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Hayden Robert M.

"Democracy" without a Demos? The Bosnian Constitutional Experiment and the Intentional Construction of Nonfunctioning States

in *East European Politics and Societies*, Volume 19, Number 2, May , pp. 226-259

The social science literature on ethnically divided states is huge and varied, but suggestions for constitutional solutions are strangely uniform: "loose federations" of ethnically defined ministates, with minimal central authority that must act by consensus and thus cannot act at all on issues that are contested rather than consented. In Bosnia, the political system mandated by the international High Representative suffer the same structural flaws that were used to make the former Yugoslav federation and the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina unworkable. Similarly nonviable systems were proposed in 1994 to 1995 for Croatia and in 1998 to 1999 for Kosovo and recently for Cyprus and for Iraq. This article analyzes the paradox of mandating consensus-based politics in ethnically divided states, inclusion in which does not have the consent of most members of at least one group.

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Shivdeep Singh Grewal

A cosmopolitan Europe by constitutional means? Assessing the theoretical foundations of Habermas' political prescriptions

in *Journal of European Integration*, Volume 27, Number 2 / June , 191-215

In recent years, German philosopher Jürgen Habermas has called for the adoption of a federal constitution by the EU. As such — particularly given the impact of his thought on the social sciences more generally, and its affinities with traditional theories of European integration — a question arises: why has a specifically Habermasian theory of European integration not developed? This article argues that one is already present, albeit implicitly, in the interstices between Habermas' journalistic and theoretical oeuvres, merely requiring delimitation, exegesis and application. It combines a sophisticated and comprehensive account of European integration and democracy with an innovative 'hermeneutic' dimension. The latter broadens the parameters of EU studies to encompass relevant developments in European culture. Having identified its component parts and 'reconstructed' this theory, the article concludes by subjecting it to a preliminary empirical test against the results of interviews with radical left and social democratic MEPs and personnel.

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von Beyme Klaus



Asymmetric federalism between globalization and regionalization

in *Journal of European Public Policy* , Volume 12, Number 3 / June , 432-447

The question 'who speaks for the Europeans?' involves a basic contradiction in European constitutional engineering: federalist autonomy developed against democratic representation on the basis of popular sovereignty of equal citizens. Working on a European Constitution includes the search for a fair balance between the modes of representation. This paper shows, however, that the balance remains precarious. Asymmetries in the de iure institutional settings and in de facto social and economic development permanently reshuffle the balance. Older theories of federalism in the age of classical modernism started from a rational model of symmetric states' rights. Postmodernist thinking with its patchwork scenarios developed more tolerance towards asymmetries. The neo-liberal paradigm leads away from 'participatory federalism' in the direction of a 'federalism of competition'. In the early federations the poor territories in a 'class struggle from below' asked for subsidies from the centre. In recent federations a 'class struggle from above' is developing. The rich states fight for asymmetries because they feel punished if they have to subsidize the poorer areas.

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Fassbender Bardo

Auswärtige Zuständigkeiten bundesstaatlicher Gliedstaaten. Die Entstehung des Prinzips der dynamischen Verweisung im Zeitalter der Gründung des Deutschen Reiches (1866-1871). Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte und zu einer allgemeinen Lehre des Bundesstaates europäischen Typus.

in *Jahrbuch des öffentlichen Rechts der Gegenwart*, Band 53, 2005 , 207-283

Nach dem Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland sind die deutschen Länder berechtigt, im Rahmen ihrer Gesetzgebungskompetenz mit auswärtigen Staaten völkerrechtliche Verträge abzuschließen (Art. 32 Abs. 3 GG). Die Bestimmung verdeutlicht, daß in der grundgesetzlichen Konstruktion des deutschen Bundesstaates die Staatlichkeit der Länder auch ihre Völkerrechtsfähigkeit umfaßt, das Grundgesetz die Länder also nicht nur in ihrem Verhältnis zueinander und zum Bund, sondern auch völkerrechtlich als Staaten auffaßt und anerkennt. Darin liegt die verfassungsrechtliche und -theoretische Bedeutung des Art. 32 Abs. 3 GG, ungeachtet der Tatsache, daß in der Praxis der Umfang der von den Ländern abgeschlossenen völkerrechtlichen Verträge gering geblieben ist.

Das Vertragschließungsrecht bundesstaatlicher Gliedstaaten bildet heute einen Bestandteil gemeineuropäischen (Bundes-) Verfassungsrechts. Die durch das Vertragschließungsrecht vermittelte Völkerrechtssubjektivität der Gliedstaaten ist ein charakteristisches Kennzeichen des Bundesstaates europäischen Typus.

Der vorliegenden Abhandlung liegt die These zugrunde, daß es zu diesem Rechtszustand ohne ein zentrales verfassungsgeschichtliches Ereignis nicht gekommen wäre: die Entscheidung der deutschen Reichsverfassung von 1871 für die völkerrechtliche Vertrags- und Handlungsfähigkeit der deutschen Einzelstaaten. Wie es zu dieser historischen Entscheidung kam, ist in geschlossener Form und auf der Grundlage der historischen Quellen bisher nicht dargestellt worden. Eine solche Darstellung wird hier versucht. In ihrem Mittelpunkt stehen die auswärtige Gewalt und die völkerrechtliche Stellung der deutschen Einzelstaaten als Gegenstand der Verhandlungen über die Norddeutsche Bundes- und die Reichsverfassung von 1867 und 1871 (Teil III). Anschließend werden die in diesen Verfassungen gefundenen Lösungen als Ausdruck der Bismarckschen Grundanschauung des deutschen Bundesstaates erklärt (Teil



IV). Bevor der Blick in die Vergangenheit gerichtet wird, geht er in die Umgebung der Gegenwart und sucht zu erkennen, welchen Prinzipien der vertikalen Verteilung auswärtiger Kompetenzen das Verfassungsrecht der europäischen Bundesstaaten (Schweiz, Belgien und Österreich) und Italiens als eines dezentralisierten (regionalisierten) Staates sowie das Recht der Europäischen Union folgt.

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Wibbels Erik

Book Review: Designing Federalism: A Theory of Self-Sustainable Federal Institutions

in **Comparative Political Studies** , Vol. 38 n. 4 , 446 - 450

No abstract available

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Arceneaux Kevin

Does Federalism Weaken Democratic Representation in the United States?

in **Publius: The Journal of Federalism**, Vol. 35, n. 2, Spring , pp. 297-312

No abstract available

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Levinson, Daryl J.

Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law

in **Harvard Law Review**, Volume 118 - issue n. 3/2005 , 915 - 972

No abstract available

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Campbell Andrea Louise

Federalism and the Politics of Old-Age Care in Germany and the United States

in **Comparative Political Studies** , Vol. 38 n. 8 , 887-914

Until the early 1990s, Germany and the United States had similar systems of long-term care. At that time, Germany created a new social insurance program, whereas American reform efforts stalled. As conventional explanations of social policies—rooted in objective conditions, policy legacies, interest group mobilization, and party politics—fail to explain the diverging trajectories, the authors show how differing federal structures shaped reform efforts. German federalism gives states a strong voice and encourages collective responses to fiscal problems, enabling comprehensive



restructuring of long-term care financing. In the United States, states lack a political mechanism to compel federal policy makers to tackle this subject. This analysis suggests reform of social welfare issues with weakly mobilized publics is unlikely without proxy actors that have institutional or political means to forcibly gain the attention of policy makers. In addition, scholars should pay more attention to "varieties of federalism" in analyses of the welfare state.

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Rowley Charles K.

Fragmenting parchment and the winds of war: The Constitution of the United States, 1860–2004

in **Public Choice**, Volume 124, Numbers 1-2 , 33 - 56

The tension between Hobbesian and Lockeian perspectives on the origins and functions of the state was resolved decisively at Philadelphia in favor of the latter. Fourscore and seven years on from 1787, however, Abraham Lincoln's resolve to save the Union rather than to preserve the Constitution launched a series of attacks by the executive and legislative branches, sustained by a complaisant judiciary, on the parchment so carefully crafted by the republic's Founders. This essay documents the federal government's exploitation of security threats, from the Civil War to the War on Terror, to dismantle constitutional rights to life, liberty and property.

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Patricia Mindus

Il letto di Procuste: l'inadeguatezza del lessico politico moderno per il costruito inedito dell'odierna Europa

in **Teoria Politica**, Vol. 21, Fascicolo 1

The essay deals with the current tussle over the political and legal definitions of the EU. By confronting the actual structure of the European Union with some of the major categories in western political thought (such as State, nation, etc.), the article aims to test the conceptual consistency not only of the Draft Treaty but also of some theoretical innovations recently put forth by EU-scholars. Particularly relevant is the analysis of multilevel governance as an alternative to classic federalism.

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Montpetit Eric, Rothmayr Christine, Varone Frédéric

Institutional Vulnerability to Social Constructions. Federalism, Target Populations, and Policy Designs for Assisted Reproductive Technology in Six Democracies

in **Comparative Political Studies** , Vol. 38 n. 2 , 119 - 142

This article contributes to efforts to integrate power-based, institutionalist, and constructivist perspectives on policy making. Using an analysis of policy designs for assisted reproductive technology, the authors argue that jurisdictional federations are more vulnerable to social constructions based on widely held perceptions of social groups than functional federations and, to a lesser extent, unitary states. In fact, policy makers in jurisdictional federations tend to rely on communicative discourses aimed at convincing a wide public, whereas those in functional federations need



coordinative discourses to obtain the support of actors who play key roles in decision making. Where coordinative discourses prevail over communicative discourses, policy makers will more likely target advantaged groups with restrictive policies.

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Habtu Alem

Multiethnic Federalism in Ethiopia: A Study of the Secession Clause in the Constitution

in *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, Vol. 35, n. 2, Spring , pp. 313-336

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

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Smith Stephen F.

Proportionality and Federalization

in *Virginia Law Review*, Vol. 91 n. 4 , 879

The literature treats the “federalization” of crime as a quantitative problem. Congress, on this view, has simply enacted too many federal crimes. This Article challenges this way of conceptualizing the federalization problem. The real problem with federalization is qualitative, not quantitative: federal crimes are poorly defined, and courts all too often expansively construe poorly defined crimes. Courts thus are not passive victims in the vicious cycle of federalization. Rather, by repeatedly interpreting criminal statutes broadly, courts have taken the features of federal criminal law that critics of federalization find objectionable – its enormous scope and its severity – and made them considerably worse.

One of the most significant adverse effects of federalization, which is overlooked in the case law and all but ignored in the literature, lies at the heart of this Article: the danger of disproportionately severe penalties. Poor legislative crime definition, coupled with the judicial practice of expansively construing criminal statutes, allows prosecutors to drive up the punishment federal defendants would otherwise face. Sometimes, courts construe ambiguous statutes to move into federal court defendants who would otherwise face lower penalties in state court. More often, courts expand serious crimes to encompass behavior for which Congress prescribed lower penalties elsewhere. This Article shows how courts can adjust their interpretive strategies to counteract the severity and scope of the federal criminal code so that federalization need not be the disaster that its critics fear.

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Hopkins John

Public Law in a Multi-Layered Constitution

in *European public Law*, Volume 11 (2005) - Issue 3 , 466-467

No abstract available



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Pappi Franz Urban, Becker Axel, Herzog Alexander

Regierungsbildung in Mehrebenensystemen. Zur Erklärung der Koalitionsbildung in den deutschen Bundesländern

in *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, Heft 3, 46. Jahrgang, September, 432-458

ABSTRACT: The German federal governmental system is conceptualized as a full-fledged two-level system, in which the Länder governments participate in federal policy decisions via the second chamber Bundesrat and in which the stakes of state coalition building are high for the federal parties. Our research question is whether we can find systematic empirical evidence for an influence of federal on state parties to build state governments whose party composition is concordant with federal politics, containing either exclusively federal governmental or non-governmental parties. We answer this question by indirect evidence. We show that such concordant majority coalitions occur above average even if important coalition predictors are controlled as minimal winning coalitions or participation of dominant and/or central players. We predict the 182 actual Land governments which were formed in the period from 1949 to 2003 compared to the possible governments in each situation.

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Hale Henry E.

The Makeup and Breakup of Ethnofederal States: Why Russia Survives Where the USSR Fell

in *Perspectives on Politics*, issue 1, vol. 3, march, 55-70

ABSTRACT: Why do some ethnofederal states survive while others collapse? The puzzle is particularly stark in the case of the former Soviet Union: the multiethnic Russian Federation has managed to survive intact the transition from totalitarian rule, whereas the multiethnic USSR disintegrated. The critical distinction between the USSR and Russia lies in the design of ethnofederal institutions. The USSR contained a core ethnic region, the "Russian Republic," a single region with a far greater population than any other in the union. This core ethnic region facilitated dual sovereignty, exacerbated the security fears of minority-group regions, and promoted the "imagining" of a Russia independent of the larger Soviet state. In place of a single core ethnic region, the Russian Federation contains 57 separate provinces. This feature of institutional design has given Russia's central government important capacities to thwart the kind of centrifugal forces that brought down the USSR. This holds important lessons for policy makers crafting federal institutions in other multiethnic countries.

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Krane Dale, Koenig Heidi

The State of American Federalism, 2004: Is Federalism Still a Core Value?

in *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, Vol. 35, n. 1, Winter, pp. 1-40



No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

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Andreas Auer

The constitutional scheme of federalism

in **Journal of European Public Policy** , Volume 12, Number 3 / June , 419-431

Federalism consists of a specific combination of self-rule (autonomy), of limited rule (superposition) and of shared rule (participation), implying the coexistence of two independent levels of government acting simultaneously on the citizens. Federal constitutions regularly accomplish specific functions, like defining the constituent units, distributing powers between the latter and the central unit, and providing for a conflict resolution scheme. This contribution argues that the EU meets every one of these conditions for being considered, in legal terms, as a multinational federal type construction.

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Wilfried Swenden

What – if anything – can the European Union learn from Belgian federalism and vice versa?

in **Regional and Federal Studies**, Volume 15, Number 2 / June , 187-204

This article highlights the similarities and differences between Belgium and the EU as multi-level polities and indicates what they might learn from each other. The comparison focuses on (dis)similarities in the internal structure of the components that form the multi-levelled polity, in the processes of central decision-making and in the institutional framework at large. I argue that plural multi-level polities can be more easily sustained if their centre respects the linguistic and territorial integrity of the constituent entities, central decision-making rules are 'majority-constraining' and institutional adaptation takes the character of piecemeal reform. Facing growing electoral discontent, leaders in both polities must confront the challenge of maintaining a sufficiently strong centre, while at the same time fostering inter-segmental cooperation in order to stimulate the gradual creation of a trans-segmental public sphere.

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Baker Samuel H.

Why Executive Power Centralizes Government

in **Public Finance Review**, Vol. 33, No. 6 , 747-766

This article examines the effects of political parties, executive power, and efficiency on federal structure. It proposes and tests a model of federalism in which different levels of veto power can lead to varying degrees of centralization in the



provision of central and local governmental services when executive and legislative branches have disparate preferences over which level should provide services. Results for the United States (1982-1992) find state and local spending centralizes with increased veto power because, absent offsetting political party advocacy for decentralization, central government spending interests dominate local government spending interests.

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Subsection 2. Constitutional reform

Lanchester Fulco

Cinque anni di trasformazioni istituzionali

in *Federalismi*, Anno III, n. 21

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 2. Constitutional reform

La Palombara Joseph

Il federalismo (quello vero) non fa per gli italiani

in *Reset*, Numero 87, Gennaio / Febbraio

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 2. Constitutional reform

Ferrara Antonio

Il nuovo ordinamento degli enti locali tra riforme costituzionali reali e virtuali

in *Federalismi*, Anno III, n. 23

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 2. Constitutional reform

Caravita di Toritto Beniamino

La riforma costituzionale: discutiamone con calma

in *Federalismi*, Anno III, n. 22

No abstract available

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Subsection 2. Constitutional reform

Risse, H.



Las reformas en el federalismo alemán.

in Cuadernos de pensamiento político, n. 7

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 3. The division (and the conflicts) of powers and competences

Messamore Barbara Jane

'The line over which he must not pass': Defining the Office of Governor General, 1878

in *Canadian Historical Review (The)*, Volume 86, Number 3, September , pp. 453-483

Confederation in 1867 did not mark any dramatic shift in the functioning of the office of governor general. The watershed of colonial self-government in 1848 was the real point of change. But neither of these constitutional milestones led to any redrafting of the instruments defining the viceregal role. The governor general's commission – or letters patent, and instructions – remained out of step with actual constitutional practice, and the British Colonial Office was content to let the anomaly stand. Lord Dufferin, Canada's governor general between 1872 and 1878, had an activist approach to the role, and his frequent clashes with Alexander Mackenzie's Liberal administration, most notably over the commitment to build a railway to British Columbia, sharpened Justice Minister Edward Blake's resolve to see new permanent documents drafted to define the limits of viceregal power.

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Bußjäger Peter

Bundesstaatsreform ja, aber welche? Modelle für die Verteilung der Gesetzgebungs-zuständigkeiten zwischen Bund und Ländern

in *Oesterreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft* , 2005/3 , 311-322

REFORM OF THE FEDERAL STATE. Yes, but how? Models for the distribution of legislative competencies between federal and state level

The division of the competencies within the Austrian federal system represented one of the most difficult questions on the agenda of the Austrian Convention which concluded its work in January 2005. It turned out to be one of the most important cleavages of the Convention since it was impossible to reach consent about the various alternatives of reforming the federal system. Even though it was agreed upon that Austria should maintain its federal structure, significant dissent existed with regard to the efficiency and future of Austrian federalism. Merely a few alternatives for the reconstruction of the federal system, which have been discussed in Working Group 5 of the Convention, remain. If and which of these proposals are likely to be incorporated in the persistent debate on reforming Austria's constitution in the aftermath of the Convention is presently not predictable

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Subsection 3. The division (and the conflicts) of powers and competences

Bailly Olivier, Sephiha Michaël

Cloisonnement identitaire entre Flamands et Wallons - La crise belge vue de Wanze et de Kruibeke
in *Monde Diplomatique (Le)*, juin 2005, 16 - 17

La Belgique célèbre dans une ambiance délétère ses 175 ans d'existence et ses 25 ans de fédéralisme. La position autonomiste des partis flamands et les querelles communautaires nourrissent ceux qui pensent que « l'Etat Belgique » ne fêtera pas son 200^e anniversaire. Flandre et Wallonie engageraient-elles chaque jour un peu plus dans des chemins séparés, voire opposés ? Visite de deux villes, Wanze la wallonne et Kruibeke la flamande.

Bien connue pour ses surréalistes, la Belgique pratique ce courant artistique au quotidien. Un des axes routiers principaux du pays, l'autoroute E40, flirte avec la frontière linguistique qui sépare la Flandre et la Wallonie. Puisqu'elle est massivement empruntée par les deux communautés, le bilinguisme devrait y être de mise. Ce n'est pas le cas. Les affiches de campagne de sécurité routière sont tantôt en néerlandais, tantôt en français, selon la région où elles sont implantées. Le long de l'E40, la ville flamande « Tienen » devient « Tirlemont » en région wallonne et la ville wallonne « Waremme » sera indiquée sous le nom de « Borgworm » en région flamande. Déconcerté par ces noms changeant tous les 15 kilomètres, l'automobiliste non averti quittant l'autoroute pour trouver un réconfort sur les routes régionales devra savoir de quel côté il se trouve. Si le 70 km/h est de mise sur les routes régionales flamandes, les Wallons accordent un supplément de 20 km/h pour le même type de voie. Etrange ? L'histoire de la Belgique et son train fédéraliste empruntent aussi une voie rapide...

Depuis 1993, la Belgique est un Etat fédéral composé de trois régions et trois communautés linguistiques (1). Cette structure est le résultat d'une avancée régulière de la décentralisation depuis 1970 (lire l'union fédérale fait la force). La dynamique a été poussée très loin puisque, fait exceptionnel, les entités fédérées ont même le pouvoir de signer des traités internationaux dans les matières liées à leurs compétences institutionnelles. Mais cela ne semble pas encore suffisant. Un nombre croissant de responsables politiques flamands réclament plus d'autonomie, voire pour les plus extrêmes l'indépendance.

Pendant longtemps, les appels au séparatisme émanaient seulement de Flandre mais, depuis peu, les Wallons brandissent le spectre de la séparation. « Les Francophones en ont marre d'être continuellement présentés comme des profiteurs qui empêchent une gestion efficace du pays. Nous avons l'impression de ne plus être acceptés complètement (...). Si une majorité de Flamands veut vivre sans les Francophones, nous devons également nous demander si cela a du sens de vivre ensemble », explique Béatrice Delvaux, la rédactrice en chef du quotidien francophone *Le Soir* (2). Chez certains responsables politiques francophones, le même état d'esprit règne. M. Jean-Claude Van Cauwenberghe, le ministre-président wallon (Parti socialiste [PS]), déclarait ainsi début mai que « la Wallonie n'est pas prête à accepter n'importe quoi, ni à défendre la Belgique à n'importe quel prix (3) ».

L'hebdomadaire francophone *Le Vif/Express*, s'engage encore plus : dans un dossier intitulé « Et si les Flamands nous larguaient ? », il estime que, « le jour venu, Francophones et Flamands devront sans doute se partager les oripeaux de l'ancienne Belgique ». Tous les états-majors politiques planchent sur les scénarios d'un avenir sans Belgique. Et, à feuilleter la presse, le pays ressemble à un baril de poudre au cœur de l'Europe. La réalité est pourtant tout autre.

Mardi 22 mars, Grand-Place de Wanze (4), en Wallonie. Sous le regard de leurs parents, des enfants profitent de la



place aménagée en aire de jeux tandis que les plus grands s'essayent au skateboard, au VTT ou à la drague. La voix des Cassandre ne semble pas parvenir jusqu'ici. A vol d'oiseau, pourtant, la Flandre n'est qu'à 25 kilomètres. « La tension entre les deux communautés n'est pas présente. Il y a un respect citoyen mutuel, assure M. Claude Parmentier, bourgmestre (maire) PS de Wanze. S'il y a une échéance électorale ou un sondage, il se peut que je sois interpellé au sujet de l'extrême droite, mais pas sur les Flamands. Je ne sens pas de rejet des Flamands. Je suis persuadé que les gens ne se préoccupent pas des problèmes communautaires. »

Installés sur un banc, Bastien et Robert, 15 ans chacun, profitent des rayons du soleil. La Flandre, ils ne connaissent pas vraiment. Robert passe ses vacances à la Côte belge ; « la Côte flamande », diront les Flamingants... ; mais leurs contacts avec la population locale y sont inexistants. Pour tout dire, les deux amis ne sont pas très au fait de la Belgique, de son histoire, de ses mœurs politiques, de sa culture, de ses artistes. Ils n'en sont pas moins opposés à l'éclatement de leur pays. « La Belgique n'est déjà pas très grande, si on se sépare, on va devenir minuscules », rigole Robert. Plus sérieusement, Bastien craint que, « si on coupe le pays en deux, il y ait peut-être des conflits... ».

Ce sentiment est largement répandu dans la population belge. Selon un sondage, réalisé en mars 2005 par le quotidien La Libre Belgique, 87 % des personnes interrogées désirent une Belgique unie, le pourcentage étant à peu près identique à Bruxelles, en Wallonie et en Flandre (5). Mais, au-delà de cette question générique, des divergences sur le « comment vivre ensemble ? » apparaissent, une majorité de Flamands réclamant plus de compétences au niveau régional. Mais rien là d'une revendication séparatiste. « Les Flamands ne sont pas pour l'indépendance de la Flandre, même si les mentalités entre le nord et le sud du pays sont différentes », assure Mme Myriam Claes, propriétaire de la seule crèche privée de Kruibeke. Située à quelques dizaines de kilomètres d'Anvers, cette commune flamande est l'équivalent de Wanze, la wallonne (6). Et, en effet, les mentalités paraissent différentes...

Là où Wanze, avec son collège communal (conseil municipal) entièrement socialiste, illustre la puissance du PS en Wallonie, Kruibeke la Flamande confirme l'image catholique du nord de la Belgique. Alors qu'à Wanze l'église est nettement séparée de la place communale, à Kruibeke elle trône au milieu du village. Pendant l'agonie très médiatisée du pape Jean Paul II, la mairie de Kruibeke arborait les drapeaux de la ville et de la Flandre ; mais, devant la maison du bourgmestre, c'est le drapeau du Vatican qui était en berne... L'église est entourée par la mutualité chrétienne, le syndicat chrétien, la maison communale (mairie) et le presbytère. Bien en vue, là aussi, le drapeau du Vatican. Pour parfaire l'osmose entre la commune et son église, les annonces des permis de bâtir s'apposent sur les panneaux d'affichage de l'édifice religieux. « Mais peu de gens vont à l'église », regrette M. Antoine Denert, bourgmestre de la commune depuis 1983.

« Je n'ai rien personnellement contre les Wallons, poursuit ce chrétien convaincu, qui se définit comme flamingant et nationaliste flamand. Quand je reçois des collègues wallons en visite, je sors un drapeau wallon. Ce n'est pas en Wallonie qu'on verrait ça. Mais moi, je suis un extrémiste en tolérance », se plaît-il à répéter. Pourtant, le bourgmestre de Kruibeke reprend volontiers le slogan du parti d'extrême droite, le Vlaams Belang (7) : « Eigen Volk Eerst » (Notre propre peuple d'abord). « Je n'ai pas de problème avec cela. Il faut d'abord être fort avant d'aider les autres. La Wallonie a une autre mentalité et une autre culture. Les Wallons abordent les problèmes différemment et fixent d'autres priorités. Au niveau de la gestion, par exemple, nous sommes plus rigoureux en Flandre. » A l'évidence, il ne verrait pas d'un mauvais



« il n'y a pas de Belgique ».

A Wanze, M. Parmentier met également en avant son identité, wallonne, mais il défend l'unité de la Belgique. « Je suis pour un fédéralisme bien compris, qui respecte les conceptions, les cultures différentes. Mais le séparatisme est une mauvaise idée. » Pourtant, dans la brochure qu'il remet aux Wanzois fraîchement installés dans sa commune, la ville est décrite comme s'inscrivant « au cœur de la région de Liège, de la Wallonie et de l'Europe ». Entre la Wallonie et l'Europe, n'existerait-il donc plus d'espace politique intermédiaire ?

« Sire, il n'y a pas de Belges »

L'oubli de ce dépliant communal ne traduit pas une volonté de nier la Belgique, mais il révèle le peu d'attachement à l'identité belge. Si, en Flandre comme en Wallonie, on connaît son village, la ville voisine, sa province, voire sa région, la méconnaissance de l'autre Communauté est de plus en plus flagrante.

Kevin, 16 ans, et Christophe, 15 ans, suivent des cours à l'Athénée royal de Beveren, la première grande ville à proximité de Kruibeke. Ils ne connaissent pas un chanteur belge francophone, n'ont pas d'amis ou de connaissances en Wallonie, n'y vont jamais ou rarement de leur propre initiative. Pieter, 15 ans, va de temps en temps rendre visite à sa famille à Virton (Ardennes). Sur place, il doit souvent utiliser l'anglais avec les habitants du cru, « sinon les gens ne se comprennent pas ». Enfin, Annelies, 18 ans, déclare aller de temps en temps en Wallonie, dans une bourgade, qu'elle situe près de... Marseille !

Malgré ces lacunes dans la connaissance de la Wallonie et des Wallons, pas un de ces jeunes ne tombe dans la haine de l'autre. S'ils s'accordent à reconnaître, voire à souligner des singularités aux deux peuples, les Wallons ne seraient pour autant ni « paresseux » ni « profiteurs » ; des préjugés encore récemment véhiculés par le parti nationaliste flamand Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie (N-VA), qui appuie sur le montant des transferts de la Flandre vers la Wallonie : 5 milliards d'euros par an, essentiellement au niveau de la sécurité sociale. Tous tiennent à ce que la Belgique reste unie. C'en est presque étonnant, car, tout au long de leur scolarité, ils n'apprennent pas grand-chose de leur pays. Directeur de l'Athénée royal de Beveren, M. Flor Van Gheem admet aisément. « Le chapitre sur la Belgique arrive qu'en terminale. Les élèves ont, alors, des cours sur l'histoire de la Belgique. On y détaille l'histoire de la Flandre et l'évolution du mouvement flamand, mais aussi celle de la Wallonie. Les cours traitent enfin des réformes de l'Etat, des structures étatiques et du fédéralisme. »

A Huy, ville proche de Wanze, les élèves sont logés à la même enseigne. A l'Athénée royal, ceux de la classe de terminale de Mme Marie-Henriette Bekaert-Medart trahissent le caractère lapidaire de leurs connaissances sur leur pays. Si les vingt et un élèves connaissent tous La Marseillaise, un seul d'entre eux peut entonner La Brabançonne, l'hymne national de la Belgique... René commente : « On est plus lié à la France, même culturellement. Cela ne m'embête pas, mais c'est dommage qu'il n'y ait pas de véritable identité belge. » S'il est le seul à pouvoir expliquer ce qu'est la « Question royale (8) », ses condisciples savent en revanche ; car ils viennent de parcourir ce chapitre de l'histoire belge ; que le socialiste wallon Jules Destrée a interpellé le roi, en 1912, en lui disant notamment : « Sire, il n'y a pas de Belges. »

Près d'un siècle plus tard, le quotidien flamand De Morgen (9) établit le même constat, commentant un sondage : « Les Flamands et les Wallons ont un avis différent sur à peu près tout : leur position par rapport à l'extrême



droite, l'interdiction de fumer dans les cafés, etc. » Dans la classe de Mme Bekaert-Medart, seule une élève se considère comme wallonne. Et les autres ? Des petits rires gênés. « Belges ? Oui, pourquoi pas... » Céline, en tout cas, ne se sent pas concernée par l'histoire belge : « Je n'ai pas réellement le sentiment d'être belge. »

Les jeunes élèves wallons préfèrent se plonger dans l'histoire de France ou celle d'Angleterre, plus prestigieuses, plus importantes à leurs yeux. Face à ces puissances européennes, la Belgique reste invisible, à peine murmurée. L'heure est plus à l'étude des grands artistes et personnalités belges, mais plutôt au profil bas.

Pour les élèves de Huy, la Flandre historique reste une nébuleuse, tandis que la Flandre contemporaine se réduit souvent à la Côte et au zoo d'Anvers. Les prestigieux stylistes d'Anvers, la beauté de Bruges, le renouveau du rock flamand (et aujourd'hui wallon) repasseront. Avouer ne quasi jamais mettre les pieds en Flandre ne les empêche pas d'avoir un avis, forcément orienté, sur leurs voisins. Pour Aurélie, qui a tout de même participé à un voyage linguistique, il y a quatre ans, dans le nord du pays (mais elle ne se rappelle plus où !), « quand on va en Flandre, on a l'impression d'être une bête curieuse ».

Alexandre soutient que « le Flamand est droit, plus réglo que le Wallon. Il aime moins faire la fête, mais il est plus respectueux que le Wallon. Il est assidu ». Et d'aborder la question du racisme. « Les chiffres sont là. Il suffit de voir les résultats des élections, le Vlaams Belang a recueilli 25 % aux dernières élections régionales en Flandre. »

Les clichés ont la vie dure, note La Libre Belgique (10) en détaillant les résultats d'un des nombreux sondages réalisés à l'occasion du 175^e anniversaire du pays : « Les francophones jugent globalement les Flamands égoïstes, orgueilleux, austères, mais aussi courageux, gestionnaires et créatifs. » Paradoxalement, le quotidien constate également que, dans la même enquête, les Flamands s'estiment moins rigoureux et créatifs mais plus négligents que les Francophones... « On aura tout vu ! Avec ces résultats, qui apparaissent tellement à contre-courant des idées reçues, ce sondage confirme une des grandes caractéristiques de la Belgique : le surréalisme. »

Ex-correspondant du journal flamand De Standaard en Wallonie, Guido Fonteyn voit dans ces regards croisés les traces de l'histoire propre à chaque région : « La Wallonie est le produit de la grande industrie (mines de charbon, sidérurgie), la Flandre celui d'une tradition catholique et essentiellement agricole, analyse-t-il. Mais ces caractéristiques ont largement changé. Malheureusement, les clichés mettent plus de temps à disparaître. Or, les traits de caractère des Wallons et des Flamands ne sont pas génétiquement établis, ils changent en permanence. »

En jouant le rôle d'écran culturel, les problèmes de langue contribuent largement à cette ignorance mutuelle. La Belgique, en communautarisant progressivement l'enseignement, n'a pas profité de la formidable chance qu'elle avait d'élever sa population dans une double culture. Elle a raté le pari du bilinguisme, voire du trilinguisme (11).

Pourtant, dans les écoles flamandes, le français est obligatoire comme deuxième langue pendant une grande partie de la scolarité. Mais, en Communauté française, les élèves ont le choix entre le néerlandais, l'anglais et l'allemand. Et, à la fin de leurs études, peu de jeunes gens parlent parfaitement les deux principales langues du pays. Mais est-ce finalement si important quand, à Kruikebeke comme à Wanze, il n'est pas nécessaire de maîtriser les deux langues pour trouver un travail ? Est-ce si important quand on vit dans une sorte d'autarcie linguistique ?



Guido Fonteyn considère qu'il y a toujours eu deux vies quotidiennes en Belgique, une flamande et l'autre wallonne. Directeur du Centre de politique comparée de l'Université catholique francophone de Louvain-la-Neuve (UCL), M. Lieven De Winter nuance : « Il y a plus de différences entre les Flamands et les Hollandais, ou entre les Français et les Wallons, qu'entre les Wallons et les Flamands. Malgré tout, il existe deux systèmes d'enseignement, deux mondes médiatiques parallèles, etc. Entre Francophones et Flamands, on se rencontre très peu, mis à part à Bruxelles, à la Côte et dans les Ardennes wallonnes » (12).

Les traces du flamand en Wallonie sont quasi inexistantes en dehors des parcours touristiques les plus importants. Si la ville de Huy propose des dépliants dans cette langue à ses visiteurs du Nord, la seule indication que les Flamands pourront lire dans leur langue au château de Moha, site touristique sur le territoire de Wanze, est qu'il est « défendu d'enlever des pierres sous peine de poursuites judiciaires ». Dans les vestiges du château de Rupelmonde, sur le territoire de Kruibeke, on apprendra que le géographe flamand Mercator (Rupelmonde 1512 - Duisbourg 1594) fut emprisonné sur le site uniquement si on sait lire le flamand. Heureusement, une ou deux brochures en français viendront à la rescousse du touriste hexagonal ou wallon qui passerait à l'office du tourisme local...

La presse aussi est exclusivement unilingue. « Il n'y a jamais eu de journal bilingue en Belgique, alors que ça a été le cas en Suisse ou au Luxembourg. Le bilinguisme n'a jamais existé en Belgique », observe Guido Fonteyn. Pas de médias bilingues et très peu de lecteurs bilingues. « Il n'y a que 3 % de personnes qui lisent la presse de l'autre communauté », ajoute M. De Winter.

Il ne suffit pas de vouloir lire « l'autre » presse, encore faut-il la trouver... A la librairie de Kruibeke, le seul journal francophone disponible sur les rayons est le tabloïd La Dernière Heure/Les Sports. Et encore, seulement le lundi : pour les résultats sportifs. A Wanze, on trouve deux exemplaires du quotidien populaire flamand Het Laatste Nieuws, mais nul ou presque ne les achète. Et, en s'éloignant du centre de la commune, la situation devient absurde. La Librairie de la Presse ne propose pas un seul journal flamand : « J'en ai déjà demandé pourtant, précise son responsable, mais l'éditeur ne voit pas l'intérêt d'en fournir ici... J'ai voulu obtenir des mots croisés en flamand il y a deux ans pour une cliente bilingue. Je les attends toujours. En revanche, j'ai des revues anglaises, américaines, allemandes. Je n'arrive pas à me procurer le journal flamand De Morgen, qui est vendu à 20 kilomètres d'ici, en Flandre. Mais si vous voulez avoir El País, pas de problème, je le commande... »

Les chaînes de télévision participent également au cloisonnement identitaire. Dans le nord comme dans le sud du pays, elles ne se penchent souvent sur l'autre communauté et ses représentants qu'en cas de dossier symbolique, anecdotique, ou « national », au risque de céder facilement aux clichés et aux généralités.

Lancée en 1989, la chaîne privée flamande VTM a sans conteste contribué à forger un sentiment identitaire puissant, grâce à des programmes axés sur la culture flamande et le phénomène des Bekende Vlamingen (« Flamands connus »), repris depuis par toutes les autres chaînes flamandes. Résultat : on ne regarde quasiment plus les chaînes néerlandaises en Flandre.

Réinventer une forme d'identité nationale

Dans le sud du pays, en revanche, ce genre de programmes n'a jamais drainé les foules. Les « stars » francophones du petit et du grand écran préfèrent « monter » à Paris. Et la concurrence des chaînes françaises (TF1, France 2, France 3) est particulièrement rude. Régulièrement, elles attirent plus d'un tiers des téléspectateurs



francophones belges. Difficile, dans ce cas, de construire une identité locale aussi forte qu'en Flandre.

Culturellement, la Belgique est un pays qui a manifestement deux identités. Deux ? Ou sept, ou quinze ? La Flandre et la Wallonie sont-elles si homogènes ? Carolorégiens, Liégeois et Luxembourgeois sont-ils identiques ? Les différences entre le Limbourg et la Flandre occidentale existent-elles pas ? Certains évoquent une différence Nord-Sud mais aussi une différence Est-Ouest. Si la solidarité économique et les échanges culturels devaient prendre fin entre Wallons et Flamands, pourquoi les maintenir entre Limbourgeois et Brugeois, entre Montois et Spadois ? Ce n'est pas tant le projet « Belgique » qui cabre les identités que l'absence de projet...

Editorialiste du quotidien flamand De Standaard et auteur du livre *Le Rêve de la Flandre ou les aléas de l'histoire* (13), Marc Reynebeau met en cause ce manque de vision pour le pays : « La Constitution belge ne mentionne nulle part ce que le modèle fédéral poursuit exactement comme objectif. C'est pourquoi la dynamique politique du pays est dominée quasi fatalement par un mouvement de défédéralisation, qui a pour effet que l'Etat central continue à s'évaporer. » « Le fédéralisme belge n'est pas un modèle de cohabitation, mais plutôt de dissociation », enchaîne M. De Winter.

Si le pays semble se désagréger, c'est donc plus du fait de la volonté politique d'une partie de ses élites qu'en raison d'une forte divergence entre ses populations. A un tournant de son histoire, la Belgique a peut-être une dernière occasion de réinventer une forme d'identité nationale. Celle-ci ne s'appuierait plus sur la fierté, le drapeau ou la nation, mais sur une nationalité légère, faite de sentiments et de qualités humbles, capable de combiner les différentes identités de ses habitants sans pour autant qu'une d'entre elles ne phagocyte les autres.

Lorsqu'on se rend au Hall Omnisport de Wanze, on est accueilli par une affiche apposée sur la porte d'entrée : « Les rollers, vélos et frites sont interdits dans le hall. » Autodérision ou surréalisme au quotidien ? La Belgique existe toujours.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 3. The division (and the conflicts) of powers and competences

Konrath Christoph

Dann bleibt es eben so: Föderalismus und Kompetenzverteilung als Themen des Österreich-Konvents
in *Oesterreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft* , 2005/4

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

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Bárcena-Ruiz Juan Carlos, Begoña Garzón María

Economic integration and privatisation under diseconomies of scale

in *European Journal of Political Economy*, Volume 21, Issue 1 , March 2005 , 247-267



In this paper we analyse whether it should be national governments that decide whether to privatise public firms (non-integration) or whether this decision should be delegated to a supra-national authority (economic integration). We assume that two countries form a single market in which there is free trade and that each country has one public firm and n private firms. We show that, if the supra-national authority decides whether or not to privatise public firms, aggregated politically weighted welfare is no less than if the governments take this decision. We also show that aggregated politically weighted welfare is no less if the firms are owned by the governments rather than a supra-national authority

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Söderlund Peter J

Electoral Success and Federal-level Influence of Russian Regional Executives

in **Europe-Asia Studies**, Volume 57, Number 4 / June , 521-541

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Rosenkranz Nicholas Quinn

Executing the Treaty Power

in **Harvard Law Review**, Volume 118 - issue n. 6/2005 , 1868-1938

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Cameron Maxwell A., Falleti Tulia G.

Federalism and the Subnational Separation of Powers

in **Publius: The Journal of Federalism**, Vol. 35, n. 2, Spring , pp. 245-272

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

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Fiseha A.

Federalism and the adjudication of constitutional issues: the ethiopian experience



in *Netherlands International Law Review*, Volume 52 - Issue 01 - May , 1-30

Since 1995, Ethiopia has embarked upon a new federal system. Very little has been written about the process in general and about the manner in which the issues concerning the division of powers between the federal government and the states in Ethiopia are adjudicated. The federal Constitution has several peculiar features. One of these relates to the institution empowered to interpret and adjudicate constitutional issues. Unless there is a tribunal that enforces the supremacy clause of the Constitution and that demarcates the proper sphere of the powers of the federal and state governments, chaos would result from jurisdictional conflicts. This power, by virtue of the federal Constitution belongs to the second chamber, otherwise known as the House of Federation. This article begins with a brief introduction of the federal system and proceeds to discuss the role, jurisdiction and procedure of the House of Federation (HOF) in the adjudication and interpretation of constitutional issues from a comparative perspective. It explains why vesting this power on the HOF, and not on the judiciary, was a policy choice.

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Kukucha Christopher J.

From Kyoto to the WTO: Evaluating the Constitutional Legitimacy of the Provinces in Canadian Foreign Trade and Environmental Policy

in *Canadian Journal of Political Science--Revue canadienne de science politique*, Volume 38 - Issue 01 - March 2005 , 129 - 152

The Kyoto Protocol was a controversial issue within Canadian federalism, especially in Alberta, where the province considered a formal constitutional challenge regarding the implementation of the agreement. This option was not pursued, however, due to existing judicial precedent that limits the jurisdictional authority of the provinces in international affairs. Regardless, these rulings still suggest a level of constitutional ambiguity, which creates motivation for federal-provincial cooperation on foreign trade and environmental policy. As a result, highly valued formalized consultative mechanisms have developed in these issue areas during the past two decades. Ottawa's decision to ratify Kyoto, however, represented a significant departure from previous practices of cooperative federalism. In pursuing the protocol as part of his legacy agenda, Chrétien was aware of the provinces' tenuous constitutional status. It is important to note, however, that the resulting tension between both levels of government was atypical and does not threaten the viability of cooperative federalism in the near future.

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Ettner Hagen

Föderalismus – To be or not to be? Das Gebiet Sverdlovsk in Rußlands Föderationsgefüge

in *Osteuropa*, Heft 2, 55. Jahrgang, Februar , 58-74



ABSTRACT: Nach dem Auseinanderbrechen der Sowjetunion wurde Rußland föderalisiert und Macht vom Zentrum „nach unten“ verteilt. Diese Entwicklung revidierte Putin nach seinem Amtsantritt und nach der Tragödie in Beslan. Wie ein Föderationssubjekt seine Machtsphäre in den 1990er Jahren erweiterte und wie Putin Machtressourcen wieder zentralisiert, zeigt die Fallstudie über das Gebiet Sverdlovsk auf exemplarische Weise. Der Föderalismus in Rußland ist auf dem Weg zu einem Scheinföderalismus.

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Liebschutz Sarah F., Palazzolo Daniel J.

HAVA and the States

in *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, Vol. 35, n. 4, Fall , pp. 497-514

Two major events - the 2000 vote counting crisis in Florida and passage of the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) in October 2002 - spawned a wave of federal, state, and local policy innovation and policy implementation. The major effect of the Florida crisis was a nationwide effort to analyze information on elections and to debate policy solutions. Subsequently, HAVA, the first major election law in U.S. history that includes federal funds for election equipment and operations, had a more substantial effect on policy innovation and implementation. Both before and after HAVA, election law changes have been affected by partisan considerations, policy analyses, and entrepreneurial leadership. Thus far, HAVA has positively affected election administration, though administrative practices and their effectiveness vary across and within the states.

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Obydenkova Anastassia

Institutional Tools of Conflict Management - Asymmetrical Federalism in Ethnic-Territorial Conflicts: Quantitative Analysis of Russian Regions

in *Peace, Conflict and Development*, Volume 7, Issue 7, July , pp. 251-281

The following paper analyses the role of federal institutions in ethnic-territorial conflict management. For many years, there have been arguments favouring federalism as the best possible form of government for a nation of disparate ethnicities and regions. The general idea is that a centralised federal government that protects both national and regional interests is the most responsive form of administration for a state marked by ethnic and territorial diversity. This paper explores the interconnection between conflict, democratisation and the role of federal institutions in conflict mitigation.

Full text available at <http://www.peacestudiesjournal.org.uk/docs/July05Obydenkova.pdf>

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Bailly Olivier, Sephiha Michaël

L'union fédérale fait la force - La crise belge vue de wanze et de Kruibeke

in *Monde Diplomatique (Le)*, juin 2005 , 16



En 1970 commence la fédéralisation de l'Etat belge. L'objectif est alors de donner au pays des structures qui tiennent compte des différentes spécificités régionales. A partir de cette date, la Constitution reconnaît l'existence de trois communautés culturelles et de trois régions. Ces structures connaîtront un nouvel élan dix ans plus tard avec une nouvelle révision constitutionnelle octroyant des compétences liées au sol (économie, emploi, politique de l'eau, aménagement du territoire, urbanisme, etc.) aux régions et des compétences « personnalisables » (politique de santé, aide aux personnes, etc.) aux communautés. Dans le nord du pays, les institutions de la région et de la communauté flamandes fusionnent, alors que Communauté française et région wallonne restent des organes distincts.

La réforme constitutionnelle de 1989 accorde encore plus de compétences aux communautés et régions, tandis que la région bilingue Bruxelles-Capitale est dotée d'un Parlement (appelé Conseil) et d'un gouvernement. Quatre ans plus tard, la Belgique devient juridiquement un Etat fédéral. En 2001, enfin, les compétences des régions s'étendent en matière d'agriculture, de pouvoirs locaux et de commerce extérieur.

Au total, la régionalisation aura indiscutablement permis à chaque communauté de gérer de façon adéquate les problèmes rencontrés sur le terrain, évitant à la Belgique – explique Guido Fonteyn – « peut-être pas une guerre civile, mais de grandes difficultés. Les réformes constitutionnelles ont, en quelque sorte, sauvé le pays ». La justice, la sécurité sociale, la dette publique, les affaires étrangères, les finances, ou encore la défense, restent des compétences fédérales tandis que l'agriculture, le tourisme, l'aménagement du territoire, l'enseignement, la formation à l'emploi ou encore la culture sont à présent des compétences communautaires ou régionales (1). Ces partages foisonnent cependant de précisions complexes et sont truffés d'exceptions...

Face à cette force centrifuge, l'absence de partis nationaux (2) couvrant tout le pays a inévitablement affaibli l'Etat central.

Actuellement, le processus de régionalisation semble plus répondre à une gestion immédiate de crises politiques épidermiques qu'à des perspectives à long terme. Exemple récent : si la diplomatie belge est nationale, le commerce des armes et munitions est devenu régional, du fait d'une loi spéciale du 12 août 2003. A peine quelques mois plus tard, tandis que la Belgique s'investissait diplomatiquement dans l'Afrique des Grands Lacs pour trouver une issue pacifique au conflit, la région wallonne envisageait d'octroyer une licence d'exportation d'armes en Tanzanie, armes qui auraient inévitablement alimenté le conflit au Congo !

La multiplication des centres de décision crée des frictions qui, par un jeu politique pervers, prennent un tour communautaire. Acculés à devoir gérer l'ingérable, les responsables politiques prônent alors « l'harmonie des pratiques » ou des « accords de coopération ». Le citoyen belge est perdu dans les arcanes communautaires et le mot « refédéralisation » se pose discrètement sur des lèvres politiques. L'union ne fait-elle pas la force ?

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Alvarez R. Michael, Hall Thad E.

Rational and Pluralistic Approaches to HAVA Implementation: The Cases of Georgia and California in Publius: The Journal of Federalism, Vol. 35, n. 4, Fall , pp. 559-577

The Help America Vote Act (HAVA) has created a new dynamic for the oversight and implementation of federal elections, requiring states to assume greater control of election processes vis-à-vis their local governments than was



previously the case in most states. We consider how HAVA has changed the relationship between states and localities, especially through the HAVA planning process. We examine two approaches that the states have used in HAVA planning - a rational approach and a pluralistic approach - and how each can shape the power relationship between states and localities. We then present case studies from Georgia and California to illustrate how these two approaches have functioned in practice.

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Ware Robert Bruce

Recent Russian Federal Elections in Dagestan: Implications for Proposed Electoral Reform

in *Europe-Asia Studies*, Volume 57, Number 4 / June , 583-600

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 3. The division (and the conflicts) of powers and competences

Barron David J.

Reclaiming Federalism

in *Dissent*, spring, 2005

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 3. The division (and the conflicts) of powers and competences

Massa Pinto Ilenia

Sussidiarietà

in *Nuvole*, n. 25, anno XV , 151-158

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 3. The division (and the conflicts) of powers and competences

Scheberle Denise

The Evolving Matrix of Environmental Federalism and Intergovernmental Relationships

in *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, Vol. 35, n. 1, Winter , pp. 69-86



No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 3. The division (and the conflicts) of powers and competences

Chebankova Elena A.

The Limitations of Central Authority in the Regions and the Implications for the Evolution of Russia's Federal System

in **Europe-Asia Studies**, Volume 57, Number 7 / November 2005 , 933 - 949

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 3. The division (and the conflicts) of powers and competences

Montjoy Robert S., Chapin Douglas M.

The U.S. Election Assistance Commission: What Role in the Administration of Elections?

in **Publius: The Journal of Federalism**, Vol. 35, n. 4, Fall , pp. 617-634

What role in the administration of the elections will the new U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) play, and how does that role differ from past federal involvement? The answers are uncertain because delays in appointing the commission members and insufficient funding severely handicapped early activities. This article examines the factors that influence the EAC's emerging role: the commission's background, structure, tasks and tools, start-up activities, and recent issues. Because the principal impact of the EAC is indirect, affecting election administration through the states, we draw on the "tools of government" literature to frame the discussion. Although the Help America Vote Act of 2002, which created the EAC continues a long line of federal regulatory mandates in the elections arena, the EAC has almost no regulatory authority. Its principal tools are grants and information - instruments of cooperative, rather than coercive, federalism. Given that the major grant programs are ending, the EAC's long-term contribution will likely be to create and disseminate information.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 3. The division (and the conflicts) of powers and competences

Clive Church, Paolo Dardanelli

The dynamics of confederalism and federalism: Comparing Switzerland and the EU

in **Regional and Federal Studies**, Volume 15, Number 2 / June , 163-185

This article outlines the modern historical evolution of the Swiss political system and describes the main features of its contemporary federalism. In particular, it focuses on how the division of competences and the distribution of power have changed over time, on the factors which have driven these changes, leading to a description of the current situation created by these developments. It then compares the Swiss experience with that of the European Union and draws some lessons from this for the debate on the evolution of the European Union and, in particular, on the adoption and the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty. Although it emphasizes the role of historical experiences and of political culture



in shaping Swiss federalism and the difficulties, if not the impossibility, of replicating them in the European context, it concludes that the EU could learn from Switzerland but may not do so.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 4. The legislative branch

Stone Bruce

Changing roles, changing rules: procedural development and difference in Australian State upper houses
in *Australian Journal of Political Science*, n. 1, vol. 40, march , 33-50

ABSTRACT: The status and potential of Australian State upper houses have been enhanced, to a greater or lesser degree from State to State, by electoral system change over the past half century. The purpose of this article is to determine the extent to which those changes have been accompanied by efforts on the part of the upper houses to improve performance of their core functions of review of legislation and scrutiny of government. The focus is the parliamentary procedures that facilitate performance of these functions. As well as surveying innovation in, and use of, relevant parliamentary procedures in the five upper houses, the article explains differential outcomes in innovation and effectiveness across the States in terms of the consequences of choice of electoral system and size of upper house membership.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 4. The legislative branch

Michela Manetti

Il Senato federale all'italiana
in *Federalismi*, Anno III, n. 8

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 4. The legislative branch

Tommaso Edoardo Frosini

Il Senato federale e i procedimenti legislativi: un "puzzle" costituzionale
in *Federalismi*, Anno III, n. 8

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 5. The executive branch

Brans Marleen, Hondeghem Annie

Competency Frameworks in The Belgian Governments: Causes, Construction and Contents
in *Public Administration*, December 2005 - Vol. 83 Issue 4 , 823-837



The Belgian Federal government and the Belgian Flemish government have picked up competency management as a multifaceted tool to suit their own visions of organizational change rather than simply responding to a new management trend in the private sector. Both governments have used it to foster both vertical and horizontal integration in their fragmented administrations, and to deal with problems of recruitment and retention of qualified personnel. The analysis presented here also reveals that the seemingly uniform use of 'competency speak' hides multiple dimensions that provide several solutions to different organizational problems. At the same time, the cases examined demonstrate how the new tools both serve and disconcert the diverse bureau-political interests of top civil servants, trade unions and Human Resource Management units. In addition, we examine how the new tools break with at least two traditional features of the highly formal and rigid career systems and the relatively low status of officials in the Belgian administrations.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 5. The executive branch

Gazier Anne

La réforme de l'administration fédérale en Russie : simple réaménagement ou transformation en profondeur ?
in *Revue française d'administration publique*, n. 115

In 2002, Russia launched an extensive federal administration reform policy. It was the first to make a deliberate break with the administrative system in place since the soviet era and was organised around sectorial ministries on one hand and intersectorial state committees on the other. State authorities first undertook a vast inventory of the functions entrusted to the federal organs of the executive power. Functions considered superfluous or redundant were suppressed, and those classified as indispensable – the only ones to be maintained – were divided into three categories : regulatory activity, management, and control. Each category was given to a category of organ. The first category went to the federal ministries, the second to the federal agencies, and the third to the federal services. The implementation of this new scheme ran into a number of limitations, the three main ones being : the fact that it was too rushed and gave rise to numerous disfunctions, that it offered no solution to old problems (in particular the maintenance of two off-category administrations : those of the president and of the government apparatus), and that it lacked a clear distribution of competencies between the three organ categories.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 6. The judiciary branch

Hoekstra Valerie

Competing Constraints: State Court Responses to Supreme Court Decisions and Legislation on Wages and Hours
in *Political Research Quarterly*, n. 2, vol. 58, june , 317-328

ABSTRACT: This article examines state supreme court implementation of Supreme Court precedent when deciding



cases challenging state legislation. While previous research provides a wealth of insight into how state contextual and institutional features constrain state court decisionmaking and how lower courts respond to Supreme Court precedent, very little research explicitly examines state court decisionmaking when both constraints are present. By integrating the findings of previous research, I develop and test hypotheses about the effect of these different actors on state court decisionmaking. The results show that state courts are indeed constrained by both state and federal actors. The results also suggest that there may be instances where policies are so salient to both state actors and to the U.S. Supreme Court that the influence of the state court's own policy preferences may be minimal. The findings provide important evidence about the importance of competing constraints on state supreme court decisionmaking.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 6. The judiciary branch

Fiseha A.

Federalism and the adjudication of constitutional issues: the ethiopian experience

in *Netherlands International Law Review*, Volume 52, Issue 1 , 1-30

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 6. The judiciary branch

Groppi Tania

Giustizia costituzionale e stati decentrati. La Corte italiana dopo la revisione del 2001

in *Amministrare*, n. 1 , 5 - 24

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 6. The judiciary branch

Gamper Anna

Judge made federalism? The role of the constitutional Court in Austria

in *Federalismi*, Anno III, n. 19

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 6. The judiciary branch

Finkel, Jodi

Judicial Reform as Insurance Policy: Mexico in the 1990s

in *Latin American Politics & Society*, Vol. 47, Nr.1 , 87-113

After seven decades of Mexican judicial subordination, President Ernesto Zedillo in 1994 introduced judicial reforms that increased the independence and judicial review powers of the judicial branch. The willful creation of a judiciary capable



of checking the power of the president and the ruling PRI appears to counter political logic; but it makes sense as a political "insurance policy" to protect the ruling party from its rivals. PRI politicians, newly unable to control political outcomes at state and local levels and unsure if they would continue to dominate the national government in the future, opted to empower the Mexican Supreme Court as a hedge against the loss of office. This article argues that the likelihood of the reforms' producing an empowered judiciary increases as the ruling party's probability of reelection declines.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 6. The judiciary branch

Luther Joerg

Jueces europeos y jueces nacionales: La Constitución del diálogo

in *Revista de Derecho Constitucional Europeo* , n. 3 Anno 2

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 6. The judiciary branch

Peyro Llopis Ana

La place du droit international dans la jurisprudence récente de la Cour Supreme des Etats Unis

in *Revue générale de droit international publique*, Tomo 109 n. 3 , 609 - 642

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 6. The judiciary branch

Rainer Arnold

Le fédéralisme renforcé: la jurisprudence de la Cour constitutionnelle fédérale allemande en 2004

in *Revue internationale de droit comparé*, Vol. 56 n. 4 , 917 - 928

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 6. The judiciary branch

Erin Delaney

Managing in a federal system without an 'ultimate arbiter': Kompetenz-Kompetenz in the EU and the ante-bellum United States

in *Regional and Federal Studies*, Volume 15, Number 2 / June , 225-244

Although an 'ultimate arbiter' is generally accepted as a necessary element of a federation, emerging federal systems



are often unable to agree on who should play the role. Legally, the debate surrounds the right to monitor the limits of federal and state competences – or the right to Kompetenz-Kompetenz. This article looks at how the early United States and the European Union managed without an ultimate arbiter and assesses the differing priorities of the two systems. It then examines how the Constitutional Treaty might change the delicate balance wrought by the European Court of Justice in Europe, and what lessons, if any, the early American experience might offer.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 6. The judiciary branch

Kelly James B., Murphy Michael

Shaping the Constitutional Dialogue on Federalism: Canada's Supreme Court as Meta-Political Actor
in *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, Vol. 35, n. 2, Spring , pp. 217-244

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 6. The judiciary branch

Gragnani Anna

Sindacato di costituzionalità e giusto equilibrio fra unità e differenziazione in uno Stato federale: in tema di giustiziabilità della *Erforderlich-keitsklausel*

in *Rassegna parlamentare*, n. 3 - 2005 Luglio/Settembre , 673-694

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 6. The judiciary branch

Bellia Anthony J. Jr

State Courts and making of federal common law

in *University of Pennsylvania Law Review*, Vol. 153 n. 3 , 826 - 920

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 6. The judiciary branch

Tarr G. Alan

State Supreme Courts in American Federalism

in *Federalismi*, Anno III, n. 20

No abstract available



Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 6. The judiciary branch

Collins M.

The Federal Courts, the First Congress, and the Non-Settlement of 1789

in *Virginia Law Review*, Vol. 91 n. 7

The extent of Congress's power to curtail the jurisdiction of the federal courts has produced a long-running debate. Article III traditionalists defend broad congressional power to withhold jurisdiction from the federal courts altogether, while critics argue that some or all Article III business—most notably cases arising under federal law—must be heard in an Article III tribunal, at least on appeal. But traditionalists and their “aggregate vesting” critics are on common ground in supposing that the Constitution is indifferent to whether Article III cases within the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction are heard initially in a state court or an inferior court that Congress chooses to create. Indeed, this is the settled understanding of Article III. This Article suggests that the First Congress likely did not share the common ground on which these competing visions of congressional power rest. Instead, the debates over the 1789 Judiciary Act reveal a widely-voiced understanding that state courts were constitutionally disabled from hearing certain Article III matters in the first instance—such as federal criminal prosecutions and various admiralty matters—and that Congress could not empower state courts to hear them. Many in Congress therefore also supposed that lower federal courts were mandated if such cases were to be heard at all. Although a vocal minority countered with the now-dominant view of state court power and the constitutional non-necessity of lower federal courts, they did so as part of a losing effort to eliminate the proposed federal district courts. The debates pose problems for traditionalists as well as their critics, but they are ultimately more problematic for the critics. Rather than providing support for a theory of mandatory aggregate vesting of federal question cases or other Article III business, this underappreciated constitutional dimension of the debate is better viewed as supporting a limited notion of constitutionally-driven jurisdictional exclusivity.

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Subsection 6. The judiciary branch

Selway Bradley, Williams John M.

The High Court and Australian Federalism

in *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, Vol. 35, n. 3, Summer , pp. 467-488

This article analyzes the constitutional role of the High Court of Australia during its first hundred years and the effect of that role on the Australian federation. The High Court has accepted as axiomatic that part of its function is the judicial review of legislation of both the federal and state legislatures. Its approach is relatively modest and "textualist". That approach has been affected by historical changes, including Australia's independence from Great Britain. The decisions of the High Court have provided a framework for the development of the Australian federalism over the last century in increasing the relative importance of the federal government at the cost of the state governments. However, those decisions are probably best viewed as reflecting, rather than creating, the changes and developments in the federation.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 6. The judiciary branch

Corley Pamela C., Howard Robert M., Nixon David C.



The Supreme Court and Opinion Content: the Use of the Federalist Papers
in *Political Research Quarterly*, n. 2, vol. 58, June, 329-340

Many scholars of the Supreme Court and many justices assert the importance of the Federalist Papers. They provide important evidence of original meaning and interpretation of the Constitution, and there is evidence that there is an increase in citations to the Federalist Papers in Supreme Court opinions. While some may view this increased citation use as a positive development because it demonstrates reliance on legal authority in judicial decisions, we provide evidence that in a period marked by dissensus and controversy, the use of the Federalist Papers represents externally and internally oriented strategic attempts by the justices to add legitimacy to constitutional interpretation, and to sway colleagues. We use a combination of descriptive and multivariate techniques to examine Federalist citations from 1953 to 1995 to demonstrate our interpretation.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 6. The judiciary branch

Wright R.F.

Trial distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal Criminal Justice
in *University of Pennsylvania Law Review*, Vol. 154 n. 1, 80 - 156

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7. Economic and fiscal federalism

Carroll Deborah A.

Are State Governments Prepared for Fiscal Crises? A Look at Revenue Diversification during the 1990s
in *Public Finance Review*, Vol. 33, No. 5, 603-633

The financial condition of state and local governments has long been held as a prominent topic of discussion among government administrators, public economists, and political scholars. This article addresses the competing hypotheses of revenue diversification and revenue complexity and offers an empirical analysis of the various factors that affect state tax revenue diversification. The findings suggest that although political and demographic factors influence the level of state tax revenue diversification, economic factors and whether a state utilizes an income or sales tax to generate revenue represent the greatest determinants of state tax structures. As a result, this article serves as a foundation to initiate the development of a comprehensive theory of the determinants of state tax structures.

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Subsection 7. Economic and fiscal federalism

Chen Duanjie, Mintz Jack

Assessing Ontario's Fiscal Competitiveness

in *Canadian Public Policy*, Volume 31, Number 1, 1-28

This paper assesses Ontario's fiscal climate in terms of how it impacts on the cost of doing business for multinational and entrepreneurial businesses. Unlike previous studies that only consider taxes, we include both taxes and expenditure



subsidies to compare Ontario with five US states, following Mintz (2001). Public subsidies provided through programs such as infrastructure, research and development, health, education, and social security reduce the cost of doing business as governments take on responsibilities that organizations would otherwise need to provide. Taxes on income, capital purchases, assets, salaries, wages, and consumption increase the cost of doing business by discouraging owners from providing labour and capital inputs needed to produce goods and services. Once expenditure subsidies are taken into account, we find that in 2003, the marginal fiscal burden in Ontario was twice as high as that in the five US states.

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Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism

Roberge Ian

Autonome malgré tout: L'internationalisation et la politique des marchés financiers au Canada
in *Canadian Public Policy* , Volume 31, Number 3 , 259-272

This article addresses some new institutional parameters for policy-making. More specifically, we study the effects of the internationalization of markets and regulations on the domestic policy-making process through a multi-level governance framework. Analyzing the policy process for Bill C8, the latest revision of Canada's financial services sector legislation, we look at the changes in policy-making practices that result from the evolving global marketplace. We conclude that the state retains autonomy in policy-making, but that decisions are increasingly made by both public sector and non-governmental actors.

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Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism

Schöbel Enrico

**Benevolent Governance and Fiscal Federalism in Veit Ludwig von Seckendorff's Teutscher Fürsten Stat (1656):
Comment on Erik S. Reinert**
in *European Journal of Law and Economics*, Volume 19, Number 3 , 231-233

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism

Castles Francis, Obinger Herbert, Leibfried Stephan

Bremst der Foederalismus den Leviathan? Bundesstaat und Sozialstaat im internationalen Vergleich, 1880-2005
in *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, Heft 2, 46. Jahrgang, Juni , 215-237

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism

Rubinchik-Pessach Anna



Can decentralization be beneficial?

in *Journal of Public Economics*, Volume 89, Issue 7 , 1231-1249

A conventional justification for government hierarchy in the fiscal federalism literature is based upon asymmetry in policy tools or in information access that is available to different levels of government. This paper demonstrates that even if these asymmetries are eliminated, addition of local (regional) governments to a one-tier central government can be strictly welfare improving.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism

Greve Michael S.

Cartel Federalism? Antitrust enforcement by State Attorneys General

in *University of Chicago Law Review*, Vol. 72 n. 1

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism

Kind Hans Jarle, Midelfart Karen Helene, Schjelderup Guttorm

Corporate tax systems, multinational enterprises, and economic integration

in *Journal of International Economics*, Volume 65, Issue 2 , March , 507-521

Multinational firms are known to shift profits and countries are known to compete over shifty profits. Two major principles for corporate taxation are Separate Accounting (SA) and Formula Apportionment (FA). These two principles have very different qualities when it comes to preventing profit shifting and preserving national tax autonomy. Most OECD countries use SA. In this paper we show that a reduction in trade barriers lowers equilibrium corporate taxes under SA, but leads to higher taxes under FA. From a welfare point of view, the choice of tax principle is shown to depend on the degree of economic integration.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism

Fabrizia Covino

Costituzione e federalismo fiscale in nove ordinamenti dell'Unione europea

in *Federalismi*, Anno III, n. 16

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism

SATO MOTOHIRO, YAMASHIGE SHINJI

Decentralization and Economic Development: An Evolutionary Approach



in *Journal of Public Economic Theory*, Vol. 7 Issue 3

There has been a growing interest in relationship between economic development and fiscal decentralization. Empirical studies, however, are not conclusive regarding their correlation or causality. The present paper aims to provide a theoretical foundation for better understanding of this issue. Developing a dynamic model, we argue that decentralization and development proceed hand in hand, interacting one another, and that the relation between them is not monotonic but evolutionary. We also show that there will exist multiple steady states and that political decision of fiscal decentralization in general fails to lead the economy to the most desirable one.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism

Atsushi Iimi

Decentralization and economic growth revisited: an empirical note

in *Journal of Urban Economics*, Volume 57, Issue 3 , 449-461

Although it is theoretically expected that decentralization leads to efficient provision of local public services and stimulates economic development, there is a mixed picture of the decentralization effect on economic growth across earlier empirical studies. Using the instrument variables (IV) technique with the latest cross-country data for the period from 1997 to 2001, this paper found that fiscal decentralization has a significant positive impact on per capita GDP growth. Therefore, when the focus is placed on the latest information on the economic situation in the latter 1990s, decentralization, particularly on the fiscal expenditure side, is instrumental in economic growth.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism

Wilson, John Douglas; Janeba, Eckhard

Decentralization and international tax competition

in *Journal of Public Economics*, Volume 89, Issue 7 , 1211-1229

This paper models tax competition between two countries that are divided into regions. In the first stage of the game, the strategy variable for each country is the division of a continuum of public goods between central and regional government provision. In the second stage, the central and regional governments choose their tax rates on capital. A country's decentralization level serves as a strategic tool through its influence on the mix of horizontal and vertical externalities that exists under tax competition. In contrast to standard tax competition models, decentralizing the provision of public goods may improve welfare.

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Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism

Matheson Thornton

Does fiscal redistribution discourage local public investment?

in *Economics of Transition*, Volume 13 Issue 1 January , p. 139



This paper studies the determinants of regional (oblast-level) public investment in transitional Russia, focusing on the effects of federal fiscal redistribution. A model of local government expenditure in the presence of regional asymmetries shows that revenue redistribution from wealthy to poor regions discourages local public investment. Random- and fixed-effects estimation of regional panel data for 1994-97 supports the existence of a disincentive effect from fiscal redistribution on regional public investment, which varies according to a region's federal status and wealth: non-republics have a lower propensity to invest out of transfers than out of own income, as do regions with above-median per capita income. Republics reduce public investment more than current spending in response to higher federal taxation. Russia's 'asymmetrical federalism' thus creates different fiscal incentives for different types of regions.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7. Economic and fiscal federalism

Fuest Clemens

Economic integration and tax policy with endogenous foreign firm ownership

in **Journal of Public Economics**, Volume 89, Issue 9-10, 1823-1840

This paper analyses the impact of economic integration on tax policy in a model where corporate taxation is motivated by the desire to tax profits accruing to foreigners and the number of foreign owned firms is endogenous. Increasing economic integration is modeled as a decline in trade costs or tariffs. It turns out that declining trade costs lead to increasing profit taxes if the government may use import tariffs. If tariffs are not available, declining trade costs induce profit taxes to decline as well. A mandatory reduction in tariffs also triggers profit tax reductions. We conclude that the existence of foreign firm ownership may fail to prevent profit taxes from declining as economic integration proceeds.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7. Economic and fiscal federalism

David McKay

Economic logic or political logic? Economic theory, federal theory and EMU

in **Journal of European Public Policy**, Volume 12, Number 3 / June, 528-544

The problems associated with the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact have inspired a number of economists to suggest recommendations for improvement and reform. The purpose of this paper is to place these recommendations in the context of federal theory and in particular to establish a link between policy choices deemed to be economically sustainable and those that may be politically sustainable. To facilitate this, the paper employs recent perspectives in the rational choice and comparative politics literature on the self-sustainability of federal systems and applies these to European monetary union. The paper concludes that the economic case both for the Stability and Growth Pact in its present form and for those proposals that provide alternative means of imposing fiscal discipline on member states is fraught with problems. In particular, the economists' prescriptions conflict with the conditions necessary for maintaining political sustainability. The paper concludes that, given the problems associated with federal level fiscal rules, fiscal discipline should be reserved to the member state policy level.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government



Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism

Boadway Robin, Thisse Jacques, Weber Shlomo

Editorial introduction for The Political Integration and Disintegration special issue
in *Journal of Public Economics*, Volume 89, Issue 7 , 1155-1156

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism

Lee Miles

Euro-outsiders and the politics of asymmetry

in *Journal of European Integration*, Volume 27, Number 1 / March , 3-23

The opening article to the special issue explores the general conceptual, political and practical challenges confronting the euro-outsiders -- here defined as European Union member states that do not at present participate in the Third Stage of Economic and Monetary Union. The guest editor of the special issue argues that the perspectives of the governments of the euro-outsiders may be understood as the politics of asymmetry, and introduces five forms of asymmetry as a comparative tool to evaluate the respective euro-outsiders. The article also sets out prospective strategies that the outsider governments may utilise to help manage their situations outside the euro as well as a number of research themes important to the study of the euro-outsiders.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism

Lago-Peñas Santiago

Evolving federations and regional public deficits: testing the bailout hypothesis in the Spanish case

in *Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy*, Volume 23, Issue 3, June , pp. 437-453

High debt autonomy and low tax autonomy often characterize evolving federations, making the bailout hypothesis very attractive in resolving subcentral government deficits. However, meeting both conditions is not enough to conclude that bailout expectations are the main reason for a potential deficit. There are many other factors affecting expectations and the real behavior of the agents involved: central government, subcentral governments, and the financial markets. Empirical research is the only means by which to determine the relevance of the bailout problem in each situation. To demonstrate this argument, the author describes an exhaustive analysis of the Spanish case. The main conclusion is that deficit seems to be better understood by a more traditional model of fiscal choices than by bailout expectations.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism

Letelier S. Leonardo

Explaining Fiscal Decentralization



in *Public Finance Review*, Vol. 33, No. 2 , 155-183

This study uses a panel of sixty-four countries to test empirically various hypotheses about the causes of decentralization at the government level and in different functional spending areas. The empirical results find a negative impact of urbanization on decentralization. In the general case, a higher income per capita favors decentralization, with this effect being stronger for high-income countries. However, the use of functional measurements of decentralization shows that income per capita has a negative effect on health decentralization. Urbanization has a negative impact on the fiscal decentralization of health and education, and it has a positive effect on the share of housing expenditures being made by subnational governments.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7. Economic and fiscal federalism

MADIÈS Thierry, PATY Sonia, ROCABOY Yvon

Externalités fiscales horizontales et verticales: où en est la théorie du fédéralisme financier?

in *Revue d'Economie Politique*, N° 1 (janvier - février) , 17 - 64

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7. Economic and fiscal federalism

Kay Adrian, Bristow Gillian, McGovern Mark, Pickernell David

Fair division or fair dinkum? Australian lessons for intergovernmental fiscal relations in the United Kingdom

in *Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy*, Volume 23, Issue 2, April , pp. 247-261

Current arguments in Australia concerning horizontal fiscal equalisation may help inform the debate in the United Kingdom concerning possible changes to the Barnett formula and the establishment of financial relations with any regional governments in England. Although Australia is a long-established federation, with mature institutions for managing the financial aspects of intergovernmental relations, the most populous states are now pushing for a per-capita-based system to replace the existing formula -- based on needs and costs -- overseen by the independent Commonwealth Grants Commission. This has important implications for the United Kingdom, where the Barnett formula -- a per capita system for deciding annual changes in the funding for the devolved administrations -- has been increasingly challenged. In particular, the Barnett system has been vulnerable to nontransparent 'formula-bypass' agreements. We argue that the status quo in the United Kingdom appears secure as long as England remains a single entity and the UK Treasury sees the financial implications of larger per capita expenditure in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland as relatively small. However, we speculate that regionalisation of government in England would be likely to increase the pressure: to abandon the Barnett system; to look more systematically at need and cost, rather than population, as criteria for allocating funds between governments; and to move towards an Australian-type system. However, the recent experience of Australia also shows that larger states prefer a per-capita-based system allied to more political, less transparent, arrangements to deal with 'special circumstances'. It may be that a Barnett-type formula would suit the new 'dominant states' in a fully federalised United Kingdom which would, ironically, create an alliance of interests between Scotland and London.



Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism

Darby Julia , Muscatelli V. Anton , Roy Graeme

Fiscal Consolidation and Decentralisation: A Tale of Two Tiers

in **Fiscal Studies**, Vol. 26 Issue 2

This paper contributes to the established literature on fiscal consolidations by investigating the distinct behaviour of central and sub-central tiers of government during general government consolidation attempts. In the light of different degrees of decentralisation across OECD countries, and the different responsibilities devolved to sub-central tiers, we believe that this approach offers an illuminating insight into the analysis of fiscal consolidations and their success.

We show that the involvement of the sub-central tiers of government is crucial to achieving cuts in expenditure, particularly in relation to the overall size of the government wage bill. In addition, central governments appear to exert a strong influence on the expenditure of sub-central tiers through their grant allocations, and control of these allocations appears to have a considerable impact upon the overall success of consolidation attempts. Finally, we demonstrate that there is a skewness in cuts towards sub-central capital expenditure both when central governments cut grant allocations and when sub-central governments engage in lone consolidation attempts.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism

Justmana Moshe, Thisse Jacques-François , van Ypersele Tanguy

Fiscal competition and regional differentiation

in **Regional Science and Urban Economics**, Volume 35, Issue 6 , 848-861

Regions can benefit by offering infrastructure services that are differentiated. Competition between regions over potential investors is then less direct, allowing them to realize greater benefits from external investors. The two polar cases of full and incomplete information about investors' needs are studied. In both cases, there is regional differentiation. However, fiscal competition is efficient in the former case but not in the latter. Finally, it is shown that free entry in the location market calls for some regulation because of the excessive number of competing regions that would prevail in equilibrium.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism

Broschek Joerg

Foederalismus und Wohlfahrtstaat im historischen Kontext: der Fall Kanada

in **Politische Vierteljahresschrift**, Heft 2, 46. Jahrgang, Juni , 238-262

No abstract available



Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism

Kempf Hubert, Rossignol Stéphane

Growth, Inequality, and Integration: A Political Economy Analysis

in *Journal of Public Economic Theory*, Vol. 7 Issue 5 , 709-739.

The issue of political integration between two countries (more generally two political constituencies) for economic reasons is studied within the context of a simple endogenous growth model with a productive public good financed by taxation. We consider two countries that initially differ in terms of average endowment, size, and inequality. Because taxation affects the distribution of income both within and between countries, we are able to show how integration impacts it over the entire time horizon. The decision to integrate or not is made by the two national median voters. We establish the net gain for any individual in any country derived from integration and offer a simple decomposition of this gain. It is then proven that even though integration generates aggregate gains for both countries through an endogenous growth mechanism related to size, it may be in the interest of either median voter not to vote for integration given the transformation in the inequality schedule it implies. Surprisingly, even the poorer median voter may vote against integration. Turning to the process of union building, we prove that, once it is decided, integration is irreversible. Countries may initially decide against integration yet be willing to reverse this decision in a subsequent period.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism

Singh Raju, Plekhanov Alexander

How Should Subnational Government Borrowing Be Regulated? Some Cross-Country Empirical Evidence

in *IMF Policy Discussion Papers*, March, 2005

Countries have adopted various institutional responses to subnational government borrowing. Using a sample of 44 countries 1982-2000, this paper provides a panel data analysis to determine the most effective borrowing constraints for containing local fiscal deficits. The results suggest that no single institutional arrangement is superior under all circumstances. The appropriateness of specific arrangements depends upon other institutional characteristics, particularly the degree of vertical fiscal imbalance, the existence of any bailout precedent, and the quality of fiscal reporting.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism

Jehiel Philippe, Thisse Jacques-François

How to win a decision in a confederation

in *Journal of Public Economics*, Volume 89, Issue 7 , 1191-1210

This paper deals with collective decision making within a group of independent states. The right to choose the public policy is delegated from the central authority to one of the states through a bidding procedure among the group state members. We identify the following tradeoff: competition among states yields higher transfers to the central authority, but the outcome tends to be less efficient than what it is when states negotiate prior to the decision making process. We extend and illustrate the model by means of a public good game involving several heterogeneous states.



Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7. Economic and fiscal federalism

Matsen Egil, Røisland Øistein

Interest rate decisions in an asymmetric monetary union

in European Journal of Political Economy, Volume 21, Issue 2 , June 2005 , 365-384

Decision rules matter for monetary policy in a currency union if the interest rate affects member states differently. We examine the consequences for inflation, output and interest rate fluctuations and the welfare loss of four alternative types of decision procedures. We show that the alternative decision rules have very dissimilar properties and that different rules favour different types of countries. In addition to asymmetric transmission mechanisms, we consider asymmetric shocks. We show that it is the combination of a country's interest rate elasticity and the covariance between the shocks to the country and the shocks to the union that determines which decision rule the country would favour.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7. Economic and fiscal federalism

Volden Craig

Intergovernmental Political Competition in American Federalism

in American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 49, Issue 2 , 327-342

Many policies in the United States are jointly determined by federal and state actions. In the game theoretic model offered here, politicians in both the state and national governments seek credit for providing goods desired by the public and avoid blame for the taxes necessary to provide the goods. In line with Peterson's (1995) theory of functional federalism, the level of government that is better able to supply particular goods and services tends to take the lead in their provision, even to the extent of fully crowding out much less efficient governments. However, under a broad set of circumstances, both state and national politicians seek credit via public spending, and their joint provision leads to a relative "oversupply" of public goods and services, and thus to "overtaxation." Under joint provision, states vary in their responses to changing federal spending patterns based both on the causes of the national changes and on state characteristics.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7. Economic and fiscal federalism

Alesina Alberto, Angeloni Ignazio, Etro Federico

International Unions

in American Economic Review, Vol. 95, No. 3, June 2005

We model an international union as a group of countries deciding to centralize the provision of public goods, or policies, that generate externalities across union members. The trade-off between the benefits of coordination and the loss of independent policymaking endogenously determines size, composition, and scope of the union. Policy uniformity reduces the size of the union, may block the entry of new members, and induces excessive centralization. We study flexible rules with nonuniform policies that reduce these inefficiencies, focusing particularly on arrangements that are



relevant to the ongoing debate on the institutional structure of the European Union.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism

Corsetti Giancarlo, Pesenti Paolo

International dimensions of optimal monetary policy

in **Journal of Monetary Economics**, Volume 52, Issue 2 , March , 281-305

This paper provides a baseline general equilibrium model of optimal monetary policy among interdependent economies with monopolistic firms and nominal rigidities. An inward-looking policy of domestic price stabilization is not optimal when firms' markups are exposed to currency fluctuations. Such a policy raises exchange rate volatility, leading foreign exporters to charge higher prices vis-à-vis increased uncertainty in the export market. As higher import prices reduce the purchasing power of domestic consumers, optimal monetary rules trade off a larger domestic output gap against lower consumer prices. Optimal rules in a world Nash equilibrium lead to less exchange rate volatility relative to both inward-looking rules and discretionary policies, even when the latter do not suffer from any inflationary (or deflationary) bias. Gains from international monetary cooperation are related in a non-monotonic way to the degree of exchange rate pass-through.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism

Antonini Luca

Introduzione alla pubblicazione "Sussidiarietà fiscale. La frontiera della democrazia"

in **Federalismi**, Anno III, n. 20

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism

Luca Antonini

L'attuazione del federalismo fiscale

in **Federalismi**, Anno III, n. 4

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism

Novikov Alexei V.

Le recul du fédéralisme en Russie : L'exemple du budget

in **Pouvoirs**, 112

Même lorsque le fédéralisme était une priorité politique, au début des années quatre-vingt-dix, la réforme des relations



budgétaires entre les trois niveaux de gouvernement (Fédération, province, collectivité locale) passait après les autres. Depuis le début de la libéralisation économique, les réformateurs considèrent la centralisation budgétaire comme un « point d'ancrage » nécessaire dans une situation économique agitée et marquée, sur le plan budgétaire, par la pénurie de liquidités. Très bien pensée dans l'abstrait, la toute récente décentralisation budgétaire inscrite dans le « Programme de développement du fédéralisme budgétaire jusqu'à 2005 » paraît floue et ambiguë en termes concrets: dans la pratique, ce programme ne peut pas servir à décentraliser le système budgétaire. Reste que les grandes réformes structurelles récentes sont mal coordonnées (ou pas du tout) avec la réforme des relations budgétaires entre les trois niveaux: la plus importante et la mieux réussie (une réforme de l'impôt) s'est surtout préoccupée des questions de pression fiscale et n'a guère donné lieu à réflexion sur ses conséquences éventuelles pour le fédéralisme budgétaire et son équilibre.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism

Luisa Cassetti

Le regole costituzionali sul governo dell'economia ed i processi federali nell'esperienza sudamericana in *Federalismi*, Anno III, n. 4

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism

Köthenbürger Marko

Leviathans, federal transfers, and the cartelization hypothesis

in *Public Choice*, Volume 122, Numbers 3-4 , 449 - 465

Federal fiscal arrangements are argued to give rise to tacit collusion among competing Leviathans (Brennan and Buchanan, *The Power to Tax*, CUP, 1980). Though frequently encountered in academic and policy discussions, the cartelization hypothesis has rarely been scrutinized formally. This paper explores the effect of federal equalizing transfers on Leviathans engaged in tax competition. Contrary to the hypothesis, equalization is found to potentially complement tax competition in taming the Leviathan by implicitly taxing tax revenues extracted by the Leviathan. Thus, transfers might be an appropriate constitutional provision against fiscal expropriation.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism

Beetsma Roel M.W.J., Jensen Henrik

Monetary and fiscal policy interactions in a micro-founded model of a monetary union

in *Journal of International Economics*, Volume 67, Issue 2, December 2005

This paper analyzes in detail the mechanisms behind fiscal stabilization policy and the role of policy commitment in a micro-founded New-Keynesian model of a two-country monetary union, which is hit by supply shocks. We also explore the determinants of the gains from fiscal stabilization. While monetary policy with identical union members is concerned with stabilizing the union-wide economy, fiscal policy aims at stabilizing inflation differences and the terms of trade.



Besides exploring optimal policies, we also consider monetary and fiscal rules. We study these rules both under coordination and non-coordination by the fiscal authorities.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism

Bell Abraham, Parchomovsky Gideon

Of Property and Federalism

in **Yale Law Journal (The)**, Vol. 115, n. 1, October , 72-115

This Essay proposes a mechanism for expanding competition in state property law, while sketching out the limitations necessary to protect third parties. The fact that property law is produced by the states creates a unique opportunity for experimentation with such property and property-related topics as same-sex marriages, community property, adverse possession, and easements. The Essay begins by demonstrating the salutary effects of federalism on the evolution of property law. Specifically, it shows that competition among states has created a dynamic property system in which new property institutions replace obsolete ones. The Essay then contemplates the possibility of increasing innovation and individual choice in property law by inducing state competition over property regimes. Drawing on the scholarly literature examining state competition for corporate law and competition over the provision of local public goods, the Essay constructs an open property system that creates an adequate incentive for the states to offer new property regimes and allows individuals to adopt them without relocating to the offering state. This Essay also has important implications for the burgeoning literature on the *numerus clausus* principle, under which the list of legally permissible property regimes is closed. The Essay argues that in a federal system, it is socially desirable to expand the list of property forms to include certain out-of-state forms.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism

Kunce Mitch, Shogre Jason F.

On Efficiency of Decentralized Environmental Regulation

in **Journal of Regulatory Economics**, Volume 28 issue 2 , 129 - 140

Contrary to conventional wisdom about an environmental race to the bottom, the theoretical literature as exemplified by Oates and Schwab [1988, *Journal of Public Economics*, 35:333–354] maintains that homogeneous jurisdictions' decentralized choices are likely to be socially optimal because each locale sets capital tax rates to zero and sets optimal environmental standards. This paper shows the well-received Oates–Schwab-style efficiency result is not likely if allowed aggregate-emissions act as a firm-augmenting public input that benefits mobile firms.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism

Revelli Federico

On Spatial Public Finance Empirics

in **International Tax and Public Finance**, vol. 12, no 4 , 475-492



This paper focuses on the empirical specification of theoretical models of strategic interaction that give rise to a spatial pattern in local government expenditures and revenues. It shows that estimation of a reduced form inter-jurisdictional reaction function might not by itself allow to discriminate among competing strategic interaction theories. A review of the recent empirical literature suggests that exploring in more depth the specific empirical implications of alternative theoretical models, as well as fully exploiting the institutional features of multi-tiered government structures and local electoral systems, can help identify the structural model generating the observed spatial auto-correlation in policy variables.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7. Economic and fiscal federalism

Lorza Oliver , Willmann Gerald

On the endogenous allocation of decision powers in federal structures

in **Journal of Urban Economics**, Volume 57, Issue 2 , 242-257

This paper provides a political-economy explanation of the degree of centralization in economic policy making. To determine which policies are to be centralized, regions select representatives who then negotiate the degree of centralization and the regional cost shares of centrally decided policies. We show that the resulting degree of centralization is suboptimally low. Voters strategically delegate to representatives who are averse to public spending and hence prefer decentralized decisions in order to reduce their region's cost share. When spillovers are asymmetric, strategic delegation is stronger at the periphery than at the center

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Subsection 7. Economic and fiscal federalism

López-Laborda Julio, Onrubia Jorge

Personal Income Tax Decentralization, Inequality, and Social Welfare

in **Public Finance Review**, Vol. 33, No. 2 , 213-235

This article elaborates and evaluates a model for the decentralization of a personal income tax that is consistent with the optimal redistribution model. In this study's model, the regions have individualistic, symmetrical, additively separable, and inequality-averse social welfare functions. Each region applies to its constituents a progressive personal income tax, which measures individuals' ability to pay with sole regard to their income. The central government has a social welfare function, and its tax-raising power is limited to the establishment of a surcharge (or deduction) proportional to the income of individuals net of the respective regional taxes. This article presents the conditions that permit this model of fiscal decentralization to be recommended as a result of the reduction of inequality and the increase in welfare in each region and in the country as a whole. The theoretical results are applied to the Spanish income tax by the performance of various microsimulation exercises.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7. Economic and fiscal federalism

Goldsmith Arthur A.

Plebiscites, Fiscal Policy and the Poor: Learning from US Experience with Direct Democracy

in **Development Policy Review** , Volume 23 Issue 5



Many countries are contemplating direct political participation as a way of giving marginalised people more say in national fiscal policies. The United States is a natural laboratory for studying how large-scale direct democracy actually works in this regard. Every state allows voters to decide certain ballot questions about how to raise and spend public revenue. The 100-year record shows, however, that state-wide plebiscites fail to produce uniformly equitable or financially sustainable government budgets, or to mobilise low-income groups to defend their economic interests. When called upon to make decisions about state government spending, the electorate is apt to disregard any hardship for poor people. Traditional political parties and advocacy organisations are usually a more promising avenue for promoting anti-poverty budgets.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7. Economic and fiscal federalism

Sinha Aseema

Political Foundations of Market-Enhancing Federalism: Theoretical Lessons from India and China
in *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 37 n. 3

Decentralization's welfare effects on economic reform are dependent upon crucial political conditions that are left unanalyzed in the conventional theories of fiscal and market-preserving federalism. This lacuna can be addressed only if decentralization is disaggregated along its different political and economic dimensions and the combined effect of the two dimensions is then reanalyzed. Certain political dimensions provide linkage mechanisms between regional and national politicians, making economic reform self-enforcing. Three such mechanisms — of authority, institutions, and personnel — are identified and used to compare India's and China's reform trajectories

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7. Economic and fiscal federalism

Bodenstein Martin, Ursprung Heinrich W.

Political yardstick competition, economic integration, and constitutional choice in a federation:
in *Public Choice*, Volume 124, Numbers 3-4 , 329 - 352

This paper investigates the behavior of rent-seeking politicians in an environment of increasing economic integration. The focus of the paper is on the implications of globalization-induced political yardstick competition for constitutional design with a view to the current discussion in the European Union. In contrast to the established literature, we carefully portray the double-tiered government structure in federal systems. The number of lower-tier governments and the allocation of policy responsibilities to the two levels of government are subject to constitutional choice.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7. Economic and fiscal federalism

Nicotra I.

Principio unitario e federalismo fiscale negli ordinamenti a struttura decentrata
in *Rivista italiana di diritto pubblico comunitario*, n. 1 , 153-166

No abstract available



Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7. Economic and fiscal federalism

Stegarescu Dan

Public Sector Decentralisation: Measurement Concepts and Recent International Trends

in **Fiscal Studies**, vol. 26 Issue 3 , 301–333

This paper deals with the problems encountered in defining and measuring the degree of fiscal decentralisation. Drawing on a recent analytical framework of the OECD, different measures of tax autonomy and revenue decentralisation are presented which consider the tax-raising powers of sub-central governments. Taking account of changes in the assignment of decision-making competencies over the course of time, new time series of annual data on the degree of fiscal decentralisation are provided for 23 OECD countries over the period between 1965 and 2001. It is shown that common measures usually employed tend to overestimate the extent of fiscal decentralisation considerably. Evidence is also provided of increasing fiscal decentralisation in a majority of OECD countries during the last three decades

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7. Economic and fiscal federalism

S. Bucovetsky

Public input competition

in **Journal of Public Economics**, Volume 89, Issue 9-10 , 1763-1787

Public investment in infrastructure may help create agglomeration economies, by attracting mobile factors such as skilled labour. Competition among regions in public investment can then be destructive. This paper analyzes the Nash equilibria to a simple model of public input competition. Even though the regions are assumed identical, the equilibrium may not be symmetric. The problem with non-cooperative behaviour is not (only) that regions invest too much, but that too many regions may choose to invest. Depending on the parameter values, the Nash equilibrium may be efficient, may be inefficient or may not exist (at least not in pure strategies). Better mobility among regions leads to more aggressive competition. The analysis suggests that rents from public investment may be dissipated by governments' competition to attract mobile factors.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7. Economic and fiscal federalism

Alessandra Casella

Redistribution policy: A European model

in **Journal of Public Economics**, Volume 89, Issue 7 , 1305-1331

Following the rationale for regional redistribution programs described in the official documents of the European Union, this paper studies a simple multicountry model built around two regions: a core and a periphery. Technological spillovers link firms' productivity within each of the two regions, and each country's territory falls partly in the core and partly in the



periphery, but the exact shares vary across countries. In line with the official view of the European Union, we find that the efficient regional allocation requires both national and international transfers. If migration is fully free across all borders, the optimal redistribution policy results from countries' uncoordinated policies. However, if countries have the option of setting even imperfect border barriers, then efficiency is likely to require coordination on both barriers and international transfers (both of which will be set at positive levels). The need for coordination increases as the Union increases in size.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7. Economic and fiscal federalism

Wren Colin

Regional Grants: Are They Worth It?

in *Fiscal Studies*, Vol. 26 Issue 2

Regional grants have recently come under scrutiny and are controversial. Some estimates put the employment effect of these grants at no more than 6,000 jobs in the first half of the 1990s, against expenditure of £500 million. Other aspects of the grants are questioned, such as their ability to attract foreign direct investment and their effect on productivity. This paper reviews these issues, focusing on the recent evidence for the Regional Selective Assistance scheme. It describes the nature and difficulties involved in policy evaluation, and finds that differences over the employment effect of the grants result from possible biases induced by the evaluation methodology and from differences in the job measure used. Overall, the paper argues that the regional grants are cost-effective in employment terms, but that expenditure is small relative to the scale of the problem, so that an expansion of the grants may be desirable.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7. Economic and fiscal federalism

Partridge Mark D. , Rickman Dan S.

Regional cyclical asymmetries in an optimal currency area: an analysis using US state data

in *Oxford Economic Papers*, 57 (3) , 373-397

Two key assumptions are often used in assessing the feasibility of a common currency area (CCA). First, asymmetric shocks increase the costs of forming a CCA. Second, the US represents a useful benchmark for evaluating a potential CCA. Changes in the asymmetry of US regional cycles, however, are rarely examined. Therefore, this study examines the synchronization of US regional business cycles for 1971–98. The results reveal that US state cyclical asymmetries changed over time, with synchronization appearing to decline by the latter 1980s. This suggests that the US was less likely to fit CCA criteria in the 1990s, which conflicts with its apparent successful monetary-policy experience. Yet, this seeming contradiction can be explained by a tradeoff between the volatility of the common-national business cycle and regional synchronization. Given that the volatility of an area's common shock can change regularly, these findings have implications for the assessment of all CCAs.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7. Economic and fiscal federalism

Hehui Jin, Yingyi Qian, Weingast Barry R.



Regional decentralization and fiscal incentives: Federalism, Chinese style

in *Journal of Public Economics*, Volume 89, Issue 9-10 , 1719-1742

Aligning the interests of local governments with market development is an important issue for developing and transition economies. Using a panel data set from China, we investigate the relationship between provincial government's fiscal incentives and provincial market development. We report three empirical findings. First, we find that during the period of "fiscal contracting system" the discrepancy between ex ante contracts and ex post implementation was relatively small, suggesting that the fiscal contracts were credible. Second, we find a much higher correlation, about four times, between the provincial government's budgetary revenue and its expenditure during 1980s and 1990s as compared to 1970s, demonstrating that provincial governments faced much stronger ex post fiscal incentives after reform. Third, we find that stronger ex ante fiscal incentives, measured by the contractual marginal retention rate of the provincial government in its budgetary revenue, are associated with faster development of the non-state sector as well as more reforms in the state sector in the provincial economy. This holds even when we control for the conventional measure of fiscal decentralization. Finally, we compare federalism, Chinese style, to federalism, Russian style.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7. Economic and fiscal federalism

Super David A.

Rethinking Fiscal Federalism

in *Harvard Law Review*, Volume 118 - issue n. 8/2005 , 2546-2652

Although interactions between federal and state taxes and spending programs are becoming increasingly controversial, this Article asserts that major theories of federalism built to divide regulatory authority between the two levels of government poorly account for the quite different problems of fiscal cooperation and competition. The Article therefore identifies and distinguishes three justifications for federal funding of states' operations: In some programs, funding seeks to insulate states from particular fiscal burdens, such as the side effects of federal policies or the abrupt termination of federal responsibility for particular problems. In other programs, funding provides an incentive for states to follow federal policy leadership. And in still others, the federal government assumes financial responsibility because of its superior fiscal capacity. The Article finds recent congressional action on unfunded mandates and the Court's new federalism jurisprudence lacking coherent justification under these three models.

The Article then turns to programs that aid low-income people, which present excellent examples of spending programs that suffer from design defects because of the current lack of a coherent theory of fiscal federalism. For example, the Article finds states' fiscal constitutions mired in pre-Keynesian economics. As a result, states consistently undercut federal macroeconomic policy, stimulating the economy during expansions and deflating it further during downturns. In addition, the Article identifies powerful but poorly understood features of state fiscal constitutions that systematically privilege low-income people. Accordingly, this Article criticizes recent moves to devolve fiscal responsibility for precisely the kinds of functions that states are least able to perform. The Article urges states to update their fiscal constitutions to eliminate chaotic responses to swings of the business cycle and to equip themselves to perform the tasks being assigned to them. It also recommends that the federal government adjust its fiscal relationship with states to account for these limitations.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government



Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism

Koppel Oliver

Reviewing Oates' insights in a repeated game setting

in **Economics of Governance**, Volume 6, Number 3 , 229 - 243

This paper analyzes the optimal assignment of public good policies to layers of a federal system in a repeated game setting. Under a centralized regime, public goods are financed jointly across regions, and a federal legislature decides on the regional quantities. Under a decentralized regime, public goods are financed locally, and governments play a non-cooperative provision game. We find that a centralized (decentralized) regime is more likely to provide the efficient public good policies in case spillovers are small (large).

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism

COSGEL METIN M. , MICELI THOMAS J.

Risk, Transaction Costs, and Tax Assignment: Government Finance in the Ottoman Empire

in **Journal of Economic History (The)**, Volume 65 issue 03 , 806-821

Risk and transaction costs often provide competing explanations of institutional outcomes. In this article we argue that they offer opposing predictions regarding the assignment of fixed and variable taxes in a multi-tiered governmental structure. Although the central government can pool regional risks from variable taxes, local governments can measure variable tax bases more accurately. Evidence on tax assignment from the mid-sixteenth-century Ottoman Empire supports the transaction cost explanation, suggesting that risk matters less because insurance can be obtained in a variety of ways.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism

Ferré Montserrat

Should Fiscal Authorities Co-operate in a Monetary Union with Public Deficit Targets?

in **Journal of Common Market Studies**, Vol. 43, Issue 3, September , 539-550

The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) aims at reducing the deficit bias and inducing fiscal policy co-ordination in EMU. This article shows that, under positive (demand or supply) shocks, average deficits and interest rates with fiscal co-ordination can be higher than without co-ordination, thus making two of the aims of the SGP incompatible.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism

Stö Sven, Traxler Christian

Tax Evasion and Auditing in a Federal Economy

in **International Tax and Public Finance**, vol. 12, no 4 , 515-531



This paper analyzes the relation between tax auditing and fiscal equalization in the context of fiscal competition. We incorporate a model of tax evasion by firms into a standard tax competition framework where regional governments use their audit rates as a strategic instrument to engage in fiscal competition. We compare the region's choice of audit policies for three different cases: A scenario of unconfined competition without interregional transfers, a scenario with a gross revenue equalization (GRS) scheme and finally, a scenario with net revenue sharing (NRS), where not only the revenues from taxation but also the regions auditing costs are shared. Without regional transfers, fiscal competition leads to audit rates which are inefficiently low for revenue-maximizing governments. While in general GRS aggravates the inefficiency, NRS makes the decentralized choice of auditing policies more efficient.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism

Allers Maarten, Elhorst J.

Tax Mimicking and Yardstick Competition Among Local Governments in the Netherlands
in *International Tax and Public Finance*, vol. 12, no 4 , 493-513

This paper provides a spatial-econometric analysis of the setting of property tax rates by Dutch municipalities. We find evidence of tax mimicking: a ten percent higher property tax rate in neighboring municipalities leads to a 3.5 percent higher tax rate. Mimicking is less pronounced in municipalities governed by coalitions backed by a large majority. This points to yardstick competition as the most likely source of tax mimicking. We also find that Dutch voters seem to be able to penalize incumbents for anticipated tax rate differentials, but not for unanticipated tax rate differentials. This limits the effectiveness of yardstick competition as a mechanism to reduce political rent-seeking.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism

Güth Werner , Levati Vittoria, Sausgruber Rupert

Tax morale and (de-)centralization: An experimental study
in *Public Choice*, Volume 125, Numbers 1-2 , 171 - 188

We consider an economy composed of two regions. Each of them provides a public good whose benefits reach beyond local boundaries. In case of decentralization, taxes collected by members of a region are spent only on that region's public good. In case of centralization, tax receipts from the two regions are pooled and used to finance both public goods according to the population size of each region. The experiment shows that centralization induces lower tax morale and less efficient outcomes. The reasons are that centralization gives rise to an interregional incentive problem and creates inequalities in income between regions.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism

Torgler Benno

Tax morale and direct democracy
in *European Journal of Political Economy*, Volume 21, Issue 2 , June 2005 , 525-531

This paper analyses the impact of direct democracy on tax morale in Switzerland, a country where participation rights



strongly vary across different cantons, using survey data from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) 1998. The findings suggest that direct democratic rights have a significantly positive effect on tax morale.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7. Economic and fiscal federalism

Hossein Askari, Joydeep Chatterjee

The Euro and Financial Market Integration

in **Journal of Common Market Studies**, Vol. 43, Issue 1, March , 1-12

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7. Economic and fiscal federalism

Hoover Gary A., Pecorino Paul

The Political Determinants of Federal Expenditure at the State Level

in **Public Choice**, Volume 123, Numbers 1-2 , 95 - 113

It has been shown that states with higher per capita senate representation have higher federal spending per capita (Atlas, C. M., Gilligan, T. A., Hendershott, R. J. and Zupan, M. A. (1995). *American Economic Review* 85: 624–629). With a more recent data sample, more highly disaggregated data and a different set of political control variables, we are able to confirm the main result of Atlas et al. that per capita senate representation is positively related to federal expenditure. This effect is strongest for procurement expenditures. By contrast, we do not find support for their result that spending increases with per capita representation in the House of Representatives. Several other political variables are found to be significant in a subset of the expenditure equations.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7. Economic and fiscal federalism

Waltraud Schelkle

The Political Economy of Fiscal Policy Co-ordination in EMU: From Disciplinary Device to Insurance Arrangement

in **Journal of Common Market Studies**, Vol. 43, Issue 2, June , 371-392

The fiscal policy framework of EMU and possible reforms of the Stability and Growth Pact have elicited much debate. The pact has been predicated on a conception of it as a device to discipline Member States. This gives rise to a paradox in which the credibility of policy-makers it is supposed to enhance is undermined. The article puts forward an alternative conception of policy co-ordination collective insurance designed to enhance the effectiveness of fiscal stabilization. The two approaches lead to different interpretations of how domestic interests affect policy-making. The insurance approach is shown to support various reform proposals by the Commission.



Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism

Heipertz Martin, Verdun Amy

The Stability and Growth Pact - Theorizing a Case in European Integration

in **Journal of Common Market Studies**, Vol. 43, Issue 5, December , 985-1008

This article looks at the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) as a case study in European integration. Applying the theoretical lenses of various European integration approaches (intergovernmentalism, domestic politics, neofunctionalism and an 'expertocratic' approach) it seeks to explain the creation of the SGP as well as its subsequent implementation. The findings show that these approaches are able to illuminate different parts of the process. The article thus argues that only an eclectic combination of the approaches provides a satisfactory theoretical explanation of the SGP as a fundamental element of the rules-based economic and monetary union (EMU) regime.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism

Du Plessis S.A.

The democratic deficit and inflation targeting

in **South African Journal of Economics (The)**, March 2005 - Vol. 73 Issue 1 , p. 93

There is widespread consensus that a goal dependent, but instrument independent central bank solves the democratic deficit. However, the standard solution to the democratic deficit risks reintroducing the biases of political control over monetary policy through the power of politicians to change the monetary policy rule. This paper considers the problem as an instance of the paradox of power in the sphere of monetary policy and proposes a solution drawing on criteria for the rule of law and the principles of constitutional economics. Finally a normative test of inflation targeting is proposed, again drawing on the constitutional economics literature.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism

David Howarth

The euro-outsiders: Conclusions

in **Journal of European Integration**, Volume 27, Number 1 / March , 133-140

This concluding article reviews the lessons drawn from the respective case studies of the special issue and returns to the central assumptions of the politics of asymmetry outlined in the Introduction by Miles. A comparative overview of the applicability of the five forms of asymmetry to the euro-outsiders leads to the conclusion that they provide a useful heuristic device to structure future analysis of the debate on EMU membership that will resurface periodically in these countries.



Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7. Economic and fiscal federalism

Boye Ejobowah John

**The new political economy of federal preservation: Insights from nigerian federal practice
in Commonwealth and Comparative Politics**, Vol. 43 n. 2 , 178 - 193

Within the last decade, rational choice theorists have been discussing the institutional features of federalism that lead to either system self-reinforcement or collapse. They draw on the early economic theories of Hayek, Musgrave, Oates and Tiebout by emphasising competition and efficiency but go beyond these theories to explain ways that federal governance relates to the market to provide for its own preservation. This essay uses the assumptions and prescriptions of 'the theory of federal preservation' to analyse federal practice in Nigeria and, in turn, uses the Nigerian case information to provide insights into the limits of the theory. The main thesis is that the assumptions and prescriptions of the new political economy are often meaningful. However the emphasis on market efficiency creates practical difficulties for governance.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7. Economic and fiscal federalism

Tridimasa George Winerb Stanley L.

The political economy of government size

in European Journal of Political Economy, Volume 21, Issue 3, September 2005 , Pages 643-666

We contribute to the political economy of public-sector growth by integrating three essential elements (i) the 'demand' for government stemming from attempts to coercively redistribute, as well as from demand for public services, often analyzed in a median voter framework; (ii) the 'supply' of taxable activities emphasized in Leviathan and other models of taxation; and (iii) the distribution of 'political influence' when influence and economic welfare are distinct. We combine these elements in a spatial voting framework, and use the comparative static properties of the model to shed light on empirical results in the literature.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7. Economic and fiscal federalism

Carlsen Fredrik , Langset Bjørg Rattsø Jørn

The relationship between firm mobility and tax level: Empirical evidence of fiscal competition between local governments

in Journal of Urban Economics, Volume 58, Issue 2 , 273-288

The mobility of the tax base may influence fiscal outcomes. The many theoretical contributions about the role of mobility are not matched by empirical evidence. Existing studies address strategic interaction between governments, but have little to say about mobility. We introduce a new measure of mobility conditions based on the geographic profit variability of industrial sectors. The econometric analysis shows a systematic negative relationship between mobility conditions and tax level among municipalities in Norway. The analysis takes into account neighborhood effects in a spatial model, and the endogeneity of mobility conditions is handled with instrumental variables.



Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism

Kessler Anke S., Lülfesmann Christopha

Tiebout and redistribution in a model of residential and political choice

in **Journal of Public Economics**, Volume 89, Issue 2-3 , 501-528

The paper considers a two-community model with freely mobile individuals. Individuals differ not only in their incomes, but also in their tastes for a local public good. In each jurisdiction, the amount of public services is determined by majority vote of the inhabitants, and local spending is financed by a residence-based linear income tax. When making their residential and political choices, individuals thus face a trade-off between the provisionary and redistributive effects of policies. We analyze this trade-off and show that Tiebout-like sorting equilibria often exist. If the spread in tastes among individuals is very large, an almost perfect sorting according to preferences emerges; otherwise, a partial sorting prevails and stratification into rich and poor communities is more pronounced. Importantly, we demonstrate that all these sorting equilibria exist whether or not individuals are allowed to relocate after voting.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism

Dawkins Casey J.

Tiebout choice and residential segregation by race in US metropolitan areas, 1980–2000

in **Regional Science and Urban Economics**, Volume 35, Issue 6 , 734-755

This article examines the link between local government fragmentation, or “Tiebout choice,” and segregation between black and white residents. As suggested by Tiebout [Tiebout, C., 1956. A pure theory of local public expenditures. *Journal of Political Economy* 64, 416–424.], fragmented local governance structures may encourage households to vote with their feet and sort into communities based on their willingness to pay for local public services. This outcome has been well documented. The nuance explored here is that, if the demand for local public services varies by race or if households have preferences for neighbors with specific racial characteristics, local government fragmentation may foster an increase in residential segregation by race across neighborhoods and jurisdictions. Results from metropolitan-level regressions suggest that increased Tiebout choice is associated with increases in black–white residential segregation within US metropolitan areas. Comparable results are obtained from household-level estimates, where the black racial composition of a household's census tract of residence is regressed on household-level controls and racially stratified measures of Tiebout choice. Results from both approaches suggest that a 10% increase in Tiebout choice would increase neighborhood segregation by no more than 1%, while segregation across jurisdictions would increase by between 4% and 7%.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism

Oates Wallace

Toward A Second-Generation Theory of Fiscal Federalism



in **International Tax and Public Finance**, vol. 12, no 4 , 349-373

Drawing on a wide range of literature and ideas, a new “second-generation theory of fiscal federalism” is emerging that provides new insights into the structure and working of federal systems. After a restatement and review of the first-generation theory, this paper surveys this new body of work and offers some thoughts on the ways in which it is extending our understanding of fiscal federalism and on its implications for the design of fiscal institutions.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism

Haimanko Ori, Le Breton Michel, Weber Shlomo

Transfers in a polarized country: bridging the gap between efficiency and stability

in **Journal of Public Economics**, Volume 89, Issue 7 , 1277-1303

We consider a political economy model of country whose citizens have heterogeneous preferences for a national policy and some regions may contemplate a threat of secession. The country is efficient if its breakup into smaller countries leads to an aggregate utility loss. We show that in an efficient country whose citizens' preferences exhibit a high degree of polarization, a threat of secession cannot be eliminated without inter-regional transfers. We also demonstrate that if majority voting is used to determine the redistribution schemes within the country, then a high degree of polarization yields the full-compensation scheme as the unique political equilibrium.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism

Duncan Brian

Using Municipal Residency Requirements to Disguise Public Policy

in **Public Finance Review**, Vol. 33, No. 1 , 84-116

Municipal residency requirements require city employees to live within the city limit. Many cities enacted residency requirements attempting to attract middle-class families into the city and to prevent them from leaving. The model developed in this article suggests that a residency requirement can increase a city's middle-class population but only if it is accompanied by a municipal wage premium. When effective, a residency requirement can also increase the likelihood that a municipal family will enroll its children in private school through a Tiebout sorting effect. Using U.S. census data, the author finds that comprehensive residency requirements are often but not always accompanied by a municipal wage premium. Furthermore, municipal families living in cities with both a residency requirement and a wage premium are significantly more likely to enroll their children in private school.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7.Economic and fiscal federalism

Feld Lars P. , Schaltegger Christoph A.

Voters as a Hard Budget Constraint: On the Determination of Intergovernmental Grants

in **Public Choice**, Volume 123, Numbers 1-2 , 147 - 169

Recent empirical literature has shown that the determination of intergovernmental grants is highly influenced by the



political bargaining power of the recipient states. In these models federal politicians are assumed to buy the support of state voters, state politicians and state interest groups by providing grants. In this paper we provide evidence that the fiscal referendum reduces the reliance of states on matching grants received from the central government and thus the possibility of interest groups and state bureaucrats to obtain more grants. If referendums are available, voters serve as a hard budget constraint.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7. Economic and fiscal federalism

Dellas Harris, Tavlas George

Wage Rigidity and Monetary Union

in **Economic Journal**, October 2005 - Vol. 115 Issue 506 , 907

We compare monetary union to flexible exchange rates in an asymmetric, three-country model with active monetary policy. We find that countries with a high degree of nominal wage rigidity benefit from monetary union, especially when they join other, similarly rigid countries. Countries with relatively more flexible wages tend to be worse off in unions with countries that have more rigid wages. We examine France, Germany and the UK and find that the welfare implications of monetary arrangements depend more on the degree of wage asymmetry than on other types of asymmetries and that the higher wage flexibility in the UK would make its participation in EMU costly.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7. Economic and fiscal federalism

Arzaghi Mohammad, Henderson J. Vernon

Why countries are fiscally decentralizing

in **Journal of Public Economics**, Volume 89, Issue 7 , 1157-1189

This paper models and empirically investigates underlying forces that promote governmental decentralization, or effective federalism, in the world over the last 25 years. A move to a federal system is based on the demand by hinterland regions for local autonomy, which increases with national income growth, greater relative hinterland population, and increasing national population. It is influenced as well by the degree of democratization nationally and locally. Decentralization is measured by both institutional indices indicating greater devolution of power to local governments and the share of local governments in national government consumption. Empirically, the paper finds that decentralization changes in ways predicted, in particular it increases with economic growth, country size, and population. Institutional structures based on colonial experience and initial constitutional provisions also matter.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 7. Economic and fiscal federalism

Belleflamme Paul , Hindriks Jean

Yardstick competition and political agency problems

in **Social Choice and Welfare**, Volume 24, Number 1 , 155 - 169

We examine how yardstick competition between jurisdictions affects the agency problem resulting from uncertainty about politicians (adverse selection) and their policies (moral hazard). We find that yardstick comparison can contribute



both to disciplining and to selecting politicians.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 8. The Central Bank(s)

Belke Ansgar, Gros Daniel

Asymmetries in Transatlantic Monetary Policy-making: Does the ECB Follow the Fed?

in **Journal of Common Market Studies**, Vol. 43, Issue 5, December , 921-946

The belief that the European Central Bank (ECB) follows the US Federal Reserve (the Fed) in setting its policy is so entrenched with market participants and commentators that the search for empirical support would seem to be a trivial task. However, this is not the case. We find that the ECB is indeed often influenced by the Fed, but the reverse is true at least as often if one considers longer sample periods. There is empirically little support for the proposition that there has for a long time been a systematic asymmetric leader-follower relationship between the ECB and the Fed. Only after September 2001 is there more evidence of such an asymmetry. There is a clear-cut structural break between the period pre-economic and monetary union (EMU) and EMU itself in terms of the relationship between short-term interest rates on both sides of the Atlantic.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 8. The Central Bank(s)

Jordahla Henrik Laséenc Stefan

Central bank conservatism and labor market regulation

in **European Journal of Political Economy**, Volume 21, Issue 2 , June 2005 , Pages 345-363

How does central bank conservatism affect labor market regulation? In this paper, we examine the economic forces at work. An increase in conservatism triggers two opposite effects. It reduces the inflation bias of discretionary monetary policy and hence the cost of regulation. It also increases unemployment variability, making regulation more costly. In combination, the two effects produce a hump-shaped relation between conservatism and labor market regulation. To test this prediction, we use data for 19 OECD countries for the period 1980–1994. Our proxies for regulation are unemployment, different labor market institutions, and indices of labor market regulation. Conservatism is proxied by two common measures of central bank independence. We find support for the prediction of a hump-shaped relation between conservatism and labor market regulation.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 8. The Central Bank(s)

Duncan E. Alford

Core principles for effective banking supervision: an enforceable international financial standard?

in **Boston College International and Comparative Law Review**, Vol. 28 n. 2 , 237 - 296

No abstract available



Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 8. The Central Bank(s)

Buzelay Alain

De la crédibilité de la Banque centrale européenne

in *Revue de l'Union européenne/Revue du Marché Commun et de l'Union européenne*, Numero 489, juin , pp. 370-375

The credibility of the European Central Bank.

Seven years after it was set up, the European Central Bank has still not acquired a level of credibility comparable to that of the Bundesbank, seen as a national model for the ECB to replicate for the euro zone. the quest for greater credibility, which is vital to ensuring sensible reactions from market players, makes it necessary to ensure that its actions conform to objectives redefined according to changes in economic and monetary data in the euro zone, with view to its enlargement over the longer term.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 8. The Central Bank(s)

Dieppe Alistai, Kuster Keith, McAdam Peter

Optimal Monetary Policy Rules for the Euro Area: An Analysis Using the Area Wide Model

in *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 43, Issue 3, September , 507-538

In this article, we analyse the conduct of optimal monetary policy for the new euro area. The aggregate euro area economy is modelled to have relatively sluggish adjustment properties and a private sector with mainly backward-looking expectations. In this economy, we assume that the central bank searches for its best-performing monetary policy rule, e.g. for the optimal weight to give to inflation stabilization compared to that of output and for the optimal degree of forward-looking in the planning horizon. We first find that the optimal degree of gradualism in interest rate-setting needs only be relatively mild and that the central bank should incorporate new information quickly into policy-making. Second, there is substantial gain from implementing and communicating quite forward-looking policies. The optimal forecast horizon for inflation ranges around six quarters. In contrast to deliberately simple rule-based policy recommendations, fully optimal policy is a complicated response to many different economic indicators. With regard to this we find, third, that optimal policy should be based on a broad information set, even if the resulting policy framework is hard to communicate to the outside world. Thus, the article contributes to the debate on optimal monetary policy for the euro area, as well as to the conduct of monetary policy in face of substantial persistence in the transmission mechanism.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 8. The Central Bank(s)

Røisland Øistein

Should Central Banks care about regional imbalances?

in *Scottish Journal of Political Economy*, May 2005 - Vol. 52 Issue 2 , Page 242

Regional imbalances may arise both as a result of asymmetric shocks and of divergent responses to symmetric shocks, such as monetary policy shocks. This paper analyses flexible inflation targeting when regional imbalances are included



in the loss function. By adding regional imbalances, the time-inconsistency problem in monetary policy becomes more complex. The paper analyses alternative institutional arrangements designed to improve the discretionary equilibrium. Even in the absence of an over-ambitious output target, it is shown that the outcome of monetary policy is improved if the central bank places less weight on regional imbalances than the political authorities.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 8. The Central Bank(s)

Kaltenthaler Karl

The Bundesbank and the formation of the ECB's monetary policy strategy

in **German Politics**, Volume 14, Number 3, September , pp. 297-314

The ECB is almost a complete copy of the Bundesbank's organization, having adopted the Bundesbank's definition of price stability and its monetary targeting strategy. But rather than following simply from coercive power attached to the relative size of the German economy and EU budget contribution, the decision to emulate the German monetary policy model was the result of the persuasive power of the Bundesbank, the domestic success of the German model, and the hope held by European central bankers and many European politicians that success could be replicated on the European level. The primary interests of European central bankers were to appear competent and to maintain their independence; their search for the monetary policy ideas that provided the best chance of achieving these goals led to the German model.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 8. The Central Bank(s)

Mayes David G.

The European Central Bank in 2004

in **Journal of Common Market Studies**, Vol. 43, Issue s1, September , 85-88

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 8. The Central Bank(s)

Forder James

The limits of 'independence' and the policy of the ECB

in **Public Choice**, Volume 125, Numbers 3-4 , 431 - 444

It is argued that the European Central Bank's independence is not as secure as it seems and that as a result it has appreciable institutional incentives to protect and enhance its position. It follows that its behaviour should not be understood as being solely determined by the pursuit of price stability. One consequence is that certain points on which it has been criticised on the basis that its approach makes for ineffective monetary policy might be better understood as, often effective, attempts to protect its position. Another is that making a central bank (or any other institution) "completely independent" may be much harder than it seems, and failed attempts, which come close, are not necessarily to be preferred, even by the advocates of independence, to less ambitious designs.



Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 9. Local government(s)

Smith Charlotte

A Critique on Legal Analysis of Local Government and the Central-Local Relationship

in *Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly*, Vol. 56, No. 3 , 373-393

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 9. Local government(s)

Cannadi John , Dollery Brian

An Evaluation of Private Sector Provision of Public Infrastructure in Australian Local Government

in *Australian Journal of Public Administration*, Volume 64, Number 3

Private sector provision of public infrastructure in Australia at all levels of government, including local government, has steadily increased over the past twenty years. Nevertheless, this method of providing public infrastructure remains controversial. This article seeks to provide a critical review of the arguments surrounding private sector provision of infrastructure in Australian local government. It examines both the case for private sector provision of municipal infrastructure in Australia and the major arguments advanced against this approach to infrastructure development. Given the conceptual argumentation and empirical evidence on private municipal infrastructure provision, it is argued that policy makers should employ a nuanced performance evaluation framework to assess the benefits and weaknesses of private provision on the basis of the specific type of infrastructure in question and the kind of services it provides rather than simply endorse carte blanche privatization.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 9. Local government(s)

Reuttler Werner

Berlin's Republic: Parliamentary government in a German land

in *German Politics*, Volume 14, Number 4, December , pp. 438-454

Berlin is the only German Land that has had to manage its own reunification and originally many hoped that it would turn into a model for east-west reconciliation. Yet 15 years later there is widespread consensus that Berlin failed to live up to the challenges of the time and adequately deal with the consequences of reunification. Instead of embarking on structural reforms Berlin produced its own version of a Reformstau. The article describes and examines some basic features of the party system in Berlin and the Berlin polity. It will thus give an answer to the question as to how unification affected the institutional setting in this Land. Overall it will be shown that the Reformstau in Berlin cannot be explained by a fragmented political system or powerful veto players. Political stagnation in Berlin rather was due to the combined effects of party system change, institutional stagnation, and constitutionally inhibited political leadership.



Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 9. Local government(s)

Souza Celina

Brazilian metropolitan regions: regime change and governance vacuum

in **Public Administration and Development**, Volume 25 Issue 4 , 341 - 350

The article analyses the political and the institutional features of Brazilian metropolitan regions in relation to (a) the influence of regime change, from authoritarianism to democracy; (b) the changes in the federal system brought about by the 1988 Constitution designed to legitimise the new democratic order; and (c) the dynamics of intergovernmental relations. It argues that the institutionalisation of metropolitan regions and the creation of agencies for their management during the military regime became associated with the regime's major negative features - authoritarianism and centralisation - hence influencing future choices and leaving metropolitan governance in a political, institutional, financial and administrative vacuum.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 9. Local government(s)

Markey Sean

Building Local Development Institutions in the Hinterland: A Regulationist Perspective from British Columbia, Canada

in **International Journal of Urban and Regional Research**, Vol. 29 Issue 2 , 358-374

This article examines the process of local development within the context of restructuring in hinterland British Columbia, Canada. The role of local development in the reconstruction of hinterland space is attracting considerable research attention, building upon an existing body of work from Canada and elsewhere, which is steadily refining our understanding of the local development process. Through a case study of two communities, this article seeks to enhance the theory–practice coordination of this work by using a regulation approach to examine the process, organizational structures and relationships inherent in local development. The communities in this study used local development both to pursue economic diversification and also to offset the uncertainty caused by economic and political restructuring. The findings illustrate that the case communities responded to restructuring in a systematic manner. This shows that the practice of local development may be related to theoretical interpretations of institution-building. Regulation theory provides a framework within which to forge a link between the practical dimensions of the local development process and the concept of building local institutions. Specifically, the development of a local mode of social regulation is dependent upon the stability and coordination of a locally based development institution.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 9. Local government(s)

Hautekeur Gerard

Community development in Europe

in **Community Development Journal**, Volume 40, Number 4 , 385-398

Throughout Europe there is a revival in community development (CD), not only in those countries with a longer tradition in the field, but also in countries such as Bulgaria, Romania and the Czech Republic where such concepts are again coming into their own. The political climate is favourable because governments and, more especially, increasing



numbers of local authorities promote interactive management in which citizens are involved in the early stages of decision-making. As another instance of this growing support, in March 1989 the standing conference of local and regional authorities of Europe adopted a resolution on self-help and CD in towns.

Many governmental agencies recognize the added value of organizations in civil society, which have developed skills and expertise in organizing people's participation.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 9. Local government(s)

Scholz John T., Wang Cheng-Lung

**Cooptation or Transformation? Local Policy Networks and Federal Regulatory Enforcement
in *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 50, Issue 1 , 81-97**

Local policy networks can aid federal agencies, but they can also coopt federal resources for unintended purposes. Our empirical study finds that effective local networks increase both enforcement and compliance rates for the Clean Water Act. We discuss the circumstances under which effective networks can transform political culture, enhancing enforcement and compliance even in conservative areas generally opposed to regulation. The modified detection-controlled estimation procedure enables us to utilize official enforcement records from 1994 to 2000 to study both enforcement and compliance.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 9. Local government(s)

Kathi Pradeep Chandra , Cooper Terry L.

**Democratizing the Administrative State: Connecting Neighborhood Councils and City Agencies
in *Public Administration Review*, September 2005 - Vol. 65 Issue 5 , 559-567**

Citizen participation in government decision making, especially at the local level, has received heightened attention with regard to its promise for improved governance. The overarching administrative ethos of the administrative state creates barriers to citizen participation in governance. Developing and nurturing citizen participation in the presence of the administrative state is a significant challenge. Drawing on the literary tradition of public engagement and learning, this article models a developmental strategy of participation that offers one avenue for achieving meaningful partnerships between city agencies and neighborhood councils in a metropolitan environment. We present a model of neighborhood councilsthat brings neighborhood councils and city agencies together in a collaborative partnership. This model is based on the literature on citizen participation, which focuses on the significance of interactive processes in building trust among participants and creating mutual understanding and agreement.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 9. Local government(s)

McAteer Mark Bennett Michael



Devolution and Local Government: Evidence from Scotland

in *Local Government Studies*, Vol. 31 n. 3 , 285 - 306

Devolution in Scotland has had a major impact upon local government. Local government, at both political and managerial levels, perceives central government in the shape of the Scottish Executive to be closer (geographically and politically) and more open to local government in terms of access to ministers and civil servants. However, Scottish central–local relations continues to be characterised by a sense of mistrust of local government, especially among civil servants and a continuing desire for central control of key policy agendas. Equally, the policy process continues to display features of fragmentation across major policy areas. Moreover, Westminster has not yet departed the scene of Scottish politics in both financial and policy terms but also in the enduring presence of a Westminster ‘political culture’

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 9. Local government(s)

Rainer-Olaf Schultze

Die Föderalismusreform zwischen Anspruch und Wirklichkeit

in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, Band 13-14, 2005

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 9. Local government(s)

Dubresson Alain, Fauré Yves-André

Décentralisation et développement local : un lien à repenser. Introduction

in *Revue Tiers Monde*, Tomo 46 n. 181

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 9. Local government(s)

Margedant Udo

Ein bürgerfernes Machtspiel ohne Gewinner

in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, Band 13-14, 2005

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 9. Local government(s)

Dinham Adam

Empowered or over-powered? The real experiences of local participation in the UK's New Deal for Communities

in *Community Development Journal*, Volume 40, Number 3 , 301-312



The notion of 'participation' has growing currency at many levels of social policy in the UK where the Labour government uses it to denote the engagement of 'local people' in decision-making about the services and structures which affect their daily lives. In particular, local participation is given as the distinctive feature of the UK government's flagship initiative for neighbourhood renewal, the New Deal for Communities, but there is little known about what this means in practice for the 'local' people it affects.

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Sjoquist David L. , Walker Mary Beth, Wallace Sally

Estimating Differential Responses to Local Fiscal Conditions: A Mixture Model Analysis

in Public Finance Review, Vol. 33, No. 1 , 36-61

Alternative hypotheses exist regarding the impact of local sales and income taxes on local governments' taxing and spending decisions. One hypothesis is that local governments use sales and income taxes to pay for spending increases and leave property tax collections unchanged, while an equally plausible alternative is that local governments use sales and income taxes to reduce property taxes. Traditional models that restrict the impact of these local taxes to be the same across all local governments are not able to capture both types of behavior. The methodological difficulty lies in allowing for differences in behavior with no a priori information on which cities belong in which category. In this article, the authors use panel data to estimate a mixture model of spending and property tax response to the existence of local taxes. These empirical results provide evidence to support both hypotheses. These differences are both substantive and statistically significant.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

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Andrews Rhys , Boyne George A. , Law Jennifer , Walker Richard M.

External Constraints on Local Service Standards: The Case of Comprehensive Performance Assessment in English Local Government

in Public Administration, August 2005 - Vol. 83 Issue 3 , 639 - 656

Central government in the UK has introduced performance management regimes that apply rewards and sanctions to local service providers. These regimes assume that organizational performance is attributable to decisions made by local policy-makers rather than circumstances beyond their control. We test this assumption by developing a statistical model of external constraints on service standards and applying this model to the outcomes of comprehensive performance assessment (CPA) in English local government. The results show that CPA scores were significantly influenced by the characteristics such as social diversity and economic prosperity of local populations. Thus 'poor' performance is partly attributable to difficult circumstances rather than bad choices.

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Kühne Hartmut

Föderalismusreform - Laufen oder Stolpern? Essay

in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, Band 13-14, 2005

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 9. Local government(s)

Lodge Martin and Wegrich Kai

Governing multi-level governance: comparing domain dynamics in German Land-local relationships and prisons

in *Public Administration*, June 2005 - Vol. 83 Issue 2 , 417-442

While the notion of governance has received considerable scholarly attention, much less is known about change, and its sources, across modes of governance within respective policy domains. This article explores these neglected issues in two policy domains characterized by multi-level governance characteristics: Land (state)-local relationships in the domain of building administration and relationships governing the prisons domain in Germany. It does so in three steps. First, the article explores governance and considers endogenous and exogenous sources of change. Second, it discusses the institutional arrangements in the two domains and analyses modes of governance and their change. Third, the article compares the different dynamics of change and links these findings to wider debates regarding change across and within modes of governance. The analysis of the two domains suggests that 'hunting around' effects (i.e. permanent instability) are less prominent than suggested by cultural theory, while external pressures for change are filtered by the preferences of the actors within the respective domains.

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Subsection 9. Local government(s)

Ashworth John, Geys Benny, Heyndels Bruno

Government Weakness and Local Public Debt Development in Flemish Municipalities

in *International Tax and Public Finance*, vol. 12, no 4 , 395-422

The Weak Government Hypothesis states that government fragmentation leads to higher public deficits and debt. This relation can be explained by government inaction, common pool problems or the strategic use of debt that arise in coalition governments. Importantly, whereas government inaction models concentrate on the short-term effects of government fragmentation on indebtedness, common pool and strategic debt models imply that such effects will persist in the long term. We test these hypotheses using a large panel of data on municipal debt in 298 Flemish municipalities (1977–2000). We find that there is no long-run effect from weak governments. However, there is general support for the fact that the number of parties in a coalition has a positive effect on the municipality's short-term debt levels—in line with government inaction models.



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Ashwort John, Heyndels Bruno

Government fragmentation and budgetary policy in good and bad times in Flemish municipalities
in **Economics and Politics**, Volume 17 Issue 2

Using a panel of budgetary data over the period 1989-1996, we analyse how political fragmentation of Flemish local governments affects their reactions in the context of a major reform of the grant system. This reform reallocated grants among municipalities and thus unavoidably created winners and losers. Thus, it is possible to distinguish between political reactions in good and bad times. The presence of a balanced budget requirement implies that in bad times municipalities have to react whereas in good times the decision to react is endogenous to the government. The results are in line with the hypotheses, if not the findings, of Kontopoulos and Perotti (1999) in that we find that fragmentation is important both in good and in bad times. Coalition size – the number of political parties – plays a crucial role when the budgetary shock is endogenous (in good times when grants increase). In this case, we find that more-party governments spend more of the additional funds. On the other hand, cabinet size – the number of spending ministers (aldermen) – is the relevant dimension of fragmentation when the reaction is exogenous (in bad times). When grants are cut back, expenditures are cut back more in municipalities with fewer ministers.

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Warburton John, Baker Geoff

Integrity Systems and Local Government

in **Australian Journal of Public Administration**, Volume 64, Number 2 , 62-68

Australia's third sphere of government is local government, consisting of about 675 councils nationally, responsible for an average of 6 percent of total public sector expenditure (around \$18 billion) annually. This article reviews key integrity issues confronting local government, based on experience in NSW and Queensland. Current issues confirm integrity to be a significant concern manifesting in a large variety of forms, both in council administration and in local government politics. A new generation of responses are increasingly tailored to recognising local government as a permanent, elected sphere of government, accounting directly to the public, while, supported by state regulators, individual councils also pursue better practice in the management of their own administrations.

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Barone G.

Intese e leale cooperazione fra Stato, regioni e autonomie locali negli interventi sul territorio
in **Quaderni Regionali** , n. 2 , 335 - 363

No abstract available



Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 9. Local government(s)

Stansel Dean

Local decentralization and local economic growth: A cross-sectional examination of US metropolitan areas
in **Journal of Urban Economics**, Volume 57, Issue 1 , 55-72

This paper builds on the growing empirical literature that explores the relationship between government structure and economic growth. It uses a new data set of 314 US metropolitan areas to examine the relationship between local decentralization and local economic growth. The results indicate a negative relationship between the central-city share of metro area population and economic growth and a positive relationship between both the number of municipalities per 100,000 residents and the number of counties per 100,000 residents and economic growth. Those findings provide support for the hypothesis that decentralization enhances economic growth

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Rodriguez-Acosta Cristina A. , Rosenbaum Allan

Local government and the governance of metropolitan areas in Latin America
in **Public Administration and Development**, Volume 25 Issue 4 , 295 - 306

Two of the most important trends occurring in Latin America and the Caribbean during the past quarter century have been rapid urbanisation and government decentralisation. With approximately 75% of its 520 million inhabitants living in urban areas, the region has seen the emergence of such mega-cities as Buenos Aires, Lima, Mexico City and Sao Paulo. At the same time, the region, partly on its own and partly prodded by international organisations and donors, has been struggling with the issue of decentralising its historically highly centralised national governments and strengthening its traditionally very weak and highly dependent local governments. In this article, the authors examine local governance structures in several major urban areas of Latin America in order to understand how these two sometimes highly contradictory developments are impacting upon the governance of metropolitan areas and the resolution of the major problems facing them. Particular attention is paid to emerging cooperative arrangements that may in the future help to address significant metropolitan area issues.

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Devas Nick

Metropolitan governance and urban poverty
in **Public Administration and Development**, Volume 25 Issue 4 , 351 - 361

In the design of urban governance structures, there is an inherent tension between scale and voice. Both aspects are important considerations if city government is to address the needs of the poor. Metropolitan-scale government offers the potential for resources (notably finance but also land, natural resources and skills) to be mobilised from across the city to provide services and infrastructure for all, including the poor. But the metropolitan scale can also mean remoteness of decision-makers from citizens and hence a weakened citizen voice, especially of the poor. This article



explores this tension, using material from recent research on urban governance and poverty in ten cities of Asia, Africa and Latin America. The analysis covers issues of jurisdiction boundaries, responsibilities for services and infrastructure, resource bases and mobilisation, performance in service delivery and access to services, political representation and accountability and mechanisms of citizen participation. The conclusion is that the tension between scale and voice may be best addressed by a two-tier or multi-tier structure involving both a very local level, with statutory rights and a share of resources, accessible and accountable to the poor, together with an upper level, also democratically accountable, covering the whole metropolitan area.

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Subsection 9. Local government(s)

Laquian Aprodicio A.

Metropolitan governance reform in Asia

in Public Administration and Development, Volume 25 Issue 4 , 307 - 315

Governance reforms in Asian city-regions have sought to achieve efficient delivery of urban services as well as greater people's participation in decision-making. Structural reforms have taken the form of unified metropolitan governance or tiered metropolitan structures imposed by higher levels of government. Significant success has been achieved in area-wide regional planning and in coordination of area-wide services such as transport, water and sanitation, and solid waste disposal. Social reforms including decentralisation of powers to local units have been hampered by strong traditions of local autonomy, particularistic politics and graft and corruption. With a few exceptions, civil society groups have not had much influence on metropolitan governance reforms in Asia.

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Subsection 9. Local government(s)

Cameron Robert

Metropolitan restructuring (and more restructuring) in South Africa

in Public Administration and Development, Volume 25 Issue 4 , 329 - 339

This article analyses the evolution of metropolitan government in South Africa. During the past ten years South Africa has progressed from having no metropolitan government, to a two-tier metropolitan system and now to a single-tier metropolitan system. The ruling African National Congress (ANC) prefers single-tier metropolitan authorities as a means to, inter alia, promote redistribution of resources and services, promote strategic land-use planning and facilitate economic and social development. A single-tier system was accordingly introduced in 2000. The major thrust of this article is an examination of the process that led to the introduction of six metropolitan governments, and the theoretical debates that underpinned this decision. It also analyses new types of executive systems, forms of public participation, development and service delivery. Finally, it provides a preliminary analysis of the performance of the new metropolitan governments. The article argues that structural reform, territorial changes, development in local government and new forms of service delivery have seriously overburdened local government in the short term and have detracted from service delivery. These unitary metros have, however, been operating for less than four years and must be given time to prove themselves before an informed evaluation can be made.

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Subsection 9. Local government(s)

Ionita Sorin

Money for our people? Decentralisation and corruption in Romania: the cases of the equalisation, infrastructure and pre-university education funds

in *Public Administration and Development*, Volume 25 Issue 3 , 251 - 267

In spite of the attempts, in the most recent years, to introduce simple, accountable and rule-based mechanisms governing the flows of funds for Romanian local governments (LGs) there is evidence showing that deviations from the norms are still widespread and undermine the stated goals of many policies. This article aims to explore to what extent the political factor (party affiliation, i.e. local informal power networks) interferes with the allocation of public funds as far as three main areas of decentralised policy are concerned: (i) the general purpose equalisation transfers; (ii) the Roads Fund grants and (iii) the transfers for financing the pre-university education. These components represent a relatively large share of the local budgets and are illustrative for two important attributions Romanian LGs perform today: maintaining the local infrastructure and providing essential social services. Through a set of variables - measuring, on the one hand, the real pattern of resource allocation and on the other hand, the intensity of politicisation in the three areas - we tested the hypothesis that intergovernmental financial flows in Romania are to a large extent captured by rent-seeking groups. It turns out that this is indeed the case with the funds for infrastructure, and much less so with the transfers financing pre-university education. Some conclusions from these contrasting situations are drawn which reflect on the broader discussion, the link between decentralisation and corruption.

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27-30

New Levels of Government Responsiveness for 'All-Hazards': the Management of Natural Disasters and Emergencies

in *Australian Journal of Public Administration*, Volume 64, Number 2 , Cornell Robert

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 9. Local government(s)

Solé-Ollé Albert , Bosch Núria

On the Relationship between Authority Size and the Costs of Providing Local Services: Lessons for the Design of Intergovernmental Transfers in Spain

in *Public Finance Review*, Vol. 33, No. 3 , 343-384

Unconditional transfers to local governments in Spain are distributed mainly according to weighted population, with weights rising with population size to account for the higher expenditure responsibilities and needs of bigger municipalities. The authors evaluate the appropriateness of these weights and estimate an expenditure equation with a data set covering more than 2,500 Spanish municipalities in 1999, and the use of a piecewise linear function accounts for the possible nonlinear relationship between costs and population size. The results identify important scale economies for the smallest local authorities and growing per capita costs for higher population sizes. However, the growth in per capita costs is much lower than the one implicit in the weights used in the distribution of transfers.



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Carnegie Garry D.

Promoting Accountability in Municipalities

in **Australian Journal of Public Administration**, Volume 64, Number 3

Local government financial reporting reforms in Australia in the late 1980s and early 1990s were promoted on the basis of usefulness for decision making and for enhanced accountability purposes. Persistent criticisms of these reforms continue to be made, including those made by councillors and other ratepayers who often appear to find such information to be too narrow, too complex and often bewildering. A case is made for rethinking the present mentality, requirements and practices, especially with respect to the contrived recognition of community assets. Instead, an emphasis is placed on advancing broad-scope accountability and meaningful financial reporting. To this end, the disclosure of a set of factual, reliable and interpretable indicators is proposed to enable a broader, more functional notion of accountability to be applied in Australian local government within prevailing social and organisational contexts. This contribution seeks to present a series of views, questions and proposals that are strictly concerned with promoting accountability in municipalities (PAM).

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Subsection 9. Local government(s)

Oates Wallace E.

Property taxation and local public spending: the renter effect

in **Journal of Urban Economics**, Volume 57, Issue 3 , 419-431

The point of departure for this study is the pervasive finding that, other things equal, local jurisdictions tend to spend more on local services the larger the fraction of renters among their residents. This paper seeks to determine the approximate magnitude of this "renter effect" by posing the question "How much smaller would local public budgets be if all residents were home-owners?" Making use of two quite different approaches, the paper finds a typical renter effect on local public expenditure on the order of ten percent. This finding suggests that we might do well to reform the administration of the property tax so that changes in property tax liabilities on rental dwellings are directly and visibly transformed into changes of monthly rental payments.

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Schmidt-Jortzig Edzard

Reformbedürftigkeit des deutschen Föderalismus

in **Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte**, Band 13-14, 2005

No abstract available



Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 9. Local government(s)

Warner Mildred E., Pratt James E.

Spatial diversity in local government revenue effort under decentralization: a neural-network approach
in **Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy**, Volume 23, Issue 5, October , pp. 657-677

Decentralization reflects a global trend to increase the responsiveness of state and local governments to economic forces, but it raises the challenge of how to secure redistributive goals. Theoretically, as the equalizing impact of federal aid declines under devolution, we expect subnational state-level government policy to become more important, and geographic diversity in local governments' efforts to raise revenue to increase. In this paper we explore the impact of state fiscal centralization and intergovernmental aid on local revenue effort with the aid of Census of Governments data for county areas from 1987 for the Mid-Atlantic and East North Central region of the United States, with particular attention paid to rural counties. The 1987 period was chosen because it is the first year in which state policy trends diverged from federal decentralization trends and both state aid and state centralization increased while federal aid to localities continued to decline. Using a neural-network approach, we explore the spatially differentiated impact of state policy and find complementary responses in effort among some localities and substitution responses among others. Classification-tree analysis of this diversity suggests that decentralization and the competitive government it promotes are likely to exacerbate inequality among local governments.

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Morrone Andrea

Statuti regionali, chimere federali

in **Mulino (il)**, n. 2, marzo-aprile, 2005 , 229-238

ABSTRACT: Che cosa è scaturito sinora dalle riforme nate sull'onda della crescente domanda di federalismo? La grancassa federalista è stata per lo più percossa a fini prevalentemente politici, per mobilitare fette di elettorato più che per creare le fondamenta di un federalismo diffuso. E la stessa legittima aspettativa di vedere carte regionali diversificate a seconda dei contesti e degli interessi territoriali è andata delusa.

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Thoenig Jean-Claude

Territorial Administration and Political Control: Decentralization in France

in **Public Administration**, August 2005 - Vol. 83 Issue 3 , 689 - 708

This paper, which is based on recent field research, suggests an interpretative model of territorial government in France. Relations between national and local authorities as well as policy-making processes suggest that the centralized state has faced a major decline of its hegemony and that decentralization reforms have induced a polycentric dynamic. Seven basic characteristics and three key properties of the model are discussed. The emerging model fits neither a new localism nor a new centralist pattern. It is the product of ongoing and incremental trade-offs between centrifugal and



centripetal rationales. This complexity reflects a situation that is under the rather conservative, as well as tight, control of national politicians who hold multiple local elected mandates.

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Bahry Donna

The New Federalism and the Paradoxes of Regional Sovereignty in Russia

in Comparative Politics, Vol. 37 n. 2

During the 1990s Russia appeared to be a classic example of the perils of federalism in political transition. Powerful ethnically based republics challenged the center on key reforms, and a weak federal government appeared unable to counter their claims to sovereignty. Since the election of 2000, however, regional prerogatives have been substantially curtailed. An assertive center has dramatically reined in much more pliant republics. How could the center roll back the regions' privileges so quickly? In fact, republic sovereignty was seriously limited. Federal authorities retained key controls over local resources, and federal inability to create effective market institutions constrained regional opportunities to develop countervailing external ties.

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Subsection 9. Local government(s)

Sancton Andrew

The governance of metropolitan areas in Canada

in Public Administration and Development, Volume 25 Issue 4 , 317 - 327

This article briefly examines five significant Canadian developments with respect to the governance of metropolitan areas: annexations and mergers such that there is one main municipal government for the metropolitan area, two-tier metropolitan government, the amalgamation of two-tier metropolitan systems into a single municipality, demergers in Quebec, and the creation of flexible and innovative entities for metropolitan governance. Special attention is paid to the Greater Toronto Area, a continuous built-up urban area that transcends at least three metropolitan areas as defined by Statistics Canada. In the absence of any authority covering the entire metropolitan area, it now appears that the Ontario provincial government is becoming the key policy maker. As an example of a flexible and innovative form of metropolitan governance, the Greater Vancouver Regional District merits attention elsewhere in the world. Canada's experiences with so many different institutional arrangements in recent years means that there is much to be learnt from their obvious failures and occasional successes.

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Subsection 9. Local government(s)

Kehaulani Kauanui J.

The multiplicity of Hawaiian sovereignty claims and the struggle for meaningful autonomy

in Comparative American Studies, Vol. 3 n. 3 , 283-299



There are multiple Hawaiian political claims and entitlements. Is independence appropriate for Hawai'i? Is it appropriate for Hawaiians? These two questions are not one and the same. In the movement today, there are multiple levels of ambiguity about these two claims – the right to indigenous self-determination under US domestic law and Hawai'i's right to self-determination under international law – as evidenced in the strategic invocation of both. The persistent maintenance of the dual claim reveals a particular sort of political ambivalence having to do with the dilemmas over the exercise of sovereignty in the 21st century. This article examines two different claims – one which is specific to Hawaiians as an indigenous people subjugated by US colonialism, and the other which is not limited to the indigenous and focuses on the broader national claims to Hawai'i's independence. Within this latter arena, there are two distinct lines of political activism and legal claims – one that calls for de-colonization protocols and the other that calls for deoccupation

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Lorrain Donimique

Urban Capitalisms: European Models in Competition

in *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, Vol. 29 Issue 2 , 231-267

This article takes as its starting point a central issue for the urban social sciences: comparison. Local government is a theme where much is singular, contingent and idiosyncratic, and international comparison reinforces this tendency towards diversity. Therefore, the capacity to generalize becomes a real issue. The central argument of this article is that, beyond any first-level complexity, the organization of the urban services sector in European countries basically follows three major 'models'. These simplified forms represent ways of combining public policy principles with a market economy. As such, they may be read as specific versions of urban capitalism. All three 'models' are European in origin, and nowadays find themselves in competition. In order to establish the features of these models — simplified forms of more complex phenomena — it is necessary to introduce a historical reading of overall choices of institutional and policy architecture. It is necessary to trace the importance of firms and to study the momentum of crisis and tension, as these give an internal view of phenomena that are generally regarded as natural.

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Subsection 9. Local government(s)

Karnik Ajit, Lalvani Mala

Urban Local Governments and the Flypaper Effect: Evidence from Maharashtra, India

in *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, Vol. 35, n. 2, Spring , pp. 273-296

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 10. Processes of federalization and decentralization

Falletti Tulia G.

A Sequential Theory of Decentralization: Latin American Cases in Comparative Perspective



in **American Political Science Review**, issue 3, vol. 99, august , 327-346

ABSTRACT: Both advocates and critics of decentralization assume that decentralization invariably increases the power of subnational governments. However, a closer examination of the consequences of decentralization across countries reveals that the magnitude of such change can range from substantial to insignificant. In this article, I propose a sequential theory of decentralization that has three main characteristics: (1) it defines decentralization as a process, (2) it takes into account the territorial interests of bargaining actors, and (3) it incorporates policy feedback effects. I argue that the sequencing of different types of decentralization (fiscal, administrative, and political) is a key determinant of the evolution of intergovernmental balance of power. I measure this evolution in the four largest Latin American countries and apply the theory to the two extreme cases (Colombia and Argentina). I show that, contrary to commonly held opinion, decentralization does not necessarily increase the power of governors and mayors.

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Subsection 10. Processes of federalization and decentralization

Grau Creus Mirela

A Step Backwards or a Step Forwards? The Politics and Policies of Decentralization under the Governments of the Partido Popular

in **South European Society & Politics**, Volume 10, Number 2, July - special issue: The South European Right in the 21st Century: Italy, France and Spain , pp. 263-279

This article analyses the extent to which the centralist and unitary perceptions of Spanish national identity, historically linked to right-wing state-wide parties, guided the policy choices on political decentralization made by the governments of the Partido Popular (PP) (1996–2004), especially those related to the participation of the Autonomous Communities within state-wide politics and policy processes. Using data on intergovernmental conflicts, it finds that although the PP governments did actively neglect the political role of the Autonomous Communities at the state level, this behaviour was as much related to their adherence to the traditional right-wing attitude towards political decentralization itself as to their desire to prevent the Autonomous Communities acting as a political opposition.

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Subsection 10. Processes of federalization and decentralization

Riphenburg Carol

Afghanistan's Constitution: Success or Sham?

in **Middle East Policy**, Volume 12, Issue 1, March , pp. 31-43

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 10. Processes of federalization and decentralization

Benz Arthur

Bundesstaatskommission scheiterte, aber nicht scheitern musste



in *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, Heft 2, 46. Jahrgang, Juni , 204-214

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 10. Processes of federalization and decentralization

Guess George M.

Comparative Decentralization Lessons from Pakistan, Indonesia, and the Philippines

in *Public Administration Review*, March 2005 - Vol. 65 Issue 2 , 217-230

This article provides an analytic framework to guide regimes that are designing or implementing decentralization programs. It is based on a comparison of three Asian cases of fast-track decentralization. The framework suggests that regimes contemplating devolution must face fundamental issues of (1) background support, (2) culture and institutions, and (3) technical design and sequencing. It can be used by regimes to compare the relative difficulty of fundamental challenges to decentralization with their own capacity and potential for effective response. The three regimes responded similarly to the first two issues and differed in how they performed technical activities to implement the decentralization programs. Within this technical sequence, the regimes varied widely in performance. In that the Philippine program has attained better performance so far, the different responses of that regime are significant. More research is required to explain differences in technical performance in the Philippines and other similar programs and to attribute measures of decentralization success to these differences.

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Subsection 10. Processes of federalization and decentralization

Chijioke Njoku Raphael

Deadly ethnic conflict and the imperative of power sharing: Could a consociational federalism hold in Rwanda?

in *Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, Vol. 43 n. 1 , 82 - 101

Principles of consociationalism and federalism have been successfully adopted by the strategic elites in a number of countries, including some in Africa, turning their once volatile politics into a more amicable order. It is proposed that the best hope for a less conflictual politics in Rwanda resides in an elite disposition towards political accommodation and the adoption of the non-majoritarian political arrangements associated with consociational federalism. This agenda is discussed in light of both the structural dimensions of consociationalism and federalism and, more briefly, of relevant African examples of their utilisation. Application of appropriately configured consociational and federal arrangements is presented as an imperative in such a deeply divided polity, where power commands monopolistic access to available resources and where those in power often employ violence and exclusion to safeguard their interests.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 10. Processes of federalization and decentralization

Blunt Peter , Turner Mark

Decentralisation, democracy and development in a post-conflict society: commune councils in Cambodia

in *Public Administration and Development*, Volume 25 Issue 1 , 75 - 87



This article explores explanations for the development of a particular form of decentralisation in the post-conflict state of Cambodia. It looks at the context in which decentralisation has taken place, and analyses critical aspects of the functioning of the main elements of decentralisation: the commune councils. The article demonstrates that decentralisation has faltered due to a lack of fit with Cambodia's socio-cultural and institutional context. This helps to explain why there has been relatively little devolution of decision-making power to commune councils in Cambodia. But this is not the complete answer. A more powerful explanation is one in which an unconducive general environment for decentralisation complements a lack of real political enthusiasm for the idea, and a government agenda that is more consistent with pragmatic short-term political gains (such as the consolidation of political party interests) than it is with the bolder, largely ideologically-driven interests of donors in the post-conflict establishment of strong forms of popular participation and political pluralism.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 10. Processes of federalization and decentralization

Dardanelli Paolo

Democratic Deficit or the Europeanisation of Secession? Explaining the Devolution Referendums in Scotland in Political Studies, Volume 53, Issue 2, June , pp. 320-342

This article deals with the variation in the demand for self-government in Scotland as measured by the vote in the two referendums between 1979, when devolution was rejected, and 1997, when devolution was endorsed. The existing literature mainly deals with each of the two referendums in isolation and does not offer an explicitly comparative analysis of them. However, implicit comparisons contained in analyses of the 1997 referendum tend to identify as the main cause of the variation the 'democratic deficit' created by Conservative rule between 1979 and 1997, which was consistently rejected in Scotland. I take issue with this explanation on theoretical and empirical grounds and advances an alternative account grounded in an explicit comparison of the two referendums. Based on a rationalist approach, the analysis presented here identifies three key elements in the voting dynamics at the two points in time – a gap between support for self-government and the actual vote in the referendum; an interaction effect between attitudes to devolution and to independence; and the role of the European context in shaping perceptions of independence. I argue that significant change in these three variables (rather than a 'democratic deficit') appear to have been the most important determinants of the different results of the two referendums.

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Brinkerhoff Derick W. , Mayfield James B.

Democratic governance in Iraq? Progress and peril in reforming state-society relations in Public Administration and Development, Volume 25 Issue 1 , 59 - 73

This article examines the experience of the Local Governance Project (LGP) in Iraq. LGP activities include: establishment of representative councils, service delivery capacity-building, civil society strengthening, decentralisation policy development and civic dialogue. The article documents how these activities contributed to changing interactions between citizens and government, reaching across individual social and ethnic groups. In post-war Iraq, such social capital could be a positive contributor. Its potential, however, is limited by the absence of the conditions necessary for



stability and reconstruction. Violence and insecurity, the actions of conflict entrepreneurs and the resiliency of the shadow state raise doubts about the prospects for governance reform. Lessons include: a local governance focus can build reform constituencies resistant to reversal by central-level actors; reformed local governance cannot support democratisation without a security and political framework that raises costs of resorting to violence; donor-led governance innovations often maintain control of change at the expense of legitimacy; acceptance of governance reforms depends upon the extent to which they are perceived as effective and legitimate, but such changes are likely to be fragile in post-conflict societies; short-term reconstruction timetables increase the risk of relying on existing power structures and on weak newly-created institutions, which lay an insufficient foundation for fundamental governance reform and new state-society relations.

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Sarasqueta, A.

Después de las últimas autonómicas. El escenario radical de la política española
in *Nueva Revista de Política Cultura y arte (Spagna)*, Nº 100. Junio-Agosto

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

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Knox Colin, Carmichael Paul

Devolution -- the Northern Ireland way: an exercise in 'creative ambiguity'
in *Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy*, Volume 23, Issue 1, February , pp. 63-83

Devolution in Northern Ireland followed directly from the 1998 Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement which provided, inter alia, for a democratically elected Assembly "inclusive in its membership, capable of exercising executive and legislative authority, and subject to safeguards to protect the rights and interests of all sides of the community". More than six years on, the Northern Ireland Executive and Assembly are in suspension for the fourth time (the latest since October 2002). The conjunction of devolution and the implementation of the Agreement mean that the former is wholly dependent on the vagaries of the latter and, as a consequence, has devalued the potential of devolution to improve the governance of Northern Ireland.

