4, maggio-agosto

ABSTRACT: The Italian Parliament and Senate are presently discussing two draft laws establishing for the first time national structures for the protection of human rights: the National Ombudsman and the Commission for the Protection of Human Rights. Against the backdrop of this promising legislative development concerning promotion and protection of human rights in Italy, the article mainly aims to inform the specialised public about Council of Europe's recent proposals for the improvement of the control mechanism of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which directly relate to the mediation role of national human rights institutions (NHRI). Another aim is to ponder the negative effects so far of a prolonged absence of NHRI in Italy, in the context of the present discussions for the improvement of the «Strasbourg Machinery».

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Ioniţa Alexandru-Leonard, Freyberg-Inan Annette,

Public administration reform in the context of European integration: continuing problems of the civil service in Romania

in *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, vol. 8, n. 3 , 205-226

Abstract

This article examines the role played by European integration in the public administration reform process in Romania, with a focus on the relations between elected political elites and the civil service. It addresses the question whether the constant interaction between EU institutions and the Romanian public administration, supported by the technical nature of accession negotiations and the process of adoption of the *acquis communautaire*, has led to a greater assertion of the bureaucratic elements of the public administration vis--vis the political elites. It finds that progress toward such bureaucratization as well as toward greater professionalization and independence of the civil service has been uneven and limited. The EU's weak involvement in public administration reform in Romania has left underlying power structures



largely untouched, and is criticized for not tackling core structural causes of the slow pace of reform located within the public administration itself.

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Driessen Saskia

Quo vadis, EU?

in **Recht und Politik**, volume 44, issue 2, 2008 , 117-118

No abstract available

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European Economy News

Realising the full potential of EMU

in **European Economy News**, June 2008 - Issue 10

The third session of the Brussels Economic Forum looked at how the euro area can be consolidated. Speakers considered issues such as economic policy governance, and the structural reforms needed to ensure the euro delivers growth according to its potential.

Section C) Regional integration processes

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Shu Min

Referendums and the Political Constitutionalisation of the EU

in **European law journal**, July 2008 - Volume 14 Issue 4 - , 423-445

This article argues that European integration has triggered a dual constitutionalisation process in Europe. One is the revision of national constitutions to accommodate the integration project at the national level. The other is the construction of transnational rules to regulate novel inter-state relationships at the European level. EU referendums are contextualised in such a dual constitutionalisation process. At the domestic level, EU referendums handle the debates on national constitutional revision. At the transnational level, these popular votes ratify supranational constitutional documents. The article comparatively analyses three types of EU referendums—membership, policy and treaty referendums—according to this analytical framework, exploring the campaign mobilisation of voters, national governments, and transnational institutions, and examining the legal and political interaction between referendums and European integration. A key finding is that, as the dual constitutionalisation process deepens and widens, entrenched domestic players and restrained transnational actors are under increasing pressure to 'voice' themselves in EU referendums.



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Evers David

Reflections on Territorial Cohesion and European Spatial Planning

in *Tijdschrift voor economische en sociale geografie (Journal of Economic & Social Geography)* , Volume 99, Issue 3, July , 303-315

From a strictly legal point of view, the European Union does not have authority to carry out spatial planning. The closest thing resembling a spatial policy is the outdated and unofficial European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP). The inclusion of the term 'territorial cohesion' in the Reform Treaty has created new opportunities for proponents of European spatial planning. Despite wide political support for the concept, there is still little consensus on its actual meaning. The purpose of this paper is to take stock of this curious situation. This is done by raising some fundamental issues. Does a 'planning subject' and 'planning object' exist in Europe? What different interpretations of territorial cohesion are there, and what implications could this have? These issues are investigated further by means of a recent ESPON study which produced several policy-oriented spatial scenarios. Ultimately, the lack of a precise definition of territorial cohesion may prove to be advantageous.

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Ellinas Antonis, Suleiman Ezra

Reforming the Commission: between modernization and bureaucratization

in *Journal of European Public Policy* , Volume 15 Issue 5 2008 , 708 - 725

The article uses evidence from an original survey of 200 top Commission officials to highlight the schizophrenic nature of the Kinnock reforms. It shows that the push toward the 'modernization' of the Commission has been accompanied by a trend towards 'bureaucratization'. The findings of the survey challenge the dominant view that the reform project was largely a move toward the institutional paradigm set by new public management (NPM). Based on the views of top Commission officials, the reforms can best be described as a marriage of 'Weberian-bureaucratic' and NPM ideas. This mix of largely incompatible reform measures resulted from the simultaneous effort to maximize the efficiency of the organization while responding to the legitimacy crisis that created demands for more accountability. The political nature of these demands suggests that it will be hard for the Barroso Commission to substantially change the turn toward bureaucratization.

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Warlouzet Laurent

Relancer la CEE avant la Chaise vide: Néo-fonctionnalistes vs. fédéralistes au sein de la Commission européenne (1964-1965)

in *Journal of European Integration History*, vol. 14, n. 1 , 96-87

No abstract available



Section C) Regional integration processes

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Lightfoot Simon

Representative Politics in the European Parliament?

in International Journal of Human Rights (The), Volume 12, Issue 2 , 289-296

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Smith Michael E.

Researching European Foreign Policy: Some Fundamentals

in Politics, Vol. 28, Issue 3, October , 177-187

The emergence of European foreign policy (EFP) as a fairly distinct field of inquiry involves contributions from several traditions within political science: international relations, foreign policy analysis and European integration. This eclecticism however can make it extremely difficult to reach consensus on the fundamental definition and boundaries of the field. To help alleviate this problem, and to stimulate further thinking on the topic, this article address several fundamental questions of research design regarding positivist scholarly inquiry in this field. These include, inter alia, the problematisation of EFP as a research question, the role of independent and dependent variables and the role of systems and actors within the field.

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Tatcher Mark, Coen David

Reshaping european regulatory space: An evolutionary analysis

in West European Politics, vol. 31, n. 4, july , 806-836

ABSTRACT: The article examines European institutions for implementing EU regulation. It assesses their development using seven different models that have been introduced or discussed for organising implementation. It argues that the development of European regulatory space has followed an evolutionary pattern involving gradual reshaping through a series of steps, with previous stages influencing later stages and institutions being built on existing structures. Despite pressures and frequent discussions of comprehensive change, existing organisations have managed to limit and shape reforms. The result has been institutional 'layering' and 'conversion' instead of streamlining, and a gradual strengthening of networks of national independent regulatory agencies. The analysis therefore suggests that evolutionary analysis based on historical institutionalist approaches seems highly appropriate to the EU. Equally, it shows how even if there are strong demand-side pressures for centralisation of regulation, existing institutional arrangements and organisations limit and shape the supply of new institutions, so that debates about radical change coexist with a fragmented, cluttered and complex European regulatory space.



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Mill Colorni Felice

Ricostruire il progetto europeo

in *Critica liberale*, Volume XV, n. 151-152, maggio-giugno

No abstract available

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Blokker Paul

Rights, Identities and Democracy in an Enlarged European Union

in *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, vol. 9, n. 3, September , 357-374

The democratization of the former communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) has been predominantly understood as a process concerning the institutionalization of political communities based on civic and political rights, and the rule of law. The rights-based programmes were not, however, the only political programmes that informed the overall horizon and specific aims of the political transformation of societies in CEE, as programmes invoking ethno-cultural traditions as a basis of social solidarity for the new political community emerged more or less simultaneously. It might then be argued that the political transformations of post-communist societies have to do with two significant markers for political identities and social integration: A rights-based and a culture-based one. The distinction is equally reflected in normative political theory, which is predominantly engaged with two major questions: How to achieve the equality of all and how to provide recognition of difference. Both 'liberal nationalism' and 'constitutional patriotism' engage with this tension, and convincingly show the limits of either a rights- or a culture-based approach. It can be argued, however, that both are ultimately incapable of fully solving the problematic of cultural plurality, and that further steps are needed. Such steps include a different conception of culture, and the need for a participatory, inter-cultural political culture, including a principle of inter-cultural dialogue.

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Subsection 6. The European unification process

Missiroli Antonio

Rivisitando la Strategia europea di sicurezza: oltre il 2008 e oltre la PESD

in *ItalianiEuropei*, n. 3

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Warkotsch Alexander

Russland und die Europäische Union: Inventur einer Partnerschaft



in **Blätter für deutsche & internationale Politik**, Oktober, 2008 , 72-77

Nun ist es endlich soweit, dachten sich wohl viele in Brüssel, als die EU und Russland im Juni d.J. beschlossen, ab Oktober über die Neuauflage ihres 2007 ausgelaufenen Partnerschaftsabkommens zu verhandeln. Vorbei das Frösteln in den bilateralen Beziehungen, das durch unnützes Kräftemessen zwischen russophoben EU-Neumitgliedern und einem eigensinnigen, sich in der Rolle des starken Mannes gefallenden Russland ausgelöst wurde. Doch mit dem georgisch-russischen Waffengang ...

Section C) Regional integration processes

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Thiele Carmen

Sanktionen gegen EG-Mitgliedstaaten zur Durchsetzung von Europäischem Gemeinschaftsrecht – Das Sanktionsverfahren nach Art. 228 Abs. 2 EG

in **Europarecht**, volume 43, issue 3, 2008 , 320-344

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Eyskens Mark

Sharing a vision of “the new Europe”

in **Europe’s World**, Issue 9, Summer

Former Belgian Prime Minister Mark Eyskens says he understands why Europe’s citizens care little for the details of EU constitutional reform. But he suggests that a glimpse of the future is essential to understanding today’s choices.

<http://www.europesworld.org/EWSettings/Article/tabid/191/ArticleType/articleview/ArticleID/20465/Default.aspx>

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Favero Carlo, Giavazzi Francesco

Should the Euro Area Be Run as a Closed Economy?

in **American Economic Review**, Vol. 98, No. 2, May 2008 , 138-145

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Antoniades Andreas

Social Europe and/or global Europe? Globalization and flexicurity as debates on the future of Europe

in **Cambridge Review of International Affairs** , Vol. 21, n. 3, September , 327-346



This article claims that the European Union (EU) has had a very peculiar relationship with the globalized post-Cold War economic order. On the one hand, the EU was instrumental in bringing about this order. It aggressively promoted (both internally and externally) the principles and policies upon which this economic order has been based. On the other hand, this proactive engagement was translated within the EU into a highly polarized and antagonistic public discourse that led to a serious identity crisis. In this way, it is argued that economic globalization emerged in the EU as a debate on the nature and future of Europe. After 2005, this polarized and antagonistic discourse started to change. The rise of flexicurity, as a new way of thinking about Europe's place and orientation in the global political economy, has been instrumental in this shift. The article examines and evaluates these developments and their implications for the European project.

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Dietl Ralph

Suez 1956: A European Intervention?

in *Journal of Contemporary History*, Volume 43, No. 2, April, 259 - 278

This article does not analyse events in the Middle East. It is concerned with the structural background of the Suez Crisis. The Cold War bargain of 1949-50, and thus the Western bloc architecture, was challenged in 1956 and 1962-63. The Suez Crisis and the SKYBOLT Affair are classic examples of intra-bloc conflict. This article focuses on inter-allied conflict during the Suez Crisis. The crisis year 1956 witnessed a European challenge to the bipolar order of the Cold War. It is the hypothesis of this article that the mystique of the Suez Crisis unravels, if the events are interpreted as a clash of conflicting world views. The article attempts to enhance our understanding of the crisis by exploring the impact of the formation of a European core on the transatlantic pluralistic security community. The article will thus re-evaluate the architectural debate within the Western partial system. It is the aim to shed new light on the almost unexplored European foreign-policy co-operation within the Western European Union (WEU) in the crisis year 1956.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Carducci Michele

Teorie costituzionali per la Turchia in Europa

in *Diritto pubblico comparato ed europeo*, n. 2, 533-545

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Boedeltje Freerk, Van Houtum Henk



The Abduction of Europe: A Plea for Less 'Unionism' and more Europe

in *Tijdschrift voor economische en sociale geografie (Journal of Economic & Social Geography)* , Volume 99, Issue 3, July , 361-365

This article claims that the development of a European super-state is undesirable and unreal. Europe has never presented itself as a single bordered entity supported by a constitution and a clear definition of Europe and non-Europe. The contemporary forceful abduction by the European Union re-creates Europe as a bounded political entity institutionalised through treaties and acts. It is made a socio-political cultural construction embedded in its own created geography, history and culture. We will argue that European Union is not the same as Europe and that Europe is not a people. Europe is neither finite nor restrictive. The invention and fabrication of a bounded version of Europe leads to new forms of 'spatial containerisation' which carries the name of 'Europeanization'.

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Kovács Melinda, Leipnik Olena

The Borders of Orientalism: "Europeanization" in Hungary and Ukraine

in *Debatte: Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe*, vol. 16, n. 2, August , 151-169

In recent English-language social science, "Europeanization" has been used to refer to institutional transformation and it has also been treated as synonymous with processes related to the EU. The mainstream of the relevant literature does not distinguish between "Europeanization" as a process and "Europeanization" as a concept. The institutional/practical and the mythical/ideological dimensions of "Europeanization" are conflated in politics, which provides people with a social myth and a powerful tool for manipulation. We distinguish the two dimensions of "Europeanization" and use the cases of Ukraine and Hungary to illustrate that the concept of "Europeanization" becoming a myth may hinder the process or exist without the real process, thereby creating a simulacrum of "Europe". We also show that advancing in the process (e.g. achieving EU membership) does not change the dynamics of the concept (Orientalism and its self-imposed varieties).

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Deroose Servaas, Hodson Dermot, Kuhlmann Joost

The Broad Economic Policy Guidelines: Before and After the Re-launch of the Lisbon Strategy

in *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 46, Issue 4, August 2008

This article explores the evolution of the European Union's Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPGs) since their introduction in 1993. It argues that the BEPGs have demonstrated value-added as an overarching instrument of policy co-ordination and as a catalyst for co-operation between European and national policy-makers. Notwithstanding this, the effectiveness of the BEPGs appears to have been hindered by the progressive accumulation of guidelines and by the failure of peer pressure to bite as a sanction mechanism. The re-launch of the Lisbon Strategy in March 2005 simplified and streamlined the BEPGs, embedding them within a new set of Integrated Guidelines for Growth and Jobs. Key issues surrounding the future of the BEPGs concern their potential as a trigger for 'home grown' peer pressure, their attention to euro area specific issues and the involvement of the European Parliament in multilateral surveillance.



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Heard-Lauréote Karen

The Commission's Advisory Groups and Committees in the Field of Agricultural Policy
in *Journal of European Integration*, Volume 30, Number 4 / September , 579-596

The paper identifies the mechanisms through which Commission 'expert' committees in the European agricultural sector have adapted to the changed post-Eastern enlargement environment. It examines the role of formal and informal adjustment mechanisms in changing practices and procedures within agricultural advisory groups. Although a range of formal adjustments are identified, these arguably represent more an attempt by the Commission to address long-standing functioning issues and the extent to which they have actually altered internal processes is questionable. Additionally, although a range of informal adjustments might have been expected as a result of the largest enlargement round to date, these are in fact rare. In a later section, the paper considers the under-development of organized civil society in the agricultural sector within the new member states and finds this in part due to various resource constraints, a focus on domestic priorities and a weaker domestic culture of consultation.

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Trondal Jarle, Van den Berg Caspar, Suvarierol Semin

The Compound Machinery of Government: The Case of Seconded Officials in the European Commission
in *Governance*, Vol. 21, n. 2, April , 253-274

This article explores the compound machinery of government. Attention is directed toward decision making within the core executive of the European Union—the European Commission. The article studies seconded national civil servants (SNEs) hired on short-term contracts. The analysis benefits from an original and rich body of surveys and interview data derived from current and former SNEs. The decision-making dynamics of SNEs are shown to contain a compound mix of departmental, epistemic, and supranational dynamics. This study clearly demonstrates that the socializing power of the Commission is conditional and only partly sustained when SNEs exit the Commission. Any long-lasting effect of socialization within European Union's executive machinery of government is largely absent. The compound decision-making dynamics of SNEs are explained by (1) the organizational affiliations of SNEs, (2) the formal organization of the Commission apparatus, and (3) only partly by processes of resocialization of SNEs within the Commission.

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MC and WTE

The Difference

in *European Constitutional Law Review*, Volume 4 - Issue 01 , 1-19



On 13 December 2007, after a remarkable acceleration of the process under the German and Portuguese presidencies, representatives of the member states put pen to paper and signed the Treaty of Lisbon. Much of the ensuing debate, both in legal circles and among the general public, has centred on its abandonment of the 'constitutional concept'.

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Font Nuria

The Domestic Politics of the EU in the Constitutional Treaty Referendums

in Perspectives on European Politics and Society, vol. 9, n. 3, September , 301-315

This paper explores the different ways in which the EU dimension was contextualised in domestic politics in the 2005 Constitutional Treaty referendums in Spain, France and The Netherlands. It suggests that an ideationally based type of contextualisation dominated the Spanish referendum, in sharp contrast with the materially based mode that was dominant in France and The Netherlands. Variations in the ways in which the EU dimension was structured in domestic politics are largely accounted for by the interplay between the presence of an explicit anti-European agenda and government popularity. The paper shows that in Spain a popular government managed to keep control of the referendum debates, preventing anti-EU campaigners from gaining control of the debate and turning its focus from a symbolic pro-European discourse to materially based anti-European matters. By contrast, increasingly unpopular governments in France and The Netherlands were unable to keep the debate focused away from potential sources of material discontent. By focusing on the modes the EU dimension is framed in domestic politics, the paper aims at making a contribution to the literature on European referendums.

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Tocci Natalie

The EU and Conflict Resolution in Turkey and Georgia: Hindering EU Potential Through the Political Management of Contractual Relations

in Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 46, Issue 4, August 2008 , 875-897

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Biserko Sonja

The EU and the Serbian Civil Society

in Europe's World, Issue 9, Summer

<http://www.europesworld.org/EWSettings/Article/tabid/191/ArticleType/articleview/ArticleID/21079/Default.aspx>

Section C) Regional integration processes



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O'Brennan John

The EU in the Western Balkans: Enlargement as Empire? A Response to David Chandler in *Global Society*, Volume 22, Issue 4, October, 507 - 518

This article constitutes a response to David Chandler and his conception of the European Union's role in the western Balkans as a contemporary form of empire-building which he argues has deeply compromised the process of democratic institution-building in a still fragile region. It analyses his view that the EU enlargement process is entirely asymmetric in design and process and contends that there is ample room for candidate states both to contest EU demands and shape their own paths toward membership. This is entirely consistent with the evidence from the EU's previous enlargement, its most ambitious to date, which saw ten states from Central and Eastern Europe become members in 2004 and 2007. The EU enlargement regime is thus a tried and tested one and constitutes the most successful instrument in the EU's external relations toolkit. But it is now facing a challenge in the western Balkans that is manifestly more difficult than anything encountered in previous accession contexts. In particular, the problem of first order democratisation, extending to the practice of state-building, remains cogent and, in the fallout from the Kosovan declaration of independence all the more important in regional terms.

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Haukkala Hiski

The EU's Common Strategy on Russia: Four Lessons Learned About Consensus Decision-Making in Foreign Policy

in *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Volume 13, Issue 3, 317-331

The article analyses and engages in a discussion the Union's experiment with so-called CFSP common strategies, especially the one drafted on Russia (1999–2004). In the process, the origins and eventual outcomes of the concept are discussed. The main conclusion is that at all times the EU and its Member States should keep an eye on the wider external context within which their policies are played out and keep in mind that their actions might have unintended consequences. The same holds for scholars in reverse: when studying EU external policies, the internal setting and dynamics count and explain a lot and should be taken more fully into account in our studies.

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Kutan Ali M, Zhou Su

The Enlargement of the European Union and the Behavior of Real Exchange Rates

in *Review of Development Economics*, Volume 12, Number 3, 550-561

The authors further investigate the conditional variance and the persistence of real exchange rate (RER) shocks between Germany and some core European Union (EU) members from January, 1973 through 2004. Using data for all EU15 countries, they test whether the enlargement of the Union has reduced the variability and the persistence of RER shocks between Germany and the rest of the members during the 1990s. They also examine the impact of the introduction of the euro on the variance and persistence of real exchange rate shocks. Finally, the authors extend the analysis to the new members who joined in May, 2004. The results have implications for the economic cost of joining the



Union, as well as assessing the timing of the newest members to enter the eurozone

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Napel Stefan, Widgrén Mika

The European Commission—Appointment, preferences, and institutional relations

in *Public Choice*, Volume 137, Numbers 1-2 , 21-41

The paper analyzes the appointment of the European Commission as a strategic game between members of the European Parliament and the Council. The focal equilibrium results in commissioners that duplicate the policy preferences of national Council representatives. Different internal decision rules still prevent the Commission from being a Council clone in aggregate. Rather, it is predicted a priori that Commission policies are on average more in accord with the aggregate position of the Parliament than that of the Council. This prediction is confirmed for a dataset covering 66 dossiers with 162 controversial EU legislative proposals passed between 1999 and 2002.

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Peers Steve

The European Community's criminal law competence: The plot thickens

in *European Law Review*, Vol. 33, n. 3 , 399-410

No abstract available

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Streinz Rudolf

The European Constitution after the Failure of the Constitutional Treaty

in *Zeitschrift für Öffentliches Recht*, issue 2, vol. 63 , 159-188

No abstract available

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Sutherland Donald

The European Union and its Institutions

in *Federalist Debate (The)*, Year XXI, n. 2, July , 38-41

No abstract available

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von Bogdandy Armin

The European Union as Situation, Executive, and Promoter of the International Law of Cultural Diversity - Elements of a Beautiful Friendship

in *European Journal of International Law*, Vol. 19, n. 2, 241-276

Cultural diversity is an important political and legal topos in the European Union. At the same time, the concern for cultural diversity gives reason for grave reservations towards the Union. This article intends to assist, on the basis of international law, in distinguishing appearance and reality. The Union will be analysed first as a situation of the application of the international law of cultural diversity, secondly as the regional executive of this international law, and thirdly as its global promoter. It shows that international law and Union law reinforce each other. The former conveys to the Union instruments to pursue European unification which at the same time serve its own implementation. Furthermore, it does not set limits to European unity since it protects only cultural pluralism but not state-supporting distinctiveness. A prerequisite for this consonance is that the Union's constitutional law allows for political unity without cultural unity and that international law remains mute about important questions on European unification. The international law perspective thus does not fully exhaust the problem: conformity with international law alone cannot dissipate concern for the future of cultural diversity in the Union.

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Beyer Cornelia

The European Union as a Security Policy Actor: The Case of Counterterrorism

in *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Volume 13, Issue 3, 293-315

This article examines the actorness of the European Union in the security policy field. Applying and adapting criteria developed by Bretherton and Vogler – namely criteria regarding structure, effect and international status – the European Union is described as a ‘collective actor’. Collective actorness is dissimilar to that of a classical international unit, i.e. the state, but implies that some coherence, cooperation and a certain amount of collective action can be expected. Also, of relevance for the measurement of actorness is the extent of participation in global governance and recognition in international law. After testing the EU on seven criteria, it can be discerned that a certain collective actorness is present, even if problems regarding a ‘common voice’ and the coherence of internal policies still exist.

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Schout Adriaan, Jordan Andrew

The European Union's governance ambitions and its administrative capacities

in *Journal of European Public Policy*, Volume 15 Issue 7 2008, 957 - 974

The existing literature has started to analyse why the policy co-ordination ambitions that permeated the 2001 White Paper on governance have not been realized. However, surprisingly little attention has been devoted to exploring the administrative demands that these ambitions impose on different policy actors. This article opens up this research area by focusing on more ambitious policy objectives and their associated network-based modes of governance. The empirical part examines three public administration systems in the EU to assess how well they have responded to these



demands. Although often downplayed by those advocating network-based modes of governance, this paper reveals that the administrative demands they pose are much greater than is commonly supposed. Some actors (e.g. the Commission and the UK) have upgraded their administrative co-ordinating capacities, whereas others (e.g. the Netherlands) have moved in a perverse direction. It is concluded that the EU needs to take administrative capacity building much more seriously in order to govern in a less hierarchical manner.

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Harmsen Robert

**The Evolution of Dutch European Discourse: Defining the 'Limits of Europe'
in Perspectives on European Politics and Society**, vol. 9, n. 3, September , 316-341

The period since the early 1990s has seen a marked shift in the terms of Dutch European discourse, as dramatically highlighted by the country's 'No' vote in its 2005 referendum on the European Constitutional Treaty. The present paper examines the trajectory of this discursive shift, suggesting that a traditional 'federalist' referential has been replaced by an elite discourse focused primarily on defining the 'limits of Europe' in intersecting substantive and geographical terms. A general framework for the understanding of national discourses of European integration is first set out, highlighting the key role played by national elites as mediators between the European and the national political systems. The Dutch case is then examined against this background, chronicling the general terms of the 'critical turn' in national European discourse, the 2005 referendum campaign, post-referendum party positioning and discussions surrounding the 2007 Reform Treaty. Despite the persistence of strong, underlying support for Dutch EU membership, it is finally argued that The Netherlands has not (as yet) found a stable, cohesive national narrative of its 'fit' and 'place' in the contemporary (post-enlargement) project of European integration.

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Bozo Frédéric

**The Failure of a Grand Design: Mitterrand's European Confederation, 1989–1991
in Contemporary European History** , Volume 17, Issue 03, August , 391-412

On 31 December 1989, a few weeks after the fall of the Berlin Wall, President François Mitterrand of France called for the creation of 'a European confederation' designed to 'associate all states of [the] continent in a common and permanent organisation for exchanges, peace and security'. Yet less than eighteen months later the Confederation project, a major initiative for post-Yalta Europe, had collapsed. What were Mitterrand's objectives? What were the modalities of the project, and how was it conducted? And why did it fail in the end, after having raised much hope?

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Vauchez Antoine

**The Force of a Weak Field: Law and Lawyers in the Government of the European Union (For a Renewed
Research Agenda)
in International Political Sociology** , Vol. 2, Issue 2, June 2008 , 128-144



ABSTRACT

Rather than considering legal and judicial arenas as the mere surface of the weighty social processes that shape European integration, this article contends that they are actually one of the essential spaces where the government of Europe is being produced. To account for this paramount role played by law in EU polity, two hitherto unexplored research paths are followed. First of all, a socio-historical perspective focuses on the critical junctures at which Law has been formalized as a science of European government providing critical devices for integration. Second, a more sociological stance is taken in relation to the functioning of the "European legal field" (ELF). A preliminary inquiry leads to its characterization as weak, with porous internal and external borders. This article argues that this weak autonomy is what makes it strong and influential when it comes to shaping the representations and principles of EU government.

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Maurer Andreas

The German Council Presidency: Managing Conflicting Expectations

in **Journal of Common Market Studies**, Volume 46 Issue s1, September 2008 , 51-59

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Kassimeris Christos, Tsoumpanou Lina

The Impact of the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms on Turkey's EU Candidacy

in **International Journal of Human Rights (The)**, Volume 12, Issue 3 , 329-345

The main purpose of this paper is to assess the impact of the European Convention on Human Rights on Turkey's bid for membership with the European Union. The main hypothesis of the present study considers the objectives of the EU and examines whether its policy regarding the issue of human rights in Turkey is, indeed, based upon the efficacy of the liberal assumption that there is a genuine link between democracy, respect for human rights and international stability. In any other case, the issue of human rights might have been manipulated as a precondition that instead of determining Turkey's status, merely delays the processing of her application while keeping her at a close distance.