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Michael Keating, Nicola McEwen

Devolution and public policy in comparative perspective
in *Regional and Federal Studies*, Volume 15, Number 4 / December , 413-421

Devolution has transferred important policy competences to sub-state levels in Europe but there has been little research on the effect of this on policy choices. Studies of the United Kingdom, Spain and Belgium illustrate different patterns,



dependent on the allocation of competences, historic influences, policy communities and political conditions.

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Silva Joseph A.

Devolution and regional disparities in the Philippines: is there a connection?

in Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, Volume 23, Issue 3, June , pp. 399-417

The 1991 Local Government Code of the Philippines brought about a far-reaching transfer of authority and resources to its local governments. Despite bringing benefits to the nation as a whole, and to the individual local governments, devolution has also had some negative consequences. Although regional disparities were present in the country prior to devolution, their recent rise has coincided with the implementation of devolution. Regional disparities are analyzed in relation to general macroeconomic policies and trends, such as industrial policy and increased trade, and particular socioeconomic features of the Philippines, such as the significance of investments and migration. These policies and trends, coupled with faulty transfer systems and differing levels of efficiency and capacity, suggest that devolution is hampering the pursuit of regional equity. Hence it is concluded that, although many factors are responsible for the spatial inequities, devolution in its present form plays a direct and interactive part in preserving and/or promoting regional disparities in the country.

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Barracca Steven

Devolution and the Deepening of Democracy: Explaining Outcomes of Municipal Reform in Mexico

in Journal of Latin American Studies , Volume 37 - Issue 01 - February , 1-28

This article evaluates the implementation of Mexico's Municipal Reform of 1983 in three states: Chihuahua, Oaxaca and Yucatán. The research focuses on one element of the reform, the transfer of public services from the state to the municipal level. The case studies were selected to examine the impact of two key variables on reform outcomes: fiscal capacity and partisan control of state and municipal governments. Counter to expectations, the reform has not advanced more in municipalities with greater fiscal capacity. Also counter to expectations, there is no evidence that devolution advanced more in municipalities controlled by the opposition. This is due to the fact that state governors have a high degree of discretion that allows them to block implementation for partisan motives rather than rational/technical ones. The Municipal Reform of 1999 attempts to remedy this problem by limiting gubernatorial discretion while increasing the legal recourse municipalities have in soliciting the transfer of services. This recourse includes filing suit before the Mexican Supreme Court.

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Onida Valerio

Do Constitutional Judges make federalism (in Italy)?

in *Federalismi*, Anno III, n. 19

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

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Rico, A.P.

El fantasma de las autonomias se despierta en America del Sur

in *Geosur : publicacion mensual* , Vol. 26 n. 303-304 , Pag. 36-41

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

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Pekka Kettunen, Tarvo Kungla

Europeanization of sub-national governance in unitary states: Estonia and Finland

in *Regional and Federal Studies*, Volume 15, Number 3 / September , 353-378

The Europeanization of sub-national institutions has been on the research agenda for some time. There are arguments both for presuming a growing power of regional actors, a gradual weakening of the nation states, and for emphasizing the continuous importance and renewal capacity of the states. The mechanisms by which this process takes place are less well known and there is a scarcity of comparative empirical studies presenting evidence for either of the above arguments. In order to shed light on the influencing factors in the process, this article analyses and discusses the Europeanization process in two unitary member states, Estonia and Finland. The policy area in focus is regional policy. The results suggest that the Europeanization process is not straightforward, but is conditioned largely by domestic policy practices and institutional constellations. In the Estonian case, the brief period of independence has been characterized by institutional turbulence, which has eventually led to a centralized style of regional policymaking. In the case of Finland, the EU impact was accommodated by new institutional and processual practices, but these arrangements proved much too weak to challenge the domestic actors, who were not prepared to play the game by the European rules.

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Piazza, S:

Federalismo e regionalismo in Italia e in Europa: cenni di riflessione ricognitiva

in *Nuova rassegna di legislazione, dottrina e giurisprudenza*, n. 14 , 1483-1497

No abstract available



Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

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Sturm Roland

Foederalismusreform: Kein Erkenntnisproblem, warum aber ein Gestaltungs- und Entscheidungsproblem?

in *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, Heft 2, 46. Jahrgang, Juni , 195-203

ABSTRACT: Fuer wenige Themen der Politik trifft die Feststellung, dass alles gesagt wurde, nur noch nicht von jedem, so sehr zu, wie fuer das Thema Foederalismusreform. Die - aus wissenschaftlicher Sicht nicht unbedingt ueberzeugende - Anfaelligkeit der Politikwissenschaft fuer Themenkonjunkturen trug ihren Teil dazu bei, die Diskussion im Kontext und begleitend zu der Arbeit der Kommission von Bundestag und Bundesrat zur "Modernisierung der bundesstaatlichen Ordnung" um weitere Ad-hoc-Beitraege zu bereichern.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

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Epstein Renaud

Gouverner à distance. Quand l'État se retire des territoires

in *Esprit*, n. 319, novembre 2005

La politique de la ville offre un bon fil conducteur pour suivre l'évolution des modes d'intervention de l'État dans les territoires, et donc des rapports entre pouvoir central et pouvoirs locaux. Après un modèle centralisé, l'État a mis en place un mode négocié de gouvernement et s'oriente aujourd'hui vers des procédures inédites de gouvernement à distance.

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Martin Ferry, Irene McMaster

Implementing structural funds in Polish and Czech regions: convergence, variation, empowerment?

in *Regional and Federal Studies*, Volume 15, Number 1 / March , 19-39

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

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Arellano-Gault David , Vera-Cortés Gabriela

Institutional design and organisation of the civil protection national system in Mexico: the case for a decentralised and participative policy network

in *Public Administration and Development*, Volume 25 Issue 3 , 185 - 192

Mexico established the Civil Protection National System (CPNS) following the disastrous 1985 earthquake that killed



nearly 10,000 people and devastated large sections of Mexico City. The institutional design and structure of the CPNS embraced citizen demands for greater participation in the Federal government's disaster prevention and response programmes. The authors examine the Federal government's response to disasters since 1985 and conclude that the CPNS operates in a manner that is contrary to the precepts that shaped its design and structure. The authors conclude that orthodox beliefs and assumptions about disasters rationalise the current operations of the CPNS. They argue that a holistic perspective of disasters, rather than a change in institutional design and organisation, is required in order to operationalise intergovernmental cooperation and citizen participation.

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Manzin Serena

La Catalogna chiede più soldi (ma non solo). La proposta di modifica dello Statuto catalano e la nuova stagione del regionalismo spagnolo

in *Federalismi*, Anno III, n. 18

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

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Piraino Andrea

La formazione dell'alta dirigenza per l'attuazione del federalismo istituzionale

in *Federalismi*, Anno III, n. 21

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

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Iurato Giovanna

Le Regioni italiane e il processo decisionale europeo. Un'analisi neo-istituzionalista della partecipazione

in *Federalismi*, Anno III, n. 23

Autopresentazione della monografia, Milano, A. Giuffrè, 2005

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

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Ghislain Otis

L'évolution constitutionnelle du Québec et des peuples autochtones : le défi de l'interdépendance

in *Cité, philosophie, politique, histoire*, n. 23

L'évocation d'une « évolution constitutionnelle » du Québec rendra sans doute perplexes bon nombre d'observateurs de



notre vie politique et juridique des quarante dernières années. La perception de stagnation, voire de régression, dans la recherche séculaire du Québec d'un renouveau dans ses rapports avec la fédération canadienne a en effet largement occulté les mutations profondes qui ont marqué, pendant la même époque, notre relation avec les peuples autochtones. Pourtant, en quelques décennies, notre rapport aux premiers peuples a évolué au point de nous faire passer d'une relation typiquement coloniale à une dynamique constitutionnelle d'interdépendance qui sera peut-être elle-même le prélude d'un mouvement, dans les prochaines décennies, vers une constitution de type postcolonial, c'est-à-dire fondée sur le principe d'égale dignité des nations. La difficulté persistante de notre inscription nationale dans l'ordre constitutionnel ne doit pas faire oublier que notre voisinage avec les autochtones engage, tout autant que le couple Québec-Canada, les déterminants fondamentaux de notre devenir que sont le partage de la légitimité historique, de la richesse et du pouvoir en ce coin d'Amérique.

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Ferrazzi Gabriele

Obligatory functions and minimum service standards for Indonesian regional government: searching for a model

in **Public Administration and Development**, Volume 25 Issue 3 , 227 - 238

The government of Indonesia is revising the 1999 regional government framework, in part, to better address the obligatory functions of the regional government. These refer to the minimum levels of service that regional governments must deliver. Regional actors have been demanding clear rules of the game on this issue in aid of accountability. Since 2000, the Ministry of Home Affairs, in concert with the key sectoral ministries, has tried to develop and test a suitable model. The findings of these efforts underscore that affordability of minimum service standards is a key concern, followed by capacity issues: recently the government has signalled its intent to forge ahead with a prescriptive approach by embedding the concept more firmly in the new law on regional government (Law 32/2004). It must still clarify the concept and provide concrete guidance to sectoral agencies to establish minimum service standards that will be affordable, feasible and enforceable. This article assesses the feasibility of the evolving Indonesian model. It concludes that a prescriptive approach is attractive, but its prospects are doubtful in the current Indonesian governance context. A cautious and phased approach is recommended

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Jocelyn Létourneau

Postnationalisme ?

in **Cité, philosophie, politique, histoire**, n. 23

Est-il encore approprié de s'interroger sur le devenir du Québec à travers le prisme cardinal de la question nationale ? Il se pourrait bien que non, ce qui ne veut pas dire que l'ambition indépendantiste, qui appartient au paysage politique québécois depuis des lustres, soit en voie de régression. Cela dit, le temps serait peut-être venu de changer de paradigme pour saisir la mouvance de la collectivité québécoise contemporaine. Si cette collectivité consolide sa distinction à l'intérieur de l'ensemble canadien, du fait notamment que ses habitants construisent au jour le jour une société qui possède des traits spécifiques et qui est marquée par des enjeux particuliers, il reste qu'elle connaît des



évolutions qui nécessitent de rafraîchir les visions, si ce n'est le répertoire de concepts, par le biais desquels on la saisit depuis le début des années 1960.

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Tierney Stephen

Refraining Sovereignty? Sub-state national societies and contemporary challenges to the nation-state
in *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, n. 1, vol. 54, january , 161-183

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

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Seongjin Kim

Regional cleavages in Russian legislative politics, 1990–93
in *Regional and Federal Studies*, Volume 15, Number 1 / March , 93-121

Despite the growing influence of the parliamentary system and at the same time of regionalist tendencies in early postcommunist Russia, little attention has so far been paid to the role of deputies in the national parliament as the agency by which contending claims were aggregated. This study focuses upon the influence of regionalism in the Congress of People's Deputies of Russia between 1990 and 1993 and its implications for future reform, including the development of federal relations. This discussion of regionalism in the Congresses leads us to the conclusion that regional socio-economic disparities affected the attitudes of deputies towards reform including possible changes in centre–periphery relations. However, the study also shows that regional interest articulation was rather chaotic, hampering the legislative process and encouraging an increasing diversity in regional patterns of reform. If the powers of the regions are to take place in a more stable manner, this study suggests, regional coordination in the central parliament should be increased.

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Schrijver Frans

Regionalism in Galicia After Regionalisation
in *Tijdschrift voor economische en sociale geografie (Journal of Economic & Social Geography)* , Volume 96, Issue 3, July , pp. 275-286

Regionalisation is in many cases introduced as a response to regionalist demands. Apart from the territorial accommodation of conflicting territorial identities and interests, regionalisation alters the context of regionalist politics. Based on the case of Galicia after the introduction of regional autonomy, this paper offers an empirical analysis of the consequences of regionalisation for political regionalism. It argues that regional identities and demands for autonomy are affected by the presence of a regional government and a broader process of regional institutionalisation. Moreover, it discusses the adaptations in terms of ideology, mobilisation strategy and organisation made by regionalist parties and



other political parties in the region, and in which ways the role of regionalism in regional politics changes after regionalisation.

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Schneider Cornelia

Striking a Balance in Post-Conflict Constitution-Making: Lessons from Afghanistan for the International Community

in Peace, Conflict and Development, Volume 7, Issue 7, July , pp. 174-216

Afghanistan is one of the more recent examples of the international community engaging in state building. One major reconstruction effort envisaged from the start was the drafting and passing of a new constitution as groundwork for increased democracy, rule of law, and good governance at a later stage. In this paper, I argue that the constitution-making process in Afghanistan, as carried out by the Afghan authorities assisted by the international community, was flawed. The main shortcoming of international actors was not only their failure to prevent the spread of 'warlordism', but their active encouragement of the rise of regional power structures through their actions. The ensuing security situation, brought about by a lack of enforcement and policing powers on the part of the Afghan authorities in combination with the negative influence of regional warlords, had direct impact on the way in which constitution-making was carried out. More importantly, it had a noticeable negative effect on how the process was perceived by the Afghan population. The main lesson to be taken away from Afghanistan is that process matters as much as substance. Failure to recognise this may jeopardise the legitimacy of state building efforts with long-lasting consequences that go far beyond the immediate written document arising from the constitution-making process.

Full text available at <http://www.peacestudiesjournal.org.uk/docs/July05Schneider.pdf>

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Salamey Imad, Pearson Frederic

The Crisis of Federalism and Electoral Strategies in Iraq

in International Studies Perspectives , issue 2, vol. 6, may , 190-207

ABSTRACT: After uprooting Saddam Hussein from power, establishing democracy in Iraq has been declared among the most important objectives of the U.S.-led Coalition. However, the Coalition has encountered complex ethnic and religious relations and resentment of foreign intervention in Iraq. These reactions reflect decades, even centuries, of divisive and antagonistic policies whose impacts continue to complicate and threaten coexistence and civil peace. The immediate challenge of achieving stability and peace in Iraq, therefore, rests in the ability to foster a genuinely indigenous institutional political structure that can accommodate the different ethnic and sectarian aspirations. This article highlights the major potential shortcomings of the federal model established by the "Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for The Transitional Period." It also examines the shortcomings of the List Proportional Representation system as presented by the United Nations for Iraq's transition, and alternatively proposes national electoral reform strategies, with the implementation of an Alternative Vote system with Minority Provision in the election to the National Assembly, as a means to strengthen Iraq's national unity.



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Bohrer II Robert E.

The Devolved Party Systems of the United Kingdom. Sub-national Variations from the National Model in Party Politics, Volume 11, Issue 6, November , pp. 654-673

In this article we examine the emerging party systems of the devolved environments, with an eye toward shedding light on the factors that influence the number of parties in a system where parties are already mobilized but the institutional context is new. Our findings demonstrate that electoral rules have an independent effect on the number of parties. More specifically, the use of proportional representation has increased the number of parties. In addition, two social cleavage structure factors appear to affect the design of the party system: class and center– periphery. All of these forces lead to a more complex governing arrangement in the devolved settings than that of the United Kingdom.

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Roland Sturm, Ju`rgen Dieringer

The Europeanization of Regions in Eastern and Western Europe: Theoretical Perspectives in Regional and Federal Studies, Volume 15, Number 3 / September , 279-294

Today we witness the process of Europeanization of subnational regions in the 2004 pre-enlargement EU countries and in the new member states. This article reflects on our knowledge about this phenomenon, especially with regard to an East – West comparison. It asks: which promising theoretical approaches have been developed so far for the analysis of (a) the institutional options the Europeanization process provides for the regions and (b) the Europeanization of policy-making in the regions. It points out that current research is in danger of overestimating formal institutional convergence when comparing the Europeanization of regions, and of underestimating and/or overlooking the consequences of institutional reform for the future fabric of societies and regional political exchange. For the Europeanization of regional policy-making as well as for the impact of Europeanization on regional societies a theoretical framework is developed here.

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Shepard Mark, Cairney Paul

The Impact of the Scottish Parliament in Amending Executive Legislation in Political Studies, Volume 53, Issue 2, June , pp. 303-319

This paper provides the first systematic attempt to investigate the legislative impact of the Scottish Parliament on Executive legislation, by analysing the fate of all amendments to Executive bills from the Parliament's first session (1999-2003). Initial findings on the success of bill amendments show that the balance of power inclines strongly in favour of ministers. However, when we account for the type of amendment and initial authorship we find evidence that



the Parliament (both coalition and opposition MSPs) actually makes more of an impact, particularly in terms of the level of success of substantive amendments to Executive bills. Our findings have implications for much of the current literature that is sceptical of the existence of power sharing between the Executive and the Parliament and within the Parliament.

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Anderson Liam, Stansfield Gareth

The Implications of Elections for Federalism in Iraq: Toward a Five-Region Model

in *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, Vol. 35, n. 3, Summer , pp. 359-382

For most observers, Iraq's recent elections were an important first step on the road to democratic normalcy. However, three related outcomes - the political marginalization of Sunni Arabs, the electoral gains made by Shi'a religious parties, and the triumphant performance of the Kurds - render the task of crafting Iraq's permanent constitution significantly more problematic. In this paper, we examine the implications of these election results for the design of Iraq's federal system. Our focus is on the character of the subunits in any future system, specifically on whether Iraq should adopt a form of territorial federalism based on the country's existing eighteen provinces (as most scholars argue) or whether a form of ethnic, or "plurinational" federalism based on five regions would be better able to address the very significant problems created by the election results. After assessing the relative merits of the various proposals for a federal Iraq, we conclude that a system based on five broad regions, though not ideal, is the least bad of the options available.

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Bingham Lisa Blomgren, Nabatchi Tina , O'Leary Rosemary

The New Governance: Practices and Processes for Stakeholder and Citizen Participation in the Work of Government

in *Public Administration Review*, September 2005 - Vol. 65 Issue 5 , 547-558

Leaders in public affairs identify tools and instruments for the new governance through networks of public, private, and nonprofit organizations. We argue the new governance also involves people—the tool makers and tool users—and the processes through which they participate in the work of government. Practitioners are using new quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial governance processes, including deliberative democracy, e-democracy, public conversations, participatory budgeting, citizen juries, study circles, collaborative policy making, and alternative dispute resolution, to permit citizens and stakeholders to actively participate in the work of government. We assess the existing legal infrastructure authorizing public managers to use new governance processes and discuss a selection of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial new governance processes in international, federal, state, and local public institutions. We conclude that public administration needs to address these processes in teaching and research to help the public sector develop and use informed best practices.

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Adamolekun Ladipo

The Nigerian Federation at the Crossroads: The Way Forward

in *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, Vol. 35, n. 3, Summer , pp. 383-405

This article reviews the first fifty years of federal experience in Nigeria. It distinguishes three phases: an apprenticeship to "true" federalism phase (1954-1965), a federal dominance phase under military rule (1966-1979 and 1984-1999) and a "muddling-through" phase under civilian rule (1979-1983 and 1999 to date). The first phase was characterized by political devolution and intergovernmental competition, during which regional governments recorded tangible results. During the second phase, successive military regimes imposed centralism and federal dominance that kept Nigeria united but arrested progress toward a consolidating federal democracy. Civilian administrations under the third phase have sought to run the federation in a muddling-through fashion, including serious political and social tensions, modest economic performance, and deepening poverty. Currently, therefore, the Nigerian federation is at a crossroads and has two options: devolution or death.

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Acierno S., Baquero Cruz J.

The Order of the Spanish Constitutional Court on the proposal to convert the Basque Country into a freely associated community: Keeping hands off constitutional politics

in *International Journal of Constitutional Law*, Vol. 3 n. 4 , 687 - 695

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 10. Processes of federalization and decentralization

Peter J. Söderlund

The Russian subnational executives as institutional veto players

in *Regional and Federal Studies*, Volume 15, Number 1 / March , 41-57

This study discusses the ability of subnational heads of government to constrain the power of the federal government in the Russian Federation. The intention is to examine under which conditions regional executives have operated since the beginning of the 1990s. The study also takes a comparative approach by examining the formal institutional strength of subnational executives in 24 other contemporary federal states. The Russian executives have had potential for strong leadership at the regional level and moderate abilities to exercise influence at the parliamentary arena, while the regions have been allocated with few constitutional powers.

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Nicola Mcewen



The territorial politics of social policy development in multi-level states
in *Regional and Federal Studies*, Volume 15, Number 4 / December , 537-554

This article examines policy divergence and convergence from the perspective of territorial politics. It considers the significance and consequences of policy divergence, and the manner in which public policies are used to serve territorial objectives in multi-level states. It argues that the practice of assuming policy ownership, and the contest for policy control, have more significance for territorial politics than does the divergence or convergence of public policy. Its focus is on Scotland and the UK, but it draws upon the experiences of Quebec and Canada to gain insight into the territorial politics of policy development in a multi-level and multi-national state.

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Adrian Vatter

The transformation of access and veto points in swiss federalism

in *Regional and Federal Studies*, Volume 15, Number 1 / March , 1-17

This article aims to delineate changes in the institutions of Swiss federalism. It shows that that the 'old' instruments of federalism, established in the nineteenth century, still represent strong veto points which enable the small, conservative and rural cantons to block national policy decisions. Urban cantons, on the other hand, resort to the 'new' institutions of federalism, developed in the course of the twentieth century, in order to influence the federal policy formulation process. Furthermore, cantonal governments have opened up informal channels of influence in order to compensate for their loss of power in the course of the strengthening of direct democracy.

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König Thomas

Unitarisierung durch Europäisierung?

in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, Band 36, 2005

No abstract available

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

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Romain Pasquier

'Cognitive Europeanization' and the territorial effects of multilevel policy transfer: Local development in French and Spanish regions

in *Regional and Federal Studies*, Volume 15, Number 3 / September , 295-310



This article explores the process of 'cognitive Europeanization' of territorial policies and how this process is impacting on multilevel governance. Over the last two decades, a number of European spatial programmes have developed similar norms of action at the local and regional level. Focusing on the interactive character of the Europeanization process, the author considers sub-national actors as key elements in the adaptation of domestic political systems to these European norms. Drawing on a comparative study of territorial policies in France and Spain, the article illustrates how the policy transfer of EU-level norms is producing structural changes in territorial governance. Socialized to a European model of local development, it is argued, both regional actors and regional institutions are Europeanizing their policies without EU legislation.

Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government

Subsection 10. Processes of federalization and decentralization

Jones Rhys, Goodwin Mark, Jones Martin, Pett Kevin

'Filling in' the state: economic governance and the evolution of devolution in Wales

in Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, Volume 23, Issue 3, June , pp. 337 - 360

We examine the unfolding dynamics of devolution and economic governance in the United Kingdom. We maintain that devolution has set in train a series of far-reaching organisational and institutional changes in the various UK territories. Although devolution in the United Kingdom can be described, following Jessop, as an aspect of the 'hollowing out' of the state, we argue conversely that the various UK territories are being 'filled in' in a number of important ways. The notion of 'filling in', we argue, draws attention to the spatially contingent impact of devolution on the various UK territories. We examine this process of 'filling in' specifically in the context of the economic governance of Wales. In particular, we focus on the creation of Education and Learning Wales (ELWa)—the body charged with improving the education and skills of the Welsh workforce, as well as with encouraging entrepreneurship within Wales. It highlights the need to consider: in an organisational context, the territorial and scalar structure of ELWa and its role in collaborating with other organisations of economic governance; and in an institutional context, the development of a new working culture within the organisation. Given the close associations between devolution and economic governance, we suggest that the success or otherwise of ELWa in overcoming these challenges has the potential to affect the future trajectories, and public and political evaluations, of devolution in Wales.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system

Annan Kofi

"In Larger Freedom": Decision Time at the UN

in Foreign Affairs, May/June n° 3/2005

Dealing with today's threats requires broad, deep, and sustained global cooperation. Thus the states of the world must create a collective security system to prevent terrorism, strengthen nonproliferation, and bring peace to war-torn areas, while also promoting human rights, democracy, and development. And the UN must go through its most radical overhaul yet.



Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system

Scobbie Iain

**"Une hérésie en matière judiciaire"? The Role of the Judge ad hoc in the International Court
in Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals (The)**, n. 3, vol. 4 , 421-464

In international law, the unfolding of the principle of the equality of the litigants — the sovereign equality of the litigant States — has resulted in their ability to nominate a judge to participate in the decision of the dispute by the International Court of Justice on terms of complete formal equality with the regular, or titular, judges. The institution of the judge ad hoc, appointed by the parties after a dispute has been submitted to the International Court, is alien to domestic systems of adjudication, but essential differences between municipal and international litigation must be given their due. The article questions, however, whether there is any solid basis for the continuation of the system of judges ad hoc.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system

Šukovič Olga

2005 World Summit Outcome

in Review of International Affairs (The) , Vol. LVI, n. 1119, July–September

<http://www.diplomacy.bg.ac.yu/mp1119.htm#1>

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system

Neha Jain

**A Separate Law for Peacekeepers: The Clash between the Security Council and the International Criminal Court
in European Journal of International Law**, Vol. 16 n. 2 , 239-254

Security Council Resolutions 1422 (2002), 1487 (2003) and 1497(2003), excluding the jurisdiction of the ICC, give rise to the fundamental issue of whether the legitimacy of an international institution such as the International Criminal Court may be eroded by an act of the Security Council, the political organ of the United Nations. This article analyses the legal validity of such resolutions within the framework of limitations that have been imposed upon the Council in international law. It discusses the relationship between the resolutions and the provisions of the Rome Statute, and concludes that their cumulative effect operates to modify the Rome Statute. It then deals with the effect of the illegality of these resolutions on the obligations of Member States of the UN, as well as on the ICC

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system

Thakur Ramesh

A Shared Responsibility for a More Secure World



in **Global Governance**, n. 3, vol. 11, july-september

ABSTRACT: The Iraq war roiled the UN-centered world of diplomacy as few other issues have since 1945. To forge a new consensus, in November 2003 Secretary-General Kofi Annan established a High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change to probe the nature and gravity of today's threats and to recommend collective solutions through a reformed UN. The report, released in December 2004, provides a brief survey of the UN's sixty-year history, an analysis of today's challenges, and a set of broad and specific proposals to improve UN performance and relevance. This article concentrates on critical reflections while taking broad agreement with much of the report. It groups comments under the two headings of normative-cum conceptual analyses, and institutional restructuring proposals.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system

Brown Chester

Access to international justice in the legality of use of force cases

in **Cambridge Law Journal (The)**, Volume 64 - Issue 02 - July , 267-271

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system

Oduntan, Gbenga

Africa Before the International Court: The Generational Gap in International Adjudication and Arbitration

in **Indian Journal of International Law**, Volume 44, Issue 4 , 701-748

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system

Mattelart Armand

Bataille à l'Unesco sur la diversité culturelle

in **Monde Diplomatique (Le)**, Octobre 2005

Du 3 au 15 octobre, la première grande bataille politique livrée à l'Unesco depuis les années 1980 va avoir pour cadre la Conférence générale de l'organisation, et pour objet une convention sur la diversité culturelle. Ce texte, à contre-courant de la marchandisation généralisée promue par l'OMC, n'est pas accepté par Washington et une poignée d'autres capitales. Iront-elles jusqu'à faire capoter le projet. La trente-troisième session de la Conférence générale de l'Organisation des Nations unies pour l'éducation et la culture (Unesco) doit, en ce mois d'octobre 2005, soumettre à l'approbation des Etats membres le projet de Convention sur la protection et la promotion de la diversité des expressions culturelles. L'objectif est de conférer force de loi à la « déclaration universelle sur la diversité culturelle », adoptée à l'unanimité au lendemain des événements du 11 septembre 2001 (1). En élevant la diversité au rang de «



patrimoine commun de l'humanité », cette déclaration opposait aux « enfermements fondamentalistes la perspective d'un monde plus ouvert, plus créatif et plus démocratique (2) ». Le paradigme éthique de la « diversité en dialogue » prenait le contre-pied de la thèse de Samuel Huntington sur l'inévitabilité du « choc des cultures et des civilisations ».

Si, au niveau des grands principes, tous les Etats sans exception avaient, en 2001, loué la pluralité des altérités comme instrument capable d'« humaniser la mondialisation », il n'en alla toutefois pas de même, deux ans plus tard, lors de la décision ouvrant la voie à la rédaction du projet. Parmi le petit nombre de pays qui s'étaient abstenus figuraient les Etats-Unis. Ils n'avaient pas oublié le double échec, une décennie plus tôt, de leur diplomatie, farouchement opposée au principe de protection de l'« exception culturelle », reformulé ultérieurement en protection et promotion de la « diversité culturelle » : en 1993, face à l'Union européenne, dans le cadre de la phase finale du cycle de l'Uruguay de l'Accord général sur les tarifs douaniers et le commerce (GATT), qui allait donner naissance à l'Organisation mondiale du commerce (OMC) ; et face au Canada lors de la signature de l'Accord de libre-échange nord-américain (Aléna) entré en vigueur en 1994. Deux négociations qui, en reconnaissant le statut particulier des « produits de l'esprit », avaient du même coup légitimé les politiques publiques, plus spécialement dans le domaine de l'audiovisuel.

Le Canada et la France – qui a joué un rôle central dans la formulation de la doctrine de l'« exception » – sont les artisans majeurs de la mise en chantier du projet de convention. La France a mobilisé les pays de la francophonie. Le Canada, lui, a mis en place un Réseau international sur la politique culturelle (RIPC) et a réussi à rassembler quelque soixante ministres responsables de la culture pour discuter de façon informelle des moyens de renforcer la diversité, de concert avec de nombreuses associations et autres organisations sociales. Conjointement avec le gouvernement du Québec, Ottawa apporte, par ailleurs, depuis septembre 2001, son soutien financier à une coalition internationale des organisations professionnelles de la culture pour la diversité culturelle, relayée par un réseau de collectifs nationaux.

Le champ d'application du projet de convention déborde le pré carré de l'audiovisuel et des industries culturelles, puisqu'il s'étend à la « multiplicité des formes par lesquelles les cultures des groupes et des sociétés trouvent leur expression ». Des formes qui concernent aussi bien les politiques de la langue que la valorisation des systèmes de connaissance des peuples autochtones. Il n'empêche que, dans l'opinion, ce sont des exemples empruntés aux industries de l'image qui illustrent les risques que la mondialisation libérale fait courir à la diversité culturelle. Ainsi le département d'Etat, à Washington, et la Motion Picture Export Association of America (MPEAA) – créée en 1945 et rebaptisée Motion Picture Association (MPA) en 1994, porte-parole des intérêts des majors – ont-ils exercé des pressions sur des gouvernements comme ceux du Chili, de la Corée du Sud, du Maroc ou des anciens pays communistes, afin, dans le cadre d'accords commerciaux bilatéraux, de les faire renoncer à leur droit de mettre en place des politiques cinématographiques, en échange de compensations dans d'autres secteurs.

Trois sessions de réunions intergouvernementales, dont la dernière en juin 2005, ont été nécessaires pour peaufiner le texte soumis à la Conférence générale. Les rédacteurs ont tenté la médiation entre deux positions. L'une, majoritaire, et incluant l'Union européenne, qui défend le principe d'un droit international entérinant le traitement spécial des biens et services culturels, parce que « porteurs d'identité, de valeurs et de sens ». L'autre, soutenue par des gouvernements comme ceux des Etats-Unis, de l'Australie et du Japon encline à voir seulement dans ce texte une expression de plus du « protectionnisme » dans un secteur censé, comme les autres services, relever de la seule règle du libre-échange. Entre les deux, un ensemble disparate d'argumentaires, parmi lesquels ceux formulés par des Etats exprimant leur crainte de voir s'effriter la cohésion nationale par contamination du principe de diversité. De ce point de vue, le texte résulte aussi d'une production interculturelle.

Le résultat est là : un ensemble de règles générales concernant les droits et les obligations des Etats : « Les parties, dit



l'article 5, réaffirme (...) leur droit souverain de formuler et mettre en œuvre leurs politiques culturelles et d'adopter les mesures pour protéger et promouvoir la diversité des expressions culturelles, ainsi que pour renforcer la coopération internationale afin d'atteindre les objectifs de la présente convention. » Pivot de l'édifice juridique, le principe de souveraineté : un Etat peut récupérer le droit à édicter des politiques culturelles qu'il aurait aliéné antérieurement.

Pour que la convention acquière un caractère normatif en cas de litige, cruciale est la définition de son rapport avec les autres instruments internationaux. C'est là tout l'enjeu de la rédaction finale de l'article 20. Il confirme que les relations de la convention avec les autres traités devront être guidées par l'idée de « soutien mutuel, de complémentarité et de non-subordination ». Lorsque les parties, lit-on, « interprètent et appliquent les autres traités auxquels elles sont parties, ou lorsqu'elles souscrivent à d'autres obligations internationales, [elles] prennent en compte les dispositions pertinentes de la présente convention ». L'article 21, lui, fait de la concertation et de la coordination avec d'« autres enceintes internationales » (non nommées) une des prémisses de l'application du précédent.

Penser le droit à la communication

Ces « autres enceintes », ce sont celles où se joue également le sort de la diversité culturelle. C'est le cas de l'OMC, avec l'Accord général sur le commerce des services (AGCS), où les services audiovisuels et culturels sont à l'ordre du jour des libéralisations, dans la perspective de sa conférence ministérielle de Hongkong en décembre prochain. C'est aussi le cas de l'Organisation mondiale de la propriété intellectuelle (OMPI), concernée par la patrimonialisation croissante des biens publics communs, dont témoigne l'appropriation privée des savoirs et connaissances, eux aussi source de créativité.

Le talon d'Achille de la convention reste son suivi, la question des sanctions en cas d'infraction, la faiblesse des mécanismes de résolution des litiges.

Le principe de souveraineté est encadré par un ensemble d'autres principes directeurs : respect des droits de l'homme, égale dignité et respect de toutes les cultures, solidarité et coopération internationales, complémentarité des aspects économiques et culturels du développement, développement durable, accès équitable, ouverture et équilibre. Pour mettre en œuvre le principe de l'accès équitable et celui de la solidarité et de la coopération internationales, les articles 14 à 19 prévoient, entre autres, un « traitement préférentiel pour les pays en développement » et l'établissement d'un Fonds international pour la diversité culturelle, financé par des contributions volontaires publiques ou privées.

Encore conviendrait-il de s'interroger sur l'expérience de projets apparentés. Au premier chef, celle du Sommet mondial sur la société de l'information, organisé par une autre agence des Nations unies, l'Union internationale des télécommunications (UIT), et dont la première phase s'est tenue à Genève en décembre 2003, la seconde étant prévue à Tunis en novembre 2005. Difficulté à mobiliser des ressources publiques dans les grands pays industriels, afin de financer un « fonds de solidarité numérique » qui permettrait de lutter contre l'inégalité d'accès au cyberspace. Intérêt des fondations philanthropiques des multinationales de l'industrie de l'information à combler le vide.

La construction de politiques culturelles est difficilement concevable sans le détour par la question des politiques de communication. Or la convention, et, plus fondamentalement, la philosophie même d'action de l'Unesco à l'égard de la diversité culturelle tendent non seulement à dissocier les deux problématiques, mais aussi à ignorer la seconde.

Dans la version finale du projet figurent deux allusions à la « diversité des médias ». L'une, au point 12 du préambule, rappelle que « la liberté de pensée, d'expression et d'information ainsi que la diversité des médias permettent l'épanouissement des expressions culturelles au sein des sociétés ». La seconde, à l'article 6, parmi les mesures à



prendre, énumère au bas de la liste (point h) « celles qui visent à promouvoir la diversité des médias, y compris au moyen du service public de radiodiffusion ».

Ce que serait cette « diversité des médias », on ne le saura point. Pas la peine de chercher le mot « concentration », par exemple : le concept dérange. Crainte d'effrayer les Etats-Unis, qui contribuent à hauteur de 20 % au budget de l'Unesco et sont revenus y siéger en 2003, après l'avoir quittée en 1984 pour marquer leur désaccord avec les demandes du mouvement des pays non alignés en faveur d'un rééquilibrage des flux à travers un nouvel ordre mondial de l'information et de la communication (Nomic) ? Certes. Compartimentation des tâches entre divisions d'une grande machine bureaucratique ? Certes encore. Mais il y a plus.

L'institution internationale a créé sa propre légende noire sur cette période des années 1970, où le débat sur les politiques culturelles allait de pair avec celui sur les politiques de communication. La réflexion socio-économique sur les industries culturelles situait alors au rang de questions fondamentales les phénomènes de concentration économique et financière accentués par l'internationalisation (3). Les thèmes du « dialogue des cultures » et du « développement harmonieux dans la diversité et le respect réciproque » inspiraient les travaux de la Commission internationale pour l'étude des problèmes de communication, nommée par le directeur général de l'Unesco de l'époque, le Sénégalais Mohtar M'Bow, et présidée par l'Irlandais Sean MacBride, prix Nobel de la paix. Commission plurielle qui comportait des personnalités comme Hubert Beuve-Méry, fondateur du quotidien *Le Monde*, et le romancier Gabriel García Márquez. Premier document émanant d'une institution internationale sur l'inégalité des échanges culturels et informationnels, le rapport MacBride, entériné par la Conférence générale de l'Unesco de 1980, et publié sous le titre symbolique *Voix multiples, un seul monde*, montrait pourquoi il devenait urgent de penser le droit à la communication comme expression de nouveaux droits sociaux (4).

Mobilisation des réseaux

Si, malgré la sourde hostilité des Etats-Unis, la convention est approuvée, elle s'imposera comme une référence avec laquelle les intervenants privés et publics devront de toute façon composer. D'où la nécessité, pour de nouveaux acteurs, de se l'approprier : non seulement pour la mettre en œuvre, mais également pour en repousser les limites.

Au cours du processus d'élaboration du projet et, auparavant, de l'approbation de l'idée même d'un instrument juridique, et en de nombreux lieux de la planète, ces acteurs ont effectivement précédé la prise de conscience des responsables publics, qu'ils ont incités à prendre position. C'est une leçon majeure de l'intense mobilisation, au niveau national et international, des réseaux liés au mouvement social, comme du réseau des collectifs nationaux des organisations professionnelles de la culture.

Les premiers ont tissé un fil rouge entre les débats sur la convention et ceux qui se déroulent notamment au Sommet mondial sur la société de l'information, faisant converger vers le plaidoyer pour les « droits à la communication » les problématiques de la diversité culturelle et médiatique. Diversité des sources d'information, de la propriété des médias et des modes d'accès à ceux-ci, soutien au service public et aux médias libres et indépendants. Les seconds, forts de quelque trente collectifs nationaux bâtis en moins de quatre ans, ont montré que l'on pouvait conjuguer métiers de la culture et citoyenneté, sans s'enfermer dans la défense d'intérêts corporatistes.

Dans la déclaration finale d'une assemblée tenue à Madrid en mai 2005 à la veille de la dernière mise au point de l'avant-projet, ces réseaux ont appelé les Etats membres de l'Unesco à « résister aux pressions qui essaient de diluer le contenu de la convention » et à « celles qui cherchent à ajourner son adoption jusqu'à la Conférence générale de l'Unesco en 2007, ou même après, ce qui compromettrait de façon significative son impact ». Rien n'est encore joué. La



balle est dans le camp des Etats.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system

Van Der Wilt H.

Bilateral Agreements between the United States and States Parties to the Rome Statute: Are They Compatible with the Object and Purpose of the Statute?

in *Leiden Journal of International Law*, issue 1 Vol.18 March , 93-111

The United States has entered into a fairly large number of bilateral agreements with states parties to the Rome Statute in order to prevent the exposure of US nationals to the jurisdiction of the ICC. Article 98 of the Rome Statute allows for such agreements and provides that the Court should yield to obligations which emerge from those agreements. The author, however, argues that the current scope of these agreements, covering all US nationals, is too wide. They should rather take as a point of departure the status of forces agreements, which envisage primary jurisdiction for the sending state, in case of military service personnel and personnel of peacekeeping operations. In their present form, the bilateral agreements compel states parties to act in contravention of the object and purpose of the Statute.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system

Heldt Birger

Can Peacekeeping Operations Promote Democracy?

in *Review of International Studies (The)*, Volume 7, Issue 2, June , 304-307

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system

Mendelson Forman, Johanna

Can Reform Save the United Nations? Opportunities for Creating an Effective Multilateral Body for the Twenty-First Century

in *American Foreign Policy Interests*, Vol. 27, n. 5 / October , 349-363

Set within the context of current events, this analysis explains how the current reform agenda was driven by the rift created by the inaction of the Security Council in sanctioning war against Iraq and explores the possibility that proposed reforms will lead to an invigorated institution.



Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system

Odello Marco

Commentary on the United Nations' High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change
in **Journal of Conflict and Security Law**, Volume 10, Number 2, Summer , 231-262

Threats to international security have shifted from interstate conflict to more complex issues. States perceive new threats to security and try to respond to them either unilaterally or through international institutions. The process of defining new threats has emerged after the end of the Cold War, and several international organisations have tried to adapt their institutional mechanisms to face those challenges. The United Nations, as the main universal organisation dealing with peace and security, has also started this process. In December 2004, the Secretary General of the organisation delivered the Report entitled *A more secure world: our shared responsibility*. This article provides some reflections on relevant issues addressed in the Report.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system

Kaul H.P.

Construction Site for More Justice: The International Criminal Court after Two Years
in **American journal of international law**, Vol. 99 n. 2 , 370-384

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system

Marcelli Fabio

Crisi dell'ONU

in **Giano**, n. 51, anno XVII, settembre

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system

Jacques Attali

For a UN of NGOs

in **New Perspectives Quarterly**, Vol. 22, Issue 1, January , 65-68

No abstract available



Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system

Barria Lilian, Roper Steven D.

How effective are international criminal tribunals? An analysis of the ICTY and the ICTR in *International Journal of Human Rights (The)*, Vol. 9 N. 3 September 2005 , pp.349 - 368

The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) were established by the United Nations in 1993 and 1994 to apprehend and try individuals suspected of committing war crimes including genocide. The crimes that are prosecuted by these courts are the same, and the structure of the tribunals is also similar (indeed, they both share the same appellate court). However, the mandate of the ICTR is much more narrow and is limited both in terms of the period of time under investigation (one calendar year) as well as being limited to crimes that were committed only in Rwanda. Given the mandate and structure of these tribunals, many question their effectiveness. This article examines these tribunals and measures effectiveness by examining not only the number of indictments that have been handed down but the actual number of individuals apprehended. One of the criticisms of both tribunals is that the lack of success in apprehending suspects diminishes the deterrent effect of the tribunals. Based on a case study of the ICTY and the ICTR, we find that the lack of effective apprehension has reduced the deterrent effect of the tribunals and provided one of the primary justifications for the creation of an international criminal court.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system

Leanza Umberto

Il Vertice ONU del 14-16 settembre 2005: un'occasione mancata per una riforma globale delle Nazioni Unite in *Comunità Internazionale (La)*, n. 4, vol. LX, quarto trimestre

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system

Cassel Douglass

Introduction and Postscript: Partial Progress on UN Reform

in *Northwestern University Journal of International Human Rights*, issue 1, vol. 4, fall, symposium issue , 1-5

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system

de Figueiredo Miguel F. P. - Posner Eric A.



Is the International Court of Justice Biased?

in *Journal of Legal Studies*, Volume 34, Number 2 (June 2005) , 599 - 630

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has jurisdiction over disputes between nations and has decided dozens of cases since it began operations in 1946. Its defenders argue that the ICJ decides cases impartially. Its critics argue that the members of the ICJ vote the interests of the states that appoint them. Prior empirical scholarship is ambiguous. We test the charge of bias using statistical methods. We find strong evidence that (1) judges favor the states that appoint them and that (2) judges favor states whose wealth level is close to that of their own states, and weaker evidence that (3) judges favor states whose political system is similar to that of their own states and that (4) (more weakly) judges favor states whose culture (language and religion) is similar to that of their own states. We find weak or no evidence that judges are influenced by regional and military alignments

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system

Nossel Suzanne

Israel and UN Reform

in *Dissent*, summer, 2005

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system

Schmidt Peter

La PESD et l'ONU: un couple parfait?

in *Politique Etrangère*, 3/2005, (automne).

L'Union européenne a pris nombre de dispositions renforçant ses liens avec l'ONU et accroissant son rôle dans les opérations menées au profit de l'Organisation. Les relations futures des deux entités dépendront d'avancées dans divers domaines: le domaine financier et la réforme du Conseil de sécurité en particulier.

L'accession de l'Allemagne au Conseil comme membre permanent pourrait renforcer la synergie entre elles, en particulier au profit de l'Afrique.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system

Marchisio Sergio

La capacità globale dell'ONU per la pace

in *Comunità Internazionale (La)*, n. 1, vol. LX, primo trimestre , 3-17

No abstract available



Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system

Draetta Ugo

La crisi delle Nazioni Unite

in *Federalista (Il)/Federalist (The)*, Anno XLVII, n. 2 , 90-95

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system

Szurek Sandra

La lutte internationale contre le terrorisme sous l'empire du chapitre VII : un laboratoire normatif

in *Revue générale de droit international publique*, Tome 109 n. 1 , 5 - 50

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system

Herz Mariana

La nueva Convención de Naciones Unidas sobre la inmunidad de jurisdicción de los Estados y sus bienes

in *Revista Electrónica de Estudios Internacionales*, Número 10/ 2005

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system

Coticchia Fabrizio

La politica italiana per la riforma dell'ONU

in *Mulino (il)*, n. 4, luglio-agosto, 2005 , 716-725

ABSTRACT: Il sistema di sicurezza collettivo, coniato all'indomani della seconda guerra mondiale, compie sessant'anni. Il 2005 non rappresenta solo la formale ricorrenza di un innovativo progetto politico che ha profondamente segnato le relazioni internazionali nel secolo scorso, ma costituisce soprattutto uno spartiacque decisivo per il futuro stesso dell'Onu. Quale può essere il ruolo del nostro Paese?

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system

Sánchez-Terán Gonzalo, Valcárcel Darío

La reforma de la ONU y los Objetivos del Milenio

in *Política Exterior*, 105 Mayo/Junio 2005



No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system

Marchetti Raffaele

La riforma delle Nazioni Unite: modelli istituzionali

in **Teoria Politica**, Vol. 21, Fascicolo 2 , 49-68

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system

Corten Olivier

La sécurité collective, un rêve contrarié

in **Monde Diplomatique (Le)**, Septembre 2005

Alors que la seconde guerre mondiale se poursuit en Asie, l'adoption de la Charte des Nations unies, le 26 juin 1945, à San Francisco, marque un tournant radical dans l'histoire des relations internationales. Tout « recours à la force » – la guerre ou toute autre forme d'intervention militaire – est, par principe, interdit. Un organe centralisé, le Conseil de sécurité, est chargé de résoudre les différends et peut, dans ce but, adopter des mesures coercitives, économiques mais aussi militaires.

Après les tentatives infructueuses de la Société des nations (SDN) (1), on passe ainsi d'un système de « guerre juste », où l'action militaire relève du pouvoir quasi discrétionnaire des Etats souverains (représailles, réparation d'une injure, recouvrement de dette...), à un système fondé sur la légalité rationnelle. Désormais, l'action armée n'est autorisée que dans deux cas reposant sur des critères objectifs : une agression justifiant la légitime défense, ou une menace contre la paix constatée par le Conseil de sécurité et imposant son intervention. La simple invocation de valeurs supérieures, par définition variables, ne peut plus suffire à justifier la guerre. Tout recours à la force doit être autorisé ou supervisé par le Conseil. Tenant compte de l'échec de la SDN, l'idée de sécurité collective prend ainsi une forme plus coercitive, dont on espère qu'elle empêchera un conflit entre les Etats-Unis et l'Union soviétique.

Malgré leur rigueur, les règles introduites par la Charte n'ont pas empêché le déclenchement de nombreuses guerres en dehors des mécanismes prévus. Au nom de « justes causes », l'Union soviétique et les Etats-Unis ont entrepris des actions militaires unilatérales en Hongrie (1956), en Tchécoslovaquie (1968) ou en Afghanistan (1979) pour la première, à Cuba (1961), au Nicaragua (années 1980), à la Grenade (1983) ou au Panamá (1989) pour les seconds. Partout au Sud, les conflits de « basse intensité » se sont multipliés, et l'occupation de la Palestine perdure. C'est que le Conseil de sécurité s'est trouvé réduit à l'impuissance par le jeu des veto des deux blocs. Il a tout au plus servi de forum de discussion ou, dans certains cas, d'organe de gestion d'un cessez-le-feu en organisant des « opérations de maintien de la paix » aux capacités d'action limitées.

Pourtant, la fin du conflit Est-Ouest n'a régénéré ni le droit international ni l'ONU. La guerre du Golfe de 1991, même si elle a été décidée à la fois conformément à la légitime défense – l'Irak ayant agressé le Koweït – et sous l'égide d'une autorisation du Conseil de sécurité, n'a pas marqué l'émergence d'un nouvel ordre mondial. Les hostilités déclenchées



par les Etats de l'Organisation du traité de l'Atlantique nord (OTAN) contre la Yougoslavie, en 1999, ont montré que les grandes puissances pouvaient contourner le Conseil de sécurité lorsqu'elles n'étaient pas assurées d'obtenir son aval. Cette dérive s'est renforcée après les attentats du 11 septembre 2001, la « guerre contre le terrorisme » lancée par les Etats-Unis favorisant une sorte d'état d'exception juridique permanent (2). Du renversement des talibans, en l'absence d'une agression armée préalable juridiquement imputable à l'Etat afghan, à l'intervention en Irak de 2003, déclenchée sans autorisation du Conseil de sécurité (3), la guerre unilatérale a effectué un retour spectaculaire sur la scène mondiale.

Conçue comme un moyen de réaliser l'équilibre international, l'ONU est tantôt instrumentalisée par les grandes puissances, et permet alors de justifier des actions militaires sélectives, tandis que la passivité prévaut dans d'autres situations (ainsi de l'occupation de la Palestine par Israël) ; tantôt paralysée par l'opposition des grandes puissances... ce qui n'empêche pas ces dernières d'agir sans mandat.

Cependant, l'échec de la Charte des Nations unies dans le domaine de la force doit être relativisé. Même malmené, le multilatéralisme demeure au moins présent dans les discours. Chaque action militaire reste formellement justifiée au regard du droit. Les règles internationales ne sont donc pas, en tant que telles, remises en cause, même si de nombreuses doctrines politiques cherchent à justifier leur contournement. Parfois on invoque la légitime défense (Afghanistan). Dans d'autres cas, on se réfère à une autorisation implicite du Conseil de sécurité, comme dans le cas de la Yougoslavie (1999) ou de l'Irak (2003). Si certains se revendiquent du « droit » d'ingérence humanitaire, celui-ci est fermement rejeté par la quasi-totalité des Etats (lire Souveraineté des Etats et souveraineté des peuples). Les gouvernants européens, en particulier, ont préféré affirmer que leur intervention militaire au Kosovo, en 1999, s'expliquait par des circonstances exceptionnelles et ne constituait donc pas un précédent (4). Quant à la guerre contre l'Irak, elle a provoqué une mobilisation sans précédent des opinions publiques et de la plupart des gouvernements.

L'idée de guerre préventive n'a jamais été officiellement revendiquée comme telle sur un plan juridique à l'appui d'une guerre. Pour l'intervention en Irak, les Etats-Unis, comme d'ailleurs les autres Etats de la coalition, ont préféré interpréter abusivement d'anciennes résolutions du Conseil de sécurité. En revanche, dans le cadre d'une éventuelle réforme de l'ONU, l'idée est parfois évoquée. Nous voilà témoins d'un double discours. Lorsque les gouvernants s'adressent à leur opinion publique nationale, ils peuvent se permettre de justifier une intervention militaire sur la base de motifs politiques (la lutte contre le terrorisme) ou moraux (le « droit » d'ingérence humanitaire). En revanche, devant un auditoire constitué par les autres membres de la société internationale, ils s'en tiennent à des arguments juridiques classiques, quitte à les interpréter abusivement. Le meilleur hommage que le vice rend à la vertu...

Les faiblesses institutionnelles de l'ONU n'expliquent qu'en partie son échec relatif. La constitution d'un comité d'état-major, responsable de la direction stratégique de toutes les forces armées mises à la disposition du Conseil de sécurité, n'a jamais vu le jour. Son absence a été suppléée par des mécanismes informels qui révèlent la volonté des grands Etats de garder le contrôle de leurs moyens militaires. A partir des années 1950, et de l'intervention en Corée, on a assisté à la constitution de forces des Nations unies (désignées comme des « casques bleus ») composées, au cas par cas, de soldats qui sont juridiquement sous l'autorité de l'ONU mais qui proviennent de contingents nationaux. L'ONU dépend ainsi de la bonne volonté de ses Etats membres, avec des conséquences parfois désastreuses, comme lors du retrait des casques bleus belges du Rwanda en plein génocide (1994).

Une autre dérive a consisté, pour le Conseil de sécurité, à déléguer l'exercice de ses compétences militaires à des armées nationales (Irak, Bosnie-Herzégovine, Somalie, Rwanda, Haïti, Albanie, Côte d'Ivoire...) agissant le cas échéant dans le cadre d'organisations régionales, comme l'Union européenne ou l'Union africaine. L'action armée n'est ainsi



plus collective (ou en tout cas universelle) que dans les textes, le Conseil n'étant pas apte à contrôler les opérations.

En outre, le système de vote au Conseil de sécurité s'est souvent révélé paralysant. Il avait été conçu comme une sorte de compromis susceptible d'assurer une action efficace : le principe du vote à la majorité qualifiée devait permettre de pallier les difficultés rencontrées entre les deux guerres par la Société des nations, où prévalait la règle de l'unanimité. La pratique a assoupli le régime initial, en admettant que la simple abstention d'un membre permanent ne pouvait faire obstacle à la prise de décision (lire Maudit droit de veto ?). De même, l'Assemblée générale s'est vu conférer, en cas de blocage du Conseil, le droit de faire des recommandations appropriées, y compris pour le recours à la force. Cependant, ces assouplissements sont limités. Le veto ou, plus encore, la menace de son utilisation restent fréquents. Quant à l'Assemblée générale, elle se contente soit d'adopter des déclarations de principe définissant les conditions dans lesquelles un recours à la force peut être exercé, soit de condamner formellement – et très épisodiquement – une intervention militaire particulière (invasion de l'Afghanistan par l'URSS en 1979 ou intervention des Etats-Unis au Nicaragua en 1985, par exemple). D'ailleurs, ni lors de la guerre contre la Yougoslavie ni lors de celle contre l'Irak, les puissances intervenantes n'ont cru utile de rechercher une légitimité auprès de l'Assemblée après avoir échoué devant le Conseil de sécurité.

Peut-on alors parler de « blocage » de l'institution ? Que ce soit pour la Yougoslavie ou pour l'Irak, le « blocage » n'existait que par référence à une volonté de déclencher une guerre dont on estimait qu'elle était la seule issue possible, alors même que le Conseil de sécurité demeurerait disposé à adopter d'autres mesures moins extrêmes.

De même, seul organe de l'ONU à pouvoir évaluer la licéité d'actions militaires, la Cour internationale de justice (CIJ) a été très peu sollicitée depuis 1945. Alors que le débat faisait rage sur une éventuelle intervention en Irak en 2002-2003, aucun Etat n'a cru opportun de demander l'avis des juges de La Haye. La Cour pourrait aussi contrôler la légalité des résolutions du Conseil de sécurité. Il n'en est rien, ce dernier continuant à agir, ou à ne pas agir, en fonction de considérations politiques. Les compétences répressives de la Cour, quant à elles, restent assez théoriques puisqu'elles sont soumises à l'acceptation de l'Etat mis en accusation (5).

Finalement, le débat institutionnel renvoie à un dilemme. Soit on élabore un système idéal, mais on court le risque d'un droit international encore moins appliqué que ne l'est l'actuel. Soit on se place dans une perspective plus réaliste, et l'on en vient à décourager toute possibilité de réforme. « La » solution institutionnelle aux problèmes de l'ONU semble ainsi renvoyer à des questions plus fondamentales qui touchent à la structure même de la société internationale. Comme son nom l'indique, le Conseil de sécurité est un organe à vocation policière. Même s'il a développé une conception très large de cette notion (flux de réfugiés, violations des droits humains, problèmes sanitaires ou économiques), c'est dans une optique essentiellement répressive qu'il continue à fonctionner. L'approche de la sécurité collective reste, dans l'ensemble, cloisonnée : aucune politique d'ensemble n'est conçue pour intégrer les multiples facettes, militaires mais aussi politiques, économiques, sociales ou encore culturelles, des problèmes rencontrés. Ainsi, l'Organisation mondiale du commerce (OMC) ou le Fonds monétaire international (FMI) poursuivent leur travail en marge des Nations unies et hors du contrôle de celles-ci.

La société internationale elle-même demeure très fragmentée. Si les Etats sont tombés d'accord sur quelques grands principes – non-recours à la force, droits humains, coopération économique –, l'interprétation qu'ils en donnent reste très diverse, comme l'a montré l'intervention en Irak de 2003. C'est précisément pour cette raison qu'ils entendent toujours subordonner le recours à la force à la supervision d'un organe central apte à arbitrer leurs divergences d'interprétation sur ce que constitue une juste cause. Mais c'est aussi pour cette raison qu'ils ne vont pas plus loin.



Tant qu'il n'existera pas un organisme politique unique capable de produire et de faire exécuter des règles juridiques qui reposent sur une cohésion idéologique forte, le droit international restera dépendant de rapports de forces conjoncturels, dans son élaboration comme dans son application. Aucune réforme institutionnelle ne pourra imposer ou remplacer ce processus de légitimation politique que la Charte, malmenée aujourd'hui, cherchait à favoriser. Le droit international constitue avant tout un langage commun dont on espère que, porté par un combat politique constant, il contribuera à empêcher la guerre.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system

de Faramiñán Gilbert J.M.

Las necesarias modificaciones de las Naciones Unidas en un mundo globalizado (en su sesenta aniversario)
in *Revista Electrónica de Estudios Internacionales*, n. 10

No abstract available

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Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system

Fini Gianfranco

L'Italia e la riforma delle Nazioni Unite

in *Comunità Internazionale (La)*, n. 3, vol. LX, terzo trimestre , 397-405

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Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system

Grigorescu Alexandru

Mapping the UN-League of Nations Analogy: Are There Still Lessons to Be Learned From the League?

in *Global Governance*, n. 1, vol. 11, january-march

ABSTRACT: In recent years the United Nations-League of Nations analogy has been used in U.S. public discourse with increased frequency. A major implication of the analogy is that, if the UN does not undergo substantive changes, it will become as ineffective as its predecessor. This study asks if the example of the League of Nations can still offer important lessons for the future of the UN. It assesses the validity of the analogy by "mapping" the similarities and differences between the recent events involving Iraq and the events preceding World War II. It further compares the structures, principles, rules, norms and decision-making procedures of the two organizations and argues that several apparently minor differences have allowed the UN to be more effective and survive much longer than its predecessor. The study concludes that the analogy is not only inaccurate, but also potentially damaging to the credibility of the UN and, implicitly, to the organization's usefulness.



Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system

Granell Francesc

Naciones Unidas: reforma y transformación

in *Politica Exterior*, 108 Noviembre/Diciembre 2005

Sin acuerdo sobre la reforma del Consejo de Seguridad y con rebajas en los Objetivos de Desarrollo del Milenio, la transformación de la ONU necesitará mayor flexibilidad en su calendario.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system

Chemillier-Gendreau Monique

Pour une organisation de la communauté mondiale

in *Monde Diplomatique (Le)*, Septembre 2005 , pp. 22-23

Comment fonder une organisation mondiale réellement chargée de défendre le bien commun des peuples, et notamment à même de limiter le pouvoir des grandes puissances ? Des pistes de propositions sont soumises au débat

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Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system

Müller Daniel

Procedural Developments at the International Court of Justice

in *Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals (The)*, n. 3, vol. 4 , 501-513

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Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system

Tournepiche Anne-Marie

Quelle réforme pour le Conseil de sécurité?

in *Revue du droit public et de la science politique en France et à l'étranger*, n. 4 , 875-880

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system

Hilpold Peter

Reforming the United Nations: New Proposals in a Longlasting Endeavour



in *Netherlands International Law Review*, 2005, Volume 52, Issue 3 , p. 389-432

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Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system

Jan Pascal

Réforme de l'ONU: choisir entre représentativité et efficacité

in *Revue du droit public et de la science politique en France et à l'étranger*, n. 4 , 869-874

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Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system

Marchi Jean-François

Réformer l'ONU? Brèves observations sur le rapport du Secrétaire général des Nations unies du 24 mars 2005

in *Revue du droit public et de la science politique en France et à l'étranger*, n. 4 , 881-885

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system

Power Samantha

Réformer les Nations unies

in *Monde Diplomatique (Le)*, Septembre 2005

Alors que l'Organisation des Nations unies (ONU) s'apprête à fêter ses 60 ans, un sommet exceptionnel des chefs d'Etat et de gouvernement de la planète se tiendra à New York, du 14 au 16 septembre. Déception et critiques marquent, avec raison, les projets de réforme qui seront soumis à la discussion. Pourtant, si l'ONU a échoué à bannir la guerre, elle demeure indispensable à la recherche de la paix. Paradoxe : l'unilatéralisme des Etats-Unis et l'hégémonisme des grandes compagnies confèrent une brûlante actualité à sa Charte, qui, en 1945, proclamait la primauté du droit, ainsi que la souveraineté des peuples. Comment retrouver cet esprit universaliste tout en prenant mieux en compte les inégalités économiques ?

Il y a soixante ans, les vainqueurs meurtris de la seconde guerre mondiale se rassemblaient à San Francisco pour décider de la création d'une organisation mondiale vouée, comme le formula plus tard Henry Cabot Lodge, l'ambassadeur américain auprès des Nations unies, non pas « à nous emmener au paradis », mais « à nous sauver de l'enfer ».

Franklin Delano Roosevelt avait été le fer de lance du projet onusien et, lorsqu'il mourut, treize jours avant la conférence de San Francisco, Harry S. Truman dut prendre les choses en main. A côté de ce dernier, M. George W. Bush fait figure de grand voyageur. Truman ne s'était rendu qu'une seule fois en Europe auparavant, pour combattre pendant la première guerre mondiale. Mais il n'en comprit pas moins l'importance de l'engagement américain en faveur des



Nations unies. « L'Amérique, déclara-t-il, ne peut plus continuer à rester avec suffisance derrière une ligne Maginot mentale (1). » Les enjeux étaient trop grands : « Dans un monde dépourvu d'un tel dispositif, nous serions voués à jamais à la peur de la destruction. Il était important pour nous d'engager le travail, même si ce début était imparfait (2). »

Les imperfections du système onusien furent manifestes dès sa fondation. L'organisation reposait sur des contradictions patentes. Premièrement, sa création était nécessaire, car on ne pouvait compter sur des Etats avides et belliqueux pour éviter la guerre, respecter les droits de leurs citoyens ou soulager de leur souffrance des peuples situés hors de leurs frontières. Pourtant, l'organisation confiait à ces mêmes Etats égoïstes la mise en œuvre des principes des Nations unies.

Deuxièmement, tout comme la Constitution américaine avait salué l'égalité, mais légitimé l'esclavage, la Charte des Nations unies proclamait le droit à l'autodétermination et encourageait la décolonisation, alors que de nombreux Etats membres résistaient à l'abandon de leurs colonies (la décolonisation fit passer le nombre des pays membres de 51, l'année où l'organisation vit le jour, à 117 vingt ans après ; l'ONU compte actuellement 191 membres).

Troisièmement, les Nations unies donnaient une voix égale aux dictatures et aux démocraties, alors que la Charte prenait parti en appelant les Etats membres à respecter les droits humains et les libertés fondamentales.

Quatrièmement, comme toute organisation, l'ONU nécessitait un organe de direction, mais le pouvoir fut confié à un comité, le Conseil de sécurité, en proie à des querelles intestines et dominé par cinq membres permanents aux intérêts et aux systèmes politiques largement divergents.

Figure de proue de l'organisation, le secrétaire général fut uniquement désigné pour tenir lieu de « directeur administratif général ». Il était le serviteur des Etats, comme l'indiquait bien la dénomination de son bureau : un « secrétariat ».

Enfin, et cinquièmement, la fondation de l'ONU reposait sur l'idée que les agressions transfrontalières, cause principale des deux guerres mondiales, constituaient la menace la plus grave pesant sur l'humanité ; l'histoire allait montrer que les menaces les plus sérieuses peuvent venir d'Etats qui violent les droits de leurs citoyens, à l'intérieur de leurs frontières, ou de terroristes qui n'ont cure des frontières.

L'ONU a été tournée en dérision depuis sa création, mais jamais elle n'avait connu une année aussi noire que 2004, qualifiée par son secrétaire général Kofi Annan d'« annus horribilis ». En réalité, c'est en 2003 que l'organisation a commencé à subir les attaques les plus brutales, quand les Etats-Unis, leur membre le plus puissant, se sont rués, avec le Royaume-Uni, sur un Conseil de sécurité divisé pour obtenir que la guerre soit déclarée contre l'Irak.

Après celle-ci, et le relatif succès américain, certains Européens opposés au conflit tentèrent de trouver un terrain d'entente avec les Américains. Victoire pour les Etats-Unis, le Conseil de sécurité vota une résolution reconnaissant l'occupation américaine de l'Irak ; victoire pour l'Europe, ce même Conseil somma M. Annan d'envoyer une mission politique de l'ONU en Irak, afin d'accélérer la passation des pouvoirs aux Irakiens.

Le secrétaire général n'a quasiment jamais eu le sentiment de pouvoir opposer un refus au Conseil de sécurité. Et, dans ce cas précis, il était tellement obsédé par le fait que les Américains accusaient les Nations unies de perdre leur « pertinence » qu'il se précipita pour rendre service. En réalité, il fit plus que rendre service, il offrit « ce que l'ONU [avait] de meilleur », en la personne de son ami de longue date Sergio Vieira de Mello, le diplomate et bâtisseur de nations le



plus chevronné de l'organisation. Onze semaines après avoir débarqué en Irak pour tenter de mener à bien leur mandat paradoxal (comment peut-on simultanément aider et démanteler une occupation ?), de Mello et vingt et une personnes furent tuées dans un attentat-suicide.

En 2004, les choses empirèrent. On découvrit que des soldats de la paix envoyés par le Maroc, l'Afrique du Sud, le Népal, le Pakistan, la Tunisie et l'Uruguay avaient abusé de jeunes filles au Congo et au Liberia. Des fonctionnaires des Nations unies responsables du programme « Pétrole contre nourriture », destiné à alimenter les Irakiens à la fin des années 1990, et qui était doté de 65 milliards de dollars, furent accusés d'avoir reçu des pots-de-vin. La Commission des droits de l'homme des Nations unies, présidée en 2003 par la Libye, réélut le Soudan avec un mandat de trois ans en 2004, au beau milieu d'une campagne de massacres ethniques au Darfour, qui avait déjà fait des dizaines de milliers de victimes dans le pays.

Début 2005, alors que l'organisation touchait le fond, l'administration Bush annonça que le prochain ambassadeur américain auprès de l'ONU serait M. John Bolton. L'homme ne reconnaît pas l'existence du droit international et a déclaré que, si les Nations unies « perdaient dix étages, cela ne ferait strictement aucune différence ».

C'est sans surprise que, le 29 mai 2005, lors d'une conférence de presse, un journaliste a demandé au secrétaire général s'il pensait qu'il était temps pour lui de démissionner. M. Annan a toujours aimé plaisanter sur les initiales de sa fonction, « SG », qu'il traduit par « scape goat » (bouc émissaire). Néanmoins, rompant totalement avec son personnage, il a rétorqué : « Pas question ! » Et de promettre au contraire d'engager des réformes, à l'occasion des célébrations du sixième anniversaire de l'ONU, en septembre.

La « réforme des Nations unies » fait l'objet d'un débat, qui n'a généralement rien apporté d'utile, depuis que l'organisation existe. Mais le sujet n'avait jamais été abordé avec autant de désespoir qu'aujourd'hui. Dans une organisation où les postes sont difficiles à obtenir, mais impossibles à perdre, plusieurs responsables haut placés dans l'entourage du secrétaire général ont été limogés. Celui-ci a recommandé de dissoudre la Commission des droits de l'homme, trop ouverte, donc embarrassante, et de la remplacer par un conseil restreint où siègeraient les Etats véritablement respectueux de ces droits. L'Allemagne, le Japon, le Brésil et l'Inde ont formé un bloc en vue de pouvoir siéger comme membres permanents au sein d'un Conseil de sécurité élargi. Certains pays d'Afrique se sont également mis sur les rangs (3).

C'est aux Etats-Unis que les voix appelant à une réforme de l'ONU se font le plus entendre, et avec le plus d'autosatisfaction. Les motifs des prétendus « réformateurs » varient. Le chef de file de la majorité républicaine à la Chambre des représentants, M. Tom DeLay, dont les attaques contre le système onusien ne datent pas d'hier, attend d'une réforme qu'elle restreigne l'autonomie de l'organisation, « l'une des plus grandes apologistes au monde de la tyrannie et de la terreur ». Collègue de M. DeLay, M. Henry Hyde a récemment présenté un projet de loi, voté par la Chambre des représentants le 17 juin, qui prévoit de réduire de 50 % les cotisations américaines si l'organisation n'a pas accepté, en 2007, au moins 32 des 46 conditions exigées par Washington.

L'administration Bush s'oppose à juste titre à ce projet de loi qui, selon elle, amoindrirait l'influence des Etats-Unis au sein de l'ONU, au moment où ceux-ci en ont le plus besoin, et – encore plus important peut-être pour un gouvernement qui pratique l'accumulation des pouvoirs – parce qu'il interférerait avec l'autorité du président en matière de politique étrangère. Prenant ses distances avec MM. DeLay et Hyde, le gouvernement américain a publiquement soutenu l'appel lancé par M. Annan pour supprimer la Commission des droits de l'homme et réformer les pratiques de gestion et d'administration de l'organisation. Il a appelé à la constitution d'un « comité des démocraties » et à l'adoption d'une



convention sur la lutte antiterroriste. Ce n'est qu'une fois ces changements mis en œuvre, expliquent les dirigeants américains, que l'Assemblée générale devrait s'engager dans un débat sur l'élargissement du Conseil de sécurité. « Nous ne voulons pas que tout l'oxygène soit aspiré de la pièce » par un débat sur le Conseil de sécurité, remarque le sous-secrétaire d'Etat Nicholas Burns.

Le gouvernement américain soutient la proposition visant à accorder un siège permanent (mais sans droit de veto) au Japon, deuxième grand contributeur de l'organisation, ainsi qu'à un autre pays. De même, Washington soutient l'idée d'ajouter « deux ou trois » sièges non permanents. Une entrée plus spectaculaire de nouveaux membres, estime M. Burns, ne serait pas « facile à digérer » et alourdirait encore cet organe de décision. Le Conseil de sécurité en viendrait peut-être même à ressembler au peu maniable Conseil à 26 de l'Organisation du traité de l'Atlantique nord (OTAN).

Toutefois, le président Bush est resté vague sur les chances de la candidature du Brésil, de l'Allemagne et de l'Inde. « Nous ne nous opposons à la demande d'aucun pays de faire partie du Conseil de sécurité », a-t-il déclaré le 27 juin juste après – ce n'est sans doute pas une coïncidence – avoir rencontré le chancelier allemand Gerhard Schröder.

Parmi les responsables de l'ONU à New York, l'idée d'une réforme est bien accueillie. La réputation de l'organisation étant ruinée dans le pays même où elle est établie, comment pourrait-il en aller autrement ? Cela n'empêche pas les anciens, parmi les fonctionnaires chevronnés de la « maison de verre », de se montrer sceptiques sur la portée d'une telle réforme, puisque les problèmes qui affectent l'ONU sont très souvent le résultat des fissures qui la lézardaient déjà à sa création, en 1945, et le résultat de politiques délibérées de la part des pays membres les plus puissants de l'organisation.

« Rejeter sur les Nations unies la responsabilité » du génocide au Rwanda ou du programme d'armes nucléaires de l'Iran, se plaît à dire M. Richard Holbrooke, ancien ambassadeur américain auprès de l'ONU, « c'est comme rendre responsable le Madison Square Garden quand les New York Knicks (4) jouent mal. » Avant tout, les Nations unies sont... un immeuble. Pour le rénover, il faut réformer le comportement et les priorités des Etats qu'il abrite.

Prenons deux exemples notoires de la « crise » qui secoue l'organisation : le maintien de la paix et la mauvaise gestion. Avant le scandale du programme « Pétrole contre nourriture », rien n'avait taché de sang le drapeau de l'ONU que les massacres au Rwanda et à Srebrenica – tueries perpétrées en 1994 et 1995 en présence des forces de l'ONU chargées du maintien de la paix. Alors à la tête du Département des opérations de maintien de la paix (DOMP) à New York, M. Annan fut averti de l'imminence des exterminations par Romeo Dallaire, son général sur le terrain au Rwanda. De manière impardonnable, M. Annan ne transmet pas cette alerte au Conseil de sécurité.

Mais qui est le plus lourdement responsable d'avoir laissé le génocide se perpétrer ? M. Annan, qui estima que l'alerte allait pousser les Etats membres soit à ne rien faire soit à fuir le Rwanda (une prévision qui se révéla juste pendant le génocide, lorsque les puissances occidentales se contentèrent de retirer les casques bleus) ? Ou M. William Clinton, qui, redoutant une implication des forces américaines dans ce borborygme, demanda que les casques bleus soient évacués alors que les massacres avaient déjà largement commencé ? Ou encore François Mitterrand, qui avait contribué à armer et à entraîner les génocidaires, et dont les soldats furent parachutés pour venir à la rescousse des principaux criminels durant les derniers jours de la tragédie ?

Quelque chose a-t-il changé ? Oui. Les nations occidentales ont tenu compte des « leçons des années 1990 ». Pas en s'assurant que le maintien de la paix s'effectuait correctement, mais en évitant purement et simplement de recourir au maintien de la paix. Les forces armées de pays occidentaux servant sous le drapeau des Nations unies sont devenues



rarissimes. Les pays qui fournissent les plus gros contingents sont actuellement le Bangladesh, l'Inde, le Pakistan, l'Ethiopie et le Ghana.

Les opérations militaires « réussies » de la dernière décennie – intervention de l'OTAN au Kosovo en 1999, opération australienne de sauvetage du Timor-Oriental en 1999, et mission britannique en Sierra Leone en 2000 – n'ont pas été menées par les Nations unies, mais par des « coalitions volontaires ». Au lieu de renforcer des structures collectives permettant d'effectuer des tâches humanitaires et de maintien de la paix essentielles, les pays riches ont décidé de faire cavalier seul ou de rester chez eux. Ce sont les pays pauvres qui se retrouvent seuls à gérer les cas les plus difficiles, comme le Congo et le Darfour actuellement.

S'agissant de maintien de la paix, il est cependant difficile de parler de l'ONU, à l'instar de M. Bolton, comme d'une « superstructure bureaucratique mastodonte en train de rouiller ». En fait, l'organisation ne dispose pas d'un personnel suffisant pour gérer les casques bleus qu'elle déploie. Après les débâcles des années 1990, le secrétaire général s'est engagé à ne jamais se laisser de nouveau dépasser par les événements. Pourtant, si le Conseil de sécurité a autorisé l'envoi de dix-huit nouvelles missions (seize demeurent en action), les 66 000 soldats de la paix ne sont suivis au siège de l'ONU que par quelque 500 fonctionnaires (lire « Dans les méandres des officines onusiennes »). Aucun Etat membre occidental n'imaginerait d'envoyer ses soldats dans des zones dangereuses avec si peu de soutien arrière. Mais, quand les soldats viennent des pays en voie de développement, les grandes puissances ne se posent pas de questions.

Les propos de M. Kevin Kennedy, l'un des magiciens chargés des opérations au siège new-yorkais, résumant parfaitement la situation : « Les endroits où l'ONU est généralement envoyée sont pourris. Cela n'excuse ni l'incompétence ni la paresse, mais ils sont pourris. Et s'ils ne l'étaient pas, les Etats membres s'en occuperaient eux-mêmes. » Si l'ONU va principalement dans les endroits que tous les pays veulent éviter, et si elle y va avec des ressources ridiculement maigres, faut-il s'étonner que son taux de succès soit faible ?

Et que dire de l'autre grande cible de ce vent de réforme, l'inefficacité notoire de l'administration onusienne ? Ronald Reagan a déclaré un jour qu'accepter une subvention du gouvernement américain – avec toutes les contraintes qui s'y attachent –, c'est comme épouser une femme et s'apercevoir que toute sa famille emménage chez vous avant la lune de miel. Les conditions exigées par les Etats membres en contrepartie de leurs cotisations à l'ONU sont encore plus démoralisantes. Chaque dollar versé, insistent-ils, doit faire l'objet d'une comptabilité minutieuse, ce qui signifie que les responsables haut placés chargés des missions les plus dangereuses passent souvent plus de temps à s'occuper de la paperasserie qu'à réfléchir aux moyens d'empêcher la progression du sida, d'organiser des élections ou d'assurer la sécurité dans les rues.

Et quand on en vient aux décisions concernant le personnel, les Etats membres essaient à tout prix de placer leurs ressortissants, indépendamment de leur aptitude pour le poste à pourvoir. Comme nous l'a récemment confié M. Annan, « nous ne récoltons pas ce qu'il y a de meilleur. Les gouvernements ont tendance à nous envoyer les personnes qu'ils n'arrivent pas à caser ».

Il serait toutefois trop simple de tenir les Etats membres pour responsables de l'« annus horribilis » ou de faire porter le fardeau de la réforme aux pays appartenant à l'ONU. Après tout, les rares fois où le secrétariat des Nations unies a attiré les meilleurs, il a rarement été en mesure de les garder. Lorsque Sergio Vieira de Mello a trouvé la mort dans une explosion à Bagdad, en 2003, M. Annan, manifestement bouleversé, a dit : « Je n'avais qu'un seul Sergio. » Tout en rendant à un fonctionnaire courageux et brillant l'hommage qu'il méritait, le secrétaire général s'en prenait aussi



involontairement à l'organisation qu'il dirige.

Quand il a eu besoin d'un expert, M. Annan aurait dû être en mesure de faire appel à quelqu'un d'autre qu'à de Mello ou qu'à M. Lakhdar Brahimi, ancien ministre algérien des affaires étrangères, aujourd'hui âgé de 71 ans. L'ONU dévore ses jeunes. Si ses dirigeants ne viennent pas à bout du défaitisme ambiant, qui incite les fonctionnaires à se concevoir non comme des acteurs mais uniquement comme la cible des machinations des pays membres, la qualité de son personnel va continuer de s'en ressentir.

Il est très peu probable que les pays rassemblés au sein des Nations unies changent de politique dans un avenir proche. Les contradictions inhérentes à l'organisation ne seront donc sans doute pas surmontées. Mais, s'il reste encore à convaincre les Etats les plus puissants qu'une ONU forte servira leurs intérêts, tous les membres admettront qu'une organisation éclaboussée par les scandales détourne les Etats membres et les agences onusiennes des défis humanitaires et sécuritaires bien plus pressants qui se profilent.

Ainsi, soixante ans après la création du système onusien, le secrétariat doit faire le ménage dans son administration ; recruter, garder et développer de jeunes talents ; faire pression pour que des envoyés et des responsables de premier ordre soient nommés sur la base de leur mérite plutôt que de leur nationalité ; et ne pas hésiter à rendre publiques, et non à intérioriser, les tentatives de manipulation et le manque d'ambition de ses Etats membres, ainsi que le sous-financement de ses programmes. S'il est une réforme que le secrétariat des Nations unies peut mener à bien par lui-même, c'est de refuser que le drapeau onusien serve à masquer les désaccords et l'indifférence des pays membres.

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Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system

Malik Mohan J.

Security Council Reform: China Signals Its Veto
in *World Policy Journal*, n. 1, vol. XXII, spring

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system

EI-Kareh Rudolf

Tempérer l'ivresse de l'empire
in *Monde Diplomatique (Le)*, Septembre 2005 , p. 29

L'Organisation des Nations unies est en crise. Portée sur les fonts baptismaux par les grands vainqueurs de la seconde guerre mondiale, elle est aujourd'hui la cible des Etats-Unis, pourtant l'un de ses principaux parrains. Le secrétaire général, M. Kofi Annan, a réaffirmé dans sa « Déclaration du Millénaire », en l'an 2000, sa « volonté de doter [l'ONU] d'une organisation qui permette de relever les nouveaux défis de la politique internationale multilatérale, compte tenu des importants changements intervenus au sein de la communauté internationale depuis la chute du mur de Berlin ».



Les propositions de M. Annan seront soumises à l'Assemblée générale, qui est, selon la Charte, le centre de décision principal de l'organisation (lire le dossier « Controverses sur l'avenir de l'ONU »). Les déséquilibres mondiaux se sont toutefois traduits par un déplacement du centre de gravité, vers le Conseil de sécurité, où les Etats-Unis sont aujourd'hui hégémoniques. Cette situation a aggravé les déséquilibres entre le Nord et le Sud. L'idée de « communauté internationale » est aujourd'hui dévoyée, car il est évident qu'une poignée de pays sont « plus égaux que d'autres (1) ».

La nomination furtive, par M. George W. Bush, de M. John Bolton comme représentant des Etats-Unis permet de supposer que la réforme de l'ONU ne se déroulera pas dans les meilleures conditions. M. Bolton et M. Annan – même si celui-ci est soumis sans cesse à diverses formes de pressions – n'ont pas, en effet, la même conception de la notion de chantier. Ses années de militantisme néoconservateur au service de MM. Barry Goldwater, Ronald Reagan et George W. Bush, M. Bolton les a parsemées de calomnies agressives à l'égard des institutions internationales.

Avoir notamment mené la campagne de dénigrement de l'administration Reagan contre l'Unesco, affirmer que la « disparition de dix étages » au siège des Nations unies à New York ne « ferait pas la moindre différence » pour une « organisation qui équivaut à rien », soutenir l'idée de « l'invalidité de la loi internationale », et considérer que le « moment le plus heureux » de sa carrière publique fut celui où il apposa sa signature au bas de la lettre d'abrogation de l'accord donné par le président William Clinton à la création de la Cour pénale internationale, n'est pas fait pour lui ouvrir les cœurs.

Et pourtant, irréductibles aux simples appareils bureaucratiques, et encore moins à certaines de leurs pratiques contestées et contestables, les Nations unies sont une organisation à nulle autre pareille. Elles sont à la fois un bien commun et une transcendance, la quête d'un idéal jamais atteint, et toujours perfectible. Elles ne sont pas, par conséquent, un simple assemblage d'Etats, mais plutôt l'expression de la planète humaine.

A l'initiative du Centre Europe-tiers-monde (Cetim), à Genève, vingt-sept juristes, chercheurs et universitaires ont voulu y porter « des regards militants (2) ». « Au fil des années, constatent les auteurs, l'Organisation des Nations unies a déçu beaucoup d'espairs », mais le monde ne se porterait pas mieux, bien au contraire, sans l'ONU. Celle-ci est une « tribune pour tous les pays où peuvent s'exprimer aussi des voix discordantes », de telle sorte que, par un débat tourné vers l'action et le changement, les convergences entre les mouvements sociaux et les droits exprimés dans sa Charte, l'esprit et les pratiques retrouvent leur essence fondatrice. Comme le dit l'écrivain uruguayen Eduardo Galeano, « la lutte pour la démocratie dans le monde [devrait] commencer par la démocratisation des organismes prétendument internationaux ».

La réflexion proposée par l'ouvrage permet d'affiner la notion, si galvaudée, de société civile et de rappeler que l'intervention de celle-ci ne se limite pas à la « colonisation de l'ONU par les entreprises transnationales ». Elle serait plutôt « l'espace situé entre le prince et le marchand, c'est-à-dire entre l'Etat et le marché (...), un lieu de contradictions (...) investi par tous les acteurs sociaux ». Dans cet ordre d'idées, faire de l'ONU un véritable outil multipolaire des relations internationales, c'est d'abord revenir au texte fondateur : la Déclaration universelle des droits de l'homme. Voilà, assure le juriste Robert Charvin, « l'outil révolutionnaire du XXI^e siècle ».

L'aventure américaine en Irak a mis à mal l'organisation et révélé ses faiblesses. Barbara Delcourt, Denis Duez et Eric Remacle, professeurs à l'Université libre de Bruxelles (ULB), s'interrogent (3) : la guerre d'Irak est-elle le prélude d'un nouvel ordre international ? S'appuyant sur la méthode d'Edward Saïd, selon laquelle « toute représentation collective, tout discours, tout texte constituent une production sociale insérée dans un espace et un temps donnés, et participent de stratégies conscientes ou inconscientes de domination et d'émancipation », les contributeurs mettent en évidence



que « le débat intellectuel international sur le monde reste d'abord un débat intra-américain et intra-occidental (...), un discours sur la puissance et l'expansion comme force d'un peuple sur la scène internationale », et, partant, « le présumé commun au-delà des apparences contradictoires capacité de l'Occident à structurer le reste de la planète et à en constituer un point de référence obligé ».

C'est sans doute en tempérant l'ivresse des destinées impériales manifestes que les Nations unies retrouveront leur esprit fondateur

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Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system

Österdahl Inger

The Exception as the Rule: Lawmaking on Force and Human Rights by the UN Security Council
in *Journal of Conflict and Security Law*, Volume 10, Number 1, Spring , 1-20

When the UN Security Council began authorising humanitarian interventions, its decisions were circumscribed by references to the unique and exceptional character of every situation dealt with. From the point of view of lawmaking, whether the Security Council claims that every situation is unique is of no significance as long as there is a consistent practice to the contrary. Even though the practice may in many respects be labelled 'ad-hocish', this article argues that there exists nevertheless a repeated if not consistent practice on the part of the Security Council on humanitarian intervention. The practice of the Security Council outweighs the words of the Council aiming to circumscribe the legal effects of its action. The immediate legal effect of the authorisations to use force to protect human rights relates to the mandate of the Security Council under the UN Charter. Indirectly, the practice of the Security Council on humanitarian intervention may also have an impact on general international law on the use of force. Perhaps, the repeated practice of the Security Council has paved the way for unilateral action in cases where the Council still cannot agree. All the decisions of the Security Council on humanitarian intervention are gone through in the article, which finds that in time the scrupulous circumscription of the authorisations to use force to protect human rights has disappeared from the resolutions of the Security Council. Then it becomes even easier to argue that the practice of the Security Council, although still 'ad-hocish', does make law

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Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system

Fereydoun Hoveyda

The Problem with the United Nations
in *American Foreign Policy Interests*, Vol. 27, n. 3 / June , 175-182

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system

Mee Laurence D.

The Role of UNEP and UNDP in Multilateral Environmental Agreements



in **International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics**, Volume 5, Number 3, September , pp. 227-263

This study examines the role of the UN's programmes for environment and development (UNEP and UNDP) in the genesis and implementation of multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). This is set in the wider context of the changing dominant focus of the international agenda, from 'environment' at the Stockholm Conference in 1972, to 'environment and development' at Rio in 1992, and 'sustainable development' in Johannesburg in 2002. UNDP is a development organisation strongly rooted in its country office network. Its role is becoming increasingly normative however, particularly since 2002 when UNDP opted to root most of its activities on the Millennium Development Goals. UNEP, as an environmental organisation has been successful at catalysing MEAs at the global and regional level; but without a significant increase in its budget over 30 years, its capacity has been spread very thinly. Many of the institutional arrangements for MEAs have effectively become independent of UNEP resulting in a very loosely and sometimes poorly coordinated network. Two case studies are used to illustrate the current institutional arrangements: UNEP's Regional Seas Conventions and Protocols, and the Convention for Biological Diversity. These illustrate the fragmentation of current institutions, the need for strengthened technical and scientific support, the importance of addressing problems at their root causes and the need to increase the devolution of global governance to the regional level. Satisfying the identified needs requires actions within the remit of both UNEP and UNDP. It is argued that current institutional arrangements have not kept pace with the requirements of evolving policy. As part of a reform process, one option may be to merge the two programmes into a single structure that conserves and strengthens vital technical functions but enables a balanced and integrated approach to sustainable development.

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Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system

Benjamin Rivlin

The UN Reform Conundrum

in **American Foreign Policy Interests**, Vol. 27, n. 5 / October , 365-384

Set within the historical context of UN reform, this analysis provides insight into the grand debate precipitated by the Security Council's action or inaction over Iraq, the ensuing U.S. preemptive war there, and the direction UN reform is likely to take.

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Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system

Berdal Mats

The UN's Unnecessary Crisis

in **Survival**, n. 3, vol. 47, autumn , 7-32

No abstract available

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Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system

Bertucci Guido, Alberti Adriana

The United Nations Programme in Public Administration: reinventing itself to help reinvent public administration

in International Review of Administrative Sciences , June 1 2005, Volume 71, No. 2 , 337-353

In a world that is changing rapidly and constantly, public administration needs to be able to respond as rapidly and as effectively as possible to new challenges and priorities. The process of reinvention and revitalization requires vision, knowledge and capacity. The same qualities are required from the United Nations if they are to assist developing countries and countries with economies in transition effectively in their efforts to reform public administration. This article provides an historical excursus of how the conception of the role of the state has changed in the past decades and its impact on developing countries; how instrumental the United Nations was in re-establishing awareness of the role of public administration in development, and the significant preparatory work done in this area by the International Institute of Administrative Sciences (IIAS). The article also illustrates how the United Nations Programme in Public Administration has reinvented itself in order to help reinvent government and singles out some of the emerging challenges in the field of public administration.

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Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system

Petculescu Ioana

The review of the United Nations Security Council decisions by the international Court of Justice

in Netherlands International Law Review, Volume 52, Issue 2 , 167-195

The present topic has been extensively addressed by several authors during the 1990s. It has provoked harsh polemics and a passionate debate and still represents an issue of interest for the international lawyers, as no formal and complete answer to the question of the international judicial review has been brought to this day. This article tries to put forward an effective and efficient mechanism allowing the International Court of Justice to review the resolutions adopted by the Security Council in the realm of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The approach of the subject is favourable to an international judicial review, which would render the intervention of the Council more legitimate, hence more easily accepted by states. The proposed method of judicial review must however ensure both the legitimacy and the efficiency of the political organ and strengthen, not weaken the United Nations' role in the maintenance of international peace and security. That is why the international judicial review mechanism should be carefully defined and should confer upon the international judge a limited power of appreciation. At the same time, the other international courts and tribunals should defer to the International Court on matters concerning the legality of the Security Council's coercive measures by means of a preliminary ruling mechanism.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations



Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system

Mark Malloch Brown

UNreformable?

in **Foreign Policy**, Issue 150, September / October

No abstract available

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Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system

Herrera Boris Yopo

Unas Naciones Unidas para el siglo XXI

in **Estudios internacionales : revista del Instituto de Estudios Internacionales de la Universidad de Chile**, Vol. 38 / 2005 / Nr. 149 , p. 99

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Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system

Šahović Milan

United Nations 60th Anniversary. Marked by Its Reform

in **Review of International Affairs (The)** , Vol. LVI, n. 1118, April–June

<http://www.diplomacy.bg.ac.yu/mp1118.htm#1>

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system

Soren Jessen Petersen

United Nations and Kosovo

in **Review of International Affairs (The)** , Vol. LVI, n. 1117, January–March

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system

Volger Helmut

Vereinte Nationen: Große Reformen klein gemacht

in **Blätter für deutsche & internationale Politik**, November, 2005 , 1290-1294

No abstract available



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Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system

Badinter Robert

Vers un monde plus sûr

in *Politique Etrangère*, 3/2005, (automne).

Le Groupe de personnalités de haut niveau chargé par Kofi Annan de proposer des mesures répondant aux défis nouveaux de sécurité a rendu son rapport en décembre 2004. Ce rapport sert aujourd'hui de base aux réflexions sur les diverses réformes de l'ONU: sur l'encadrement et les modalités de l'usage de la force dans les crises internationales, le terrorisme, la gestion des États "délinquants", la réforme de la Commission des droits de l'homme ou l'élargissement du Conseil de sécurité.

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Subsection 1. The United Nations and its system

Puchala Donald J.

World Hegemony and the United Nations

in *Review of International Studies (The)*, Volume 7, Issue 4, December , 571-584

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Finger J. Michael

A diplomat's economics: reciprocity in the Uruguay Round negotiations

in *World Trade Review*, (2005), 4:1 , 27-40

A diplomat's jurisprudence, as Bob Hudec characterized the early GATT legal system, was a compromise between jurisprudence as understood by lawyers and the reality of the limited influence trade negotiators had over national trade policy decisions. A diplomat's economics was a parallel compromise between economics as understood by economists and the reality of the many objectives that governments hoped the GATT would serve. As the GATT evolved into the WTO and took on more complicated areas of economic policy, its jurisprudence evolved with it, but its economics remained the same. When the bargain was tariff concessions versus tariff concessions, the difference between mercantilist economics and real economics did not matter, but in the new areas the WTO took on at the Uruguay Round it does matter. There is such a thing as comparative advantage among institutions, and in the new areas the WTO is at a comparative disadvantage relative to the international development banks.

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Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Cho Sungjoon



A quest for WTO's legitimacy

in *World Trade Review*, Vol. 4 - Issue 03 – November 2005

The WTO Consultative Report, dubbed the 'Sutherland Report' (the Report), was released on 17 January 2005 in an attempt to identify the WTO's institutional challenges, to provide non-binding recommendations from eminent persons, and thus to trigger a 'process of reflection'. While these challenges (and criticism) vary, they are inextricably linked to the fundamental question of the legitimacy of WTO as a system, not necessarily as a mere gathering of 148 Members. In fact, the question has hotly been debated ever since the WTO's creation, generating a great deal of debates and reactions among scholars and politicians alike.

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Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Petersmann Ernst-Ulrich

Addressing Institutional Challenges to the WTO in the New Millennium: A Longer-Term Perspective

in *Journal of International Economic Law*, 8 (3) , 647-665

The report on 'The Future of the WTO' – in its sub-title – calls for 'addressing institutional challenges in the new millennium'. In his Foreword, WTO Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi recalls that – during the Uruguay Round negotiations on the Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO) – 'there had been too little thinking on whether the institutional design and practice that had served the GATT so well would do the same for the WTO'; in his view, the enlarged WTO membership and the political responsibilities of WTO Members require a new 'dialogue on the options available to reinforce this vitally important institution for the future'. The first WTO Director-General and chairman of the Consultative Board Peter Sutherland – in his Preface to the report – confirms this diagnosis: the WTO 'is not by any means fully equipped for its tasks. There is a real need for institutional reforms to, and increased support for, the WTO.' Yet, the report limits itself 'to propose realizable reforms rather than more substantial changes that could not, in our view, have commanded the degree of support necessary for them to be effected'. It remains an important task for academics to promote a longer-term perspective and public discussion on institutional reforms that, even if they remain controversial among politicians focusing on what may be realizable in the short term, appear to be necessary 'in the new millennium' so as to ensure that WTO Members and the world trading system protect consumer welfare and other general citizen interests more effectively, with due regard for universal human rights and democratic self-government.

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Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Donald Kenyon and John Kunkel

Australia and the European Union in the World Trade Organisation: partners or adversaries?

in *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 59, n. 1 / March , 55-69

Shared interests between Australia and the European Union (EU) in multilateral trade negotiations are increasing. However, the relationship in the WTO continues to be defined by conflicts over agriculture. This article examines the case for closer Australia-EU co-operation on shared interests in WTO negotiations while continuing to press for more rapid reform of EU agriculture policies. It traces the major changes in the interface between Australia and the EU in the WTO, including the re-structuring of the Australian economy over the past two decades and the more recent efforts by the EU to modify the trade impact of the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) on world agriculture trade. The article



concludes that closer co-operation between Australia and the EU in the WTO on shared interests would enhance Australia's influence in the multilateral trade system.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Thangavelu S. M. , Toh Mun-Heng

Bilateral 'WTO-Plus' Free Trade Agreements: The WTO Trade Policy Review of Singapore 2004
in *World Economy*, Volume 28, Number 9 , 1211-1228

The World Trade Organisation's 2004 Trade Policy Review of Singapore (WTO-TPR Singapore 2004) depicts the small and outward-oriented economy as one of the most open countries to international trade and investment. The review highlights the benefits of the outward-oriented strategy that has enabled the Singapore economy to weather recent external shocks such as the Asian financial crisis to the SARS and to the recent unfavourable conditions in the Middle East. In particular, the report commended Singapore's efforts on its liberalisation of the services sector and its economic benefits to consumers and global trade. However, the WTO-TPR Singapore 2004 highlights several key areas of concerns: (a) the commitment to multilateral agreements with the rising number of bilateral free trade agreements signed by Singapore and (b) the lack of growth of total factor productivity, a key indicator for long-run efficiency of the economy. The paper addresses the above key concerns raised in the WTO's TPR of Singapore in terms of its commitment to global trade in terms of WTO-plus bilateral FTAs, which intends to support a multilateral trading system, and its overall industrial strategies to raise its competitiveness.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Valor Martinez Carmen

Constraints for the participation of NGOs in the WTO: courses of action
in *Transnational Associations*, n. 2, 2005 , 79-86

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Ehlermann Claus-Dieter , Ehring Lothar

Decision-Making in the World Trade Organization
in *Journal of International Economic Law*, 8 (1) , 51-75

Globalization creates a demand for international rule-making, and the WTO remains the forum for creating binding and enforceable international trade rules. The WTO therefore needs an effective decision-making system capable of resolving diverging interests. Although the WTO Agreement foresees votes where consensus cannot be reached, the practice of consensus dominates the process of decision-making. The GATT 1947 only spoke of voting and did not mention the word 'consensus'. The WTO Agreement reflects the evolution from votes to consensus in the GATT 1947.



Nevertheless, voting was not abandoned in the WTO Agreement. Although the consensus practice generally works well, it nevertheless implies the risk of deadlock and in particular the Membership's inability to respond legislatively where it disagrees with a panel's or the Appellate Body's legal interpretation. Consensus also inherently favours the status quo and can make it extremely difficult to achieve change. Consensus does not provide for equality (in terms of decision and influence) because not every Member has the same ability to maintain vetoes. Consensus of course has many advantages, but it is questionable whether it is also more democratic than the majority rule.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Schirm Stefan A.

**Der Einfluss von Interessen und Normen auf nationale Positionen zur Global Economic Governance
in Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft** , 15. Jahrgang (2005), Heft 3 , 825-847

The Role of Endogenous Interests and Norms in National Positions on Global Economic Governance

Why do governmental positions on new governance diverge despite a similar interest in a stable world economy? Why is economic globalization only in some cases accompanied by a globalization of politics through new rules for global markets? National divergences on global economic governance can neither be explained by the logic of the international system nor by the logic of globalization, but instead strongly reflect endogenous interests and norms. In addition, variation in achieving governance can be explained with the different impact of interests versus norms on the ability to compromise internationally. These hypotheses are exemplified in case studies on governmental positions on the governance of financial markets (IMF, Basel II) and trade (WTO).

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Koul, A K

**Developing Countries in the GATT/WTO -- Their Obligations and the Law
in Indian Journal of International Law**, Volume 44, Issue 3 , 451-487

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Rose Andrew

Does the WTO Make Trade More Stable?

in Open Economies Review, Volume 16, Number 1 , 7-22

I examine the hypothesis that membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its predecessor the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) has increased the stability and predictability of trade flows. I use a large data set covering annual bilateral trade flows between over 175 countries between 1950 and 1999, and estimate the effect of GATT/WTO membership on the coefficient of variation in trade computed over 25-year samples, controlling for a number of factors. I also use a comparable multilateral data set. There is little evidence that membership in the



GATT/WTO has a significant dampening effect on trade volatility.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Boughton James M.

Does the World Need a Universal Financial Institution?

in *IMF Policy Discussion Papers*, No. 05/116 June 2005

All financial institutions specialize, in dimensions that may include categories of assets and liabilities, types of services offered, customer demographics, and geographic coverage. The International Monetary Fund is the only international financial institution that is universal in its geographic scope, prepared to lend on request to virtually any country in the world. Why has this status come about? What are its costs and benefits? Is it an appropriate model for a world where macroeconomic imbalances, financial crises, and disparities in economic development must compete for attention and resources?

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Mahieu Géraldine, Ooms Dirk, Rottier Stéphane

EU Representation and the Governance of the International Monetary Fund

in *European Union Politics*, Vol. 6, n. 4, December, 493-510

The introduction of the euro and closer coordination of economic policies in the European Union are fuelling a debate on Europe's representation in the international financial institutions. A single EU representation at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) would affect the balance of power in the institution through a fundamental reallocation of quotas and executive directors among its membership. A reduction in the number of European executive directors, and in the total voting power of Europe and in its contribution to the Fund's general resources, could go hand in hand with an increase in the Union's impact on IMF decision-making. Such a change would also weaken the cooperative nature of the Fund through a reduction in the number and impact of mixed constituencies.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Van den Bossche Peter, Alexoviová Iveta

Effective Global Economic Governance by the World Trade Organization

in *Journal of International Economic Law*, 8 (3), 667-690

The World Trade Organization ('WTO') is the principal international institution for the management and regulation of the process of economic globalization. Its effectiveness in fulfilling this important task, however, leaves much to be desired. On 4 and 5 February 2005, the Faculty of Law of Maastricht University organized an international research conference entitled 'In Search of Effective Global Economic Governance: The Case of the World Trade Organization'. This conference brought together academics, WTO officials, government diplomats, national trade officials, representatives of



business associations and NGOs to discuss a wide range of issues, including: possible improvements to and alternatives for consensus decision-making in the WTO; issues of transparency, democratic legitimacy and the participation of civil society in WTO decision-making; secondary law-making by WTO bodies; and an expanded role for the WTO Secretariat. It is important that legal and political science scholars focus their research efforts on the reforms needed to transform the WTO into an instrument of effective global economic governance. The main objective of the conference was, therefore, to define a comprehensive agenda for research into the institutional reform of the WTO. This article is, above all, a report of the conference and summarizes the main arguments made by the participants.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Cottarelli Carlo

Efficiency and Legitimacy: Trade-Offs in IMF Governance

in *IMF Policy Discussion Papers*, No. 05/107 June 2005

Designing appropriate governance structures for an international financial institution such as the IMF is difficult, because steps to enhance the legitimacy of such an institution through constraints on its decision-making process may affect its operational efficiency. Potential trade-offs between legitimacy and efficiency exist for any public institution but are arguably more severe for an international one, because delegating power to it politically controversial and, thus, likely to imply tighter constraints. The paper also underscores that the trade-offs are not absolute, however: they depend on the specific ways in which legitimacy is pursued—that is, on the specific constraints that are set. Strategic reforms should, thus, aim at improving the terms of the trade-off by exploring steps that are Pareto-improving in the dimensions of legitimacy and efficiency.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Bagwell Kyle , Staiger Robert W.

Erratum to Multilateral trade negotiations, bilateral opportunism and the rules of GATT/WTO

in *Journal of International Economics*, Volume 67, Issue 2, December 2005 , 1-29

Trade negotiations occur through time and between the governments of many countries. An important issue is thus whether the value of concessions that a government wins in a current negotiation may be eroded in a future bilateral negotiation to which it is not party. We identify rules of negotiation that serve to protect the welfare of governments that are not participating in the bilateral negotiation. Our main finding is that the two central principles of GATT/WTO—nondiscrimination (MFN) and reciprocity—preserve the welfare of nonparticipating governments and therefore offer a “first-line of defense” against bilateral opportunism.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Targetti F.

Europa e Stati Uniti e la governance dell'economia

in *ItalianiEuropei*, n. 1 , 141-151



No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Gutner Tamar L.

Explaining the Gaps between Mandate and Performance: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform

in **Global Environmental Politics**, Volume 5, Issue 2, May , pp. 10-37

This article seeks to explain why the World Bank's environmental performance is so uneven despite numerous reform efforts. I argue that a principal-agent model offers a potentially powerful tool for analyzing gaps between the mandates and performance of international organizations (IOs) such as the World Bank. The model is particularly useful when it is calibrated to recognize problems of antinomic delegation and the dual role an IO may have as both agent and principal. Antinomic delegation occurs when states ask IOs to take on complex tasks that are difficult to institutionalize. Recognizing that many IOs may be principal and agent at different stages of the policy process reveals more opportunities for agency slack that are not well addressed by the IO literature. This article presents these modifications to the principal-agent model and applies the model to the case of the World Bank. The case study demonstrates that the nature of the tasks being delegated and the incentives shaping both sides of the principal-agent relationship are key sources of disconnect between the institution's stated goals and its performance

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Arestis Philip, Basu Santonu , Mallick Sushanta

Financial globalization: the need for a single currency and a global bank

in **Journal of Post Keynesian Economics**, Volume 27, Number 3

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Higgott Richard Weber Heloise

GATS in context: development, an evolving lex mercatoria and the Doha Agenda

in **Review of International Political Economy**, Volume 12, Number 3 / August 2005 , Pages: 434 - 455

As the hub of the organization for world trade, the WTO has been subject to critical scrutiny from various political and theoretical persuasions. Beyond merely the exchange of goods across borders, the complex and expansive WTO framework is one that encompasses juridical and political capacity to oversee and facilitate the regulation of 'property rights' on a global scale. Therefore, it is not surprising that the social and political organization of world trade law is increasingly subject to controversies over its nature and implications for world politics. One field where these play out prominently is the one marked by competing social and political visions of development, with advocates of the world trade agenda considering development to be premised upon the consolidation and entrenchment of lex mercatoria (or



commercial law). The key institution to oversee global development, in this view, is the WTO. However, important evaluations of the trajectories of development are taking place outside the framework of this particular and recent trade-development discourse. Through a critical appraisal of this mainstream trade-development discourse we draw attention to its ahistorical nature and ask, what is the relationship of the normative and substantive underpinnings of the WTO Doha 'Development' agenda with world historical development? We advance two politically significant points. The first pertains to the relationship between trade, the political economy of development, and poverty. The second, and related point is essentially a methodological comment on the framing of development. The state-centric groundings of the trade and development agenda, as well as its rationalist assumptions, obscure substantive analysis of the social and political implications of global development in relational terms. If viewed from the perspective of social experience, the Doha Development Round fails as a 'development' agenda. Against this backdrop, we draw on the example of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) – a key component of the Doha Round – and suggest that the theory of poverty that underpins orthodox development theory serves to legitimize, stabilize and advance a particular politically steered world order: this theory is constituted through an abstraction from social realities, and thus seeks to stabilise and 'naturalize' social power relations conducive to 'development through inequality'.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Lavelle, Kathryn C.

Growing Pains for the Bretton Woods Institutions

in *Review of International Studies (The)*, Volume 7, Issue 1, March , 110-113

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Setton Daniela

IWF - Zuchtmeister auf Kuschelkurs

in *Blätter für deutsche & internationale Politik*, November, 2005 , 1287-1290

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Bordo Michael D., MacDonald Ronald

Interest rate interactions in the classical gold standard, 1880–1914: was there any monetary independence?

in *Journal of Monetary Economics*, Volume 52, Issue 2 , March , Pages 307-327

This paper examines an hypothesis of Svensson (1994) (*Journal of Monetary Economics* 33, 157–199) that a credible target zone can confer on a country a degree of independence in the operation of its monetary policy, even when exchange rates are fixed. We test this hypothesis for the Classical gold standard using a newly created monthly data base for the period 1880–1913. Building on the recently noted finding that the Classical gold standard represented a credible, well-behaved, target zone system we propose a number of ways of testing the Svensson' model. Our main



finding is that the Classical gold standard did indeed confer some independence in the operation of monetary policy for participating countries. This would seem to have an important bearing on the kind of institutional framework required for a modern day target zone to function effectively and, in particular, to weather speculative attacks.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Frein Michael

Katzenjammer bei der WTO

in **Blätter für deutsche & internationale Politik**, Dezember, 2005 , 1440-1443

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Bestagno Francesco

Le implicazioni dell'allargamento dell'Unione Europea per l'Organizzazione Mondiale del Commercio

in **Diritto del Commercio Internazionale**, 19. 1 - Gennaio - Marzo , 3-40

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Won-Mog Choi

Legal Problems of Making Regional Trade Agreements with Non-WTO-Member States

in **Journal of International Economic Law**, 8 (4) , 825-860

In pursuing regional economic integration with non-WTO-member economies, a WTO member must be aware that WTO compliance is under question. An exchange of preferential treatment between the WTO-member party and non-WTO-member parties gives rise to a violation by the WTO member of the MFN treatment obligation of the WTO Agreement. In the case of integration in the service sector, consistency with WTO jurisprudence is guaranteed, whereas in integrating the goods sector, WTO consistency can only be guaranteed when the non-WTO-member parties are least-developed countries. Furthermore in the TRIPs sector, the WTO compliance is not questionable only when the RTA reconfirms original rights and duties arising under the TRIPs Agreement. Thus, in order to be consistent with WTO jurisprudence, regional integration agreements in the area of trade in goods need to be approved by a two-thirds majority of the WTO members, before they come into force. Or, the WTO member could encourage the non-WTO-member state to join the WTO before their RTA comes into force. On the other hand, in the case of economic integration in the service sector, as non-WTO-member status of any counterpart economies does not act as a legal impediment, the WTO members may pursue more active negotiations, while remaining consistent with WTO jurisprudence. In drafting and negotiating on IPR chapters under RTAs, WTO members must be vigilant not to mutually exchange a higher level of IPR protection than that stipulated under the TRIPs Agreement.



Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Momani Bessma

Limits on streamlining Fund conditionality: the International Monetary Fund's organizational culture
in *Journal of International Relations and Development*, Volume 8, Number 2, June , 142-163

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) recently started addressing its 'runaway agency' image by instituting top-down directives to streamline, or limit the scope and breadth of, conditionality. Under the leadership of a new Managing Director in 2000, the IMF attempted to change its guidelines on conditionality to address members' concerns that Fund staff had encroached on members' economic sovereignty. After some internally proposed steps to change conditionality, the new guidelines that were ideally designed to allow flexibility in designing conditionality ³/₄ explicitly for member-states and implicitly for Fund staff ³/₄ resembled the existing means of formulating conditionality. The reason for the continued status quo is that the Fund's organizational culture, qualified as technocratic, resisted policy changes and instead invited a continued mission creep. Based on published internal Fund studies and personal interviews with Fund staff, this article suggests that internal efforts to change conditionality have had a minimal effect on changing the status quo due to the Fund's entrenched organizational culture.

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Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Richez Béatrice

Mondialisation et cycle de Doha. L'accord de juillet 2004 à l'OMC : un manque d'ambition ?

in *Revue de l'Union européenne/Revue du Marché Commun et de l'Union européenne*, Numero 484, janvier , pp. 26-30

The July 2004 WTO Agreement: Lack of Ambition.

The World Trade Organisation (WTO) entered into a framework agreement in late July 2004, for the Doha cycle, which deserves to be acknowledged, since it will help clear the distrust climate that weighed on the Organisation and boost negotiations, whereas member countries seemed to have no real will to reach new agreements. The WTO is moving towards a new dynamic far from failure. Yet the goals displayed are rather modest, regarding access to market and service liberalisation. Minimum agreements on both those issues are to be feared. The risk is to give the impression to companies that they do not have much to gain with this new cycle. Failing, they will move away from an organisation, of which they are the driving force. and which cannot move under the sole drive of politics. Lastly, the removal of three of the issues of Singapore (investments, competition and public markets), which French companies had expressed interest in, also poses the problem of their future regulation. The agreement will also affect the future nature of the WTO.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Bournet Jacques

Mondialisation et cycle de Doha. La politique commerciale commune de l'Union européenne et la



mondialisation -- La recherche d'une libéralisation maîtrisée des échanges internationaux

in *Revue de l'Union européenne/Revue du Marché Commun et de l'Union européenne*, Numero 484, janvier , pp. 19-25

The European Union's Common Commercial policy and globalisation, the search for a controlled international trade liberalisation.

The goal to control globalisation has been an objective of the European Union's common commercial policy for nearly two decades. Is it merely a dream, an ideological stance, a political slogan or a realistic objective?. How can the European Union offer globalisation control without world economic governance, which does not exist, whereas the European economic governance is just starting, after half a century of integration? The European Union should admit in this early XXth century, that the realistic goal cannot aim at less globalisation, it should be aimed at putting in place support policies to streamline some of the effects of an increasingly stringent environment. With that in view, the EU's commercial policy chose three series of objectives that seem to be the first bases of a realistic approach of globalisation: guaranteeing the predominance of multilateralism, bringing together all countries in the world commercial system, broadening the field of the world-wide control. The limited results of Europe's attempts are not attributable to the EU's strategy only, they can also be attributed to the international climate in which the strategy is implemented and to the various compromises that Europe has to accept.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Srinivasan T. N.

Nondiscrimination in GATT/WTO: was there anything to begin with and is there anything left?

in *World Trade Review*, (2005), 4:1 , 69-95

Nondiscriminatory treatment at its border of a like product coming from another WTO signatory (Article I on Most Favored Nation Treatment), and of domestic and foreign suppliers of like or similar products within its borders (Article III on National Treatment) are widely held to be the fundamental principles of GATT/WTO. Yet GATT included significant exceptions to nondiscriminatory treatment, for example, in its articles relating to customs unions and free trade areas, antidumping and safeguards. I argue that these exceptions have become dominant over time so that not much nondiscrimination remains in the global trading system. With the recent inclusion of services, intellectual property and trade-related investment measures, traditional GATT issues of tariff and non-tariff barriers at the border to market access have become less important compared to regulatory barriers inside the border. It is an open question whether nondiscrimination per se is a salient issue in thinking about multilateral disciplines in these new areas.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Park Susan

Norm diffusion within international organizations: a case study of the World Bank

in *Journal of International Relations and Development*, Volume 8, Number 2, June , 111-141

Constructivists often argue that International Organizations (IOs) diffuse norms throughout the international system. This article asks the question: if IOs promote and diffuse specific norms within world politics, where do these norms come from? In particular, this analysis seeks to formulate how IOs' identities emerge in issue areas where rationalist theories



give limited explanation, such as the environment. This article posits that IOs interact with and consume norms from non-state actors such as transnational advocacy networks, a process overlooked by the constructivist analysis of institutions. This is examined through a case study of the World Bank's environmental identity where transnational advocacy networks played an important role in the Bank's shift towards sustainable development, through processes characterized here as direct and indirect socialization. This article demonstrates that the Bank's shift was more than instrumental as a result of this interaction, and that constructivists therefore need to examine the role of IOs as norm consumers as well as norm diffusers.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Young Alasdair R.

Picking the Wrong Fight: Why Attacks on the World Trade Organization Pose the Real Threat to National Environmental and Public Health Protection

in Global Environmental Politics, Volume 5, Issue 4, November , pp. 47-72

A principal reason for popular concern about the World Trade Organisation is that national rules—especially those for environmental and public health protection—may be overturned because they are incompatible with the WTO's rules. This article argues that while these concerns are not totally unfounded, they are exaggerated. A central reason for this exaggeration is that environmental and consumer advocates discount the pivotal role of governments in the dispute resolution process. Governments agree to the multilateral rules in the first place. Governments decide which market access barriers to pursue and how aggressively. Governments determine how to comply with a WTO judgment that goes against them. Furthermore, this article contends that by exaggerating the constraint imposed upon national governments by the WTO, consumer and environmental advocates run the risk of actually discouraging the very environmental and public health regulations they favor.

(Full Text available at http://mitpress.mit.edu/journals/pdf/GEP0504_pp047-72.pdf)

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Simmons Beth A. - Guzman Andrew T.

Power Plays and Capacity Constraints: The Selection of Defendants in World Trade Organization Disputes
in Journal of Legal Studies, Volume 34, Number 2 (June 2005) , 557 - 599

This paper examines the relationship between the wealth and power of states and their ability to participate fully within the World Trade Organization's system of dispute resolution. Two alternative hypotheses are considered. The power hypothesis predicts that politically weak countries will refrain from filing complaints against politically powerful states for fear of costly retaliation. The capacity hypothesis predicts that low-income states will tend to complain about behavior by high-income states because the latter offer a higher expected return. We test these two hypotheses and find considerable support for the capacity hypothesis and no support for the power hypothesis. We conclude that poor states behave differently than their rich counterparts because they lack the financial, human, and institutional capital to participate fully in the dispute resolution system



Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Panitchpakdi Supachai

Reflections on the last three years of the WTO

in *World Trade Review*, Vol. 4 - Issue 03 – November 2005

The multilateral trading system has been an astonishing achievement in international economic cooperation. The power of trade to raise living standards is widely recognized and so too is the capacity for trade tensions to escalate with severe economic consequences and also repercussions that go way beyond economics. As many have observed, when trade cannot cross borders, then armies will. For these reasons, the World Trade Organization (WTO) is one of the most indispensable international organizations that exists today. It is a system based upon the rule of law and not the law of the jungle, equipped with appropriate legal instruments to defuse and resolve trade conflicts as well as providing a forum for Member governments to negotiate trade rules and trade liberalization.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Strand Jonathan R., Rapkin David P.

Regionalizing Multilateralism: Estimating the Power of Potential Regional Voting Blocs in the IMF

in *International Interactions*, n. 1, vol. 31, january-march , 15-54

ABSTRACT: This paper explores the voting power of hypothetical regional voting blocs in the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund. We first discuss the prospect of regionally defined groups becoming more significant in the Fund's decision-making process. After briefly outlining the IMF's formal decision procedures, including its weighted voting system, use of special majorities, and the function of voting groups in the Fund's Executive Board we define three indices of a priori voting power — the Banzhaf, Johnston, and Shapley-Shubik indices — which are then applied to existing voting groups. Following this we simulate several regionally defined a priori coalitions and their potential to influence outcomes in passing resolutions in the Fund using a simple majority. The coalitions we specify are based on the assumption that members of the IMF will form into voting blocs based on regionally-defined preferences. The procedures employed use existing voting weights to project the relative strengths of alternative regional blocs that could emerge within the IMF. Our results indicate that the United States would have the greatest voting power in almost all scenarios. A voting bloc comprised of European countries, however, would be able to dominate the United States unless the U.S. formed an Asia-Pacific bloc. Japan, the PRC, and other Asian countries appear to be unable to form voting blocs that would provide them with more voting power than the United States.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Mallaby Sebastian

Saving the World Bank

in *Foreign Affairs*, May/June n° 3/2005



The next World Bank president will confront a nearly impossible challenge: saving the institution from a curious alliance of conservatives and radical activists that threatens to undercut its financial viability and effectiveness. Failure to head off the danger will mean the gradual decline of the best tool the world has for managing globalization, just when that tool is more needed than ever.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Meagher Niall

So far, so good: but what next? The Sutherland Report and WTO dispute settlement

in World Trade Review, Vol. 4 - Issue 03 – November 2005

This comment will focus primarily on the Sutherland Report's analysis of and recommendations for the WTO dispute settlement system. Before turning to the specific issue of dispute settlement, however, it is necessary to make a few introductory remarks regarding the objectives of the Sutherland Report, as well as its view of the future role of the WTO, including the dispute settlement system, in the international political system.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Gualerzi Davide

Stiglitz on Globalization and Development with an Eye to Keynes

in Review of Political Economy (The), Volume 17, Number 2 / April 2005 , Pages: 317 - 329

Joseph Stiglitz has laid out many of the issues central to the debate on globalization in a compelling story in a recent influential book. Globalization has become a contentious issue because the economic policies advocated for and, at times, almost imposed upon developing countries by international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the World Trade Organization are based on misconceptions about how market systems work. Market fundamentalism underlies the entire policy framework of the Washington Consensus. The limits of this approach are nowhere clearer than in the examples presented by developing and transition economies. Many policy missteps could have been avoided by adopting the main insights of traditional Keynesian theory, the basic lessons of which remain valid, even if it has been largely excised from the IMF's recipe book. The results of 20 years of market fundamentalism make it clear that globalization and development are distinct issues and that the former does not necessarily entail the latter. In order to understand how they are connected we need to supplement macroeconomic analysis with studies of how international economic integration comes about.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Yu Wusheng , Jensen Trine Vig

Tariff Preferences, WTO Negotiations and the LDCs: The Case of the 'Everything But Arms' Initiative

in World Economy, Volume 28, Number 3 , 375-405

By assessing the impact of the recently adopted 'Everything But Arms' (EBA) initiative of the EU on the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and by showing how further multilateral trade liberalisations erode the EBA preferences and impact



the LDCs, this paper attempts to uncover the LDCs' difficult positions in the WTO trade negotiations. Due to its limited product coverage and previous preferences granted by the EU, welfare impacts of the EBA on the LDCs are shown to be small and the bulk of these gains are associated with the 'sensitive' products that are subject to gradual liberalisations. Moreover, these small gains are likely to disappear if the EU conducts trade policy reforms in fulfilling its WTO obligations, resulting in an actually worse-off situation for the LDCs. Extending the analysis to a multilateral trade liberalisation scenario reinforces the above results that the LDCs may well lose due to preference erosion and higher world market prices. It concludes that other development assistance measures from developed countries should be made available to the LDCs to ease their dependency on trade preferences and to foster their supply capacities. The LDCs themselves should attempt to integrate the duty and quota-free market access status contained in the EBA into a binding WTO agreement to secure a stable trading environment. But more importantly, in order to solve the difficulties at the root these countries should actively engage in reforming their own trade policies.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Jackson John H.

The Changing Fundamentals of International Law and Ten Years of the WTO

in *Journal of International Economic Law*, 8 (1) , 3-15

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Lavranos Nikolaos

The Communitarization of WTO Dispute Settlement Reports: An Exception to the Rule of Law

in *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Volume 10, Issue 3 , pp. 313-318

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Sutherland Peter

The Doha Development Agenda: Political Challenges to the World Trading System – A Cosmopolitan Perspective

in *Journal of International Economic Law*, 8 (2) , 363-375

The Doha Work Programme of 1 August 2004 justifies hopes for a successful conclusion of the Doha Round negotiations in 2006/2007. Developing countries must exploit more actively the opportunities which the WTO offers for promoting economic welfare through trade liberalization and legal reforms. The decisions to phase-out export subsidies and to move forward with negotiations on trade facilitation will help the WTO to realize the 'development agenda' of the Doha Round. Additional commitments by advanced developing countries will be necessary for enabling industrial countries to remove some of their – for developing countries most damaging – market access restrictions. In order to deliver favourable results for developing countries, market liberalization commitments have to be supplemented by



special and differential treatment and a large amount of non-discretionary technical assistance to aid implementation. The WTO also has to demonstrate to the US Congress that WTO negotiations and the domestic implementation of WTO dispute settlement rulings are worthwhile. The article discusses legal and institutional WTO reforms necessary for concluding the Doha Round.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Billiet Stijn

The EC and WTO Dispute Settlement: The Initiation of Trade Disputes by the EC
in *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Volume 10, Issue 2 , pp. 197-214

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Hornng Der-Chin

The ECB's Membership in the IMF: Legal Approaches to Constitutional Challenges
in *European law journal*, November 2005 - Vol. 11 Issue 6 , 802-822

Although the European Central Bank (ECB) is only an observer in the International Monetary Fund (IMF), its membership in the IMF will spark constitutional changes for both the EU and the IMF. The ECB's participation in IMF activities has so far been undertaken pragmatically, and is likely to evolve over time. This arrangement will limit the ECB's ability to fully develop in international monetary cooperation. This paper reviews what kinds of constitutional challenges the ECB faces in its bid for membership in the IMF. The research is based on the legal method and assesses the relevant provisions of both the EC Treaty and the IMF's Articles of Agreement. It also suggests some feasible approaches for ECB membership in the IMF.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Ubong E. Effeh

The Gatt/Wto regime, economics rights and sub-Sahran Africa: the musings of a heretic
in *Netherlands International Law Review*, Volume 52 - Issue 02 - agosto 2005

The year 2005 marks the 10th anniversary of the establishment of the World Trade Organization – the multilateral body responsible for regulating the global trading regime. Whether because or in spite of the organization's existence, trade has brought unprecedented levels of economic prosperity to various parts of the world within this period. Even those parts of what used to be called 'the Third World' are beginning to challenge the appropriateness of that unfortunate categorization. However, much of sub-Saharan Africa has not only failed to become part of this trend, but has in fact become poorer than it was 25 years ago. Various excuses have been proffered, amongst which is that the GATT/WTO regime represents an impediment to its economic emancipation. This interdisciplinary critique aims to challenge this orthodoxy by offering a different analysis of the region's inability to trade, and by extension, of its failure to realize the



rights proclaimed under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Kapur Devesh, Naím Moisés

The IMF and Democratic Governance

in **Journal of Democracy**, Volume 16, Number 1, January , pp. 89-102

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and its fellow Bretton Woods financial institution, the World Bank, not only play many roles in the global economy but also affect democratic prospects in many corners of the world. Through structural-adjustment and austerity programs, the Fund and the Bank influence key policies of many nations, especially the poorer developing ones. The story of the Bank and the Fund shows why technocratic, expert-run institutions of global governance are necessarily limited and nondemocratic. Useful as they may be, such institutions can never become the basis for a governance that is at once globe-girdling, objective, and democratic.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Mayer Wolfgang, Mourmouras Alexandros

The Political Economy of IMF Conditionality: A Common Agency Model

in **Review of Development Economics**, Volume 9, Number 4, November , 449-466

The paper models the relationship between an aid-providing international financial institution (IFI) and an aid-receiving government whose economic policy choices are influenced by a domestic interest group. Two assistance schemes are evaluated: conditional aid in which the IFI makes assistance contingent on less- distorting economic policies and unconditional aid which is provided without such conditions. Conditional aid is shown to raise welfare of the receiving country and the world as a whole relative to unconditional aid. The paper also examines how conditional and unconditional aid schemes are influenced by the IFI's opportunity cost of providing assistance and the receiving government's political dependence on a domestic interest group.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Matsushita Mitsuo

The Sutherland Report and its Discussion of Dispute Settlement Reforms

in **Journal of International Economic Law**, 8 (3) , 623-629



The WTO has had difficulties in new policy-making areas. The failure to launch multilateral trade negotiations at Seattle and Cancun prompted some WTO Members to conclude regional trade arrangements. As a result, multilateralism as incorporated in the WTO is facing a serious challenge. In contrast to this, the WTO dispute settlement system is regarded as a remarkable success. The number of cases brought to the WTO during the ten-year period since its establishment in 1995 has surpassed the number of cases brought to the old GATT dispute settlement procedure during its life of almost fifty years.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Joost Pauwelyn

The Sutherland Report: A Missed Opportunity for Genuine Debate on Trade, Globalization and Reforming the WTO

in *Journal of International Economic Law*, 8 (2) , 329-346

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Picciotto, Sol

The WTO's Appellate Body: Legal Formalism as a Legitimation of Global Governance

in *Governance*, Vol. 18, n. 3, July , 477-503

The creation of the Appellate Body (AB) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) entails an unprecedented delegation of power to an international adjudicator, because the WTO requires states to ensure compliance of their domestic regulations with the sweeping obligations in WTO agreements. This is legitimized in some academic analyses and much political rhetoric in terms of the rule of law, suggesting that the role of the adjudicator is merely to apply the precise words of the texts agreed by states, according to their natural meaning. The AB has supported this by adopting a formalist approach that combines an objectivist view of meaning with a legalistic style of judgment. However, both the general structure and many of the specific provisions of the WTO agreements are indeterminate and raise issues of interpretation that were known to be highly contestable. Although the delegation of adjudication in its early phase was considered to be of a narrow technical function, in the current phase interpretation is more clearly seen to involve a flexible application of principles to cases in light of the policies involved. The AB's role would be better legitimized by adopting a more open epistemology and reasoning that could be accessible to a wider constituency. However, it is constrained by fear of usurping the political legitimacy of the governments to which it is primarily accountable, and governments, in turn, are motivated by a reluctance to admit to their domestic constituencies how much power has been transferred to supranational instances such as the AB.

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Moore Mike

The WTO's first decade

in *World Trade Review*, Vol. 4 - Issue 03 – November 2005

This year the World Trade Organisation (WTO) celebrates its tenth year of existence. That celebration is also an opportunity to review, audit, and evaluate its place, progress, and evolution. I am aware that this issue of the World Trade Review is carrying several articles about the 10th Anniversary. This contribution is targeted at the populist perception that the WTO is undemocratic. It also accepts that there are great injustices in the world trading system, but the answer to that is not the rejection of multilateralism but to conclude the Doha Development Round. The problem of poor nations is never too much trade; it is not enough trade. The WTO is unique among the international institutions and plays a vital role in the international architecture.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Sarfaty Galit A.

The World Bank and the Internalization of Indigenous Rights Norms

in *Yale Law Journal (The)*, Vol. 114, n. 7, May , 1791-1818

The World Bank has emerged as an important actor in the international law community by enforcing social and environmental standards in borrower countries. One such standard is its indigenous peoples policy, which the Bank attempts to incorporate into domestic law through binding loan agreements. This Note presents a case study of a proposed Bank loan to Morocco in order to examine the difficulties of operationalizing the Bank's indigenous peoples policy.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Harrison Graham

The World Bank, Governance and Theories of Political Action in Africa

in *British Journal of Politics & International Relations* , Vol. 7, Issue 2, May , 240-260

This article considers the World Bank as a political thinker. This involves an interpretation of the values, methodologies, and theoretical references contained within the Bank's governance documentation. Generally, the Bank steers away from a serious engagement with the nature of states, or the dynamics of reform execution, even in its more detailed policy documents in reform areas such as administrative reform. But, by looking at the World Bank's involvement in African states, we can understand the ways in which the World Bank works with certain expectations concerning how reforms will work. The article critically analyses the Bank's 'political vision' by comparing it with prominent theories of African politics. The article concludes that the World Bank's governance agenda misses three pivotal aspects of African politics: the unity of political and economic power, the extreme openness of African states to external pressures, and the salience of historically-embedded cultural and political relations. These three points directly raise important questions about the prospects of good governance reforms in Africa, and the involvement of the Bank therein.



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Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Sutherland Peter

The World Trade Organization at ten years

in *World Trade Review*, Vol. 4 - Issue 03 – November 2005

In reflecting on the record of the World Trade Organization during its first ten years of existence I have chosen to take a 'political' view. In doing so, I am aware that other observers might well draw quite different conclusions from my own. However, it is often the political perceptions that count. Indeed, in the past few years, as the WTO has gained recognition in the public consciousness, the work of the institution has sometimes been deflected from what strict economic or legal analysis might suggest as the 'best courses' for the overall public good.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Ruggero Renato

The World Trade Organization: three priorities

in *World Trade Review*, Vol. 4 - Issue 03 – November 2005

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Van den Spiegel Freddy

The euro's challenge to the dollar as an international reserve currency

in *Europe's World*, Issue 1, Autumn

http://www.europesworld.org/PDFs/EW1_1.5_VandenSpiegel_The_euros_challenge_to_the_dollar.pdf

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Sampson Gary P.

The future of the WTO in world economic affairs

in *World Trade Review*, Vol. 4 - Issue 03 – November 2005

Trade policy today extends its influence well beyond what has traditionally been the grist of those interested in international trade policy. Many domestic regulations relating to patents, financial services, subsidies, and support measures for agriculture are subject to WTO disciplines. Some WTO agreements raise ethical questions about the patenting of life forms, precaution and risk management, access to essential medicines, and the rewarding of indigenous peoples for their genetic resources. There are negotiations on the legitimacy of fishing subsidies that lead to fish stock depletion and recent disputes have dealt with internet gambling, genetically modified organisms and the conservation of endangered species.



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Blackhurst Richard

The future of the WTO: some comments on the Sutherland Report

in *World Trade Review*, Vol. 4 - Issue 03 – November 2005

Three times since its founding in 1948, the GATT/WTO has turned to outside experts for help in finding solutions to pressing issues confronting the multilateral trading system. In 1957 the Contracting Parties decided to create a panel of three (later four) internationally recognized experts in international trade and finance to consider trends in world trade, and in particular the failure of the trade of the less developed countries to develop as rapidly as that of industrialized countries, excessive short-term fluctuations in prices of primary products, and widespread resort to agricultural protection.

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Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Fiorentini Riccardo

The international role of the euro and the relationship between EU and IMF

in *Politico (II)*, n. 208, anno LXX, gennaio-aprile , 35-56

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Weber Martin

The 'nature' of environmental services: GATS, the environment and the struggle over the global institutionalization of private law

in *Review of International Political Economy*, Volume 12, Number 3 / August 2005 , Pages: 456 - 483

The article traces the contradictions in the current phase of the formation of Global Trade Governance via an inquiry into the discourse surrounding environmental services. The analysis elucidates the inadvertent politicization of environmental services, which paradoxically emerges within a context of attempts to insulate and depoliticize the Trade in Services agenda more generally. It provides an interpretation of this dynamic from a political ecology perspective. As a site of profound definitional problems, the Trade in Environmental Services discourse reveals deep-seated contradictions lodged in social relations with nature. The contradictions are explored via a critical deconstruction of the very concept of 'environmental services', which aids the identification of sites of political engagement vis-à-vis the substantiation of 'global modernity' through economic integration. The developmental logic of capitalist modernity expands into areas where its contradictory nature becomes, once more, tangible, the subject of a social experience of detrimental forms of relations with nature, and thus subject to political struggle. The article concludes by illustrating the argument with examples from the Environmental Services Trade agenda.



Section B) Global governance and international organizations

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Messerlin Patrick A.

Three Variations on 'The Future of the WTO'

in *Journal of International Economic Law*, 8 (2) , 299-309

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Joyce Joseph P.

Time Past and Time Present: a Duration Analysis of IMF Program Spells

in *Review of International Economics*, May 2005 - Vol. 13 Issue 2 , Page 283

The programs of the IMF were designed to provide short-term assistance to countries with balance-of- payments disequilibria. Over time, however, the Fund instituted new facilities with longer time horizons, while many countries adopted consecutive programs. As a result, the length of time spent by countries in IMF programs has grown. This paper analyzes IMF program spells for a group of developing economies over the period of 1982-2000. Duration models are used to investigate the time dependence of the spells and the factors that affect their duration. The hazard ratio of spells has a nonmonotonic shape, first rising and then falling. Spell duration is independent of previous spell length or the number of spells. Program duration is extended for countries with lower income, exports concentrated in primary goods, landlocked geographic status and autocratic regimes. Governments that are polarized have shorter spells, which may reflect a breakdown in governance.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Richardson, J. W.

Toward Democracy: A Critique of a World Bank Loan to the United Mexican States

in *Review of Policy Research* , Vol. 22 issue 4 , pag. 473-482

In 2002 the World Bank issued a US\$300 million loan to Mexico to finance an education reform project. The loan is the second phase of a three-part Adaptable Program Loan (APL). A brief description of the 136-page World Bank reform project is initially detailed and contrasted with a historical perspective. The Multiple Streams Model is used to determine why this education reform has come to fruition. Finally, the Frank Model is used to assess viability of this phase of the APL. It is concluded that this loan takes great national steps toward modernization, decentralization, and democratization. The adaptability of the loan is quite evident and proactive. Success of this project is promising, but the World Bank must not forget the cultural needs of the indigenous peoples.

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Clavin Patricia, Wessel Jens - Wilhelm

Transnationalism and the League of Nations: Understanding the Work of Its Economic and Financial Organisation

in *Contemporary European History* , Volume 14 - Issue 04 - November 2005 , pp. 465 - 492

This article explores the work of the little-studied Economic and Financial Organisation of the League of Nations. It offers a sustained investigation into how this international organisation operated that assesses the transnational aspects of its work in relation to its inter-governmental responsibilities, and demonstrates the wide-ranging contribution of the organisation's secretariat. The second part of the article establishes the way in which transnationalism enabled the United States, the League's most influential non-member, to play a crucial role in shaping the policy agenda of the League. It also shows how a growing sense of frustration in its work prompted EFO to attempt to free itself from inter-governmental oversight and become an independent organisation to promote economic and financial co-operation in 1940 – a full four years before the creation of the Bretton Woods agreements.

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Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Biggeri Ugo, Tricarico Antonio

Una politica italiana ed europea in seno alla grandi istituzioni economiche internazionali

in *Democrazia e diritto*, Anno XLIII, n. 1 , 94-105

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Moore Michael O.

VERs and Price Undertakings under the WTO

in *Review of International Economics*, May 2005 - Vol. 13 Issue 2 , Page 298

Under the rules of the WTO, governments are prohibited from negotiating voluntary export restraints (VERs) but may negotiate price undertakings (i.e. import price minima). While these two policies can have identical effects in models of perfect competition, they can have very different economic consequences with imperfect competition. The model presented here shows that in a model of international Bertrand duopoly, a VER can result in lower domestic prices and profits than a price minimum regime. This suggests that price undertakings should also be prohibited under the WTO.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Goldberg Jörg

Weltbank: Chancengleichheit als Ideologie

in *Blätter für deutsche & internationale Politik*, Juli, 2005 , 884-886



No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Lloyd Peter

When should new areas of rules be added to the WTO?

in *World Trade Review*, Vol. 4 - Issue 02 – July 2005

When the WTO was created as an outcome of the Uruguay Round, one of the major differences from its predecessor, the GATT, was the addition of new areas of rules of trade. The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), the Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS), and to some extent also the Agreement on Trade-related Investment Measures (TRIMs) added sets of rules that were entirely new. By adding trade in services, the rules of the multilateral trade organization now encompass trade in all produced goods and services. The WTO rules, however, encompass neither the international movements of capital or labour, nor other non-trade policies, such as those relating to the environment, labour standards, and competition policy, with minor exceptions.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 2. The economic and financial international organizations

Rose Andrew

Which International Institutions Promote International Trade?

in *Review of International Economics*, Volume 13, Issue 4, September 2005

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 3. Security communities and organizations

Pertti Joenniemi

America's Old/New Meets Russia's True/False: The Case of Europe's North

in *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 18, n. 2, July, 229-241

Recent talk about Europe's diminishing importance to America's policymaking is here regarded as unfounded. Europe remains an indispensable signifier tightly embedded in the soul of the US as well as that of Russia. With identity being a relational process and profoundly social in character, both America and Russia employ Europe as the main mirror in which they portray themselves. This article unpacks their respective delineations of Europe: the American old/new as outlined by Donald Rumsfeld, and the Russian true/false, focusing on Europe's North as a region where the two perspectives might potentially clash.

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Subsection 3. Security communities and organizations



Haftendorn Helga

Das Atlantische Bündnis als Transmissionsriemen atlantischer Politik
in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, Band 38-39, 2005

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 3. Security communities and organizations

José A. Morandé Lavín

Estados Unidos y la Unión Europea en el siglo XXI: Fundamentos y alcances de una Unidad y diversidad
in *Estudios internacionales : revista del Instituto de Estudios Internacionales de la Universidad de Chile*, Vol. 38 /
2005 / Nr. 149 , p. 21

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Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 3. Security communities and organizations

Gheballi Victor-Yves

Growing Pains at the OSCE: The Rise and Fall of Russia's Pan-European Expectations
in *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* , Vol. 18, n. 3, October , 375-388

After the dissolution of the USSR, the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) sought to contribute to the transformation of Russia into a democratic state abiding by the rule of law and by international law. The Yeltsin administration concurred and adopted a generally cooperative posture within the CSCE. However, when Moscow suggested (as a counter-move against NATO's enlargement projects) the elaboration of a legal pan-European security system, the CSCE—now rebaptised OSCE—responded by means of the Istanbul Charter for European Security (1999), an empty text by Russian standards. Feeling that its interests were no longer served, the Putin administration warned that without drastic reforms the Organisation would be 'doomed to extinction'. In order to defuse the crisis, the OSCE adopted a number of reform measures. Overall, however, the reform process brought very little to a Russia whose obsession with equality of status is now better addressed through bilateral institutional channels with NATO and the EU. In the present circumstances, the fate of the OSCE depends on the political value that the West attaches to this organisation, as well as Russia's wisdom not to break the single European security organisation where its place and role are fully legitimate.

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Fulvio Attinà

Il cambiamento di strategia degli USA e le relazioni transatlantiche: implicazioni per il sistema mondiale
in *Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica*, Numero 1, Aprile , 3-28



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Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 3. Security communities and organizations

Williams Paul D.

International peacekeeping: the challenges of state-building and regionalization

in *International Affairs* , issue 1, vol. 81, january , 163-174

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Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 3. Security communities and organizations

Cagiati Andrea

L'avvenire della NATO

in *Rivista di Studi Politici Internazionali*, Volume 72, n. 2 , pp. 273-278

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Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 3. Security communities and organizations

Battistelli Fabrizio

La difesa europea e la NATO

in *ItalianiEuropei*, n. 3 , 84-92

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Section B) Global governance and international organizations

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Moreno Maurizio

La proiezione operativa della NATO

in *Affari Esteri*, Anno XXXVII, n. 148 , 774-784

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Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 3. Security communities and organizations

Di Paola Giampaolo

La trasformazione della NATO

in *Affari Esteri*, Anno XXXVII, n. 145 , 45-53



No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 3. Security communities and organizations

Pierangelo Isernia

Le fratture transatlantiche e l'opinione pubblica: continuità e mutamento negli orientamenti del pubblico americano ed europeo

in *Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica*, Numero 1, Aprile , 57-76

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Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 3. Security communities and organizations

Francia Roberto

L'Europa tra PESC e Consiglio di Sicurezza

in *Affari Esteri*, Anno XXXVII, n. 147 , 600-616

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Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 3. Security communities and organizations

Branko Crvenkovski

Macedonia is Firmly Committed to Integration into the European Union and NATO

in *Review of International Affairs (The)* , Vol. LVI, n. 1117, January–March

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 3. Security communities and organizations

Jason Dittmer

NATO, the EU and Central Europe: Differing Symbolic Shapes in Newspaper Accounts of Enlargement

in *Geopolitics*, Vol. 10, n. 1, Spring , 76-98

This essay investigates the contemporary evolution of the symbolic shape of Central Europe by conducting a quantitative and qualitative content analysis of newspaper articles from the Lexis–Nexis database covering NATO and EU expansion. The results of this content analysis show that Central Europe is associated with different symbolic shapes at different times and in different political contexts, and therefore the idea of one hegemonic Central Europe, either transcending time and context or tied to an institutional identity, is a fallacy. 'Central Europe' has shaped NATO and EU expansions, but similarly those processes have constructed differing geopolitical images of Central Europe that are mediated to the consumers of the newspapers. In contrast to these differing symbolic shapes, a series of common structures of expectation were associated with Central Europe that constructed the region as different from Eastern



Europe

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Dufourcq Jean, Masala Carlo

OTAN: pour un nouveau rapport Harmel

in Politique Etrangère, 3/2005, (automne).

Le concept stratégique adopté en 1999 ne suffit pas à définir ni à organiser concrètement les nouvelles tâches de l'Alliance. Il est temps qu'intervienne une réflexion de fond sur l'avenir de l'Alliance, son rôle, ses espaces d'intervention, ses relations avec l'Union européenne. Une Commission de haut niveau pourrait être chargée de rédiger un rapport comparable au rapport Harmel de 1967: au-delà du technique, la transformation de l'Alliance doit aussi être politique.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 3. Security communities and organizations

Dunford Michael

Old Europe, New Europe and the USA

in European Urban and Regional Studies, Volume 12, No. 2 , 149-176

The collapse of Communism in Europe and the recent enlargement of the European Union have significantly refashioned the world. As one of three developed economic blocs (Europe, North America and East Asia) Europe has increased in size and yet faces internal divisions between old and new Europe. While having shared interests, these blocs are also rivals, as is most strikingly reflected in the struggle for markets and over the expansion of imperial influence. At the same time globalization, economic transformation and integration have been profoundly shaped by Anglo-American/neo-liberal economic ideologies. The aim of this paper is to consider some of the implications of these developments for the new Europe extending from the Atlantic to Russia. Essentially it will deal with two issues. First, it will ask whether Europe has lost economic momentum relative to its trans-Atlantic rival, qualifying the earlier view that Rhine capitalism was superior to Anglo-American capitalism. Second, after considering the question of whether the European Union is a catch-up machine in a world in which inequalities are frequently widening, it will consider in some detail the territorial and social impacts of transition in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the former Soviet Union (FSU). Throughout, attention will be paid to the impact of market-led models of development on growth and inequality, and the way in which a subjection of different parts of Europe to similar economic mechanisms, while in some senses making different parts of the continent more similar, also produces profoundly differentiated economic and social geographies

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Fukuyama Francis

Re-Envisioning Asia

in Foreign Affairs, Jan-Feb. n.1/2005



Washington's system of Asian alliances may have worked during the Cold War, but it ignores today's political reality. Although the six-party talks now underway on North Korea's nukes were born of necessity, their format should be made permanent, so the White House can help reshape Asian diplomacy.

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Asmus Ronald D.

Rethinking the EU: Why Washington needs to support European integration in *Survival*, n. 3, vol. 47, autumn , 93-102

It is time for the United States to rethink its policy toward the European Union and European integration more broadly. The challenges of the twenty-first century and America's changing priorities and strategic needs are making the United State more rather than less dependent on the EU and its success. Already America's ability to achieve its own top foreign policy objectives – defending the US homeland, winning the 'war on terror' and promoting the spread of freedom and democracy around the world – increasingly require a strong, politically cohesive and outward-looking Europe. Today America needs a functioning EU as much as an effective NATO.

The rejection in France and the Netherlands of the European constitutional treaty has clearly plunged the EU into a crisis. While some American conservatives may have enjoyed a moment of schadenfreude over the EU's current difficulties, this is not the time for the United States to walk away from the Union or celebrate its troubles. For this crisis has paradoxically created an opportunity for US policy. The constitution's rejection has kindled a much more fundamental debate about what the EU is all about and how it can or should be reconstructed. How the EU should shape its relations with the outside world, including the United States, is a central issue in that debate. And as Europe engages in that debate, the views of Washington can be important in shaping its outcome.

For Washington to seize that opportunity, however, requires a more supportive and proactive approach toward the EU. The fundamental problem facing Europe today is its weakness. The United States should support the creation of an EU capable of becoming a global strategic actor and open to jointly confronting common challenges around the world. Philosophically, the United States needs to return to the spirit that guided US policy in the 1950s and 1960s under Eisenhower and Kennedy, when Washington was

Ronald D. Asmus

Rethinking the EU: Why

Washington Needs to Support

European Integration

Ronald D. Asmus is Executive Director of the Transatlantic Center of the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Brussels, Belgium. He served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for



European Affairs from 1997 to 2000. The views expressed here are his own.

Survival vol. 33; no. 3; Autumn 2000; pp.

33-34; DOI:

10.1080/00222160010001613333; Ronald D. Asmus

unabashedly in favour of European integration because US leaders believed the process could produce a unified and Atlanticist Europe. In practical terms, the United States needs to pursue policies that help empower those European countries that share this vision of the EU, be prepared to lobby for that vision and work to restructure the US–EU relationship. In other words, as opposed to being ambivalent about the EU or trying to keep it down, Washington should be seeking to help build it up while encouraging it to be as outward looking and pro-Atlanticist as possible.

Americans should support the creation of a strong EU for reasons rooted in their own interests. Yet a shift in US policy along these lines would also help boost America's image on the continent. In other words, this is not only smart strategy but good public diplomacy. The European project remains Europe's number one political priority, notwithstanding the failed referendums in France and the Netherlands. Few aspects of American policy have cost more goodwill in Europe in recent years than loose talk in Washington about dividing Europe or undercutting European integration. If the United States is seen as ambivalent or hostile to Europe's top concern, it will breed resentment. Conversely, there are few steps that will go further in restoring that goodwill than a clear American commitment to the successful creation of a strong Europe.

From Atlanticist origins to Gaullist counterweight

Today it is often argued – on both sides of the Atlantic -- that the origins of the European project were Atlanticist. Jean Monet and his colleagues were as Atlanticist as they come. Similarly, in the US and Washington

was profoundly pro-European integration. It is inconceivable that this early generation of Europe-builders would embrace today's fashionable talk about the EU as a counterweight to American power, or that the American foreign policy establishment of the US and Washington would have embraced the kind

of Eurosceptic sentiments prevalent in some American conservative circles today. The prospect of a German chancellor mobilising anti-American sentiments to get elected, or his American counterpart using anti-French themes to do the same, would have been considered irresponsible and unthinkable.

To be sure, there was anti-Americanism in Europe in the US, while not all Americans in the early post-war years were pro-European Atlanticists.

But for that generation of American and European leaders, the Atlantic and European projects were inherently linked and complementary. Both sides



were deeply and actively involved in ensuring the success of the other's project. In contrast, it is common today for NATO to be seen as 'America's project' and the EU to be seen as Europe's. In the 1950s it was often the other way around: Europeans were frequently the bigger boosters of NATO and Rethinking the EU: Why Washington Needs to Support European Integration Americans were at times the integrationist hawks. And both sides would have instinctively agreed with the argument that they were natural partners in trying to build a better world order.

Much has changed since then. The realignment that occurred can in large part be traced back to French President Charles de Gaulle. He was determined to turn the European project into something distinctly European and non-Atlanticist. He wanted to create a Europe liberated from American influence, which would be built in contradistinction to the Atlantic project rather than be complementary and intertwined with it – what is known today as the 'counterweight' movement. De Gaulle's shift also helped set in motion the intellectual and political realignment in American policy that we see today. For as European integration developed what many Americans considered to be an anti-American hue, Washington also became increasingly ambivalent about it.

For much of the next 30 years Washington and Paris were locked in a wrestling match over the relative weight that the Atlantic and European frameworks would enjoy in the US–European relationship. The requirements of the Cold War nonetheless imposed a certain discipline. Both sides sought to mobilise different coalitions to assert themselves. Countries such as Germany sought to build bridges and avoided choosing between Washington and Paris. While European integration was proceeding, most allies other than France refrained from supporting plans that would challenge the Atlantic framework. However, with the collapse of communism and the withdrawal of Russian power from the continent, the question of Europe's future, the acceleration of the European project and reorganising the US–European relationship were all on the table.

Bill Clinton, the first post-Cold War American president, was also the American president most supportive of the EU and European integration since John F. Kennedy. He was committed to the building of a Europe whole and free, and supportive of the vision of a strengthened EU that would eventually grow into a global partner of the United States. He came within one sentence of agreeing to an understanding that would have brought France into NATO and reharmonised the Atlantic and European projects. That sentence was a compromise formula on who in NATO would lead the Alliance's southern command. One cannot help but wonder how much of the subsequent European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) debate and the difficulties between the EU and NATO might have been muted if this deal had been consummated. In any case, Clinton believed it was in the US interest to encourage a strong and unified EU to become an actor on the global stage and was more relaxed about and less threatened by EU aspirations than most



of the Washington foreign-policy establishment.

and Ronald D. Asmus

At the same time, the consensus within Washington on this issue started to fray. By the late 1990s, conservative ambivalence and open questioning of American support for the European project started to emerge in the debates over the UK–French St Malo Declaration and the ESDP. Having failed in his effort to reintegrate with NATO, President Jacques Chirac returned to his Gaullist roots and increasingly and loudly embraced the ‘counterweight’ thesis. This in turn only deepened growing scepticism in American circles over whether Washington’s support for the EU still made sense.

With the advent of the George W. Bush administration, many of these differences burst into the open. Several leading officials during the president’s first term let it be known that they were either agnostic or critical of the European project. While such views never became official policy, loose talk of disaggregation sent shivers down the spines of European allies. The degree of contempt and vitriol that emerged on both sides of the Atlantic over the Iraq war threatened to spin out of control. There were few issues that angered Americans more than the chorus of European voices claiming it was the United States that had suddenly become the new danger the EU had to counter. And there were few issues that created more resentment in Europe than real or imagined American attempts to pursue a policy of ‘divide and conquer’ vis-à-vis its former allies.

Both Democratic and Republican policies over the past decade have been largely ineffective. The Clinton administration believed in a strong Europe and European integration but was often worried that in practice the EU would pursue policies that would undercut the Alliance. It therefore combined a policy of principled support with a tactic of being vigilant when it came to the details of ESDP and other issues. The result was often seen as contradictory and did not give the United States the kind of influence or results it wanted. The Bush administration came into office with a good number of Eurosceptics in its ranks. It stepped back from the principled support the Clinton administration had offered and its initial ambivalence toward the EU, its unilateralist policies and the outright hostility of some American conservatives often undercut America’s Atlanticist friends and actually strengthened the hand of Euro-Gaullist opponents who argued that this demonstrated the United States was incapable of ever treating Europe as an equal partner. And the public mood in Europe has shifted against the United States in a dangerous way. While Atlanticists still exist in significant numbers in Europe, there are few policies they would like to see revised more than US policy on the EU.

Contempt
and vitriol



threatened
to spin out of
control

Rethinking the EU: Why Washington Needs to Support European Integration

If it is time for a change of US policy toward the EU and European integration, the point of departure must be a clear understanding of what American interests are. Part of the problem the United States faces today is that its policy is bogged down in conflicting assessments of the European debate over what the EU is all about. America has not kept its eye on the ball of what its own interests are, but instead allowed US policy to become reactive and, in a sense, passive-aggressive in response to the different, and at times contradictory, currents of the debate in Europe. These currents should not set the course for Americans deciding their own interests.

Why America needs the EU

There are four fundamental reasons why the United States has a real and growing interest in the success of the EU and European integration more broadly.

The first is simply to sustain peace and stability in Europe. It is often taken for granted that Europe has ceased to be a theatre of geopolitical competition and conflict. This is an extraordinary historical accomplishment for which Americans and European statesmen laboured for most of the last century. It is stating the obvious to note that the United States has a core interest in Europe remaining peaceful and secure. Just imagine what the world would be like if Washington today – in addition to the problems of the broader Middle East and Asia – was also confronted with the prospect of strategic turmoil on the continent. The success of the EU is the best guarantee that Europe remains peaceful, democratic and secure in the decades ahead.

The second reason is the profound stake that Washington has in the EU remaining a magnet with influence beyond its borders, helping anchor to the West the young and still fragile democracies on the continent's periphery.

There is a long queue of countries seeking closer relations with and eventual membership of the EU. That list starts with the Balkan countries and Turkey, reaches deep into Eurasia to include Ukraine, and extends to Georgia and the southern Caucasus.

The potential role of the EU in helping these countries transform themselves can hardly be overstated. The perspective of EU membership for several countries is key to a long-term settlement of the Kosovo final status issue and peace more broadly in the Balkans. When one looks at Turkey and the dramatic changes that have taken place there in recent years, it is clear that the desire for EU membership was behind the recent drive to reform – with NATO playing the role in the reform process. While the United States has played a key role in supporting democratic breakthroughs in countries such as Georgia and Ukraine, it is the EU flag that the leaders of the Rose and Orange Revolution now often fly in their offices in Tbilisi and Kiev to signal their aspirations to go West.

Ronald D. Asmus



The simple fact is that the EU, with its comprehensive integrationist approach, is critical and well-equipped to help lock in enduring change in these countries. Americans have rightly concluded that it is in their national security interest to see the EU reach out to these countries – which is why Washington is such an enthusiastic supporter of EU enlargement. Too few Americans, though, ask themselves what kind of EU will be able to manage this challenge and what they can do to help achieve the goal. The answer is that only a more politically cohesive, unified and self-confident European Union is likely to be willing and able to continue to enlarge and anchor these countries to the West.