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Uslu Emrullah

The Kurdistan Workers' Party Turns against the European Union

in **Mediterranean Quarterly**, Volume 19, Number 2, Spring , 99-121

The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) is the largest Kurdish opposition group in Turkey, serving as an umbrella for a myriad of organizations. The PKK includes the following basic components: 1. Organizations: an armed militia group,



called Kongra-Gel/PKK (Kurdish People's Congress) a political party, the Democratic Society Party (DTP), which serves, its legal wing, the Free Youth Organization o the Free Women's Organization, the Kurdistan Students Association, the Kurdish Imams' Association 2. Media outlets, three newspapers: Yeni Ozgur Politika in Germany and Gundem and Azadiya Welat (a Kurdish-language publication) in Turkey o two news agencies: Firat News Agency and Dicle Haber Ajansi o two satellite TV stations: Roj TV (Denmark) and MMC TV o a radio station:...

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Baquero Cruz Julio

The Legacy of the Maastricht-Urteil and the Pluralist Movement

in *European law journal*, July 2008 - Volume 14 Issue 4 - , 389-422

The Maastricht-Urteil of the German Constitutional Court of October 1993 has left a deep mark on EU law. Although some may consider it as part of legal history, the decision has never been overruled, and the ideas behind it are very much alive. This article tries to examine the legacy of that decision. From a practical point of view, the article focuses on the following issues: the current situation in Germany; the influence on other constitutional or supreme courts and on constitutional reforms in some Member States; the influence on the European Court of Justice and on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. Regarding theory, three sections of the article discuss a number of widespread 'idées reçues' contained in the Maastricht-Urteil on notions such as the state, constituent power (pouvoir constituant), and democracy. The next section presents the movement of legal pluralism as an attempt to come to terms with the Maastricht-Urteil and its legacy. It criticises the radical versions of legal pluralism in view of the damage they may cause to essential dimensions of the rule of law. The final section reflects on the real motives behind the Maastricht-Urteil and its legacy, and on possible future developments.

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Leinen Jo, Kreutz Jan

The Lisbon Treaty - What next?

in *Federalist Debate (The)*, Year XXI, n. 2, July , 33-37

European Federalism will soon be back on the political agenda. In the past decades, decisive steps were taken towards pushing forward the European integration project. Each treaty change brought us closer to fulfilling the visions of Altiero Spinelli and the other founders of the European federalist movement: a peaceful integration of nation states that for centuries had systematically ruined each other and forced the Europeans to suffer; a democratic and stable political system for the entire continent, based on federalist principles; the establishment of a Union of Citizens. No previous treaty has brought us so close to the aim of a federal and democratic Europe as the Treaty of Lisbon: co-decision between the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers will be introduced as a general rule, the veto-powers of the member states will be reduced to a large extent, participatory democracy will be introduced, justice and home affairs will be communitarised and a quasi foreign minister, supported by a European External Action Service, will be introduced.

However, much remains to be done. During the implementation phase, many of the federalist achievements could be



winded back. Many questions remain open: the relationship between the institutions and the relationship between the different "EU-leaders", the positioning of the European External Action Service and the implementation of the "participatory democracy" concept, just to name a few. The federalists should raise their voice in the next months and contribute to the debate. The Treaty of Lisbon - even though it is a considerable improvement compared to the Treaty of Nice - is not the last European treaty. The European Federalists have to develop ideas and visions for the next steps towards a truly democratic Europe, to be taken after the European elections next year.

The Lisbon Treaty: An important step on the path to European Federalism

The Lisbon Treaty can be considered as a breakthrough for European democracy. It is an important intermediate step on the way from an economic community to a political Union and from a Union of governments to a Union of citizens. The new post of "President of the European Council" will be introduced. But this is not at all to be mixed up with a real European President. Considering that the powers of the European Council President will be limited and considering the unlikelihood of the European governments and citizens accepting one central leader for the Union, it is obvious that the EU will not develop into a presidential system. Instead, the new Treaty defines the European Union clearly as a parliamentary system.

Once the new Treaty is ratified, the European Parliament will be more or less on equal footing with the Council of ministers. In 95% of European legislation, co-decision between the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers will be the rule. It will have equal rights in the budgetary procedure. With its new powers, it will be able to ensure that the EU budget is spent in the best interest of the citizens. Furthermore, it is the European Parliament who will elect the President of the European Commission and no longer the Heads of States and Governments. This is another important step in transforming the Union of States into a Union of Citizens. Soon the European Political Parties will campaign for the European elections with their top candidate, competing for the position of "President of the European Commission", the head of a developing "EU-government". By participating in the elections, the Union citizens will thus have better possibilities to directly influence the political agenda of the EU.

The Commission will be strengthened in its role as the "European government". In important areas, such as climate change, energy policy and civil protection, the EU will receive new competences. Therefore the Commission can develop new political initiatives and extend the field of activity. The introduction of the new legal forms of delegated acts and implementing acts will strengthen the role of the European Commission to execute the legislation adopted by the Council and the Parliament, a traditional role for every government. Furthermore, it will be primarily the President of the European Commission and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who will represent the EU abroad. An important development will be the scaling down of the number of Commissioners to two thirds of the member states from 2014 on. Since not every member state will be represented in the Commission, the Commissioners will no longer be able to act as representatives of their member states in the EU. All of them will have to represent the common interest of the EU and will have to work for the strengthening of the Community method, even in cases where this goes against the interests of their home country.

Important for the development of European democracy is the new citizens' initiative, requesting the Commission to put forward a proposal for European legislation, if this is demanded by one million European citizens. This will help the Europeans shape the political agenda of the European Union and bring the EU closer to its citizens. A large majority of the Union citizens are in favour of a more democratic Europe. Therefore the new tool of the citizens' initiative should be used by non governmental organizations such as the UEF to put political pressure on the institutions to make further steps in this regard.



The introduction of qualified majority voting as general rule for decision-making in the Council of Ministers is an important step forward. In most policy areas, individual member states will no longer have the possibility to block initiatives launched by the EP and the Commission. Since it will no longer be necessary to find a minimum common denominator amongst the member states, policy making in the EU will be faster, more efficient and more ambitious. Policy delivery and problem solving on the European level will improve. As a result, the EU will gain more legitimacy in the eyes of the citizens.

The procedure for amending the Treaties will be revised. In the future, new European Conventions can be set up, in order to prepare substantive changes of the European Treaties. Considering the experience with the previous two conventions, it is very likely that future conventions will decide to move towards a federal Europe and to more democracy in the EU. With the Lisbon Treaty, the European Parliament has the right to put forward amendments to the European Treaties and it will use this right after the 2009 elections.

Unfortunately, there are a number of setbacks, in the Lisbon Treaty vis-à-vis the Constitutional Treaty. A real loss was the reformulation of Article 1 of the Constitutional Treaty, which defined the EU as a Union of states and citizens. With the Lisbon Treaty, the EU will be founded on the will of the "High Contracting Parties", the member states. Negative is also the removal of the European symbols, which reduces the visibility of the European Union. During the Intergovernmental Conference last year, Great Britain, Poland and Ireland insisted on opt outs from several EU policies, endangering splitting the EU into two groups and risking to slow down the integration process of the entire EU. Due to Polish pressure, the introduction of the double majority system in the Council was postponed to 2014, possibly even until 2017. Furthermore, in some areas of Justice and Home Affairs, the member states maintain strong veto powers. Also in the area of foreign policy, too little was done to strengthen the European dimension and the role of the EU in the world. To be criticised is also the creation of a President of the European Council - next to a Commission President and the "Foreign Minister" - which could lead to confusion and strengthen the role of the intergovernmental method in Europe. However, those setbacks are few compared to the enormous number of improvements introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon, compared to the Treaty of Nice.

Implementing Lisbon in a federal way

The real significance of the Lisbon Treaty depends a lot on its implementation. Like every other Treaty, the Lisbon Treaty is only a legal framework. How this frame will be filled with content, remains to be seen in the next months. Several provisions can be interpreted in different ways. One of them is the post of the President of the European Council. In the media this post is already portrayed as the future face of the European Union, as the President of the EU. However, from a federalist point of view it should be ensured that the European Council President is in reality no more than a chairperson. The political leader of the EU should be the European Commission President, the head of the quasi "EU-government" and therefore the quasi European Prime Minister.

A very important area for the future integration of the European Union will be the European foreign policy. With the Lisbon Treaty, a "Foreign Minister" and a European External Action Service will be introduced. How far this will contribute to an integrated and stronger European foreign policy, remains up to the implementation of the treaty. Although all institutions claim that the European External Action Service should have a sui generis character and should be independent from direction from all EU institutions and the member states, behind the scenes the Commission and the Council both work towards a service which is directly connected to them. The foreign service's ability to contribute to a genuine European foreign policy depends directly on the construction of the service. If the Council and the member states gain control over the European External Action Service, the Union risks to continue speaking with many different voices in international politics. Since it is possible that the service will also include aspects of the foreign trade policy and



the development policy, there is a certain risk that those community policies are reintergovernmentalised through the European External Action Service.

Problematic will also be the developments concerning the opt outs of Great Britain, Poland, Ireland and Denmark. These opt outs are a dangerous precedent. They bear the risk that the EU is split into different groups - those willing to integrate and those opposing a political Union - and citizens from some countries will be treated as second class Union citizens. In the future, more must be done to avoid that further countries, especially the new member states and the Scandinavian countries, follow the example of Britain and try to block future integration steps or keep out of certain policy areas. On the other hand, the enhanced cooperation procedure is an important tool to allow "coalitions of the willing" to go ahead and to overcome blockades of the European integration project. Efforts should be made to put pressure on the governments of Great Britain, Poland, Ireland and Denmark to overcome their opt-outs.

Reviving the federalist vision

In the past years - especially after the failed referendums in France and the Netherlands - many voices in Europe claimed that the European constitutional project had been defeated and that the federalist visions had failed. Although this is far from being the truth, too little was done to openly oppose this view. Federalists should play a role in explaining to people that this new Treaty is another step on the way towards a federal Europe and that a stronger European Parliament, enshrining the participatory democracy in the Treaties and the strengthening of the Union citizens rights, is the result of political pressure from European federalists. We have to underline that the Federalists will continue to work for a more democratic Europe. We should not be scared to oppose eurosceptic views in public and strongly demand further steps towards a United Europe, even though not all of them might seem to be feasible in the short term.

In the past years, the European Federalists have partly been the victims of their own success. In the fifties, sixties and seventies, we managed to mobilize ten thousands of people with demands for peace on the continent, a borderless Europe and a common currency. All of those aims have been achieved. For the next steps towards a democratic Europe, such as a federal European Constitution, it will be more difficult to mobilise citizens. We have to define a clear message on what should be achieved. For the next years, this message could be that a strong "European Government" is needed in order to answer the challenges of the 21st century. The citizens' initiative could be used to gather broad support for such demands.

Next steps on the path to European Federalism

The priority for the near future has to be the implementation of the new Treaty, to make the reforms work and to develop new, strong European policies. However, the construction of the European Union is not completed yet. In order to make the European Union really democratic, strengthen the role of the EU in the world and improve the European policies, further reforms have to be done. The institutional setup and the way decisions are taken in the EU have to be addressed once again. In this regard we should analyse the concept of "institutional balance". In the recent history of the European Union, there was a broad agreement not to touch the existing "institutional balance". This meant that in the past reform processes the strengthening of one institution was only admitted if also the other institutions were reinforced. This may be no longer appropriate. We have to analyse which role each institution can and should play in a democratic Union.

Especially the role of the Council and the European Council should be evaluated. Should we overcome the co-decision method and introduce in some policy areas the exclusive right of the European Parliament to decide, for example in some of the areas where the EU has the exclusive competence? Also the role of the European Commission should be reconsidered. It used to be the "guardian of a general European interest". But in times when the European Union rightly starts to become more politicised, the "Common European Interest" depends on the political point of view. Different



parties represent different visions of how European policy should develop. The new Treaty gives the Union citizens better opportunities to choose the political direction they wish the Union to take. Therefore steps should be taken to better align the European Commission to the will of the majority in the European Parliament.

Also the monopoly on the right of initiative for the Commission is no longer justified. The European Parliament and the Council of Ministers should therefore receive the same right to initiate European legislation. The co-decision method and qualified majority voting should be strengthened and extended to further policy areas. The setup of the Council of Ministers could be reformed as well. One idea would be that in the future it is the respective Commissioner and not any longer a minister from a member state that chairs the Council formations. This will be already the case with the Foreign Affairs Council, which is chaired by the High Representative, who is Vice-President of the Commission. The General Affairs Council, which will be very important for coordinating the work of the Council, could be chaired by the Commission President.

Very important will be the reform of the European budget. Restricting the Union budget to little more than 1% of the Union's gross national income, will not allow the EU to fulfill all its tasks in the years to come. Own Union resources - such as an EU tax - should be introduced and all budgetary decisions, on income and expenditure, should be taken with qualified majority.

The biggest obstacle for a federal development of the EU remains the revision procedure for the European Treaty. Any single member state can block the ratification of European Treaty revisions. In the European Convention - where a clear majority was in favour of more ambitious results than those achieved in the end - the setbacks concerning a strong and democratic Union were due to a veto-threat from some member states.

There are two options to overcome the member states veto right in treaty reforms. A super-qualified majority voting for the ratification of the European Treaties could be introduced: a Treaty is ratified if it is approved in three quarters of the member states representing three quarters of the EU citizens (independent on whether the ratification has been conducted by parliamentary means or through a referendum). Alternatively a real European referendum could be held on new treaties: a referendum is held in all member states on the same day and with the same question. If a majority of the participating citizens vote in favour and if the referendums have been positive in two thirds of the member states, the referendum is successful. In both cases, the EU could be considerably strengthened and deepened. Those member states who consistently oppose further integration and the ratification of agreed reform-treaties and in which a majority of the citizens oppose membership, should make use of the new exit-clause.

Indeed, the question remains in how far the implementation of such a procedure would increase the support of citizens for the European Union and whether citizens would not see this as a betrayal of their right to decide about the future of the Union nation state by nation state. However, the European Union is doomed to failure, if it is not able to reform itself and adapt to new challenges. In a Union with 30 member states, unanimous agreements will be extremely difficult to achieve. Once the Lisbon Treaty has entered into effect, it is important to start a new debate about the questions raised above. In July 2007, the European Parliament expressed its will to use its new right of initiative to put forward proposals for changes of the European Treaties. The European federalist should speak up in this debate and mobilise public support.

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Swimelar Safia

The Making of Minority Rights Norms in the Context of EU Enlargement: The Czech Republic and the Roma in *International Journal of Human Rights (The)*, Volume 12, Issue 4 , 505-527

The end of the Cold War, the twin processes of democratisation and European Union enlargement in the Central and East European states, and the desire to prevent inter-ethnic tensions in the region have created new incentives and resources for the promotion and protection of minority rights. Engaging the constructivist approach within international relations theory, this article seeks to understand the domestic impact of international minority rights norms and the actors who promote them by applying a current 'spiral model' of human rights norm socialisation concerning the case of the Roma minority in the Czech Republic. By tracing the mechanisms of the norm socialisation process, this article illustrates how minority policy and the domestic salience of minority rights norms regarding the Roma steadily progressed between 1990 and EU accession in 2004. Initial changes in minority policy were made for instrumental reasons, but as the Czech Republic became increasingly enmeshed in the transnational minority rights network, further changes were also made for reasons of belief and identity. Both rationalist and constructivist approaches taken together are best able to explain the outcomes.

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Lavenex Sandra, Kunz Rachel

The Migration-Development Nexus in EU External Relations

in Journal of European Integration, Volume 30, Number 3 / July , 439-457

The linkage of development cooperation with migration policies has been promoted widely by international organizations from 2000 onwards. This paper analyses the factors that have prompted and impeded a reorientation of the dominant migration policy-frame within the EU towards the realization of a migration-development nexus. It is argued that external events such as the international debate on the migration-development nexus and the external shocks provoked by the events in Ceuta and Melilla prompted the EU to rethink its traditionally rather narrow approach, focusing on the repression of migration flows. However, the persistence of the established policy-frame and the existing institutional setting limit the scope for balanced policy coordination, introducing development mainly as an instrument of migration policy rather than the other way round. Challenging the literature that argues that there is a necessary trade-off between a development and a security-orientated migration policy, it is shown that this dichotomous juxtaposition hides the many ways in which different orientations can be combined, depending on the institutional context within which they are framed.

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Biukovi#263; Ljiljana

The New Face of CEFTA and its Dispute Resolution Mechanisms

in Review of Central & East European Law, vol. 33, n. 3 , 257-294

Amendments made to the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) in 2006 mark significant developments in the economic integration of the Western Balkans. Among those amendments were changes to the Agreement's dispute resolution mechanism. This article analyzes the latest developments in economic integration in the Western Balkans and



examines the nature and operation of the dispute resolution mechanisms used in CEFTA. Explanations for important changes to the dispute settlement process in CEFTA are suggested by examining the context of the members' economic, political, social and legal surroundings. The article surveys ongoing tendencies in the development of dispute resolution mechanisms in other regional trade agreements, in particular those utilized by the European Union (EU), as a means of exploring the rationale behind the new CEFTA. It argues that the EU practice—developed in EU association agreements with third countries—has inspired the 2006 amendments to the CEFTA dispute resolution mechanism.

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García-Solanes José, María-Dolores Ramón

The New Member States and the Process towards EMU

in Review of Development Economics, Volume 12, Number 3 , 655-667

The authors apply two complementary empirical criteria to eight new member states (NMSs) of the European Union to assess how ready they are to adopt the euro. As a first step, they recover demand and supply shocks and calculate the social losses implied by the two relevant exchange rate regimes: flexible rates and currency board. As a second step, the authors calculate the real exchange rates variability that these countries are currently experiencing and compare it to that of three Mediterranean countries during a similar period before they joined the EMU. The combination of the results of both tests shows that Estonia and Slovenia are the only countries that seem ready to adopt the euro within the shortest period of time foreseen by the Maastricht criteria; that is, after the two mandatory years in the ERM2. The rest of the countries will probably still need some exchange rate flexibility to absorb external shocks in the coming years.

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Lempp Jakob , Altenschmidt Janko

The Prevention of Deadlock through Informal Processes of 'Supranationalization': The Case of Coreper

in Journal of European Integration, Volume 30, Number 4 / September , 511-526

In 2004 and 2007 the European Union faced the biggest rounds of enlargement to date. It is not difficult to imagine that enlargement affected the way the European Union and its institutions function and that the effects of enlargement are especially noticeable in the Council of the EU and its preparatory bodies. Many researchers expected procedures, especially in the Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper), to become more formalized and 'intergovernmental' in nature and decision-making to become more complicated. However, enlargement contributed to institutional change in quite another way: it strengthened the influence of supranational and 'quasi-supranational' actors within the committee, such as the Commission, the presidency and the General Secretariat, and it made decision-making in many cases considerably easier. This paper analyses these processes and seeks to answer the question: Which mechanisms contributed to the process of 'informal supranationalization' that helped to prevent considerable losses in efficiency and functionality in Coreper?

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Hagelberg Robin

**The Relations between Turkey and Europe from a Geopolitical Perspective
in Europe en formation (L'), n. 347, printemps (avril) , 17-44**

full text available at <http://www.cife.eu/UserFiles/File/EEF/HAGELBERG347.pdf>

Section C) Regional integration processes

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Roth Elie

**The Rule of Reason Doctrine in European Court of Justice Jurisprudence on Direct Taxation
in Canadian Tax Journal, Volume 56, Issue Number 1 , 67 - 140**

This article critically reviews the doctrine of justification developed by the European Court of Justice in its jurisprudence on direct taxation concerning whether, and the circumstances under which, a national measure that is found to restrict the exercise of one or more of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the ec treaty, or that is discriminatory in its application or effect, may be justified as representing an imperative requirement in the public interest. The article begins with an overview of the court's development of the doctrine of justification, or "rule of reason," with emphasis on its application in cases involving direct taxation. The limitations on the exercise of the fundamental freedoms contained in the ec treaty and the grounds on which a restrictive or discriminatory national tax measure may be justified as being in the public interest have traditionally been interpreted very narrowly by the court. The article suggests that the non-discrimination principle developed by the court in its jurisprudence on direct taxation supports a more expansive interpretation of the potential grounds of justification that the court has considered to date in its rule of reason doctrine, and argues that some of the court's recent judgments may form the framework for a more balanced interpretation of the rule of reason in which the justification doctrine is broadened to include an analysis of relevant international tax policy principles. This issue will be of relevance as well in the context of the application of the free movement of capital provisions in article 56 of the ec treaty to third-country investment in Europe, as the court continues to define the circumstances under which the various grounds of justification it has considered to date may be applied to nationals of non-ec member states.

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Orbie Jan, Babarinde Olufemi

The Social Dimension of Globalization and EU Development Policy: Promoting Core Labour Standards and Corporate Social Responsibility

in Journal of European Integration, Volume 30, Number 3 / July , 459-477

This article describes and analyses the role of the European Union in promoting the social dimension of globalization (SDG). In the context of its policy coherence for development (PCD) commitments, the EU aims to promote decent



work, including core labour standards (CLS) and employment objectives, in the Third World. The first part of this article shows that the “direct” impact of internal EU social policies on developing countries has been limited. Moreover, the Community’s capacity to act in the International Labour Organization has been confined by sensitive competence issues. The second and third parts elaborate on the “indirect” trade and development mechanisms through which the EU is advancing the SDG. Whereas the EU originally used a narrow approach centred on CLS in trade relations, it gradually developed a broader and development-orientated perspective, including the support of voluntary corporate social responsibility (CSR) schemes. The article concludes that although the EU has clearly increased the social face of its development policies, this softer approach is still in an embryonic phase.

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Dougan Michael

The Treaty of Lisbon 2007: Winning minds, not hearts
in *Common Market Law Review*, issue 3, vol. 45 , 617-703

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

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Craig Paul

The Treaty of Lisbon: Process, architecture and substance
in *European Law Review*, Vol. 33, n. 2 , 137-166

No abstract available

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Dangerfield Martin

The Visegrád Group in the Expanded European Union: From Preaccession to Postaccession Cooperation
in *East European Politics and Societies*, vol. 22, n. 3, Summer , 630-667

This article investigates whether the Visegrád Group (VG) is proving capable of a successful transition from preaccession to postaccession cooperation in the expanded European Union (EU). Prior to EU accession, the VG agenda mainly emphasised political cooperation around strategic goals of EU and NATO membership, acting as an incubation chamber and the organising framework for joint policies and actions. The article finds that pessimistic prognoses for postaccession VG cooperation in circulation around the time of EU entry rather underestimated the VG's staying power and its usefulness as a vehicle for serving some of the requirements and challenges of the actuality of the "return to Europe." The postaccession agenda seems to have opened up many new avenues for cooperation on both intra-VG and external affairs, including towards the EU, and seems to have given rise to the kind of substantial practical cooperation agenda that eluded the VG during the preaccession period.



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Jorle Trandal

The anatomy of autonomy: Reassessing the autonomy of the European Commission

in *European Journal of Political Research*, issue 4, vol. 47, June, 467-488

ABSTRACT: Abstract. The European Commission (Commission) occupies a pivotal role as the key executive institution of the European Union (EU). Yet, the factual autonomy of the Commission remains largely unexplored, contributing to contradictory assessments of it. This study reassesses the behavioural autonomy of the Commission, as well as organisational conditions thereof. The article utilises one under-researched laboratory of the Commission: temporary officials (SNEs). SNEs may serve as a crucial test-bed of Commission autonomy due to their ambiguous affiliation towards the Commission. Whereas past studies claim that SNEs have a predominantly intergovernmental behavioural pattern, this study demonstrates that the SNEs blend departmental, epistemic and supranational behavioural dynamics, thereby safeguarding their behavioural autonomy. Understanding Commission autonomy requires that the organisational anatomy of the Commission organisation be carefully considered. The organisational anatomy is measured by considering four independent variables: the organisational composition of the Commission services; organisational incompatibilities across levels of governance; recruitment procedures of Commission officials through a so-called 'submarine' approach; and socialisation dynamics inside the Commission. The autonomy of the Commission is organisationally contingent and not only subject to what has been called 'actors' conspicuous desire for autonomy'.

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Banks Karen

The application of the fundamental freedoms to Member State tax measures: guarding against protectionism or second-guessing national policy choices?

in *European Law Review*, Vol. 33, n. 4, 482-506

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

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Popescu Gabriel

The conflicting logics of cross-border reterritorialization: Geopolitics of Euroregions in Eastern Europe

in *Political Geography*, Volume 27, Issue 4, 418-438

Europe is currently experiencing an unprecedented process of reterritorialization in the context of European Union integration. Central to this process is the implementation of various cross-border cooperation schemes, commonly known as Euroregions, aimed at redefining fixed, border-induced Westphalian territoriality. The literature on Euroregions has primarily examined the reterritorialization of state power and institutions across borders, documenting the emergence of cross-border governance networks. However, the territorial underpinning of cross-border reterritorialization, as well as the process of territorial constitution of cross-border spaces has been less well explored. This paper examines cross-border reterritorialization from a geopolitical perspective informed by multi-scalar conceptualizations of political territoriality. Actors at supranational, national and local scales often follow territorial logics



that are at odds with each other. Competing meanings of territory and territoriality interact to produce a geopolitics of Euroregions that shapes cross-border reterritorialization. The paper focuses on the Euroregions established at the current fringes of the EU, in the Romanian–Ukrainian–Moldovan borderlands.

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European Economy News

The economy of the euro area

in *European Economy News*, June 2008 - Issue 10

The euro area has proved over the past ten years to have been a successful and increasingly integrated economy. Today, in many respects, the euro area can be viewed as a single economic entity comparable to other very large economies.

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Anagnostaras Georgios

The incomplete state of Community harmonisation in the provision of interimprotection by the national courts

in *European Law Review*, Vol. 33, n. 4 , 586-597

No abstract available

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Johnson Juliet

The remains of conditionality: the faltering enlargement of the euro zone

in *Journal of European Public Policy* , Volume 15 Issue 6 2008 , 826 - 841

When eight postcommunist states became European Union members in 2004, they committed to eventually joining the euro zone. But by 2005 the states' diverging preferences on pursuing rapid euro adoption had split them into 'pacesetters' (the Baltic states, Slovenia, and Slovakia) and 'laggards' (Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary). This contrasts starkly with their previous agreement on the desirability of EU membership. Why did the conditionality of Maastricht prove less potent than that of Copenhagen? First, I argue that a domestic cost-benefit analysis turned the smaller new member states into pacesetters. Second, I argue that Maastricht conditionality has not only allowed but encouraged the laggards to further delay their entry. By making it possible for new member states to delay entry, by increasing the difficulty of the entry conditions, and by displaying internal problems undermining the euro zone's legitimacy and attraction, EU actors discouraged the laggards from making euro-zone entry a domestic priority.