The third core reason why the United States has a growing interest in the success of the European Union is the need for strategic cooperation between the United States and Europe to meet the new challenges of the twenty-first century. Imagine two lists: the first contains the top ten American priorities in terms of strategic cooperation with Europe in the 1990s; or the 1980s; (that is, toward the end of the Cold War); the second contains the top ten strategic priorities today, or ten years from now. It is safe to say that the vast majority of issues on the first list would have been tasks for NATO. The second list would look very different: it would contain problems that were more global, less military and where the EU either already has responsibility or aspires to acquire it in the future. Only a much smaller set of issues on the list would involve NATO.

One issue at the top of today's list is homeland security, an area increasingly in the EU's bailiwick. It is no accident that the US Department of Homeland Security is a strong supporter of European integration. Its success depends in large part on close and successful European integration and US–EU cooperation. Homeland security is the United States' first line of defence against future terrorist attacks. In his final news conference, outgoing Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge commented that one of the things he regretted during his tenure was not reaching out to the EU sooner. His successor, Michael Chertoff, made an early visit to Brussels and the EU. In the future, this relationship will become as important as the US–European military relationship was in the past – and it will increasingly take place with and through the EU.

Nowhere is this more true than when it comes to the signature initiatives of the Bush administration – the war on terror, the fight against the spread of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, and the goal of promoting freedom and democracy around the world. On all of these issues, a stronger and more effective Europe would be a critical partner. Indeed, the EU's legitimacy, resources and support are critical if the United States is to succeed. Although NATO can and should play a supporting role in the 'war on terror', this is a war in which the EU is as important as NATO for the United States. This is Rethinking the EU: Why Washington Needs to Support European Integration especially true when one looks at tackling the root causes of terrorism and the need to combat them with new policies on democracy promotion, economic growth and trade and addressing the root causes of terror.



Although Americans still instinctively turn to NATO as the primary framework in which to cooperate with Europe, the new reality is that the areas where the United States needs close cooperation with Europe have outgrown NATO's narrow and military-focused framework. And the administration's treatment of the Alliance as a 'toolbox', as opposed to a broader political and strategic forum for debate, has thus far prevented the broadening of that framework. To his credit, NATO's current Secretary-General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, has been pushing for the Alliance to assume a more political role. Yet, even if he succeeds, the changing nature of the threats and the strategic needs that flow from these will make the United States increasingly dependent on a politically strong, effective and outward-looking European Union as well as NATO.

Last but not least, the United States and the EU have the potential to form a natural coalition of democracies that work together to confront new challenges around the globe. When the United States and the EU cooperate, they have the ability to set a global agenda. They become a magnetic pole that can attract other countries and regions to coalesce around a common view. The ability to set that kind of agenda will in all likelihood decrease over time as other countries grow in stature and power. This makes it all the more important to use this historical opportunity to shape a global system that is conducive to Western values and interests.

This is not just theory. The ability to influence Russia, for example, is directly affected by the degree of US–EU cohesion. When it comes to the grand task of managing the rise of China as a global economic and military player, Washington and Brussels are clearly in a better position to influence Chinese behaviour if they have a common approach. To be sure, today the United States and EU are at odds on many of the issues of global order and governance. The other truth is that there has never been a real strategic dialogue or an effort to narrow the gap on these issues akin to what America did during the Cold War or what Europe has done to create a common foreign and defence policy. Does anyone doubt that if Monnet, Truman or any of the other great statesmen from the early post-war era were alive today, they would be appealing for the United States and the EU to make common cause in setting a new transatlantic global agenda?

When the
United States
and the EU
cooperate,
they can set a
global agenda

by Ronald D. Asmus



The ghost of de Gaulle

If America's interest in a politically strong, effective and outward-looking European Union is so clear and obvious, why is it so hard for Washington to recognise it and to pursue a policy consistent with that goal?

First, the simple fact that generations of American leaders and officials have been conditioned to think first and foremost of NATO as the key, if not the only, framework for transatlantic cooperation. It is the framework Americans know the best and are most comfortable with, and the one structured to allow them to pursue their interests. All too often working with the EU or NATO is seen as a zero-sum game where the gain of one institution comes at the expense of the other. Washington has understandably avoided any initiative that could potentially weaken NATO. After all, the Atlantic Alliance is the only contractual link binding the United States and Europe together. There is no equivalent bond on the US–EU side.

The United States, in its desire to protect the prerogatives of NATO for those situations where Washington and its allies will want to undertake joint military operations, runs the risk of becoming myopic. A strong and effective NATO remains a vital American interest but Washington can not lose sight of the bigger strategic picture where it needs a strong EU as a foreign policy partner in a host of non-military fields. It is in these other areas that the United States is likely to need assistance and where the EU's success will mean that it increasingly has something real to offer. Washington needs to find a way to continue to support a strong Alliance and also support the emergence of the EU as a strong foreign policy partner. Therefore, the recognition that the United States has new and different needs and priorities that require closer cooperation with the EU should not be equated with a downgrading of the Atlantic Alliance. Instead, we are sketching out a much larger and wider strategic realm of cooperation in which the EU can also play a central role. The lion's share of what the EU does and what the US and EU need to do together has to do with military security. The Alliance can and should remain what it is, and keep doing what it does best: a political–military alliance to defend the security interests of its neighbours, and which is being transformed to be able to defend those interests from new threats emanating from beyond its immediate borders.

Military power is no longer the only important currency, and the traditional political–military arena is no longer the sole or even most important sphere where Europe's assistance and cooperation is needed. It is the area in which the United States is probably the most self-reliant. Yet the changing challenges and threats now faced require deep cooperation in areas where the Europeans have decided to pool their resources and sovereignty under Rethinking the EU: Why Washington Needs to Support European Integration the umbrella of the EU. If the United States wants effective cooperation in those areas, it has a profound interest in seeing the EU succeed.

The EU is still widely seen as an institution hostile to American interests



and one that Washington should keep at arm's length rather than embrace and support. In some ways, American policy has become hostage to French rhetoric and America's own paranoia about the EU becoming the Gaullist 'counterweight'. The result is that the United States ends up 'playing defence' and investing effort in countering real or imagined French ambitions rather than 'playing offence' and thinking about ways to support the kind of evolution within the EU that would be a better mesh with America's own interests. The name of the game today is not to try to keep the EU down but to help it build itself up while encouraging it to be as open to working closely with the United States as possible

It is time for US policy to exorcise the ghost of de Gaulle – and now Chirac. There are some leaders in France and elsewhere in Europe who do believe the EU should become a counterweight to American influence and power. But they are a minority – and increasingly so in an enlarged EU that is being reshaped by a new set of actors and dynamics. The vision of the EU as a counterweight is only likely to become reality if the United States pursues policies that makes this a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Instead, the task facing American diplomacy is how to assist those in the EU who want to build a political and unified Union that is a strategic partner of the United States. Critical Eurosceptics will suggest that the EU is incapable of evolving into this kind of animal, but such a view is ahistoric and anachronistic. It is ahistoric because it denies the Atlanticist origins of the European project and anachronistic because it overlooks how the EU is changing under the impact of enlargement and other factors.

It also ignores the opportunity the current EU crisis paradoxically offers. Today a clear majority of member states would concur with the kind of vision laid out in this essay. The question is whether a European leader will emerge who can mobilise that majority and steer the EU in a new direction. Paradoxically, the new debate in Europe over how to reconstruct the EU in the wake of the French and Dutch rejection of the constitution, coupled with upcoming elections in Germany, may open the way for a new group of leaders to steer a new course. An enlightened American policy could help.

—; Ronald D. Asmus

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 3. Security communities and organizations

Pettman Ralph

Taoism and the concept of global security

in International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Volume 5, Issue 1, April , 59-83

Global security is typically discussed in the rationalist terms used to articulate contemporary modernism. To restrict analysis to such articulations, however, is to accept the limits and distortions that this way of being and knowing creates. This article seeks to transgress these limits, and to compensate for these distortions. It does so by discussing the



concept of global security from a Taoist perspective. Initially, it maps what global security means to rationalists. Then it discusses what Taoism entails, and compares Taoist and rationalist epistemologies. Then it compares Taoist and rationalist thinking about global security, defined first in more general, 'human' security terms, and second in more particular, politico-strategic terms. It concludes by highlighting the significance of the Taoist concept of wu-wei ('no unnatural action'), and of Taoism as one way in which to contextualise the rationalist construction of global security.

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Jean-Pierre Juneau

The Future of NATO: A Canadian Approach

in *Review of International Affairs (The)*, Vol. LVI, n. 1117, January–March

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 3. Security communities and organizations

Messervy-Whiting Graham

The Growing EU-NATO Relationship: Beyond Berlin

in *International Spectator (The)*, Vol. XL, n. 2, April-June

Between March 2000 and March 2003, the EU set up its military structures and brought into effect the "Berlin plus" arrangements, launching its first-ever military operation. Military-to military relations between the EU and NATO focused mainly on six issues: liaison; intelligence, geographic, command, control and communications; capabilities; security; exercises and training; policy; and operations. The EU-NATO relationship will be crucial in further developing a strategic culture in Europe favouring early, rapid and where necessary robust intervention.

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Garvey Jack I.

**The International Institutional Imperative for Countering the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction:
Assessing the Proliferation Security Initiative**

in *Journal of Conflict and Security Law*, Volume 10, Number 2, Summer, 125-147

This article examines the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a recent US nonproliferation initiative for the interdiction of cargo shipments involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The PSI is analysed in the context of current US foreign policy's avoidance of traditional international institutional organisation in favour of reliance on the so-called coalitions of the willing, characterised by the Bush Administration as the new multilateralism. The author examines the interaction between the PSI and the United Nations (UN) Law of the Sea Convention and looks to situations of potential international nuclear conflict, for assessing the PSI and the potential role of law and international organisation. It is argued that the PSI approach unnecessarily undermines the legitimacy and effectiveness of interdiction and that the distinctiveness of the threat, involving both state and non-state actors, requires rather than negates the advantages of



institutional organisation. It is institutional process, the article explains, that can provide the necessary capacity for intelligence sharing, mutual critique and maximisation of political consensus. This difference in approach would ground the international community's response to the interdiction challenge on a more solid legal, practical and political foundation, leading to a more effective and comprehensive modality for countering the most serious threat of our time.

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Drozdiak William

The North Atlantic Drift

in Foreign Affairs, Jan-Feb. n.1/2005

To repair the damaged transatlantic alliance, the second Bush administration must rediscover the values of Republican internationalism. Fortunately, the recent enlargement of NATO and the EU gives Washington a great chance to buttress the allies' economic ties, security strategy, and foreign policy.

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Bialos Jeffrey P.

The United States, Europe and the Interoperability Gap

in International Spectator (The), Vol. XL, n. 2, April-June , 53-62

The capabilities gap revealed in the nineties is likely to last as European countries have neither the resources nor the political will to put more money into defence spending. Yet, forces must be made interoperable if coalition warfare remains a real objective: it is interoperability that allows the partners to communicate. This goal is economically more feasible for Europe than matching the US in raw combat capabilities. But the only way to achieve it is by pursuing ESDP and formulating a European grand strategy with a single European procurement agency and R&D agency. The United States would be well counselled to encourage it to do so.

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Subsection 3. Security communities and organizations

Cornish Paul, Edwards Geoffrey

The strategic culture of the European Union: a progress report

in International Affairs , issue 4, vol. 81, july , 801-820

This article re-examines the EU's character and potential as a strategic actor, setting that analysis in the context of the debate on strategic culture. The definition of strategic culture as the political and institutional confidence and processes to manage and deploy military force, coupled with external recognition of the EU as a legitimate actor in the military sphere, lends itself to a reappraisal around four core questions. First, military capabilities: establishing a European strategic culture is vital in order to rationalize the acquisition of capabilities necessary for the range of humanitarian and peacekeeping tasks envisaged. Equally, without military capabilities, all talk of a strategic culture would ring hollow. This



article discusses how much closer the EU has come to acquiring those essential capabilities. Second, while the EU has gained significant experience of, albeit limited, military/policing experiences and established a growing reputation and some credibility for ad hoc action, to what extent and in what quarters have these experiences engendered a sense of reliability and legitimacy for autonomous EU action? Third, given that so far operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Balkans have depended on an integrated civil–military effort, do the policy-making processes of the EU now ensure the appropriate level and depth of civil–military integration? Finally, considering that EU operations have been limited in time and scope, and that much of the EU's work in the Balkans has depended upon cooperation with NATO, what can be said of the evolving relationship between the EU and NATO?

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Odello Marco

Thirty Years after Helsinki: Proposals for OSCE's Reform

in **Journal of Conflict and Security Law**, Volume 10, Number 3, Winter , 435-449

The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has recently released a report dealing with its operational and institutional reforms. Created in 1975 as a loose conference-style organisation, including Western and Eastern European states, it survived the end of the Cold War. It was based on political and moral commitments and was not created by a constitutional treaty. It has developed a wide range of activities based on a wide concept of international security. But its operational and institutional framework still lack solid legal bases. The report under consideration points out some issues that deserve further comment in the context of international security aspects of post-Cold War European cooperation. The legal aspects of the report and their possible implications are the main object of this comment

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Subsection 3. Security communities and organizations

Miller Benjamin

When and How Regions Become Peaceful: Potential Theoretical Pathways to Peace

in **International Studies Review**, issue 2, vol. 7, june , 229-268

ABSTRACT: The objective of this essay is to address the following two puzzles. First, what best accounts for the transition from war to peace in different regions at different times? Second, what is the best explanation for variations in the level of regional peace that exists in different regions in a particular time period? Consider the differences that exist today in the Middle Eastern, South American, and Western European regions. A theoretical framework is proposed that is intended to integrate the regional and international perspectives on regional peace. It establishes linkages between different mechanisms that can lead to regional peace and the emergence of different levels of peace as well as presents three potential theoretical pathways to peace. An argument is made that the underlying cause of regional war propensity is the extent of the state-to-nation imbalance in a region. Accordingly, different peacemaking strategies produce different levels of peace based on their treatment of the state-to-nation problem. A distinction is made between the effects of



different approaches to peacemaking and the conditions for their success. In effect, peacemaking strategies bring about the transition from war to peace only if certain conditions exist in the region. The advantages and disadvantages of the three mechanisms are illustrated through three case studies, each exemplifying a specific strategy and level of peace that have resulted from the presence of certain conditions in the region: the Middle East (a transition to cold peace in the 1990s), South America (the evolution of normal peace across the twentieth century), and Western Europe (the emergence of warm peace since the 1950s).

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Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Martin Paul

A Global Answer to Global Problems

in *Foreign Affairs*, May/June n° 3/2005

The G-20 has helped the world's economic leaders go from simply managing crises to making long-term improvements in the international economy. Now a new leaders' forum -- call it the L-20 -- could do something similar for political problems

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Korab-Karpowicz W. Julian

A Global Authority: Classical Arguments and New Issues

in *Theoria*, 106 (April 2005)

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Buchholz Wolfgang, Peters Wolfgang

A Rawlsian Approach to International Cooperation

in *Kyklos*, Volume 58 Issue 1 - February , 25 ss

Both the economic theory of federalism and international environmental economics are interested in finding conditions under which countries or groups of countries would like to start cooperation with other countries. In the framework of the standard public-good model this paper presents a criterion for individually rational and thus voluntary international cooperation aiming at the provision of an international public good. This basic criterion can be traced back to Wicksell and Rawls and reflects the idea of reciprocity. In a further step, it is used to specify determinants that affect the decision of a group of countries to enter a coalition. It turns out that in this context the adjustment behavior of the original coalition members as well as that of the remaining outsiders is of particular importance. Finally the theoretical considerations are confronted with actual behavior of countries and groups of countries (as the EU, US and the developing countries) in the Kyoto process leading to a discussion of further prospects for global climate-change policy.



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Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Grant Ruth, Keohane Robert

Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics

in *American Political Science Review*, issue 1, vol. 99, february , 29-43

ABSTRACT: Debates about globalization have centered on calls to improve accountability to limit abuses of power in world politics. How should we think about global accountability in the absence of global democracy? Who should hold whom to account and according to what standards? Thinking clearly about these questions requires recognizing a distinction, evident in theories of accountability at the nation-state level, between “participation” and “delegation” models of accountability. The distinction helps to explain why accountability is so problematic at the global level and to clarify alternative possibilities for pragmatic improvements in accountability mechanisms globally. We identify seven types of accountability mechanisms and consider their applicability to states, NGOs, multilateral organizations, multinational corporations, and transgovernmental networks. By disaggregating the problem in this way, we hope to identify opportunities for improving protections against abuses of power at the global level.

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Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Etzioni Amitai

Affective Bonds and Moral Norms: A Communitarian Approach to the Emerging Global Society

in *Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft*, Heft 3, 2005 , 129-143

ABSTRACT: The explosive growth of transnational voluntary associations and the growing worldwide respect for human rights, women’s rights and the environment indicate that communal bonds and a shared set of values and norms are beginning to be formed across national borders, providing the moral basis for an inchoate global society.

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Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Wendt Alexander

Agency, Teleology and the World State: A Reply to Shannon

in *European Journal of International Relations* , Vol. 11, n. 4, December , 589-598

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Krahmann Elke

American Hegemony or Global Governance? Competing Visions of International Security



in *Review of International Studies (The)*, Volume 7, Issue 4, December , 531-546

No abstract available

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Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

David Held

At the global crossroads: The end of the Washington Consensus and the rise of global social democracy?
in *Globalizations* , Vol. 2, n. 1, May , 95-113

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Michael Goodhart

Civil society and the problem of global democracy
in *Democratization*, Vol. 12, n. 1, February , 1-21

This article criticizes the increasingly popular idea that global civil society (GCS) represents an appealing model of or strategy for global democracy. After briefly reviewing the arguments for conceiving global democracy and democratization in terms of GCS, it distinguishes two models of civil society's democratic role at the state level on which these claims rest. It shows that neither successfully survives transposition to the supranational setting. In both cases the purported democratic functions and effects of civil society depend on assumptions that do not hold globally. Proponents of GCS as a model of global democracy do not adequately conceptualize global democracy or democratization. This failure points to broader epistemological problems in theorizing global politics and global democracy. In place of strategies to extend and apply existing democratic theory globally, we need a theory of global democracy.

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Coen Federico

Come governare il mercato globale
in *Lettera Internazionale*, n. 83, 2005

No abstract available

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Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Schattle Hans

Communicating Global Citizenship: Multiple Discourses Beyond the Academy



in **Citizenship Studies**, n. 2, vol. 9, may , 119-133

ABSTRACT: This article demonstrates that notions of “global citizenship”, as communicated beyond academic debates in political theory and sociology, can be situated within two overarching discourses: a civic republican discourse that emphasizes concepts such as awareness, responsibility, participation and cross-cultural empathy, and a libertarian discourse that emphasizes international mobility and competitiveness. Within each of these discourses, multiple understandings of citizen voice can be identified. Exploring how myriad ways of thinking related to “global citizenship” are springing forth in public debate serves to illustrate new ways in which a wide variety of political, social and economic actors are reflecting upon the meaning of voice and citizenship in the context of increasing public recognition of global interdependence. Not only has “global citizenship” emerged as a variant within the concept of citizenship, but the concept of “global citizenship” contains many variants and sources of internal division. How the concept of “global citizenship” continues to evolve in public discourse, especially in response to watershed events, promises to remain a fruitful line of inquiry for years to come.

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Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Perju Vlad F.

Comparative Constitutionalism and the Making of A New World Order

in **Constellations**, Vol. 12, Issue 4 December , 464-486

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Krasner Stephen D.

Condividere la sovranità. Nuove istituzioni per gli stati nazionali in crisi

in **Quaderni di Scienza Politica**, n. 3, 2005

ABSTRACT: Conventional sovereignty assumes a world of autonomous, internationally recognized, and well-governed states. Although frequently violated in practice, the fundamental rules of Conventional sovereignty – recognition of juridically independent territorial entities and non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states – have rarely been challenged in principle. But these rules no longer work, and their inadequacies have had deleterious consequences for the strong as well as the weak. The policy tools that powerful and well-governed states have available to “fix” badly governed or collapsed states – principally governance assistance and transitional administration – are inadequate. In the future, better domestic governance in badly governed, failed or occupied polities will require the transcendence of accepted rules, including the creation of shared sovereignty in specific areas, and some new forms of de facto trusteeship.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations



Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Kögler Hans-Herbert

Constructing a Cosmopolitan Public Sphere: Hermeneutic Capabilities and Universal Values

in *European Journal of Social Theory*, Volume 8, No. 3, August 2005 , 297-320

Democratic politics might be defined as the agonistic struggle of different parties, groups or individuals over resources, recognition and influence under reciprocal and inclusive conditions. It is based on an unconditional orientation to equality as well as freedom of all those involved to consent to - or dissent from - the norms, policies and practices that are established in the process of public dialogue. This article reconstructs the general agent-based capabilities required for a democratically defined public sphere under conditions of globalization. Making capabilities central is intended to correct a certain over-emphasis regarding institutional macro-structures in the discourse on globalization and cosmopolitanism. After setting the stage with a critical analysis of Martha Nussbaum's concept of capabilities, the analysis proceeds in two major steps. In the first part, a notion of hermeneutic agency is introduced that avoids a Foucauldian reduction of agency to power structures, while thoroughly situating agency in a symbolically mediated social context. The symbolic mediation of agency is, in the second part, taken as a ground of potentiality for reflexive capabilities that, once actualized and enacted, allow for a normatively satisfying process of public deliberation. The aim of the analysis is to relate a normative model of value-orientation to the linguistically grounded empirical resources of social agents. The core argument lays out as basic capabilities (1) to be able to normatively orient oneself at contextually defined yet universally open postconventional commitments, (2) to be able to engage in an interpretive and dialogical perspective-taking vis-a-vis differently situated agents and backgrounds, and (3) to be able to critically distance oneself from one's taken-for-granted assumptions and background structures via a power-alert social reflexivity.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Cavallar Georg

Cosmopolis. Supranationales und kosmopolitisches Denken

in *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie*, 53. Jahrgang, Heft 1, 2005

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Chris Rumford

Cosmopolitanism and Europe

in *Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research*, Volume 18, Number 1 / March , 1-9

Cosmopolitan perspectives on contemporary social and political issues have made inroads into EU studies, despite official EU discourse making no reference to Europeans as cosmopolitans. There are three main dimensions to the cosmopolitanization of the EU studies agenda: (i) a rethinking of transnationalism and globalization in relation to the EU;



(ii) an increasing interest in the social dimensions of Europeanization; and (iii) a growing multi-disciplinarity in the study of contemporary Europe. There are several reasons for the increased interest in cosmopolitanism: a growing disenchantment with nationalism; recognition of the importance of global civil society; the 'cosmopolitan democracy' thesis advanced by Archibugi and Held; and the growing importance of human rights as a benchmark for democracy. Cosmopolitanism encourages a shift from a concern with the role of the nation-state in Europe to a broader sense of its role in the world, and relativizes Europe and the EU by placing them in a global context.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Andreatta Filippo

Democrazia e politica internazionale: pace democratica e democratizzazione del sistema internazionale
in *Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica*, Vol. XXXV, Numero 2, Agosto , 213-234

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Cajal M.

Derecho internacional público y relaciones internacionales - El vínculo transatlántico
in *Revista Espanola de Derecho Internacional*, Vol. 56 n. 1 , 129-140

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Najam Adil

Developing Countries and Global Environmental Governance: From Contestation to Participation to Engagement

in *International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics*, Volume 5, Number 3, September , pp. 303-321

Developing countries did not start off as demanders of global environmental governance. Although they are still rather skeptical about the global environmental enterprise, they have come a long way from being the vigorous contestants that they were three decades ago. This fascinating evolution has not only changed the views of developing countries but has also transformed the shape of the global environmental discourse, most significantly by turning what used to be global environmental politics into what is now the global politics of sustainable development. This paper charts this evolution by using the twin conceptual lenses of effectiveness and legitimacy and the heuristic markers of the three key global conferences on the global environment (Stockholm 1972; Rio de Janeiro 1992; Johannesburg 2002). The paper argues that the pre-Stockholm era was exemplified by a politics of contestation by the South; the Stockholm-to-Rio period was a period of reluctant participation as a new global compact emerged around the notion of sustainable



development; and the post-Rio years have seen the emergence of more meaningful, but still hesitant, engagement by the developing countries in the global environmental project but very much around the promise and potential of actualizing sustainable development.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Anderson-Gold Sharon

Die Kantische Grundlage des gegenwärtigen Kosmopolitismus
in *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie*, 53. Jahrgang, Heft 1, 2005

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Benhabib Seyla

Die Krise des Nationalstaats und die Grenzen des Demos
in *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie*, 53. Jahrgang, Heft 1, 2005

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Martens Stephan

Die Zukunft der transatlantischen Beziehungen
in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, Band 38-39, 2005

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Marino. Ignazio M.

Diritto, amministrazione, globalizzazione
in *Diritto dell'economia (il)*, n. 1, 25 - 46

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Leonard Eric K.

Discovering the New Face of Sovereignty: Complementarity and the International Criminal Court



in **New Political Science**, n. 1, vol. 27, march , 87-104

ABSTRACT: This article examines the socially constructed nature of sovereignty in order to ascertain a more empirically based understanding of the role that this concept plays in the current postinternational order. In particular, it analyzes the practice of sovereignty in the construction of the newly forming International Criminal Court (ICC). In an attempt to understand the relationship between sovereignty and the ICC, the article addresses the following questions. Does the ICC undermine the principles of state sovereignty? What are the implications of this institution on sovereignty? Finally, can we consider the authority structure of the ICC a new form of sovereignty?

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Mouffe Chantal

Eine kosmopolitische oder eine multipolare Weltordnung?

in **Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie**, 53. Jahrgang, Heft 1, 2005

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Dahrendorf Ralf

Europa und die Zukunft des Westens - Ein Gespräch mit Ralf Dahrendorf

in **Blätter für deutsche & internationale Politik**, März, 2005 , 288-300

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Mauil, Hanns W.

Europe and the new balance of global order

in **International Affairs** , issue 4, vol. 81, july , 775-800

The European Union has become an important shaping factor in international relations, but how and under what conditions it can exercise influence and contribute constructively to global order are still not well analysed. In fact, the EU's contribution may resemble more that of a force in physics than of a great power in the traditional sense of international relations (which the EU is not, and will not become in the near future), and its influence depends probably more on what the EU represents and how well it manages its own realm, rather than on what it can do externally. In this sense, European influence in international relations presently benefits from past achievements, and may therefore have peaked if the twin challenges of enlargement and national structural deficiencies are not addressed effectively. But even if the European Union does master those challenges successfully, and thus manages to sustain and perhaps even enhance its influence as a force in international relations, it will still have to proceed cautiously and clearly focus its



attempts on shaping its external environment and contributing to a 'concrete' or 'civilized' global order. In a global setting that, despite appearances to the contrary, seems characterized by a diffusion rather than a concentration of power and by strong tendencies towards entropy rather than order, the EU can and will probably not remain America's principal ally in sustaining Pax Americana. Nor does it seem likely to become an equal partner in a constructive, balanced transatlantic relationship, let alone a great power capable of challenging, perhaps together with others, America's apparent pre-eminence. The most plausible assumption for the EU's future role in the new balance of global order is that of a 'civilian force' with a regional focus. It may best be able to contribute to global order by managing its own realm well, promoting the normative and institutional infrastructure for civilized international relations, not least in the sense of functioning statehood, and working towards effective multilateralism.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Helper L.

Exiting Treaties

in *Virginia Law Review*, Vol. 91 n. 7

This Article analyzes the under-explored phenomenon of unilateral exit from international agreements and intergovernmental organizations. Although clauses authorizing denunciation and withdrawal from treaties are pervasive, international legal scholars and international relations theorists have largely ignored them. This Article draws upon new empirical evidence to provide a comprehensive interdisciplinary framework for understanding treaty exit. It examines when and why states abandon their treaty commitments and explains how exit helps to resolve certain theoretical and doctrinal puzzles that have long troubled scholars of international affairs.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Mantouvalou Virginia

Extending Judicial Control in International Law: Human Rights Treaties and Extraterritoriality

in *International Journal of Human Rights (The)*, Vol. 9 Nr. 2 June , 147 - 163

This article examines the extraterritorial reach of international human rights treaties, as a way to hold accountable states that perform human rights violations outside of their national boundaries. In order to illustrate this, the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights are discussed. The final aim of the article is to show that the notion of jurisdiction in international human rights treaties is to be interpreted in light of their distinct purpose.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy



Makinda Sam

Following postnational signs: the trail of human rights

in *Futures*, issue 9, vol. 37, november , 943-957

ABSTRACT: Following postnational signs is one of way of moving 'beyond nationalism', and this requires a critique of the moral and ethical foundations of the modern political community. However, moving 'beyond nationalism' is by itself not necessarily superior to operating within national boundaries. The important issue is how we can improve the human condition by following postnational signs or moving beyond nationalism. The route through human rights is one of many, but it is ethically appealing because it has the potential to broaden the scope of human emancipation and strengthen social bonds across the globe. Promoting human rights can provide a platform for the deconstruction of the nation-state, which will subsequently expose its totalizing effects, especially its strategies for ensuring that the boundaries of territory, nation, citizenship and sovereignty are coterminous.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Martinelli Alberto

From World System to World Society?

in *Journal of World-Systems Research*, n. 2, vol. XI, december , 241-260

ABSTRACT: In the paper, I first argue that we live in a fundamentally interconnected global order, integrated by complex patterns of exchange, hierarchy and solidarity among multiple global actors-which are increasingly aware of their interdependence and common fate. However, a universal world society does not exist yet. I then discuss the role played by international collective movements, non-governmental organizations and epistemic communities in shaping a transnational civil society and an international public space. And finally I evaluate the main factors either favoring or hindering the institutions and values of a system of global governance.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Manfred B. Steger

From market globalism to imperial globalism: Ideology and American power after 9/11

in *Globalizations* , Vol. 2, n. 1, May , 31-46

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Gstöhl Sieglinde

Gipfeltreffen und Theorien der internationalen Politik

in *Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft* , 15. Jahrgang (2005), Heft 2 , 395-418

Summits and Theories of International Relations



Even though the number of summits of heads of state and government has steadily increased since World War II, political science has so far mainly ignored them. Based on the American-Soviet superpower summits, the world economic summits, and the world conferences under the auspices of the United Nations, this article shows that the three mainstream theories of international relations – neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism and constructivism – offer adequate explanations for those summits which fall into their historical context of emergence. The cooperation of states at the highest level and the theories about them are thus children of their time.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Clapp Jennifer

Global Environmental Governance for Corporate Responsibility and Accountability

in **Global Environmental Politics**, Volume 5, Issue 3, August , pp. 23-34

Recent years have seen a growing movement toward externally imposed regulations directed specifically at improving TNCs' environmental and social performance. This movement draws on a long history, and its most recent incarnation is largely a reaction to disappointment on the part of many with the results of private voluntary initiatives among global firms. A number of international level initiatives have emerged, including the UN's Global Compact and the inclusion of an environment chapter in the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. Because these efforts, while externally driven, are voluntary on the part of firms, there have been growing calls for a binding international treaty on corporate accountability. Industry has been extremely resistant to this idea. Many see such a treaty as vital for developing countries, as it could bolster their ability and willingness to monitor and enforce environmental regulations. This is especially important in the Global South, as these countries have seen the bulk of the negative environmental impacts of TNCs in recent decades.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Manuel Castells

Global Governance and Global Politics

in **PS: Political Science & Politics** , Vol. 38, Issue 1, January , 9-16

The world is undergoing a process of structural transformation in multiple dimensions: technological, economic, cultural, and institutional. This creates as many opportunities as it induces perils. Perhaps the most fundamental problem we now face is the crisis of political institutions in charge of managing the transition. We know the problems, we understand the issues, and in many countries there is enough political will to tackle the questions to be addressed. However, the organizational and institutional tools of governance are either insufficient or inadequate. Furthermore, the crisis of governance is related to a crisis of political legitimacy, characterized by increasing distance between citizens and their representatives. Both crises feed into each other, threatening with political paralysis and opening the way both for authoritarian policies and for demagogic revolts.



Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Peter A. Furia

Global citizenship, anyone? cosmopolitanism, privilege and public opinion

in *Global Society*, Vol. 19, n. 4, October , 331-359

This paper utilises the World Values Survey (WVS) and the Inter-university Survey on Allegiance (ISA) in order to evaluate the claim that cosmopolitanism is elitist. Variants of this claim include: (1) "Cosmopolitanism appeals to almost no one but the rationalist philosophers who articulate it", (2) "Cosmopolitanism is systematically likely to appeal to privileged individuals", and (3) "Cosmopolitanism is systematically likely to appeal to privileged societies." Treating these claims as empirically testable hypotheses, I find that none is strongly supported by available data. Cosmopolitans can therefore be more confident than they have been in defending global citizenship as a practicable and desirable political ideal.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Weiss Linda

Global governance, national strategies: how industrialized states make room to move under the WTO

in *Review of International Political Economy*, Volume 12, Number 5 / December 2005 , pp. 723-749

Global and national governance are sometimes seen to stand in a zero-sum relationship, particularly in the post-GATT era of multilateral trade. A more nuanced view expects states to seek the benefits of multilateralism whilst finding convenient loopholes and escape routes from its policy constraints. This paper steers a different course, focusing on the overt ('legitimate') measures industrialized states are undertaking to succeed in the international arena. Rich nations as a group have carved out a multilateral order which best suits their current developmental trajectory – one that diminishes space for promoting industries critical to their climb up the development ladder, while increasing scope for sponsoring the technology-intensive sectors now critical to securing national prosperity. State activism continues and in some respects has taken on a more strategic and collaborative quality. This paper discusses several forms of 'strategic activism' in trade, technology, and finance and considers why it has emerged in the context of increased multilateral discipline.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Valencia Sáiz Angel

Globalisation, Cosmopolitanism and Ecological Citizenship

in *Environmental Politics*, Volume 14, Number 2, April , pp. 163-178

Globalization is patently changing our understanding of environmental politics. It relates to environmental problems in two ways. First, environmental problems and their effects are global, and hence solutions beyond the remit of nation



states are required. Second, globalization may benefit local?—?global relationship and contribute to the realization of a sustainable society. These points obviously influence green political theory since one of its tasks is to understand the transformation of political community in the context of the global scope of environmental problems. One route is through laying the foundations for an autochthonous idea of citizenship namely, ecological or environmental citizenship. The goal of this article is to explore the connections between cosmopolitan reflections on citizenship on the one hand, and green political theory's attempts to develop its own idea of citizenship, on the other. It is argued that although the idea of ecological citizenship may be regarded as a kind of cosmopolitan or global citizenship, its features and current degree of development move towards a new kind of citizenship.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Della Porta Donatella

Globalizations and democracy

in Democratization, Vol. 12, n. 5, December , 668-685

Globalization has been seen as a factor in increasing democratization, but also as one of the main challenges to democracy. The term globalization has been used to indicate various and heterogeneous types of phenomena, all of them producing challenges for traditional, nation-state based models of democracy. Economic globalization as free trade, with devolution of power from the state to the market, challenges the welfare state model of tempered capitalism. Cultural globalization, with intensified communication over borders, challenges the idea of democracy as one based upon a pre-political community of destiny. The social dimension of globalization brings about a fragmentation of social groups and identities, as well as growing transnationalization of civil society organizations and protest campaigns. In the political system, the economic, cultural and political dimensions of globalization reverberate in the increasing complexity of the structure of international organizations and international regimes. The challenge to the power and competence of the nation-state posed by the various instances of globalization brings into sharp relief the democratic deficit of the growing number of international organizations. Normative theories of democracy must insist on the need to create new political institutions that take into account the greatly diminished power of nation-states and the changing definition of relevant political communities.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Indrajit Roy

Good governance and the dilemma of development: what lies beneath?

in Socio-Economic Review, 3 (1) , 83-116

Ideas unleash human imaginations, as well as hold these imaginations on a leash. However, they are scarcely disarticulated from material realities. Together with these realities, they take on the form of discourses—words, concepts and thoughts that characterize how we live. 'Good governance' has come to occupy such a space in the practical and theoretical discussions on development. This paper attempts to put current understanding into perspective, by locating



specific trends in government reform and public expenditure. It realizes that the nature of the Indian state, international finance and fiscal prudence, rather than responsiveness to democratic demands of poor people, inform the discourse on 'good governance'. Such thinking among the key players poses a dilemma to the theory and practice of development, because it reflects the tendency of the state to shy away from responsibility to its citizens. The discourse on 'good governance' must articulate democratic aspirations.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Chandhoke Neera

How Global is Global Civil Society?

in *Journal of World-Systems Research*, n. 2, vol. XI, december , 355-371

ABSTRACT: In recent times the concept of global civil society has made its appearance on national and international intellectual, as well as political agendas, in a major way. It is of some interest that two other concepts, both of which call for transcendence of national boundaries in precisely the same way as global civil society does, have also made their appearance on the scene of intellectual debates at roughly the same time: the concept of cosmopolitanism and that of transnational justice. All three concepts have dramatically expanded the notion of commitment to one's fellow beings beyond the nation state. And all three concepts have extended critiques of policies that violate the dignity of human beings from national governments to the practices of international institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Forum. In sum the inter-related concepts of global civil society, cosmopolitanism, and transnational justice have greatly enlarged the traditional domain of political theory. And yet for any political theorist who is acutely conscious of the phenomenon of power, these concepts are not unproblematic. For the practices of global civil society may just reinforce the intellectual and the moral power of the West over the postcolonial world. This is particularly true of say global human rights organizations. This paper will attempt to raise some questions of the concept and the practices of global civil society from the perspective of the countries of the South.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Oberleitner Gerd

Human Security: A Challenge to International Law?

in *Global Governance*, n. 2, vol. 11, april-june

ABSTRACT: The concept of human security, which emerged in the 1994 UNDP Development Report, is on its way to changing the practice and institutions of global governance. The underlying issues of human security—a focus on the individual, the waning of state sovereignty and the rise of new actors, the shift in our understanding of security, the need and risks of "saving strangers" through humanitarian intervention, the reform of the Security Council, the conduct of complex peace missions, and the adequate reaction to new threats—pose a challenge to international law. As a value-based and people-centered approach to security, human security will contribute to normative changes in the international legal order.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy



Cassese Sabino

Il diritto amministrativo globale: una introduzione

in *Rivista trimestrale di diritto pubblico*, n. 2 , 331 - 357

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Kagan Robert

Il diritto di fare la guerra

in *Affari Esteri*, Anno XXXVII, n. 145 , 199-203

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Salleo Ferdinando

Il multilateralismo e le regole della società internazionale

in *Affari Esteri*, Anno XXXVII, n. 148 , 766-773

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Pfahl Stefanie

Institutional sustainability

in *International Journal of Sustainable Development*, Volume 8, Numbers 1-2 , pp. 80-96

In the context of the conceptual and analytical discussion of operationalising sustainable development, institutional sustainability has so far not played a major role. The UN Commission for Sustainable Development decided in 1995 to develop indicators for assessing the progress which UN members had made with the implementation of Agenda 21. However, these indicators did not reflect the broader notion at institutions and neglected important institutional aspects that predetermine activities and policies. Yet, policy analysis showed that not just formal organisations help to support decision making. The paper explores the broader notion of institutions, including less formal, but powerful institutional structures and links them to sustainable development and good governance principles. The concluding section applies this approach to the European Union in order to assess, in general terms, the sustainability of its development and implications for the future structure of the EU.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Posner Eric A., Yoo John C.



Judicial Independence in International Tribunals

in *California Law Review*, Vol. 93 n. 1 , 93 ss.

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Padoan P.C.

L'aggiustamento degli equilibri globali e il ruolo della Cina

in *ItalianiEuropei*, n. 1 , 121 - 128

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Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

D'Aspremont J.

La création internationale d'Etats démocratiques

in *Revue générale de droit international publique*, Tomo 109 n. 4

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Archibugi Daniele

La democrazia cosmopolitica: una prospettiva partecipante

in *Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica*, Vol. XXXV, Numero 2, Agosto , 261-288

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Ferrajoli Luigi

La guerre et l'avenir de l'ordre international

in *Actuel Marx*, N°37 (mai 2005)

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Le Goff Jacques



La naissance d'un droit mondial?

in *Esprit*, n. 317, août 2005

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Piattoni Simona

La "governance" multi-livello: sfide analitiche, empiriche e normative

in *Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica*, Vol. XXXV, Numero 3, Dicembre , 417-446

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Vachez Antoine , Sacriste Guillaume

Les « bons offices » du droit international : la constitution d'une autorité non politique dans le concert diplomatique des années 1920

in *Critique Internationale*, N°26 - Janvier 2005

Le débat classique sur la « force » du droit dans la politique internationale est ici revu par le biais d'une analyse du fonctionnement concret des espaces juridiques transnationaux tels qu'ils ont émergé à la faveur du développement du multilatéralisme et des organisations internationales au cours des années 1920. Cet article met en évidence les mécanismes sociaux au principe du « tiers-pouvoir » des juristes sur la scène internationale de cette époque. Il souligne la vision particulière de l'intérêt général international qui s'échafaude alors dans ces communautés savantes transnationales constamment tiraillées entre loyauté nationale et loyauté internationale, d'une part, entre logique politique et logique savante, d'autre part.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Larry Diamond

Lessons from Iraq

in *Journal of Democracy*, Volume 16, Number 1, January , pp. 9-23 (full text available on-line)

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Weiss Linda

L'integrazione globale accresce il potere degli Stati



in *Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica*, Vol. XXXV, Numero 3, Dicembre , 397-416

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Xilai Yu

Made in USA: The Future of International Justice and the World Order

in *Heartland – Eurasian Review of Geopolitics*, Number 1, "China-America, the Great Game" , pp. 47-55

No abstract available

Full text available at http://www.eheartland.com/_lib/_docs/2005_01c_China_America_The_Great_Game.pdf

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Bowen, Norman

Multilateralism, Multipolarity, and Regionalism: The French Foreign Policy Discourse

in *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol. 16 Nr 1, Winter , 94-116

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Darryl S.L. Jarvis

Multinational enterprises, international relations and international business: reconstituting intellectual boundaries for the new millennium

in *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 59, n. 2 / June , 201-223

The rapidly changing nature of the international political economy along with its increasing complexity, poses challenges for both theoreticians as well as policymakers; the former in terms of developing innovative frameworks of analysis able to model and understand the constitutive nature and contours of its parameters; the latter in terms of developing suitable frameworks of analysis able to inform policy analysis and practical management strategies. This article explores these dilemmas from two disciplinary perspectives. First, from international relations (IR) theory, particularly how various theoretical approaches have failed to consider more fully the role of non-state actors like multinational enterprises (MNEs) despite the growth in their importance and the resources they control. Second, from the perspective of international business (IB) which, while focusing on MNEs, has done so in the absence of more contextual approaches that situate MNEs in power-political, regulatory, and inter-state environmental settings. By highlighting the weaknesses of both disciplinary approaches, the article then suggests that the construction of new interdisciplinary rubrics jointly created from IR and IB, offers a better means of appreciating the changing character of the global political economy and some of its most important actors and emerging processes.



Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Castles Stephen

**Nation and Empire: Hierarchies of Citizenship in the New Global Order
in International Politics** , Vol. 42, n. 2, June , 203-224

Citizenship in nation-states has always contained tensions between inclusion and exclusion, between the citizen and the national, between the active and the passive citizen and between the citizen as political sovereign and the warrior-citizen. These tensions have been transformed and sharpened by globalization and the emergence of a global order based on the hegemony of a single superpower. For the first time in history, most states have the institutional structures of democratic nation-states, and the majority of the world's people are defined as citizens. This article argues that this formal equality masks a new global hierarchy of nation-states and of citizenships. These hierarchies apply with regard to international law, trade, the control of weapons of mass destruction and global governance. As a result patterns of differentiated citizenship within nation-states are now overlaid by patterns of global inequality.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Heinig Hans Michael

Offene Staatlichkeit oder Abschied vom Staat?

in *Philosophische Rundschau*, 52. Jahrgang, 3, September 2005

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Benhabib Seyla

On the alleged conflict between democracy and international law

in *Ethics and International Affairs*, n. 1, vol. 19, spring , 85-100

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Brand Ulrich

Order and regulation: Global Governance as a hegemonic discourse of international politics?

in *Review of International Political Economy*, Volume 12, Number 1 / February , 155-176

Under the heading of 'Global Governance' a discussion is taking place on changes in political regulation at the



international level. In this contribution Global Governance is understood as a discourse which is a part of the search process of emerging post-Fordist politics and its substantiation. This is based on the Foucault concept of discourse. It is analyzed in terms of five dimensions: 'globalisation'; 'world problems' and 'global challenges'; Realpolitik; 'Utopia' and democracy; and finally the 'general interest' of world society. This shows how Global Governance is articulated with the dominant transformations of the political which are understood from the perspective of regulation theory. It is demonstrated that this discourse, which legitimizes societal developments and provides a guide for action, is not at all in contradiction to the post-Fordist neoliberal transformation of society, but rather serves to make the handling of globalization-induced crises more effective. The article does not aim to provide a precise analysis of the discourse or its ontological and epistemological basis; instead it seeks to open up a perspective which should serve to stimulate discussion and research about the changing nature of international politics and hegemony.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Battini Stefano

Organizzazioni internazionali e soggetti privati: verso un diritto amministrativo globale?

in *Rivista trimestrale di diritto pubblico*, n. 2 , 359 - 388

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Helen Yanacopulos

Patterns of governance: the rise of transnational coalitions of NGOs

in *Global Society*, Vol. 19, n. 3, July , 247-266

This paper explores patterns of governance in transnational development non-governmental organisation (NGO) coalitions. Governance is a term that has increased in usage during the last decade; it has been used in a variety of ways, by a variety of actors. Here, governance is broken down into two elements—governance as a purposive activity, and governance as an explanatory framework. This is an empirically grounded paper which focuses on the mechanisms of governance as a purposive activity, illustrated by interviews with four transnational development NGO coalitions. The principal aim of this research is to illustrate the workings and mechanics of governance.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Gallavin, Chris

Peace Without Justice: Hegemonic Instability or International Criminal Law?

in *European public Law*, Volume 11 (2005) - Issue 2 , 291-293



Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Ieraci Giuseppe

Politica tra le nazioni o scontro delle civiltà. Alcune riflessioni sulle relazioni mondiali oggi e su alcuni modi d'intenderle

in *Ragion Pratica*, numero 1, giugno 2005 , 243-254

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Van Harten Gus

Private authority and transnational governance: the contours of the international system of investor protection in Review of International Political Economy, Volume 12, Number 4 / October 2005 , pp. 600-623

Conventionally, investors could not sue states directly under international law and arbitration tribunals did not have general jurisdiction over international investment disputes. This has changed, especially since the early 1990s, with the emergence of an international system of investor protection that combines investor-state arbitration and broad standards of investor protection. The system elevates the legal status of investors (but not other individuals) in international law by allowing them to make international claims for damages against host states. Although the system depends on state authority for its establishment and ongoing effectiveness, the system adopts private authority as a method of transnational governance by permitting private investors to make claims and by giving private arbitrators the power to resolve those claims. This provides significant advantages to multinational enterprises at the expense of governmental flexibility in both capital-importing and capital-exporting states, as revealed by the recent explosion of investor claims. This article examines the legal architecture of the system in order to demonstrate how it expands private authority in the context of transnational governance.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Swaak-Goldman Olivia

Recent Developments in International Criminal Law: Trying to Stay Afloat Between Scylla and Charybdis in International and Comparative Law Quarterly, n. 3, vol. 54, July , 691-704

ABSTRACT: This article examines a recent development in international criminal law, namely the emergence of two countervailing trends. On the one hand there is a broadening trend, in that the various prosecutorial means used to hold individuals accountable for violations of international crimes has expanded. In this regard the ICC, the ad hoc tribunals, mixed tribunals and national jurisdictions based on universal jurisdiction are of importance. On the other hand there is a narrowing trend, in that the protection from prosecution afforded to certain individuals by the international law principle of immunity, that once seemed to falter, has been reinstated.



Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Posner, Eric A., Yoo John C.

Reply to Helfer and Slaughter

in *California Law Review*, Vol. 93 n. 3 , 93 ss.

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Jim Russell

Rethinking post-national citizenship: The relationship between state territory and international human rights law

in *Space and Polity*, Volume 9, Number 1 / April , 29-39

With the rise of international human rights regimes, the continued relevance of state sovereignty is being called into question. This paper engages with the possibility for the emergence of post-national citizenship, in which universal human rights are attached to persons rather than territories. The case of detainees held by the US at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, brings to the fore questions about the relationship between territorial boundaries and human rights. An analysis of a recent US Supreme Court ruling on the legal rights of the Guantanamo detainees demonstrates that debates over post-national citizenship misconceptualise the relationship between international human rights law and state territory.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

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Sgard Jérôme

Réguler l'économie mondiale : le juge plutôt que le diplomate

in *Lettre du CEPII*, Avril, 244

Le débat sur la "nouvelle architecture internationale" s'est centré principalement sur la coopération des États souverains et sur la division du travail entre les grandes organisations multilatérales. De manière plus quotidienne, la régulation des échanges globalisés est assurée cependant par de nombreux acteurs, généralement très discrets : scientifiques, experts, régulateurs indépendants ou juges. Un des cas les plus intéressants est celui de l'arbitrage privé international, indépendant des juridictions publiques, qui assure le règlement d'un très grand nombre de différends contractuels entre acteurs privés, à l'abri des interférences politiques. Ces pratiques exercent désormais une influence croissante dans des domaines qui mettent en question les États, notamment l'investissement direct et les conflits commerciaux.



Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Pedaci Vincenzo

Sovranazionalità della funzione e nuovo assetto dell'amministrazione pubblica tra "government" e "governance"

in *Amministrazione italiana (Ia)*, n. 6 , 802 - 805

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Mangu, André Mbata B

States' Revenge Against People in International Law: Requiem for Universal Jurisdiction?

in *Indian Journal of International Law*, Volume 44, Issue 2 , 324-346

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Adam Lupel

Tasks of a global civil society: Held, Habermas and democratic legitimacy beyond the nation-state

in *Globalizations* , Vol. 2, n. 1, May , 117-133

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Bohman James

The Democratic Minimum: Is Democracy a Means to Global Justice?

in *Ethics and International Affairs*, n. 1, vol. 19, spring

ABSTRACT: I argue that transnational democracy provides the basis for a solution to the problem of the "democratic circle"—that in order for democracy to promote justice, it must already be just—at the international level. Transnational democracy could be a means to global justice. First, I briefly recount my argument for the "democratic minimum." This minimum is freedom from domination, understood in a very specific sense. Employing Hannah Arendt's conception of freedom as "the capacity to begin," the form of nondomination sufficient for the democratic minimum is the capability to initiate deliberation and thus democratic decision-making processes. My point in developing this argument further concerns the political form of a transnational polity: its citizens enjoy the democratic minimum as members of various demoi. In the case of the European Union, this leads to a potential for democratic domination. I call this the demoi problem, a difficulty that holds for any multilevel polity, for bounded as well as transnational political communities. Second, I argue that such domination is overcome so long as the capacity to initiate deliberation is distributed among various units and various levels. The democratic minimum could fail to obtain not only because individuals or groups are



dominated by nondemocratic means, but also because they are dominated democratically to the extent that the demos of one unit lacks the normative power to initiate deliberation and thus is subordinated to others.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Doucet Marc G.

The Democratic Paradox and Cosmopolitan Democracy

in Millennium: Journal of International Studies, n. 1, vol. 34, January, 137-155

ABSTRACT: Democracy's narrative on the source of legitimate political power contains a fundamental paradox which surfaces most clearly whenever there is an attempt to inaugurate a new democratic order. The new order is meant to be founded upon the consent of an authority – the people – which can only exist as such after the order is created. This research note begins with an examination of how this paradox re-emerges with the attempt to theorise cosmopolitan democracy, and how it leads such a theorisation into a logical impasse. Rather than seeking a way out of this impasse however, the second half of this note explores how the paradox may in fact be seen as leaving an irresolvable tension within the modern democratic imaginary which may lend itself to the project of theorising forms of post-national democracy.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Guzman A. T.

The Design of International Agreements

in European Journal of International Law, Vol. 16 n. 4, 612- 634

States entering into international agreements have at their disposal several tools to enhance the strength and credibility of their commitments, including the ability to make the agreement a formal treaty rather than soft law, provide for mandatory dispute resolution procedures, and establish monitoring mechanisms. Each of these strategies – referred to as 'design elements' – increases the costs associated with the violation of an agreement and, therefore, the probability of compliance. Yet even a passing familiarity with international agreements makes it clear that states routinely fail to include these design elements in their agreements. This article explains why rational states sometimes prefer to draft their agreements in such a way as to make them less credible and, therefore, more easily violated. In contrast to domestic law, where contractual violations are sanctioned through zero-sum payments from the breaching party to the breached-against party, sanctions for violations of international agreements are not zero-sum. To the extent that sanctions exist, they almost always represent a net loss to the parties. For example, a reputational loss felt by the violating party yields little or no offsetting benefit to its counter-party. When entering into an agreement, then, the parties take into account the possibility of a violation and recognize that if it takes place, the net loss to the parties will be larger if credibility-enhancing measures are in place. In other words, the design elements offer a benefit in the form of greater compliance, but do so by increasing the cost to the parties in the event of a violation. When deciding which design elements to include, the parties must then balance the benefits of increased compliance against the costs triggered in the event of a violation.



Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Andresen Steinar, Hey Ellen

The Effectiveness and Legitimacy of International Environmental Institutions

in International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Volume 5, Number 3, September , pp.

211-226

The Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) concluded during the past decades have established complex interlinkages between the institutions established by MEAs and institutions such as UNEP, UNDP and the World Bank and the funds administered by the Bank, in particular the GEF. Questions regarding the effectiveness and legitimacy of this system of global environmental governance have arisen both in practice and in research. This essay explores the manner in which these questions have arisen, how they have been addressed in recent research and provides the context for the subsequent contributions to this special issue.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Lucio Levi

The European Parliament Calls for a EU Seat on the Security Council and a UN Parliamentary Assembly

in Federalist Debate (The), Year XVII, n. 1, March

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Vogler, John

The European contribution to global environmental governance

in International Affairs , issue 4, vol. 81, july , 835-850

The European Union has become an increasingly central player in international environmental politics. Its role, especially as a protagonist to the United States, has been highlighted by the way in which it successfully led the campaign for ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. The 2005 UK presidency has made climate change one of its twin priorities along with African development, and it is with this in mind that the article discusses the way in which the Union can be considered an international environmental actor in its own right and the various contributions that it makes to global environmental governance. While the EU is well known as a trade actor the complexities of its role as an environmental actor, operating under shared competence between the member states and the Community, are less well understood. Despite the inherent difficulties it has been surprisingly effective, although in areas such as climate change there is a need for strong presidential leadership.

The EU's most evident field of activity has concerned the many multilateral environmental agreements in which it has come to play a leading role. However, this does not exhaust its contribution to global environmental governance that extends to the dissemination of norms and the incorporation of partners in its accession and neighbourhood policies. Sustainable development is also a key area of internal and external Union endeavour at the WTO and elsewhere,



although there are continuing contradictions arising from its agricultural and fisheries policies. Finally, the Union's credibility will rest upon its ability to implement its environmental commitments and this is nowhere more evident than in its new emissions trading system. This is the centrepiece of the EU's commitment to the Kyoto Protocol and it is the need to co-ordinate the Union's diplomacy in the extension of the climate change regime, to include the United States and the developing countries, that the UK presidency must address.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Pollack Mark A.

The New Transatlantic Agenda at Ten: Reflections on an Experiment in International Governance
in **Journal of Common Market Studies**, Vol. 43, Issue 5, December , 899-920

The 1995 New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) represents a novel experiment in international governance, linking the institutions of the EU and the United States at the intergovernmental, transgovernmental and transnational levels. This article draws lessons from the NTA after its first decade, noting tensions in the Brussels-Washington relationship, a highly variable pattern of effectiveness in transgovernmental regulatory co-operation, and a largely ineffectual record of transnational civil-society co-operation.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Scott C. Byrd

The Porto Alegre Consensus: Theorizing the forum movement
in **Globalizations** , Vol. 2, n. 1, May , 151-163

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Nagel Thomas

The Problem of Global Justice
in **Philosophy and Public Affairs**, Volume 33, Issue 2, March 2005 , 113-147

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Higgott Richard

The Theory and Practice of Global and Regional Governance: Accommodating American Exceptionalism and European Pluralism



in *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Volume 10, Issue 4 , pp. 575-594

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Webster Andrew

The Transnational Dream: Politicians, Diplomats and Soldiers in the League of Nations' Pursuit of International Disarmament, 1920–1938

in *Contemporary European History* , Volume 14 - Issue 04 - November 2005 , pp. 493 -518

The pursuit of disarmament was central to the work of the League of Nations throughout its existence, but it was a relatively small and consistent set of national representatives who sat on the many bodies created to deal with the issue. Unfortunately, the gradual development of a sense of 'transnational' community among these delegates was never able to overcome the more powerful imperatives of national self-interest. Disarmament was always tied too closely to the issue of security for the individual governments of the major powers to view it from anything other than a strictly national strategic perspective.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Saskia Sassen

The repositioning of citizenship and alienage: Emergent subjects and spaces for politics

in *Globalizations* , Vol. 2, n. 1, May , 79-94

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Romeo Giuseppe

Una governance europea per una governance mondiale

in *Affari Sociali Internazionali*, n. 1, 2005

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Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Marchetti Raffaele

Utilitarismo e giustizia globale

in *Filosofia e Questioni Pubbliche*, Volume X (2005), n. 1 , 111-133



No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Heisbourg François

**Von der Atlantischen Allianz zur europäisch-amerikanischen Partnerschaft
in Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte**, Band 38-39, 2005

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Shannon Vaughn P.

**Wendt's Violation of the Constructivist Project: Agency and Why a World State is Not Inevitable
in European Journal of International Relations** , Vol. 11, n. 4, December , 581-587

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Günther Klaus

**World Citizens between Freedom and Security
in Constellations**, Vol. 12, Issue 3 September , 379-391

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 4. Global governance, supranational federalism and democracy

Thomas Olesen

**World politics and social movements: the Janus face of the global democratic structure
in Global Society**, Vol. 19, n. 2, April , 109-129

This article advances a theoretically informed understanding of the relationship between world politics, democracy and social movements. The pivot of the discussion is the concept of a global democratic structure. The global democratic structure is rooted in changes taking place after the end of the Second World War, but has become globally dominant only after the end of the Cold War. The global democratic structure is undergirded by powerful political, security and economic interests. At the same time, however, it provides opportunities for social critique and change. This potential is exemplified through a discussion of the role of social movements in world politics. Social movements are influential through discursive means. The article offers a number of propositions about the conditions for social movement success and failure in the global democratic structure.



Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Deflem Mathieu

A Global Perspective on Globalization

in **Review of International Studies (The)**, Volume 7, Issue 2, June , 337-340

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Staples Clifford L.

A Theory of Global Capitalism: Production, Class, and State in a Transnational World

in **European Journal of Social Theory**, Volume 8, No. 4, November 2005 , 533-536

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Falkner Robert

American Hegemony and the Global Environment

in **Review of International Studies (The)**, Volume 7, Issue 4, December , 585-600

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Laguna-Díaz Elpidio

Americanización/Globalización/Anglobalización

in **El Cotidiano : revista de la realidad mexicana actual** , n. 129 , 16-21

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Paul James

Arguing globalizations: Propositions towards an investigation of global formation

in **Globalizations** , Vol. 2, n. 2, September , 193-209

No abstract available



Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Francesco Tuccari

Ascesa o declino? Gli Stati Uniti nell'era globale

in *Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica*, Numero 1, Aprile , 135-148

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Eppler Erhard

Auslaufmodell Staat? Politik im Schraubstock der Globalisierung

in *Blätter für deutsche & internationale Politik*, Juni, 2005 , 693-703

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Drainville André C.

Beyond altermondialisme: anti-capitalist dialectic of presence

in *Review of International Political Economy*, Volume 12, Number 5 / December 2005 , pp. 884-908

That 'Another World is Possible' has become the ensign of the left's common sense. For lack of having been thought through, and for want to take it all in, the new reasonableness has given itself a hollow name with a ring to it: altermondialisme. Notwithstanding fashionable certainties, everything about it needs to be problematized, both because, in carrying on the century-old internationalist drive for programmatic coherence, altermondialisme rather stands at the rearguard of the movement than at its forefront, and because in its relationship to it, it reproduces rather than challenges attempts by the World Bank et al. to contain contemporary anti-capitalism and empty it of political possibilities. The text is divided into three parts. In the first, I identify what I take to be an essential political dynamic of contemporary world order: the attempt by regulatory agencies of global capitalism to invent a functional, civil and perfectly apolitical global subject that could serve as an ideal social companion to global-neo-liberalism. In the second part of the text, I work from concepts that originated with the Internationale Situationniste to begin making political sense of contemporary anti-capitalist praxis. In the third part of the article, I extract from the first two principles of articulation that may allow us to understand contemporary anti-capitalism for what it is, without containing or reifying it.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Fogel Cathleen

Biotic Carbon Sequestration and the Kyoto Protocol: The Construction of Global Knowledge by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change



in **International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics**, Volume 5, Number 2, June , pp. 191-210

This paper explores the dynamics of the production of global knowledge by an international knowledge organization, in this case the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Based on previous notions of international boundary organizations, the idea of international knowledge organizations emphasizes the knowledge generation function of such organizations rather than their convening function. Using the case of controversial Kyoto Protocol biotic carbon sequestration policies, I argue that boundary work and uncertainty management are the essential dynamics in the successful construction of global knowledge by international knowledge organizations. This uncertainty management occurs in a manner broadly, although not completely, in conformance with the institutional preferences of powerful policy actors. Global knowledge can legitimate and help refine global policies, but the process of its construction must be iterative and transparent if it is to be credible for global environmental governance over the long-term.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

William K. Tabb

Capital, class and the state in the global political economy

in **Globalizations** , Vol. 2, n. 1, May , 47-60

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Bandiera Oriana, Barankay Iwan Rasul Imran

Cooperation in collective action

in **Economics of Transition**, Volume 13 Issue 3 July 2005 , p. 473

The ability to cooperate in collective action problems such as those relating to the use of common property resources or the provision of local public goods is a key determinant of economic performance. In this paper we discuss two aspects of collective action problems in developing countries. First, which institutions discourage opportunistic behaviour and promote cooperation? Second, what are the characteristics of the individuals involved that determine the degree to which they cooperate? We first review the evidence from field studies, laboratory experiments, and cross community studies. We then present new results from an individual level panel dataset of rural workers.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Christien van den Anker

Cosmopolitan Justice and the Globalization of Capitalism: The UNDP and ILO Proposals

in **Globalizations** , Vol. 2, n. 2, September , 254-270

No abstract available



Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Orrego Vicuña Francisco

Customary International Law in a Global Community: Taylor Made?

in *Estudios internacionales : revista del Instituto de Estudios Internacionales de la Universidad de Chile*, Vol. 38 / 2005 / Nr. 148 , p. 21

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Lazari Antonio

De Ulises, Hércules y (la fuerza de la debilidad) el nuevo orden cosmopolita

in *Revista Electrónica de Estudios Internacionales*, Número 10/ 2005

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Clavin Patricia

Defining Transnationalism

in *Contemporary European History* , Volume 14 - Issue 04 - November 2005 , pp. 421 - 439

This article offers an introduction to the essays in the theme issue, an overview of the reasons behind the recent resurgence of interest in transnationalist phenomena and a consideration of what the term means. It places the topic in the different fields of international, world, regional, local and national history. The essay argues that transnationalism is best understood not as fostering bounded networks, but as creating honeycombs, a structure that sustains and gives shapes to the identities of nation-states, international and local institutions, and particular social and geographic spaces. A honeycomb binds, but it also contains hollowed-out spaces where organisations, individuals and ideas can wither away to be replaced by new groups, people and innovations.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Della Porta Donatella

Democrazia in movimento: partecipazione e deliberazione nel movimento “per la globalizzazione dal basso”

in *Rassegna italiana di sociologia*, n. 2 , 307 - 344

No abstract available



Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Sassen Saskia

Die entfesselte Exekutive - Globalisierung und liberaler Staat

in *Blätter für deutsche & internationale Politik*, April, 2005

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Montout Sylvie, Zitouna Habib

Does NorthSouth Integration Affect Multinational Firms' Strategies?

in *Review of International Economics*, August 2005 - Vol. 13 Issue 3 , Page 485

This paper aims to develop a theoretical model that shows how a firm's decision to make a foreign direct investment is influenced by a NorthSouth regional economic integration. Our results suggest that tariff-jumping and export-platform strategies depend on a tradeoff between variable trade costs and fixed costs, in addition to wage differences.

Furthermore, insiders may affect the strategic location of outsiders by dampening the market accessibility advantages induced by the trade liberalization process, which results in an eviction of the outsiders from the area. This effect, however, depends heavily on the level of fixed costs. Indeed, a decrease in the costs of implanting in the low-wage country gives the insiders a first-mover advantage that allows them to later evict their competitors.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Poblete Juan

Dossier: Los Latino Americanos en una perspectiva global-hemisférica

in *Iberoamericana. America Latina – España – Portugal*, n. 17 , 87-195

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Chang Yuan-Ching

Economic Interdependence and International Interactions: the Impact of Market Power on Dyadic Conflict and Cooperation

in *South African Journal of Economics (The)*, September 2005 - Vol. 73 Issue 3 , 426



This article presents a theoretical approach to analysing how a country with market power could affect international relations. The liberal view and trade-conflict model claim that if countries seek to protect their trade gains, trade will reduce conflict between pairs of countries, designated "actors" and "targets". The main purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of market power on the gains from trade. Once the distribution of trade gains is changed between countries, the conflict and cooperation relationships between countries will also alter. We apply the trade-conflict model to derive two propositions as follows: (1) the more monopoly power over exports a monopolistic target has, the greater the amount of actor-to-target conflict; (2) the more monopsony power over imports a monopolistic target has, the greater the amount of actor-to-target conflict. To summarise, these hypotheses will predict that a country with market power reaps the gains from trade and will exhibit less conflict and more cooperation, whilst the country that is exploited will exhibit more conflict and less cooperation.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Bond Eric W., Jones Ronald W., Wang Ping

Economic Takeoffs in a Dynamic Process of Globalization

in Review of International Economics, February 2005 - Vol. 13 Issue 1 , p. 1

The paper develops a dynamic general-equilibrium framework to illustrate that trade liberalization may speed up the process of globalization and industrialization by enabling a small open economy to reallocate production factors to modern export sectors where increasing returns to experience are present. The authors emphasize the role of knowledge in service activities related to the export of modern sector goods, which has the form of a public good that can be utilized in exporting of other modern sector goods. As a consequence of this knowledge accumulation, the economy begins to take off and exhibits more rapid rates of wage and output growth. The accumulation of knowledge also shifts comparative advantage in the modern sector to more service-intensive goods, thus leading to a natural evolution of comparative advantage. These results lend theoretical support to the different development experiences in the 1960s between East Asia and Latin America

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Sugden Roger, Wilson James R.

Economic globalisation: dialectics, conceptualisation and choice

in Contributions to Political Economy, 24 (1) , 13-32

This paper provides an analytical foundation for use of the term 'globalisation' when examining processes of economic development. A meeting ground is suggested for those that argue in favour of globalisation and those that are often, but in our view inappropriately, labelled as 'anti-globalisation'. We see economic globalisation as a process in which new technologies and a new geography imply the possibility of strategic decisions that result in alterations to the prospects for, and forms of, economic development. A spectrum of possibilities for different forms of globalisation is identified, focusing in particular on 'elite globalisation' and 'democratic globalisation'.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process



Fred Dallmayr

Empire or cosmopolis? Civilization at the crossroads

in *Globalizations* , Vol. 2, n. 1, May , 14-30

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Ehrmann Michael, Fratzscher Marcel

Equal Size, Equal Role? Interest Rate Interdependence Between the Euro Area and the United States

in *Economic Journal*, October 2005 - Vol. 115 Issue 506 , 928

This article investigates whether the degree of interdependence between the US and the euro area has changed with EMU by analysing the effects of monetary policy and macroeconomic news on daily interest rates in the two economies. The article finds a strongly increased interdependence of money markets around EMU. Spillover effects from the US to the euro area remain stronger than in the opposite direction, but US markets have started reacting to euro area developments. In recent years certain US macroeconomic news affect euro area money markets and have become good leading indicators for the euro area.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Ruddy Thomas F.

Europe's global responsibility to govern trade and investment sustainably: climate, capital, CAP and Cotonou

in *International Journal of Sustainable Development*, Volume 8, Numbers 1-2 , pp. 97-112

This paper examines the progress made towards forging a Sustainable Development Strategy of the European Union on the basis of three structures of the global economy: Trade, Investment and Knowledge Generation. It identifies deficits in all three, and cites alternatives for improvement such as acknowledging ecological debt and setting up a Global Marshall Plan. It outlines how, over the medium term, compatibility with trade law could be maintained, and how Sustainability Impact Assessments (SIA) could cushion the effects of the current governance regimes. It then considers alternatives such as encouraging the EU's African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) partners to form Regional Trade Areas among themselves. Guidance is given regarding reform of the Common Agricultural Policy and the question as to whether the investment regime can be governed multilaterally and, if so, at which venue.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Moses Jonathon W.

Exit, vote and sovereignty: migration, states and globalization

in *Review of International Political Economy*, Volume 12, Number 1 / February , 53-77

In this article I introduce a framework for understanding the political effects of globalization on labor. While the globalization literature is rife with references to the effects of sovereignty from global trade and capital networks, there is



surprisingly little written about the effects of increased labor mobility on national sovereignty. To fill this void, I adapt Albert Hirschman's (1970) model to examine how exit might affect national voice in the context of free international migration. This adapted framework generates concrete expectations about how increased mobility affects both internal and external conceptions of sovereignty. In particular, increased mobility is shown to improve the responsiveness of governments to citizen demands. Thus, in contrast to the general consensus that labor/voters benefit least from increased globalization, I suggest that the problem facing labor is not globalization, per se. In a world characterized by relatively free mobility for other factors of production (and their owners), labor/voters appear to be handicapped by being prisoners of territory.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Lane Philip R., Milesi-Ferretti Gian Maria

Financial Globalization and Exchange Rates

in *IMF Policy Discussion Papers*, January, 2005

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Edwards Sebastian, Levy Yeyati Eduardo

Flexible exchange rates as shock absorbers

in *European Economic Review*, Volume 49, Issue 8, November 2005

In this paper we analyze empirically the effect of terms of trade shocks on economic performance under alternative exchange rate regimes. We are particularly interested in investigating whether terms of trade disturbances have a smaller effect on growth in countries with a flexible exchange rate arrangement. We also analyze whether negative and positive terms of trade shocks have asymmetric effects on growth, and whether the magnitude of these asymmetries depends on the exchange rate regime. We find evidence suggesting that terms of trade shocks get amplified in countries that have more rigid exchange rate regimes. We also find evidence of an asymmetric response to terms of trade shocks: the output response is larger for negative than for positive shocks. Finally, we find evidence supporting the view that, after controlling for other factors, countries with more flexible exchange rate regimes grow faster than countries with fixed exchange rates.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Feliu Laura

Global Civil Society Across the Mediterranean: The Case of Human Rights

in *Mediterranean Politics*, Volume 10, Number 3, November, pp. 365-383

The concept of global civil society began to be used regularly just a decade ago. Its formulation results from the



application of the civil society concept to transnational political processes. This article reviews the networks created in recent years in the field of human rights in the Mediterranean and investigates to what extent these are exponents of the emergence of an alleged global civil society. Links and exchanges between very diverse human rights advocacy groups have multiplied in recent years and transnational constituencies have been forged. But the existence of this 'global civil society' can hardly be identified as if it were a global player. It would be more appropriate to speak of the existence of parcels of an international (and internationalized) civil society.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Knight A.

Global environmental threat: can the security council protect our earth?

in *New York University Law Review* , Vol. 80 n. 5 , 1349 - 1385

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Sandoval Hernández Federico

Globalidad negativa y alternativas

in *El Cotidiano : revista de la realidad mexicana actual* , n. 129 , 22-28

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Singh Ajit

Globalisation And The Regulation Of FDI: New Proposals From The European Community And Japan

in *Contributions to Political Economy* , 24 (1) , 99-121

The key analytical and policy question examined in this paper is whether multinational companies and their overseas investment need to be regulated at the national and/or at the international level, in order to address market failures, and to enhance their potential contribution to world welfare. The paper examines, from a developing country perspective, two kinds of regulatory regimes: first, the current regime and second, a new regime proposed by the European community and Japan at the WTO (ECJ) to institute fresh global rules of the game which will effectively allow multinationals unfettered freedom to invest where they like, whenever they like, how much and in what products. The central conclusions of the paper are, first, that ECJ, despite its important concession of confining itself to only one source of external finance namely FDI, is a flawed proposal from the perspective of both developing and developed countries. Its shortcomings are particularly serious with respect to developing countries as it essentially ignores the developmental dimension altogether. Secondly, it is emphasised that although the current post-Uruguay Round FDI regime is to be preferred in relation to the ECJ, the former has, nevertheless, severe deficits from a developmental perspective. Thirdly, the paper suggests that instead of laissez faire, globalisation and integration of the world economy is more likely to be promoted on a sustainable basis by suitable national and international regulation of MNC activities and the incentive



structure facing their executives.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Ponzio, C.A.

Globalisation and Economic Growth in the Third World: Some Evidence from Eighteenth-Century Mexico
in **Journal of Latin American Studies** , Volume 37 - Issue - 03 august , pag. 437-467

This article studies the connection between globalisation and economic growth in eighteenth-century Mexico. This was a period of globalisation in Mexico, characterised by market integration and growth in international trade. I estimate economic growth at that time and explore its relationship with the dominant export of the epoch, silver. The results show that Mexico experienced rapid economic growth in the eighteenth century and, furthermore, that exports caused that growth. During the period of Bourbon reforms economic growth improved, but not dramatically. Mining ceased to be the engine of growth by the end of the century.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Busch Andreas

Globalisation and national varieties of capitalism: The contested viability of the 'german model'
in **German Politics**, Volume 14, Number 2, June , pp. 125-139

It is often argued that globalisation is eroding differences between national varieties of capitalism and enforcing convergence. This study takes up the debate – triggered by declining economic performance – about the viability of the 'German model' of a coordinated market economy, examining the arguments about its alleged seminal transformation over the last decade. It goes on to identify a number of flaws in the literature and questions whether the case for fundamental change in Germany has really been made in a credible and convincing way. In addition, it points to significant elements of continuity in areas such as industrial relations and emphasises the importance of political decisions in determining the fate of national economic models.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Dobson Andrew

Globalisation, Cosmopolitanism and the Environment
in **International Relations**, n. 3, vol. 19, september , 259-273

ABSTRACT: In this article the question of whether dialogic cosmopolitanism is an adequate normative response to globalisation is broached. First, a distinction is drawn between 'interdependence' and 'asymmetrical' analyses of globalisation, and a brief defence of the latter is offered. Asymmetrica globalisation is illustrated through environmental



examples. Second, dialogic cosmopolitanism is described. It is argued that the normative focus on unconstrained dialogue of this type of cosmopolitanism runs the risk of underestimating the significance of what 'subaltern' populations have already managed to say about their condition, even in less-than-ideal dialogic circumstances. This leads to the suggestion that in an asymmetrically globalising world, more justice as well as more unconstrained dialogue is what is required

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Dolezal Martin

Globalisierung und die Transformation des Parteienwettbewerbs in Österreich. Eine Analyse der Angebotsseite in Oesterreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft , 2005/2 , 163-176

This article is based on the assumption that globalisation leads to a reconfiguration of national societal conflicts. This thesis is analysed by exploring changes in party competition in Austria from 1975 to 2002. The parties' positions are derived from a quantitative content analysis of newspaper articles on election campaigns and - using the method of Multidimensional Scaling - subsequently represented in a political space. The analysis shows the changes of party competition and the parties' political offers for winners and losers of globalisation.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Hinojosa Martínez Luis Miguel

Globalización y soberanía de los Estados
in *Revista Electrónica de Estudios Internacionales*, Número 10/ 2005

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Hinojosa Martínez L. M.

Globalización y soberanía de los Estados
in *Revista Electrónica de Estudios Internacionales*, n. 10

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Rosenberg Justin

Globalization Theory: A Post Mortem
in *International Politics* , Vol. 42, n. 1, March , 2-74



'Globalization' was the Zeitgeist of the 1990s. In the social sciences, it gave rise to the claim that deepening interconnectedness was fundamentally transforming the nature of human society, and was replacing the sovereign state system with a multi-layered, multilateral system of 'global governance'. A decade later, however, these expectations appear already falsified by the course of world affairs. The idea of 'globalization' no longer captures the 'spirit of the times': the 'age of globalization' is unexpectedly over. Why has this happened? This article argues that 'Globalization Theory' always suffered from basic flaws: as a general social theory; as a historical sociological argument about the nature of modern international relations; and as a guide to the interpretation of empirical events. However, it also offers an alternative, 'conjunctural analysis' of the 1990s, in order both to explain the rise and fall of 'globalization' itself, and to illustrate the enduring potential for International Relations of those classical approaches which Globalization Theory had sought to displace.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Anupam Chander

Globalization and Distrust

in **Yale Law Journal (The)**, Vol. 114, n. 6, April , 1193-1236

There was a time when the critics of international law denounced it for its irrelevance, its masquerade of power. Now, in the post-ontological era of international law, the critique has shifted. International law is denounced not for its weakness but for its vigor, specifically its transfer of authority from local to international bodies. Critics find a "democratic deficit" in almost all international institutions—from the World Trade Organization to the International Criminal Court to even the World Health Organization. Critics also denounce U.S. courts for serving as vassals of international law through the jurisdictional grant of the Alien Tort Statute. Three decades ago, the Warren Court's constitutional pronouncements overruling the judgments of the American people were similarly decried as judicial usurpation. John Hart Ely's legal process classic, *Democracy and Distrust*, rescued the judiciary from illegitimacy.