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Fonseca Marinheiro Carlos



The stability and growth pact, fiscal policy institutions and stabilization in Europe
in *International Economics and Economic Policy*, Volume 5, Numbers 1-2 / July, 2008 , 189-207

Ever since its inception, the EMU has been subject to controversy. The fiscal policy rules embedded in the Maastricht Treaty, and clarified in the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), are probably the most contentious. The SGP has constantly been accused of being too rigid and of forcing procyclicality in fiscal policy. However, in an influential paper Galí and Perotti (2003) concluded that discretionary fiscal policy has actually become more countercyclical in EMU countries since the Maastricht Treaty. This paper argues that this conclusion stands up to several robustness tests using ex-post data, including the use of institutional variables, but not to the use of real-time data. Using ex-post data, there is some evidence pointing to a more countercyclical use of discretionary fiscal policy (or at least to less use of procyclical discretionary fiscal policy). However, the use of real-time data for the period 1999–2006 reveals that discretionary fiscal policy has been designed to be procyclical. Hence, the actual acyclical behaviour of discretionary fiscal policy in the period after 1999 seems to be simply the result of errors in forecasting the output gap, and not the result of a change in the intentions of policy-makers. As a result, there is no evidence to support the view that Maastricht rules have forced euro-area policy-makers to change their behaviour and design countercyclical discretionary fiscal policies.

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Bentégeat Henri

The steps needed to move ESDP from theory to fact
in *Europe's World*, Issue 9, Summer

Financial as well as political solidarity is crucially important if the EU's military capabilities are to be adequately developed. Henri Bentégeat, the French General who is chairman of the European Union's Military Committee, sets out the practical steps that have already been taken, and that those still lie ahead.

<http://www.europesworld.org/EWSettings/Article/tabid/191/ArticleType/articleview/ArticleID/20418/Default.aspx>

Section C) Regional integration processes
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Artis Michael J., Fidrmuc Jarko, Scharler Johann

The transmission of business cycles. Implications for EMU enlargement
in *Economics of Transition*, Volume 16 Issue 3 July 2008

We show that countries characterized by large bilateral trade and financial flows tend to have more correlated business cycles. However, we also find that countries with divergent fiscal policies and highly regulated labour markets are subject to idiosyncratic cycles. Applying these results to the new member states of the EU weakens the optimistic view towards the monetary integration of these countries into the euro area, which is frequently found in the literature. Although our results suggest that extensive trade and financial linkages are likely to result in further increases in business cycle correlation, an increase in labour market regulation and the pursuit of national fiscal policies may result in a counteracting effect.



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Curtin Deirdre; Egeberg Morten

Tradition and innovation: Europe's accumulated executive order

in *West European Politics*, vol. 31, n. 4, July, 639-661

ABSTRACT: With the advent of the European Union and its predecessors, Europe's executive order has become qualitatively different from the intergovernmental order inherited from the past. We ascribe this phenomenon in particular to the consolidation of the European Commission as a new and distinctive executive centre at the European level. This institutional innovation triggers significant centrifugal forces within national governments due to the Commission's strategy of establishing direct partnerships with semi-independent national agencies that are crucial for the implementation as well as the formulation of EU policies. The new order does not replace former orders; instead it tends to be layered around already existing orders so that the result is an increasingly compound and accumulated executive order. Such an order raises sensitive questions about which actors should be held to account: holding governments to account may no longer be enough and may need to be complemented with mechanisms and forums that focus both on the accountability of supranational executive bodies as well as national agencies with dual loyalties.

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Fakiolas Efstathios T., Tzifakis Nikolaos

Transformation or Accession? Reflecting on the EU's Strategy Towards the Western Balkans

in *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Volume 13, Issue 3, 377-398

This article reflects on the EU's strategy towards the Western Balkans. It identifies the lack of a coherent and consistent strategy intended for stabilization and integration. In principle, the Western Balkan states' road towards Europe is driven by the belief that regional stabilization and EU membership are mutually constitutive and reinforcing objectives. Progress in one is expected to lay the ground for advancements in the other. In practice, however, we claim the Union capitalizes on the prospect of accession to attain transformation. The problem is that it has so far failed to set out what is the ultimate aim and stake of its strategy. It appears both reluctant to concert its declarations with its intentions and unprepared and unable to implement its pronounced will. As a result, it finds much difficulty in relating means to achieve the ends in view, and this strips its current strategy of an important part of its value.

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Lord Christopher

Two constitutionalisms? A comparison of British and French government attempts to justify the Constitutional Treaty

in *Journal of European Public Policy*, Volume 15 Issue 7 2008, 1001 - 1018

One lesson of the failed Constitutional Treaty was that the European Union is unlikely to be an exception to a general rule that attempts to constitutionalize polities according to liberal democratic values provoke disagreement about the relative weight that should be given to the empowerment or the constraint of institutions. Just how that cleavage developed in practice is illustrated using a discourse analysis of attempts by the British and French governments to



justify the Constitutional Treaty.

Section C) Regional integration processes

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Enjolras Bernard

Two hypotheses about the emergence of a post-national European model of citizenship

in *Citizenship Studies*, n. 5, vol. 12, october , 495-505

ABSTRACT: Citizenship is not just a status (defined by a set of rights and obligations), it is also an identity that expresses membership in a political community. It also has a substantive political dimension of active participation in the public sphere. Traditionally, collective identity and the membership dimensions of citizenship have been seen as intrinsic to the nation-state. The processes of globalization that have undermined the sovereignty of the nation-state make it necessary to reconceptualize citizenship in light of a 'post-national' framework. At the same time, however, the 'culturalization' of the social and the 'multiculturalization' of societies are putting into question the homogeneity of a collective identity. According to a recent hypothesis, a new post-national model of citizenship is emerging, one of European construction. In seeking to explore this position, the paper advances two additional hypotheses: (i) EU policy-making and governance are likely to foster a post-national European civil society with multi-level citizenship participation; and (ii) European anti-discrimination regulations are likely to accelerate the emergence of an alternative model to multiculturalism that can address differences within a universal framework of rights.

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Huber Peter M.

Unitarisierung durch Gemeinschaftsgrundrechte – Zur Überprüfungsbedürftigkeit der ERT-Rechtsprechung

in *Europarecht*, volume 43, issue 2, 2008 , 190-199

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

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Majone Giandomenico

Unity in diversity: European integration and the enlargement process

in *European Law Review*, Vol. 33, n. 4 , 457-481

No abstract available

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Rizzo Aldo

Verso la difesa europea?

in *Affari Esteri*, Anno XL, n. 159 , 547-554



No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

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Jentges Erik, Trezz Hans-Jörg, Vetter Regina

Von der politischen zur sozialen Konstitutionalisierung Europas. Verfassungsgebung als Katalysator europäischer Vergesellschaftung?

in *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, Heft 4, 48. Jahrgang, Dezember, 705-729

ABSTRACT: Der Verfassungsgebungsprozess der Europäischen Union bedeutet nicht nur eine Neugestaltung der politischen Ordnung, sondern auch ein Sich-Verfassen der gesellschaftlichen Ordnung. Die soziale Konstituentenschaft der EU wird dabei über mediales Claimsmaking und Medienresonanz beobachtbar, die in Beziehung zur europäischen Verfassungsgebung stehen. In einer vergleichenden Claimsanalyse der Berichterstattung zur Ratifizierungsphase in deutschen und französischen Qualitätszeitungen wird untersucht, wer die Debatte prägte, welche Themen aufgegriffen wurden, wie die jeweiligen Akteure sich gegenüber der EU positioniert haben und wie Visionen zur Zukunft Europas gerechtfertigt wurden. Eine stark politisierte, aber nach innen gewandte französische Debatte stand dabei einer aufmerksamen, aber eher passiv beobachtenden Haltung deutscher Medien gegenüber.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Geerlings Jörg

Welche Legitimation(en) hat die EU?

in *Recht und Politik*, volume 44, issue 2, 2008, 116

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Curzon Stephen J., Rossi Lucia Serena

What 'Rule of Reason' for the EU International Market?

in *Studi sull'integrazione europea*, Anno III, n. 2, 295-309

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Zwilling Carolin

What Does Asymmetry Mean in Today's Europe?

in *Federalist Debate (The)*, Year XXI, n. 2, July, 42-45

No abstract available



Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Barnavi Élie

What Europe's past can tell us of its future

in Europe's World, Issue 9, Summer

Can European policymakers draw on lessons from the past to shape our thinking on the future? Élie Barnavi, one of the driving forces behind the "Musée de l'Europe" project in Brussels, explains why history matters.

<http://www.europesworld.org/EWSettings/Article/tabid/191/ArticleType/articleview/ArticleID/20597/Default.aspx>

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Leidig Sabine

What a truly democratic EU might look like

in Europe's World, Issue 9, Summer

Pretending that more democracy will automatically make the EU more popular misses the point, says Sabine Leidig who heads the ATTAC Germany office. She argues that the EU must be made to work for the people if it is ever to achieve real democratic legitimacy.

<http://www.europesworld.org/EWSettings/Article/tabid/191/ArticleType/articleview/ArticleID/20532/Default.aspx>

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Steven Greer

What's Wrong with the European Convention on Human Rights?

in Human Rights Quarterly, Volume 30, Number 3, August 2008 , 680-702

The European Court of Human Rights faces a potentially fatal case overload crisis. But this is not the only problem confronting the European Convention on Human Rights. The underlying difficulty is the reluctance of the Strasbourg institutions, and others, to acknowledge that the Convention's main function is not to provide remedies for each deserving applicant. It is, rather, to promote convergence in the operation of public institutions at all levels of governance in Europe by articulating an abstract constitutional model which member states should then apply in their own domestic constitutional systems. This article seeks to make the case for "constitutionalization" and to explore the policy implications.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Kaina Victoria, Karolewski Ireneusz P.



Why we should not believe every lesson Andrew Moravcsik teaches us: A response

in *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, Heft 4, 48. Jahrgang, Dezember , 740-757

ABSTRACT: Dieser Artikel ist eine Reaktion auf Andrew Moravcsiks Beitrag „What Can We Learn from the Collapse of the European Constitutional Project?“, erschienen in der PVS, Nr. 2, 47. Jg. (2006). Drei Kritikpunkte stehen im Mittelpunkt. Zum ersten wird gegen die Apologetik des Status quo argumentiert, die angesichts der wachsenden Heterogenität der EU nicht überzeugen kann. Zum zweiten diskutiert der Beitrag das vom Autor entwickelte Ketten-Modell, das Partizipation, Deliberation und politische Legitimität kausal verknüpft. Es soll gezeigt werden, dass hier Kausalität mit Konditionalität verwechselt wird. Drittens erfolgt eine kritische Auseinandersetzung mit Moravcsiks Demokratiekonzeption, die Gefahr läuft, eine Demokratietheorie ohne Demokratie zu generieren.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Berglof Erik, Burkart Mike, Friebel Guido, Paltseva Elena

Widening and Deepening: Reforming the European Union

in *American Economic Review*, Vol. 98, No. 2, May 2008 , 133-137

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Frenzel Korbinian

Wie die Lobby Europa regiert

in *Blätter für deutsche & internationale Politik*, Juni, 2008 , 17-21

Wie viel Einfluss haben Lobbys auf die Politik? In Berlin wie auch in Brüssel erhitzt diese Frage gegenwärtig die Gemüter. War es in der Bundeshauptstadt der Rechnungshof, der die direkte Einflüsterung von Unternehmensinteressen in Bundesministerien thematisierte, 1 sind es am Hauptsitz der EU-Institutionen vor allem Nichtregierungsorganisationen (NGOs), die die Entscheidungsfindung der „Blackbox EU“ analysiert haben. Das Ergebnis ist ernüchternd: Die organisierten Interessen, ...

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Buzelay Alain

À propos de la lutte sur les inégalités régionales en Europe. Bilan et perspectives

in *Revue de l'Union européenne/Revue du Marché Commun et de l'Union européenne*, n. 519, juin , 345-350

The need to move effectively reduce regional intra-community inequalities accentuated by the enlargements of 2004 and 2007, in view of the budgetary constraints of the European Union which put a ceiling on the total of payment appropriations to 0.99% of the gross national revenue, has led the European authorities to rethink for the period of 2007-2013 the strategy of structural funds used until then. After explaining, and then defining this strategy, our article will show, on the basis of several statistical approaches, the very relative character of the results obtained between 1988



and 1999, in spite of a slight improvement which was itself called into question by the European Union going from fifteen to twenty-seven Member states. Then new Strategy integrated from 1988 into a wider cohesion policy as well as the conditions of its effectiveness for the coming period will be analysed, so that the economic and social cost with too great a regional disintegration does not call the Community's integration process into question.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Sabatoukakis Ekaterini

À propos du Traité de Lisbonne et de l'Europe sociale

in *Revue de l'Union européenne/Revue du Marché Commun et de l'Union européenne*, n. 520, juillet-août , 432-441

Unlike the Constitutional Treaty which would have acted as a springboard for stronger social aspects in Europe, the Treaty of Lisbon is merely a treaty that reinforces symbols. Will it be able to revive the popular enthusiasm in favour of a "European project"?

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 7. Inter-regional Cooperation

Gillespie Richard

A 'Union for the Mediterranean' ... or for the EU?

in *Mediterranean Politics*, Volume 13, Issue 2, July , 277-286

full text available at http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/677454__794318151.pdf

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 7. Inter-regional Cooperation

Ismailov Eldar, Papava Vladimer

A new concept for the Caucasus

in *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, vol. 8, n. 3 , 283-298

This article offers a new perspective of the regional dimensions and historical, political and economic legacies of the Caucasus. The Caucasus is composed of three regions: the Central Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia), the North Caucasus (some southern autonomous republics of Russia), and the South Caucasus (some northern provinces of Iran and Turkey). Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey are one 'team' in the implementation of regional projects for the development of transportation networks, while Armenia, Iran and Russia are in principle opposed to these projects. Further activation of the cooperation of the United States and the European Union in the Caucasus is, therefore, very important in obtaining as many alternative sources of oil and natural gas as possible.

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Subsection 7. Inter-regional Cooperation

Fontagné Lionel, La borde David, Mitaritonna Cristina

Accords de partenariat économique : l'impact de la libéralisation commerciale



in *Lettre du CEPII*, N° 276 Mars

Les règles de non-discrimination de l'OMC imposent une redéfinition des accords commerciaux existant entre l'Union européenne et les pays ACP. S'ils veulent conserver un accès préférentiel au marché européen, ces pays doivent parvenir avec l'UE à un libre-échange réciproque sur l'essentiel du commerce bilatéral. Mais l'écart de développement crée une forte asymétrie entre les deux parties négociantes, accentuée par les niveaux actuels de protection qui concentrent sur les ACP les efforts de libéralisation à réaliser. Nous en évaluons l'impact commercial et budgétaire pour chacune des six régions avec lesquelles l'UE poursuit en 2008 les négociations. Pour certains pays, la transition sera difficile et réclamera un soutien européen durable.

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Subsection 7. Inter-regional Cooperation

McDonald, Scott¹; Walmsley, Terrie

Bilateral Free Trade Agreements and Customs Unions: The Impact of the EU Republic of South Africa Free Trade Agreement on Botswana

in *World Economy*, Volume 31, Number 8, 993-1029

The EU has indicated that after 2008 its trade relationships with developing countries will be dominated by the development of preferential trade agreements. Although not a consequence of the Cotonou Agreement, the free trade agreement between the EU and the Republic of South Africa (EU RSA FTA) was clearly one of the first fruits of this approach to trade relationships. However, there is no evidence that the design of the EU RSA FTA incorporated a comprehensive general equilibrium evaluation of the agreement for either the signatories or the other southern African nations. The analyses reported here indicate that while the EU RSA FTA may substantially benefit the signatories, there are appreciable negative impacts for other states, especially the Republic of South Africa's immediate neighbours. Moreover, the analyses indicate that the structural adjustments for African economies signalled by the FTA are substantial, which implies that there will be substantial economic costs associated with the FTA.

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Lyne Roderic

Blueprint for a new relationship with Russia

in *Europe's World*, Issue 9, Summer

The EU's fractious relations with Moscow owe much to Europe's "flying on the wrong compass course and heading further and further away from reality", says Roderic Lyne. He explains how Brussels should re-set its political and economic autopilot.

<http://www.europesworld.org/EWSettings/Article/tabid/191/ArticleType/articleview/ArticleID/21166/Default.aspx>

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 7. Inter-regional Cooperation

Buhigas Schubert Carlos



Claves para el encuentro entre Europa y Asia

in *Política Exterior*, 123

En los últimos años han surgido preguntas acerca de cómo Europa puede hacer frente a los retos de la globalización. Gran parte de este debate refleja la llegada ineludible del desafío asiático. Una Europa vieja y lenta que se enfrenta a la vitalidad y energía de Asia. ¿Es este el punto de partida de cualquier análisis sobre las relaciones euroasiáticas? Los dilemas internos y externos de la UE no deben eclipsar su capacidad como modelo de cooperación estable hacia Asia.

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Hamel Tewfik, Hatzidiakos Andréas-Christos

De l'Euro-Med à l'UPM: la Méditerranée, un objet politico-strategique non identifié

in *Revue de l'Union européenne/Revue du Marché Commun et de l'Union européenne*, n. 521, septembre , 554-558

The international system is still structurally disorganised. Once again peace is only an illusion and the fall of the USSR was only an opportunity to go from one anarchy to the other. In the era of globalisation and major regional blocks, the ever complex and specific Mediterranean still seeks an overall strategy towards the rest of the world, a regulation framework and a system to establish trust measures with a view to ensure peace, security, growth and prosperity in the area. As two sides of the same coin, security is the absolute condition for growth and there cannot be lasting security without growth. With many paradoxes, the place of every fracture, a hostage of regional conflicts, of conflicting perceptions and mutual distrust, the Mediterranean's harmony is a long time coming. Although it is no longer possible to deny facts under the pretext of defending values, however noble they may be, considering a Mediterranean plan means discussing politics in the meaning of acting on events without losing sight of the complex morphology of the area. Whereas reality is never separated from the perception that one has of it, in the North, the issue is to know whether the Other can be integrated, while in the South, they wonder whether Europe is able to welcome the Other. This being said, the fate of human rights, of the legal state, of democracy in the South and the fate granted to that Other in the North, will be the evolution criteria of inter-Mediterranean relations and therefore, the assessment unit by which are counted changes in the level of unity between both shores.

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Charbonneau Bruno

Dreams of Empire: France, Europe, and the New Interventionism in Africa

in *Modern and Contemporary France*, Volume 16, Issue 3, August , 279-295

This paper argues that European cooperation in the management of African crises is not inherently more legitimate than previous unilateral forms of intervention. Nonetheless, the French colonial tradition of military intervention and continued efforts to maintain French hegemony are not necessarily incompatible with a European capacity to manage African crises. The cases of the French interventions in Cte d'Ivoire and in Chad/Darfur will support this argument. These cases show that the new interventionism cannot escape the fact that these postcolonial African states are a product of the French colonial Republic. Functionally, France's historic links to such places have both constructed their current political crises and created the expectation that France (above everyone else) should take the lead role in intervention.



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A. Flamos, W. Van der Gaast, H. Doukas and G. Deng

EU and Asian countries policies and programmes for the diffusion of sustainable energy technologies in Asia *Europe Journal*, Volume 6, Number 2 / June , 261-276

The Asian region accounts for already over 40% of the global economy, and is becoming the world's main manufacturing hub. Unprecedented changes in economic growth and trade in the last couple of decades have resulted in severe degradation of the regional, as well as the global environment that could offset the advantages that economic growth has brought to the countries and their populations. In this framework the need to deploy sustainable energy technologies is a key concern for the global community. This paper gives an overview of EU programmes and policies to develop sustainable energy technologies and the common barriers faced to technology implementation in EU and Asian countries. Following that, the approaches and mechanisms that are used internationally for overcoming the barriers to technology transfer and implementation are presented. After having assessed barriers to technology implementation and possible ways and programmes to help overcome them, the paper provides specific examples of success stories of how government policies and programmes, in combination with involvement of the private sector, can be effective in sustainable energy technology transfer and implementation in both EU and Asian countries. Finally, the opportunity that has recently arisen to enhance the introduction of sustainable energy technologies in developing countries through the development of programmes of related activities as CDM projects is presented and indicative mutual benefits for the strengthening of the EU Asian partnership are highlighted.

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Subsection 7. Inter-regional Cooperation

Keck, Jörn

EU–Japan “Structured Cooperation” and energy efficiency for Asia *in Asia Europe Journal*, Volume 6, Number 2 / June , 205-216

The paper argues that for EU–Japan cooperation the time has come to move from declarations of intent to action. It is suggested that in order to function and to last the cooperation needs a framework that pulls together and organizes different cooperation areas and concrete projects. The framework, it is suggested, should be a flexible “Structured Cooperation” in and under which cooperation would be treated as a negotiating project, in which the advantages and benefits of individual projects would lead to an agreed BoB—balance of benefits. To ensure delivery and allow for adjustments, adding and adjusting of subjects etc. a management and surveillance structure would be required to ensure an enduring interest of both sides in continuing cooperation. The individual cooperation projects, it is suggested, should be organized around common themes—the pillars—for better coherence and management. In a second part the paper suggests a practical and feasible cooperation project for improving the energy efficiency of some products widely used in Asia. That proposal uses the main elements of a relatively easy to implement approach that has been successfully applied in Europe. This approach has the advantage over others to make harmonization of efficiency requirements for energy using products in Asia possible, without the need to engage in time consuming and potentially controversial mutual recognition negotiations of national standards or the need to harmonize national Asian standards.



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Meyn Mareike

Economic Partnership Agreements: A 'Historic Step' Towards a 'Partnership of Equals'?
in *Development Policy Review* , Volume 26 Issue 5 , 515 - 528

This article argues that the EPAs initialled between the EU and less than half of the ACP countries do not represent a 'historic step' in EU-ACP relations, but are the outcome of asymmetric power relations. Many ACP countries submitted hastily drawn up liberalisation schedules that did not consider whether their commitments were in line with those of their neighbours — with significant implications for regional integration processes. Further, the enforcement of EPAs is unlikely in some cases, given the decreasing attractiveness of the EU market and the Commission's dwindling capacity to sanction non-compliance by withdrawing preferences. If the EU wants to see EPAs implemented, it is vital that the process and outcome are owned and supported by both sides.

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Subsection 7. Inter-regional Cooperation

Scheipers Sibylle, Sicurelli Daniela

Empowering Africa: normative power in EU-Africa relations
in *Journal of European Public Policy* , Volume 15 Issue 4 2008

The EU's identity construction as a normative power has often been described as a practice by which the EU portrays itself as a force for good while at the same time depicting other actors as inferior, thereby disempowering them rhetorically. In contrast to this, our findings indicate that in its relations to Sub-Saharan Africa, the EU intends to empower African countries by referring to them in a framework of solidarity and partnership. We trace this mechanism of empowering by analysing how the EU promoted the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the Kyoto Protocol to African countries while at the same time trying to enable these countries to play an active role in the negotiations related to these institutions as well as in the institutions themselves. At the same time, though, this attempt to empower Africa displays crucial limits concerning the effectiveness of the EU's attempts to promote norms and the international image of the EU itself. We argue that these limits might constrain the process of EU identity construction as a normative power.

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Hansen Bundt Kate

Germany – Norway – Russia. The Northern Triangle

in *Heartland – Eurasian Review of Geopolitics*, n. 2, "The Polar Game" , 109-119

Natural oil and gas weaves a net of common interests between Berlin, Oslo and Moscow. Willy Brandt, the pioneer of Russian-German natural resources. The strategic importance of Štokman. The death of unbundling.

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Subsection 7. Inter-regional Cooperation

Manea, Maria-Gabriela

Human rights and the interregional dialogue between Asia and Europe: ASEAN-EU relations and ASEM in Pacific Review (The), Volume 21 Issue 3 , 369 - 396

Since the early 1990s, human rights have been a contentious issue for relations between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the European Union (EU), especially in the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM). It is an issue that has constantly led to tensions in interregional cooperation. However, the ASEAN-EU dialogue on human rights has, in fact, had a significant impact on regional dynamics by stimulating the process of regional identity formation, especially in Southeast Asia. The core mechanism through which this development takes place is that of interaction, the process in which the two regional groupings engage while negotiating human rights policy. It can be argued, therefore, that interregional and intraregional human rights interactions are mutually dependent. ASEAN's rather confrontational mode of interaction with the European Union in relation to human rights has served as a catalyst for the dynamic growth of a collective definition of self in ASEAN. It has led to an 'essentialization' of ASEAN's idea of self as opposed to a common other, something which has undermined the possibility of maintaining an interregional dialogue that is not confrontational. However, it has also contributed to the development of a regional space for communicating about human rights and has thus played a central role in the gradual transformation of ASEAN's collective identity formation.

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Elgström Ole, Pilegaard Jess

Imposed Coherence: Negotiating Economic Partnership Agreements in Journal of European Integration, Volume 30, Number 3 / July , 363-380

Ensuring coherence in the European Union's relations with other actors is no easy task and particularly difficult when several distinct policy areas are handled within one and the same international negotiation. Such was the case in the recently concluded negotiations on Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with regional groupings of Asian, Caribbean and Pacific countries. The aim of this article is to analyse the challenges facing the EU when struggling to ensure coherence in its relations with developing countries and to shed light on the institutional characteristics that either prevent or promote coherence. It is argued that the highly compartmentalized character of EU policy fields and the disjointed decision-making machinery constitute historically grounded institutional obstacles to coherence. At the same time, however, both external institutional linkages — primarily to the WTO — and the internal institutional definition of EPA negotiations as trade negotiations have a logic of their own, which favour a coherent approach. The result is a process of "imposed coherence": while the EU formally acts as one united body in the negotiations, the disjointed character of EU policy making means that the negotiation stance of the Union is fundamentally ambiguous and characterized by significant tensions and conflicts between policy objectives.

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Marchat Philippe

L'Arménie, un carrefour entre l'Orient et l'Occident...

in *Revue de l'Union européenne/Revue du Marché Commun et de l'Union européenne*, n. 521, septembre , 545-553



Armenia, with a small surface area than yesterday's Great Armenia, has had a long and painful history, dotted by many occupations, massacres, and a genocide, which traces remain. This surrounded country, located in a seismic area, with high mountains, without energy resources, has been, for several years, the subject of a sporadic conflict with its Azerbaijainis neighbour about the Karabakh. Freed from Soviet supervision by the perestroika, it has since then engaged in the liberalisation of its economy and in a presidential type democratisation, which seem to continue, in spite of the serious incidents caused in February 2007 by the election of a new president. This way is strongly followed and encouraged by the United States and the European Union, of which Armenia hopes to become a member of in the future, without applying, like Georgia and Ukraine, for NATO integration. Ideed, like at all times of its history, it needs to continue to look for a delicate balance between East and the West, due to its strategic location, and take into account the influence of, and role that is still played by, its great Russian neighbour, both for gas supplies and in contributing to solve the Karabakh conflict.

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Yakemtchouk Romain

L'Union européenne et la Chine

in *Revue de l'Union européenne/Revue du Marché Commun et de l'Union européenne*, n. 521, septembre , 535-544

China has gone through, in the past thirty years, an extraordinary transformation and outstanding economic growth, so much so that it is now a major diplomatic player in world of international politics and a top third economic power in the world. The European Union has become the first trade partner, though its exchanges are very unbalanced: the EU's deficit towards China is ever-increasing. It is a difficult issue, affecting several China-Europe exchange sectors, and Commissioner Mandelson is making his best efforts to find a mutually acceptable solution. The EU took a moderate stance during the recent Tibet crisis, with its nine commissioners travelling to Peking in March 2008 to discuss the future of the relationship with China, and with President Barroso attending the Olympics opening ceremony: one simply cannot boycott one quarter of the humanity. The EU does acknowledge that China has recently become a more open country with increased tolerance in the area of free speech, compared with its Mao era, but it also believes that substantial progress has to be made in terms of respecting Human Rights which, as Europe emphasises, do not arise only from cultural relativism, but are universal values. It should be hoped that Olympics Games will contribute to the growth of democracy in China

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Subsection 7. Inter-regional Cooperation

Khader Bichara

L'Union méditerranéenne: un beau discours ou une bonne idée

in *Rivista di Studi Politici Internazionali*, Volume 75, n. 1, gennaio-marzo , 11-36

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 7. Inter-regional Cooperation

Ben Ayed Nizar



L'entrée en vigueur provisoire du traité sur la charte de l'énergie, élément de consolidation du droit international des traités

in *Europe en formation (L')*, n. 348, été (juillet) , 23-65

full text available at <http://www.cife.eu/UserFiles/File/EEF/348/NBA-EEF348.pdf>

Section C) Regional integration processes

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Stuhldreher Amalia

La Unión Europea y el Tratado de Lisboa: ¿Posibilidades de una nueva dinámica interna con implicancias externas?

in *Estudios internacionales : revista del Instituto de Estudios Internacionales de la Universidad de Chile*, Vol. 40 / 2008 / Nr 159

The article focuses on some changes that the Lisbon Treaty will imply for the European Union (EU), particularly those related to its common foreign policy. It examines some of the 'traditional' ways of conducting EU's relations with Latin America, as well as the new European approach, which includes the choice of Brazil as a strategic partner. Finally, some comments are made concerning the likely evolution of interregional ties with a view to the Lima Summit, to be held in May 2008.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 7. Inter-regional Cooperation

Palma Trujillo

Mercosur y Asia. Chile punto de contacto

in *Geosur : publicacion mensual* , 335-336 , 45-48

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 7. Inter-regional Cooperation

García Francisco

Primera ronda entre Centroamérica y la Unión Europea: ¿Quién tiene la iniciativa política?

in *Panorama centroamericano : reporte politico* , n. 216 , 4-14

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 7. Inter-regional Cooperation

Jazra Bandarra Nelly

Quelle Union pour la Méditerranée?

in *Revue de l'Union européenne/Revue du Marché Commun et de l'Union européenne*, n. 519, juin , 370-375



The Mediterranean issue has been brought up again by the French President, who has proposed the Union for the Mediterranean and wants to make it a priority during his presidency of the EU in the second half of 2008. The article attempts to explain the different underlying conceptions of this idea and their development. It explains the stakes involved on either side of the two shores. It asks the questions that such a project brings up: does it really constitute a change in perspective with regard to the Barcelona Process and in what conditions is a complete review of orientations possible? Will we be able to move past the differences and conflicts in the region? What do the partners of the South of the Mediterranean have to say? A little disappointed by the Barcelona process, are they ready to start getting into new co-operations? The proposed areas are concrete; projects can be launched that are important and essential for the countries of the two shores: pollution control, energy, development of businesses, and cooperation in the scientific and academic fields.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 7. Inter-regional Cooperation

Lukyanov Fyodor

Russia-EU: The Partnership That Went Astray

in *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol. 60, n. 6, August, special issue "Power and Policy in Putin's Russia", 1107-1119

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 7. Inter-regional Cooperation

Schieder Siegfried, Folz Rachel, Musekamp Simon

Solidarität und internationale Gemeinschaftsbildung

in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, Band 21, 2008

Quelle:

<http://www.bpb.de/publikationen/VU7VU1.html>

Solidarität und internationale Gemeinschaftsbildung

Siegfried Schieder / Rachel Folz / Simon Musekamp

Inhalt

Einleitung

Solidarität als Faktor in der Außenpolitik

Die EU-Sonderbeziehungen zu den AKP-Staaten

Zusammenfassung und Fazit



Einleitung

Solidarität wird seit langem ganz selbstverständlich als wichtige soziomoralische Ressource demokratischer Gesellschaften angesehen. Daher erstaunt es, dass der Solidaritätsgedanke bislang in der Politik- und Gesellschaftstheorie die Rolle eines "Stiefkindes" gespielt hat.[1] Auch im Bereich der Internationalen Beziehungen ist Solidarität bislang kaum theoretisiert worden. Dies ist darauf zurückzuführen, dass ein unterschiedliches Verständnis von Solidarität existiert und entsprechend verschiedene Begründungen in den Mittelpunkt gestellt werden. Das können spezifische Gemeinsamkeiten wie soziale oder räumliche Nähe, die Zugehörigkeit zu einer "imaginierten Gemeinschaft" (Benedict Anderson) oder auch gemeinsame Interessen sein.[2]

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Man könnte vermuten, dass sich die Bereitschaft, Solidarität zu zeigen, mit zunehmender räumlicher Distanz zwischen Individuen und Gruppen verringert und letztlich verliert. Es gibt aber auch gegenläufige Tendenzen: Jenseits des Nationalstaates hat sich ein über spontane Hilfsbereitschaft hinausgehendes institutionelles Beziehungsgeflecht herausgebildet, das Staaten und ihre Bürger als Träger von solidarischen Rechten und Pflichten in zwischenstaatlichen Zusammenhängen ausweist.[3] Dies gilt natürlich in besonderem Maße auf europäischer Ebene, aber auch in anderen zwischenstaatlichen Zusammenhängen. Am deutlichsten sichtbar wird internationale Solidarität an finanziellen Transferleistungen wie etwa der Vergabe von öffentlicher Entwicklungshilfe.

Traditionell jedoch gilt Entwicklungshilfe vor allem als Instrument außenpolitischer Strategien der Allianzbildung oder zur Gewinnung neuer Absatzmärkte.[4] Aber diese Sichtweise greift zu kurz: Neuere Forschungen haben gezeigt, dass Entwicklungshilfe sich weder auf ökonomischen Eigennutzen noch auf strategische Erwägungen reduzieren lässt.



Vielmehr ist der Anstieg der offiziellen Entwicklungshilfe auch die Folge "the misery of those far away having been brought home to the peoples of the richer countries".[5] So resümiert Enzo R. Grilli in seiner Studie zur Entwicklungspolitik der EU gegenüber Afrika: "[I]f the African continent remains a priority in EC development, it is more for historical and humanitarian reason (...) than for the protection of European economic interests considered to be vital."[6]

Auch wir gehen davon aus, dass sich die europäische Entwicklungspolitik kaum alleine interessengeleitet erklären lässt. Wenn dies der Fall wäre, gäbe es keine plausible Erklärung für den Anstieg der Entwicklungshilfe für Afrika nach 1989: Geostrategisch und wirtschaftlich hat der Kontinent seither insgesamt an Bedeutung verloren.[7] Vielmehr muss - so das zentrale Argument - auf Solidarität als konstitutives Element für die Erklärung von Entwicklungspolitik zurückgegriffen werden. Zunächst skizzieren wir einen solidaritätssoziologischen Ansatz, der es ermöglicht, das Gewicht von Solidarität in der Entwicklungspolitik analytisch zu erfassen. Illustriert wird die Bedeutung von Solidarität danach am Beispiel der Sonderbeziehungen der EU gegenüber den Staaten Afrikas, der Karibik und des Pazifiks (AKP). Wir vergleichen dabei exemplarisch die nationalen AKP-Politiken Frankreichs, Deutschlands und Schwedens beim Zustandekommen des Cotonou-Abkommens (2000). Dabei fragen wir nach den Gründen, weshalb sich Europa nach wie vor für die AKP-Staaten engagiert, und warum bestimmte EU-Mitgliedsstaaten politisch und finanziell stärker für diese Staaten eintreten als andere.

Solidarität als Faktor in der Außenpolitik

Als wichtigste Ziele von Außenpolitik werden gemeinhin die Bewahrung der Sicherheit eines Staates bzw. seiner Bevölkerung und deren (wirtschaftliches) Wohlergehen angesehen. Entsprechend sind alle Bemühungen, anderen Staaten zu helfen, ohne dabei derartige Interessen zu verfolgen, zunächst sekundär. Autoren neuerer konstruktivistischer Außenpolitikanalysen halten dieser Sichtweise aber entgegen, dass sowohl normative und geschichtliche Kontexte als auch intersubjektiv geteilte Wirklichkeitskonstruktionen wesentliche Bedeutung dafür haben, welche Interessen Staaten wahrnehmen und wie sie diese verfolgen. Normen und Werte, Ideen und Identitäten - und damit auch Solidarität - können sich deshalb ebenfalls außenpolitisch auswirken.

Was ist Solidarität? Obwohl die konstruktivistische Wende inzwischen Einzug in die Außenpolitikforschung gehalten hat, ist Solidarität bis heute ein vernachlässigter Faktor geblieben.[8] Dies hat nicht nur damit zu tun, dass Solidarität ein mehrdimensionaler Begriff ist, sondern auch damit, dass "soziale Solidarität als ein (...) moralisches Phänomen der unmittelbaren, exakten Beobachtung nicht zugänglich [ist]. (...) Um es also klassifizieren wie vergleichen zu können, muss man die innere Tatsache, die sich uns entzieht, durch eine äußere Tatsache ersetzen, die sie symbolisiert, und die erste vermittels der zweiten erforschen."[9]

Während Durkheim als sichtbares Symbol das Recht wählt, untersuchen wir in diesem Beitrag internationale Solidarität über Handlungsprinzipien.[10] In Anlehnung an die Gaben- und Reziprozitätstheorie definieren wir Solidarität als eine gegenseitige Erfüllung von moralischen Handlungsrechten und -pflichten, die sich aus Verbundenheit ergeben.[11] Diese Rechte und Pflichten können im Einzelnen unterschiedlich konstruiert werden, wobei jeweils verschiedene Formen der Solidarität in den Mittelpunkt gestellt werden. Der jeweilige Solidaritätszusammenhang ist dabei nicht nur objektiv gegeben, sondern wird von den solidarisch miteinander Verbundenen vor allem auch als bedeutsam wahrgenommen.

Die Besonderheit solidarischer Bindekraft besteht nun darin, dass solidarisches Handeln sich der Dichotomie von



Eigennutz versus Altruismus entzieht. Eigennütziges kooperatives Handeln kann deshalb nicht als Solidarität verstanden werden, weil interessengeleitete Kooperation zur Bedingung hat, dass auf ein Entgegenkommen der einen Seite eine direkte Gegenleistung der anderen erfolgt. Im Sinne der Theorie der Gabe, die sowohl freiwillig als auch verpflichtend ist, sprechen wir von Solidarität als "erweiterte Reziprozität".[12] Solidarität unterscheidet sich aber auch von einer universalistischen Norm - sie wirkt verpflichtend nur gegenüber einer bestimmten Gruppe, nicht gegenüber allen Menschen. Solidarität grenzt sich damit klar von universellen Gerechtigkeitsnormen und allgemeinen Hilfsnormen der Barmherzigkeit bzw. Caritas ab.[13] Allerdings wird Solidarität nur selten als alleiniger Handlungsgrund nachzuweisen sein. So dürften bei der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit auch handfeste politische und wirtschaftliche Interessen im Spiel sein - und zwar durchaus auch dann, wenn internationale Solidarität beschworen wird. Aber das bedeutet eben nicht, dass Solidarität in diesem Zusammenhang völlig belanglos wäre.

Zur solidarischen Struktur in der Entwicklungspolitik: Während sich Solidaritätszusammenhänge ursprünglich auf den Mikrobereich der Familie oder der dörflichen Gemeinschaft bezogen haben, hat auf kollektiver Ebene der moderne Wohlfahrtsstaat die Organisation von Solidarität übernommen. Wohlfahrtsstaaten normieren auf spezifische Weise moralische Solidaritätsrechte und -pflichten für die nationale Solidargemeinschaft, die auf dem Grundsatz beruhen, dass Menschen in sozialen Problemlagen geholfen werden sollte.[14] Menschen scheinen aber nicht nur auf interne, sondern auch auf externe Ungerechtigkeit sensibel zu reagieren. Daher ist anzunehmen, dass Solidarität grundsätzlich nicht an nationale Grenzen gebunden ist.[15]

Gesellschaftlich verankerte solidarische Überzeugungen übersetzen sich nicht unmittelbar in außenpolitisches Regierungshandeln. Vielmehr werden unterschiedliche Forderungen an das politische Entscheidungssystem gerichtet, so dass Solidarität mit Forderungen nach Sicherheit oder Herrschaft konkurriert. Ist Solidarität schon innerhalb von Nationalstaaten schwierig einzufordern, so trifft dies umso mehr jenseits des Nationalstaats zu. Internationale Solidarleistungen sind nämlich nicht geschuldete Rechtspflichten, sondern vielmehr freiwillig und gegenüber den Steuerzahlern rechtfertigungsbedürftig. Welchen Stellenwert Regierungen Solidaritätspflichten gegenüber Dritten einräumen und wie sie diese erfüllen, hängt letztlich von der jeweiligen Argumentations- bzw. Diskursstruktur ab, mit der Solidarität vertreten wird. Drei unterscheidbare Handlungsmotive bestimmen dabei vor allem die Verteilung von moralischen Rechten und Pflichten in der jeweiligen Solidargemeinschaft: Bedürftigkeit, Bindung und Eigenanstrengung.

Nach dem ersten Handlungsprinzip ist Solidarität abhängig von der Bedürftigkeit der Hilfsempfänger. So erhalten insbesondere solche Individuen, Gruppen oder Staaten finanzielle Hilfe und politische Unterstützung, deren Armut und Not am größten ist. Je größer die Bedürftigkeit der Empfänger, umso größer ist der solidarische Handlungsdruck auf die Geberländer, diesen zu helfen.

Nach dem zweiten Handlungsprinzip sind es die besonderen Bindungen zwischen Geber und Empfänger, welche solidarisches Handeln begründen. Moralische Bindungen können aufgrund einer gemeinsamen Geschichte, kulturellen Nähe oder aus einer Verbindung im "Geiste" (z.B. Glaubensgemeinschaften) resultieren. Je stärker diese Bindungseffekte ausgeprägt sind, umso größer ist der solidarische Handlungsdruck.

Solidarität wird aber auch abhängig gemacht vom Prinzip der Eigenanstrengung. Die Bereitschaft zu Solidarität gegenüber Bedürftigen kann dann leiden, wenn letztere Hilfeleistungen nicht entsprechend der vereinbarten Zielsetzungen einsetzen. Die Eigenanstrengung bestimmt dann in diesem Kontext letztlich, wer aus solidarischen Gründen Hilfsansprüche geltend machen kann und so Solidarität "verdient".



Die EU-Sonderbeziehungen zu den AKP-Staaten

Mit dem Abkommen von Cotonou vom 23. Juni 2000 wurde die bis zu den Römischen Verträgen zurückreichende, privilegierte Entwicklungspartnerschaft der EU mit inzwischen 78 AKP-Staaten bis 2020 erneuert und verlängert.[16] Die Verhandlungen des Abkommens und des Finanzprotokolls waren schwierig und langwierig. Drei Verhandlungsgegenstände erwiesen sich als besonders kontrovers: erstens die Definition der AKP-Gruppe, zweitens die finanzielle Ausstattung des Europäischen Entwicklungsfonds (EEF) und drittens die Konditionalisierung der Hilfe.

Erstens: Die EU-AKP-Sonderbeziehungen schließen Länder ohne historische Bindungen an die EU-Mitgliedstaaten aus, darunter einige der ärmsten Länder der Welt.[17] Ausgewählten Partnern einseitige Handelspräferenzen zu gewähren, verstößt zudem gegen die WTO-Grundregel der Gleichbehandlung und war bisher allein mit Hilfe einer Ausnahmeregelung zulässig.[18] Während Frankreich - flankiert durch die AKP-Staaten - das "partikuläre" Handelsregime und die AKP-Gruppe zu bewahren versuchte, sprachen sich andere Mitgliedstaaten, insbesondere Deutschland und Schweden, für eine Einbeziehung der AKP-Politik in die "globale" EU-Südpolitik aus, konnten sich aber damit nicht durchsetzen.[19]

Zweitens: Neben der Gewährung einseitiger Handelspräferenzen erhalten die AKP-Staaten über den EEF Finanzhilfen. Der neunte EEF wurde für den Zeitraum 2000 - 2007 mit 13,2 Mrd. Euro dotiert. Zusätzlich standen zum Zeitpunkt des Abschlusses von Cotonou 9,9 Mrd. Euro an nicht abgeflossenen Mittel aus vorangegangenen Laufzeiten zur Verfügung. Während Deutschland und Schweden sich für das Einfrieren des EEF aussprachen, war es vor allem Frankreich, das sich für eine großzügige Dotation des EEF einsetzte.

Drittens: Mit Cotonou wurde die politische Dimension gestärkt. Das Abkommen von Cotonou erlaubt der EU bei Verstößen gegen Menschenrechte, Demokratie und Rechtsstaatlichkeit sowie schwerer Korruption einseitige Maßnahmen bis hin zur Einstellung der eigentlich vertraglich zugesicherten Hilfe zu ergreifen. Aufgrund massiver Gegenwehr der AKP-Staaten wurden die Sanktionierungsmöglichkeiten in Hinblick auf das Prinzip der "verantwortungsvollen Regierungsführung" jedoch stark eingeschränkt.[20] Zentraler Streitpunkt unter den EU-Mitgliedstaaten war nicht die Frage, ob die Hilfe an politische Konditionen zu knüpfen sei, sondern wie auf nichtkonformes Handeln reagiert werden sollte.[21] Frankreich favorisierte ein weiches Vorgehen, welches auf politischen Dialog statt auf Sanktionen setzt. Schweden und Deutschland befürworteten hingegen die Anwendung von Sanktionen bei Verstößen gegen die vereinbarten politischen Bedingungen.

Frankreichs "familiäre" Beziehungen zu den AKP-Staaten: Die besondere Bindung Frankreichs an seine ehemaligen Kolonien bzw. an den afrikanischen Kontinent insgesamt wird in der Forschung einstimmig als zentrales Merkmal französischer Entwicklungszusammenarbeit angesehen.[22] Die Beibehaltung einer spezifischen Konvention zwischen der EU und den AKP-Staaten sei "ein für Frankreich essentielles Element der unabdingbaren europäischen Solidarität mit Afrika," so Entwicklungsminister Charles Josselin im Juni 1998.[23] Der Bezug auf die Verbundenheit Frankreichs mit den AKP-Staaten, deren Privilegien gegen Widerstände seitens anderer Mitgliedstaaten zu verteidigen sind, zieht sich wie ein roter Faden durch die französische Debatte über die AKP-Politik.[24]

Die Dominanz des Bindungsprinzips zeigt sich auch im Einsatz Frankreichs für eine gute finanzielle Ausstattung des EEF. Frankreich zahlt seit den 1990er Jahren einen überproportionalen Anteil (24,3 gegenüber 17 Prozent am EU-Haushalt) in diesen Fonds ein, um dessen Gesamthöhe abzusichern. Dies zeigte sich auch in den Verhandlungen zum neunten EEF, in denen die französische Regierung ihre ursprüngliche Forderung nach einer Senkung des eigenen Beitrags fallen ließ, um die Höhe des Fonds nicht zu gefährden.[25] Da die EEF-Mittel ausschließlich für die



AKP-Staaten bestimmt sind, lässt sich diese Haltung am besten mit der engen Bindung Frankreichs an viele dieser Staaten erklären. In diese Richtung weist auch der Umstand, dass in der AKP-Debatte zwar der Aspekt der Bedürftigkeit stets hervorgehoben wurde, sich in der Definition der französischen Empfängerländer allgemein aber eher nicht widerspiegelt.

Auch das Anstrengungsprinzip spielte in der französischen Debatte eine Rolle. Zwar sprach sich die französische Regierung entsprechend der Reformen in ihrer bilateralen Entwicklungspolitik für eine politische Konditionalisierung von AKP-Hilfen aus.[26] Allerdings betonte Paris die Schwierigkeiten bei der Anwendung von Sanktionen und sah den politischen Dialog als vorrangiges Instrument beim Umgang mit Verstößen gegen die Konditionalitätskriterien.[27] In der Vergangenheit hat Frankreich ehemalige Kolonien immer wieder vor der Anwendung harscher Sanktionsmaßnahmen bewahrt.[28]

Deutschland und die "Normalisierung" der AKP-Politik: Das Bindungsprinzip zeigte sich in der deutschen Cotonou-Debatte dagegen wenig erklärungs mächtig. Insgesamt stand Deutschland den europäischen Sonderbeziehungen mit den AKP-Staaten eher skeptisch gegenüber.[29] In der deutschen Debatte zum Cotonou-Abkommen wurde so wiederholt gefordert, die "koloniale Hypothek" der Sonderbeziehungen zu den AKP-Staaten zu überwinden und die Entwicklungspolitik für weitere Least Developed Countries (LDCs) zu öffnen.[30]

Das geringe Interesse an einer privilegierten EU-AKP-Entwicklungspartnerschaft wird auch daran deutlich, dass Deutschland stets bestrebt war, den eigenen Beitrag zum EEF gering zu halten. So gehörte Deutschland auch bei den Verhandlungen des Finanzprotokolls von Cotonou zu den Ländern, die sich gegen eine Erhöhung des EEF aussprachen.[31] Die Ablehnung der Sonderbeziehungen mit den AKP-Staaten wird in der deutschen Debatte häufig mit dem Ausschluss einiger LDCs aus der Gruppe der Privilegierten begründet und mit der Forderung nach einer AKP-Politik verknüpft, die sich stärker an der Bedürftigkeit von Empfängern orientiert. Gleichwohl legt die bilaterale deutsche Entwicklungszusammenarbeit gerade keinen Schwerpunkt auf LDCs, sondern konzentriert sich auf "Middle Income Countries".[32] Als handlungsleitend erwies sich in der deutschen Debatte das Prinzip der Anstrengung: Entwicklungsministerin Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul legte Wert darauf, dass "im Abkommen von Cotonou das Prinzip der verantwortungsvollen Regierungsführung verankert worden [und] in Fällen schwerer Korruption die Möglichkeit der Unterbrechung der finanziellen Hilfe von Seiten der Europäischen Union gegeben ist".[33] Die Bindung von Entwicklungshilfe an politische Kriterien und Eigenanstrengungen findet seit Anfang der 1990er Jahre auch in der bilateralen Entwicklungspolitik Anwendung, und die hier gültigen Konditionen und Sanktionsinstrumente weisen in die gleiche Richtung wie diejenigen im Cotonou-Abkommen.

Schwedens skeptische AKP-Politik: In der schwedischen Entwicklungsdebatte nimmt das Bedürftigkeitsprinzip eine herausragende Stellung ein. So hat sich die schwedische Regierung wiederholt für eine Auflösung der AKP-Gruppe und für eine Überführung dieser Politik in eine einheitliche europäische Hilfspolitik für alle Entwicklungsländer ausgesprochen: "We wish the separate system of preferences for the ACP countries to be discontinued." [34] Zwar gehört der Großteil der AKP-Staaten zur Gruppe der LDCs, die schwedische Regierung argumentierte jedoch, dass die Höhe und die geographische Verteilung von EU-Hilfen generell nach dem Entwicklungsstand des jeweiligen Empfängers bemessen werden sollten. Die skeptische Einstellung Schwedens gegenüber der Sonderstellung der AKP-Gruppe äußert sich auch in den EEF-Einzahlungen. Zwar ist Schweden bilateral einer der großzügigsten Geber weltweit, seine Beiträge zum Europäischen Entwicklungsfonds sind aber moderat.[35] In den neunten EEF zahlte Schweden entsprechend seinem EU-Haushaltsanteil ein, während sich Berlin und Paris überproportional an den Kosten für die AKP-Politik beteiligten.



Nach der Bedürftigkeit war das politische Anstrengungsprinzip prägend in der schwedischen AKP-Debatte. Schweden trat sehr für die Einführung einer politischen Dimension in das Cotonou-Abkommen sowie für die Anwendung von Sanktionsklauseln ein, wenn gegen vereinbarte politische Grundsätze verstoßen wird.[36]

Im Gegensatz zu den ehemaligen europäischen Kolonialmächten und als eher junges EU-Mitglied verfügt Schweden über keine historisch motivierten Bindungen zu den AKP-Staaten. AKP-Politik wird nicht als Priorität schwedischer Entwicklungspolitik, sondern als Instrument angesehen, das der Armutsbekämpfung in afrikanischen LDCs dienen sollte.[37]

Zusammenfassung und Fazit

Der Vergleich der Präferenzen Frankreichs, Deutschlands und Schwedens in der Cotonou-Debatte hat gezeigt, dass Solidarität mit den AKP-Staaten in den einzelnen EU-Mitgliedstaaten auf unterschiedliche Weise zum Tragen kommt. Während sich im Falle Frankreichs das - positiv konstruierte - Bindungsprinzip aus der engen historisch-kulturellen Verbundenheit zu den afrikanischen Staaten speist, wird in der deutschen, aber auch in der schwedischen Entwicklungsdebatte die privilegierte EU-AKP-Entwicklungspartnerschaft eher negativ als Restbestand der europäischen Kolonialvergangenheit gesehen. Deutschland und Schweden betonen das Anstrengungs- und - vor allem Schweden - das Bedürftigkeitsprinzip. Dabei erscheint das Prinzip der Anstrengung invers mit dem Bindungsprinzip verknüpft: Je stärker das Bindungsprinzip in den jeweiligen Solidaritätsstrukturen ausgeprägt ist, desto geringer ist die Bereitschaft, die AKP-Hilfe an Kriterien der Anstrengung zu knüpfen. Die unterschiedliche Gewichtung bei den solidarischen Handlungsprinzipien erklärt, warum Frankreich sich politisch und finanziell stark für den Fortbestand der exklusiven EU-AKP-Zusammenarbeit engagiert. Die Wahrnehmung wechselseitiger Verbundenheit zwischen Frankreich und seinen Ex-Kolonien führt zu solidarischer Nähe, die sich in privilegierter Unterstützung ausdrückt, während Deutschland und Schweden für die Normalisierung der Beziehungen eintreten. Die Kehrseite von internationaler Solidarität ist freilich, dass andere Staaten von Hilfebeziehungen machtvoll ausgeschlossen sind.

Unbestritten bleibt dabei, dass die EU-AKP-Politik auch ambivalent zu beurteilen ist. Das führen nicht nur die mageren Ergebnisse der Lomé-Phase vor Augen. Es wird hier keineswegs in Abrede gestellt, dass die AKP-Politik auch mit strategischen oder wirtschaftlichen Zielsetzungen einhergehen kann. Aber sie lässt sich auch nicht gänzlich auf diese Motive reduzieren. Vielmehr bildet der Solidaritätszusammenhang der EU-AKP-Entwicklungspartnerschaft (wie vermutlich auch andere derartige Zusammenhänge in den internationalen Beziehungen) eine eigene, auf spezifischen Solidaritätskonstruktionen beruhende Handlungslogik aus.