Today's democratic deficit is yesterday's countermajoritarian difficulty. This article tests the transnational legal process against Ely's vision of democracy. Three case studies anchor the inquiry: (1) *Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain*, the Supreme Court's recent decision regarding the application of international law in U.S. courts; (2) the online gambling claim brought by Antigua and Barbuda against the United States in the World Trade Organization; and (3) the International Monetary Fund's intervention in Indonesia at the height of the Asian financial crisis. Through these studies, I demonstrate that the transnational legal process operates through (and is consistent with) national democratic processes, permitting review, revision, and rejection through such processes. Furthermore, the part of international law that purports to be superconstitutional—*jus cogens*—can be seen as representation reinforcing, supplying minority protections in a world that has sadly come to see the need for them.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Megill Allan

Globalization and the History of Ideas



in *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Volume 66, Number 2, April , pp. 179-187

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Schneewind Jerome B.

Globalization and the History of Philosophy

in *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Volume 66, Number 2, April , pp. 169-178

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Ripsman Norrin M., Paul T.V.

Globalization and the National Security State: A Framework for Analysis

in *International Studies Review*, issue 2, vol. 7, june , 199-228

ABSTRACT: A growing body of scholarly literature argues that globalization has weakened the national security state. In this essay, we examine the globalization school's main propositions by analyzing the national security strategies of four categories of states: (1) major powers, (2) states in stable regions, (3) states in regions of enduring rivalries, and (4) weak and failed states. We conclude that the globalizations school's claims are overstated given that states of all types pursue more traditional security policies than they would expect. To the extent that globalization has affected the pursuit of national security, it has done so unevenly. States in stable regions appear to have embraced the changes rendered by globalization the most, states in regions of enduring rivalries the least. Although the weak and failed states also show signs of having been affected by globalization, many of the "symptoms" they manifest have more to do with internal difficulties than external challenges.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Ripsman Norrin M., Paul T. V.

Globalization and the National Security State: A Framework for Analysis

in *Review of International Studies (The)*, Volume 7, Issue 2, June , 199-228

A growing body of scholarly literature argues that globalization has weakened the national security state. In this essay, we examine the globalization school's main propositions by analyzing the national security strategies of four categories of states: (1) major powers, (2) states in stable regions, (3) states in regions of enduring rivalries, and (4) weak and failed states. We conclude that the globalizations school's claims are overstated given that states of all types pursue more traditional security policies than they would expect. To the extent that globalization has affected the pursuit of national security, it has done so unevenly. States in stable regions appear to have embraced the changes rendered by globalization the most, states in regions of enduring rivalries the least. Although the weak and failed states also show



signs of having been affected by globalization, many of the "symptoms" they manifest have more to do with internal difficulties than external challenges.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Rudra Nita

Globalization and the Strengthening of Democracy in the Developing World
in *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 49, Issue 4 , 704-730

Scholars and policy makers have long assumed that trade and financial liberalization encourages developing countries to become more democratic; yet no one has developed formal hypotheses about the causal relationship between globalization and democracy. This article shows that these two trends are indeed related, but not necessarily in the direct manner that has commonly been postulated. Combining theories of embedded liberalism and conflict-based theories of democracy, the model presented here depicts the process that affects decisions to strengthen democracy as trade and capital flows increase. I argue that increasing exposure to international export and financial markets leads to improvements in democracy if safety nets are used simultaneously as a strategy for providing stability and building political support. Empirical evidence is provided by econometric analysis covering 59 developing countries for the time period 1972–97.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Rudra N.

Globalization, Democracy, and Effective Welfare Spending in the Developing World
in *Comparative Political Studies* , Vol. 38 n. 9 , 1015-1049

The literature on the effects of globalization on social policy and welfare, and the parallel literature on the effects of democracy, operate in mutual isolation to a surprising degree. This article extends the debate on the welfare state in the developing world by examining the social policy reactions of democratic and authoritarian governments to globalization. Using unbalanced panel data on 57 developing nations, and considering social security and health and education spending, the authors examine whether democratic and authoritarian regimes exhibit similar or different social spending priorities in the context of increasing economic openness. The results show that social spending in "hard" authoritarian regimes is more sensitive to the pressures of globalization than in democratic or intermediate regimes.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Gizelis Theodora-Ismene

Globalization, Integration, and the European Welfare State
in *International Interactions*, n. 2, vol. 31, april-june , 139-162

ABSTRACT: This paper considers three challenges to the mature European welfare states posed by economic and



social integration, demographic changes, and the alleged decline of state capacity in the form of fiscal extraction in an era of globalization. I argue that the experiences of the older member states in the European Union are difficult to reconcile with the common assertions that globalization necessarily leads to a “race to the bottom” where welfare spending is downsized to the lowest common denominator. I develop a set of hypotheses on plausible linkages between demographic challenges, globalization, political capacity, and welfare spending, and test the propositions in an empirical analysis of 14 European Union member states from 1983 to 1998. My empirical results suggest that economic integration does not pose a threat to European welfare states. Rather, demographic changes such as low fertility rates and the aging of the population and their political implications for political leaders’ incentives are more serious challenges for the continuation of the welfare state in Europe.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Putzel James

Globalization, Liberalization, and Prospects for the State

in *International Political Science Review* , n. 1, vol. 26, january , 5-16

ABSTRACT: Patterns of globalization and liberalization need to be examined in light of their political consequences, especially in the context of situations of state collapse and violent conflict. Champions of globalization can be divided into two camps – the advocates of economic liberalization and the promoters of global governance. They share a common skepticism of the state, which ignores both the developmental lessons of history and the perverse impact liberalization has had on peace and security. While liberalization has transformed the terrain of politics, privileging a form of semi-democracy, problems of violent conflict highlight the urgent need for the reconstitution of modern states in the developing world.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Traca Daniel A.

Globalization, Wage Volatility, and the Welfare of Workers

in *Review of International Economics*, May 2005 - Vol. 13 Issue 2 , Page 237

This paper analyzes the effects of trade liberalization on the level and volatility of factor returns, in a model with identical technologies across industries and industry-specific uncertainty. The results show an increase in the return to capital and, under certain conditions, a decline in the real wages and welfare of workers, along with an expansion of wage dispersion and volatility. Unlike the SolperSamuelson mechanism, our results do not depend on the factor intensity of imports and exports and are borne out by all patterns of trade, including among industrialized countries, suggesting that the traditional analysis has missed some important linkages between trade and wages.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations



Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Ethier Wilfred J.

Globalization, globalisation: Trade, technology, and wages

in *International Review of Economics and Finance*, Volume 14 number 3 , 237-258

Abstract

I address a complex of globalization issues: the effect of globalization on the skill premium; on unemployment; on the ability of national governments to conduct independent social policies; the relative importance of globalization and exogenous technical change. A large empirical literature concludes that trade has played a relatively minor role, relative to skill-biased technical change, in the rise of the skill premium. This paper replaces the Stolper–Samuelson theorem's focus on inter-sectoral with attention to intra-sectoral relations between inputs. Specifically, I assume out-sourcing and unskilled labor are highly substitutable, equipment and skilled labor are complementary, production methods are flexible, and that the country undertaking out-sourcing has a significantly different structure from that providing it. Globalization then offers a simple and immediate possible explanation for prominent stylized facts regarding the skill premium and the presence of skill-biased technical change.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Ben Rosamond

Globalization, the ambivalence of European integration and the possibilities for a post-disciplinary EU studies

in *Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research*, Volume 18, Number 1 / March , 23-43

Using the work of Manuel Castells as a starting point, this article explores the ambivalent relationship between globalization and European integration and the variety of ways in which the mainstream political science of the EU has attempted to deal with this issue. The analysis here suggests that various 'mainstreaming' disciplinary norms induce types of work that fail to address fully the somewhat paradoxical and counter-intuitive range of possible relationships between globalization and European integration. The article explores critically four possible analytical ways out of this paradox--abandonment of the concept of globalization, the development of definition precision in globalization studies, the reorientation of work to focus on globalization as discourse, and inter- and post-disciplinarity. The argument suggests that orthodox discussions of the relationship require a notion of social geography that sits at odds with much of the literature on globalization and while greater dialogue between disciplines is to be welcomed, a series of profound epistemological questions need to be confronted if studies of the interplay between global and social process are to be liberated from their disciplinary chains.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Moshe Syrquin

Globalization: Too Much or is it too Little?

in *Economia Politica*, Fascicolo 1



No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Birdsall Nancy, Rodrik Dani, Subramanian Arvind

How to Help Poor Countries

in **Foreign Affairs**, July/August - Vol 84, Number 4, 2005

Increasing aid and market access for poor countries makes sense but will not do that much good. Wealthy nations should also push other measures that could be far more rewarding, such as giving the poor more control over economic policy, financing new development-friendly technologies, and opening labor markets.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Manfred B. Steger

Ideologies of globalization

in **Journal of Political Ideologies** , Volume 10, Number 1 / February , 11-30

Taking issue with Michael Freeden's sceptical assessment that 'it is far too early to pronounce on globalism's status as an ideology', this article seeks to establish that globalism not only represents a set of political ideas and beliefs coherent enough to warrant the status of a new ideology, but also constitutes the dominant ideology of our time against which all of its challengers must define themselves. After drawing careful analytic distinctions between often-conflated terms involving the concept of 'globalization', the main section of this article relies on three criteria suggested by Freeden to assess the ideological maturity of globalism. It is proposed that its conceptual structure be disaggregated not merely into core, adjacent, and peripheral concepts, but--perhaps more dynamically--into a set of six core claims that play crucial semantic and political roles. With regard to semantics, this article argues that these claims absorb and rearrange bits and pieces of several established ideologies and integrate them with new concepts into a hybrid meaning structure of genuine novelty. Their political role consists chiefly in preserving and enhancing asymmetrical power structures that benefit particular social groups. The article ends with a short experimental 'thought exercise' designed to bring the insights gained from my critical analysis of globalism to bear on the necessary project of reclassifying conventional political belief systems.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Stewart R. B.

Il diritto amministrativo globale

in **Rivista trimestrale di diritto pubblico**, n. 3 , 633 - 640

No abstract available



Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Lacher Hannes

International transformation and the persistence of territoriality: toward a new political geography of capitalism
in *Review of International Political Economy*, Volume 12, Number 1 / February , 26-52

Starting from the premise that the proper foundation for the historicisation of international systems lies in the delineation of the prevailing social property relations of an epoch, my paper seeks to conceptualise the international relations of capitalist modernity. This endeavour, however, runs into problems when no conceptual basis in capitalist social relations can be spelled out that would specify clearly why capitalism needs an interstate system. Turning to history, I find that the emergence of territorial statehood in fact preceded the rise of capitalism. This then leads me to ask in what way the transition to capitalism in the 19th century transformed the content of international relations – but also, conversely, what the reproduction of the territorial form in this transition means for the development of capitalist societies. Finally, I will ask whether the current process of globalisation entails the restructuring of political space in line with the inherently global nature of capital. Has capitalism, in other words, ‘worked its way through’ to the international system and finally, after a 200-year long transitional period, subsumed ‘the international’ under its own global logic?

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Dunning John H.

Is global capitalism morally defensible?

in *Contributions to Political Economy*, 24 (1) , 135-151

This article first makes the case for responsible global capitalism, and the role of belief systems in advancing or inhibiting economic efficiency and socially acceptable behaviour. It then goes on to illustrate how the content and effectiveness of three contemporary elements of the global economy, viz, corporate social responsibility, the achievement of the millennium development goals and the opening up of centrally planned economies to market forces, are being, or might be, effected by the appropriate ‘bottom up’ and ‘top down’ incentive structures and enforcement mechanisms devised by the society of which they are part.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Bagnasco Arnaldo

Isole nella corrente: regioni e città nel processo di globalizzazione

in *Mulino (il)*, n. 1, gennaio-febbraio, 2005 , 157-164

ABSTRACT: I processi di globalizzazione mettono in questione vecchi assetti dell'organizzazione sociale nello spazio. Lo stato nazionale è in difficoltà, città e regioni stanno tornando sulla scena: il mondo è pieno di amalgama territoriali di economia e società in cerca di rappresentanza politica. Potenziare le capacità strategiche dei sistemi locali è una grande opportunità per le politiche nazionali di sviluppo.



Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Restrepo M.L. A.

La globalización de la economía, el crimen y la seguridad

in *Análisis político* , n. 53

This writing offers a general mark of reading that provides some approaches on two topics that they occupy today the center of the regional concerns and they generate geopolitical tensions in the hemisphere: the economic globalization and their hemispheric concrete expression, the Area of Free Trade of America (ALCA), and the global strategy of Washington against the international terrorism and their repercussions in Colombia and the continent. So much in the commercial topic as mainly in that of the security, Colombia occupies a significant place in the hemispheric mark. In that sense, the article carries out a review around the contexts that surround to the country in the external plan: the strategy that Brazil advances with an eye toward the ALCA, Chávez's Venezuela, the Plan Colombia and the doctrine Bush, of preventive "war against the international terrorism.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Garapon Antoine, Guarnieri Carlo

La globalizzazione giudiziaria

in *Mulino (il)*, n. 1, gennaio-febbraio, 2005 , 165-176

ABSTRACT: Che il tema della globalizzazione arrivi a toccare anche l'amministrazione della giustizia non deve sorprendere. Se ci troviamo di fronte a un fenomeno che interessa, anche se in varia misura, tutte le società contemporanee, la giustizia non può certo starne fuori. Anzi, il suo ruolo cruciale, a cavallo fra politica, economia e società, la mette in prima fila.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

De Liso Nicola , Casilli Cosimo

La globalizzazione in una prospettiva tecnologico-istituzionale

in *Economia Politica*, Fascicolo 1 , 43-68

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations



Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Marcelli Fabio, Martone Francesco

La politica estera nel contesto della globalizzazione

in *Democrazia e diritto*, Anno XLIII, n. 1, 79-93

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Golub Philip S.

Le grand tournant de Washington

in *Monde Diplomatique (Le)*, juillet 2005, 1, 20 - 21

En recevant, le 20 juin, MM. Jean-Claude Juncker et José Manuel Barroso, délégués d'une Union européenne en crise, M. George W. Bush a affirmé : « Les Etats-Unis continuent d'apporter leur soutien à une Union européenne solide comme partenaire. » Par-delà les formules diplomatiques, l'administration américaine se débat dans ses contradictions, car son unilatéralisme économique, commercial et militaire se heurte à la réalité multilatérale de la planète. La santé économique de la première puissance dépend largement de l'épargne mondiale, mais les politiques de Washington, inspirées par sa suprématie militaire, contredisent le sacro-saint principe du libre-échange officiellement défendu. S'agit-il d'un tournant de l'histoire similaire à celui qui mit fin, entre 1880 et 1914, à la première phase de la mondialisation capitaliste ?

La mondialisation de la fin du XXe siècle, comprise comme l'unification de l'économie mondiale selon un paradigme libéral, semble aujourd'hui toucher à sa fin. Les symptômes en sont multiples : guerres impérialistes, montée des nationalismes, conflits commerciaux de plus en plus graves au sein et à l'extérieur du noyau capitaliste, turbulences sociales qui éclatent dans le monde entier. Cela dans un contexte de déséquilibres structurels de l'économie mondiale et d'accentuation des inégalités sociales tant à l'intérieur des pays qu'entre eux (1).

Ces tendances désintégratrices affaiblissent les modèles de coopération interétatique et les régimes de gouvernance qui sous-tendent l'ordre mondial. Elles reflètent la contradiction entre le caractère transnational de l'expansion capitaliste et la segmentation du système interétatique moderne selon des lignes nationales.

Cette contradiction n'est pas nouvelle. Au XIXe siècle, elle mit fin à la première vague de mondialisation qui suivit l'expansion coloniale occidentale, lorsque la conjugaison du nationalisme et du militarisme porta un coup fatal à l'ordre économique international dominé par la Grande-Bretagne et interrompit la longue période de paix postérieure à 1815 en Europe.

La montée d'un Etat allemand fort et militarisé, de même que les rivalités interimpérialistes finirent par compromettre définitivement la capacité de la Grande-Bretagne à « occuper le centre ». En perte de vitesse depuis les années 1880, les paradigmes qui prévalaient au milieu du siècle, à savoir le libéralisme économique et le libre-échange, s'effondrèrent lorsque l'Allemagne de Guillaume II visa l'hégémonie européenne en 1914. La première phase de la mondialisation occidentale, placée sous des auspices britanniques, prit ainsi fin dans une mer de sang.



Dans son célèbre ouvrage sur le déclin du libéralisme, la montée subséquente du fascisme et l'éclatement d'une nouvelle guerre mondiale, Karl Polanyi (2) montre comment la coopération capitaliste transnationale, incarnée par les réseaux paneuropéens de la « haute finance », à qui « il échut par détermination fonctionnelle d'empêcher les guerres générales », finit par succomber aux politiques de puissance nationales : « La puissance avait le pas sur le profit. Quelque profonde que fût l'interpénétration de leurs domaines, c'était en fin de compte la guerre qui dictait sa loi au commerce. » Malgré le niveau avancé de l'intégration économique européenne dans la seconde moitié du XIXe siècle, le tissu de l'interdépendance capitaliste fut pulvérisé par la vague montante du nationalisme.

Provoquée par les ravages d'un « marché s'ajustant lui-même », cette vague culmina avec le fascisme. En tant que phénomène général, le fascisme, qui écrasa le libéralisme et le socialisme, fut une « solution » mortelle et pathologique « à l'impasse dans laquelle s'était mis le capitalisme libéral », une réforme « de l'économie de marché réalisée au prix de l'extirpation de toutes les institutions démocratiques ». La société, selon Karl Polanyi, « prit des mesures pour se protéger » du « marché s'ajustant lui-même », institution qui « ne pouvait exister de façon suivie sans anéantir la substance humaine et naturelle de la société ». On opta ainsi pour des Etats militarisés forts et pour l'unification de la société derrière l'Etat (3).

Certes, l'histoire ne consiste pas en un éternel retour des mêmes phénomènes, mais l'hypothèse de Karl Polanyi fournit un cadre utile pour analyser les impasses de notre époque. De puissantes forces désintégratrices menacent l'édifice de l'actuel ordre libéral. Au niveau sociétal, le durcissement de la résistance sociale devant la compétition du « marché libre » se traduit à la fois par l'apparition d'un mouvement démocratique mondial de transformation sociale et par la montée de populismes autoritaires de droite. Au niveau du pouvoir d'Etat, la réaction la plus parlante a été le spectaculaire regain de nationalisme en Chine, en Russie, au Japon, en Europe (4) et ailleurs. Aux Etats-Unis, c'est le système capitaliste mondial, le nationalisme a pris une forme particulièrement exacerbée : celle de l'impérialisme.

Cette renationalisation de la politique mondiale marque la fin de l'interlude libéral de l'après-guerre froide. Beaucoup ont pensé à la fin des années 1980 et dans les années 1990 que l'apparition d'un « village mondial » (la révolution informatique permettant de compresser le temps et l'espace), la transnationalisation du capital et la création de réseaux de production horizontaux planétaires allaient mener à une redistribution du pouvoir des acteurs publics vers les acteurs privés, et à « la disparition progressive de l'Etat territorial moderne comme lieu premier du pouvoir mondial (5) ».

Les théoriciens libéraux démocrates ont estimé que nous étions désormais entrés dans une période post-moderne où l'Etat-nation était remis en cause d'une double manière : d'en bas, par une société civile forte d'un nouveau pouvoir et, d'en haut, par des marchés mondialisés autonomes. La période post-moderne transformait également la grammaire de la politique mondiale : dès lors que l'interdépendance créée par les marchés mondiaux et les acteurs transnationaux freinait les impulsions belligérantes de l'Etat-nation moderne, le « pouvoir fondé sur la persuasion » (soft power) supplantait le « pouvoir fondé sur la force » (hard power). L'opinion libérale démocratique rassemblait aussi bien les institutionnalistes préconisant une coopération interétatique renforcée que les pacifistes commerciaux voyant dans un renforcement de l'interdépendance et de la convergence économiques le fondement d'une paix démocratique durable. Le philosophe Jürgen Habermas, dans une perspective sociale, démocrate, pensait qu'on assistait à l'apparition d'une constellation favorable de forces capable de réaliser enfin le projet, issu des Lumières (Aufklärung), d'une paix kantienne fondée sur une « conception cosmopolitique du droit » transcendant le droit international (6).



Plus à gauche, les théoriciens néomarxistes réfléchissant sur la transnationalisation du capital, la reconfiguration de l'Etat et les nouvelles formes de gouvernance mondiale se sont posés la question de savoir si l'impérialisme représentait toujours une catégorie d'analyse utile. S'inspirant de la thèse de Karl Kautsky sur « ultra-impérialisme » (1914), selon laquelle la coopération capitaliste peut transcender les rivalités interimpérialistes provoquées par les poussées monopolistiques de l'Etat-nation et des cartels nationaux, un certain nombre d'intellectuels estimaient dans les années 1990 que le capitalisme tardif avait inauguré une ère postimpérialiste (7). Ils en voyaient les signes dans la formation d'une classe capitaliste transnationale aux intérêts mondiaux, consciente que ses intérêts transcendaient le cadre national territorial (8). L'impérialisme classique, ou la rivalité pour le monopole entre Etats-nations expansionnistes, n'était plus une option dans un système capitaliste interdépendant gouverné par des institutions supraétatiques qui reflétaient les intérêts communs de la nouvelle classe.

A la fin de la décennie, Tony Negri et Michael Hardt ont largement accrédité une version légèrement remaniée de cette hypothèse en formulant dans leur ouvrage *Empire* (9) le postulat méta-historique selon lequel l'empire contemporain n'est pas un faible écho des impérialismes modernes, mais une forme fondamentalement nouvelle de domination. L'empire, selon eux, avait coupé le cordon ombilical qui le reliait à l'Etat-nation et n'était plus délimité par un territoire : dépourvu de centre politique, le nouvel imperium global devient l'expression d'un ensemble géométrique de rapports de pouvoir et de domination créés par les marchés mondialisés à tous les niveaux de la vie sociale. En contraste avec les systèmes de domination verticaux et concentrés des anciens empires européens, le pouvoir, dans la nouvelle configuration mondialisée, est diffus, déconcentré et horizontal. Ce phénomène, à son tour, conduit à de nouvelles formes transnationales de résistance de la part des réseaux décentralisés : les multitudes. L'empire ainsi défini devient un royaume mondial sans limites et sans nom.

De manières différentes, donc, ces perspectives suggèrent toutes un changement d'époque, le passage de stratégies de maximisation de la puissance de l'Etat-nation moderne à une configuration postnationale, postmoderne de la globalité. Toutefois, au moment même où ces idées étaient formulées, des forces puissantes rongeaient secrètement les fondations fragiles de l'ordre mondial capitaliste libéral. Ces forces sont désormais clairement visibles.

Robuste nationalisme

La principale force perturbatrice est venue des Etats-Unis, qui, sous la présidence de M. George W. Bush, s'efforcent d'acquérir un monopole mondial. Il y a là une certaine ironie en ce sens que les Etats-Unis ont été le moteur et le principal bénéficiaire de l'intégration capitaliste et de l'économie de marché mondialisée dans les années 1990. La mondialisation a renforcé l'autonomie américaine, car « la mobilité croissante de l'information, de la finance ainsi que des biens et des services a libéré le gouvernement américain de ses contraintes tout en imposant des contraintes plus fortes à tous les autres pays (10) ».

Cependant, l'affirmation d'un « nationalisme (américain) robuste », ainsi que Samuel Huntington appelle le nouvel ethos des Etats-Unis, a fondamentalement bouleversé la trajectoire des affaires mondiales : la mondialisation libérale et l'interdépendance capitaliste ont été supplantées par une politique de puissance impériale affirmant comme telle. Tout comme Londres avait été au XIXe siècle le centre de l'expansion d'une économie de marché maintenue par un ordre politique et renforcée par des réseaux transnationaux ayant intérêt à ce que la paix



règne en Europe (11), la poursuite de la mondialisation au XXI^e siècle requiert de la part des Etats-Unis qu'ils continuent à soutenir à la fois un système de coopération institutionnalisée entre Etats et des régimes libéraux de gouvernance de l'économie mondiale.

Mais contrairement à la Grande-Bretagne, qui perdit le contrôle qu'elle exerçait, les Etats-Unis ont choisi de déconstruire le système institutionnel international. Comme écrit Stanley Hoffmann : « Les Etats-Unis veulent soit revenir aux conditions d'avant 1914 (...), ou alors, se considérant comme le gardien de l'ordre mondial, laisser les autres Etats supporter leurs contraintes actuelles en se réservant pour leur part le droit de choisir parmi les contraintes du droit et des institutions internationales celles qui servent leurs intérêts et de rejeter toutes les autres. » Dans les deux cas, il s'agit ni plus ni moins pour les Etats-Unis de déconstruire les cadres de la coopération multinationale mis en place après 1945 pour introduire « un peu d'ordre et de modération dans la jungle des conflits internationaux traditionnels (12) ».

Ce choix reflète les options et les intérêts du bloc de forces national-impérialistes qui est formé à droite pendant la guerre froide et est parvenu au pouvoir en janvier 2001. Comme écrit Stephen Gill, chercheur en relations internationales, ce bloc national est historiquement « lié au complexe de sécurité, aux secteurs protectionnistes en déclin et aux penseurs géopolitiques d'obédience réaliste (13) ». Il se distingue des forces transnationalisées plus cosmopolites au sein de la société américaine, notamment « des intérêts économiques (corporate interests) plus mondialisés ayant besoin d'avoir accès aux marchés et aux capitaux d'autres pays et dont l'identité par rapport à l'entité territoriale américaine est moins précise ». Ces derniers, comme leurs homologues du XIX^e siècle, sont des « capitalistes du grand large », pour reprendre l'expression de Fernand Braudel, dont les intérêts, dont l'existence même, dépendent de réseaux de coopération transnationale.

Alors que la composition et la politique de l'administration William Clinton reflétaient, du moins en partie, les intérêts de cette classe cosmopolite, réduite mais influente, l'élite de droite actuellement au pouvoir représente le complexe militaro-industriel, c'est-à-dire le secteur le moins autonome et le plus nationaliste de l'économie politique américaine. Le moins autonome, car, étant fondu dans l'Etat, son existence et son développement dépendent de l'Etat. Le plus nationaliste, car il cherche par définition à maximiser la puissance nationale. Ces deux fractions dirigeantes s'appuient chacune sur une large base sociale. Comme a clairement montré la répartition géographique du vote à l'élection présidentielle de novembre 2004, l'assise sociale des internationalistes libéraux est concentrée dans les zones urbaines côtières à forte densité démographique, alors que la principale base populaire du nationalisme et du militarisme se trouve dans les zones rurales, parmi les classes populaires et moyennes, au sud du pays.

Cette disparité sociologique se reflète parfois dans des différences de politique très marquées. L'équipe de M. William Clinton, par exemple, tenta de modifier l'équilibre institutionnel au sein du gouvernement en faveur du département du trésor et s'efforça avant tout de promouvoir les avantages comparatifs des secteurs les plus internationalisés du capital américain sur les marchés nouvellement mondialisés. En revanche, l'administration Bush n'a eu pour seul objectif, depuis qu'elle est en place, que de renforcer le « pouvoir par la force » du pays et de mobiliser les forces armées américaines afin d'établir un ordre mondial disciplinaire sous contrôle monopolistique. Comme Mme Condoleezza Rice indiquait clairement avant l'élection de 2000, le bloc de forces rallié à M. George W. Bush avait l'intention de se libérer d'une « communauté internationale illusoire » et de jeter bas le paradigme libéral en abandonnant la politique d'internationalisme hésitant des années 1990 pour le nationalisme, la force et la guerre (14).



La formation du bloc national-impérialiste se fit en trois grandes étapes. Tout d'abord, les partisans radicaux de la guerre froide réussirent en partie à saper la détente Est-Ouest au milieu des années 1970 (15). La nécessité de maintenir les alliances internationales de la guerre froide freina l'entreprise. Tenter de marquer un avantage unilatéral aurait menacé l'unité « occidentale » et compromis la légitimité américaine, déjà entamée par la guerre du Vietnam. Dans les années 1980, sous la présidence de Ronald Reagan, vint ensuite la « révolution conservatrice », accompagnant de la tentative, une nouvelle fois, d'affirmer la primauté américaine par la mobilisation militaire et l'unilatéralisme en matière de politique étrangère et commerciale. Enfin, troisième étape, la fusion qui opéra dans les années 1990 entre le néoconservatisme et le militarisme de la « ceinture de la Bible » (Bible Belt militarism) et qui entraîna la victoire de la nouvelle droite au Congrès en 1994.

La victoire des républicains se traduit par une campagne visant à affaiblir, voire à anéantir, les Nations unies et à renforcer l'autonomie américaine aux dépens de tous les autres pays. Rappelons que, pendant les années 1990, le Congrès américain, souvent allié à un Pentagone de plus en plus autonomisé par rapport à la présidence, refusa d'acquiescer les cotisations du pays auprès des Nations unies, imposa des sanctions économiques unilatérales contre trente-cinq Etats-membres de l'organisation, vota en faveur d'une législation extraterritoriale (lois Helms-Torricelli) enfreignant le droit international et refusa de ratifier des conventions internationales et traités sur le contrôle des armements de première importance (comme la convention d'Ottawa, de 1997, qui interdit la production, le commerce et l'utilisation de mines antipersonnel, et le traité global sur l'interdiction des essais nucléaires (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty)).

« Un succès catastrophique »

Bien qu'il ait ratifié la convention sur les armes chimiques en 1997, le Congrès américain a fait en sorte d'y introduire des dérogations qui vident cet instrument de sa substance. Début 2001, l'administration Bush reniait le protocole de Kyoto, signé par le président Clinton, rejetait un programme des Nations unies destiné à contrôler le commerce des armes légères, bloquait les efforts visant à ajouter un protocole de vérification à la convention relative aux armes biologiques et abandonnait purement et simplement le traité relatif aux missiles antibalistiques (ABM).

Cette campagne culmina en 2003, avec la guerre en Irak et des discours de légitimation vantant l'empire mondial. Aujourd'hui, malgré l'échec patent de cette aventure impériale (qualifiée de « succès catastrophique » par M. George W. Bush lui-même, et une crise de légitimité sans précédent, l'administration poursuit sa voie monopolistique. On en voit des signes dans plusieurs domaines (16), mais le phénomène se manifeste tout particulièrement dans la volonté américaine de plus en plus affirmée de parvenir à une suprématie militaire absolue et sans fin. Deux décisions gouvernementales récentes illustrent cette volonté : celle de développer des armes nucléaires miniaturisées de première frappe et celle d'adopter une stratégie spatiale dite de frappe globale (global strike). Ce programme de militarisation de l'espace doit être bientôt annoncé. Son objectif est d'établir et de maintenir une supériorité spatiale des Etats-Unis en les dotant de la capacité, à partir de l'espace, de « détruire des centres de commandement ou des bases de missiles n'importe où dans le monde (17) ».

Ces deux programmes s'inscrivent dans le droit-fil de la doctrine de la suprématie stratégique perpétuelle esquissée dans la stratégie de sécurité nationale de la Maison Blanche (2002), et de la reconfiguration des forces armées américaines à laquelle avait appelé auparavant Mme Condoleezza Rice afin de « faire face de manière décisive à l'apparition de n'importe quelle puissance militaire hostile (...) et de réagir de manière décisive aux régimes voyous et à la menace venant de puissances hostiles ».



L'un et l'autre menacent la stabilité du monde : le premier en encourageant la prolifération nucléaire, et le second en attisant une nouvelle course aux armements dans l'espace. Dans l'esprit de l'administration, semble-t-il, la Chine et la Russie, considérées comme futures puissances rivales respectivement régionale et mondiale, n'auront d'autre choix que de suivre le mouvement et de consacrer à des dépenses militaires des ressources, limitées, qui seront détournées de l'économie nationale, ou d'accepter la suprématie stratégique potentielle de Washington. L'interlude de coopération entre les Etats-Unis et ces deux pays dans le cadre de la « guerre mondiale contre le terrorisme » est terminé.

Il va de soi que chercher à obtenir le monopole est l'exact contraire de l'interdépendance. Les Etats-Unis représentant le centre du système capitaliste mondial, cette orientation a des conséquences planétaires, certaines manifestes, d'autres insidieuses. Ces effets perturbateurs gagnent l'économie mondiale. Les déséquilibres structurels au sein du système économique international se traduisent par la mise en place de dispositifs protectionnistes, la concurrence économique prenant la forme classique de conflits monétaires et commerciaux de plus en plus aigus entre pays et blocs rivaux.

Dans un monde pluriel, il est manifestement illusoire de songer à un monopole. Les Etats-Unis ont beau être le pays dominant du système international, ils sont pris, de plus en plus, dans les filets d'une dépendance qui est de leur propre fait : tout en contribuant à soutenir l'activité économique asiatique, le mode de consommation et le niveau de vie américains doivent, pour se perpétuer, absorber des volumes toujours plus importants de l'épargne mondiale (80 % à l'heure actuelle). Ce phénomène ne pourra pas durer.

Les réseaux transnationaux de coopération capitaliste, formels et informels, et les institutions supraétatiques de régulation du capitalisme globalisé construits ou renforcés au cours des années 1980 et 1990 se révèlent incapables de maintenir le système. Et, faute d'une autorité politique transnationale en mesure de renverser cette tendance désintégratrice, nous dérivons vers le désordre.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Hassner Pierre

Les ambiguïtés de l'ordre international

in *Esprit*, n. 318, octobre 2005

Comment comprendre la manière dont le système international se réorganise aujourd'hui ? Les États y jouent-ils encore un rôle ? Peut-on échapper au seul rapport de force ? Si bien des situations paraissent tragiques, il faut relever également des évolutions contradictoires qui échappent aux antinomies de la force et de la loi comme à celles de la domination et de la régulation.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Bruff Ian



Making Sense of the Globalisation Debate when Engaging in Political Economy Analysis

in *British Journal of Politics & International Relations* , Vol. 7, Issue 2, May , 261-280

This article assesses various contributions to the globalisation debate. It takes as its basis the split in the political economy literature between three 'waves' of analysis, and provides an overview of each in the first part of the article. A progression towards a more sophisticated understanding of 'globalisation' has taken place with the emergence of each wave, with the third wave representing the most refined account. The second section suggests neo-Gramscian theory can overcome the shortcomings of the otherwise praiseworthy third wave. In particular, the work of Stuart Hall is presented as appropriate for the study of globalisation, and political economy in general. The article concludes by calling for greater cross-pollination of ideas between the various critical theories of political economy.

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Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Foreign Policy & A.T. Kearney

Measuring Globalization

in *Foreign Policy*, Issue 148, May / June

The fifth annual A.T. Kearney/FOREIGN POLICY Globalization Index shows that global integration survived the turbulence of the Iraq war, a sharp economic downturn, and the failure of trade talks. Our ranking of political, economic, personal, and technological globalization in 62 countries reveals that the world is still coming together. Find out who's up, who's down, and how they got there.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Wolf Martin

Märkte, Demokratie und Frieden

in *Internationale Politik* , n. 3, 60. Jahrgang, März , 6-16

ABSTRACT: Kapitalismus funktioniert nicht ohne Freiheit. Globalisierung fördert Demokratie
Unser Wohlfahrtsstaat entstand durch die fördernde Kraft des Wettbewerbs, wird erhalten und gezähmt durch die Herrschaft des Rechts und basiert auf dem Respekt für grundsätzliche Werte. Er garantiert nicht nur Freiheit, sondern wirtschaftlichen Erfolg. Die Globalisierung erweist sich als größter Förderer von Demokratie, Wohlstand und Frieden. Deshalb brauchen wir mehr Globalisierung, nicht weniger.

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Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Champagne Helene

Peacebuilding: Toward a Global Ethic of Responsibility?

in *Peace, Conflict and Development*, Volume 6, Issue 6, January , pp. 31 (full text available on-line)



Full text available

<http://www.peacestudiesjournal.org.uk/docs/Ethic%20of%20Peacebuilding%20final%20version%20edited.pdf>

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Ikenberry G. John

Power and liberal order: America's postwar world order in transition

in *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, Volume 5, Number 2, August , 133-152

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Newell Peter

Race, Class and the Global Politics of Environmental Inequality

in *Global Environmental Politics*, Volume 5, Issue 3, August , pp. 70-94

The politics of natural resource access, control and exploitation assume fundamental relations of social power; they imply them and consolidate them. Environmental issues reflect broader patterns of domination and social exclusion at work in global politics which enable us to understand who benefits from the current distribution of environmental benefits and which social groups shoulder a disproportionate amount of the burden of pollution. The task, however, is not merely to identify those global structures that produce environmental inequities and injustices, but to show how, in some cases, those structures are supported and entrenched by the institutional configurations that we continue to assume and generating the solutions to environmental degradation. Towards this end, I connect debates about the global managerial class and critiques of the prevailing sustainable development historical bloc with more localized studies of the consequences of organized inequality and the strategies adopted by marginalized groups to contest their fate as victims of environmental injustice. Such an approach builds upon the project which Marian Miller began with her enquiries into the Third World in global environmental politics, emphasizing the importance of the global political economy in shaping those political relations. Political and social cleavages of race, class and gender are shown to be key to understanding the global organization of environmental inequality and justice, though it is the neglect of the first two dimensions, in particular, that forms the core concern of this paper. Their importance in understanding patterns of causation (distribution of benefit), process (access, voice, representation) and distribution (of harm) is highlighted through reference to a range of contemporary case studies in the global North and South.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Eizenstat Stuart, Porter John Edward, Weinstein Jeremy

Rebuilding Weak States

in *Foreign Affairs*, Jan-Feb. n.1/2005

The turmoil caused by weak and failing states gravely threatens U.S. security, yet Washington is doing little to respond. The United States needs a new, comprehensive development strategy combining crisis prevention, rapid response,



centralized decision-making, and international cooperation.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Sergiu Mișcoiu

Reinventing the international approaches to globalization: The Helsinki Process

in Globalizations, Vol. 2, n. 2, September, 274-282

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Hafner-Burton Emilie M.

Right or Robust? The Sensitive Nature of Repression to Globalization

in Journal of Peace Research, Volume 42, Number 6, November, pp. 679-698

A growing number of studies provide quantitative evidence that economic globalization encourages government protection of human rights: trade and investment advance civil and political rights and encourage governments to refrain from violations of the right to life, liberty, and the security of the person. Other studies provide evidence that globalization promotes government repression of human rights: the arbitrary arrest, torture, forced disappearance, or extra-judicial killing of citizens, activists, or dissidents by state security forces under the control of ruling state elites. This article employs a variant of Extreme Bounds Analysis in order to analyze the robustness of this growing body of important but contradictory inferences. It argues that (1) we can make robust empirical claims about the relationship between certain trade and investment indicators and government repression, but shows that (2) cumulative knowledge across studies nevertheless remains limited by the sensitivity of many indicators to conditioning sets of information. This problem stems from vaguely specified theoretical mechanisms linking economic processes to government repression and is of potentially great consequence for scholarship seeking to explain the causes of human rights violations, in particular, and the effects of economic globalization, in general.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Anson José, Cadot Olivier, Estevadeordal Antoni, de Melo Jaime, Suwa-Eisenmann Akiko, Tumurchudur Bolormaa

Rules of Origin in NorthSouth Preferential Trading Arrangements with an Application to NAFTA

in Review of International Economics, August 2005 - Vol. 13 Issue 3, Page 501

All preferential trading agreements (PTAs) short of a customs union use rules of origin (ROO) to prevent trade deflection. ROO raise production costs and create administrative costs. This paper argues that in the case of the recent wave of NorthSouth PTAs, the presence of ROO virtually limits the market access that these PTAs confer to the Southern partners. In the case of NAFTA, we find average compliance costs around 6% in ad valorem equivalent, undoing the tariff preference (4% on average) for a large number of tariff lines. Administrative costs amount to 47% of the preference margin. These findings are coherent with the view that NorthSouth PTAs could well be viewed like a principal-agent problem in which the Southern partners are just about left on their participation constraint.



Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Ferguson Niall

Sinking Globalization

in **Foreign Affairs**, March/April - Vol 84, Number 2, 2005

Could globalization collapse? It may seem unlikely today. Yet despite many warnings, people were shocked the last time globalization crumbled, with the onslaught of World War I. Like today, that period was marked by imperial overstretch, great-power rivalry, unstable alliances, rogue regimes, and terrorist organizations. And the world is no better prepared for calamity now.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

ato D.

Social production of representations of ideas of civil society. The role of transnational networks of local and global actors

in **Comparative American Studies**, Vol. 3 n. 4 , 470 - 494

In this era of globalization, the social production of social representations of ideas of civil society is related to processes that involve the participation both of local and/or national actors as well as of transnational actors. In an effort to understand how these processes occur, in this article I analyze the practices of multilateral banks, non-governmental agencies, and governmental, intergovernmental and para-governmental agencies from the United States and several European countries. I also analyze the practices of some local and national actors from Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Mexico and Venezuela.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Nimetz, Matthew

Southeastern Europe in the Age of Globalism

in **Mediterranean Quarterly**, Vol. 16 Nr 1, Winter , 16-32

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Richard N. Haass

Sovereignty

in **Foreign Policy**, Issue 150, September / October

Sovereignty—the notion that governments are free to do what they want within their own territory—has provided the



organizing principle of international relations for more than 350 years. Thirtyfive years from now, sovereignty will no longer be sanctuary. Powerful new forces and insidious threats will converge against it.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Hehir Aidan

**Structural Imperatives and The “Globalisation” of Human Rights
in Peace, Conflict and Development**, Volme 6, Issue 6, January , pp. 27

Full text available

<http://www.peacestudiesjournal.org.uk/docs/Globalisation%20of%20HR%20final%20version%20edited.pdf>

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Najjar Fauzi

**The Arab, Islam and Globalization
in Middle East Policy**, Volume 12, Issue 3, Fall

No abstract available

Excerpt at http://www.mepc.org/public_asp/journal_vol12/0509_najjar.asp

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Urry John

**The Complexities of the Global
in Theory, Culture & Society**, Volume 22, n. 5, October , 235-254

‘Complexity theory’ seems to provide some metaphors, concepts and theories essential for examining the intractable disorderliness of the contemporary world. Relations across that world are complex, rich and non-linear, involving multiple negative and, more significantly, positive feedback loops. This article shows how globalization should be conceptualized as a series of adapting and co-evolving global systems, each characterized by unpredictability, irreversibility and co-evolution. Such systems lack finalized ‘equilibrium’ or ‘order’; and the many pools of order heighten overall disorder. They do not exhibit and sustain unchanging structural stability. Complexity elaborates how there is order and disorder within these various global systems. The global order is a complex world, unpredictable and irreversible, disorderly but not anarchic.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Garten Jeffrey E.



The Global Economic Challenge

in *Foreign Affairs*, Jan-Feb. n.1/2005

Improving U.S. foreign economic policy after four years of neglect will require addressing a series of problems that, if left to fester, will have grave consequences for U.S. domestic interests and U.S. foreign policy as a whole. Above all, the second Bush administration must recognize that geopolitics and geoeconomics are deeply intertwined and must be managed accordingly.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Rajaagopal Balakrishnan

The Role of Law in Counter-hegemonic Globalization and Global Legal Pluralism: Lessons from the Narmada Valley Struggle in India

in *Leiden Journal of International Law*, Volume 18 (2005) Issue 3 , pp 345–387

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Howard-Hassmann, Rhoda E.

The Second Great Transformation: Human Rights Leapfrogging in the Era of Globalization

in *Human Rights Quarterly*, Vol.27 n.1February , 1-40

Whether globalization improves or undermines human rights is not a matter that can be observed in the short term. Globalization is the second "great transformation" spreading capitalism over the entire world. Many of its short-term effects will be negative. Nevertheless, its medium and long-term effects may well be positive, as it impels social changes that will result in greater moves to democracy, economic redistribution, the rule of law, and promotion of civil and political rights. Capitalism is a necessary, though hardly sufficient condition for democracy: democracy is the best political system to protect human rights.

This does not mean that the non-Western world will follow the exact same path to protection of human rights that the Western world followed. No international law obliged the West to protect human rights during its own era of economic expansion. Thus, the West could practice slavery, expel surplus populations, and colonize other parts of the world. Genocide and ethnic cleaning were not prohibited.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Williams Marc

The Third World and Global Environmental Negotiations: Interests, Institutions and Ideas

in *Global Environmental Politics*, Volume 5, Issue 3, August , pp. 48-69



Marian Miller provided an engaging and persuasive analysis of the role of Third World states in global environmental negotiations. While Miller focused on the strategies of individual states, this article examines the collective agency of the Third World in global environmental negotiations. The first part of the article explores the debates on the continuing relevance of the Third World as a concept, and contends that the Third World retains relevance in the context of global bargaining processes. The second part of the article highlights the role of ideas and institutions in the continued reproduction of the Third World as an actor in global environmental politics. The final part of the article explores the ways in which the negotiations on climate change have tended to reproduce a distinctive Southern perspective.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Coussy Jean

The adventures of a concept: is neo-classical theory suitable for defining global public goods?

in *Review of International Political Economy*, Volume 12, Number 1 / February , 177 - 194

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Ray Kiely

The changing face of anti-globalization politics: Two (and a half) tales of globalization and anti-globalization

in *Globalizations* , Vol. 2, n. 1, May , 134-150

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

von Hagen Jürgen, Zhou Jizhong

The choice of exchange rate regime: An empirical analysis for transition economies

in *Economics of Transition*, October 2005 - Vol. 13 Issue 4 , 679

We analyze the choice of exchange rate regimes of the 25 transition economies in Europe and the CIS after 1990. The empirical results show that the traditional Optimum Currency Area considerations provide relevant guidance for the regime choices in these countries. Moreover, regime choices are influenced by inflation rates, cumulative inflation differentials, and international reserves sufficiency. That is, macroeconomic stabilization and the ability to commit to exchange rate pegs also play important roles. Large government deficits have ambiguous effects; they increase the likelihood of moving from flexible to intermediate regimes as well as that of moving from fixed to intermediate ones.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Kopczuk Wojciech, Slemrod Joel, Yitzhaki Shlomo



The limitations of decentralized world redistribution: An optimal taxation approach

in *European Economic Review*, Volume 49, Issue 4, May, 1051-1079

A centralized scheme of world redistribution that maximizes a border-neutral social welfare function, subject to the disincentive effects it would create, generates a drastic reduction in world consumption inequality, dropping the Gini coefficient from 0.69 to 0.25. In contrast, an optimal decentralized (i.e., with no cross-country transfers) redistribution has a miniscule effect on world income inequality. Thus, the traditional public finance concern about the excess burden of redistribution cannot explain why there is so little world redistribution.

Actual foreign aid is vastly lower than the transfers under the simulated world income tax, suggesting that voluntary world transfers – subject to a free-rider problem – produces an outcome that is consistent with rich countries such as the United States either placing a much lower value on the welfare of foreigners, or else expecting that a very significant fraction of cross-border transfers is wasted. The product of the welfare weight and one minus the share of transfers that are wasted constitutes the implicit weight that the United States assigns to foreigners. We calculate that value to be as low as 1/2000 of the value put on the welfare of an American, suggesting that U.S. policy is consistent with social preferences that place essentially no value on the welfare of the citizens of the poorest countries, or that implicitly assumes that essentially all transfers are wasted.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Heikki Patomäki

The long downward wave of the world economy and the future of global conflict

in *Globalizations*, Vol. 2, n. 1, May, 61-78

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Gritsch Maria

The nation-state and economic globalization: soft geo-politics and increased state autonomy?

in *Review of International Political Economy*, Volume 12, Number 1 / February, 1-25

Many social scientists contend that the nation-state is experiencing a loss of power and autonomy in the era of economic globalization. In contrast, this article argues that as advanced capitalist nation-states actively promote economic globalization and its associated political institutions, they gain increased power and autonomy in this contemporary phase of their ongoing historical development. Economic globalization is theorized, first, as a 'soft' geo-politics, with which states use economic means to acquire international geo-political hegemony. More importantly, globalization represents a strategy with which advanced capitalist states – along with members of their capitalist classes – shift the politics of accumulation away from domestic citizenries to gain increased control over their political-economies and greater insulation from intra-national contestation. It is states' increased autonomy that provides them leverage to dissolve relationships of reciprocity, obligation, and shared determination that have embedded accumulation within the territorially rooted nation and that partly constitute the foundations of nation-hood and participatory citizenship. Individual states' ability to use globalization toward these ends depends upon their relative power within the inter-state system and



their indigenous subaltern groups' capacity to retain partial control over economic decision-making, through collective action.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Canzoneri Matthew B., Cumby Robert E. Diba Behzad T.

The need for international policy coordination: what's old, what's new, what's yet to come?

in *Journal of International Economics*, Volume 66, Issue 2, July 2005

The first generation of policy coordination models was introduced some 25 years ago; it provided a rationale for policy coordination, but the gains from coordination were generally thought to be small. Now, a new generation of policy coordination models is emerging, incorporating monopolistic competition and nominal inertia. Here, we examine macroeconomic interdependence and the scope for policy coordination in a tractable second generation model with two countries and multiple sectors. Initial calibration of the model suggests that second generation models may have more scope for policy coordination than did the first.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Ganesh K. Trichur

The new imperial conjuncture and alternative futures for twenty-first century global political economy

in *Globalizations*, Vol. 2, n. 1, May, 164-181

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Facchini Giovanni Willmannb Gerald

The political economy of international factor mobility

in *Journal of International Economics*, Volume 67, Issue 1 September 2005

We model the endogenous determination of policy towards international factor mobility. In a common agency setting, domestic interest groups bid for protection from the government and the incumbent politicians maximize a welfare function that depends both on domestic voters' welfare and contributions collected. We characterize equilibrium policies in the price space and show how the degree of complementarity among inputs determines the outcome. We establish a similar result for quotas, allowing for partial rent capturing. For the strategic environment under consideration, we also establish a general equivalence result between tariffs and quotas if capturing is complete.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

GOTHAM KEVIN FOX

Tourism from Above and Below: Globalization, Localization and New Orleans's Mardi Gras



in *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, Vol. 29 Issue 2

Scholars currently debate whether tourism is a force of standardization that eradicates local cultures and traditions or whether tourism is a force of heterogeneity that enhances place distinctiveness. This article uses a case study of the Mardi Gras celebration in New Orleans to explain the connections between global forces and local actions in the development of urban tourism. I argue that the globalization and localization of Mardi Gras are occurring simultaneously with the result being a mix of homogenizing and particularizing influences in New Orleans. I develop this argument by distinguishing between 'tourism from above' and 'tourism from below', a distinction that helps to explain how tourism can help undermine as well as promote local differences. 'Tourism from above' refers to the global level forces of commodification, standardization and rationalization that affect all cities. 'Tourism from below' refers to the ways in which local groups and individuals resist the homogenizing effects of globalized tourism and use tourism to anchor Mardi Gras in place and create new carnival traditions. Analysis of global-local connections in tourism provides an important opportunity for theoretical development and offers a unique perspective for understanding tourism as a process of globalization and localization.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Ornelas Emanuel

Trade creating free trade areas and the undermining of multilateralism

in *European Economic Review*, Volume 49, Issue 7, October 2005

This paper indicates that the consequences of regional trade agreements for the world trade system may be deceiving—an arrangement's apparent virtue may constitute the source of its drawback. In a model where governments have political, as well as economic, motivations, I show that a free trade area induces its members to reduce protection against the non-members, and to do so sufficiently deeply to generate overall trade creation. Trade creation amplifies the excluded countries' access to the integrating markets, but also reduces their extra gains from multilateral liberalization. Thus, trade creation can reverse the support of the excluded countries to liberalization on a multilateral basis. This is more likely to happen when governments outside the free trade area are more responsive to special interests.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Limão Nuno

Trade policy, cross-border externalities and lobbies: do linked agreements enforce more cooperative outcomes?

in *Journal of International Economics*, Volume 67, Issue 1 September 2005

We analyze whether linking international cooperation in trade policy to environmental policy (or other issues with nonpecuniary externalities) promotes more cooperation in both policies, or whether cooperation in one is strengthened at the expense of the other. In the context of self-enforcing agreements, we show that if the policies are independent in the government's objective function, then linkage promotes cooperation in one policy at the expense of the policy that is easier to enforce under no-linkage. However, if the linked policies are not independent and if these policies are strategic complements, then linkage can sustain more cooperation in both issues than no-linkage. The policies are strategic



complements only if (i) the production externality has cross-border effects; (ii) the weight on the externality cost is high; (iii) import competing lobbies are not "powerful".

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Rucht Dieter

Un movimento di movimenti? Unità e diversità fra le organizzazioni per una giustizia globale
in *Rassegna italiana di sociologia*, n. 2 , 275 - 306

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Lenzi Guido

Una etica internazionale fra ragion di Stato e sicurezza collaborativa
in *Rivista di Studi Politici Internazionali*, Volume 72, n. 4 , pp. 579-600

With the end of the Cold War, events have accumulated and accelerated, and international actors increased exponentially, but not dismissed the reasons and modalities of the international system devised in 1945, which needs to be rediscovered in order to develop a more widespread, even if diversified, consensus around 'cooperative security'. Good governance and a workable system of international relations imply broader participation, which in turn requires spreading the conviction that, in the present conditions of globalisation, ethics - i. e. compatible and convergent national behaviours - have become utilitarian for the entire diversified community of peoples and nations. Under such umbrella, idealists and pragmatists can and should come together, dispelling in their stride the mistaken assumption that a clash of civilisations is in the making.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Hanna Schissler

Weltgeschichte als Geschichte der sich globalisierenden Welt
in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, Band 1-2, 2005

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Helper Laurence R. , Slaughter Anne-Marie

Why States Create International Tribunals: A Response to Professors Posner and Yoo
in *California Law Review*, Vol. 93 n. 3 , 899 ss.

No abstract available



Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Spence Keith

World Risk Society and War Against Terror

in **Political Studies**, Volume 53, Issue 2, June , pp. 284-302

I interpret the 'war against terror', declared following September 11 2001, as adopting concepts drawn from the work of Ulrich Beck, as a projection of world risk society. Despite its global character, war against terror is constructed through outmoded vocabularies of national security and sovereignty, within which the reasoned negotiation of risk is marginalized. This exclusion contributes to the intensification rather than reduction of terror and terrorism. In so doing the moment of violence inscribed within the concept of the political resurfaces in the constitution of war against terror, Homeland Security, and the identities and anxieties that they reproduce. Contrary to Slavoj iek's claim that risk society is incapable of resolving the dilemmas that it exposes, Beck's approach cuts across established ideological and methodological boundaries, anticipating key transformations of discourse required to address the prevailing global predicament through the vocabularies and logic of cosmopolitan risk, rather than those of absolute security, terror and war.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Albuquerque Rui, Loayzab Norman Servénb Luis

World market integration through the lens of foreign direct investors

in **Journal of International Economics**, Volume 66, Issue 2, July 2005

This paper is motivated by the unparalleled increase in foreign direct investment to emerging market economies of the last 25 years. Using a large cross-country time-series data set, we evaluate the dependence of foreign direct investment on global factors, or worldwide sources of risk (i.e., factors that drive foreign direct investment across several countries). We construct a globalization measure that equals the share of explained variation in direct investment attributable to global factors. We show that our globalization measure has increased steadily for developing and developed countries. For the full sample of countries, the globalization measure rose by over 10-fold from 1985 to 1999. Furthermore, in recent years, developing countries' exposure to global factors has approached that of developed countries. Finally, our globalization measure correlates strongly with measures of capital market liberalization, supporting our hypothesis that increased market integration leads to a greater role for worldwide sources of risk. We discuss the implications of our results for public policies regarding capital market liberalization and policies directed at attracting foreign investment.

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Barry K. Gills

'Empire' versus 'Cosmopolis': The clash of globalizations

in **Globalizations** , Vol. 2, n. 1, May , 5-13

No abstract available



Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Aaron Koh

'Heteroglossic' Discourses on Globalization: A View from the 'East'

in *Globalizations* , Vol. 2, n. 2, September , 228-239

No abstract available

Section B) Global governance and international organizations

Subsection 5. The Globalization process

Pinilla García Alfonso

"La Aglobalización de la pobreza, la pobreza de la globalización": el reto inaplazable

in *El Cotidiano : revista de la realidad mexicana actual* , n. 129 , 29-37

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 1. Theory of regional integration processes

Farrell Henry , Héritier Adrienne

A rationalist-institutionalist explanation of endogenous regional integration

in *Journal of European Public Policy* , Volume 12, Number 2 / April , 273-290

What is at the basis of regional integration and what are the processes that drive integration? Why do integration processes develop faster in some issue areas than in others? These questions are at the heart of our own work, just as they are the driving concerns of Ernst Haas's version of neofunctionalism. While we, unlike Haas, emphasize endogenous processes of institutional change based on bargaining processes in a particular institutional context, rather than exogenously driven processes of technical needs and spillover, we believe that there is important overlap between our approach and Haas's, as well as areas of disagreement. By exploring these areas of overlap in this article, we hope – by focusing on bargaining processes – to empirically illustrate on the one hand how our approach may help to answer questions that Haas's version of neofunctionalism had difficulties with, and on the other how Haas's emphasis on epistemic factors can alleviate some of the blind spots in our own perspective.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 1. Theory of regional integration processes

Aubin C.

Biens publics et régionalisation

in *European Union Review*, Vol. 10 n. 1



Excludability plays a secondary role in the definition of a public good but it is of primary importance in the determination of the level at which it is offered. Hence, one may question the relevance of a regional area, uniting sovereign countries, as the right place to supply international public goods. Two complementary approaches are used to deal with this question. The first one reminds of the justifications that can be invoked from a normative point of view. The second one takes a positive point of view to outline further reasons that can explain the transfer of the supply of public goods from the national level to a higher regional level. As a complement, the analysis presents various types of institutional organisation that can be implemented to manage the supply of public goods at the regional level.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 1. Theory of regional integration processes

Ventura Deisy

Democratic Governance and Economic Integration : Comparative Views of Mercosur and the European Union in *Droit et société*, n. 59

In Europe, one does not call into question the tangible advantages of integration, but one dreads the creeping dissension between the system's evolution and the will of the people. With Mercosur, on the other hand, one increasingly wonders if its lack of legitimacy is not related to its weaknesses. The pact between citizen and government allows the confrontation or the minimization of the transnational concentrations of power, especially economic, which are often free from any regulation. It also can reveal the many « black boxes » of national bureaucracies that are hardly susceptible to needed cultural and methodological changes. Remarkable divergences and convergences emerge from the examination of the institutional parallel of governance in Mercosur and in the European Union.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 1. Theory of regional integration processes

Ruta Michele

Economic Theories of Political (Dis)integration in *Journal of Economic Surveys*, Vol. 19 Issue 1 , 1-21

This paper surveys the recent political economy literature on countries' incentives to form international unions and/or to disintegrate in smaller jurisdictions. The main factors that affect these incentives are (i) economic integration, (ii) the international order, (iii) international spillovers and (iv) the institutional setting. Some implications are drawn for the current debate in Europe on the political effects of economic integration, on the enlargement process and on the distribution of prerogatives between the European Union and national governments.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 1. Theory of regional integration processes

Ornelas Emanuel

Endogenous free trade agreements and the multilateral trading system in *Journal of International Economics*, Volume 67, Issue 2, December 2005



I evaluate in this paper the impact of free trade areas (FTAs) on the world trading system. I use an oligopolistic-political-economy model where the external tariffs of FTA members, as well as the decision to form FTAs, are endogenously determined. In this context, I show that FTAs are primarily beneficial to the multilateral trading system. This conclusion is based, first, upon the finding that FTAs induce their member governments to lower their external tariffs, and to do so deeply enough to enhance trade even between FTA members and non-members. While this ensures gains for the latter, in general FTA members may not gain. I show, however, that governments will endorse only welfare-improving arrangements, in spite of their political motivations; as a result, FTA members benefit from ratified arrangements as well. Finally, I find that FTAs, by reducing the role of special interests criteria in governments' trade regime decisions, also tend to enhance support for further liberalization at the multilateral level.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 1. Theory of regional integration processes

Philippe C. Schmitter

Ernst B. Haas and the legacy of neofunctionalism

in *Journal of European Public Policy* , Volume 12, Number 2 / April , 255-272

In Europe, the scholarly reputation of Ernst B. Haas is inseparably linked to the vicissitudes of something called 'neofunctionalism'. It is as the founding father of a distinct approach to explaining the dynamics of European integration that he is so well known. This article explicates the strengths and weaknesses of his contribution and explores some changes that should be inserted to make it more relevant to understanding the contemporary politics of the EU. It concludes that, while everyone recognizes that no single theory or approach can explain everything one would like to know and predict about the EU, a revised 'neo-neo' version may still be the best place to start.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 1. Theory of regional integration processes

Walter Mattli

Ernst Haas's evolving thinking on comparative regional integration: of virtues and infelicities

in *Journal of European Public Policy* , Volume 12, Number 2 / April , 327-348

Haas's work on Europe has been immensely influential, so much so that the study of European integration has long been synonymous with Haas and his intellectual legacy. His name, however, does not figure prominently in recent contributions to the rapidly growing field of comparative regional integration. In part, this is an oversight and thus unfortunate since several of his insights travel well and are quite relevant to present-day debates. However, it also is, in part, Haas's own fault. While his early work on European integration is of unmatched brilliance and depth, some of his later theorizing suffers from a series of methodological infelicities that have detracted from his fundamental contributions to comparative regional integration. This paper traces and critically assesses the evolution of Haas's thinking on integration with special focus on regions outside Europe.



Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 1. Theory of regional integration processes

Beck Ulrich

Europäisierung - Soziologie für das 21. Jahrhundert

in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, Band 34-35, 2005

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 1. Theory of regional integration processes

Jiandong Ju, Kala Krishna

Firm behaviour and market access in a Free Trade Area with rules of origin

in *Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue Canadienne d'Economique*, Volume 38, Number 1 , 290-308

We study a Free Trade Area with Rules of Origin and show that there are two distinct regimes. Comparative statics results for the two regimes are exact opposites and a regime switch occurs when ROO become restrictive enough. Consequently, imports into the FTA of the intermediate good first fall and then rise while the opposite pattern occurs for imports of the final good and for the price of the domestic input. We also show that tighter ROO have opposite effects on the well-being of final versus intermediate good producers and producers inside versus outside the FTA.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 1. Theory of regional integration processes

Harald Badinger

Growth Effects of Economic Integration: Evidence from the EU Member States

in *Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv)*, Vol. 141, No. 1

After compiling an index of economic integration that accounts for global (GATT) as well as regional (European) integration of the EU member states we test for permanent and temporary growth effects in a growth accounting framework, using a panel of fifteen EU member states over the period 1950--2000. While the hypothesis of permanent growth effects is rejected, the results---though not completely robust to controlling for time-specific effects---suggest sizeable level effects: GDP per capita of the EU would be approximately one-fifth lower today if no integration had taken place since 1950

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 1. Theory of regional integration processes

Thomas Risse

Neofunctionalism, European identity, and the puzzles of European integration

in *Journal of European Public Policy* , Volume 12, Number 2 / April , 291-309

This article concentrates on the relationship between neofunctionalist reasoning and the study of collective identities. Recent research confirms what Ernst B. Haas already knew in 1958, namely, that transferring loyalty to Europe and the EU is possible without giving up one's national (or regional or local or gender) identities. But preliminary results



challenge the assumption that the transfer of loyalties on to the European level simply followed from the material benefits received through European integration. At the same time, the evidence suggests that socialization into European identity works not so much through transnational processes or through exposure to European institutions, but on the national levels in a process whereby Europeanness or 'becoming European' is gradually being embedded in understandings of national identities. This latter reasoning also sheds light on the double puzzle of European integration, i.e. the persistent balance in the EU's constitution-building between supranational and intergovernmental institutions, on the one hand, and the lagging behind of foreign/defense affairs in European integration, on the other. If national processes and collective understandings are crucial to understanding the Europeanization of national identities, this will lead to uneven and varied degrees to which Europe can be embedded in collective identities. Federal states with respective constitutional traditions change their collective understandings more easily to include Europe and orientations toward supranationalism than unitary and centralized states.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 1. Theory of regional integration processes

Gráinne de Búrca

Rethinking law in neofunctionalist theory

in **Journal of European Public Policy** , Volume 12, Number 2 / April , 310-326

Haas's original neofunctionalist theory did not give express consideration to the role of law in the integration process. However, neofunctionalism had an intuitive resonance for legal scholars who generally assumed that law played an important part in advancing European integration. Political science scholarship which has addressed the role of law, on the other hand, has usually either (e.g. in neorealist accounts) taken law to be a functional tool serving the political process, or (e.g. in neofunctionalist analyses) examined only a limited dimension of law, focusing primarily on courts and on legal rather than political integration. However, a promising research agenda on the dynamics of European integration – examples of which, building on Haas's work, have recently begun to appear – could develop if legal scholars paid more attention to the empirical methodologies and explanatory theories of political science, and if political scientists adopted a less reductionist and more nuanced account of law.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 1. Theory of regional integration processes

Beeson Mark

Rethinking regionalism: Europe and East Asia in comparative historical perspective

in **Journal of European Public Policy** , Volume 12, Number 6 / December , 969-985

Regionally based processes of political and economic integration, security co-operation, and even social identification have become increasingly important and prominent parts of the international system. Nowhere have such processes gone further than in Western Europe. Somewhat surprisingly, similar patterns of regional integration have been steadily developing in East Asia – a region many observers consider unlikely to replicate the European experience. This paper uses an historically grounded comparative approach to examine the historical preconditions that underpinned the



formation of the European Union, and then contrasts them with the situation in East Asia today. While the overall geopolitical and specific national contexts are very different, such an analysis highlights surprising similarities and differences, particularly in the role played by the United States in both periods. A comparative analysis allows us to understand and rethink the incentives for, and constraints on, regional integrative processes.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 1. Theory of regional integration processes

Press-Barnathan Galia

The Changing Incentives for Security Regionalization

in Cooperation and Conflict, n. 3, vol. 40, september , 281-304

ABSTRACT: In this article I argue that the systemic shift to unipolarity has created an incentive to invest in security regionalization, both on the part of the American hegemon and on the part of the regional states. After defining what I mean by 'security regionalization', I examine the hegemonic incentives for encouraging the building of regional security institutions. Such institutions, I suggest, can advance its three main goals: to maintain regional stability, to maintain its unipolar position and to achieve system-maintenance at low cost. At the same time, regional states have increased incentives to invest in building regional security arrangements. Such arrangements, I suggest, are necessary should the hegemon choose to abandon them. They can also help prevent such abandonment by offering meaningful burden-sharing. They can serve as a 'pact of restraint' to restrain the hegemon, and finally they can be an avenue to a new division of labor. I apply this framework to the changes in security regionalization in Europe after the end of the Cold War (11/9 - beginning of the fall of the Berlin wall) and after the events of 9/11. I conclude by highlighting some of the tensions and paradoxes built into this security regionalization thesis.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 1. Theory of regional integration processes

Ben Rosamond

The uniting of Europe and the foundation of EU studies: Revisiting the neofunctionalism of Ernst B. Haas

in Journal of European Public Policy , Volume 12, Number 2 / April , 237-254

This article suggests that the neofunctionalist theoretical legacy left by Ernst B. Haas is somewhat richer and more prescient than many contemporary discussants allow. The article develops an argument for routine and detailed re-reading of the corpus of neofunctionalist work (and that of Haas in particular), not only to disabuse contemporary students and scholars of the normally static and stylized reading that discussion of the theory provokes, but also to suggest that the conceptual repertoire of neofunctionalism is able to speak directly to current EU studies and comparative regionalism. Neofunctionalism is situated in its social scientific context before the theory's supposed erroneous reliance on the concept of 'spillover' is discussed critically. A case is then made for viewing Haas's neofunctionalism as a dynamic theory that not only corresponded to established social scientific norms, but did so in ways that were consistent with disciplinary openness and pluralism.



Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 2. Cooperations and integration in Africa and in the Middle East

Olarreaga Marcelo , Özden Çağlar

AGOA and Apparel: Who Captures the Tariff Rent in the Presence of Preferential Market Access?
in *World Economy*, Volume 28, Number 1 , 63-77

The United States grants preferential (tariff- and quota-free) market access to a list of products from eligible countries in sub-Saharan Africa through the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). We analyse the increase in prices received by apparel exporters who benefited from AGOA preferences. In the presence of competitive markets, export prices should increase as much as the tariff which was previously collected by the US government. We refer to this price increase as the 'tariff preference rent' since exporters receive this income as the rent for their preferential status. The results show that exporters receive only one-third of this rent and smaller exporters receive less than larger and established ones. We then provide evidence that suggests this may be due to the degree of market power enjoyed by US importers when facing African exporters.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 2. Cooperations and integration in Africa and in the Middle East

Yang, Yongzheng

Africa in the Doha Round: Dealing with Preference Erosion and Beyond
in *IMF Policy Discussion Papers*, November 2005

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 2. Cooperations and integration in Africa and in the Middle East

Debrun, Xavier, Masson Paul, Pattillo, Catherine

Monetary union in West Africa: who might gain, who might lose, and why?

in *Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue Canadienne d'Economie*, Volume 38, Number 2 , 454-481

We develop a model in which governments' financing needs exceed the socially optimal level because public resources are diverted to serve the narrow interests of the group in power. From a social welfare perspective, this results in undue pressure on the central bank to extract seigniorage. Monetary policy also suffers from an expansive bias, owing to the authorities' inability to precommit to price stability. Such a conjecture about the fiscal-monetary policy mix appears quite relevant in Africa, with deep implications for the incentives of fiscally heterogeneous countries to form a currency union. We calibrate the model to data for West Africa and use it to assess proposed ECOWAS monetary unions. Fiscal heterogeneity indeed appears critical in shaping regional currency blocs that would be mutually beneficial for all their members. In particular, Nigeria's membership in the configurations currently envisaged would not be in the interests of other ECOWAS countries unless it were accompanied by effective containment on Nigeria's financing needs.

Section C) Regional integration processes



Subsection 2. Cooperations and integration in Africa and in the Middle East

Loot Elsabe

NEPAD and the capital flows initiative: can Africa walk the walk?

in **South African Journal of Economics (The)**, March 2005 - Vol. 73 Issue 1 , p. 1

In the 1960s and early 1970s the future of Africa looked bright and promising. Economic growth and development on the continent was considerably higher than in other developing regions. However, during the middle 1970s political instability increased and economic development started to deteriorate, both contributing to the marginalization of the continent. The continued marginalization constitutes a serious threat to the participation of Africa in the global economy. Nepad calls for a reversal of this process through a new partnership between Africa and the international community (Nepad, 2001: 1 and 2).

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 2. Cooperations and integration in Africa and in the Middle East

Bénassy-Quéré Agnès, Coupet Maylis

On the Adequacy of Monetary Arrangements in Sub-Saharan Africa

in **World Economy**, Volume 28, Number 3 , 349-373

We examine the economic rationale for monetary union(s) in Sub-Saharan Africa through the use of cluster analysis on a sample of 17 countries. The variables used stem from the theory of optimum currency areas and from the fear-of-floating literature. It is found that the existing CFA franc zone cannot be viewed as an optimum currency area: CEMAC and UEMOA countries do not belong to the same clusters, and a 'core' of the UEMOA can be defined on economic grounds. The results support the inclusion of the Gambia, Ghana and Sierra Leone in an extended UEMOA arrangement, or the creation of a separate monetary union with the 'core' of the UEMOA and the Gambia, rather than the creation of a monetary union around Nigeria. Finally, the creation of the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) around Nigeria is not supported by the data.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 2. Cooperations and integration in Africa and in the Middle East

Yehoue Etienne

On the Pattern of Currency Blocs in Africa

in **IMF Policy Discussion Papers**, March, 2005

This paper seeks to elucidate the debate over currency union in Africa. The paper examines whether empirical investigation points to the gradual emergence of currency blocs. Based on the historical data on inflation, trade, and the comovements of prices and outputs, I argue that the emergence of large-scale currency blocs in Africa will follow a gradual path and that this dynamic does not lead to the emergence of a single continental currency at this time. Rather, the pattern which emerges seems to suggest three blocs: one in West Africa, a second around South Africa, and a third in Central Africa. Although little evidence is found supporting the emergence of a single African currency at this time, the emergence of an African currency union is not necessarily precluded, since the ultimate decision to surrender a nation's monetary policy to a supranational institution is not made based solely on economic considerations. I then address the issue of a possible anchor for the union, were it to emerge and opt for an anchorage. I find- based on the trade criterion-that the euro seems to be a good choice.



Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 2. Cooperations and integration in Africa and in the Middle East

Irving Jacqueline

Regional Integration of Stock Exchanges in Eastern and Southern Africa: Progress and Prospects
in *IMF Policy Discussion Papers*, No. 05/122 June 2005

This paper assesses whether regional cooperation and integration of stock exchanges in eastern and southern Africa could offer a way of overcoming impediments to the exchanges' development. The paper concludes that regional cooperation and, at a later stage, integration, if carried out at the right pace and in a pragmatic way, could improve the liquidity, efficiency, and competitiveness of these exchanges. Further progress in developing national financial markets must precede any actual moves to integrate securities markets. These exchanges could meanwhile benefit from closer cooperation, including by encouraging more crossborder listings and information/technology sharing.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 2. Cooperations and integration in Africa and in the Middle East

Piesse Jennifer, Hearn Bruce

Regional integration of equity markets in sub-saharian Africa
in *South African Journal of Economics (The)*, March 2005 - Vol. 73 Issue 1 , p. 36

Equity markets in developing and emerging economies have grown in number and importance as a result of financial market globalisation. However, their role in economic growth and development is enhanced if nascent markets are integrated with well-established ones. Market integration, measured by the transmission of returns volatility, is identified across a sample of SSA countries, using a unique dataset. Evidence for potential integration between financial markets in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is found. Spillovers are found across markets, some unidirectional and others bi-directional. However, continued illiquidity and incomplete institutions indicate that an integrated financial community remains premature, and considerable regulatory reform and harmonisation will be necessary for this to succeed.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 2. Cooperations and integration in Africa and in the Middle East

van den Boogaerde Pierre, Tsangarides Charalambos

Ten Years After the CFA Franc Devaluation: Progress Toward Regional Integration in the WAEMU
in *IMF Policy Discussion Papers*, No. 05/145 July 2005

This paper takes stock of the achievements toward integration in the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) 10 years after the 1994 devaluation of the CFA franc. It investigates the lessons learned and evaluates progress toward economic convergence, examines the evolution of trade and competitiveness, and points to ways to remove impediments to greater integration. The paper concludes that a continued political commitment will be needed to overcome the important dissimilarities between WAEMU member countries that have limited the degree of convergence achieved to date, and to advance toward a full-fledged economic union.



Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 2. Cooperations and integration in Africa and in the Middle East

Van Der Mei A. P.

The New African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights: Towards an Effective Human Rights Protection Mechanism for Africa?

in *Leiden Journal of International Law*, issue 1 Vol.18 March , 113-129

This article offers an analytical overview of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the establishment of an African human rights court, which entered into force in January 2004. The article seeks to answer the questions of whether and, if so, to what extent the Protocol strengthens the African human rights protection system.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 2. Cooperations and integration in Africa and in the Middle East

Kirk Robert , Stern Matthew

The New Southern African Customs Union Agreement

in *World Economy*, Volume 28, Number 2 , 169-190

From its origins in 1910 the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) has been characterised by striking asymmetries in policies, levels of development and administrative capacity. Following the demise of apartheid in 1994, the five member countries (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland) began negotiations to reform the SACU. Eight years later, a new Agreement was signed in October 2002. In this paper, we outline the main characteristics of the 2002 Agreement and assess whether it addresses the criticisms of the preceding arrangement. Most importantly, the 2002 Agreement introduces shared decision-making and provides for a sustainable revenue-sharing arrangement. But varying levels of trade policy capacity along with policy divergences between the members present new challenges. Moreover, the exclusion of Services, Intellectual Property Rights and Singapore issues gives the 2002 Agreement a somewhat jaded appearance. Nevertheless, the reconstituted SACU could form the core of a larger regional customs union that would facilitate a realignment of the existing regional organisations. This will depend on the ongoing trade negotiations with both the EU and the United States. These negotiations will also put pressure on SACU to address excluded issues and reduce cross-border transaction costs in order to realise the benefits from economic cooperation.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 2. Cooperations and integration in Africa and in the Middle East

Michael Lizette

The contribution of CAFRAD to public administration in Africa

in *International Review of Administrative Sciences* , June 1 2005, Volume 71, No. 2 , 327-336

This article attempts to provide an analysis of the mission of the African Training and Research Centre in Administration for Development (CAFRAD). It presents an overview of the Centre's activities in training, research, consultancy,



information and publication, assesses its achievements and highlights the constraints which CAFRAD faced in the implementation of its work. The article concludes with the way forward and prospects for a better and stronger CAFRAD in the 21st century, one which will contribute effectively to the improvement of African public administration.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 3. Cooperations and integration in Central and North America

Ley-Borrás Roberto

**A Decision Analysis Approach to Policy Issues: The NAFTA Case
in Review of Policy Research**, Vol. 22 Issue 5

This article presents decision analysis concepts and tools that can help scholars and decision makers to get a better understanding of policy issues. It describes the structure of knowledge maps for representing uncertain elements in policy issues, and decision frames for uncovering the information elements behind conflicting positions and helps participants find a common ground for agreement. The article also presents the application of these techniques to issues arising from the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 3. Cooperations and integration in Central and North America

Gordon Mace, Hugo Loiseau

**Cooperative Hegemony and Summitry in the Americas
in Latin American Politics & Society**, Vol. 47, Nr. 4

As an instrument for governance, summitry is a novel structure for the management of contemporary hemispheric regionalism in the Americas. Such regionalism is a clear case of the "structuralist paradox" of international cooperation. This article attempts to explain the particular asymmetric regionalism in the Americas by using the concept of cooperative hegemony. The underlying hypothesis is that the U.S. government, since 1994, has pursued a strategy of cooperative behavior, at least in regard to power sharing, in two specific phases of hemispheric regionalism: agenda setting and institutionalization. This study tests the hypothesis through a content analysis of the main documents produced at the Miami, Santiago, and Québec summits, then relates these findings to the progress of institutionalization from 1994 to 2003.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 3. Cooperations and integration in Central and North America

Beine Michel, Coulombe Serge

**One Market, One Money: Evidence from Canada–United States Economic Integration
in World Economy**, Volume 28, Number 7, 985-1003



In this paper, we focus on the evolution of the optimum currency area (OCA) properties between Canada and the United States. To this end, we specifically investigate the relationship between the intra-industry trade dynamics of Canadian provinces with the United States and the increasing level of integration between the two countries from 1980 to 1998. Our findings lead us to support the view that integration (real and monetary) improves the conditions under which a monetary union can yield net gains in the long run for the integrating countries. We also find that exchange rate developments exert asymmetric effects on the Canadian provinces.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 3. Cooperations and integration in Central and North America

Swofford James L.