Fußnoten

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Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 7. Inter-regional Cooperation

Tornberg Claes

The Baltic Like System

in **Heartland – Eurasian Review of Geopolitics**, n. 2, "The Polar Game" , 96-101

A Swedish point of view of the Baltic maritime region. The objective is to put in place communal resources of European and Atlantic countries, without excluding Russia, in order to fight the threat of terrorism and illicit trafficking. The energy security key.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 7. Inter-regional Cooperation

Krastev Ivan

The EU, Russia and the crisis of the post-Cold War European order

in **Europe's World**, Issue 9, Summer

The post-Cold War European order has come to an end and the EU now finds itself confronting a new Russia – one determined to turn itself in a powerful international player. Faced with this, Ivan Krastev argues that the EU needs to adopt strategies that stop Russia from sending it into a benevolent global irrelevance.

<http://www.europesworld.org/EWSettings/Article/tabid/191/ArticleType/articleview/ArticleID/20551/Default.aspx>

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 7. Inter-regional Cooperation

Curran Louise, Nilsson Lars, Brew Douglas

The Economic Partnership Agreements: Rationale, Misperceptions and Non-trade Aspects

in **Development Policy Review** , Volume 26 Issue 5 , 529 - 553



The European Union and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries entered a new era in 2008. The Cotonou trade regime and the WTO waiver legitimising it have expired, and the long anticipated, and much debated, move to Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) has begun. This article explains the background and analyses the 'alternatives' to EPAs, in order to tackle common misperceptions. Moving on from what has been the focus of debates, namely, the reciprocal liberalisation required under WTO rules, it sheds some light on the non-goods trade aspects of EPAs which, while integral to economic policy, are inherently hard to quantify and often skimmed over in existing studies or addressed in ideological terms

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 7. Inter-regional Cooperation

Bretherton Charlotte, Vogler John

The European Union as a Sustainable Development Actor: the Case of External Fisheries Policy
in *Journal of European Integration*, Volume 30, Number 3 / July , 401-417

Promotion of sustainable development and poverty eradication in the world's poorest countries are interlinked and frequently reiterated commitments of the European Union. While their achievement depends upon successful implementation of the Union's policy coherence for development (PCD) strategy, they also epitomize the challenges facing that strategy. This article examines EU actorness in relation to sustainable development, using the external dimensions of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), with particular reference to fisheries agreements with West Africa, as an illustrative case. Given the many sources of incoherence identified in relation to the CFP, it is concluded that, while the Union is undoubtedly a global actor, implementation of the PCD strategy is insufficient to enable it to function effectively as a sustainable development actor.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 7. Inter-regional Cooperation

Matthews Alan

The European Union's Common Agricultural Policy and Developing Countries: the Struggle for Coherence
in *Journal of European Integration*, Volume 30, Number 3 / July , 381-399

Europe's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has long been criticized as an outstanding example of policy incoherence with development objectives. However, successive CAP reforms now mean that the distortions it generates on world markets are smaller than before, although they remain significant for individual commodities. This paper first examines whether the traditional criticism of the CAP as incoherent with the EU's proclaimed development objectives remains valid. It then asks how the CAP might be further reformed so as to make it still more coherent with the EU's development policy objectives. Improving the development coherence of EU agricultural policy requires more liberal market access for developing country agri-food exports than they currently enjoy. But it also requires that the EU put in place policies to protect and assist those developing countries which may not be able to take advantage of improved market access or which may lose out where lower trade barriers lead to preference erosion.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 7. Inter-regional Cooperation

Olsen Gorm Rye



The Post September 11 Global Security Agenda: A Comparative Analysis of United States and European Union Policies Towards Africa

in *International Politics* , Volume 45, Issue 4, July , 457-474

The Africa policies of the United States and of the European Union seem to have undergone significant changes in the years following September 2001. Nevertheless, the paper shows that the choice of policy instruments has been path dependent in both cases. The American policy is not totally path dependent if the size of the military initiatives and the volume of development aid are included in the analysis. The Africa policy of the EU is path dependent even when the increase in development assistance is taken into account. The growth in EU aid can only be explained by reference to the influence of values and norms. Even though September 11 is a 'breaching point', path dependency and bureaucratic inertia seem to be able to explain most of the lacking changes. However, agency-based explanations are also necessary.

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Subsection 7. Inter-regional Cooperation

Bechev Dimitar, Nicolaidis Kalypso

The Union for the Mediterranean: A Genuine Breakthrough or More of the Same?

in *International Spectator (The)*, Vol. XLIII, n. 3, July - September , 13-20

The new French scheme for a Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), officially inaugurated on 13 July, has stirred up a great deal of controversy inside the EU. Even in its watered-down form, the initiative promises to relaunch the stalled relations between the two sides of the Mediterranean in the context of the Barcelona Process. Though vulnerable to all manner of external shocks linked to the multiple inter- and intra-state conflicts around the Mediterranean, the Sarkozy plan is a welcome move to a greater degree of "co-ownership" through the institution of a joint presidency. Of great importance in the interest of overcoming at least some of the problems that have bedeviled the Barcelona Process is further "decentring" of Euro-Med politics away from Brussels and more comprehensive trade opening by the EU.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 7. Inter-regional Cooperation

Holmqvist Göran

The case for cash aid to Africans & not to their governments

in *Europe's World*, Issue 9, Summer

The European Union is committed to scaling-up its aid to Africa. But traditional aid delivery methods like direct budget support are often unpopular in both donor and host countries. Göran Holmqvist argues for a new approach, and suggests that direct cash payments to Africa's poorest citizens could be the answer.

<http://www.europesworld.org/EWSettings/Article/tabid/191/ArticleType/articleview/ArticleID/20715/Default.aspx>

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 7. Inter-regional Cooperation

Holzer, Constantin; Zhang Haibin



The potentials and limits of China–EU cooperation on climate change and energy security

in *Asia Europe Journal*, Volume 6, Number 2 / June , 217-227

Due to economic interdependency through trade and investment, economies of scale, and economic complementarities, China and the European Union (EU) have a huge potential for cooperation. Already many things have happened so far. Since 2004, the cooperation on climate change has been a key issue on the political agenda of China–EU summits. In 2005, the EU and China even endorsed a “Joint Declaration on Climate Change” which emphasizes reducing the cost of clean energy key technologies for China, first and foremost through the development and deployment of near-to-zero-emission CCS technology. Letting China gain access to clean energy technology is the key issue of climate change cooperation. Despite great efforts and potential mutual benefits, this is still a field of conflicting interests. The authors argue that currently, cooperation on the transfer of clean energy technology is very limited due to rational interests of the actors and the insecurities involved in cooperation.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 7. Inter-regional Cooperation

Bordachev Timofei

Think big, Russia and Europe, you both need an energy community

in *Europe’s World*, Issue 9, Summer

Talks between Russia and Europe are so stymied by mutual suspicion that only a “big deal” can break the deadlock, says Timofei Bordachev. Cooperation over energy is a great opportunity to set bilateral relations on a whole new course.

<http://www.europesworld.org/EWSettings/Article/tabid/191/ArticleType/articleview/ArticleID/21081/Default.aspx>

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 7. Inter-regional Cooperation

Bierman Rafael

Towards a theory of inter-organizational networking

in *Review of International Organizations (The)* , n. 2, vol. 3, june , 151-177

ABSTRACT: This article combines inductive and deductive theory building to identify building blocks for a theory of inter-organizational networking, a phenomenon that has gained prominence in international relations, but is largely neglected by IR scholars. Organizational and network theory are identified as the major starting points for theory building. Hypotheses are generated from the network of Euro-Atlantic security institutions, which has become the most sophisticated network of its kind since the early 1990s. The article looks specifically at the genesis of dyadic inter-organizational relations and of entire networks, at the relevance of networking for policy output and at the system effects that networks have on individual organizations. The theoretical findings are presented so as to allow a transfer to other geographical and functional areas of networking.

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Subsection 7. Inter-regional Cooperation

Soler i Lecha Eduard

Why Sarkozy's Mediterranean plan is arousing suspicions

in *Europe's World*, Issue 9, Summer

French President Sarkozy's proposal for a new "Mediterranean Union" underlines the fact that the EU's policies in the region have so far fallen short of expectations says Eduard Soler I Lecha.

<http://www.europesworld.org/EWSettings/Article/tabid/191/ArticleType/articleview/ArticleID/21012/Default.aspx>

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 7. Inter-regional Cooperation

Heurlin Bertel

Why the US is destined to remain a "European power"

in *Europe's World*, Issue 9, Summer

How intertwined are the United States and Europe? Bertel Heurlin traces the deteriorating transatlantic relationship, and explains why the US-EU partnership is set to continue despite its frictions.

<http://www.europesworld.org/EWSettings/Article/tabid/191/ArticleType/articleview/ArticleID/21181/Default.aspx>

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 1. Federalism

Gardner James A.

In Search of Sub-National Constitutionalism

in *European Constitutional Law Review*, Volume 4 - Issue 02 , 325-343

Federalism as a consequence of local/cultural self-determination – Degree of autonomous human rights protection on a subnational level – Analysis in terms of two dimensions: subnational constitutionalism and contestatory federalism – Contrast between US and European models – Opposition between contestatory federalism and subsidiarity – Rise of international human rights protection diminishes importance of subnational human rights protection

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 1. Federalism

Siegel Neil S.

International Delegations and the Values of Federalism

in *Law and contemporary problems*, Volume 71 Winter 2008 Number 1 , 93-114



Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 1. Federalism

Ypi Lea

Sovereignty, Cosmopolitanism and the Ethics of European Foreign Policy

in *European Journal of Political Theory*, Vol. 7, n. 3, July , 349-364

This article explores the tensions between cosmopolitanism and sovereignty as a means to conceptualize the ethics of European foreign policy. It starts by discussing the claim that, in order for the EU to play a meaningful role as an international actor, a definition of the common ethical values orienting its political conduct is required. The question of a European federation of states and its ethical conceptualization emerges clearly in some of the philosophical writings of the 17th and 18th centuries. I seek to provide an outline of the main arguments presented by authors such as Saint Pierre, Rousseau and Kant regarding the implications of the emerging difference between cosmopolitanism and the law of nations in the ethics of international relations. The article focuses on the normative significance of the concept of sovereignty as it emerges in modern political philosophy and highlights its tensions with the ideas of moral and political cosmopolitanism. This exploration serves a double function: theoretical and practical. From the theoretical perspective it leads to a better understanding of the tensions involved in conceptualizing a common ethical orientation for the states of Europe. From the practical standpoint it sheds light on some persistent difficulties the European Union faces in trying to move beyond an intergovernmental political arrangement in the field of foreign policy.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2. Nationalism

Luks Leonid

"Weimar Russia?": Notes on a Controversial Concept

in *Russian politics and law*, vol. 46, n. 4, July - August , 47-65

No abstract available

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2. Nationalism

Beissinger Mark R.

A New Look at Ethnicity and Democratization

in *Journal of Democracy*, Volume 19, Number 3, July , 85-97

Political scientists have long believed that ethnic diversity and strongly-held national identities work against the cause of democratic consolidation, yet new evidence reveals that this need not be so, and even suggests that these factors can, under certain conditions, work in its favor. And while there is evidence that ethnic diversity correlates with poor government performance, lower rates of aggregate economic growth, and ineffective provision of public goods, these relationships are subject to qualification. A diverse set of cases suggest that institutional choices are a crucial factor in determining whether ethnic diversity and national identity work for or against democratic consolidation. In the case of three unambiguously successful postcommunist democracies—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—ethnic nationalism was crucial in the transition to free self-government.



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Subsection 2. Nationalism

Laven David , Baycroft Timothy

Border regions and identity

in **European Review of History - Revue Européenne d'Histoire**, Volume 15, Issue 3, June , 255-275

This article examines a number of models for the formation of spatial, 'geo-political' and 'geo-cultural' identities that have emerged since the publication of Eugen Weber's *Peasants into Frenchmen*, and asks how effectively these approaches can be applied to border regions. The article focuses on two contrasting case studies: French Flanders, and the Adriatic port of Trieste and its immediate hinterland. The first is a region located by a relatively stable border on the edge of a 'historic nation'; the second, until the end of the First World War, was part of a multi-national empire, located at a point where several different cultures and ethnicities met, mingled and, on occasion, violently clashed. Analysis of the contrasting experience of identity formation in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Trieste and French Flanders serves not only to highlight both the value and the limitations of various theoretical approaches, but also to emphasise the surprising degree to which peripheral regions can play a pivotal part in shaping the identity of the centre.

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Subsection 2. Nationalism

Schöning Matthias

Bruno Bauchs kulturphilosophische Radikalisierung des Kriegsnationalismus. Ein Bruchstück zum Verständnis der Ideenwende von 1916

in **Kant-Studien**, Jahrgang 99, Heft 2, 2008 , 200–219

No abstract available

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2. Nationalism

Aberbach David

Byron to D'Annunzio: from liberalism to fascism in national poetry, 1815–1920

in **Nations and Nationalism**, Volume 14, Issue 3, July 2008 , 478-497

From Byron's death at Missolonghi in 1824 to D'Annunzio's capture of Fiume for Italy in 1919, the nationalism of universal liberalism and independence struggles changed, in literature as in politics, to cruel dictatorial fascism. Byron was followed by a series of idealistic fighter-poets and poet-martyrs for national freedom, but international tensions culminating in World War I exposed fully the intolerant, brutal side of nationalism. D'Annunzio, like Byron, both a major poet and charismatic war leader, was a key figure in transforming nineteenth-century democratic nationalism into twentieth-century dictatorial fascism. The poet's 'lyrical dictatorship' at Fiume (1919–20) inspired Mussolini's seizure of power in 1922, with far-reaching political consequences. The poet became the dangerous example of a Nietzschean *Übermensch*, above common morality, predatory and morally irresponsible. This article shows how the meaning of nationalism was partly determined and transformed by poets, illustrating their role as 'unacknowledged legislators of the world'.



Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2.Nationalism

Sokolov Mikhail

**Class as Ethnicity: The Rhetoric of the Russian Radical-Nationalist Movement
in Russian politics and law**, vol. 46, n. 4, July - August , 80-94

No abstract available

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2.Nationalism

Umland Andreas

**Conceptual and Contextual Problems in the Interpretation of Contemporary Russian Ultrnationalism
in Russian politics and law**, vol. 46, n. 4, July - August , 6-30

No abstract available

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2.Nationalism

Spinner-Halev Jeff

**Democracy, Solidarity and Post-nationalism
in Political Studies**, Volume 56, Issue 3, October , 604-628

Nearly all democratizing states are also nationalizing, but this connection has not been adequately explained. A few scholars argue that nationality supplies democracy with a pre-political identity, while others maintain that nationality is often developed and manipulated by elites. I argue that national identity is a political identity, sustained by political institutions for political purposes, though this identity may contain some ethnic or abstract principles within it. The solidarity that national identity creates is most needed by democracies when they first emerge. Democratizing states need to build up institutions and create a culture of sacrifice, which they can do by creating a sense of solidarity among citizens. This solidarity is not only in the interests of the elites, but also benefits those in the dominant national group. The solidarity created by national identity is crucial to institution building, but it is also a source of inequality, since those not seen as members will often face discrimination or worse. The unfortunate side of nationalism has led some theorists to argue that liberal democracies need to move toward post-nationalism if they are to reach the promise of equality and individual rights for all. Doing so, however, means separating identity from the state. I doubt this is possible; and I argue that post-nationalism means forgetting about national memories. Yet to honor rightly the past victims of nationalism we must engage in acts of remembrance. We cannot both bear the legacy of the past and easily move toward post-nationalism. I work through these issues partly by way of Habermas who tries, unsuccessfully in my view, to reconcile post-nationalism with the retention of national memory.

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Subsection 2.Nationalism



Uberoi Varun

Do Policies of Multiculturalism Change National Identities?

in *Political Quarterly* , Volume 79, Issue 3, July–September 2008 , 404-417

'Policies of multiculturalism are often criticised for undermining national identities in one of three ways and in this article I suggest why this is questionable and then point to a more plausible relationship between the two. More specifically, I offer a hypothesis which is that policies of multiculturalism change national identities and I argue that this hypothesis is both theoretically plausible and empirically plausible in at least one instance. This argument is made in three stages and in the first of them I explain what I think policies of multiculturalism and national identities are. In the second stage I present my hypothesis and explain why it is theoretically plausible. In the third stage I use new evidence to suggest why my hypothesis is also empirically plausible in at least one instance. In the final stage I show why a sceptic who might doubt whether my hypothesis is plausible in other instances need not do so.'

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2. Nationalism

Burbank Jane, Cooper Frederick

Empire, droits et citoyenneté, de 212 à 1946

in *Annales: Histoire, Sciences Sociales*, 63 année, n. 3, mai-juin , 495-532

In 1946, when France's Assemblée Nationale Constituante was debating articles on France's overseas empire for a new constitution, a deputy cited a precedent: in 212 the Roman Emperor Caracalla extended Roman citizenship to all male, non-slave subjects of the empire. The example, it was argued, showed that people could be citizens of an empire without giving up 'local civilizations'. This article explores different meanings of citizenship and rights in empires, emphasizing two different models – Roman and a Eurasian one – and focusing on the contrasting examples of imperial Russia, the USSR, and 20th century France. The discussion moves beyond the common association of citizenship with the nation-state and rights with democracy. Building and sustaining an empire, we argue, entailed balancing the incorporation of diverse people into a political unit and the maintenance of distinction and hierarchy. That a 20th century republic could look to a classical precedent suggests the continued importance of imperial imaginaries and structures; the polity was not characterized by a binary distinction between a core and a subordinate periphery but rather was a multiplex combination of different territories and people that could be governed differently. The article calls for recognition of the wide range of ways in which political belonging, cultural difference, and rights can be analyzed, envisioned, and understood.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2. Nationalism

West Brad

Enchanting Pasts: The Role of International Civil Religious Pilgrimage in Reimagining National Collective Memory

in *Sociological Theory*, Volume 26, Issue 3, September 2008 , 258-270

The burgeoning activity of Australian backpacker tourists visiting the WWI Gallipoli battlefields is analyzed to explore the



rite of international civil religious pilgrimage. Drawing on Maurice Halbwachs, it is argued that this ritual form plays an important role in reimagining and enchanting established national mythologies. At Gallipoli, this occurred through the development of a dialogical historical narrative combining Australian and Turkish understandings of the past. The broader influence of this narrative on Australian historical understanding illustrates how global forces can be integrated within the study of national collective memory.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2. Nationalism

Baixas Lionel

Entre l'Inde et le Pakistan. Mémoires de la Partition et partition de la mémoire

in *Transcontinentales*, n. 6, juillet , 73-90

The tyranny of silence that characterizes the memory of the Partition of the British Raj still divides India and Pakistan. Academic and educational history constitutes the main means used to overshadow this memory, and the Indian and Pakistani governments exploit it to pit their populations against one another. The emergence of a "contested" history of Partition focusing on its human dimension and based on individual and collective memories ensured the renewal of the writing of the history of Partition. Many civilian initiatives beyond borders try to sustain peace with Partition.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2. Nationalism

Mcgarry Aidan

Ethnic Group Identity and the Roma Social Movement: Transnational Organizing Structures of Representation

in *Nationalities Papers*, Volume 36, Issue 3, July 2008 , 449-470

No abstract available

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2. Nationalism

Rowe John Carlos

European lessons in imperialism: a letter to America

in *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* , vol. 6, n. 2, August, Special issue: "Unveiling what the iron curtain hid" , 183-198

US neo-imperialism in Iraq and Afghanistan has its roots in European imperialism, which was closely tied with the rise of nationalism. Patriotism in many different cultural media has been crucial for the success of nationalism and thus for imperialism. Not only must intellectuals challenge the rhetoric of patriotism, but they must also offer political and social alternatives to the nation state. One example of such an alternative is the European Union, which has been designed to overcome the imperialism of Europe's past history.

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Subsection 2.Nationalism

Núñez Xosé-Manoel , Umbach Maiken

Hijacked Heimats: national appropriations of local and regional identities in Germany and Spain, 1930-1945
in *European Review of History - Revue Européene d'Histoire*, Volume 15, Issue 3, June , 295-316

This article analyses instances in which ultra-nationalism and local and regional identity politics proved compatible, and even mutually constitutive. Focusing on Germany and Spain under Hitler and Franco, the authors suggest that both regimes imagined the nation as a space composed of distinctive regional parts. They uncover a particular ideological affinity between fascist or quasi-fascist views of the state and the notion of regional diversity, which was invoked to combat the perceived dangers of state-building in the Napoleonic mode: liberalism, progressivism and bureaucratisation. While political separatism was repressed, regionalism was often cultivated to introduce an element of populism, grass-roots activism, social rootedness and ideological dynamism into the political process that seemed desirable to both regimes. In the German case, it also served as a pragmatic and hence manageable alternative to volkish ideologues, whose spiritualist and egalitarian inclinations brought them increasingly into conflict with the party line

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Subsection 2.Nationalism

Umbach Maiken

Introduction: Municipalism, Regionalism, Nationalism: Hybrid Identity Formations and the Making of Modern Europe
in *European Review of History - Revue Européene d'Histoire*, Volume 15, Issue 3, June , 235-242

No abstract available

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2.Nationalism

Rocca Daniele

La teoria dei quattro stati nel pensiero di Charles Maurras
in *Teoria Politica*, Vol. 24, Fascicolo 1 , 16

In this article the author tries to illustrate how Charles Maurras, the leader of French integral nationalism, interlaces Nationalism, Positivism, Federalism, and Catholicism in order to ground his own reactionary thought. By defining «Anti-France» the conjunction of « four confederate states of Protestants, Jews, Freemasons and foreigners (métèques) », he develops the idea that only monarchy could provide France with a symbol of continuity and statehood. It would be decentralized against métèques, who rule the central republican institutions for helping each other; hereditary against Jews, who menace the purity of French blood; traditional against Protestants, who overwhelm France with a non-Latin culture; anti-Parliamentary against Freemasons, who control almost all the newspapers. Hence, Maurras draws his conclusion that France does need an absolute monarchy against its « internal foreigners ».

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2.Nationalism

Wolff Stefan



Learning the Lessons of Ethnic Conflict Management? Conditional Recognition and International Administration in the Western Balkans since the 1990s

in *Nationalities Papers*, Volume 36, Issue 3, July 2008 , 553-571

No abstract available

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2. Nationalism

McCall George J.

Lessons about nation-building and civil society

in *International Social Science Journal* , Volume 59, Issue 192, June 2008 , 247-253

The concepts "nation-building" and "civil society" have extensive roots in positive social theory, but both have been reborn as important prescriptive concepts in the context of foreign aid. Even as a normative concept, the term "civil society" means quite different things, as at least four models can be distinguished in the foreign aid context. More to the point, today's normative notions of nation-building also vary, seemingly by the model of civil society that is being used. However it is construed, nation-building faces serious problems that are both external and internal to those efforts. Externally, there is a problem of scale, as globalisation tends to outflank nation-building; internally, the result of civil interactions do not always facilitate nation-building efforts.

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Subsection 2. Nationalism

Antonsich Marco

Linguistic commonality between universalism and particularism: a reply to Ipperciel (2007)

in *Nations and Nationalism*, Volume 14, Issue 3, July 2008 , 600-605

Universalism (of values) and particularism (of political communities) are two terms which scholars have struggled for long time to tame into a dialectical relationship (Bader 1997: 773). More often than not, however, these two dimensions, which historically have legitimated the existence of civic nation-states, have caused uneasiness among intellectuals. How is it indeed possible to confine a political community when its source of legitimacy is rooted not in the specifics of an ethnos, but in the appeal to universal values? The question is particularly relevant today, i.e. in an epoch in which, under the pressure of financial, communication, and migration flows, the isomorphism between sovereignty, territory, and identity seems to have become untenable (Appadurai 1996; Habermas 1998, 2001a; Soysal 1994). Going beyond this isomorphism, the postnational discourse affirms indeed the divorce of the state from the nation or, to use the terminology that Smith (1995: 11) refers to Hobsbawm, the 'de-politicisation' of the nation. This means that the space that once saw the coincidence between the political (state) and the cultural (nation) has to be re-thought, from a unitary space to a plural and fragmented socio-spatial constellation – the 'postnational constellation', as indeed Habermas (2001a) calls it. This postnational condition has fed (and it has been fed by) the reconceptualisation of the notion of citizenship. In her seminal work, Soysal (1994) has shown the increasing decoupling of rights and identity, as citizenship is increasingly decoupled from belonging to the national community. In Western Europe's multicultural societies,



citizenship is no longer a cultural, but only a political dimension. In other words, it is no longer national belonging which constitutes the source of rights and duties, but human rights, which are legitimated at the transnational level. Thus, for instance, as Soysal (2002: 140) recalls, when Pakistani immigrants in Britain demand the teaching of Islam in state schools, they appeal to the principle of human rights and, consequently, it is not surprising that they activate the European Court of Human Rights on this issue.

This postnational thesis can be discarded as merely 'unrealistic', as Schnapper (2002: 10), for instance, suggested from the pages of this journal. She argued that national identity and political allegiance have always gone together in the history of liberalism and therefore there is no reason to think that the future will be different. Yet, to discard a hypothesis by referring to evidence that comes from the past or by adducing, in a slightly essentialist tone, the emotional nature of human beings does not really help us to understand and answer the demand of inclusion associated with multicultural societies. If the statistical projection of the United Nations is true, by 2050 over 60 per cent of the total populations of France, Germany, and Italy will be descendants of non-native born persons (United Nations 2000 quoted in Berezin 2003: 27). In this context, how is it possible to reproduce an ethno-cultural idea of the nation? Even if everybody is going to assimilate, it would be naïve to think that this process would not change the terms highlighted by Smith in his answer to the question 'when is a nation?' (Smith 2002).

Ipperciel, among others, has not dismissed the postnational hypothesis as unrealistic, but, as a way to solve the original conundrum (how to reconcile universalism and particularism), he has taken seriously Habermas' theory – one of the most sophisticated intellectual efforts to reflect on the transformation of the nation-state in the age of globalisation. Yet, despite Ipperciel's willingness to remain within the postnational terrain, his argument reveals some theoretical and pragmatic shortcomings when analysed from this postnational perspective. In fact, theoretically, it seems to me that his reasoning ends up bringing the postnational back to a national dimension and, pragmatically, it leaves unanswered some questions about the actual feasibility of his hypothesis in today's multicultural world.

As is well known, in his theory about 'constitutional patriotism', Habermas advocates a form of deliberative democracy that is not legitimated by the existence of an ethnos, 'a people' in ethno-cultural terms, but by a demos, a collectivity shaped by the same political culture. For Habermas, cultural homogeneity is not a necessary condition for democracy, as engagement into the public sphere is what produces the collective opinion- and will-formation which secures legitimacy of and support to political institutions.

Ipperciel, however, notes that Habermas's reasoning leaves unanswered an important question: 'how are the democratic state's borders to be set?' (Ipperciel 2007: 400). Ipperciel's question does not focus on the lack of a common 'thick' cultural identity, which Schnapper and other communitarian authors (Miller 1995) have used to reject as unrealistic Habermas's model of constitutional patriotism. His question, instead, aims to give an answer to the seemingly irreconcilable relationship between universalism (the functioning of procedural democracy) and particularism (the necessity of drawing a geographical boundary around this democracy). Given the fact that Habermas is unable to answer this question (Ipperciel 2007: 400), Ipperciel, following 'a Habermasian logic beyond Habermas himself' (Ipperciel 2007: 398), essays to offer such an answer. The lack of a conspicuous reflection on this issue by postnational authors can perhaps be explained by the fact that these authors, following the post-Westphalian argument (Albert et al. 2001; Anderson 1996; Ruggie 1993), maintain that, in the present epoch, the modern distinction between inside-inclusion (domestic) and outside-exclusion (international) no longer holds, as boundaries have become increasingly porous, fuzzy, blurred, and in a permanent flux (Neumann 1998, 2001; Newman and Paasi 1998; Zielonka 2002). Not surprisingly, Habermas, whose constitutional patriotism ultimately translates into a form of cosmopolitanism, has not given particular attention to the issue of boundaries. In practice, however, if we are not to believe with Wendt



(2003) that a world state is inevitable, then we should come to terms with the fact that even in the age of globalisation societies remain separated into different political communities. This basic fact informs today also mainstream cosmopolitan theories, as Beck and Grande (2007), for instance, have recently argued against a cosmopolitanism tied to the 'cosmos' and have privileged instead a 'cosmopolitan realism', i.e. an ethical approach aimed at pursuing one's own interests. Ipperciel's question, therefore, even though not privileged by postnational authors, is definitely relevant. Yet, his answer seems to me rather problematic. In his search for the rationale which can be used to define the boundaries of contemporary postnational democratic societies, Ipperciel points indeed to the importance of language: 'common language is a sine qua non of public discussion' (Ipperciel 2007: 400). Public discussion is, following Habermas, the essential criterion for developing a political culture on which constitutional patriotism is based, ergo commonality of language is the key principle for drawing the boundaries of the democratic state. Logically, the reasoning is consistent. Theoretically, however, it brings Habermas's postnational dimension back into a national one. As is well known, language is one of the criteria traditionally used by students of nationalism to trace the boundaries of the nation (Gellner 1983; Smith 1995). Ipperciel (2007: 401) explicitly mentions that his use of the notion of language is not a Herderian one – language as a depositary of culture, tradition, history, etc. – but a functional one – language as a medium of communication. Yet, Ipperciel also admits that to separate the two dimensions is impossible, as language as a function 'does not in any way invalidate its cultural aspect as bearer of tradition' (Ipperciel 2007: 401) – a point that clearly emerges from Ipperciel's account of eighteenth-century France. It is precisely because of this intrinsic symbolic character that Habermas has discarded any notion of commonality of language in his postnational model: '... a political culture in the seedbed of which constitutional principles are rooted by no means has to be based on all citizens sharing the same language' (Habermas 1992: 7). Referring specifically to Europe as a would-be postnational society, Habermas has reiterated this point, by expressly rejecting the formation of a monolingual (English-speaking) public sphere, which would be constituted only by a business elite, and he has favored, instead, the persistence of national public spheres and the use of translation, which would guarantee a larger democratic participation (Habermas 2001b: 18–19). I am not therefore sure whether Ipperciel's reasoning can really consider itself 'to follow a Habermasian logic beyond Habermas himself' (Ipperciel 2007: 398).

These last considerations bring me to the pragmatic shortcomings that I see in Ipperciel's thesis. As a way to test his hypothesis, Ipperciel briefly analyses the cases of what, as he says, are the 'four multilingual nation-states among all the Western countries' – namely, Belgium, Spain, Switzerland, and Canada.¹ Contrary to Miller's (2001) interpretation of sub-state nations as 'nested nationalities', Ipperciel affirms that 'multilingualism is not an attribute of the nation, but of the state' (Ipperciel 2007: 407) and all four case studies confirm, according to Ipperciel, that language is what sets each public sphere apart from another. In a linear, causal scheme this would read as follows: one language → one public sphere → one (civic) nation. Strangely enough, though, this scheme undermines the fact that, for instance, in Catalonia, participation in the public sphere can also take place in Spanish, rather than in Catalan or, in the case of the Italian region of Valle d'Aosta-Vallée d'Aoste, the process of opinion- and will-formation takes place in both Italian and French. Moreover, if we have to espouse Ipperciel's thesis, it would be difficult to explain why, for instance, Scotland, despite being overwhelmingly English-speaking, is today again on its way to asking for independence. Similarly, it would be simply impossible to think of any future European political integration, given the lack of a medium of communication which is mastered by all its citizens. More importantly, however, I think that the limits of Ipperciel's thesis emerge in relation not to multinational states – as he argues – but to multicultural societies, which I think generate today the most urgent questions about inclusion/exclusion. While multinational states are formed by national communities which generally claim a specific portion of the state's territory as their homeland, multicultural societies are formed by immigrant communities whose homeland is somewhere else, outside the boundary of the state where they live. This often means that these immigrant communities are scattered all over the territory of the state. Cultural-linguistic boundaries run confusingly inside the territory of the state and make impracticable any attempt to use



language as a criterion (albeit only 'political', as stressed by Ipperciel) to draw the geographic boundary of the political community. How is it indeed possible to draw a boundary around something which is spatially fragmented? Multicultural societies defy the idea, invented by late eighteenth-century France, of a cultural-linguistic boundary which must run along the boundary of the state. The boundary of the nation and the boundary of the state today no longer match – if they have ever matched in the past.

In an epoch in which societies become even more multilingual, as several languages coexist in the same place and at the same time, a common language as a medium of inter-individual communication is needed, but to use it as a criterion for binding social spaces can generate unreflexive undemocratic effects. In fact, this choice risks reinforcing the condition of exclusion of some of those immigrants who do not (yet) master the language of the dominant culture in which they are immersed. Rather than creating an environment of inclusion, as in the original spirit of Habermas's postnational model, the choice of a common language as a criterion for drawing the boundaries of the democratic space would reproduce and reify social marginalisation and exclusion, at least for some first-generation immigrants. I am not criticising the necessity to have a common medium of communication. I am only questioning both the feasibility and the democratic nature of language as the principle of inclusion/exclusion in multicultural societies.

To conclude, does this mean that we have to live with the irreconcilability of universalism and particularism, as we lack a principle which can be used to set a geographic boundary around a democratic space? I think that this conundrum can be loosely solved by reading Habermas himself and other authors too. In the introduction to *The Postnational Constellation*, Max Pensky (2001) pointed out that in Habermas, universalism, as a moral and political principle, 'can only be plausibly realized through the very particular history, traditions, and forms of life that continue to characterise national cultures' (Pensky 2001: xii; see also Fine and Smith 2003: 471). Similarly, espousing Rawls' liberal contractualist position, Andreas Føllesdal (2000) has argued that although societies are regulated by the sense of justice of individuals who comply with rules which emanate from just institutions and which apply to them, the origin of societies can only rely on a shared history. These comments suggest that no single factor accounts for the process of boundary-making, as this is the product of an ensemble of different practices which accumulate in the course of history: different modes of production, different wars (which create spaces of inclusion/exclusion in a Schmittean sense), and different relations of affiliation, identification, agon, and estrangement, as in Isin's (2002) forms of being political. To reduce ad unum (i.e. language) the principle which can justify the bounding of political communities would fail to take into account the living complexity of societies or, in Calhoun's words, 'the richer ways of constituting life together' (Calhoun 2002: 151).

Note

1 As a geographer, I should point out that the Western democratic countries where 'more than one official or public language is recognised within the state' (Ipperciel 2007: 407) number much more than four. If we focus only on Europe, these countries are Italy (Italian, French, German, and Ladin), Portugal (Portuguese and Mirandese), Finland (Finnish and Swedish), Ireland (English and Gaelic), Austria (German, Croatian, Hungarian and Slovene), and Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian).



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Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2. Nationalism

Judson Pieter M.

L'Autriche-Hongrie était-elle un empire ?

in **Annales: Histoire, Sciences Sociales**, 63 année, n. 3, mai-juin , 563-596

Nationalist propagandists and many historians continue to view Austria-Hungary as an empire in traditional terms. This reinforces traditional theories that view Eastern Europe as somehow backward, semi-oriental, and fundamentally different from a democratic and nationally constituted 'West'. A close analysis of constitutional structures and forms of citizenship suggests that following the Compromise of 1867 Austria-Hungary had little in common with other continental empires. In fact, it hardly constituted a single state at all, much less an empire. After 1867 Hungary became essentially a nation state, while Austria developed a pluralist political system within which there was no dominant nationality. This article examines the mutual constitution of the concept 'empire' by nationalists and by Habsburg loyalists, both in Austria-Hungary and retrospectively in the successor states, in order to diminish the power of nationalist narratives about the region.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2. Nationalism

Le Vine Victor T.

Nation-building and informal politics

in **International Social Science Journal** , Volume 59, Issue 192, June 2008 , 155-167

Among the problems that confront nation-builders in new states is dealing with their country's informal sector and its politics, manifest not only in the informal economy of markets and hidden transactions, but also its traditional authority systems, networks of patronage, bonds of ethnic and other parochial identities, and illicit activities, including corruption and criminal organisations. Some of these aspects of the informal sector have survived from pre-independence or colonial periods. Others, like kleptocracy and the criminalisation of the state, are outgrowths of the new state and its



leadership cadre. These problems largely arise in the so-called juridical state, the legal-rational construct of new statehood, and reflect the failure, or unwillingness of the managers of the new state to move beyond the juridical state to the empirical state, that is, to nationhood and a generalised national identity and citizenship.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2.Nationalism

Berger Stefan, Miller Aleksey

Nation-building and regional integration, c.1800-1914: the role of empires

in European Review of History - Revue Européene d'Histoire, Volume 15, Issue 3, June , 317-330

This article takes issue with the view that nation-states challenged empires in the nineteenth century and ultimately brought about their downfall. Instead it argues that nation-states were created by empires. It discusses nationalising strategies of diverse empires in comparative perspective, and focuses on their key elements, including, first, mental mapping of empires, second, the role of elites (both at the centre and at the periphery), third, means of transport and communication as well as the emergence of a public sphere, fourth, migration within and between empires, and, finally, the economic development of empires and their border regions. In conclusion, the article offers some tentative suggestions as to why some empires were more successful than others in nationalising their cores and incorporating diverse peripheries.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2.Nationalism

Larson Erik, Aminzade Ron

Nation-building in post-colonial nation-states: the cases of Tanzania and Fiji

in International Social Science Journal , Volume 59, Issue 192, June 2008 , 169-182

Building on our comparative research about policies and politics of redress in Tanzania and Fiji, we identify and explore nation-building in post-colonial ethnically and racially divided states. The historical legacies of colonial and post-colonial state formation give rise to two issues. The problem of national identity arises from the need of post-colonial states to overcome legacies of colonial racial formations that created strong elements of group identification. With independence, nation-states face competing pressures to address enduring inequality but also to respond to political mobilisation, both of which may be grounded in group identities. The dilemma of democratic legitimacy derives from the competing pressures of nation-states to follow global norms of behaviour while responding to the domestic electorate. In such instances, states may be judged on different, incompatible criteria. Because national identity did not grow in tandem with the administrative apparatus of the state in these societies, the state may become spoils for political victors, prolonging existing divisions. Overcoming these problems will require enlightened leadership, both domestically and internationally.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2.Nationalism

Rasizade Alec



Putin's Place in Russian History

in *International Politics* , Volume 45, Issue 5, September , 531-553

This essay reflects on the period of Putin's presidency in a broader context of general Russian history and maintains that Putin's Bonapartist mission has been historically predetermined. By characterizing the contemporary stage in Russia's political evolution as the Russian Thermidor, the author explains, from this viewpoint, the revanchist policy of Russia towards the West, as well as in the post-Soviet area, and predicts an inevitable drive to 'regather' the severed historic Russian lands, including territorial claims to the 'newly independent states,' as the ultimate resolution of the 'Russian Question.' Explicating the 'shock therapy' transition to capitalism as a robbery of state assets by the Russian plutocracy, the author argues in favor of the Chinese transition model and concludes that, in spite of all these detriments, the resurgence of Russia as a great power is ensured by its intellectual, economic and military potential, boosted by the highest oil and gas prices in history.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2.Nationalism

Vural Yücel, Özuyanık Evrim

Redefining Identity in the Turkish-Cypriot School History Textbooks: A Step Towards a United Federal Cyprus in *South European Society & Politics*, Volume 13, Issue 2, June , 133-154

Since coming to power in the 'TRNC' in late 2003, the CTP government has initiated novel attempts at the official level towards redefining collective identity and the boundaries of the nation. Revisions to school history textbooks manifest the inclination to stress the importance of the territorial rather than the ethnic dimension of identity. This paper compares the old and new mechanisms of cultural indoctrination through history teaching and concludes that the strategy of the CTP-led government to redefine nation and identity is consistent with the notion of a united federal Cyprus in the sense that it incorporates the territorial element into the collective identity, demilitarizes history teaching and reduces 'self-other' confrontation.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2.Nationalism

Wright Julian, Clark Christopher

Regionalism and the state in France and Prussia

in *European Review of History - Revue Européene d'Histoire*, Volume 15, Issue 3, June , 277-293

Prussia and France have been associated with the absolutist expansion of monarchical authority and the evolution of a heavily centralised and interventionist state structure. Drawing on revisionist work in the two historiographies, this article explores the meanings of 'region' in both cases, with some surprising results. French regionalism has often been seen as fundamentally antagonistic to the pretensions of the centralising state. Yet the authors suggest that French regionalists increasingly moulded their reflections on culture and the state in a modern, republican context. The state responded in subtle ways: the relationship was thus marked by a higher degree of reciprocity than has often been acknowledged. The structure of the Prussian kingdom was, initially for historical and later for ideological reasons, less centralised than the traditional view would allow. This relatively fragmented and decentralised system created the space for a complex and highly adaptable relationship between the region, the province, the state and the nation. The picture that emerges forces us to rethink some key assumptions about the political cultures of France and Prussia, but also



highlights some commonalities in the European experience of regionalism.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2. Nationalism

Grant Susan-Mary

Reimagined communities: Union veterans and the reconstruction of American nationalism

in Nations and Nationalism, Volume 14, Issue 3, July 2008 , 498-519

American commemoration of the Union dead and the role this played in the development of post-war American nationalism is a topic of growing interest. Those who survived, however, are too often left out of the discussion: unsettling reminders of the sectional conflict at the time, the veterans' role in the reconstruction of American nationalism was rather more ambiguous than historians have made it seem. To trace the lineaments of American national identity after the Civil War requires some assessment of the ways in which the veteran was incorporated into or detached from the home front during the war itself and, later, from post-war society. The evidence suggests that, in contrast to the ambiguity surrounding the veteran, the dead could, in many ways, be more easily accommodated by the new nationalist discourse emerging from the war. Positioning the veteran at the centre of the debate on war and nationalism, indeed, challenges the very concept of an imagined community emerging from or through civil conflict.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2. Nationalism

Laponce Jean

Research on Ethnies and Nations: Comparing is the Way, But Comparing What?

in Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, Volume 14, Issue 2, April 2008 , 223-238

Many are the terms used to describe either groups or communities having in common actual or assumed inherited characteristics. So many and so ill-defined are these terms that they stand in the way of proper comparative research, at least when the comparison involves many ethnies, nations, and countries. The article recommends the use of more discriminating criteria to avoid confusion between "origin" and "identity," between "grouping" and "community," and between the ethnic and the national. The author concludes that, for the sake of theory building, hypotheses are, at present, normally better tested by comparing a few well-selected cases than by means of large multistate data sets.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2. Nationalism

Humpage Louise

Revision required: Reconciling New Zealand citizenship with Maori nationalisms

in National Identities, vol. 10, n. 3, September , 247-261

Governments in settler societies conventionally have regarded the incorporation of indigenous peoples into the equal rights of citizenship as an appropriate response to indigenous calls for justice. Yet, the state nation-building agendas behind citizenship sit in tension with indigenous nationalisms, which reflect an alternative form of nation-building not framed by the state. This article first identifies four major 'citizenship regimes' in New Zealand's history, noting that



symbolic recognition of Mori nationalisms has been made without addressing the fundamental conflation of 'nation' and 'state'. It then explores possible directions for revisioning New Zealand citizenship to overcome these historical limitations.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2. Nationalism

Sokolov Mikhail

Russian National Unity: An Analysis of the Political Style of a Radical-Nationalist Organization in Russian politics and law, vol. 46, n. 4, July - August , 66-79

No abstract available

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2. Nationalism

Noorbaksh Mehdi

Shiism and Ethnic Politics in Iraq in Middle East Policy, Volume 15, Issue 2, Summer , 53-65

No abstract available

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2. Nationalism

Ting Helen

Social Construction of Nation—A Theoretical Exploration in Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, Volume 14, Issue 3, July 2008 , 453-482

In this article, the term “nation” is understood as a mental construct, and the formation of national identity as a dynamic, contentious historical process of social construction. Using the concept of “figured world of nationhood,” I discuss how the subjective, collective perception of the “objective,” virtual reality of a nation is (re)constituted and negotiated through social practices. In the same process, actors come to increasingly identify with and commit themselves to this “figured world of nationhood.” The agency of social actors involved is differentiated according to the respective “social field” of their action.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2. Nationalism

Fahrmeir Andreas, Jones H. S.

Space and belonging in modern Europe: citizenship(s) in localities, regions, and states in European Review of History - Revue Européenne d'Histoire, Volume 15, Issue 3, June , 243-253

Does citizenship exist beneath the level of the nation-state? An enduring historiography insists on the essentially national character of modern citizenship, but this article argues on the contrary that locally defined identities have



continued to exercise an important influence on the social and political rights of citizens. These local identities are not just relics of composite states with different membership criteria; rather, spatially complex citizenship is the norm.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2. Nationalism

Bollens Scott A.

The City, Substate Nationalism, and European Governance

in **Nationalism and Ethnic Politics**, Volume 14, Issue 2, April 2008 , 189-222

Are cities significant fulcrums through which new relations between historic substate nationalism and contemporary European governance are being forged? Using case studies of Basque cities (Spain) and Sarajevo (Bosnia), the study explores the link between Europeanization and identity-based substate nationalism, with special focus on how city interests affect that relationship. In Basque Country, city actors have taken advantage of the new structures and opportunities in Europe to strengthen and to modernize sub-state nationalism. In Sarajevo, European governance is managing the city and substate region in order to overcome war-hardened group identities. Whether active agents or regulated entities, cities are key axes in redefining relations between substate nationalism and the new Europe.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2. Nationalism

Leshchenko Natalia

The National Ideology and the Basis of the Lukashenka Regime in Belarus. Preview

in **Europe-Asia Studies**, vol. 60, n. 8, October , 1419-1433

The rule of Alyaksandr Lukashenka in Belarus has created one of the most resilient authoritarian regimes in post-communist Europe but the sources of its stability have not been clearly understood until now. The article suggests that President Lukashenka's authority is sustained on the basis of a national ideology, which he uses to drive his economic, social and foreign policies. The Belarusian transition reveals a new type of national mobilisation in the post-communist area: egalitarian nationalism. It is suggested that this ideology provides the principal source of the failure of democratisation and the authoritarian consolidation in post-Soviet states such as Belarus.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2. Nationalism

Inozemtsev Vladislav

The Nature and Prospects of the Putin Regime

in **Russian politics and law**, vol. 46, n. 3, May-June , 6-26

No abstract available

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2. Nationalism

Magocsi Paul Robert



The Scholar as Nation-Builder, or as Advisor and Advocate: Remarks Delivered by Paul Robert Magocsi (Chair of Ukrainian Studies, University of Toronto) for the Special Panel “Paul Robert Magocsi on the Scholar as a Nation-Builder” at the ASN 2007 World Convention, Columbia University
in *Nationalities Papers*, Volume 36, Issue 5, November 2008 , 881-892

No abstract available

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2. Nationalism

Smith Anthony D.

The Shifting Landscapes of “Nationalism”

in *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism* , vol. 8, n. 2, September , 317-330

The field of study that comprises nations and nationalism is often seen as riven by a conflict between 'modernists' and their opponents. In fact, the field is far more fragmented than such a characterisation suggests. From the very first normative critical essays 150 years ago, it has been composed of shifting landscapes in which different approaches and perspectives overlap and cross-cut each other like intersecting monologues. While there was a short period of engagement in the 1980s, a 'classic debate' between modernists, perennialists and ethno-symbolists who embraced a macro-analytic framework and a causal-historical methodology, the familiar landscape has radically shifted to reveal a series of deconstructionist strategies and techniques; and while rational choice theories, among others, continue to embrace causal-historical analysis, there has been a rejection in many quarters of both macro-analytic narratives and causal-historical analysis. The new anti-essentialist strategies include feminist critiques, the study of everyday nationhood, the hybridisation of national identities, and debates about the 'ethics of nationalism' which echo earlier critiques. Above all, there is a new concern with the application of globalising trends to nations and nationalism, and especially with the role of nations without states, and the impact of supranationalism, large-scale migration and 'religious nationalisms'.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2. Nationalism

Daadaoui Mohamed

The Western Sahara conflict: towards a constructivist approach to self-determination

in *Journal of North African Studies* , Volume 13, Issue 2, June , 143-156

Using the case of the Western Sahara conflict, the paper examines the challenge of identity and identity determinants within the self-determination discourse in international relations. This study subjects the theory of self-determination's classical and secessionist broad categories to a systematic analysis. The paper argues that the self-determination theory and practice are unable to account for the intricate nature of the conflict in the Western Sahara. In particular, the theory neglects the colonial legacy of the territory and fails to problematise the central issue of identity. These have contributed to the ensuing difficulty of identifying the indigenous peoples of the territory due to its emphasis on a positivist legal framework. Alternatively, the study suggests a constructivist approach to the study of identity and indigenesness in self-determination. The significance of this research lies in its ambitious attempt to enrich the debate on the self-determination from an international relations theoretical framework. It also bridges the gap between international relations and international law. Finally, the paper invites future theoretical formulations of the



self-determination theory and practice. The implications of this article are generalisable beyond the Western Sahara case and certainly enrich the overall understanding of the self-determination concept and claims in other areas of the world. Practically, this research forces a rethinking of the prevalent United Nations' views on identity and indigenouness away from its rigid legalistic and positivist framework.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2. Nationalism

Morag Nadav

The emerald isle: Ireland and the clash of Irish and Ulster-British nationalisms

in *National Identities*, vol. 10, n. 3, September , 263-280

This article will focus on the development of Irish and Ulster-British nationalisms through examining five factors that had the greatest impact on the creation and growth of these nationalisms: the geographic and topographic setting; demographic changes; sociocultural factors; economic and class factors; and the impact of the colonial power. The article will show that nationalism is driven by variables that originate from broader processes extending beyond the national group.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2. Nationalism

Kaufmann Eric

The lenses of nationhood: an optical model of identity

in *Nations and Nationalism*, Volume 14, Issue 3, July 2008 , 449-477

This paper tries to make the case for a model of political identity based on an optical metaphor, which is especially applicable to nations. Human vision can be separated into sentient object, lenses and inbuilt mental ideas. This corresponds well to identity processes in which 'light' from a bounded territorial referent is refracted through various lenses (ideological, material, psychological) to focus in certain ways on particular symbolic resources like genealogy, history, culture or political institutions. Distinguishing between referent, lenses and resources helps us more precisely situate many hitherto disparate problems of national identity. These include the 'ethnic-civic' dilemma, the mystery of national identity before nationalism, and the relationship between local and national, and individual and collective, identities. The model also clarifies the place of universalist ideology, which currently fits poorly within the leading culturalist and materialist theories of nationalism.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2. Nationalism

Ipperciel Donald

Transcending particularities through communication: a reply to Antonsich

in *Nations and Nationalism*, Volume 14, Issue 3, July 2008 , 606-612

Marco Antonsich's reply to my article (Ipperciel 2007a) is a welcome opportunity for me to clarify the concept of a communicative nation, which I conceive of as a normative idea of a civic and political community. Stressing the politically



integrative function of the nation, as does Dominique Schnapper (1994), I specify participation in the public process of opinion- and will-formation (Habermas 1996) as the actual mechanism of political integration. A public sphere in which a concrete, particularistic public discussion is conducted in congruence with universal principles of justice constitutes what I refer to as a 'communicative nation'. And since sharing a specific language is a necessary, if non-sufficient, condition for communication, I believe that it can serve as a concrete criterion for delimiting a nation.

Theoretical shortcomings

In his criticism of my position, Antonsich pursues two threads, one theoretical, the other pragmatic. Though the theoretical demonstration of the communicative nation seems logically consistent to Antonsich, it has the disadvantage, in his view, of relapsing into a national framework. While his objective description is correct – I do attempt to rehabilitate a concept of nation and to re-politicise it – I do not believe that this rehabilitated form of politicised nation should be cause for concern, unless one still holds to an ethnic form of the nation. Indeed, the idea of nation that I am defending accords with the post-national view that cultural homogeneity is not a necessary condition for democracy (as confirmed by the empirical cases of multicultural societies such as Canada, the United States, Australia, etc.). Although it establishes one common public political language deemed essential for integration, the communicative nation is not a cultural or ethnic nation since it makes room for a plurality of cultures. People of old stock Québécois, Haitian, Lebanese, Vietnamese or any other cultures can participate in one political macro-discussion within the Quebec nation because of the common French language that allows for political integration. In this context, the public language of communication becomes the concrete means by which ethnic particularities can be transcended. So if post-nationalism per se should be discarded, it is not for historical reasons, but because it fails to grasp the concrete means by which a political 'groupness' (in Brubaker's sense) is established in a democratic and pluralistic setting in spite of all its underlying heterogeneity. Political 'groupness' is meaningless when defined solely in terms of fragmentation.

By highlighting the role of language in public communication, I obviously distance myself somewhat from Habermas. I must insist, however, that this distance is not theoretical but pragmatic in nature, since the communicative theory itself implies the role that I attribute to language. Indeed, as is apparent in the case of Habermas's diagnosis of the European case, it is in the appreciation of concrete situations that we differ.

For the creation of a Europe-wide public sphere, Habermas pins his hopes on the potential role of translations and the elite. Admittedly, they can contribute to enriching a national public discussion, not least through 'imports' from other public fora, but they can hardly achieve a merging of all national public spheres in Europe. Europeanists, in empirical as well as theoretical analyses, tend to agree 'that the more realistic scenario is probably not that of a genuinely supranational European public sphere in the singular, but a Europeanization of the various national public spheres' (Koopmans and Erbe 2003: p. 4) in the form of a wider treatment of specifically European questions. In spite of some common themes shared by all national public spheres, specialists agree that the reality of a plurality of national public spheres will remain (cf. inter alia Brüggemann et al. 2006; Gerhards 2001). The case of Switzerland cited in this context by Habermas as an example of how political integration can be achieved in spite of national or linguistic differences (Habermas 1996: 507) shows instead that mass media and language constitute centrifugal forces in a context of national diversity, despite any goodwill on the part of the mediatic actors.¹

Interestingly enough, Habermas himself has difficulty overcoming the necessity of a common public language in the European multinational context. To be sure, he considers European multilingualism to be inevitable:



Within the present Union of fifteen members there are thirteen different, officially recognised languages. This constitutes at first glance an embarrassing obstacle to the formation of a shared polity for all. The official multilingualism of EU institutions is necessary for the mutual recognition of the equal worth and integrity of all national cultures.

But immediately thereafter, he invokes the advantage, indeed the need, for a lingua franca: 'However, under the veil of this legal guarantee it becomes all the easier to use English as a working language at face-to-face level, wherever the parties lack another common idiom. This is in fact what now happens anyway, in ever wider circles.' (Habermas 2001: 19).