Tests of microeconomic foundations of a North American common currency area

in Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue Canadienne d'Economie, Volume 38, Number 2 , 420-429

The movement of some members of the European Union towards a common currency area is likely to spark interest in other possible common currency areas. One such area of interest is a North American common currency area. In this paper some results from tests of microeconomic foundations of a North American common currency area are presented. These results can be viewed as favourable for the formation of a North American common currency area.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 3. Cooperations and integration in Central and North America

Phillips Nicola

U.S. Power and the Politics of Economic Governance in the Americas

in Latin American Politics & Society, Vol. 47, Nr. 4

This article examines the nature of the emerging regional economic regime in the Americas and argues that the dominant approach to economic governance is one defined by the assertion of U.S. power in the region and oriented toward distinctively U.S. interests and preferences. This has been clearly evident in the evolution of the Free Trade Area of the Americas but also, with the deceleration and fragmentation of that process during 2002 and 2003, in the growing prioritization of bilateralism. The leverage afforded by the bilateral negotiation of trade agreements acts to situate primary influence in shaping the rules that constitute the regional economic regime, and the primary functions associated with governing in this context, firmly within the agencies of the U.S. state. This essay therefore explores how the hegemonic power of the United States manifests itself in the substance of the hemispheric project and the shape of the economic regime associated with it.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 4. Cooperation and integration in Central and Latin America

Burges Sean W.

Bounded by the Reality of Trade: Practical Limits to a South American Region

in Cambridge Review of International Affairs , Vol. 18, n. 3, October , 437-454

This article argues that regionalism in South America will meet with limited success because continental and subregional integration projects lack the necessary economic underpinnings. The result is an incomplete form of regional integration



that, while offering some rewards to the participating countries, predominantly serves the energy security needs of the region's major players. Brazil, in particular, benefits from this process and also is the prime reason that regionalism in South America will not deepen. Without a major state to absorb the costs of region-building the process will stall. As the evidence in this article implies, Brazil is not willing to absorb these costs, placing severe limits on the region and regional acceptance of Brazilian leadership.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 4. Cooperation and integration in Central and Latin America

JACOBS JAMIE ELIZABETH, MALDONADO MARTÍN

Civil Society in Argentina: Opportunities and Challenges for National and Transnational Organisation
in *Journal of Latin American Studies* , Volume 37 - Issue 01 - February , 141-172

Among the many consequences of globalisation is the creation of new political spaces. As these emerge, new or redefined power relationships accompany the process. In the course of creating transnational relationships, citizenship, representation and the role of the stakeholders may be redefined. This article focuses on the case of Argentina and on the role of civil society organisations (CSOs) in the process of political integration. The relationship between the state and civil society has sparked a debate about the core status of the political system as the third sector assumes roles traditionally belonging exclusively to the state. This raises issues regarding the difference between rights and services, the sources of legitimacy and efforts to enhance accountability, among others. The existing and potential channels of regional cooperation in the context of Mercosur illustrate the interplay between domestic, regional and global norms and institutions. This article emphasises the role of organised civil society in providing sense and meaning in the formation and awareness of supranational concerns, but is sceptical about its possibilities of providing and guaranteeing rights, tasks that still remain in the sphere of the state.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 4. Cooperation and integration in Central and Latin America

García Francisco

Consecuencias del DR-CAFTA en Centroamerica
in *Panorama centroamericano : reporte politico* , n. 201 , 4-16

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 4. Cooperation and integration in Central and Latin America

Fernando Julio

El impacto del Tratado de libre comercio RD-CAFTA EN
in *Panorama centroamericano : reporte politico* , n. 201 , 17-18



No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 4. Cooperation and integration in Central and Latin America

Gomez M. L.

Explaining Mercosur's Survival: Strategic Sources of Argentine–Brazilian Convergence

in *Journal of Latin American Studies* , Volume 37 - Issue 01 - February , 109-140

This article aims to address a fundamental question for analysts and students of MERCOSUR: what explains the bloc's survival despite its recurrent crises and frequent pessimistic forecasts predicting its collapse? It argues that the maintenance of co-operation after 1999, when the economic and political economy rationale of the project had almost disappeared, is best understood in terms of the convergent strategic interests of MERCOSUR partners. This convergence of interests in the continuity of the regional regime reflects three types of strategic incentives. First, defensive considerations reflecting external forces and a shared sense of vulnerability vis-à-vis the external environment have provided the main motivation for partners to engage in negotiations and attempt to move the process of integration forward. Secondly, the offensive incentives faced by Brazil, given its relatively stronger position within the region have also worked to foster regional co-operation. But besides these power considerations, the sustainability of co-operation has been at least partially assisted by an emerging process of socialisation among executive officials taking place within regional institutions. These processes of increased interaction and enmeshment have reinforced interests in regional integration, giving way to positive incentives to maintain MERCOSUR.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 4. Cooperation and integration in Central and Latin America

Boschovich, N.

Geostrategia para la integracion regional

in *Geosur : publicacion mensual* , Vol. 26 n. 301-302 , Pag. 19-25

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 4. Cooperation and integration in Central and Latin America

Dabène Olivier

La relance du Mercosur. Ouro Preto II ou le temps des réformes politiques

in *Critique Internationale*, N°26 - Janvier 2005

En dépit de différends commerciaux récurrents entre ses États membres, le Mercosur politique progresse. L'arrivée au pouvoir au Brésil, en Argentine et en Uruguay de forces progressistes favorables à l'intégration a permis la relance d'un processus d'intégration très affecté par la crise économique argentine de 2001. Le Parlement du Mercosur, dont le projet a été entériné par le XXVII^e sommet du Mercosur du 17 décembre 2004 et qui devrait être inauguré en 2006, ne sera sans doute pas un outil de démocratisation du



processus d'intégration imaginé par le Secrétariat technique, véritable « entrepreneur politique » créé au sein du Mercosur en 2003, mais il permettra d'associer davantage les classes politiques des États membres au Mercosur et, surtout, de redonner un élan politique au processus d'intégration.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 4. Cooperation and integration in Central and Latin America

Vaillant Marcel

MERCOSUR: Southern Integration under Construction

in Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft, Heft 2, 2005

ABSTRACT: The members of MERCOSUR have not yet exploited the full potential of their regional integration agreement. Economic performance is unsatisfactory since market integration remains incomplete. Trade agreements with the Northern industrialized countries could both help to perfect the bloc and win it external markets.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 4. Cooperation and integration in Central and Latin America

Malamud Andrés

Mercosur Turns 15: Between Rising Rhetoric and Declining Achievement

in Cambridge Review of International Affairs , Vol. 18, n. 3, October , 421-436

Founded in 1991 as an intergovernmental association among four member countries, Mercosur is likely to begin 2006 as intergovernmental and with the same members as when it was founded. Political rhetoric notwithstanding, there has been little deepening and no enlargement in almost 15 years. There have been some achievements, however: increased regional interdependence and political cooperation. This article assesses how much Mercosur has achieved in light of its starting point and the explicit goals set by regional decision makers. It then makes a critical appraisal of the distance between political rhetoric and effective policy implementation, focusing on the role played by the two largest members, Argentina and Brazil. Finally, the article examines the current enlargement, deepening and institutionalisation agenda and assesses its feasibility.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 4. Cooperation and integration in Central and Latin America

Varvaele John

Mercosur and Regional Integration in South America

in International and Comparative Law Quarterly, n. 2, vol. 54, april , 387-410

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes



Subsection 4. Cooperation and integration in Central and Latin America

Nadia de Araujo Nadia , Magalhães Marques Frederico M.

Mercosur/ALCA : Is Integration Possible ?

in *Droit et société*, n. 59

On the basis of an historically-minded contemporary study pertaining to international contracts under international law in the Americas, the authors present a panorama of the impact of ALCA on international obligations. In addition to its antecedents, they examine the current movement, resulting from this international agreement, towards homogenous international private law in the Americas. Comparing the various treaties signed by South American countries in the framework of the ALCA and Mercosur, they draw conclusions concerning the present and future integration of Latin American countries.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 4. Cooperation and integration in Central and Latin America

Quirjano J.M.

Mercosur: el relanzamiento?

in *Nueva Sociedad*, n. 199

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 4. Cooperation and integration in Central and Latin America

Assis de Almeida José Gabriel

Mercosur's Legal Framework

in *Droit et société*, n. 59

Mercosur has an important legal production : from its creation in 1991 until the end of the century, it issued more than one thousand rules. The present paper treats two major questions raised by this important legislative production. The first concerns the specificity of these rules, which must be examined in order to determine if there is a Mercosur legal order, and if so, what it is. The second question is the relationship between Mercosur rules and national laws of the Member States. The ultimate goal is to determine the impact of Mercosur rules on everyday life and how the rules can achieve their goals.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 4. Cooperation and integration in Central and Latin America

d'Arcy François

Political Perspectives on Mercosur : comparisons with the European Union

in *Droit et société*, n. 59

The recent creation of the South American Community of Nations and the enlargement of Mercosur's membership to nearly all of South America open new political perspectives for Mercosur. Using the political project of the European Union for comparative purposes, these perspectives are examined from a double point of view : the progressive



enlargement of regional integration to an entire continent ; and the will of the Member States to transfer to the supranational level competencies and powers, more or less extensive, exerted by institutions more or less autonomous. Passing from the « little » Mercosur to an enlarged Mercosur will require a close cooperation between Argentina and Brazil.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 4. Cooperation and integration in Central and Latin America

Malamud, Andres

Presidential Diplomacy and the Institutional Underpinnings of Mercosur: An Empirical Examination

in Latin American Research Review, Volume 40, Number 1, , 138-164

The relative success of the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) is a puzzle for most theories of regional integration. This is due to its having achieved remarkable progress in spite of lacking features such as significant levels of previous interdependence (demand factor) or major regional institutions (supply factor). To account for this puzzle, it has been claimed that the operation of MERCOSUR rests on presidential diplomacy. Such a mechanism is understood as the resort to direct negotiations between the national presidents whenever a crucial decision has to be made or a critical conflict solved. This article argues that presidential diplomacy—understood as political, summit diplomacy as opposed to institutionalized, professional diplomacy—is insufficient to account for the performance of MERCOSUR. Through the empirical analysis of three critical episodes, the article shows how institutional structures, shaped by the system of government of the member countries, have sustained presidential intervention and, hence, the process of regional integrat

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 4. Cooperation and integration in Central and Latin America

Morelli Federica, Nocera Raffaele

Quale mercato per l'America Latina

in Mulino (il), n. 2, marzo-aprile, 2005 , 375-384

ABSTRACT: Per ipotizzare le prospettive politico-Economiche dell'America Latina è necessario mettere a confronto due opposte strategie: una patrocinata dagli Stati Uniti e basata sulla nascita, entro la fine di quest'anno, di un'area di libero commercio delle Americhe; l'altra, promossa principalmente da Argentina e Brasile, che fa leva sull'ampliamento del Mercosur e sulla nascita di una «unione sudamericana».

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 4. Cooperation and integration in Central and Latin America

Jimenez C.G.

Reflexiones sobre la integracion en America Latina

in El Cotidiano : revista de la realidad mexicana actual , n. 133 , 74 - 80

No abstract available



Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 4. Cooperation and integration in Central and Latin America

García Francisco

**Region: Crece el debate en el Congreso de Eua por el Dr-Cafta
in Panorama centroamericano : reporte politico** , n. 202 , 4-9

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 4. Cooperation and integration in Central and Latin America

Angrisani Luisa

Regional Markets in Latin America

in Perspectives on Politics, issue 1, vol. 3, march , 129-133

ABSTRACT: Never in America ... has there been a matter requiring more good judgment or more vigilance, or demanding a clearer and more thorough examination." José Martí's observation on the first effort by the United States to unite both Americas at the Pan-American Congress in 1889 is relevant again today. Efforts to unite the two hemispheres are underway with the proposal to create a Free Trade Area of the Americas and the flurry of preliminary bilateral and regional trade agreements that the Bush Administration has been pushing in Latin America. It appears that Latin American leaders have taken the quote to heart—most trade negotiations now focus on forming a united regional front. The aim of "regionalization" is to unite countries in Latin America into small groups prior to their integration into a larger, hemisphere-wide trade bloc.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 4. Cooperation and integration in Central and Latin America

Estoup Luis Alejandro

Society and Solving Controversies : The Originality of Mercosur's Permanent Court of Review

in Droit et société, n. 59

The existence of a Permanent Court of Review (TPR) represents an important advancement towards the solution of controversies in Mercosur. Its establishment may fail, however, because of the present situation : the forum shopping clause can send controversies back to the WTO and thereby derail Mercosur's application of law. The free trade agreement with the Andean Community introduces competing jurisdictions with the latter's Court of Justice, which has a longer praetorian tradition. That the TPR must coexist with the Member States' Superior Courts of Justice, even when its acceptance does not at all seem insured, represents a final big challenge for its creation.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 4. Cooperation and integration in Central and Latin America

Falchetti Roberto

The Institutional Reform of Mercosur : What is the Future of its Economic and Social Consultative Forum ?



in *Droit et société*, n. 59

Political representation has often been in conflict with the representation of interests. Today, civil society's contributions reinforce the natural legitimacy of democratic political representation, even in economic integration. Organized civil society has institutional participation in Mercosur, specifically in its Economic and Social Consultative Forum, and Mercosur is trying to improve this participation with the implementation of future reforms.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 4. Cooperation and integration in Central and Latin America

Gardini Gian Luca

Two Critical Passages on the Road to Mercosur

in *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 18, n. 3, October, 405-420

This article challenges two traditional interpretations of the genesis of Mercosur. First, the literature is evenly divided among those who trace back the beginning of the process to the military administrations of Brazil and Argentina, and those who entirely credit their newly democratic administrations. By contrast, this paper argues that integration was initially discussed in a situation of regime asymmetry, Argentina having already returned to democracy and Brazil being still in the final stage of transition. Second, the creation of the common market is generally associated with the 1988 Treaty of Integration signed by Presidents Alfonsín and Sarney of Argentina and Brazil, respectively, while Presidents Menem and Collor are deemed to have simply reduced the period for its implementation from ten to five years. By contrast, this article suggests that in 1988 the project of a common market was still just an aspiration and that in fact that treaty only established a free trade area, its actual progression into a common market being undertaken by the latter two leaders. The first argument tempers the democratic mysticism surrounding integration, the second suggests a partial rehabilitation of the now discredited neoliberal presidents.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area

Starr S. Frederick

A Partnership for Central Asia

in *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2005, Vol 84, Number 4

U.S. engagement with Afghanistan has brought all of Central Asia to a turning point, but flagging interest and uncoordinated policies risk undermining recent gains. To seize the opportunity for progress in a vital region, Washington should form a Greater Central Asia Partnership for Cooperation and Development.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area

Tow William

ANZUS: Regional versus Global Security in Asia?

in *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, Volume 5, Number 2, August, 197-216



Debate over the continued relevance of postwar U.S. alliance systems in Asia is intensifying at a time when American 'global' and 'regional' strategies seem to be converging. The ANZUS alliance is no exception to this trend. Australian and regional security analysts have recently focused on whether Australia faces a 'choice' between sustaining U.S. alliance affinities and commitments in a 'global' context or prioritizing its regional security postures in tandem with its growing economic involvement in Asia. It is argued in this article that the two approaches are complementary rather than divergent and that the current Australian government recognises this geopolitical reality. It concludes that alliances and other 'classic' state-centric mechanisms for pursuing both regional and international security will continue to be applicable to Australia's need for 'getting the balance right' between its future regional and global strategies.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area

Solingen Etel

ASEAN cooperation: the legacy of the economic crisis

in International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Volume 5, Issue 1, April , 1-29

This article examines the implications of domestic political changes in the post-1997 era for ASEAN's regional cooperation and institutionalization. The conceptual framework traces regional relations to the makeup and grand strategies of domestic coalitions (internationalizing, hybrid, backlash). Had some predictions in the immediate aftermath of the crisis been fulfilled, the advent of domestic backlash coalitions would have portended lower levels of regional cooperation. Alternatively, in the absence of changes in the fundamental nature of most ruling coalitions after the crisis, ASEAN's cooperative thrust was expected to be maintained. The article explores the extent to which ASEAN's activities in the post-crisis era supports either of these two propositions. It finds that a shock of major proportions in Southeast Asia led to some immediate challenges to bilateral relations. At the same time, the aftermath of the crisis led to considerable multilateral and bilateral cooperation on economic issues, expansion, intervention, and security. Furthermore, cooperation may have indeed improved despite subsequent crises, including 9/11 and its aftermath. Yet no linear progression or irrevocable process towards internationalization or regional cooperation can be assumed. Alternative coalitions, and their potential for changing regional trajectories, must be reckoned with.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area

Tongzon Jose L.

ASEAN-China Free Trade Area: A Bane or Boon for ASEAN Countries?

in World Economy, Volume 28, Number 2 , 191-210

At the ASEAN Summit in November 2000, the leaders of ASEAN and China agreed to enhance economic cooperation and integration with the goal of establishing an ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (FTA). This decision was a natural response to a number of important global and regional developments of the past decade. Since the signing of the framework agreement, policymakers from China and ASEAN member states have already started their negotiations on the specific terms and features for this proposed FTA. While such an FTA would hold the potential of yielding enormous economic benefits, it also causes some sense of apprehension and uncertainty in some quarters, due to the common perception that China is already a strong competitor in trade and attracting foreign investment. To examine the



economic basis for such concern, this paper analyses the economic implications of this proposed free trade area from the ASEAN economies' perspective. Specifically, it examines how competitive ASEAN countries are vis-à-vis China, evaluate the scope for strengthening China-ASEAN trade and the impediments facing Chinese and ASEAN investors in each other's markets, and recommends policy measures to maximise the benefits and minimise the hardships resulting from an ASEAN-China FTA.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area

Glen Stafford and Purnendra Jain

Asia–Pacific and a new international order: responses and options

in *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 59, n. 3 / September , 375-381

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area

Michael Richardson

Australia-Southeast Asia relations and the East Asian Summit

in *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 59, n. 3 / September , 351-365

The economic and geopolitical landscape of Asia has changed dramatically in recent years, providing Australia with an unprecedented opportunity to become an integral and significant player in a wider Indo-Pacific region as it charts its future and seeks to manage tensions while shaping a new architecture of cooperation. Late in 2004 at their annual summit, leaders of ASEAN, the Association of South East Asian Nations, agreed to create a new forum—the East Asian Summit—and hold the first meeting of heads of government of participating countries in Kuala Lumpur in December this year. The summit seems destined to become a regular event and thus the policy-guiding core of any future East Asian or Indo-Pacific community.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area

Aggarwal Vinod K., Koo Min Gyo

Beyond network power? The dynamics of formal economic integration in Northeast Asia

in *Pacific Review (The)* , Volume 18, Number 2, June , pp. 189-216

At the turn of the new millennium, the traditional institutional equilibrium of East Asian economic integration – the embrace of the WTO at the multilateral level and a focus on market-driven, informal integration at the regional level – is under heavy strain. A growing number of Northeast and Southeast Asian countries are pursuing greater institutionalization at the sub-multilateral level, actively weaving a web of preferential trading arrangements. To examine this development, we focus on the likely new institutional equilibrium in Northeast Asia and its implications for East Asia and beyond. We first examine the various political and economic arguments that have been advanced to explain states'



desire to pursue 'regionalism'. From our perspective, most conventional explanations fail to adequately differentiate various forms of trading arrangements, thereby impairing both theoretical and empirical analysis of trading arrangements. To remedy this lacuna, we develop a more fine-grained typology of different modes of trade management – unilateral, bilateral, minilateral and multilateral. We then discuss an institutional bargaining-game approach focusing on goods, countries' individual situations and the fit with existing arrangements. This approach is used to analyze how trade arrangements evolved in East Asia in the 1990s, particularly after the Asian financial crisis. We then explore several paths that might lead to formal economic integration in Northeast Asia. Finally, we consider other possible outcomes beyond Northeast Asia.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area

Harris Stuart

China's regional policies: how much hegemony?

in *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 59, n. 4 / December , 481-492

China is commonly assumed to be seeking hegemony in its region. Yet China's region involves it in relationships with major states with their own hegemonic or leadership interests—the US, Russia, Japan and India. This article examines each of China's regional relationships in terms of the prime interests of China's foreign policy framework. It concludes that it is important to distinguish between hegemonic capabilities and intentions: that while China will want to extend its influence as a regional power, its capability to do that will continue to grow in each of its subregions, its ability to exercise that power and influence will be limited. In the past its efforts have been largely to seek secure borders and economic opportunities and that for some years those objectives, together with energy security, are likely to remain the priority.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area

Acharya Amitav

Do norms and identity matter? Community and power in Southeast Asia's regional order

in *Pacific Review (The)* , Volume 18, Number 1, March , pp. 95-118

This article reviews Michael Leifer's contribution to the study of Southeast Asian regionalism, particularly the role of ASEAN and the ASEAN Regional Forum. Unlike some who portray Leifer as a realist or a neo-realist who totally dismissed the role of ASEAN in the regional order, this article argues that the real difference between Leifer's and the newer constructivist understanding of Southeast Asia is not so much over whether regionalism matters, but under what conditions does it matter. Leifer viewed material forces, such as the prior existence of a great-power balance as a precondition of effective regionalism. He paid less attention to norm dynamics and the politics of regional identity formation. He did not consider them as independent forces in regional order. This paper argues that taking a more sociological approach, factoring in the role of regional norms and identity formation offers a more complete explanation of ASEAN's achievements and failures than Leifer's diplomatic investigations focusing on the balance of power. This also opens the space for a more transformative understanding of Asian security order in which socialization and institution-building are to be seen not merely as adjuncts to the balance of power dynamics, but as shapers of the



regional balance of power.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area

Camilleri Joseph A.

East Asia's emerging regionalism: Tensions and potential in design and architecture
in *Global Change, Peace & Security*, n. 3, vol. 17, october , 253-261

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area

Inoguchi Takashi, Bacon Paul

Empire, hierarchy, and hegemony: American grand strategy and the construction of order in the Asia-Pacific
in *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, Volume 5, Number 2, August , 117-132

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area

Jong-Wha Lee, Innwon Park

Free Trade Areas in East Asia: Discriminatory or Non-discriminatory?
in *World Economy*, Volume 28, Number 1 , 21-48

The debates on regional trade arrangements in East Asia focus on whether the RTAs can be net trade creating or diverting, and whether they impede multilateral trade liberalisation or not. This paper attempts to answer these questions by quantitatively estimating the economic impact of possible East Asian free trade areas based on a bilateral gravity model, and evaluating the main characteristics of the proposed FTAs. We find that the trade creation effect expected from the proposed East Asian FTAs such as a China-Japan-Korea or an ASEAN plus three (China, Japan, Korea) FTA will be significant enough to overwhelm the trade diversion effect. We also judge that East Asian FTAs will likely be a building block for a global free trade.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area

Karras Georgios

Is there a yen optimum currency area? Evidence from 18 Asian and Pacific economies
in *Japan and the World Economy*, Volume 17, Issue 4 , 456-469

This paper examines the macroeconomic costs and benefits of adopting a common currency (the yen) for 18 Asian and



Pacific countries. Economic theory suggests that the main benefit is enhanced price stability, while the main cost is higher business-cycle volatility if the adopting country's output is not sufficiently correlated with that of Japan. Using data from 1960–2001, the paper finds that the estimated cost and benefit measures exhibit substantial variability across the countries and are often positively correlated: countries (such as Bangladesh or Nepal) that have a lot to gain from adopting the yen, also have a lot to lose from it; while other economies (such as Singapore, Thailand, or Taiwan) that have little to lose by adopting the yen, have also little to gain by it. The empirical results can be also used to compare net benefits for individual countries, showing, for example, that Korea is a more promising candidate for adopting the yen than Pakistan or Malaysia.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area

Yuzawa Takeshi

Japan's changing conception of the ASEAN Regional Forum: from an optimistic liberal to a pessimistic realist perspective

in *Pacific Review (The)* , Volume 18, Number 4, December , pp. 463-497

This article explores changes in Japan's conception of and policy toward security multilateralism¹ in the Asia-Pacific region after the end of the Cold War with special reference to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). It makes the observation that notwithstanding Japan's active role behind the establishment of the ARF in the early 1990s and continuing public expression of strong support for Asia-Pacific security multilateralism since that time, in actuality, Japan's enthusiasm for it has dwindled from the late 1990s onwards. This article argues that this has been due primarily to Japan's disappointing experiences in the ARF, evinced by its abortive efforts to promote meaningful cooperative security measures and the failings of multilateral security diplomacy in addressing its security concerns. Consequently, Japan's conception of regional security multilateralism has shifted from an optimistic liberal to a more pessimistic realist perspective from which the ARF can, at best, be seen as a venue contributing only to a minimal level of confidence building among regional countries or, to put it more cynically, 'a talking shop'. This has made Japan's ARF policy more tentative and less energetic. Japan's enthusiasm has also been diluted by a number of internal and external constraints on ARF policy, including US misgivings about Japan's tilt toward regional security multilateralism, its domestic organizational limitations, growing dissent within the Japanese government over the value of security multilateralism, the lack of political support for bureaucratic initiatives and the unexpected frictions between bilateral and multilateral security approaches in Japan's overall security policy.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area

Chasek Pamela S.

Margins of Power: Coalition Building and Coalition Maintenance of the South Pacific Island States and the Alliance of Small Island States

in *Review of European Community & International Environmental Law*, Volume 14, Issue 2, August , pp. 125-137

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes



Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area

Huseynov Tabib

Mountainous Karabakh: Conflict Resolution through Power-sharing and Regional Integration in Peace, Conflict and Development, Volme 6, Issue 6, January , pp. 31 (full text available on-line)

Full text available

<http://www.peacestudiesjournal.org.uk/docs/Mountainous%20Karabakh%20final%20version%20edited%203.pdf>

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area

Hughes Christopher R.

Nationalism and multilateralism in Chinese foreign policy: implications for Southeast Asia in Pacific Review (The) , Volume 18, Number 1, March , pp. 119-135

One of Michael Leifer's main fears for the future role of ASEAN arose from the spectre of a rising nationalistic China. This article assesses whether recent developments have borne out those fears by looking at the nature of Beijing's evolving multilateral approach towards the region. Agreeing with Leifer that nationalism is an important influence on Chinese foreign policy, the article explores the complex relationship between domestic politics and the discourse of multipolarity in China to propose that multilateralism is an effective way for Beijing to increase its regional power while avoiding confrontation with the United States or regional powers like India and Japan. However, Beijing's multilateralism is still premised on hard conceptions of state sovereignty and has to be developed in the context of a nationalistic political culture that prevents the achievement of regional stability through compromise on issues such as the South China Sea disputes and the Taiwan question. China's continuing economic growth also means that its multilateralism in Southeast Asia will unavoidably be shaped by issues such as the role of the ethnic Chinese as economic bridgeheads and the realities of an increasingly asymmetrical balance of power. Meanwhile, the relative economic weakness of the Southeast Asian states also means that nature of ASEAN-style regionalism will continue to be determined by the extra-mural balance of power, with China as one of the major actors, as Michael Leifer predicted.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area

Lawson Stephanie

Regional integration, development and social change in the Asia–Pacific: implications for human security and state responsibility

in **Global Change, Peace & Security**, n. 2, vol. 17, june , 107-122

ABSTRACT: Regional integration is generally seen as having positive security outcomes with respect to traditional inter-state relations as well as economic growth. However, there are also negative social and economic effects, which the broader concept of human security is useful in focusing attention on. The main aim of the article is to highlight some of the negative human security outcomes produced by the dynamic processes that have underscored regionalization in the Asia–Pacific in recent years. A further aim is to question what this means in terms of state responsibility. Given that states are 'social protection providers' of last resort, this is an important issue. This function has been largely ignored in



neoliberal agendas that have sought to promote market reforms while actively undermining the role and capacity of the state. The state has also had a bad press from other quarters, including the human rights/human security lobby. While agreeing with the general point of the refrain that 'human rights are not state rights', I suggest that those who might welcome a weakening of the state per se in the cause of human security should think twice.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area

Tae-Joon Kim, Jai-Won Ryou, Shinji Takagi

Regional monetary integration in the presence of two large countries: What modality makes sense for East Asia?

in Japan and the World Economy, Volume 17, Issue 2 , 171-187

This paper analyzes the modalities of East Asian monetary integration by taking note of the relevance of two large economies, one outside the region (the United States) and one inside (Japan), for monetary policy making. Within the framework of a three-country model, it derives the social welfare of two regional economies and uses numerical calibration to show how it crucially depends on the specific modality of monetary integration. By using parameters obtained from the actual macroeconomic data for 1981–1996, we find that the smaller regional economy (Korea) always benefits from monetary integration, while the large regional economy (Japan) benefits from monetary integration only when it is asymmetric (such as a peg to a common basket or yenization), so that it can continue to enjoy some monetary autonomy. Symmetric integration, while not a viable option for East Asia in the short run, may become feasible in the long run if economic integration deepens sufficiently to produce convergence in economic structure and synchronization of business cycles.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area

Emmerson Donald K.

Security, Community, and Democracy in Southeast Asia: Analyzing ASEAN

in Japanese Journal of Political Science, Volume 6, Issue 2, August , 165-185

Is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) a pluralistic security community (PSC)? Does community cause security in Southeast Asia? In a PSC, member states are sovereign. So are the members of ASEAN. Before concluding that the ASEAN region is a PSC, however, one should distinguish between two versions: a thin or descriptive PSC, whose members share both a sense of community and the expectation of security, and a thick or explanatory version in which community has actually been shown to cause security. Depending on how a sense of community is defined, one may say that at certain times in its history, ASEAN probably has been a thin PSC. More recently, however, the cooperative identity of regional elites may have frayed, as democratization, especially in Indonesia, has incorporated non-elites into public life. Meanwhile the proposition that the assurance of security in Southeast Asia has resulted from this sense of community, that ASEAN is a thick PSC, remains to be proven.



Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area

Warr Peter

Should Bangladesh Join a Regional Free Trade Area?

in *South Asia Economic Journal*, 6 (1) , 79-97

Suppose a regional preferential trading agreement (PTA) is to be formed and a particular country is invited to join. Should it do so? This question arises for Bangladesh in relation to a proposed PTA based upon the BIMST-EC country grouping of Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Thailand. This paper examines the case for Bangladesh joining such a PTA. It is concluded that the net gains from doing so would be very small. There are two reinforcing aspects to this point. The first is the relatively small levels of intra-regional trade between Bangladesh and the other BIMST-EC countries. Although these trade volumes would almost certainly increase under a PTA, they may not do so sufficiently to make the benefits economically significant. The second aspect is that the pattern of trade between Bangladesh and the other BIMST-EC countries suggests that they are not natural trading partners. The trade-creating effects that generate net benefits may be especially small. There may be other strong reasons for forming a PTA among these countries, resting mainly on political considerations, but significant trade-related gains should not be expected.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area

Narine Shaun

State sovereignty, political legitimacy and regional institutionalism in the Asia-Pacific

in *Pacific Review (The)* , Volume 17, Number 3 , pp. 423-450

Regional institutions in the Asia-Pacific have been of limited efficacy. Asian members of organizations such as ASEAN and APEC have insisted that these institutions not infringe upon their sovereign rights. The basic norms, rules, structures and practices supporting these organizations have, to varying degrees, reflected this concern. A number of factors contribute to explaining this regional reluctance to create effective multilateral institutions. This paper argues that the single most important factor is the concern of most East Asian states with domestic political legitimacy. Drawing on the work of Muthiah Alagappa and Mohammed Ayoob, the paper demonstrates that a significant majority of the states of East Asia see themselves as actively engaged in the process of creating coherent nations out of the disparate ethnic, religious and political groups within the state. As a result, these states are reluctant to compromise their sovereignty to any outside actors. Indeed, the regional attitude towards multilateral institutions is that they should assist in the state-building process by enhancing the sovereignty of their members. As an exceptional case, Japan has encouraged regional institutionalism, but it has also been sensitive to the weaknesses of its neighbours, and has found non-institutional ways to promote its regional interests. The incentives to create effective regional structures increased after the Asian economic crisis, but Asian attempts to reform existing institutions or create new ones have been undermined by the issues connected to sovereignty. East Asian states recognize that they can best manage globalization and protect their sovereignty by creating and cooperating within effective regional institutions. However, their ability to create such structures is compromised by their collective uncertainty about their domestic political legitimacy. In the emerging international environment, being a legitimate sovereign state may be a necessary prerequisite to participating in successful regional organizations.



Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area

De Santis Hugh

The Dragon and the Tigers: China and Asian Regionalism

in *World Policy Journal*, n. 2, vol. XXII, summer

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area

Foong Khong Yuen

The elusiveness of regional order: Leifer, the English school and Southeast Asia

in *Pacific Review (The)* , Volume 18, Number 1, March , pp. 23-41

Regional order' was Michael Leifer's yardstick of choice to assess the international relations of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Leifer's recurrent theme was how elusive, and at times how illusory, regional order was for Southeast Asia. The elusiveness of regional order is attributed to ASEAN's lack of a set of genuinely shared assumptions about their interrelationships with each other and external states. This article challenges Leifer's portrait of a Southeast Asia devoid of regional order. I argue that Leifer's notion of order is theoretically underdeveloped and methodologically imprecise, allowing the analyst to see disorder in every minor perturbation in the region. I propose replacing 'regional order' with 'peace and stability', the preferred terms of the discourse by ASEAN's policy elites. By the latter criteria, ASEAN and the Asia-Pacific, contrary to the skeptics, have made impressive progress in the last forty years.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area

Cheung Yin-Wong, Yuen Jude

The suitability of a greater China currency union

in *Pacific Economic Review*, February 2005 - Vol. 10 Issue 1 , Page 83

The study assesses the level of integration among the three Greater China economies (China, Hong Kong and Taiwan) and examines the suitability of a Greater China currency union. The three economies already have extensive trade and investment linkages. Our analyses show that they share common long-run and short-run cyclical variations. We also estimate the output costs of relinquishing policy autonomy to form a currency union. The estimated output losses, which depend on, e.g., the method used to generate shock estimates, seem to be moderate and are likely to be less than the efficient gains derived from a currency union.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area

Rajan, Ramkishan S.



Trade liberalization and the new regionalism in the Asia-Pacific: taking stock of recent events
in *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, Volume 5, Number 2, August , 217-233

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area

Ramesh Chand, Seema Bathla

WTO Agriculture Negotiations and South Asian Countries

in *South Asia Economic Journal*, 6 (1) , 1-22

As mandated by Article XX of the Uruguay Round, negotiations for next round of the Agreement on Agriculture (AOA) began in 1999 and are now in an advanced stage. It is quite important now for South Asian countries (SACs) to join hands based on mutual interest and geographic considerations, and push a common agenda in the negotiations on the AOA. These countries have a lot in common in their economic situation, agricultural concerns and interest in the global market. Taking a common position in the negotiations will increase the bargaining strength of SACs and help in getting better deal for the region. The South Asian agenda for a new round of negotiations on agriculture in the WTO needs to be somewhat offensive. The popular opinion in SACs is such that any deal that secures freedom from commitment and provides protection against imports is a great achievement. In a liberalized economy, protection and freedom from commitment granted to other countries is equally, and sometimes more, important. Sometimes it is beneficial to go for a trade-off between, say, making a commitment to reduce subsidies and reducing protection in own market if it results in enough gain in market access in other countries. South Asian agriculture has some strength and SACs need not be extremely defensive and inward looking. This paper suggests a common agenda for SACs for genuine protection of the domestic market and to take advantage of the external one.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area

Emmerson Donald K.

What do the blind-sided see? Reapproaching regionalism in Southeast Asia

in *Pacific Review (The)* , Volume 18, Number 1, March , pp. 1-21

The late Michael Leifer's association with an insecurity-focused realist approach to international affairs and his work on Southeast Asian regionalism inspire this question: How have the Asian financial crisis and the 'war on terror' affected the plausibility of insecurity-concerned realism compared with other ways of approaching regionalism in Southeast Asia? Five general approaches (and featured themes) are presented: realism (insecurity), culturalism (identity), rationalism (interests), liberalism (institutions) and constructivism (ideas). By and large this sequence runs ontologically from the most to the least foundationalist perspective, and chronologically from the earliest to the newest fashion in the American study of international relations since the Second World War.

The Asian financial crisis and the 'war on terror' have, on balance, vindicated the extremes – realism on the one hand, constructivism on the other – while modestly enhancing the plausibility of culturalism and challenging the comparative intellectual advantages of rationalism and liberalism. But this result implies scholarly polarization less than it suggests a diverse repertoire of assumptions and priorities that are neither hermetically compartmentalized nor mutually exclusive.



Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 5. Cooperation and integration in Asia and the Pacific Area

Delage Fernando

¿Hacia una comunidad asiática?

in *Politica Exterior*, 108 Noviembre/Diciembre 2005

Aunque no existe una perspectiva única sobre el futuro de Asia oriental, está surgiendo un tejido cada vez más denso de interdependencias. ¿Está próxima la creación de una comunidad regional?

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Piedrafita Sonia - Torreblanca José I.

The Three Logics of EU Enlargement : Interests, Identities and Arguments

in *Politique européenne* , n. 15, 2005

In this article we examine three different ways to approach the study of EU Eastern enlargement process : first, from a utility-maximising perspective, second, from the values stemming from EU's collective identity, and finally, using a deliberative framework. More specifically, we look at whether each of these different rationales can explain the decision to enlarge, the selection of the candidates and the opening of negotiations. In our conclusions, we argue that while an instrumental logic can account for a good deal of EU member states' actions, a logic of justification has a great potential to explain why member states have felt obliged to refer their actions not to material interests but to norms and principles accepted by all.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Finchelstein Gilles

"Non? Non! Non...": il referendum sulla Costituzione in Francia

in *ItalianiEuropei*, n. 3 , 43 - 51

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Davies Gareth

'Any Place I Hang My Hat?' or: Residence is the New Nationality

in *European law journal*, January 2005 - Vol. 11 Issue 1 , 43-56



Removing all nationality discrimination means treating the emigré national like a foreigner, not just treating the foreign resident like a national. This challenges directly the idea that the national enjoys a permanent bond with his home country, wherever he may go. It also ushers in residence as an alternative to nationality as the criterion for membership of society and rights to benefits. This makes national solidarity a less discriminatory affair, and so easier to defend legally. One result may be tighter, in some ways less open societies. Yet membership of these societies will be voluntary and temporary and open to all. This argument is developed through a critical examination of recent judgments from the Court of Justice on residence conditions in national law.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

LFMB/WTE

A Constitution for Europe and other constitutions

in *European Constitutional Law Review*, Volume 1 - Issue 03 , 335-337

The spring of 2005 saw major set-backs for the Treaty of Rome of 29 October 2004, establishing what it calls 'a Constitution for Europe'. On 29 May, the French rejected the Treaty in their referendum by 54,8% (turnout 70%). Then the Dutch rejected it on 1 June by an even more massive 61,7% (turnout 63%). In response to these refusals the member states agreed to a 'reflection period' and a suspension of the ratification deadline at the European Council of 16 and 17 June. In the subsequent 10 July Luxembourg referendum 56,2% of the electorate voted in favour (obligatory vote), a significant drop from polls in October 2004, but at least creating a simple majority of 13 member states to ratify the document. But the UK put its ratification on hold, followed by other countries.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Mette Jolly

A Demos for the European Union?

in *Politics*, Vol. 25, Issue 1, February , 12-18

The European Union's alleged shortage of democratic legitimacy is said to be caused partly by the polity's lack of a demos which makes it unsuitable for majoritarian decision-making. However, this problem is often overshadowed by sometimes even confused with the lack of public enthusiasm as regards European integration. But, although clearly related, these are not synonymous. The no-demos thesis focuses on the lack of a transnational political relationship between individuals and is related mainly to the legitimacy of the EU's decision-making processes, whereas the issue of popular support primarily relates to the legitimacy of European integration itself. In this article, I address the former by attempting to answer the following questions. Firstly, what do we mean when we say that the EU has no demos? Secondly, does the EU really need a demos, and if so, how can one be created?



Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Graham Robert

A European public opinion is just an EU pipe dream

in *Europe's World*, Issue 1, Autumn

http://www.europesworld.org/PDFs/EW1_2.5_Graham_A_European_public_opinion.pdf

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Andreas Maurer and Sarah Reichel

A Three-Phase Plan for the European External Action Service

in *International Spectator (The)*, Vol. XL, n. 1, January-March

The European Union's Constitutional Treaty provides a new legal basis for setting up and developing a European External Action Service (EEAS) under the authority of the EU's future Minister for Foreign Affairs. Since late 2004, the EU institutions have begun to compete for political influence over the reorganisation of European foreign policy and the funds that will be distributed in this field. To prevent the nascent service from being torn apart by the power struggle in Brussels and to ensure that the "single European voice" in EU external affairs has a real chance of emerging, this article puts forward a coherent "three-phase plan" for the construction of the service, supported by all EU institutions and member states.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Koen Lenaerts

A Unified Set of Instruments

in *European Constitutional Law Review*, Volume 1 - Issue 01, 57-61

A powerful development by the European Constitution exists in the rationalisation of the instruments through which the Union may exercise the competences conferred upon it. This has constituted a particularly sensitive issue for the Convention. Under the EC and EU Treaties, the Union uses no less than 15 different instruments, some having the same appellation but entailing different legal effects, others being rarely used. This diversity has contributed to the development of an obscure patchwork of norms with ill-defined scope, legal effects and institutional origin. That situation consequently limits democratic control over governance at the European level.

Section C) Regional integration processes



Subsection 6. The European unification process

Duff Andrew, Voggenhuber Johannes

A proposal for re-launching the european constitutional process
in **Federalist Debate (The)**, Year XVIII, n. 3, November , 42-45

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Gowan Peter

A salutary shock for bien pensant Europe
in **Radical Philosophy**, Issue: 133 - September/October 2005

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Caramani Daniele, Wagemann Claudius

A transnational political culture? The Alpine region and its relationship to European integration
in **German Politics**, Volume 14, Number 1, March , pp. 74-94

This article deals with the political culture of the Alpine region, its expression in the strategies of regionalist and populist parties, and how this affects the relationship to European integration. The Alpine culture is a specific set of attitudes and values overlapping with religious, rural–urban and centre–periphery (ethno-linguistic) dimensions. These cultural elements are expressed in similar ways across national borders and are most visible in the Lega Nord in Italy, the Christlich-Soziale Union in Bavaria, the Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs in Austria, and the Schweizerische Volkspartei in Switzerland. The Alpine political culture includes strong anti-modern features, emphasises issues such as ‘nature’ and Heimat in the political discourse, and incorporates religious and traditional attitudes. This type of political culture is particularly relevant as it may represent a crucial dimension in the emerging European-wide party system, presenting an alternative ‘image of Europe’ and European integration.

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Subsection 6. The European unification process

Iglesias, Fernando A.

A unified european army: the end of the european dream?
in **Federalist Debate (The)**, Year XVIII, n. 2, July , 45-49

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

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Gyrfy Dóra

Adopting the Euro: a path to fiscal sustainability

in *Acta Oeconomica*, Volume 55, Issue 2 , 151-170

Following their accession to the European Union, new member states are now facing the next step in the integration process: the adoption of the common currency. While there is a relative agreement about the overall benefits of joining the European Monetary Union (EMU), the timing of entry has been subject to significant controversy. A gradual path of accession is often suggested since the contractionary effects of fulfilling the fiscal criterion of the Maastricht Treaty might contradict the objective of real convergence. The author argues against this position by showing that even without EMU entry it is the self-interest of the new member states to pursue policies in accordance with its rules, considerations of competitiveness make the usual options of financing further deficits (inflation, accumulation of debt, or increasing taxes) very costly in terms of long-term growth prospects. Slovenia and the Baltic countries have already recognised this and have achieved a virtuous circle of low deficit, low debt and high growth rates. In contrast, the Visegrád countries are struggling with the fiscal criteria. In their case accession into the euro-zone opens a window of opportunity to introduce reforms, which are conducive to the long-term sustainability of their finances.

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Andreas Auer

Adoption, Ratification and Entry Into Force

in *European Constitutional Law Review*, Volume 1 - Issue 01 , 131-135

The provision relating to the adoption, ratification and entry into force of the Treaty establishing the Constitution for Europe is probably one of the most difficult ones, both in legal and political terms. It is supposed to define the legal nature and quality of the entire EU process in its present and future phase. There is an inherent ambiguity about the legal nature of the treaty, which is already apparent in the title, and there are profound political implications as well. Is the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe a treaty or a constitution? Can it be both or neither? These are hard questions indeed.

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Ricci Antonio

Allargamento UE, nuove dinamiche e nuovi confini

in *Affari Sociali Internazionali*, n. 3, 2005

No abstract available



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Eriksen Erik Oddvar

An Emerging European Public Sphere

in *European Journal of Social Theory*, Volume 8, No. 3, August 2005 , 341-363

The development of post-national democracy in Europe depends on the emergence of an overarching communicative space that functions as a public sphere. But can there be a public sphere when there is no collective identity? Despite the fact that the European Union (EU) is neither a state nor a nation its development as a new kind of polity is closely connected to the formation of a common communicative space. In this article it is argued that European cooperation and problem solving create public spaces but has not (as of yet) produced a single, general European public sphere. Rather what one finds are transnational, segmented publics evolving around policy networks constituted by the common interest in certain policy fields. They are found wanting with regard to political justification intrinsic to the democratic principle that requires a general non-exclusive public sphere. The EU also harbours many legally institutionalized discourses - strong publics - that are specialized on collective will-formation close to the centre of the political system and which have been promoters of democratic reforms.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Chieffi L.

Banca centrale e sviluppi della governance europea

in *Rassegna parlamentare*, n. 1 - 2005 gennaio-marzo , 117-152

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Menéndez, Agustín José

Between Laeken and the Deep Blue Sea: An Assessment of the Draft Constitutional Treaty from a Deliberative-Democratic Standpoint

in *European public Law*, Volume 11 (2005) Issue 1 , 105-144

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Vedovato Giuseppe

Celebrazioni cinquantenarie. L'impegno europeo di De Gasperi

in *Rivista di Studi Politici Internazionali*, Volume 72, n. 4 , pp. 697-710



No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Giorgi Liana, Pohoryles Ronald J.

Challenges to EU political integration and the role of democratization

in *Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research*, Volume 18, Number 4 / December , 407 - 418

The European Union project of political integration faces three main challenges. The first concerns the constitutional make-up of the European Union as a political system. Key here is the role of subsidiarity and the question of statehood. The second challenge has to do with the opportunity structures for participation in a multilevel and supra-national context of governance. The third challenge is that of political identity. In the contemporary political debate, the first of the above challenges is discussed almost exclusively in terms of institutional mechanisms, the third in terms of symbolic identification based on culture and language. Opportunity structures for participation are thought to matter as a means of legitimacy or, alternatively, in terms of political acceptability. The underlying assumption is that policy is mainly a matter of technocratic management and politics a question of identity. This is the key problem of the contemporary discourse regarding European integration and the EU democratic deficit.

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Rigo Enrica

Citizenship at Europe's Borders: Some Reflections on the Post-colonial Condition of Europe in the Context of EU Enlargement

in *Citizenship Studies*, n. 1, vol. 9, february , 3-22

ABSTRACT: This article proposes a critical approach to European citizenship through the analysis of the legal dispositives which define the external borders of Europe in the context of EU enlargement. It examines the deterritorialization of the EU's external and internal borders through an analysis of the immigration laws of Poland, Romania and Bulgaria which have all been recently modified in order to meet the requirements of the Schengen aquis. By comparing these legislative changes with the legal mechanisms of colonial systems, the article suggests that the material process of the constitutionalization of EU citizenship highlights a post-colonial condition of the European polity.

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Rousseau Dominique

Citizenship in Abeyance

in *European Constitutional Law Review*, Volume 1 - Issue 01 , 44-46



In a text which claims constitutional rank the principle of citizenship, in all meanings of the term, is fundamental. If a treaty has as its first reference the State, a constitution naturally has as a reference also the citizen. Indeed in the European Constitution provisions abound referring to the citizen. In Part I they are to be found in Titles II and VI; in Part II there is the whole Title V and in Part III there is Title II. As citizenship is everywhere in the Draft, this would deserve it the rank of Constitution that it claims.

This first impression, however, is not supported by reading the different actual provisions in the Draft Constitution concerning citizenship. They fall short on three grounds.

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Tiersky Ronald

Clouds over Europe

in American Foreign Policy Interests, Vol. 27, n. 5 / October , 385-393

Driven by a storm of overblown expectations and miscalculated strategy and tactics, the defeat of the constitution, the author maintains, has provoked the definitive crisis of European integration.

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Jabko Nicolas

Comment la France définit ses intérêts dans l'Union européenne

in Revue française de science politique, Volume 55, Numéro 2, Avril , 221 - 243

The French interests within the European Union

This article offers an institutionalist explanation of French positions on the future of Europe, from the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 through the Constitutional Treaty of 2004. It argues that the single most important determinant of French preferences was the unfolding institutional logic of the constitution-drafting exercise itself. More specifically, it highlights certain typically institutional phenomena, like the formatting of debates and the occurrence of path dependency. The resulting institutional logic of French preference formation prevailed over ambition of national power, considerations of decision-making efficiency, and political leaders' visions of Europe. Domestic politics also played a relatively minor role because the French constitution freed the president from the necessity of domestic coalition-building.



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Paolo Dardanelli

Comparative federalism and the constitutional treaty

in Regional and Federal Studies, Volume 15, Number 2 / June , 259-269

This volume has drawn on the experience of some prominent federal and confederal systems in order to shed light on the transformations of the EU that may be brought about by the Constitutional Treaty signed in October 2004. This concluding article will focus on some key points that emerge from the case studies and offer some comparative reflections applied to the European Union. Four broad issues appear to have a particularly strong bearing on the evolution of the EU. The first is naturally the significance of the Constitutional Treaty itself, and the impact it is likely to have on the nature of the EU's political system. Secondly, there are questions of how the division of policy-making competences is likely to evolve and whether a dual or a cooperative form of con/federalism is taking root. Here the evolving role of subsidiarity may be important, as several of the authors in this volume have suggested. Thirdly, how will dispute resolution between the two main levels of the EU system be managed and, in particular, is the balance between the judicial and the political elements likely to be altered? Lastly, how will the changing nature of the EU affect the practice of democracy in, and popular identification with, the Union, and what role will be played by the evolution of collective identification with the individual European nations and with Europe as a whole? The following sections address each of these issues in turn. In conclusion, I offer some reflections on the ratification process.

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Macri' D.

Comunità europea ed enti locali

in Nuova rassegna di legislazione, dottrina e giurisprudenza, n.5 , 639 - 649

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Rosamond Ben

Conceptualizing the EU Model of Governance in World Politics

in European Foreign Affairs Review, Volume 10, Issue 4 , pp. 463-478

No abstract available



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Fossum John Erik

Conceptualizing the EU's Social Constituency

in *European Journal of Social Theory*, Volume 8, No. 2, May 2005, 123-147

The EU is often considered to be a unique entity. This assertion rests on assessments of its institutional character more than on assessments of its social constituency, i.e., the structure of demands and expectations that citizens and groups place on the EU. Establishing the character of the latter is important both to understand the EU as polity and to understand its democratic deficit. It is also of theoretical interest given the increased focus on recognition politics, not only within nation-states but also within the transnational realm. This article develops a conceptual-methodological framework with a set of structured tests so as to permit us to establish the character of the EU's social constituency. This framework combines a philosophical approach to recognition with a sociological approach to contentious politics. A central element is the notion of 'recognition order', and the article briefly examines whether the EU might be said to make up a unique recognition order.

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Askew-Renaut Estelle, Mirwaldt Katja

Conference Report: A Critical Assessment of the European Union Constitutional Treaty

in *Essex Human Rights Review*, n. 1, vol. 2

The report summarises the presentations and discussions at the European Union Constitutional Treaty conference held at the Moot Hall in Colchester on 3 November 2004. The conference was a public information event aimed at sixth formers and university students as well as the general public. It was also an event to mark the 40th anniversary of the University of Essex. The speakers included Essex politicians drawn from local government, Westminster, and the European Parliament, as well as academic experts, lawyers and journalists. The conference also heard from the Irish Ambassador to the United Kingdom. The intention was to present a critical and balanced assessment of the Constitutional Treaty and to contribute to the debate that must now begin in the UK, as a European Union member state, on whether to ratify the Constitution. The Constitution will first be considered in Parliament and thereafter the electorate will have the opportunity to vote on the Constitution in a referendum. The conference focussed on two topics: the possible impact of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, and the roles of the European Parliament and national Parliaments under the proposed Constitution. Inevitably much of the debate was concerned with the question as to whether the Constitutional Treaty should be accepted by the British people at all.

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Subsection 6. The European unification process

Askew-Renaut Estelle, Mirwaldt Katja

Conference Report: A Critical Assessment of the European Union Constitutional Treaty



in *Human Rights Review*, Vol. 2 No. 1 , 69

No abstract available

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Subsection 6. The European unification process

Lopez Aguilar J.F.

Constitución Europea

in *Revista de Derecho Constitucional Europeo* , n. 3 Anno 2

<http://www.ugr.es/~redce/ReDCE3/13lopezaguilar.htm>

Section C) Regional integration processes

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Chaltiel Florence

Constitution Européenne et Constitution Française. Une première pour le Conseil constitutionnel -- Juger un Traité établissant une Constitution.

in *Revue de l'Union européenne/Revue du Marché Commun et de l'Union européenne*, Numero 484, janvier , pp. 5-10

A first for the Constitutional Council. Judging a treaty establishing a Constitution.

Un precedented, enigmatic, dynamic, the treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe was submitted to the Constitutional Council by the President of the Republic. The expected non-conformity decision comes as a surprise as to its reasons. Due to a broad understanding of control and interpretation instruments, the Constitutional Council contributes to an extension of the Constitutionality block. By its often reducing appreciation of texts, it avoids too daring an interpretation of a constitutional treaty, and only focuses on the first term of the expression.

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Closa, Carlos

Constitution and Democracy in the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe

in *European public Law*, Volume 11 (2005) Issue 1 , 145-164

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Regourd Serge

Constitution européenne et "modèle social" européen. Analyse juridique d'une imposture politique

in *Pensée (La)*, Fascicule 05/341 , 125-137



No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

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Delaunay Jean-Claude

Constitution européenne et nations dans le capitalisme contemporain

in *Pensée (La)*, Fascicule 05/341 , 97-110

No abstract available

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Chaltiel Florence

Constitution française, Constitution européenne, vers l'osmose des ordres juridiques? A propos de la révision constitutionnelle du 28 février 2005

in *Revue de l'Union européenne/Revue du Marché Commun et de l'Union européenne*, Numero 488, mai , pp. 280-287

The French Constitution and the European Constitution: Towards a convergence of the various legal systems? Some thoughts on the constitutional amendment of February 28, 2005.

The French constituent authority has recently included the principle of the "European Constitution" in its basic text. This constitutional "first" will necessarily lead to a convergence of the various legal systems. National sovereignty is becoming "Europeanised" via the participation of the people and their representatives in European political power, and through the use of state-like powers by the European institutions. Each national institution, each European institution and each people has now become a participant in a constitutional process the likes of which has never been seen. The French Constitution is influenced by a Europe which is itself included within the constitutional perimeter. It is now down to the peoples' governing powers and judges to shape this constitutional interface and this gradual convergence of legal systems, if the European Constitution is finally adopted by the various peoples and nations of Europe.

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Estella, Antonio

Constitutional Legitimacy and Credible Commitments in the European Union

in *European Constitutional Law Review*, Volume 1 - Issue 02 , 22-42

The idea that the European Union must not adopt a constitution is gaining ground in current legal research on European constitutionalism. The N-C (No Constitution) thesis is being forcefully defended, in particular, by authors in the 'contextual' or 'law in context' tradition. However, likewise using a 'contextual' methodology, in this article I argue that the N-C thesis is in many regards misplaced. In this work, I defend the idea that Europe must adopt a constitution for reasons of credibility. I also try to show the main pitfalls of the N-C thesis.



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Mueller Dennis C.

Constitutional political economy in the European Union

in **Public Choice**, Volume 124, Numbers 1-2 , 57 - 73

This article surveys recent research in constitutional political economy in Europe. Although not all of the works discussed necessarily focus only on European constitutional issues or are written by Europeans, European constitutional issues figure importantly in each area surveyed. The article examines the literatures linking constitutional institutions to economic growth, government size, government deficits and corruption, bicameralism, direct democracy and federalism. Three exclusively European topics also are covered: constitutional issues in the transition countries, the structure of the European Union and the draft constitution for the European Union

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Puder Markus G.

Constitutionalizing Government in the European Union: Europe's New Institutional Quartet Under the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe

in **Columbia Journal of European Law**, Vol. 11 n. 1 , 11 - 77

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

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Duhamel Olivier

Convention versus IGC

in **European public Law**, Volume 11 (2005) Issue 1 , 55-62

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Schout Adriaan and Jordan Andrew

Coordinated European Governance: Self-Organizing or Centrally Steered?

in **Public Administration**, March 2005 - Vol. 83 Issue 1 , 201-220

Now that it is widely accepted that the European Union (EU) constitutes a system of governance, analysts need actively to explore precisely how it may affect the continuing struggle better to coordinate national and European administrations.



In its 2001 White Paper on governance, the European Commission interpreted governance to mean less central control and more network-led steering. Its interpretation of such networks is that they are self-organizing. Drawing upon an empirical study of environmental policy integration (EPI) in the EU, this article shows that this vision may not adequately fit the multi-actor, multi-level coordination challenges associated with some EU problems. By studying the administrative capacities that the European Commission and three member states have created to achieve better environmental coordination, this article shows significant administrative weaknesses. It concludes that the coordination challenges now troubling the EU require a more thoughtful discussion of network management than the White Paper suggests.

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Faíña J. Andrés

Counterpoint vs. Disharmony in the Constitutional Treaty: a European Paradox

in *Intereconomics*, Volume 40 No. 4 • 2005 , p. 190

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Section C) Regional integration processes

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Voigt Stefan

Crisis: What Crisis? After the Failure of the Draft Constitution, Europe Needs Thorough Discussions... and a New Focus on Integration

in *Intereconomics*, Volume 40 No. 4 • 2005 , p. 196

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Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Churruca Cristina

Criticizing the EU Security Strategy: the EU as a regional cooperative security provider

in *Revista Electrónica de Estudios Internacionales*, Número 10/ 2005

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Nascimbene Bruno

Dal Trattato di Nizza alla "Costituzione per l'Europa": e oltre?



in *Quaderni Costituzionali*, numero: 3, settembre 2005 , 661-663

Section C) Regional integration processes

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Haltern Ulrich

Das Janusgesicht der Unionsbürgerschaft

in *Swiss Political Science Review - Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft - Revue suisse de science politique*, Volume 11, Issue 1, Spring 2005

Zwar sind die Bürgerschaftsnormen (Art. 17 ff. EGV) überwiegend kritisch aufgenommen worden. Dennoch knüpft sich an den Topos der Unionsbürgerschaft ein hoffnungsgeladener Fortschrittsdiskurs. In einer Union, die den Markt als Integrationsziel überwunden hat, verspricht die Unionsbürgerschaft Werte mit Zukunftsperspektive. Sie überwindet die geistige Absenz, die im Herzen der Integration liegt, und stellt in Gestalt einer Grundrechtsfundierung ein auf das Individuum zugeschnittenes ethisches Fundament zur Verfügung. Dieser Fortschrittsdiskurs findet sich insbesondere in den emphatischen Schlussanträgen der Luxemburger Generalanwälte, die die Unionsbürgerschaft als „Grundrecht persönlicher Freiheit“; und als „Gipfel der Individualrechte“; bezeichnen. Der Europäische Gerichtshof hingegen bleibt einerseits sprachlich subtiler, verbindet die Unionsbürgerschaft aber andererseits mit dem Diskriminierungsverbot und setzt durch die Betonung von Gleichheitsrechten statt von Freiheitsrechten eine transnationale Gleichheit voraus, die der Unionsbürgerschaft vorausliegt und große Sprengkraft beinhaltet. Damit gerät die affektive Dimension von Bürgerschaft in den Blick. Wer sich als Bürger eines Gemeinwesens definiert, nimmt die kollektive Identität politischer Gemeinschaft in seine individuelle Identität auf. Dies ist einerseits erwünscht, weil so das soziale Legitimationsdefizit der Union überwunden werden kann. Andererseits birgt es all jene Gefahren, die aus den Hypertrophien und Katastrophen des letzten Jahrhunderts bekannt sind. Dies wiederum erlaubt einen Blick auf die Natur des Rechts, dem eine emanzipatorische und liberale Integrationskraft zugetraut wird. Eine kulturtheoretisch informierte Analyse hingegen zeigt, dass das Recht unter seiner liberalen Oberfläche eine Tiefenstruktur besitzt, die nach wie vor viel Atavistisches transportiert. Auch die Unionsbürgerschaft teilt diese Ambivalenz. Wer auf sie baut, um Europa vom Bürger her zu integrieren, muss sich dieser gefährvollen Zweiseitigkeit bewusst sein.

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Wörgötter Caroline

Das Konventsmodell: Höhere Legitimität für die EU-Entscheidungsfindung?

in *Oesterreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft* , 2005/4



No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Beck Ulrich

Das kosmopolitische Empire

in *Internationale Politik*, n. 7, 60. Jahrgang, Juli, 6-12

ABSTRACT: Weder Staat noch Nation: Die Vielfalt ist die Quelle, aus der Europa schöpfen kann Europa kann und wird weder Staat noch Nation werden. Darum kann es auch nicht mit nationalstaatlichen Begriffen gedacht werden. Der Weg zur Einigkeit Europas führt nicht über seine Einheitlichkeit, sondern über die Anerkennung seiner nationalen Partikularitäten. Gerade seine Vielfalt ist die Quelle, aus der Europa schöpfen kann. Und nur im europäischen Zusammenspiel liegt die Lösung nationaler Probleme.

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Robert Anne-Cécile

De la rébellion à la reconstruction

in *Monde Diplomatique (Le)*, juin 2005, 22 - 23

En disant « non » au traité constitutionnel, la majorité des Français ont aussi dit « oui » à des changements profonds, dans leur pays comme à l'échelle de toute l'Europe. Voici de premières pistes pour les débats à venir.

Comme par effraction, les peuples ont pénétré le débat européen : le 29 mai 2005, les Français rejettent nettement le traité constitutionnel, suivis, le 1er juin, par les Néerlandais. Ce qui devrait confirmer M. Anthony Blair dans sa décision de renoncer à la consultation populaire prévue au Royaume-Uni, tandis qu'à Prague le président tchèque a annoncé qu'il en ferait autant. « En cas de référendum, les Allemands auraient voté "non" », estime de son côté le député CDU Peter Altmaier (1). Dans le même temps, le lancinant appel à une « autre Europe » exprime une attente que les discours fatalistes des dirigeants n'ont pas anesthésiée.

Le projet européen doit répondre à la demande sociale et à l'exigence démocratique sous peine de perdre sa raison d'être. Compromis « indispensables mais imparfaits » pour leurs auteurs, les traités entraînent plus d'adhésion, même à contrecœur. En effet, pourquoi construire l'Europe si cela ne contribue pas à améliorer la qualité de la vie (emploi, lutte contre la précarité, pouvoir d'achat, environnement) ? Pour la première fois, les électeurs ont fait le lien entre les politiques, notamment économiques, qui leur sont appliquées et les choix effectués au niveau de l'Union européenne. Cette prise de conscience semble traverser les vingt-cinq Etats membres et leurs 456 millions d'habitants comme ils avaient déjà suggéré les forums sociaux de Florence (2002), de Paris (2003) et de Londres (2004).

La stupeur, l'incompréhension des dirigeants européens et nationaux devant le rejet du traité constitutionnel, leurs réactions parfois méprisantes confirment la nécessité d'une refondation démocratique de la construction



européenne. Déjà, l'idée de rédiger une « Constitution » hors des procédures adéquates donnait à l'Union un caractère aristocratique : le projet, rédigé sans mandat populaire par la convention (2), n'est pas sans rappeler Louis XVIII qui, en 1814, « octroyait » au peuple une charte fondatrice de la monarchie restaurée.

Un « monstre » économique-juridique

La légitimité même des décisions de l'Union est sujette à caution alors que, chaque jour, elles affectent la vie quotidienne des citoyens. En effet, les institutions de Bruxelles, qui ne respectent pas le principe de séparation des pouvoirs, mélangent technocratie, influence des lobbies, discussions parlementaires et négociations intergouvernementales au mépris de la transparence et de la responsabilité politique. Le droit de pétition prévu par le traité constitutionnel, pompeusement appelé « droit d'initiative citoyenne », ne fait que confirmer un droit inhérent à la libre expression et ne compense en rien la mise à l'écart structurelle du suffrage universel.

En outre, l'article I-47, qui incite les institutions à entretenir un dialogue régulier avec les associations, semble tenir pour acquis la marginalisation du processus électoral. Enfin, la Banque centrale européenne - dont les choix concernant l'euro et les taux d'intérêt sont sans appel et sans contrôle de la part des gouvernements - symbolise l'inexistence d'un modèle démocratique européen. Formidable tête-à-queue, la Déclaration universelle des droits de l'homme (1948) semble condamner cette infraction aux droits fondamentaux : « La volonté du peuple est le fondement de l'autorité des pouvoirs publics » (article 21, alinéa 3).

La démocratisation de l'Union soulève un tabou fondateur : fédéralisme, supranationalité, souveraineté nationale... Quel modèle choisir ? Cette question a été soigneusement évitée jusqu'à une date récente en raison des difficiles débats qu'elle soulève (3). Elle semble difficilement évitable et il faudra peut-être réfléchir à un mélange des différents modèles. Cependant, elle en entraîne une autre : où se situe la légitimité démocratique dans l'Union ? Lorsqu'un peuple accepte de ratifier un traité par référendum, la question ne se pose pas ; lorsqu'il le refuse, on tente de minorer son geste : ainsi, après le vote français du 29 mai, on rappelle que neuf pays « représentant 49 % de la population européenne » ont déjà approuvé le texte. Une telle opposition a-t-elle un sens ? Une chose est sûre : l'importance acquise par l'échelon européen impose qu'il soit, de manière crédible, responsable politiquement et démocratiquement (4).

Cette responsabilité est d'autant plus impérative que le contenu du projet européen est ouvertement contesté. Jusqu'à présent, la construction communautaire était fondée sur la méthode dite Monnet - du nom de Jean Monnet qui a conçu la première des Communautés, la Communauté européenne du charbon et de l'acier (CECA) en 1951. Elle consiste à construire l'Europe par projets concrets successifs suivant la technique de l'engrenage. Fédéraliste convaincu, Jean Monnet souhaitait ainsi parvenir à son but en contournant le débat public, source selon lui d'interminables discussions débouchant souvent sur l'échec. Le rejet du traité constitutionnel fait surgir la question interdite après des décennies de contournement obsessionnel : au fond, quel est le but de la construction européenne ?

L'idéal de paix ne suffit plus à justifier l'adhésion et les sacrifices qu'elle implique. La méthode Monnet, efficace, a cependant construit un « monstre » : une fédération technico-économico-juridique hors de portée des citoyens et de leurs préoccupations. Paradoxe : l'Union semble s'occuper de tout mais pas de l'essentiel : l'emploi, le progrès social, le droit international, la solidarité avec le tiers-monde... Elle semble capable de « prouesses » techniques (par exemple, les montages financiers de la politique agricole commune) mais impuissante à défendre un modèle social issu des histoires nationales.



La construction européenne s'est progressivement identifiée à la mondialisation libérale, vécue comme une jungle par les classes populaires et une partie des classes moyennes progressivement aspirées dans la nasse. Sans déconnexion des deux, on voit mal comment elle pourrait affirmer une identité propre et rencontrer ainsi l'adhésion des populations. Objectif indispensable à l'élaboration d'une autre Europe, cette déconnexion sera cependant ardue.

En effet, ce qui frappe le plus, ce n'est pas tant l'incapacité de l'Union européenne à construire un modèle politique et social spécifique que son refus obstiné de s'atteler à la tâche. Non seulement l'Union ne cherche pas à s'affranchir de cette contrainte internationale, mais elle l'encourage. Sur mandat des gouvernements, la Commission européenne joue à la première de la classe libre-échangiste dans les négociations de l'Organisation mondiale du commerce, comme elle ont notamment montré les conférences de Doha (2001) et de Cancún (2003). L'Union ne se contente pas de se soumettre à la logique de la mondialisation financière et libérale, elle l'impose, avec zèle, aux pays du Sud (accords de Cotonou, 2000) (5).

Pourtant, cette collusion n'était pas inscrite dans ses gènes. Le traité de Rome fondant la Communauté économique européenne (1957) instaurait une préférence communautaire pour les produits agricoles et ne craignait pas de tordre le coup au dogme libre-échangiste pour aider les pays du Sud, notamment à travers les accords de Lomé (6).

Devenue la première puissance commerciale du monde, l'Union européenne révèle ainsi sa volonté fondamentale de ne pas imposer une autre vision des rapports mondiaux, conforme aux intérêts de ses peuples. Double langage : les traités européens, toujours plus libre-échangistes et marchands, sont présentés comme des moyens d'affirmer l'Union européenne sur la scène mondiale. Perversité : c'est au nom de la « solidarité » avec les pays d'Europe centrale et orientale qu'on élargit une Union européenne mettant les peuples en concurrence les uns avec les autres (Lire ci-dessous l'article de Bernard Stiegler). Au-delà des incantations sur l'Europe puissance alternative aux Etats-Unis, elle se refuse à défendre des valeurs qui lui soient propres et qui marqueraient son identité. « L'Europe démultiplie nos forces », affirmait le président français Jacques Chirac dans son allocution télévisée du 31 mai. La guerre américaine en Irak a, au contraire, mis à nu l'inexistence de l'Union dans la géopolitique mondiale. C'est le refus souverain de la France - et de ses alliés du « camp de la paix » - qui a permis d'affirmer une autre voix de l'Europe que celles de MM. Anthony Blair, José Manuel Barroso et José María Aznar, et qui a sauvé les Nations unies du discrédit.

Ce refus d'exister a plusieurs causes qu'il est devenu nécessaire d'affronter. En premier lieu, la méthode dite Monnet induit un rejet congénital du débat public, qui empêche de construire l'espace public européen. Et, dans une Europe composée de vingt-cinq Etats, le plus petit dénominateur s'impose : le marché commun. En second lieu, la relation quasi freudienne de certains pays avec les Etats-Unis empêche l'émancipation politique de l'Europe. La peur de mettre en danger une alliance historique étouffe l'affirmation des valeurs européennes : rapport à la guerre et au droit, à la violence et à la peine de mort, statuts des personnes et des minorités. En troisième lieu, le poids de l'histoire n'est pas assumé : par exemple, la définition d'une Europe politique butte sur la peur de la puissance, peur issue du passé colonial et impérialiste, voire fasciste, de certains pays. Pourtant, de telles dérives ne sont pas fatales et l'héritage des mouvements pacifistes, anticolonialistes, mutualistes et syndicaux existe autant que l'autre.

Une autre Europe, sociale et politique, ne saurait se construire sans la levée de ces blocages, car ils empêchent l'Union de définir ce qu'est son intérêt commun. Ainsi, en s'embarquant dans la guerre américaine contre le terrorisme, elle développe une vision purement sécuritaire de ses rapports avec les pays du Sud



dont beaucoup de ressortissants émigrent dans l'Union et contribuent à son développement. La coopération avec ces pays ne consiste plus qu'à étendre le libre-échange et le partenariat euro-méditerranéen se limite à des incantations.

Une vaste et imaginative remise à plat du projet européen semble donc s'imposer dans l'intérêt de l'Union et de ses habitants. Elle implique une clarification, voire une redéfinition, des compétences européennes : la méthode de l'engrenage induit un effet boule de neige, les compétences s'enchaînant les unes les autres. Le marché commun a ainsi débouché sur la création d'une monnaie unique et d'une Banque centrale qui échappe au contrôle des gouvernements, ce qui n'est pas le cas aux Etats-Unis, où la réserve fédérale coordonne soigneusement sa stratégie avec la Maison Blanche. Or les choix de cette Banque centrale déterminent, pour une large part, la politique de crédit dans chacun des pays membres, et surtout les orientations budgétaires et fiscales - donc finalement l'évolution du pouvoir d'achat des populations.

Un moteur pour l'emploi

Cette conception du marché commun a conduit à un foisonnement de normes dans des domaines très variés : définition du contenu des produits - voir le cas emblématique du chocolat (7), règles sanitaires, notamment dans le cadre de la politique agricole commune, ou environnement.

Dans une Europe à vingt-cinq, cette logique fourre-tout risque d'accentuer encore l'absence de rationalité et de transparence. Afin d'assurer l'autorité de l'Union et son bon fonctionnement, certains en déduisent qu'il faut imposer le fédéralisme sans se préoccuper de la légitimité politique d'un tel projet (8). Le désordre créé justifierait en quelque sorte une violence de plus faite au peuple. Ne faudrait-il pas plutôt recentrer les compétences européennes sur quelques axes, autour de l'emploi, du progrès social, de la coopération industrielle et scientifique, de la paix ? La volonté de l'Allemagne de renationaliser la politique agricole commune, pour des raisons financières il est vrai, montre qu'une nouvelle répartition des pouvoirs entre les Etats membres et l'Union est possible.

Au-delà de la critique globale du libéralisme économique et du libre-échange, la mise en place d'une Europe sociale est en partie liée à cette question. Face à l'intégration économique, faut-il mettre en place une intégration sociale, avec une marche vers l'uniformisation par le haut des systèmes de protection ? Un accord est-il possible sur le contenu d'une telle politique comme il a été possible en ce qui concerne, par exemple, la mise en place du marché commun et de l'euro ? A minima, la généralisation d'une clause de non-recul paraît nécessaire : elle interdit de tirer argument de la règle européenne pour faire régresser les législations nationales. Cependant, une telle clause peut constituer une protection de papier dans la mesure où les gouvernements de droite et de gauche, imbibés de libéralisme économique, n'ont pas besoin d'une obligation européenne pour remettre en cause les acquis sociaux. Son application ne doit pas être laissée à l'appréciation de la Cour de justice de Luxembourg, juridiction par définition hors de tout contrôle politique (9).

De même, doit être remise dans les cartons pour ne plus jamais en sortir la directive Bolkestein, qui pénalise les salariés des nouveaux pays entrants comme ceux des autres nations : dans les premiers, elle encourage les entreprises à maintenir des bas salaires au nom de la conquête des marchés à l'extérieur ; dans les seconds, elle pousse à pressurer les salaires, au nom de la concurrence.

Au-delà même des clauses de droit social, sans doute l'irruption des peuples incite-t-elle à repenser l'ensemble de l'architecture européenne et à imaginer un autre moteur propre à répondre à la question



fondamentale de l'emploi. C'est d'autant plus urgent que la carte française des « non » recoupe assez largement celle du chômage, qui n'épargne pas les couches diplômées. Ainsi, dans leur bataille pour sauver la recherche, les chercheurs ont mis l'accent sur le besoin de politiques novatrices, en France et en Europe, afin de mutualiser moyens et expériences. Est aussi apparue dans le débat public l'idée de politiques fiscales et de crédit qui incitent à un nouveau partage de la valeur ajoutée, en faveur de l'emploi et des revenus salariaux (elle a en moyenne baissé de dix points ces vingt dernières années), en articulant le niveau national et le niveau européen.

Il s'agit en quelque sorte de refonder un modèle social spécifiquement européen. Les services publics doivent y retrouver une place centrale. Porteurs des valeurs de solidarité sociale et territoriale, ils sont les vecteurs indispensables du combat contre les inégalités et la précarité. Or, depuis le sommet de Lisbonne, leur destruction méthodique est programmée et mise en oeuvre. Sous le nom de services d'intérêt économique généraux (SIEG), ils sont soumis à la concurrence quand l'accomplissement même de leur vocation - égalité des droits, solidarité, aménagement du territoire - nécessite qu'ils en soient affranchis. Cette spécificité doit être reconnue, au moins dans le cadre du respect des compétences nationales. Mais elle pourrait aussi être posée au niveau de services publics transnationaux, dans les transports par exemple.