Again, Habermas's discussion of Europe is not theoretical in nature. It stems from Habermas's sense of pragmatism and political judgment. One can hold to Habermasian theory, a set of objective assertions, without adhering to Habermas's subjective appreciation of concrete situations, such as his analysis of Europe. It is in this sense that my position can be said to 'follow a Habermasian logic beyond Habermas himself'.

Pragmatic shortcomings

Antonsich identifies three pragmatic reasons for rejecting the normative model of the communicative nation: (1) the existence of distinct public spaces that do not form nations (even as they are described in Ipperciel 2007a); (2) the existence of nations that do not consist of distinct public spaces; (3) the inability of the model to account for multicultural immigrant societies.

First of all, Antonsich cites the Aosta Valley as a counter-example, since in this region 'the process of opinion- and will-formation takes place in both Italian and French'. My contention is that this region does not meet the conditions of nationhood as they are described in the model: there is no francophone political public space in that region, and hence no political community, although French speakers do form a cultural community in that region. Clearly, these French speakers must integrate in the Italian-speaking political space. Demographically, the overwhelming majority of Valdotans are native Italian speakers (75 per cent), while French is the mother tongue of 1 per cent, Franco-Provençal of 3 per cent of the population.² Admittedly, French is learned as a second language by a greater margin of the population than anywhere else in Italy. Nonetheless, speaking French in the Aosta Valley is more a question of identity affirmation than a true means of political public communication. The francophone media are practically nonexistent:³ television broadcasting has a marginal presence; francophone radio programmes are rare; there are no francophone (or bilingual) daily newspapers and only one weekly bulletin of eight pages with a low circulation; the regional authorities publish a bi-weekly francophone page in local newspapers on the activities of the local government; French is more present in specialised magazines (mountain climbing, hunting, crafts, history, etc.). As is apparent, political integration of Valdotans cannot in any meaningful way be carried out by an exclusive insertion into a French or Franco-Provençal space.

A similar point can also be made about the Mirandese community in Portugal, the Sorbs in Germany, the lingua corsa in Corsica, Gaelic in Ireland, Hungarian, Slovene and Croatian in Austria, etc., in spite of the legal protection most of these languages and communities enjoy. Official status is not sufficient for these languages to form a public means of political communication and thus to establish a distinct political community. As for Bosnia and Herzegovina, one must recognise that this multi-ethnic state has only one public language. Regardless of whether Serbian, Croatian and Bosnian



constitute one or more languages per se— linguists can debate this question – all will agree that they are mutually intelligible (cf. *inter alia* Greenberg 2004: 8, 33) and that despite the problem of the two alphabets, they form a single 'speech community' (Haarmann 1986: 57).

On the other hand, the existence of a German-speaking public space in South Tyrol seems more assured, even if the Tyroleans' bilingualism allows them to participate in two distinct public spaces.⁴ The case of the Swedish-speaking space in Åland is even more clear-cut because of the sharp separation from the Finnish-speaking space, which goes as far as impeding bilingualism. In such cases, it is appropriate to speak of 'nations' or 'national groups' as described by the communicative model, even if they are not, for political and historical reasons, officially labelled as such. In these cases, national or unionist claims would nonetheless be normatively justifiable since they do not contravene the principles of democracy and inclusion.

The second type of objection involves cases of nations that do not correspond to distinct public spaces. This criticism mistakes, to use the terminology of logic, a bi-conditional for a conditional: whereas public spaces imply nations in the communicative model, the converse is not necessarily true. To quote Renan: 'Language may invite us to unite, but it does not compel us to do so' (1882). In fact, there are many conditions besides language for successful communication. Hence, the examples of different nations sharing a common language do not suffice to invalidate the thesis of the communicative and linguistic foundation of a democratic and pluralistic nation. The model does, however, allow us to pass judgment on the normative claims to nationhood of such nations.

Scotland is a case in point. Though Scotland is nested in an English-speaking public space, a sizeable number of its people are demanding complete independence from Britain. In this specific case, history is the mainspring of the demands. Arguing from the premises of the communicative model, one could point out that communication always presupposes the willingness to communicate, which is not always present between segments of a common public space. Similarly, Serbs and Croats share a common language of communication, and thus potentially a common public space, but history has produced at least a partial break in communication. From a merely descriptive perspective, one can speak of two distinct nations (Serbia and Croatia), but the communicative model has the added advantage of allowing a normative perspective. From this normative perspective, indeed, one could say that Serbia's or Croatia's national claims, insofar as they arbitrarily exclude a group that could be integrated into their public space, are less admissible than those of a fully inclusive nation. It is worth evoking the counterfactual character of this normative judgment: for a nation that does not recognise inclusivity as a binding norm, it is not unacceptable to exclude any group even though they could integrate in its communicative space.

Antonsich also could have cited cases of national groups that have chosen to join heterogeneous communicative spaces. The Ticinese could well have joined Italy during the Napoleonic campaigns, but in 1798, they preferred Swiss liberty ('*liberi e svizzeri!*') to the Jacobinic liberty of the Cisalpine Republic, thus declaring Ticino's bonds with non-italophone Switzerland instead of with an Italian republic with which it could have shared a communicative space. Or, to take a contemporary example, the exclusively Palestinian community of Umm el-Fahem prefers to stay within Israel in spite of its national ties with the Palestinians on the other side of the border because, despite the discrimination they claim to endure, this community values the stability and social support guaranteed by the state of Israel.⁵ Obviously, nationhood is not the sole driving force behind history. Interest is also a powerful motivation that can trump bonds of communication and for this reason it cannot be ignored.

Antonsich's third 'pragmatic' objection touches upon the question of immigrant communities in multicultural societies. In his view, the linguistic criterion is here of no use in marking boundaries since cultures are scattered across a given



territory. Antonsich is right in this regard, but why should boundaries be set in this context? The question of boundaries is relevant to states and nations (even in the meaning conferred by the communicative model), not to cultures. Antonsich's objection seems to vanish when the concept of public political language is recalled, this concept being central to the idea of the communicative nation. In order to reach a truly national status, a language must open a space of public discussion of a political nature. In other words, it must ensure political integration. In the United States, for instance, at least 165 different languages are spoken by various cultural communities (Gordon 2005), in the case of Spanish by as much as 14 per cent of the population. Nonetheless, only one language has a political status or role and serves as a vehicle for public political discussions. In this sense, the United States is a multicultural country (language being the bearer of culture), but it is not multinational.

This explains why language remains even today, in spite of the United States' fiercely 'universalistic' constitution, one of the pillars of democratic integration in that country. Indeed, the US Commission on Immigration Reform recognises the linguistic question as fundamental, in the same way as it does certain other constitutional principles. In its 1997 report on the Americanisation and integration of immigrants,⁶ the commission identifies four principles acting as ideological prerequisites to immigration policy: (1) constitutional rights (equality, liberty, etc.), (2) allegiance to the constitution, (3) the value of multiculturalism, and (4) the importance of English: 'The nation is strengthened when those who live in it communicate effectively with each other in English' (US Commission on Immigration Reform 1997). Here, the establishing of a national language is not merely 'juxtaposed', as a temporary expedient, upon constitutional rights. A national language is rather presupposed by these rights as that which effectively realises them.

The Canadian case, for its part, is exemplary of a multicultural country that is also multinational (the Quebec nation being distinct from the Anglo-Canadian nation). As Kymlicka (1998) notes, the overwhelming majority of immigrants seek to integrate into their adoptive country. It is for them a question of survival. In a liberal-democratic state, immigrants need not be integrated into a specific culture in which they just happen to find themselves. For example, a Japanese immigrant settling in a Punjabi neighbourhood of Toronto will not be required to learn Punjabi and the modes of interaction peculiar to this culture, though it would be appreciated by this community. However, this immigrant will have to learn English and to publicly interact with the English-speaking community that makes up the Anglo-Canadian nation (of which Toronto's Punjabi community is part) in order to avoid political, and hence social and economic, marginalisation. In return, the host nation has the responsibility of providing services and institutions that will support integration at this public and political level. The same applies for all other political integration spaces, such as Quebec, France, Germany and all other nations where, *mutatis mutandis*, newcomers have to integrate – if only passively – to public life.

Conclusion

In my view, the communicative model has the advantage of eluding the abstract, intellectualist and sometimes angelical conceptions of the nation while conforming to the postnational objective of providing for cultural plurality in a given polity. Antonsich does not deny the necessity of a common medium of communication in liberal societies, but he is not ready to grant it an integrative or inclusive function. One might ask: how else can such an inclusion and integration be accomplished? How else can culturally different citizens actually participate in the common process of public will- and opinion-formation? How else can togetherness emerge from difference? It is not history that binds people, but their common appreciation of it. And this common appreciation is arrived at by no other means than through public



communication.

Notes

1 cf. Ipperciel 2007b. Christophe Büchi points out that the existence of French-speaking media in Romandy contributed to forging a Romande consciousness distinct from its German counterpart (Büchi 2001: 296). As the Canadian case would also confirm (cf. Nielsen 1994), media tend to accentuate linguistic and national differences.

2 'Sondage linguistique', Fondation Émile Chanoux. Institut d'Études fédéralistes et régionalistes, <http://www.fondchanoux.org/site/pages/sondage.asp>, consulted on 4 December 2007.

3 The following information is taken from Leclerc, Jacques. 2007. 'Val-d'Aoste', L'aménagement linguistique dans le monde, Québec, TLFQ, Université Laval, 24 Octobre 2007 [<http://www.tlfq.ulaval.ca/axl/europe/italieaoste.htm>] (consulted on 5 December 2007). See this reference for more information.

4 This is also the case in Catalonia, where a majority of Catalans parteciple both in the Catalan and the Castilian political pubic spaces. However, participation in more than one linguistic-national space does not invalidate the existence of these two national spaces.

5 cf. Hamdan, Amal, 'Palestinians slam land swap plan', Aljazeera.net, 5 February 2004, online: <http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/0D06B0E9-A5A7-4090-B77A-3497A5A7AB4D.htm>.

6 US Commission on Immigration Reform, 'Becoming an American: Immigration and Immigrant Policy', online: <http://www.utexas.edu/lbj/uscir/becoming/americanization.html>.

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Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2. Nationalism

Umland Andreas

Zhirinovskiy's Last Thrust to the South and the Definition of Fascism

in *Russian politics and law*, vol. 46, n. 4, July - August , 31-46

No abstract available

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 3. Federalist authors, personalities and organizations

Baum Tomas

A Quest for Inspiration in the Liberal Peace Paradigm: Back to Bentham?

in *European Journal of International Relations* , Vol. 14, n. 3, september , 431-453

ABSTRACT: It is a fundamental dictum in the canon of IR theory that 'democracies do not wage war against each other'. The philosopher Immanuel Kant is given credit for having originally advanced this essentially liberal research agenda in his essay entitled 'Perpetual Peace'. The present article intends to offer a reassessment of this view by examining Kant's critical proposition, confronting it with the contemporary liberal perspective of Jeremy Bentham, and evaluating its implications on policy recommendations that are based on Kantian ideas. We will see how fundamental epistemological and ethical perspectives are the formative principles of Kant's peace essay and how these are not compatible with a liberal point of view. Bentham's 'Plan for a Universal and Perpetual Peace' provides for a more genuine liberal inspiration. The differences that exist between both philosophers will disclose a normative predicament.



Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 3. Federalist authors, personalities and organizations

McKnight Nichols Christopher

Citizenship and Transnationalism in Randolph Bourne's America

in *Peace Review*, vol. 20, n. 3, july , 348-357

No abstract available

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 3. Federalist authors, personalities and organizations

Thiele Ulrich

Demokratischer Pazifismus. Aktuelle Interpretationen des ersten Definitivartikels der Kantischen Friedensschrift

in *Kant-Studien*, Jahrgang 99, Heft 2, 2008 , 180–199

No abstract available

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 3. Federalist authors, personalities and organizations

Melchionni Maria Grazia

Denis de Rougemont: la persona, l'europaismo, la politica

in *Rivista di Studi Politici Internazionali*, Volume 75, n. 2, aprile-giugno , 286-290

No abstract available

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 3. Federalist authors, personalities and organizations

Ossipow William

Kant's Perpetual Peace and Its Hidden Sources: A Textual Approach

in *Swiss Political Science Review - Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft - Revue suisse de science politique*, Volume 14, Number 2, Summer 2008 , 357-389

The problem of Kant's sources in Perpetual Peace has never before been dealt with in a systematic fashion. As some commentators have already noticed, Kant seldom quotes his sources in Perpetual Peace and in quite a number of other works. The purpose of the present research note is to analyze the Kantian text and to find philological traces of the various authors that we believe have been important to Kant's work in the field of political philosophy. With this in mind, a methodology has been elaborated which includes three aspects: a textual and comparative analysis, a consistency analysis and a contextual analysis. These three approaches combined should allow us to systematically shed light on the key role played by Emer de Vattel's famous book *The Law of Nations* (1758) and, more unexpectedly, by the *Federalist Papers*, in particular articles No. 10, 14 and 51 written by Madison.



Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 3. Federalist authors, personalities and organizations

de Benoist Alain, Tarchi MARCO

Laboratorio: Un incontro con Alain de Benoist; La decrescita e le poste in gioco; Che cos'è il neoconservatorismo?; Pensare l'ecologia fino in fondo: I due volti del Sessantotto

in *Diorama*, n. 288, giugno

No abstract available

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 3. Federalist authors, personalities and organizations

Veneruso Danilo

Luciano Bolis dall'antifascismo al federalismo

in *Rivista di Studi Politici Internazionali*, Volume 75, n. 1, gennaio-marzo , 137-146

No abstract available

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 3. Federalist authors, personalities and organizations

García de la Torre Armando

The contradictions of late nineteenth-century nationalist doctrines: three keys to the 'globalism' of José Martí's nationalism

in *Journal of Global History*, volume 3, Issue 01, March , 67-88

Scholarly literature on nineteenth-century nationalism concentrates on its strong exclusionary tendencies, while studies of the Cuban independence leader José Martí (1853–95) focus on his articulation of Cuban nationalism and pan-Latin American regionalism through his political activities and writings. This article identifies the globalism of Martí's nationalism, moving beyond the national and regional frameworks to which studies of Martí have consigned the Cuban freedom fighter. It argues that the global history narratives that Martí wrote for children constitute critical and innovative components of his programme for national liberation and nation building, and encapsulate his nationalist ideology through three key components: the right to self-determination at the national level, the right to self-determination at the personal level, and a sense of global humanitarianism. The article's transnational perspective places Martí, through his inclusionary, racially blind, humanitarian form of nationalism, as contradicting late nineteenth-century nationalist doctrines, and begs for ideas about the general intellectual climate of the period to be rethought.

http://journals.cambridge.org/download.php?file=%2FJGH%2FJGH3_01%2FS1740022808002441a.pdf&code=52eb5ca8ded3e03aa467b20ce538f628



Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 3. Federalist authors, personalities and organizations

Nardin Terry

Theorising the international rule of law

in Review of International Studies (The), Vol. 34, Issue 3, July , 385-401

Recent trends in international law scholarship recycle objections to international law advanced by an earlier generation of political and legal realists. Such objections fail to understand the place of international law in the global order. To understand that place, we must distinguish the idea of the rule of law from other understandings of law. That idea is an inherently moral one. Theories of international law that ignore the moral element in law cannot distinguish law as a constraint on power from law as an instrument of power. A Kantian theory of international law can help to recover that moral element.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 3. Federalist authors, personalities and organizations

Walker Thomas

Two Faces of Liberalism: Kant, Paine, and the Question of Intervention

in International Studies Quarterly, issue 3, vol. 52, september , 449-468

ABSTRACT: Compared with the realist tradition, relatively few students of international relations explore variations within liberalism. This paper introduces a particular interpretation of Immanuel Kant's evolutionary liberalism and then compares it with Thomas Paine's revolutionary liberalism. Paine was an ebullient optimist while Kant was more guarded and cautious. These different assumptions lead to distinct liberal views on voting rights, how trade fosters peace, and defense policies. The most striking disagreement, and one that endures in contemporary liberal circles, revolves around the question of military interventions to spread democratic rule. Kant advocated nonintervention while Paine actively pursued military intervention to spread democratic rule. Differences between Kant and Paine represent some enduring tensions still residing within the liberal tradition in international relations.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 3. Federalist authors, personalities and organizations

Behnke Andreas

'Eternal Peace' as the Graveyard of the Political: A Critique of Kant's Zum Ewigen Frieden

in Millennium: Journal of International Studies, n. 3, vol. 36, may , 513-531

ABSTRACT: The purpose of this essay is a critical investigation of Immanuel Kant's Zum Ewigen Frieden as a metaphysical and transcendental rather than political project. The essay argues that this project, despite Kant's protestations to the contrary, necessarily produces the 'peace of the graveyard'. Eternal Peace needs to be understood not only as a guide to the creation of peaceful relations between states — a common interpretation reflected in the misleading translation of the treatise as 'Perpetual Peace' — but also as a philosophical response to the problem of Difference in international politics. As such, it establishes many of the metaphysical tenets through which Liberalism has ever since attempted to establish the conditions for Eternal Peace via the ontological eradication of Difference and the



operation of an ethnoand temporocentric epistemology. Consequently, Eternal Peace depends on the death, rather than affirmation, of the Political as the agonistic engagement with the Other.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Hernández Antonio M.

Memoria Nación-Provincias Informe general
in **Cuaderno de federalismo**, Volumen XX , 15-28

No abstract available

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Brown Eleanor, Morgan John

A Culture of Peace via Global Citizenship Education
in **Peace Review**, vol. 20, n. 3, july , 283-291

No abstract available

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Doorenspleet Renske, Kopeckỳ Petr

Against the Odds: Deviant Cases of Democratization
in **Democratization**, vol. 15, n. 4, August, Special Issue "Deviant Democracies" , 697-713

Economic development and diffusion effects appear to exert substantial influence on the success of democratization. However, large-N quantitative studies also show that there are some 'outliers', or 'deviant' cases, which do not fit the general pattern and cannot be explained by existing theories and models. It appears that deviant cases of democratization include Costa Rica and India (since the 1940s), Botswana (since the 1960s) and Benin and Mongolia (since the 1990s). This introduction focuses on important conceptual, theoretical, and methodological problems involved when studying them. We first look at the highly contested concept of democracy and place 'deviant democracies' in the framework of a minimal definition of democracy and transition waves. We also provide a working definition for two other highly contested concepts - democratic transition and democratic consolidation. We then go on to briefly review existing general theories of democratization. By doing so, we lay the ground for specifying more precisely the level of 'deviancy' of our cases, and offer potential explanations for their unusually successful process of democratization. Finally, we outline the nested mixed method, the logic of which we follow in this special issue.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Shlapentokh Dmitry

Alexander Dugin's Views on the Middle East



in *Space and Polity*, Volume 12, Number 2 / August , 251-268

Alexander Dugin, influential Russian geo-politician and proponent of Eurasianism, regards Russia as a heartland state that should engage in a web of alliances with various Eurasian powers to confront Russia's natural enemy, the US. While Eurasianism has been quite popular in the late Yeltsin era and Putin regime, it is important for other reasons as well. It demonstrates that, in the wake of the Cold War, the most unexpected combinations could happen.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Segert Dieter

An Unexpected Dawn: The Prague Spring and the Mechanism of Change in State Socialism
in *Debatte: Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe*, vol. 16, n. 2, August , 203-211

From the perspective of post-1989, Soviet-style state socialism is seen as a historical dead end. This account of the attempt to reform state socialism in the Prague Spring of 1968 attempts a different interpretation. The reforms in Prague were a remarkable attempt to live up to the original Marxist ideal of a just and politically free modern society. What were the policies of the reformers around Alexander Dubcek? How were these reforms at all possible in the first place? Why were they carried out and who were the main actors? When did this development begin that later blossomed into the Prague Spring? Finally, what does the emergence of this practical transformation have to say about state socialism and its power structure: in view of the reforms that actually happened, is it meaningful to describe it still as a totalitarian dictatorship?

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Abbamondi Carla , Lanza Laura (a cura di)

Bibliografia di storia delle istituzioni contemporanee
in *Carte e la Storia (Le)*, n. 1, giugno , 41-62

No abstract available

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Zawahri Neda A.

Capturing the nature of cooperation, unstable cooperation and conflict over international rivers: the story of the Indus, Yarmouk, Euphrates and Tigris rivers
in *International Journal of Global Environmental Issues*, Volume 8, Issue 3 , 286-310

This article analyses the existing definitions of conflict and cooperation over international rivers and introduces new definitions to remedy some of the shortcomings. Conflict tends to be defined as militarised confrontation, firing guns, political flare-ups or deterioration in relations. This range of violence is too wide. To remedy this weakness, it is necessary to incorporate the category of unstable cooperation introduced by Wolf (1997, 1998). Existing definitions of cooperation also have drawbacks. There is a tendency to associate the signing of treaties with cooperation.



Unfortunately, treaties can remain unimplemented or states might not comply with them. The underlying weakness with existing definitions is an insufficient examination of the problem structure that states confront. States sharing international rivers confront a management problem, which involves continuous disputes that require constant negotiations. As this article argues, how states manage their water disputes is an indicator of whether they exist in a condition of conflict, unstable cooperation or cooperation.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Cavallo Riccardo

Carl Schmitt e l'Europa. Attualità e memoria

in *Studi sull'integrazione europea*, Anno III, n. 2 , 361-394

No abstract available

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

McNally Mark

Conor Cruise O'Brien's Conservative Anti-Nationalism

in *European Journal of Political Theory*, Vol. 7, n. 3, July , 308-330

From the early 1970s Conor Cruise O'Brien acquired a reputation in Ireland and internationally as one of the most vociferous critics of nationalism. While many see the origins of his critique in his reaction to the emergence of militant nationalism in Northern Ireland at this time, in this article I argue that the foundations of O'Brien's anti-nationalism had already been laid in the postwar European context. The article illustrates how O'Brien's historical and intellectual experience in the aftermath of the Second World War had an essentially conservative influence on his thought, providing him with a pool of ideas which he would later employ in his attack on nationalism, and Irish nationalism in particular. I therefore maintain that there is a lot more continuity in O'Brien's thought than is sometimes assumed.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Cedrini Mario

Consensus versus freedom or consensus upon freedom? from Washington disorder to the rediscovery of Keynes

in *Journal of Post Keynesian Economics*, Volume 30, Number 4 , 499 - 522

This paper retraces the history of the debate on the Washington Consensus according to the four-stage partition Consensus, Confusion, Contention, Conclusion, with particular attention to the criticisms evoked by the use of it as a tool for the "integrationist agenda" of the 1990s. The author argues that the excessive shrinking in policy space available to developing countries is among the key factors explaining why the saga has rapidly come to a Conclusion, leaving room for the rediscovery of the "embedded liberalism" of Bretton Woods. It is the author's aim to show, however, that



Keynes's plan for a new international order inspired by a consensus on freedom, rather than discipline, is still the most relevant model for a new system of national capitalisms enhancing member countries' freedom to choose.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Buchanan Allen , Powell Russell

Constitutional Democracy and the Rule of International Law: Are They Compatible?

in **Journal of Political Philosophy**, Vol. 16, Issue 3, September , 326-349

No abstract available

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Calhoun Craig

Cosmopolitanism and nationalism

in **Nations and Nationalism**, Volume 14, Issue 3, July 2008 , 427-448

No abstract available

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Der Derian James

Critical encounters in international relations

in **International Social Science Journal** , Volume 59, Issue 191, March 2008 , 69-73

This article aims to map the most significant influences of Foucault on the study of international relations. This is done through an analysis of Foucault's diverse intellectual toolbox, including the notions of discourse, heterotopias and genealogy. It considers whether Foucault helps us understand the most pressing issues in world politics and offers a critique of the historical and cultural limitations of Foucault's ideas, and questions the relevance of Foucault for an increasingly globalised, virtualised politics.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Pagano Emilio

Dalla Carta di Nizza alla Carta di Strasburgo dei diritti fondamentali

in **Diritto pubblico comparato ed europeo**, n. 1 , 94-100

No abstract available



Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Van De Haar Edwin

David Hume and international political theory: a reappraisal

in **Review of International Studies (The)**, Vol. 34, Issue 2, April , 225-242

David Hume's ideas on international relations are different than most international relations academics suppose. Close scrutiny of Hume's views on the nation, international society, war, balance of power, empire and trade reveals the need to reassess his place within international political theory. Taking an English School perspective, the analysis also shows the possible benefits for IR theorists within this tradition to focus on Scottish Enlightenment philosophy, which will also strengthen the position of the pluralist perspective within international society.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

McDonald Avril

Declarations of war and belligerent parties : international law governing hostilities between states and transnational terrorist networks

in **Netherlands International Law Review**, Vol. 54, issue 2 , 279-314

Following the 9/11 attacks, the US declared a war on terrorism, principally aimed at Al Qaeda. The declaration could be dismissed as a sleight of words were it not for the fact that, for the US and for those it affects, it has real and serious legal consequences. The US claims that its declaration of a war on terror is merely an act of self-defence as in its view, Al Qaeda declared a state of war through the 9/11 attacks and these initiated an armed conflict to which the laws of armed conflict apply. Although the characterization of the war on terror as an armed conflict has been rejected by many authorities, the view that the 9/11 attacks were an armed attack giving rise to the rise of self-defence has been widely accepted.

If the 9/11 attacks are armed attacks giving rise to the right of self-defence but the attacks did not constitute an armed conflict; as an act of war, they would not be subject to the laws of war. This would disconnect jus ad bellum and jus in bello in relation to acts of war. If there is a state of war without there being an armed conflict, this would allow the US to take certain measures in relation to the terrorist threat but would not give it the more extensive liberties associated with an actual wartime situation.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Iriye Akira

Environmental History and International History

in **Diplomatic History**, vol. 32, n. 4, September , 643-646

No abstract available



Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Colonomos Ariel

Ethical reasoning and justification in international relations

in *International Social Science Journal* , Volume 59, Issue 191, March 2008 , 115-127

Foucauldian notions, such as the critique of governmental reason, the regime of truth, and juridification, are enlightening for comprehending the phenomenon of justification in international relations. My use of Foucault is intended to be non-relativistic. These notions shed light on a process of justification based on a utilitarian reason of consequences, which is today very significant in international affairs. In this article I attempt to reconcile a genealogical approach with an abstract philosophical approach that sets the limits of one kind of ethical reason.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Akhtar Zia

Federal Law and Indian Rights

in *International Journal of Human Rights (The)*, Volume 12, Issue 2 , 297-301

The conquest of the indigenous American is based on the notion that they are barbarians and have no prior claim to their ancestral land. The US authority dates back to the European colonial occupation and is itself based on the imperial doctrine of 'discovery'. The operation of this came with the arrival of Columbus and the two papal bulls of the fifteenth century, which served as its ideological underpinning. The subordinate status of Native Americans has allowed the US to designate them as political vassals and their claim as tribal nations is blinkered by laws that do not recognise real sovereignty. Will the impact of the UN declaration override the treaties which led to the determination that they are wards of the US government?

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Antonopoulos Constantine

Force by armed groups as armed attack and the broadening of self-defence

in *Netherlands International Law Review*, Vol. 55, issue 2 , 159-180

A feature of the end of the Cold War has been the tendency in state practice to expand the right of lawful resort to force by introducing novel grounds for the exercise of the right of self-defence. These are an alleged right to use force in self-defence against armed bands, regardless of the precise involvement of another state in their activities and the introduction of a right of pre-emptive self-defence against likely threats to the security of a state. Action by armed bands is viewed as an autonomous instance of an armed attack, while at the same time the alleged right of pre-emptive self-defence marks a departure from the hitherto controversial concept of anticipatory self-defence by dispensing with the requirement of imminence of an armed attack. A factual assessment of 'imminence' is replaced by considerations of



state security. This tendency in state practice faces the persistence by the ICJ to view the use of force as an inter-state phenomenon and to interpret resort to defensive action as narrowly as possible.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Marttti Koskenniemi

Formalismo, fragmentación y libertad. Temas kantianos en el derecho internacional actual
in *Revista Electrónica de Estudios Internacionales*, Numero 15/2008

No abstract available

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Saner Raymond, Toseva Gordana , Atamanov Aziz , Mogilevsky Roman, Sahov Aleksandar

Government Governance (GG) and Inter-Ministerial Policy Coordination (IMPC) in Eastern and Central Europe and Central Asia

in *Public Organization Review*, Volume 8, Number 3 , 215-231

This paper focuses on the function of Inter-ministerial Policy Coordination (IMPC) and its critical role in governance. Following a definitional section, the authors give an overview of public sector governance in Eastern and Central Europe and Central Asia and discuss the application of governance principles to Inter-Ministerial Policy Coordination in these regions. They conclude with specific examples from the Republic of Macedonia and Central Asia.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Jensen Laura S.

Government, the State, and Governance
in *Polity*, Volume 40, Issue 3, July , 379-385

No abstract available

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Haklai Oded

Helping the enemy? Why transnational Jewish philanthropic foundations donate to Palestinian NGOs in Israel
in *Nations and Nationalism*, Volume 14, Issue 3, July 2008 , 581-599

This article asks why transnational Jewish donor organisations have been increasingly providing financial support to Palestinian social movements and NGOs in Israel when many of the main recipients are strong critics of the Jewish character of the state and act to promote Palestinian national claims within Israel. The article evaluates a number of plausible explanations, some generated by interest-centric theories while others are driven by ideational underpinnings.



The study concludes that the donors do not view the interests of the Jewish state and the Palestinian Arab minority in Israel (PAI) in zero-sum terms. Having internalised liberal values of minority rights and pluralism in their countries of residence (mainly the United States), donating foundations believe that the development of the PAI is both normatively desirable and strengthens Israel as a whole because it facilitates the minority's integration into Israel's society and bolsters its civic culture, and therefore, it also contributes to the country's security. These findings are theoretically significant because they demonstrate how the interpretation of communal interest is strongly related to the normative social environment in which transnational activists operate.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Serra Maurizio

Hervé Alphan

in **Rivista di Studi Politici Internazionali**, Volume 74, n. 4, ottobre-dicembre , 617-624

No abstract available

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Owens Patricia

Humanity, Sovereignty and the Camps

in **International Politics** , Volume 45, Issue 4, July , 522-530

This article responds to the commentary on my book, *Between War and Politics: International Relations and the Thought of Hannah Arendt*, by Helen M. Kinsella, Richard Beardsworth and Anthony Burke. Burke's claim that Arendt betrays a 'normative defeatism' based solely on his reading of *Origins of Totalitarianism* is misguided. It is a narrow reading to suggest that Arendt was uninterested in institutions and laws more cosmopolitan in intent than traditional inter-state law. In response to Beardsworth, I argue that Arendt's criticism of the reduction of all politics to violence is not normative in the way he suggests. Nor is it 'merely' to repeat the 'Schmittian/realist argument that conflict is irreducible'. Arendt's agenda is different. Finally, I respond to Kinsella's provocative defence of some concordance (as distinct from equivalence) between the Nazi concentration camps of World War II and US-run camps at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Urquijo Mikel

Il Dizionario biografico dei parlamentari spagnoli nella cornice della storia parlamentare europea

in **Carte e la Storia (Le)**, n. 1, giugno , 5-14

No abstract available

Section D) Federalism as a political idea



Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Winter Jay

Imagining Peace in Twentieth-Century Europe

in *Contemporary European History* , Volume 17, Issue 03, August , 413-422

Any definition of peace is also a definition of war. The two cannot be described other than in each other's image. In the twentieth century there have been four roughly separate periods of warfare. Their character and consequences tell us much about how peace was defined.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Easterly William

Institutions: Top Down or Bottom Up?

in *American Economic Review*, Vol. 98, No. 2, May 2008 , 95-99

The article discusses two competing viewpoints that attempt to describe how institutions are created. Advocates of "top down" theory assert institutions arise out of laws initiated by political leaders. Conversely, adherents to a "bottom up" world view see social norms, traditions, and beliefs at the individual level as having transformative power. The author broadly discusses both views, then focuses more narrowly on top-down efforts at land reform in Africa. He concludes that top-down attempts to impose sweeping changes tend to be ineffective.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Nehring Holger, Pharo Helge

Introduction: A Peaceful Europe? Negotiating Peace in the Twentieth Century

in *Contemporary European History* , Volume 17, Issue 03, August , 277-299

The topic of peace in twentieth-century Europe develops a novel interpretation of twentieth-century European history. Rather than focusing on the question of the impact of war and violence within European societies, it seeks to examine what we can gain from exploring how peace was established and maintained in the wake of wars in various European societies. In particular, it focuses on the manifold ways in which different social and international actors negotiated peace, both literally and symbolically. Taken together, the contributions to this special issue thus present a much more complex picture of twentieth-century Europe than the one of a 'Dark Continent' (Mark Mazower) ravaged by violence or that propagated by European institutions of a peaceful Europe.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Bega Federico Maria

La geopolitica delle popolazioni musulmane balcaniche tra minaccia del fondamentalismo islamico e prospettiva di integrazione europea

in *Rivista di Studi Politici Internazionali*, Volume 74, n. 4, ottobre-dicembre , 526-538



No abstract available

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Dietsch Thomas V., Philpott Stacy M.

Linking Consumers to Sustainability: Incorporating Science into Eco-friendly Certification

in Globalizations , Volume 5, Issue 2, June 2008 , 247-258

Efforts to counter ecological and socio-economic degradation have put coffee at the forefront of a new sustainability movement to reform negative globalization trends. This paper focuses on the possibilities of and challenges to sustainable certification efforts with particular focus on biodiversity conservation concerns. It presents the potential contributions from scientists in the certification processes, particularly to ensure that concern actually translates into measurable progress toward conservation goals. The benefits of unifying the three main certifications (organic, Fair Trade, and eco-friendly or shade grown), or triple-certified coffee, are explored. In general, benefits for biodiversity conservation and social justice from sustainable coffee certification can only be enhanced by greater cooperation among the current market-based efforts and scientists researching this unique response to globalization.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Guenancia Pierre

L'idée de nation d'un point de vue cosmopolitique

in Esprit, n. 345, juin 2008 , 67-83

Pour sortir de l'opposition entre cosmopolitisme et nationalisme, il faut envisager l'appartenance au monde comme une modification du regard. De Montaigne à Kant, le cosmopolitisme désigne un « point de vue » que nous prenons sur nous-mêmes et qui relativise nos allégeances nationales. Le passage du « je » au « nous » est donc d'abord une expérience de pensée où la conscience de soi devient reconnaissance d'appartenir à quelque chose de plus grand que soi.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Pittaway Mark

Making Peace in the Shadow of War: The Austrian–Hungarian Borderlands, 1945–1956

in Contemporary European History , Volume 17, Issue 03, August , 345-364

This article examines the process of state reconstruction in Austria and Hungary's borderlands that followed the Second World War. This process of state reconstruction was also a process of pacification, as it represented an attempt to (re)build states on the foundations of the military settlement of the war. The construction of legitimate state authority was at its most successful on the Austrian side of the border, where political actors were able to gain legitimacy by creating a state that acted as an effective protector of the immediate demands of the local community for security from a variety of threats. On the Hungarian side of the border the state was implicated with some of the actors who were seen as



threatening local communities, something that produced political polarisation. These differences set the stage for the transition from war to cold war in the borderlands.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Zückert Martin

National Concepts of Freedom and Government Pacification Policies: The Case of Czechoslovakia in the Transitional Period after 1918

in *Contemporary European History* , Volume 17, Issue 03, August , 325-344

Founded in 1918, the Czechoslovak state faced a series of problems in the years after its foundation. Apart from the question of the relationship between the ideal of a nation-state and the reality of its multi-ethnic structure, as well as the question of territorial security, the successive Czechoslovak governments faced the challenge of pacifying an uprooted post-war society. During this phase of transition, ideals of nationhood and peace as well as concepts of political power were adapted to pragmatic government policies. Despite rifts between the Czech- and the German-speaking parts of the population, combined with the dangers of a radicalised strike movement and the difficult integration of members of the Czechoslovak Legion into the new polity, attempts at pacification were much more successful in the west of the country than in Slovakia and in Carpathia, since the latter two regions lacked the structural continuities of laws and institutions.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Wöbse Anna-Katharina

Oil on Troubled Waters? Environmental Diplomacy in the League of Nations

in *Diplomatic History*, vol. 32, n. 4, September , 519-537

No abstract available

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Meckled-Garcia Saladin

On the Very Idea of Cosmopolitan Justice: Constructivism and International Agency

in *Journal of Political Philosophy*, Vol. 16, Issue 3, September , 245-271

No abstract available

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Forgette Richard, King Marvin, Dettrey Bryan

Race, Hurricane Katrina, and Government Satisfaction: Examining the Role of Race in Assessing Blame

in *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, vol. 38, n. 4, Fall , 671-691



Are there clear racial differences in government satisfaction across levels of government? And, if so, how do we explain this racial gap? Race was one of the prevailing cleavages in public attitudes toward Hurricane Katrina recovery and response. We propose and test contending explanations for racial differences in local, state, and national government satisfaction among Hurricane Katrina survivors. The first is an environmental vulnerability (racism) theory suggesting that minority populations are more vulnerable in their housing quality, location, and level of insurance compared to others. A second explanation relates to the role of informal or social networks in disaster recovery. We assess whether racial differences in perceptions of disaster response may be partly due to weaker informal social networks among minorities. A third explanation is that these differing explanations are largely a function of partisanship. Our findings indicate that the role of race in government evaluation was largely mediated through the greater environmental vulnerability and Democratic party identification of minorities.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Anzaldi Pablo A.

Raymond Aron y la teoría de las relaciones internacionales

in *Estudios internacionales : revista del Instituto de Estudios Internacionales de la Universidad de Chile*, Vol. 40 / 2008 / Nr 159

The paper examines Raymond Aron's International Relations as a process of development along three decades, where politics, war and technology are analyzed and reinterpreted in three different manners. The first depends on Spengler's thought, while the second and third are based in a deep and original interpretation of Clausewitz.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Burke Anthony

Recovering Humanity from Man: Hannah Arendt's Troubled Cosmopolitanism

in *International Politics* , Volume 45, Issue 4, July , 514-521

Taking its inspiration from Patricia Owens' important and original new book on Hannah Arendt and international relations, this essay considers how Arendt's many scattered remarks on humanity, world order and cosmopolitanism work for us today – a time when a worthwhile 'cosmopolitanisation' of international law (such that its subjects are individual humans as much as states) coexists with darker appropriations of the idea of humanity to legitimise coercive interventions and liberal imperialism. Whilst agreeing with Owens that Arendt's thought offers us significant critical tools to question the latter, I depart from Arendt's general scepticism of a moral subject called humanity, and argue that the time has come to reaffirm, rather than question, what is especially sacred in 'the abstract nakedness of being human'.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

John Richard R.

Rethinking the Early American State



in *Polity*, Volume 40, Issue 3, July , 332-339

No abstract available

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Dani Rodrik

Second-Best Institutions

in *American Economic Review*, Vol. 98, No. 2, May 2008 , 100-104

The article discusses institutional reform in developing countries. An overview is presented of the different types of institutions that are best suited for developing countries as compared to the institutions that work best in advanced countries. Operational practices used by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organization, the author indicates, are based on the best-practice model. This model is examined. Also discussed are reforms in developing countries concerning contract enforcement, entrepreneurship, trade openness, and macroeconomic stability.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Green James A.

Self-defence: a state of mind for states?

in *Netherlands International Law Review*, Vol. 55, issue 2 , 181-206

This paper focuses upon a comparatively overlooked issue with regard to the scope of self-defence in international law: whether the subjective 'psychological' positions of the states concerned in a dispute involving the use force have any impact upon the lawfulness of an action avowedly taken in self-defence. There exists a long standing conception that the motives of a state responding in self-defence are relevant to the lawfulness of that response. The purity (or impurity) of a state's motive forms the basis of a distinction for many writers between a lawful self-defence action and an unlawful armed reprisal. Similarly, in recent decisions of the ICJ, the implication has been that the subjective intention of the attacking state may be relevant to the question of whether the attack perpetrated by that state can trigger the right of self-defence. The conclusion is reached here that the lawfulness of an avowed self-defence action should be premised upon objective criteria alone. Moreover, this reflects the law as it is in fact applied in practice. It is argued that the subjective 'psychological' position of either the responding or attacking state has no place in the final analysis of whether an action in self-defence was lawful or unlawful.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Barnsley Ingrid, Bleiker Roland

Self-determination: from decolonization to deterritorialization

in *Global Change, Peace & Security*, n. 2, vol. 20, june , 121-136



ABSTRACT: Unresolved claims to self-determination are among the biggest challenges in global politics today. A large number of groups in all parts of the world, from indigenous peoples to religious, linguistic and ethnic minorities, seek independence or greater participation in the determination of their futures. However, several problems associated with the conceptualization of self-determination are limiting opportunities for the peaceful resolution of such claims. The international community lacks a coherent legal framework for extending the right of self-determination to all peoples, particularly to groups outside the decolonization context. More seriously, the issue of self-determination remains linked to a deeply entrenched concept of state sovereignty which revolves around an artificial link between nations, states and territorial integrity. Given that the boundaries of identity and community are fluid and constantly shifting, this territorial model of sovereignty more often precipitates rather than accommodates claims to self-determination. We thus argue for the need to deterritorialize self-determination, which would place greater emphasis on human rights and democratic participation. It would also open up more possibilities to deal with self-determination claims in the context of alternative political arrangements, such as autonomy, federalism, multiculturalism or overlapping sovereignties.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Jackson Robert H., Rosberg Carl G.

Soberanía y subdesarrollo: estatalidad jurídica en la crisis africana

in Relaciones internacionales : revista publ. por el Instituto de Relaciones Internacionales , N° 8 Marzo 2008

No abstract available

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Williams John

Space, scale and Just War: meeting the challenge of humanitarian intervention and trans-national terrorism

in Review of International Studies (The), Vol. 34, Issue 4, October , 581-600

This article contributes to current debates about Just War by analysing an insufficiently recognised problem with the way Just War theorists have responded to the two principal challenges surrounding the ethics of violence in international relations since the end of the Cold War – humanitarian intervention and the ‘global war on terror’. The problem focuses on strongly embedded assumptions that exist in contemporary Just War debates about the nature and meaning of territory. The article argues that Just War needs to engage more systematically with challenges to dominant ‘Westphalian’ framings of territory, space and scale in order to contribute more effectively to important ethical debates about the use of violence in international relations.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Bryan Dick

The Global Foreign Exchange Market: An Interpretation of the Bank for International Settlements' Survey of Foreign Exchange and Derivatives Market Activity, 2007

in Global Society, Volume 22, Issue 4 ,October , 491 - 505



Markets for foreign exchange derivatives are turning over \$US 5.5 trillion per day and they are having a critical economic and social impact. But they are little understood in the international relations and international political economy (IPE) literature. This paper introduces the key themes of derivative markets and reports on the results of the most recent Bank for International Settlements' triennial survey of global foreign exchange and derivative markets. As well as reporting the enormous scale of growth of these markets, the paper analyses the trends, especially regarding the declining role of the US dollar and the changing roles of different sorts of financial institutions in global financial markets. Finally, it explores what the data indicate about whether these markets can be characterised as being driven by "speculation".

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Straumann Benjamin

The Peace of Westphalia as a Secular Constitution

in Constellations, Vol. 15, Issue 2, June , 173-188

No abstract available

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Chowdhury Nayeefa

The Quest for Universal Human Rights: A Brief Comparative Study of Universal Declarations of Human Rights by the UN and the Islamic Council of Europe

in International Journal of Human Rights (The), Volume 12, Issue 3 , 347-352

The universalist discourse of human rights cannot be defended without assuming a metaphysical position concerning the sanctity and inherent moral endowment of humankind. The canonical texts of Islam are accommodative of multiple interpretations. Traditionalist interpretations of the texts appear to stand in conflict with the universalist discourse of human rights principles, whereas the contextual readings of the Qur'an reveal a profoundly liberating ethos as regards

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Ish-Shalom Piki

The Rhetorical Capital of Theories: The Democratic Peace and the Road to the Roadmap

in International Political Science Review , n. 4, vol. 29, september , 281-301

ABSTRACT: The article introduces the concept of rhetorical capital, which is defined as the aggregate persuasive resources inherent in entities. It then proceeds to apply the concept to the study of theories and identifies the structural duality of accessibility and incomprehensibility overlaid with the prestige of objectivity as the theories' resources of rhetorical capital that render them vulnerable to political and rhetorical abuses. The article focuses on the democratic peace thesis and its mobilization by the Israeli right, mainly by Benjamin Netanyahu and Natan Sharansky, in helping to bring about the Roadmap.



Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Adamson Kevin, Johns Robert

The Vlaams Blok, its electorate, and the ideological articulation of 'Europe'

in *Journal of Political Ideologies*, Volume 13, Number 2 / June, 133-156

In this article we analyse the Vlaams Blok's ideological production on the issue of 'Europe', identifying a rhetorical strategy of subverting the common equivalence between the 'EU' and 'Europe'. We then estimate the receptivity of Flemish voters to this strategy. Our study combines qualitative analysis of Vlaams Blok ideology with regard to 'Europe', the EU and immigration, and quantitative analysis of Flemish public attitudes towards those objects. Our research suggests that the party is applying a more 'cosmopolitan' veneer to its rhetoric on Europe, perhaps in a bid to win support from a wider pool of voters who identify as 'Europeans' and might recoil from overtly racist rhetoric. The ideological analysis shows that a positive image of Europe as a 'civilisation' is connected with the idea of Flanders as a 'European' nation, and the need to defend this civilisation provides the justification for rejecting 'non-European' immigration. Further, this positive outlook on 'Europe' is set in stark contrast to a negative portrayal of the EU, which is held responsible for the swamping of Europe under a tide of that 'non-European' immigration. Comparisons with public opinion show that Vlaams Blok ideological constructions find an echo in voter attitudes. When encouraged to evaluate 'Europe' independently of the EU, voters with extreme right attitudes are willing and able to do so, and many express a positive identification with 'Europe' while remaining strongly anti-EU. This applies especially to the party's target voters: those with anti-immigrant attitudes but who have not (yet) supported the Blok.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Ghafur Hamid Abdul

The legality of anticipatory self-defence in the 21st century world order: a re-appraisal

in *Netherlands International Law Review*, Vol. 54, issue 3, 441-490

While the overwhelming majority of states do not practice anticipatory self-defence, believing that it would create a dangerous precedent, it is ironic that many scholars in the area support the idea of it. After September 11, the legality of anticipatory self-defence is attracting increasing support. What makes the matter worst is the pronouncement of a preventive style of self-defence in the National Security Strategy of the US, which goes far beyond the traditional concept of 'anticipatory' self-defence. The old doctrinal debate has resurfaced with stronger vigour. The present article is an attempt to re-appraise the debate and test the legality of anticipatory self-defence. The article objectively interprets Article 51 of the Charter in light of canons of treaty interpretation and explores customary international law of the time. It re-examines the Caroline formula and affirms that it had not been established as customary international law before September 11, owing to the lack of widespread and consistent state practice and *opinio juris*. The article concludes that although state practice after September 11 tends to condone the use of force against imminent terrorists attacks, Article 51 of the UN Charter is still a good law that can cope with the normal inter-state use of force. Despite the flaws of the United Nations, the Charter-based system of world order can very well serve the international community even in the context of the 21st century world order.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous



Mercille Julien

The radical geopolitics of US foreign policy: Geopolitical and geoeconomic logics of power
in *Political Geography*, Volume 27, Issue 5 , 570-586

This article presents a version of geopolitics termed “radical geopolitics,” which is critical, political economic, and concerned with investigating the “why” (the causes) of policy and political events, without neglecting the “how” (the way they unfold). In particular, it examines the relative importance of the geopolitical and geoeconomic factors that drive policy. It seeks to address questions which have been neglected by current approaches in geopolitics, a number of which fail to incorporate political economy or to identify the fundamental reasons behind policy. Inspired by revisionist Cold War historiography, it modifies and reformulates David Harvey's logics of power into a “geoeconomic logic” and a “geopolitical logic” through which postwar American foreign policy may be interpreted. The former logic arises out of capitalism's tendency to expand geographically and the latter out of politicians' need to maintain credibility internationally as well as from pressures generated by domestic public opinion. A discussion of the Vietnam War illustrates the approach and criticizes Harvey's account of postwar American foreign policy, which he claims is the product of political and economic forces that sometimes display “outright antagonism.” On the contrary, it is advanced that their oppositions are tactical, but not fundamental, and that it is mostly the geoeconomic logic that has driven postwar American foreign policy. The conclusion illustrates the relevance of a radical geopolitics approach to post-Cold War events through a discussion of the current Iranian crisis.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Karp David Jason

The utopia and reality of sovereignty: social reality, normative IR and 'Organized Hypocrisy'
in *Review of International Studies (The)*, Vol. 34, Issue 2, April , 313-335

This article applies E. H. Carr's analysis of utopia and reality, and a Searlean-constructivist analysis of rules and norms, to the concept of 'sovereignty' in general, and Stephen Krasner's argument in *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy* in particular. In doing this, the article charts a theoretical space that incorporates insights from classical realism, scientific realism, and philosophical (social) constructivism. To view 'utopia' and 'reality' as distinct yet equally important planes of International Relations (IR) inquiry, thereby treating 'sovereignty' as a single concept with descriptive and normative elements, highlights both the merits and the shortcomings of Krasner's approach. Furthermore, this type of analysis suggests a fruitful way to continue a contemporary normative discussion about what sovereign entities ought to do.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Roscini Marco

Threats of armed force and contemporary international law
in *Netherlands International Law Review*, Vol. 54, issue 2 , 229-277

The present article analyses threats of armed force by states against other states. After determining what conduct amounts to a 'threat of force', the current status of its prohibition is investigated. In particular, this article contends that the prohibition of the threat of force contained in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter reflects customary international law. The fact that only a few states have supported the legality of threats for certain law enforcement purposes prevents the



prohibition of any threats of force from being qualified as jus cogens. This status should be limited to the prohibition of threats of aggression, which constitutes the common denominator of the practice and opinio juris of all states.

The consequences of threats of force under the law of treaties, the law of state responsibility and international criminal law are then discussed, in particular treaties, the conclusion of which has been obtained by the threat of force in violation of the UN Charter are void ab initio. Article 41 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility could also entail a duty of non-recognition of situations procured by the threat of aggression. On the other hand, threats of aggression (let alone threats of less serious forms of the use of force) cannot be qualified as international crimes entailing individual responsibility.

As to remedies at the disposal of the victim state, armed responses to threats of force would be lawful only within the limits of self-defence, and only if the threatened armed attack is imminent enough to meet the Caroline requirements. On the contrary, coercive responses to non-imminent armed attacks are still prohibited under contemporary international law.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Heydemann Günther

Tra consenso, crisi e conflitto. L'11 settembre 2001 e gli effetti sui rapporti tra Germania e USA
in *Studi sull'integrazione europea*, Anno III, n. 2 , 255-268

No abstract available

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Etzioni Amitai

Una lingua globale che genera un senso di comunità?
in *Rassegna italiana di sociologia*, numero 2, aprile-giugno 2008 , 159-182

No abstract available

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Gram-Skjoldager Karen, Tønnesson Øyvind

Unity and Divergence: Scandinavian Internationalism, 1914–1921
in *Contemporary European History* , Volume 17, Issue 03, August , 301-324

Scandinavia (Denmark, Norway and Sweden) is frequently seen as a democratic 'island of peace' in international politics and the three states are seen as ardent supporters of an 'international community' under the umbrella of the United Nations as well as its predecessor, the League of Nations. This article seeks to challenge this idealised, unitary conception of Scandinavian peace politics by exploring how different strands of internationalism, as transnational phenomena, developed from the outbreak of the First World War until the three states became members of the League.



Initially, that development was more or less independent of official foreign policy. The article explains how and to what degree new internationalist ideas were eventually merged with traditional neutralist Scandinavian foreign policies.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Doorenspleet Renske, Mudde Cas

Upping the Odds: Deviant Democracies and Theories of Democratization

in **Democratization**, vol. 15, n. 4, August, Special Issue "Deviant Democracies" , 815-832

This concluding article tries to integrate the different insights of the individual case studies of this special issue into some comparative observations. The findings are related to debates and findings of the broader literature on democratization, with the aim of generating new insights that might help develop new studies on the topic. Importantly, our suggestions are to be considered as hypotheses complementary to the two dominant theories of democratization, rather than opposite to them, accepting both their key assumptions and stipulations. More specifically, two aspects of key concern to the study of democratization are discussed in more detail: the phasing of the process of democratization and the ambiguity of the process(es) of diffusion. We argue and show that, while accepting that the different phases of the process of democratization might overlap in practice, the analytical distinction of democratic transition and consolidation provide clearer insights into the factors affecting processes of democratization. We also emphasize the importance of processes of diffusion in explaining (the different phases of) democratization, but at the same time analyse the current conceptual, methodological and theoretical problems involved in diffusion theory.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Bensel Richard F.

Valor and Valkyries: Why the State Needs Valhalla

in **Polity**, Volume 40, Issue 3, July , 386-393

full text available at <http://www.palgrave-journals.com/polity/journal/v40/n3/pdf/pol20082a.pdf>

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Siegel Alfons

Völkerbund, Hexagon und die Zukunft der UNO. Kant-Bezüge in Friedenskonzepten von Matthias Erzberger und Dieter Senghaas

in **Zeitschrift für Politik**, Jahrgang 55, Heft 3, 2008 , 337-362

In 1918 the politician Matthias Erzberger published his famous book *The League of Nations, the Way to the World's Peace* which contains a roadmap for a global peace making and keeping concept. It is based explicitly on ideas of the German philosopher Immanuel Kant including a criticism of militarism. In 2004 the wellknown scientist and peace researcher Dieter Senghaas referred in his book *Zum irdischen Frieden* to the works of Immanuel Kant and transferred his vision of 1795 *Zum ewigen Frieden* into the post cold war era.



The article illustrates differences and similarities of the concepts of Erzberger and Senghaas concerning the reference to Kant's vision and stresses the common principles for the creation of a durable peace in a modern world. As shown the principles of Immanuel Kant still have relevance for the creation of a more peaceful international community. However, a further development is necessary in order to adapt the considerations to the changing international circumstances as done more or less by Senghaas and Erzberger. With such an adaption and implementation – including a reform of the UNO – conflicts could be tackled more successfully and the world might become more peaceful.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Raeymaekers Timothy

¿Colapso u orden? Cuestionando el colapso del estado en África

in Relaciones internacionales : revista publ. por el Instituto de Relaciones Internacionales , N° 8 Marzo 2008

No abstract available