L'affranchissement à l'égard des règles du libre-échange mondial - qui laissent sans protection le marché européen face, par exemple, à certains produits chinois, comme le textile - implique, a minima, une réactivation du principe de la préférence communautaire (10).

Enfin, une autre Europe implique une vision renouvelée des rapports mondiaux. Les liens historiques, les enjeux politiques et les flux migratoires nécessitent que l'Union européenne définisse une politique à l'égard du Sud qui lui soit propre, fondée sur la solidarité et affranchie des règles inégalitaires de la mondialisation libérale. Les liens ainsi tissés avec de nombreux Etats largement négligés renforceront le poids géopolitique de l'Union.

Les peuples du Vieux Continent ont patiemment construit leur prospérité : ils en connaissent le prix et mesurent ses bienfaits. L'obsession libre-échangiste et concurrentielle apparaît alors comme une formidable négation de l'histoire. Mais aussi comme une revanche des classes possédantes sur tout ce qui leur a été arrachés depuis trois cents ans, depuis le suffrage universel jusqu'à la protection sociale. Cette spirale de régression humaine est bien résumée par le traité constitutionnel qui met sur le même plan la « concurrence libre et non faussée » et les valeurs de justice et de liberté. Elle impose un sursaut pour survivre au doute qui semble saisir les citoyens face à la construction européenne.

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Subsection 6. The European unification process

Ahrens Joachim, Hoen Herman W., Ohr Renate

Deepening Integration in an Enlarged EU: A Club-theoretical Perspective in *Journal of European Integration*, Volume 27, Number 4 / December , 417-439

The paper focuses on the problem of a simultaneous deepening and enlargement of the EU from the perspective of club theory. The EU can be perceived as a club that provides several non-rival but excludable goods to its members. Contrary to purely collective goods, for which the club size is infinite, club theory starts from the assumption that



membership size is an endogenous variable, as is the provision level of club goods. In order to enhance the quality of EU governance, it is concluded that the increasing heterogeneity of EU members requires a systematic initiative of creating clubs within the club. The treaty agreed at the Nice summit in December 2000 has been as insufficient to meet these requirements as will be the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe.

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Leonard F.M. Besselink

Defence: Old Problems in a New Guise?

in *European Constitutional Law Review*, Volume 1 - Issue 01 , 21 - 26

While the Nice Treaty cast a shadow over the Convention's work on the institutions and led to the project's first failure in the Brussels Summit, the war in Iraq cast shadows over the common foreign and security agenda. On the one hand, it proved the extent to which Europe is divided over substantive positions and over the means to act, particularly the resort to war. On the other hand, there is an increased popular sense that Europe should play a role (reflected in Eurobarometer polls, including one especially commissioned by Giscard). Article I-40 of the Draft Constitution on defence reflects that ambition. It remains to be seen whether this facilitates Europe to unite when it comes to giving foreign policy teeth in the form of a real and effective common 'defence' policy.

As with most other provisions of the Constitution, Article I-40 in the main builds on and consolidates the texts as we already have them in the existing Treaties, but at the same time, it innovates.

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Closa Carlos

Deliberative Constitutional Politics and the Turn Towards a Norms-Based Legitimacy of the EU Constitution

in *European law journal*, July 2005 - Vol. 11 Issue 4 , 411-431

Section C) Regional integration processes

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Marín Manuel

Democracy has been the first casualty of the Constitutional debacle



in *Europe's World*, Issue 1, Autumn

http://www.europesworld.org/PDFs/EW1_2.9_Marin_Democracy_has_been_the_first_casualty.pdf

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Fossum John Erik, Menéndez Agustín José

Democratic Constitution-Making – Reflections on the European Experiment

in *Oesterreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft*, 2005/3, 249-262

Laeken has ushered in the first continent-wide debate, on the issue of a European constitution. An important question is whether this amounts to Europe's constitutional moment in a critical normative sense. To address this we first distil out five core lessons from the Laeken experience. This serves to clarify which normative standards are relevant through reconstruction of those that actually informed the process. We find that the standards from normative theory are adequate, but that the complex European setting and experience throw up several thorny issues pertaining to how such a process can be organised, so as to comply with democratic norms, and whether it at all can be deemed to be representative. Our concern here is to shed light on how the tension between the idea of a constitutional moment and the notion of democratic representation can be resolved. To this end we develop a normative model of deliberative constitution-making.

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Schmitter Philippe C.

Democratizar Europa

in *Metapolitica : revista trim. de teoria y ciencias de la politica*, Num. 43 septiembre-octubre 2005

¿Realmente los europeos anhelan una democratización de la Unión Europea?, ¿qué tan informados están sobre el proceso de integración y la democratización de sus órganos políticos?, ¿no sería más conveniente que Europa se proponga primero consolidar las democracias nacionales antes que la democracia supranacional? Estas son algunas de las interrogantes que plantea Philippe C. Schmitter en este interesante ensayo.

No sabemos todavía cómo democratizar la llamada europolity en modo "veloz y total". Inclusive, no está del todo claro si los europeos realmente lo quieren hacer. Nada resulta más peligroso para la futura euro-democracia que ser impuesta a una ciudadanía que aún no está lista para ejercitarla y que está convencida por el momento que sus intereses y sus pasiones pueden ser mejor defendidas desde una democracia nacional y no supranacional.

Sin embargo, eventos recientes demuestran que la cuestión de la democratización se está imponiendo por la fuerza en la agenda de la Unión Europea (UE). El Tratado de Ámsterdam no sólo refuerza, a pesar de que sea en modo marginal, los poderes del Parlamento europeo, sino que también concibe la posibilidad de expulsar a un Estado miembro que "viole en modo consistente y persistente" los principios cardinales de la democracia, los derechos humanos y el dictado de las leyes. A pesar de que lo anterior pueda generar un cierto optimismo, aún falta una prueba efectiva para que los ciudadanos perciban la necesidad de que se está dando una mayor democratización de las instituciones comunitarias. La participación en las elecciones comunitarias sigue disminuyendo, si bien el Euro-parlamento ya ha comenzado a ejercer mayores poderes.

Estoy convencido de que es necesario mejorar la calidad de la euro-democracia, reformando las modalidades con las



cuales la ciudadanía, la representación y la toma de decisiones son llevadas a la práctica en las instituciones de la UE. Si mi previsión es correcta, es decir, si las reglas y las prácticas de la futura euro-democracia serán completamente distintas de aquellas ya existentes en el nivel nacional, entonces, es aún más apremiante que los europeos se muevan cautelosamente al experimentar arreglos políticos cuya configuración no tiene precedentes y cuyas consecuencias podrían revelarse inesperadas y también inoportunas.

Según veo, existen dos motivos para comenzar lo más pronto posible dicho experimento de democracia supranacional. El primero, existen pruebas evidentes de que las reglas y las prácticas de la democracia en el nivel nacional son cada vez más contestadas por los ciudadanos. No llegan aún a la revuelta o a los comportamientos “asociales”, o a lo que Gramsci llamaba “síntomas patológicos”, tales como una mayor abstención electoral, un decrecimiento de la identificación política, una más frecuente alternancia en el gobierno por parte de los distintos partidos, un menor prestigio de los políticos y una mayor impopularidad de los gobernantes, un aumento de la evasión fiscal e impuestos más altos que tienen enormes costos para las autoridades, acusaciones trepidantes de corrupción de los servidores públicos y, en general, una difundida impresión de que las democracias europeas contemporáneas sencillamente no protegen a sus ciudadanos. En efecto, sería un exceso etiquetar todo lo anterior como una “crisis general de legitimación”, pero algo no está funcionando bien ― y muchos políticos de los Estados europeos no se dan cuenta de ello―.

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Janowski Cordula

Demokratie in der EU gemäß der Europäischen Verfassung: parlamentarisch, post-parlamentarisch oder beides?

in *Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft* , 15. Jahrgang (2005), Heft 3 , 793-824

Democracy in Europe after the EU-Constitution:
Towards a Parliamentary or a Post-parliamentary Basis or Both?

The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe is the first European Treaty that contains a chapter about „The Democratic Life of the Union”. Rather than solving democratic issues it contains elements of several democracy models. While this may have been a necessary compromise the introduction of a „participative democracy” is critical. There is a highly visible link between post-parliamentary concepts and the EU-Commission’s governance white book from 2001. As a consequence, the democratic problems of the EU may become worse. If „governance by the people” were replaced by „governance by actors of the civil society”, Delors’ vision of the European elite as „enlightened despotism” could become reality again. This would be even more ironic as this concept of democracy caused the debate about the EU’s democratic deficit.

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Maus Ingeborg

Demokratie und Justiz in nationalstaatlicher und europäischer Perspektive - Zur Verteidigung der Verfassungsprinzipien des „alten“ Europa (III)

in *Blätter für deutsche & internationale Politik*, Juli, 2005 , 965-979



No abstract available

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Häberle Peter

Der europäische Jurist vor den Aufgaben unserer gemeinsamen Verfassungszukunft - 17 Entwürfe auf dem Prüfstand - Textanhänge

in *Jahrbuch des öffentlichen Rechts der Gegenwart*, Band 53, 2005

No abstract available

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Dylla Daria, Jäger Thomas

Deutsch-polnische Europavisionen

in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, Band 5-6, 2005

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Day Stephen

Developing a Conceptual Understanding of Europe's Transnational Political Parties (With a Specific Focus on the Party of European Socialists)

in *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, n. 1, vol. 13, april, 59-77

ABSTRACT: The goal of this paper is to develop a conceptualised understanding of the PES, as a transnational European political party. In so doing it will draw up a framework via which we can actually evaluate a transnational political party. The central claim is that such an understanding rests upon the interdependent relationship of four party-streams (factions) and a realisation of each streams position vis-à-vis weak or strong institutionalisation. I will analyse the resonance of this claim by looking at the historical and contemporary development of the PES. This will encompass the following dimensions: the party's genesis and its continuing legacy and the views of the streams concerning the future development of the PES.

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René Schwok · Stephan Bloetzer

Die Beziehungen zwischen der Schweiz und der EU

in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, Band 36, 2005



No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

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Vobruha Georg

Die Dynamik Europas und der zwanglose Zwang der Türkei-Integration

in *Blätter für deutsche & internationale Politik*, Juli, 2005 , 811-818

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Susanne Rippl, Dirk Baier, Angela Kindervater, Klaus Boehnke

Die EU-Osterweiterung als Mobilisierungsschub für ethnozentrische Einstellungen? Die Rolle von Bedrohungsgefühlen im Kontext situativer und dispositioneller Faktoren

in *Zeitschrift für Soziologie*, Jahrgang 34, Heft 4, August 2005

Summary: The article elaborates on the question whether the Eastern European enlargement of the European Union is liable to mobilize ethnocentric attitudes in Germany. It is the expectation that rapid social change as caused by the enlargement will be perceived as a threat by the individual. Recent theories of prejudice postulate that feelings of threat are an important predictor of discrimination. But not every individual tends to feel threatened in times of rapid social change. Thus, the integration of threat theory with the assumptions of the authoritarianism approach and the theory of disintegration is proposed to explain interindividual difference. The resulting theoretical model is tested empirically based on a representative German survey study (N=1008) conducted in the early Summer of 2003. Results show that under certain conditions EU enlargement may indeed mobilize ethnocentric attitudes. This is especially true for individuals with an authoritarian personality disposition. Only in East Germany does economic threat on the personal level additionally predict a devaluation of outgroups.

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Maus Ingeborg

Die Errichtung Europas auf den Trümmern der Demokratie? Zur Verteidigung der Verfassungsprinzipien des "alten" Europa

in *Blätter für deutsche & internationale Politik*, Juni, 2005 , 679-692

No abstract available

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Karlheinz Dürr

Die Europäisierung der Demokratiebildung

in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, Band 36, 2005

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

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Papier Hans-Jürgen

Die Neuordnung der Europäischen Union. Zum Vertrag über eine Verfassung für Europa

in *Europäische Grundrechte zeitschrift*, issue 23, vol. 31 , 753-757

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

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Maus Ingeborg

Die Rekonstruktion demokratischer Souveränität - Zur Verteidigung der Verfassungsprinzipien des

in *Blätter für deutsche & internationale Politik*, Juli, 2005 , 829-839

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Hilz Wolfram

Die Sicherheitspolitik des europäischen Führungstrios

in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, Band 38-39, 2005

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Subsection 6. The European unification process

Gellner Winand, Glatzmeier Armin

Die Suche nach der europäischen Zivilgesellschaft

in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, Band 36, 2005

No abstract available

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Bogdandy Armin (von)

Die europäische Republik

in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, Band 36, 2005

No abstract available

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Balaguer Callejón Francisco

Die europäische Verfassung auf dem Weg zum Europäischen Verfassungsrecht

in *Jahrbuch des öffentlichen Rechts der Gegenwart*, Band 53, 2005

No abstract available

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Trenz Hans-Jörg

Die mediale Ordnung des politischen Europas. Formen und Dynamiken der Europäisierung politischer Kommunikation in der Qualitätspresse

in *Zeitschrift für Soziologie*, Jahrgang 34, Heft 3, Juni 2005

Summary: The achievement of European integration as an experiment in transnational society building is closely linked to the potential of an unfolding European public sphere. However, in the current discussion about the so-called public sphere and the communication deficits of Europe a rather skeptical view prevails. Europeanization of political communication proceeds at a slow rate and it is not clear whether it will be able to meet the functional and normative requirements of the public sphere. This paper starts from the thesis of a functional relationship between the practice of rule- and decision-making in the EU and the emergence of a sphere of publics. The extent to which Europe has become the object of public observation and communication will be measured both quantitatively and qualitatively. This research is based on a comparative media analysis of political news coverage about Europe from the year 2000 in quality newspapers in six countries. Through the coding of news articles different degrees of resonance of the European political process can be measured. This will further help us to understand the effects of the unfolding European public sphere for negotiating the legitimacy of a European political order.

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Celotto A. - Groppi T.

Diritto UE e diritto nazionale : primauté vs controlimiti

in *Rivista italiana di diritto pubblico comunitario*, n. 6 , 1309-1384



No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

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Bonvicini Gianni

Discontent killed Europe's Constitution: Here's what to do

in *Europe's World*, Issue 1, Autumn

http://www.europesworld.org/PDFs/EW1_2.1_Bonvicini_Discontent_killed_Europes_Constitution.pdf

Section C) Regional integration processes

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Maurizio Massari

Do All Roads Lead to Brussels? Analysis of the Different Trajectories of Croatia, Serbia-Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina

in *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* , Vol. 18, n. 2, July , 259-273

The article examines the main factors that have affected the prospects of Euro-Atlantic integration for Croatia, Serbia-Montenegro, and Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH). For each of the three countries, the internal and external factors affecting progress are examined separately in both the domestic and international spheres, allowing for a comparative assessment of the role of the international community and for analysis of different ways of addressing key regional issues in the individual states. The central argument is that the difference in the pace of Euro-Atlantic integration among these three states has been a result of both EU policies and specific internal political issues within each of those countries. The article concludes with two possible scenarios for the region—one of rapid integration, the other of delayed progress resulting in a dangerous 'ghettoisation' of the Western Balkans—and emphasises the role of the international community's policies as a strong determinant of the outcome.

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Subsection 6. The European unification process

Jozef Bátora

Does the European Union transform the institution of diplomacy?

in *Journal of European Public Policy* , Volume 12, Number 1 / February , 44-66

Diplomacy as a framework of principles, rules and organized patterns of behaviour regulating interstate relations in the Westphalian system of states is challenged by the process of European integration. This article conceptualizes diplomacy and its change using two new institutionalist perspectives that provide us with complementary insights into the nature of diplomacy as an institution. These are then applied to the study of diplomacy in the EU. The process of European integration is shown as challenging the institution of diplomacy at three levels: (a) the intra-European bilateral relations; (b) the multilateral setting of the Council; and (c) the emerging capacity of the EU to conduct external diplomatic relations with third states. The article assesses change in and of diplomacy at these levels.



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Draetta Ugo

Dopo il Trattato costituzionale. La questione dell'Europa politica
in *Federalista (Il)/Federalist (The)*, Anno XLVII, n. 1 , 19-30

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Missiroli Antonio

Dopo la Costituzione, una politica estera comune
in *Mulino (il)*, n. 1, gennaio-febbraio, 2005 , 113-122

ABSTRACT: Sempre più evidente è la necessità che l'Europa impari ad assumersi le proprie responsabilità internazionali, per porsi come interlocutore credibile e paritario rispetto agli Stati Uniti. Le tante crisi internazionali l'hanno messo bene in luce. La Costituzione europea, ora sottoposta a ratifica nei diversi Paesi dell'Unione, sembra offrire gli strumenti necessari affinché, finalmente, ciò possa accadere.

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Vedovato Giuseppe

Démocratie, droits de l'homme, Etat de droit: CdE-UE. Trilogie pour la coopération paneuropéenne
in *Rivista di Studi Politici Internazionali*, Volume 72, n. 3 , pp. 471-478

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Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Auer Andreas

E pur si muove. Le caractère constitutionnel de la Constitution pour l'Europe
in *Revue du droit de l'Union Européenne*, n. 1 , 65 - 91

Section C) Regional integration processes



Subsection 6. The European unification process

Rehn Olli

EU Enlargement Under Stress

in *Review of International Affairs (The)*, Vol. LVI, n. 1119, July–September

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Egeberg Morten

EU Institutions and the Transformation of European-Level Politics: How to Understand Profound Change (If It Occurs)

in *Comparative European Politics*, n. 1, vol. 3, april, 102-117

ABSTRACT: One key indicator of profound change in a Westphalian state order might be the extent to which cleavages are cross-cutting national borders. The kind of conflict structure found at the European level is supposed to be highly dependent upon the institutional architecture at that same level. Arguably, a peculiar thing about the EU's institutional set-up is that it might be able to generate a multi-dimensional cleavage pattern at the European level. In that case, power becomes significantly redistributed, and serious conflicts along a single axis are less likely to develop. If EU institutions really are that important, then we have to address more systematically the processes through which they themselves come about and change. Prevalent rational choice explanations, including liberal intergovernmentalism, have their shortcomings when profound institutional change is to be accounted for, and, particularly so, if such change is intended.

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Biondi Andrea, Harmer Katherine

EU: Waiting for the Constitution: 2004 in Luxembourg

in *European public Law*, Volume 11 (2005) - Issue 3, 345-362

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Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Farrell Mary

Editorial: EU External Relations: Exporting the EU Model of Governance?

in *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Volume 10, Issue 4, pp. 451-462

No abstract available



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Theisen Heinz

Ein dritter Weg für Europa. Die kulturelle Erweiterung der EU

in *Osteuropa*, Heft 2, 55. Jahrgang, Februar , 3-14

ABSTRACT: Mit der geplanten Erweiterung in den orthodoxen und den islamischen Raum wird aus der bis dahin westlich geprägten Europäischen Union eine multikulturelle Union. Durch eine kulturelle Überdehnung könnte es zu dem Verlust eines für die Handlungsfähigkeit der Union notwendigen Wir-Gefühls kommen. Andererseits sollte aber auch die „soft power“ der Anziehungskraft der Union für die Stabilisierung Ost- und Südosteuropas genutzt werden. Dieses Dilemma kann nicht im Entweder-Oder einer vollständigen Mitgliedschaft, sondern nur durch Abstufungen zwischen einer Integrations-, Assoziations- und einer Kooperationszone aufgehoben werden. Die kulturellen Zugehörigkeiten sollten bei der Zuordnung eine wesentlich bedeutendere Rolle erhalten. Im interkulturellen Lehren und Lernen müßte an Differenzierungen und Übergängen gearbeitet werden.

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Knelangen Wilhelm

Eine neue deutsche Europapolitik für eine andere EU?

in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, Band 38-39, 2005

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Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Martinez Cuevas M.D.

El Consejo Europeo, su Presidente y el Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores

in *Revista de Derecho Constitucional Europeo* , n. 3 Anno 2

<http://www.ugr.es/~redce/ReDCE3/05mdolorescuevas.htm>

Section C) Regional integration processes

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Naranjo de la cruz R.

El Consejo de Ministros en la Constitución Europea

in *Revista de Derecho Constitucional Europeo* , n. 3 Anno 2

<http://www.ugr.es/~redce/ReDCE3/07rafaelnaranjo.htm>



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Bartolini Stefano

El Estado nacional y la integración europea

in *Metapolitica* : revista trim. de teoría y ciencias de la política, Num. 43 septiembre-octubre 2005

Una agenda de investigación sobre Europa y su integración es lo que propone el autor de este sugerente ensayo, pero para ello primero hay que desempolvar la indagación de prejuicios, lugares comunes y simplificaciones, como el teologismo, los neologismos estériles y el teoricismo en el vacío.

Sostener la necesidad de repensar una agenda de investigación sobre la integración europea puede sorprender, sobre todo si tomamos en cuenta la explosión de la literatura dedicada al tema los últimos tres lustros. No obstante, pienso que este reciente y acelerado crecimiento provocó quizá inevitablemente algunas distorsiones sistemáticas y determinó un cierto "extravío" de la problemática de fondo, por la excesiva efervescencia de los desarrollos y de su análisis inmediato.

Ello me obliga a afrontar en la primera parte el elenco de algunos excesos, defectos o debilidades de la literatura corriente y predominante. En la brevedad de la exposición, me volveré decididamente crítico hacia aquellas no pocas contribuciones que existen. En la segunda parte de la lectura sugeriré una perspectiva interpretativa que es necesario recuperar en este ámbito de estudios, delineando el tipo de teoría que necesitamos.

Finalmente, en la tercera y última parte discutiré tres modos distintos para afrontar los problemas de la integración que conjuntamente son perspectivas teóricas y proyectos políticos implícitos.

ALGUNOS DEFECTOS DE LA LITERATURA

Dividiré los defectos que pretendo brevemente discutir en dos grupos: dicotomías radicalizadas y dualismos excesivos; neologismos y "novismos" teóricos.

Intergubernamentalismo y supranacionalismo

El dualismo entre teorías intergubernamentales y teorías supranacionales ha dominado y sigue dominando la literatura sobre la integración europea. Incluso, la más modesta investigación busca consistencia teórica, concluyendo que sus resultados son compatibles con una visión intergubernamental o supranacional. Estudios y teorías sectoriales son constantemente evaluadas con referencia a la dicotomía supranacionalismo-neofuncionalismo y realismo-intergubernamentalismo. ¿Es esta dicotomía aún relevante? Me parece más trivial frente al hecho evidente de que la gran variedad de las políticas y de las iniciativas comunitarias responden a lógicas distintas; de vez en vez preponderantemente intergubernamentales o supranacionales según las áreas y los niveles decisionales, los distintos sectores de los tratados, por no hablar de los distintos momentos históricos;. Quizá no podría ser de otra manera. Por lo tanto, los resultados a los cuales se llega dependen en gran medida de la elección de la institución, de la política, del sector o del proceso que se ha elegido para estudiar. Estudiando las conferencias intergubernamentales y sus éxitos se concluye que ellas son intergubernamentales; estudiando las sentencias de la Corte de Justicia se revela su supranacionalismo y se invita a no descuidarlo.

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Guillen Lopez E.

El Parlamento Europeo

in *Revista de Derecho Constitucional Europeo* , n. 3 Anno 2



<http://www.ugr.es/~redce/ReDCE3/04enriqueguillen.htm>

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Núñez Encabo Manuel

El derecho de ciudadanía europea en la Constitución europea

in *Rivista di Studi Politici Internazionali*, Volume 72, n. 4 , pp. 601-630

The European Constitution establishes the beginning of a European Citizenship and a first development of It still quite limited. The constitutional text is confusing, messy and not systematic in its references to European Citizenship. That's the reason why I have tried in this first article to bring some order and coherence within the different references to the European Citizenship which are distributed along the Constitution, with a systematic and connected explanation of them. I have tried to be as clear as possible, taking the risk of being repetitive. Despite this, the European Constitution is quite a valid tool in order to get a total expansion of the European Citizenship in the future, because the text makes of this citizenship the most important element of legitimation both in a political and juridical way for the European Union. We could say that still no one born as a European citizen, this is a status that the person reaches along his life. That's the reason why European Citizenship has not shown still relevant facts in its development. The high index of abstention in the European Parliament elections and the problems in order to approve the European Constitution via referendum are two clear highlights of this problem.

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Vania Lorenzo

El proceso constitucional europeo: antecedentes y resultados

in *Estudios internacionales : revista del Instituto de Estudios Internacionales de la Universidad de Chile*, Vol. 38 / 2005 / Nr. 149 , p. 5

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Farrell David M., Scully Roger

Electing the European Parliament: How Uniform are 'Uniform' Electoral Systems?

in *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 43, Issue 5, December , 969-984

In 2002 agreement was reached on new uniform electoral procedures for European Parliament elections. This article does two things. First, it provides a comprehensive account of the rules under which the EP was elected in 2004, revealing a high degree of continuing variability in the existing electoral systems across all 25 Member States. Second, it addresses the question: if the electoral systems vary in form, do they also differ significantly in their effects?



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Nuno Gomes de Andrade Norberto

Enhanced Cooperation: the Ultimate Challenge of Managing Diversity in Europe

in *Intereconomics*, Volume 40 No. 4 • 2005 , p. 201

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Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Aktar Cengiz

Et si l'Europe puissance passait par la Turquie

in *Revue de l'Union européenne/Revue du Marché Commun et de l'Union européenne*, Numero 488, mai , pp. 303-304

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

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Unterberger Andreas

Europa neu gründen

in *Europäische Rundschau*, Heft 3, 2005

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

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Brusis Martin

Europa vor der Südosterweiterung?

in *Europäische Rundschau*, Heft 2, 2005

No abstract available

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Dahrendorf Ralf

Europa y el Occidente

in *Metapolitica : revista trim. de teoria y ciencias de la politica*, Num. 43 septiembre-octubre 2005

La tesis de Dahrendorf en este ensayo es decisiva para el futuro de Europa: si se aspira a construir un nuevo orden mundial, Europa sólo puede hacerlo junto con Estados Unidos. Esta alianza occidental tiene más futuro que una



especie de “Estados Unidos de Europa” como pretenden muchos insensatos.

El principal tema de este ensayo es un concepto, el Occidente, el cual nos lleva a las profundidades de la historia de Europa y América: y es extremadamente actual en el mundo después del 11 de septiembre de 2001 (11-S), o sea después de los ataques terroristas en Estados Unidos, que han hecho evidente la vulnerabilidad de la gran potencia, o mejor de la superpotencia, en el mundo entero. Robert Kagan ve el 11-S en su importante ensayo sobre Potencia e impotencia como un punto de retorno para Occidente: “Ahora que la amenaza llegó directamente al territorio americano pasando a los aliados de Estados Unidos, el dolor extraordinario y la vulnerabilidad de Estados Unidos se ha vuelto el tema dominante, y no el Occidente”. Al mismo tiempo, “también Europa ha entendido después de la Guerra Fría que el tema no es más el Occidente. Para los europeos el tema se ha vuelto la Europa”.

Son consideraciones ardidadas, y aun reconociendo que contienen algo de verdad, sostengo que en el fondo son erróneas. Ni la idea de “América” ni la de “Europa” tienen un significado correcto sin el concepto más complejo de “Occidente”. Como quiera que sea, yo permanezco como un hombre del Occidente, antes de ser un europeo, y mientras algunos de mis amigos estadounidenses aman ser primero estadounidenses, ninguna definición de esta identidad puede descuidar que los valores que están en su base son occidentales.

Se trata de afirmaciones muy personales, y no me disculpare por el hecho de que las observaciones que desarrollaré se apoyan sobre mis viajes intelectuales y políticos a través del Occidente y por tanto en vista de la constitución de la libertad.

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Allegretti Umberto

Europa, che fare?

in Democrazia e diritto, Anno XLIII, n. 2 , 219-224

No abstract available

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Massucci Enrico Maria

Europa, una Costituzione d'epoca

in Giano, n. 48-49, anno XVII, gennaio

ABSTRACT: L'approvazione finale del Trattato Costituzionale, dapprima ad opera del Consiglio europeo, successivamente del Parlamento di Strasburgo, cala definitivamente il sipario sull'ingenua aspettativa che la Carta continentale potesse finalmente dare sanzione a quel “modello sociale europeo” che, soprattutto da sinistra, si vorrebbe vincolante, rispetto agli equilibri sanciti dalle devastanti dinamiche economiche globali.

Come in un copione o una coazione a ripetere, ma in modo ferreamente conseguente, il testo del Trattato europeo sancisce invece la piena organicità degli orientamenti delle classi dirigenti del continente alle grandi tendenze epocali. E associa con malcelata disinvoltura alle politiche liberiste, di matrice americana, assunte in un'ottica di “naturalità”, il loro coerente sbocco “gestionale”, la guerra, riassorbita in una declinazione multilateralistica.



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Kulahci Erol

Europartis et politiques publiques: les sociaux-démocrates et la quête d'une politique fiscale

in *Swiss Political Science Review - Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft - Revue suisse de science politique*, Volume 11, Issue 3, Autumn 2005 , 79-100

La pertinence des Europartis dans la vie politique européenne constitue une préoccupation croissante auprès des praticiens et des chercheurs. Le rôle des Europartis dans le processus politique européen est un aspect important de cette préoccupation. Sur base des acquis de la littérature, le présent article proposera de nouvelles perspectives d'analyse qui seront appliquées au cas du Parti des socialistes européens (PSE) et à sa quête d'une politique fiscale. Nous défendrons la thèse que le PSE a contribué au succès de l'agenda de l'UE contre la compétition fiscale 'dommageable', et ce, malgré l'échec de la mise en oeuvre de son programme fiscal. En outre, notre analyse théorique et empirique remettra en question les approches institutionnelle et cognitive de l'intégration européenne.

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Pflüger Tobias, Wagner Jürgen

Europas Kriege der Zukunft

in *Blätter für deutsche & internationale Politik*, Juni, 2005 , 715-724

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Section C) Regional integration processes

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Beck Ulrich, Grande Edgar

Europas letzte Chance: Kosmopolitismus von unten

in *Blätter für deutsche & internationale Politik*, September, 2005 , 1083-1097

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Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Rogusch Kai

Europaweit verhaften

in *Blätter für deutsche & internationale Politik*, September, 2005 , 1039-1042

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Roussel Eric

Europe : la fin des illusions

in *Revue des deux mondes*, Septembre 2005

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Niblett Robin

Europe Inside Out

in *Washington Quarterly (The)*, Vol. 29, Issue 1 - Winter 2005-2006

Six months after the French and Dutch rejections of the European Union's constitutional treaty, Europe is still in shock. Member states remain in a self-mandated period of reflection in the hope that they can reach a new consensus on how to achieve their "ever-closer union."¹ Yet, the more time that passes, the more it becomes apparent that the basic foundations on which the process of European integration has been built over the past 50 years are now under assault. The EU's expansion from 15 to 25 members in May 2004 created new fissures that cannot be smoothed over with the sorts of trade-offs arranged in the past by its original West European member states, led by France and Germany. Is this then just the most recent in a series of temporary crises that have punctuated the EU's history and have generally served, in the end, to provide a new impetus for the process of integration, or should a gradual loosening of the EU or even a collapse of its key institutions be expected? Rather than presaging the unraveling of the EU, the current crisis appears to announce a recalibration of the emphasis that EU governments have placed on each of the three pillars of integration established by the Maastricht Treaty of 1991, which launched a new phase of European integration after German unification and the end of the Cold War. The first pillar encompasses primarily the EU's program of economic integration, including the single market and single currency. The second involves the development and implementation of common foreign and security policies among the EU member states.

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Mark Leonard

Europe Will Survive the French No

in *Foreign Policy*, Issue 148, May / June

No abstract available

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Straubhaar Thomas



Europe at the Crossroads

in *Intereconomics*, Volume 40 No. 3 • 2005 , pp. 118-119

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

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Thibaud Paul

Europe manquée, Europe à faire

in *Debat (Le)*, N° 136 septembre-octobre 2005

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

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Shaw J.

Europe's constitutional future

in *Public law*, spring , 132 - 151

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Section C) Regional integration processes

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Erin Delaney, Julie Smith

Europe's constitutional future – Federal lessons for the European Union

in *Regional and Federal Studies*, Volume 15, Number 2 / June , 131-143

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Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Marciali Sébastien

Europe: Actualités institutionnelles de l'Union européenne

in *Annuaire européen d'Administration publique*, 2004 , 533-557

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Section C) Regional integration processes

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Cassese Sabino



European Administrative Proceedings

in *Law and contemporary problems*, Winter 2004 , Volume 68, Number 1 , 21 - 36

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Auer Andres

European Citizens' Initiative

in *European Constitutional Law Review*, Volume 1 - Issue 01 , 79-86

The European citizens' initiative (ECI) is a new device of participatory democracy, which has its own characteristics, unknown to date at any level of national or trans-national government. It is designed to allow the citizens to take an active role within the law-making process of the EU. The specific features of this process affect the legal nature as well as the functioning of the new participatory device. Both will depend strongly on the European law, which shall determine the procedures and conditions required for the ECI.

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Kritzinger Sylvia

European Identity Building from the Perspective of Efficiency

in *Comparative European Politics*, n. 1, vol. 3, april , 50-75

ABSTRACT: The paper seeks to analyse whether citizens' utilitarian expectations towards the European level can explain variations in European identity. Based on Lipset (1960) it is argued that a political system that is expected to be efficient can gain identity. Identity is believed to encompass different dimensions of which efficiency is one. As such it is possible to use utilitarian reasoning to observe affective (identity) variations. As utilitarian expectations we use citizens' policy preferences. We observe whether they favour a national handling of the policy or whether they prefer the EU to be the main policy actor. The results of factor and multinomial logit analyses confirm the existence of a 'utilitarian identity' at the European level indicating that the development of a European identity is closely connected to the EU's ability to deliver policy outputs according to citizens' expectations.

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James G. Forsyth



European Integration Is Killing European Integration

in *Foreign Policy*, Issue 147, March / April

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Eilstrup-Sangiovanni Mette, Verdier Daniel

European Integration as a Solution to War

in *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 11, n. 1, March, 99-135

We seek to establish the conditions in which binding international institutions can serve as a solution to preventive war. Scholars of international integration portray institutions as a response to problems of incomplete information, transaction costs and other barriers to welfare improvement for their members. In contrast, we show that international institutions can have binding properties that solve credible commitment problems among member states — even in the case of volatile preventive war dilemmas. Our primary case is post-war Europe. We show that European integration since the early 1950s was conceived as a means of committing a temporarily weakened West Germany not to use its future power to pursue military ends in Europe, thereby obviating a preventive war against it. The various institutions that form part of the European Communities, now the European Union, still bear the mark of this goal. In this article, we establish the game theoretic conditions for the existence of binding international institutions as a solution to preventive war. We also provide evidence that the model is a good approximation of what political elites had in mind in the wake of World War II.

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Naert Frederik

European Security and Defence in the EU Constitutional Treaty

in *Journal of Conflict and Security Law*, Volume 10, Number 2, Summer, 187-207

This contribution analyses the provisions on the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (EU Constitution), focusing on elements that constitute a further development of the present *acquis* in this field. It successively addresses the adoption and status of the EU Constitution and the place of the CSDP therein, the objectives, scope and missions of the CSDP, the actors, decision-making, instruments and implementation, capabilities and permanent structured cooperation, financing, enhanced cooperation and cooperation with third States and other international organisation and concludes with some final remarks. The author argues that the commitment to a common defence as a future objective, the mutual defence clause, even with its caveats, the explicitly broader definition of the EU's crisis management missions, the possibility of enhanced cooperation on defence and of entrusting the execution of a mission to a group of Member States, the commitment to improve capabilities, the permanent structured cooperation and the creation of the function of the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs are significant positive developments in the EU Constitution regarding the CSDP. However, he submits that the CSDP still faces several major challenges, in particular some of the provisions concerned are rather ambiguous, a reference to



cooperation with NATO is lacking, Member States will have to live up to their commitments and it remains to be seen whether the EU Constitution will enter into force.

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Subsection 6. The European unification process

Pibá Jíí

European Union Constitution-Making, Political Identity and Central European Reflections

in *European law journal*, March 2005 - Vol. 11 Issue 2 , 135-173

This article focuses on the European Union's constitution-making efforts and their specific reflections in the Central European accession states. It analyses both the temporal and spatial dimensions of constitution-making and addresses the problems of political identity related to ethnic divisions and civic demos. It starts by summarising the major arguments supporting the Union's constitution-making project and emphasises the Union's symbolic power as a polity built on the principles of civil society and parliamentary democracy. The EU's official rejection of ethnically based political identity played an important symbolic role in post-Communist constitutional and legal transformations in Central Europe in the 1990s. In the following part, the text analyses the temporal dimension of the EU's identity-building and constitution-making and emphasises its profoundly future-oriented structure. The concept of identity as the 'future in process' is the only option of how to deal with the absence of the European demos. Furthermore, it initiates the politically much-needed constitution-making process. The following spatial analysis of this process emphasises positive aspects of the horizontal model of constitution-making, its elements in the Convention's deliberation and their positive effect on the Central European accession states. The article concludes by understanding the emerging European identity as a multi-level identity of civil political virtues surrounded by old loyalties and traditions, which supports the conversational model of liberal democratic politics, reflects the continent's heterogeneity and leads to the beneficial combination of universal principles and political realism.

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Nick Stevenson

European cosmopolitanism and civil society

in *Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research*, Volume 18, Number 1 / March , 45-59

The discussion of European cosmopolitanism and civil society has failed to take questions of culture seriously enough. While remaining sympathetic to liberal forms of cosmopolitanism, this article considers the view that such proposals fail to make space for the 'Other'. In the context of histories of nationalist violence, masculinism and consumerism this article discusses the charge that ideas of European civilization need to be reconsidered. In the final part of the article, I discuss the view that cultural feminism and certain versions of multiculturalism have much to contribute towards the European project. However, at this point, I seek to distance myself from essentialist arguments in respect of identity. A generative European cosmopolitanism would do well to take questions of cultural domination seriously without reducing



the complexity of modern identities.

Section C) Regional integration processes

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Pernice Ingolf

European v. National Constitutions

in *European Constitutional Law Review*, Volume 1 - Issue 01 , 99-103

In federal systems public authority is established by the people and exercised for the people at two levels. The treaties establishing the European Union may be conceptualised as the constitution of a supranational public authority, part of a federal system. And what the European Convention has submitted to the European Council to agree upon is an attempt to give this constitution a more coherent, more complete and more appealing form. The new 'Constitution for Europe' will be concluded, formally, by an international treaty. But governments and national parliaments will do this on behalf of the citizens of the Union, and insofar as national Constitutions provide for a referendum, the citizens will directly be involved. This Constitution will, therefore, like national constitutions, draw its legitimacy from the people, citizens of the polity, through their constitutional representatives. Legitimacy obtained is similar to that sought for a regular treaty but specific due to the contents and the explicit constitutional claim of the instrument.

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Major Claudia

Europeanisation and Foreign and Security Policy – Undermining or Rescuing the Nation State?

in *Politics*, Vol. 25, Issue 3, September , 175-190

The article aims to explore the utility of Europeanisation as a concept to grasp the interactions between national and European levels. The article illustrates how the EU impacts on the national level of policy, polity and the politics of Member States and assesses how the role of nation states within the European political system has changed as a result. First, the existing definitions of Europeanisation are critically assessed, contextualised and delimited. Initially developed for communitised policy areas in the first pillar, Europeanisation is defined as an interactive, ongoing and mutually constitutive process of 'Europeanising' and 'Europeanised' countries, linking national and European levels. Defining Europeanisation as 'domestic change', the article then discusses mechanisms, objects and forms, as well as the criteria and conditions of change. The article subsequently seeks to clarify the validity of the Europeanisation concept in capturing the increasing interwovenness of national and European spheres in intergovernmental policy fields situated in the second pillar of the EU, that is, foreign and security policy. Inherent methodological challenges, mainly due to the deficient delimitation of Europeanisation and the intergovernmental character of this policy field are discussed as well as the particularities of its applicability in this unique policy area.



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Liebfried Stephan, Wolf Dieter

Europeanization and the Unravelling European Nation State: Dynamics and Feedback Effects
in *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Volume 10, Issue 4 , pp. 479-499

No abstract available

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Subsection 6. The European unification process

Tocci Nathalie

Europeanization in Turkey: Trigger or Anchor for Reform?
in *South European Society & Politics*, Volume 10, Number 1, April , pp. 73-83

Since late 2001, successive Turkish governments have pursued an ongoing and unprecedented process of domestic political reform. Given the correlation between political reforms and relations with the EU, this process of change has been associated with Turkey's Europeanization. This article analyzes the link between Turkey's reform process and its path to EU accession. Did the accession process trigger the reforms as an external force driving internal change; or has domestic change been spearheaded by domestic actors that have used and been strengthened by the external EU anchor? What appears to be in the making is a process of change largely driven by endogenous factors, whose precise form and timing is intricately linked with the launch of Turkey's accession process.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Krisch Nico

Europe's Constitutional Monstrosity
in *Oxford Journal of Legal Studies*, Volume 25, Number 2, Summer , 321-334

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Stern Klaus

Europäische Verfassung und Grundrechte-Charta nach dem Nein der Franzosen und Niederländer
in *Teoria del diritto e dello stato*, n. 1 - 2005



No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

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Oberhuber Florian

Europäische politische Realität im/und Verfassungskonvent. Elemente und Funktionen einer supranationalen Institution

in *Oesterreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft* , 2005/3 , 279-294

EUROPEAN POLITICAL REALITY AND/IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION. Elements and functions of a supranational institution

This article is based upon an empirical investigation of the European Convention from an ethnographic and political science perspective. Five (competing or contradictory) aspects of the Convention process, its mandate and functions are identified and analysed in the context of the EU's recent development: on the one hand, the Laeken declaration had envisaged a broad debate of the finality and legitimacy of an enlarged Union; on the other hand, the consolidation of the Treaties was based upon the incrementalist and selective work of legal experts in the Convention Secretariat and facilitated by the social process of mainstreaming (or engrenage) with respect to the various voices of Convention members. As a further element, inter-governmental bargaining could not be avoided in the Convention, although compromises and governments' 'red lines' interfered with the legal rationality of the new 'constitutional treaty'. Finally, the self-proclaimed democratic mission of the Convention turned out to be rather a matter of rhetoric and public relations, and the contribution of the 'statal' political imaginary of constitution-making to legitimising the 'pluralist' Europolity seems to be doubtful.

Section C) Regional integration processes

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Hölscheidt Sven

Europäischer Konvent, Europäische Verfassung, nationale Parlamente

in *Jahrbuch des öffentlichen Rechts der Gegenwart*, Band 53, 2005

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Micheletta Luca

Ex pluribus...25 e più: l'allargamento dell'Unione Europea in una prospettiva storica

in *Comunità Internazionale (La)*, n. 2, vol. LX, secondo trimestre

No abstract available



Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Gibbs Nathan

Examining the Aesthetic Dimensions of the Constitutional Treaty

in *European law journal*, May 2005 - Vol. 11 Issue 3 , 326-342

One of the most important issues surrounding the new Constitutional Treaty is the extent to which it will be able to generate a greater popular identification with the European integration project. This article explores this issue in more depth by looking at the role of popular identification in securing polity legitimacy in general. An argument is then developed that although popular identification and polity legitimacy are often separated, from a practical point of view, it is preferable to think of polity legitimacy in such a way as to incorporate questions of identity and affectivity. The article then outlines a way in which such a theory can be constructed, termed an 'aesthetic' theory of political legitimacy. Such a theory is then applied to understand both the EU as a distinctive type of post-state polity and the role that the constitutional tradition might play in securing its legitimacy.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Krajewski Markus

External trade law and the Constitution Treaty: Towards a federal and more democratic common commercial policy?

in *Common Market Law Review*, issue 1, vol. 42 , 91-127

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Hix Simon, Crombez Christophe

Extracting Ideal Point Estimates from Actors' Preferences in the EU Constitutional Negotiations

in *European Union Politics* , Vol. 6, n. 3, September , 353-376

This article uses the Domestic Structures and European Integration (DOSEI) data set of actors' preferences on 65 issues in the 2003-4 Intergovernmental Conference to extract the underlying preferences of the governments, the Commission and the European Parliament on the main dimensions of conflict in the European Union's constitutional negotiations. The analysis starts by comparing the ideal point estimates produced by three 'inductive' techniques: exploratory factor analysis, NOMINATE and Optimal Classification. The results are a series of ideal point estimates that do not correlate well with some simple a priori assumptions about key actors' positions on the reform of the EU. The analysis then proceeds with a 'mixed' deductive/inductive method, in which responses to the survey questions relating to the two exogenous dimensions of constitutional design in a multi-level polity (the 'vertical' and 'horizontal' allocation of power) are used to generate ideal point estimates on these two dimensions. The result is a more intuitive set of ideal



point estimates for the 28 main actors in the negotiations.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Ferry Jean-Marc

Face à la crise, quelles perspectives pour l'Union européenne?
in *Politique Etrangère*, 3/2005, (automne).

Les défis de l'élargissement et de la constitutionnalisation étaient rudes. Le premier impliquait surtout un risque d'utilisation néo-libérale des disparités entre l'Ouest et l'Est européens. Quant au texte à ratifier, il a échoué à créer le patriotisme constitutionnel nécessaire. Il est urgent de s'interroger sur les finalités et les formes possibles de l'intégration, en délaissant la fausse évidence fédéraliste, les peuples se réappropriant les questions aujourd'hui contestées.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Komarec Jan

Federal elements in the Community judicial system: Building coherence in the Community legal order
in *Common Market Law Review*, issue 1, vol. 42, 9-34

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

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Lori Thorklakson

Federalism and the European party system
in *Journal of European Public Policy*, Volume 12, Number 3 / June, 468-487

Applying a framework from comparative federalism to the European party system requires examining the ways in which the European and national party systems are linked, through congruent or incongruent party system structures and through party organizations that either integrate or separate the two arenas of political competition. The European party system exhibits two forms of incongruence. The first is a high degree of party strength in some national party systems for parties that lie outside the ideological range of the core party families in the European Parliament. The second is the emergence of parties that compete only in European parliamentary elections on European issues, signalling the politicization of a European integration cleavage.



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Christin Thomas, Hug Simon, Schulz Tobias

Federalism in the European Union: The view from below (if there is such a thing)

in *Journal of European Public Policy*, Volume 12, Number 3 / June, 488-508

As a federal system the European Union (EU) has to deal in one way or another with the distribution of competencies. While conflicting views about this thorny issue are ventured in the literature, we emphasize in this paper the implications for political accountability. At the present time, most authors would concur, political accountability due to the institutional structure and the complex decision-making processes is mixed at best. Thus, we propose to explore the ways in which the distribution of competencies is viewed from below, namely by the EU citizens. As one might expect, we find evidence that this view is not yet as clear-cut as one might hope.

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Subsection 6. The European unification process

Roobol W.H.

Federalism, Sovereignty, etc.

in *European Constitutional Law Review*, Volume 1 - Issue 01, 87-91

For the first time in history, the aspiration to 'an ever closer union' between European peoples (not states) was laid down in the Treaty of Rome of 1957. The same idea has now found expression in the preamble to the Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe: 'Convinced that, while remaining proud of their own national identities and history, the peoples of Europe are determined to transcend their ancient divisions and, united ever more closely, to forge a common destiny'. However, as is usual in politics, the precise meaning of this formula is left unclear. Can pride of national identity and history go together with the forging of a common destiny? Without trying to answer this question, this short article looks at whether (a) European history, (b) the wording of the proposed treaty itself and (c) the international context can give some clues as to where forging a common destiny between the peoples of Europe might lead in a constitutional sense. Will the Union develop into a more or less centralised entity that resembles a state or will it remain the rather loose and open conglomeration of states it presently is?

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Subsection 6. The European unification process

Möstl Markus

Festvortrag: Die Europäische Union als Wertegemeinschaft - Eine verfassungsrechtliche Betrachtung

in *Politische Studien*, Heft 402, 56. Jahrgang, Juli-August, 22-33

No abstract available



Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Diez Thomas, Agnantopoulos Apostolos, Kaliber Alper

File: Turkey, Europeanization and Civil Society

in South European Society & Politics, Volume 10, Number 1, April , pp. 1-15

This article reviews the Europeanization literature and proposes to distinguish between four different kinds of Europeanization: policy-Europeanization, political Europeanization, societal Europeanization and discursive Europeanization. We link these different concepts to the impact of the EU on the current domestic transformations in Turkey and argue that existing scholarship has not sufficiently discussed the impact of Europeanization on civil society development, and the role of civil society organizations in furthering Europeanization. We establish the need to further analyze the triangle of Europeanization, civil society and Turkish political reform in a comparative perspective, introducing the other articles included in this SESP File

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Uzagalieva Ainura

Fiscal Consequences of Monetary Integration within a Common Economic Area: The Case of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia

in Post communist economies, Volume 17, Number 4 / December 2005 , p. 399 – 424

This article analyses the possible impact of planned monetary integration on public sector revenue from seigniorage in Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia. Using the concept of total gross seigniorage, we investigate the main sources and uses of the central bank revenue in these countries. Special attention is given to the role of seigniorage revenue in financing public sector expenditure. Amounts of yearly transfers from central banks to the state budget in Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia are evaluated, and the size of potential gains and losses in seigniorage revenue under different scenarios of monetary integration are estimated.

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Torben M. Andersen

Fiscal stabilization policy in a monetary union with inflation targeting

in Journal of Macroeconomics, Volume 27, Issue 1 , 1-29

Policy mix problems may arise in a currency union like the EMU since monetary policy (targeting inflation) is centralized and fiscal policy (targeting output) is decentralized. This issue is considered in a setting allowing for various cross-country interdependencies and types of shocks (demand/supply; aggregate/idiosyncratic). An inappropriate stabilization of shocks arises, and fiscal policy is too counter-cyclical when shocks are aggregate, but insufficiently counter-cyclical for idiosyncratic shocks. The stabilization bias is increasing in the number of fiscal decision makers when shocks are aggregate, but decreasing for idiosyncratic shocks. Numerical illustrations show that the cost of non-cooperative fiscal policies is higher for aggregate than for idiosyncratic shocks.



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Stettner R.

Flexibilidad en el Derecho europeo. Complemento autónomo del Tratado y cooperación reforzada
in *Revista de Derecho Constitucional Europeo* , n. 3 Anno 2

<http://www.ugr.es/~redce/ReDCE3/11stettner.htm>

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Vanoni L. P.

Fra Stato e Unione europea: il principio di sussidiarietà sotto esame della Corte costituzionale e della Corte di Giustizia

in *Rivista italiana di diritto pubblico comunitario*, n. 6 , 1457-1500

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

George Susan

France's "non" marks just the beginning of our campaign

in *Europe's World*, Issue 1, Autumn

http://www.europesworld.org/PDFs/EW1_2.2_George_Frances_non_marks_just_the_beginning.pdf

Section C) Regional integration processes

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Bühl Hartmut

Franzosen und deutsche interkulturelle Erfahrungen aus der Anfangsphase des deutsch-französischen Projekts EUROKORPS

in *Revue d'Allemagne et des Pays de langue allemande*, 37 (2005), 3

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

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Schmid Bernard

Französisches Duell

in *Blätter für deutsche & internationale Politik*, April, 2005 , 391-394



No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

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Petritsch Wolfgang

Friedensprojekt Europa und globale Ausrüstung

in *Europäische Rundschau*, Heft 3, 2005

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

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Dinan Desmond

Governance and Institutions: A New Constitution and a New Commission

in *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 43, Issue s1, September , 37-54

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Ringe Nils

Government-opposition dynamics in the European Union: The Santer Commission resignation crisis

in *European Journal of Political Research*, issue 5, vol. 44, august , 671-696

ABSTRACT: This article seeks to shed light on the sources of government-opposition dynamics in the European Union (EU). It considers the ideological left-right divide and the sovereignty-integration dimension as potential sources of a government-opposition cleavage in the EU, as well as a 'representation dimension'. The empirical evaluation of these propositions is based on a qualitative and quantitative analysis of the political crisis leading to the collective resignation of the Santer Commission. The article finds that government-opposition dynamics in the EU are related to the sovereignty-integration dimension of EU politics and to representation in EU executive institutions, rather than a left-right divide. Both political beliefs and opportunistic motivations determine government-support and opposition in the EU.

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Hunold Christian

Green Political Theory and the European Union: The Case for a Non-integrated Civil Society

in *Environmental Politics*, Volume 14, Number 3, June , pp. 324-343

Contrary to established ideas about the European Union's (EU) democratic deficit, a conception of European civil society based on contestation and communication within and across multiple public spheres is good for green politics and



ecological democracy in the EU. This article shows that the European Commission's own proposals for restructuring its relationship to civil society organizations follows a trajectory from "passive inclusion" to "active inclusion" of civil society groups. This historical sequence, I argue, is associated with weakening civil society's capacity to serve as a reservoir of democratic innovation in the EU's system of multilevel governance. I aim to show that efforts to green and democratize the EU are better served by a non-integrated European civil society.

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Zolo Danilo

Hacia una Europa de ciudadanos

in *Metapolitica* : revista trim. de teoria y ciencias de la politica, Num. 43 septiembre-octubre 2005

¿Qué papel juega realmente la nueva Constitución en la transformación de Europa? Ciertamente el tema es controversial y difícil de agotar de un plumazo. No por casualidad el proceso de aprobación de la Carta Magna atraviesa un impasse. Pero no por ello se puede obviar su discusión. He aquí una aproximación autorizada a la cuestión, a cargo de uno de los filósofos políticos europeos más reconocidos en la actualidad.

La aprobación en Niza de la Carta de los Derechos Fundamentales de la Unión Europea (UE) fue juzgada por muchos observadores como un evento excepcional, tanto por la originalidad del organismo que la preparó ―una "Convención" compuesta por 62 representantes de los parlamentos y los gobiernos nacionales, además del Parlamento y la Comisión Europea―; como por las novedades introducidas desde el punto de vista normativo e institucional. Bajo su perfil normativo, se dice, la Carta representa un Bill of rights incluyente, al punto de ofrecer un remedio eficaz al "déficit democrático" de las actuales instituciones europeas. Es la primera vez que en un documento internacional aparecen al lado de los tradicionales derechos civiles y políticos, y de los derechos sociales y económicos, los llamados nuevos derechos (bioética, protección de los datos personales, ambiente).

El reconocimiento de este amplio abanico de derechos subjetivos pondría en primer plano a los "ciudadanos europeos" y reduciría, por consiguiente, el hiato existente entre la "sociedad civil" europea, por una parte, y un proceso de integración que hasta el día de hoy ha estado dominado por los "poderes absolutos" de las tecnocracias económico-financieras y de las burocracias administrativas, por la otra.

Según esta interpretación, el reconocimiento de los derechos fundamentales ofrece una nueva base de legitimidad a las instituciones europeas, obligándolas a un trato justo y homogéneo sobre las expectativas de todos los ciudadanos, sin discriminaciones étnicas, nacionales o de otro tipo. Más allá de esto, la Carta puede ser entendida como el núcleo de la identidad política de los europeos, el emblema distintivo de su civilización. Ella "señala el pasaje de la Europa del mercado a la Europa política, de la Europa de los Estados a la Europa de los ciudadanos", como se han expresado, al término de los trabajos de la Convención, sus miembros italianos, entre los cuales sobresale el nombre de Stefano Rodotà, representante del Presidente del Consejo. Después de Niza, se podría hablar de una "ciudadanía europea" fundada sobre los derechos y no únicamente sobre la moneda común.

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Cimadomo Jacopo



Has the Stability and Growth Pact Made Fiscal Policy more Pro-Cyclical?

in *Lettre du CEPII*, N° 247 July-August 2005

The Stability and Growth Pact has recently been under close examination on the grounds that, rather than being associated with a neutral fiscal policy stance over the business cycle, it may have induced pro-cyclicality during downturns while also being unable to curb loose policies under buoyant economic conditions. However, the existing empirical literature does not find strong support to these arguments. By focusing on the euro area and on those phases of the economic cycle in which swings are particularly strong, it is found here that fiscal policy seems to have been neutral both in mild and severe recessions. In contrast, during upturns and from 1999 onwards, i.e. since the introduction of the Pact, a pro-cyclical bias is at play when economic conditions are particularly favourable. Nevertheless, this occurs also in other industrialised countries. Hence, the surge of pro-cyclicality cannot be associated directly with the adoption of the EU fiscal framework.

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Subsection 6. The European unification process

Urban Thomas

Historische Belastungen der Integration Polens in die EU

in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, Band 5-6, 2005

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Andrew Moravcsik, Kalypso Nicolaidis

How to Fix Europe's Image Problem

in *Foreign Policy*, Issue 148, May / June

The European Union must showcase its democracy-building skills while avoiding moral grandstanding and its own version of unilateralism.

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Alexander H. Trechsel

How to federalize the European Union ... and why bother

in *Journal of European Public Policy*, Volume 12, Number 3 / June, 401-418

Most authors agree today that the European Union (EU) is undergoing a process of federalization. This contribution argues that under the unanimity principle for constitutional change, the EU faces three fundamental structural and institutional developments which, combined, may severely hinder its capacity to adapt its constitutional order in the future. These three developments are the expanded number of veto players (through the recent – and future – enlargement), the proposed Treaty on the European Constitution drafted as a detailed text with a clear division of



competences, and the increasing use of national referendums on EU integration. By looking in particular at the Swiss but also at the American trajectories of federalization the author proposes three options for the EU to overcome its current 'federalist deficit'.

Section C) Regional integration processes

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Rick Lawson

Human Rights: The Best is Yet to Come

in **European Constitutional Law Review**, Volume 1 - Issue 01 , 27 - 37

Now that the EU Constitution has been adopted, one might be inclined to think that the debate on the position of human rights in the legal order of the European Union has come to an end. For more than 25 years academics and politicians have discussed the desirability of EC/EU accession to the European Convention of Human Rights and have argued for or against a separate bill of fundamental rights. That is all over now: Article I-7 of the Constitution provides for Union accession to the European Convention, whereas part II incorporates the Charter of Fundamental Rights.

It would seem, therefore, that a solid framework for the protection of human rights in the EU legal order has been put in place. The rest will be a matter of implementation: taking fundamental rights into account when drafting and executing European legislation; invoking these rights before the Court of Justice; lodging complaints with the European Court of Human Rights when the EU institutions, despite everything, failed to secure these rights. All very important, albeit that some may find the daily application of human rights not as sexy as the large constitutional questions of the past.

So is this the 'end of history' for human rights? Quite the opposite. The best is yet to come!

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Subsection 6. The European unification process

van Ham Peter

I "heart" Europe

in **Foreign Policy**, Issue 151, November / December

Think rioting in France and recent rejections of the European Union Constitution signal the end of the Europe? Not so. The European Union is still a model citizen, it just does a lousy job of selling itself at home and abroad. It's time for Brussels to learn its own brand.



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Ziller Jacques

I concetti costituzionali nella nuova Costituzione per l'Europa

in **Quaderni Costituzionali**, numero : 1, marzo 2005 , 67-110

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Cazzola Giuliano

I piccoli passi dell'Europa sociale

in **Mulino (il)**, n. 1, gennaio-febbraio, 2005 , 123-130

ABSTRACT: Cinque anni fa a Lisbona venne solennemente deciso di trasformare l'Europa entro il 2010 nella «economia della conoscenza più competitiva e più dinamica del mondo, capace di una crescita economica durevole accompagnata da un miglioramento quantitativo e qualitativo dell'impiego e di una maggiore coesione sociale, nel rispetto della sostenibilità ambientale». A che punto siamo?

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

von Bogdandy A.

I principi costituzionali dell'Unione europea

in **Diritto pubblico comparato ed europeo**, n.2 , 574 - 619

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Ciampi Carlo Azeglio

I sei Paesi fondatori avanguardie dell'unità europea come alla Conferenza di Messina

in **Affari Esteri**, Anno XXXVII, n. 147 , 455-459

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Ruiz Jiménez A.



Identidad europea y lealtad a la nación. Un compromiso posible

in *Revista española de ciencia política*, n. 12 , 99 - 127

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Andersen Robert - Evans Jocelyn

Identifying Europe ? The Role and Dynamics of a European Cleavage

in *Politique européenne* , n. 16, 2005

Traditional sociological accounts of party choice in European countries have been based largely upon the cleavage work of Lipset and Rokkan. Challenges to this model have posited changing social structure, individualisation of society and growing 'issue politics' as responsible for a decline of political cleavages and consequently of their electoral role. This article examines an alternative realignment hypothesis, looking at the possible appearance of a new cleavage based upon European versus national orientation. Having built a sociological definition of this potential divide and conditions for its implantation, the article uses Eurobarometer data from 1974 to 1996 to explore for evidence of a strengthening identity cleavage in accounting for party choice. Our findings reinforce those of existing research on the role of Europe : to the extent that European identity exists, it remains latent and largely untapped in most countries, with the exception of France. Europe emerges as an important issue from time to time, but the conditions for cleavage-emergence are still unmet.

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Giuseppe Allegri

Il No francese al trattato costituzionale europeo: verso il declino politico di Jacques Chirac e di un continente?

in *Federalismi*, Anno III, n. 11

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Azzariti Gaetano

Il Trattato costituzionale europeo: un corpo senz'anima

in *Quaderni Costituzionali*, numero: 2, giugno 2005 , 413-415

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process



Marini Francesco Saverio

Il fallimento della Costituzione per l'Europa e la sopravvivenza del diritto costituzionale europeo in Federalismi, Anno III, n. 24

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Johnstone Diana

Il lato militare della Costituzione europea

in **Giano**, n. 50, anno XVII, aprile

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

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Vigliar, Emilia

Il modello di unione europea nel Trattato che adotta una Costituzione per l'Europa

in **Diritto comunitario e degli scambi internazionali**, n. 1 , 151 - 178

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Padoa-Schioppa Antonio

Il no all'Europa e il difficile rilancio dell'Unione

in **Mulino (il)**, n. 3, maggio-giugno, 2005 , 543-551

ABSTRACT: L'esito conclusivo del processo di ratifica costituzionale va ben oltre il suo significato immediato. Dai risultati delle diverse ratifiche, in particolare di quelle referendarie, dipenderà dunque gran parte del futuro del continente. Nei fatti, è l'intera Unione a essere sottoposta a ratifica: ecco perché è cruciale il risultato netto che sta uscendo dalle urne in questa sorta di «azzardo democratico».

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IL Federalista - Editoriale

Il no di Francia e Olanda a questa Europa

in **Federalista (Il)/Federalist (The)**, Anno XLVII, n. 2 , 65-70

No abstract available



Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Risi Cosimo

Il processo continuo di allargamento dell'Unione Europea

in *Affari Sociali Internazionali*, n. 1, 2005

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Melica Luigi

Il processo di integrazione europea tra ordinamento statale incompiuto e costituzione 'incerta'

in *Giurisprudenza Costituzionale*, fasc. 2, 1443-1478

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Presa Silvano

Il quadro finanziario pluriennale dell'Unione e la costruzione del processo di integrazione europea

in *Economia Pubblica*, Fascicolo 4

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Giuseppe Allegri

Il referendum francese sul Trattato costituzionale europeo: in bilico sul "futuro dell'europa"

in *Federalismi*, Anno III, n. 10

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Martina Corrado

Il referendum spagnolo sul "Trattato che adotta una Costituzione per l'Europa"

in *Federalismi*, Anno III, n. 4

No abstract available



Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Rossolillo, Francesco

Il ruolo delle istituzioni nella lotta per l'Europa

in *Federalista (II)/Federalist (The)*, Anno XLVII, n. 1 , 45-57

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Yannis Papadopoulos

Implementing (and radicalizing) art. I-47.4 of the Constitution: is the addition of some (semi-)direct democracy to the nascent consociational European federation just Swiss folklore?

in *Journal of European Public Policy* , Volume 12, Number 3 / June , 448-467

This contribution scrutinizes how the Swiss approach towards democratization, which not only combines representative and direct democracy, but also includes federalist provisions and implies consociational practices similar to those in the EU, can reduce its democratic deficit. It proposes as a means of implementing art. I-47.4 of the Constitutional Treaty referendums that would be initiated 'from below' by citizens' petitions (with balanced geographical distribution). Popular initiatives on European 'laws' and 'framework laws' should be introduced. This contribution discusses various procedural variants of such institutions and concludes that, given the similarities between the European and the Swiss political system, direct democracy mechanisms in the EU would primarily produce – as in Switzerland – indirect integrative effects. They would reinforce the negotiated aspect of policy-making instead of acting as majoritarian devices. They might also reinvigorate interest in European matters and strengthen identification with the EU system.

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Ferraris Luigi Vittorio

In Europa oltre la Costituzione verso un nuovo progetto politico

in *Affari Esteri*, Anno XXXVII, n. 148 , 711-722

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Kaldor Mary, Glasius Marlies

Individuals First: A Human Security Strategy for the European Union

in *Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft*, Heft 1, 2005



ABSTRACT: In the era of globalization and asymmetric threats, a "human security" approach is the only realistic model for a European security policy. It focuses on the primacy of individuals and follows the logic of law enforcement rather than traditional war-fighting. It thus marks out a middle way between a non-interventionist stance and a geopolitical approach to global security.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Craig Paul

Institutional Structure: A Delicate Balance

in *European Constitutional Law Review*, Volume 1 - Issue 01 , 52-56

The inter-institutional balance of power within the EU is central to the new constitutional order. It is not therefore surprising that this topic, which is dealt with in Title IV of Part 1 of the Constitution, was contentious. This was evident in the process employed at the Convention. The Convention's general three-stage methodology of listening, examination, and proposal was not applied to the deliberations about institutions. There was no Working Group. The Convention discussions about institutions only began formally in January 2003. The Praesidium submitted its proposals to the Convention in April 2003. Full discussion of the draft articles concerned with institutions only occurred in the plenary session on 15-16 May 2003. There was no second reading in plenary about these articles. The Praesidium opted instead for consultations with the four constituent groups, governments, MEPs, National MPs, and the Commission, which took place on 4 June 2003. Formal text of the revised articles on the institutions only became available on 10 June, a mere three days before the concluding session on 13 June.

This short piece cannot deal in detail with the many issues concerning the institutional provisions of the Constitutional Treaty. It is designed to be a brief guide to the relevant issues

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Grimm Dieter

Integration by constitution

in *International Journal of Constitutional Law*, Vol. 3 n. 2-3 , 193-208

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Balaguer Callejón Francisco



Internationale und interne Ebenen und Techniken zur Verwirklichung von Rechten in Europa. Eine Verfassungssicht

in *Jahrbuch des öffentlichen Rechts der Gegenwart*, Band 53, 2005

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Quagliotti de Bellis, B.

Interrogantes geopolítico para la Grande Europa

in *Geosur : publicación mensual* , Vol.26 n 299-300 , Pag. 21-24

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Ziller M. J.

Introduction - Les administrations doivent faire face à l'élargissement et à l'approfondissement de l'intégration européenne - Avec ou sans traité constitutionnel

in *Revue française d'administration publique*, n° 114 , 213-218

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Belot Céline - Cautrès Bruno

Introduction : Redéfinitions et recompositions des partis et systèmes partisans autour de l'enjeu européen : Premiers sillons sur un terrain en friche

in *Politique européenne* , n. 16, 2005

Although often dismissed as an impotent party system (Mair, 1999 ; Hix, 2000 ; Ladrech, 1999) the emerging networks at EU level demonstrate an incremental interdependence and growing policy convergence between national parties of the same ideological families spirituelles. However the persistent democratic deficit and declining voter turnout in EP elections undermines their efficient policy performance. The under-researched behaviour of party networks' representation is examined with data for mid-level elites and rank and file members of the PES network from the new Membership Survey (2001). The profile, attitudes and behaviour of these 'members' are examined in comparison to non-members from Eurobarometer, to explore the 'added value' of involvement in a trans-national party network. This complex relationship with the voter - through Multi Level Governance structures and indirect membership - plays a central role in defining these voters' relationship with the EU. Hence, the evidence from this membership survey implies that co-operation and convergence within party systems across Europe is not restricted to the party elites. If this assertion is acknowledged, then a reassessment is called for on the significance of EU trans-national party development.



Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Utard Jean-Michel

Inventer une télévision européenne: le cas de l'information sur ARTE

in *Revue d'Allemagne et des Pays de langue allemande*, 37 (2005), 1

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Flogaitis Spyridon , Pottakis Andreas

Judicial Protection Under the Constitution

in *European Constitutional Law Review*, Volume 1 - Issue 01 , 108-111

The challenges for the system of judicial protection of the EU spring from two main developments: first, the enlargement of the EU, which inevitably affects all institutions of the Union, most notably their organisational structure and modus operandi, second, the deepening and widening of the areas falling within the scope of competences of the EU. Article I-28 Draft Constitution states that the Court of Justice of the EU shall include the ECJ, the High Court and specialised courts. These courts, together with the national courts of all levels, constitute the intricate nexus offering judicial protection in the EU. The issues that dominated debates on the reform of the system of judicial protection varied from the amendment of Article 230.4 EC on the locus standi of applicants, to the impact of the incorporation of the Charter of Human Rights and to the competences of the ECJ in the areas of the second and third pillar. They all relate to the deepening and widening of the Union through this Draft Constitution.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Irondelle Bastien

L'Europe de la défense à la croisée des chemins ?

in *Critique Internationale*, N°26 - Janvier 2005

Malgré les tensions européennes et la crise du lien transatlantique à propos de la guerre en Irak, l'année 2004 a été marquée par des avancées significatives dans le domaine de la Politique européenne de sécurité et de défense (PESD), au point que l'Europe de la défense fait aujourd'hui figure de principale source de satisfaction dans un paysage européen « sinistré ». L'avenir de la PESD en demeure pas moins chargé de lourdes incertitudes. L'examen critique de chacun des grands chantiers de l'Europe de la défense permet de dresser le tableau des futures orientations de la PESD



Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Grahl John

**L'absurde statut de la Banque centrale
in Monde Diplomatique (Le)**, juillet 2005

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Amato Giuliano

**L'Europa dopo i referendum
in ItalianiEuropei**, n. 3 , 7 - 10

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Ruffolo Giorgio

**L'Europe après (le) coup?
in ItalianiEuropei**, n. 3 , 59- 66

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

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243 - 260

**L'Union européenne: vers une nouvelle forme de fédéralisme?
in Revue Trimestrielle de droit européen**, n. 2 , Paris Jean-Claude

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Tosato Gian Luigi, Greco Ettore

L'Unione da ratificare



in **Mulino (il)**, n. 3, maggio-giugno, 2005 , 552-558

ABSTRACT: Nell'Unione allargata a 25 il processo di ratifica dei Trattati risulta particolarmente complesso. Il rischio di una bocciatura del Trattato che istituisce la Costituzione europea è ora più che mai concreto, soprattutto per la scelta di molti Paesi di ricorrere allo strumento referendario. Nel 2005, dopo Spagna, Francia e Paesi Bassi, toccherà al Lussemburgo e, in autunno, a Polonia, Danimarca e Portogallo.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Beghini Alessandro

L'Unione europea e la globalizzazione: un nuovo ordine economico o qualcosa di più?

in **Affari Sociali Internazionali**, n. 1, 2005

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Milanese Jimmy O.

L'allargamento ad Est dell'Unione europea

in **Rivista Italiana di Politiche Pubbliche**, Numero 1 / 05, Aprile , 115-144

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Martenet Vincent

L'émergence d'un

in **Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Internationales und Europäisches Recht**, Heft 2, 15. Jahrgang , 281-313

ABSTRACT: The sources of fundamental rights within the European Union are several. Those sources and the way they relate to each other are analysed in the present contribution, which also takes account of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. After setting out the current inadequacies of the fundamental rights' judicial protection within the European Union, the present contribution ends with a plea in favour of the creation of a specific legal remedy to protect fundamental rights

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Subsection 6. The European unification process

Dimitrakopoulos Dionyssi G., Kassim Hussein

La Commission européenne et le débat sur l'avenir de l'Europe

in **Critique Internationale**, N°28 - Juillet / Septembre 2005



No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Brigot André

La Constitution et l'union politique: de la dilution à la reconstruction?

in Politique Etrangère, 2/2005, (été).

Au-delà de certains progrès institutionnels, le traité constitutionnel organise des espaces de coopération entre États plus qu'il ne structure un acteur politique européen. La frilosité budgétaire des États jointe aux ambiguïtés du traité laisse mal augurer de la gouvernabilité d'un ensemble à 30. Mais le traité peut sans doute permettre aux États qui le souhaitent, au-delà des difficultés de la ratification, de reprendre la construction d'une entité politique nouvelle.

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Subsection 6. The European unification process

Cohen Antonin

La Constitution européenne. Ordre politique, utopie juridique et guerre froide

in Critique Internationale, N°26 - Janvier 2005

Cet article porte sur la genèse et l'échec du premier projet de Constitution européenne. En analysant les réseaux politiques et les mobilisations transnationales qui ont ainsi favorisé la promotion de la Constitution comme catégorie d'entendement d'un ordre politique européen, dans le contexte de la guerre froide, il entend notamment illustrer tout ce que cette utopie doit aux investissements des juristes dans la formalisation d'un modèle de fédéralisme fondé sur un comparatisme dans lequel la Constitution américaine tend à faire référence.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Toulemon Robert

La Constitution européenne. Son origine, ses vertus, ses faiblesses

in Revue de l'Union européenne/Revue du Marché Commun et de l'Union européenne, Numero 487, avril , pp.

213-219

The European Constitution. Its origins, strengths and weaknesses.

The constitutional treaty which should be presented to the French people for a vote in June includes significant areas of progress but also weaknesses. Common values are stated far more clearly. The targets, competence and activities of the Union are better defined. The institutions are to be made more democratic and more efficient. However, it is regrettable that the veto will be maintained in numerous fields and that there will be no system created to give the Union



real resources of its own. Questions must also be raised concerning certain institutional changes, the value of which only time will reveal. However imperfect it may be, if it is adopted this Constitution will provide further progress along that long road leading the peoples of Europe away from their previous conflicts and helping them to build a future together. It will also contribute to developing a sense of common identity without which it would be impossible to create a truly European political body. Rejection of the Constitution would lead to a period of stagnation. Should the rejection come from France, this would seriously harm the image of our country and its capacity to influence events.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Luchaire François

La Constitution pour l'Europe devant le Conseil constitutionnel

in *Revue du droit public et de la science politique en France et à l'étranger*, n. 1 , 51-58

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Lenaerts Koen, Van Nuffel Pier

La Constitution pour l'Europe et l'Union comme entité politique et ordre juridique

in *Cahiers de Droit Européen*, n. 1 - 2 , 13 - 126

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Lenaerts K., van Nuffel P.

La Constitution pour l'Europe et l'Union comme entité politique et ordre juridique

in *Les Cahiers de droit europeen*, Vol. 41 n. 1-2 , 13 - 126

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Delors Jacques

La Constitution, un pas en avant pour l'Union européenne

in *Revue du droit de l'Union Européenne*, n. 1 , 5 - 10



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Subsection 6. The European unification process

Violini L. , Pèrez Tremps P.

La Costituzione europea e l'organizzazione territoriale degli Stati membri

in *Rivista italiana di diritto pubblico comunitario*, n. 6 , 1431-1456

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Frediani Carlo M.

La Costituzione europea e la ratifica

in *Affari Esteri*, Anno XXXVII, n. 145 , 38-44

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Desmoulin Gil

La Cour et les États: qui contrôle qui? Indépendance de la Cour des Comptes européenne et souveraineté des États membres

in *Revue de l'Union européenne/Revue du Marché Commun et de l'Union européenne*, Numero 491, septembre , pp. 515-523

The Court and the States: who control who? European Court of Accounts and member country sovereignty. Even though the Court of Accounts has become somewhat of an institution, on par with "major institutions" as the Council, the Parliament, the Commission and the Court of Justice, the European Union's high auditing body still lacks independence and political or even democratic legitimacy. As a rule, it appears that the action of the Court of Accounts is slowed by a set of weak points pertaining to the inconsistent process of appointment of Court members and to the practical limitations of the theoretical and legal equality between member countries. Such national privileges seem difficult to question, and assertion against national institutions can be achieved through new reforms, likely to transform the institutional position of the external auditing body. This requires the development of an integrated, federal public account auditing system bringing together the European Court of Accounts and national high auditing institutions. Lastly, the reinforcing of the status of the external auditing body could be completed by the establishment of a Court of Account auditing system, as auditing is ineffective unless it results in a sanction.



Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Yakemtchouk Romain

La Croatie: deviendra-t-elle membre de l'Union européenne?

in *Revue de l'Union européenne/Revue du Marché Commun et de l'Union européenne*, Numero 488, mai , pp. 317-324

Will Croatia become a member of the European Union?

Having recognised Croatia's independence in January 1992, the European community remained highly critical of the authoritarian regime of President Tudjman, who argued for an "ethnically pure" Croatia. It was only after his death in December 1999 that it began to weave closer relations with the new Croatian authorities, who opted for a democracy and a state of law. The stabilisation and association agreement between the EU and Croatia was concluded in October 2001. This is based on a respect for democratic principles and human rights. Following Croatia's application to join the European Union in February 2003, the EU granted it the status of candidate nation in June 2004. It was decided that the negotiations concerning Croatia's membership of the EU would begin in March 2005. The Croatians must fulfil the Copenhagen criteria. More particularly, the EU has required the government in Zagreb to commit itself to fully co-operating with the International Criminal Court for Yugoslavia, and to hand over General Ante Gotovina to the court, who was charged for war crimes in 2001. As this requirement has not been observed, the ministers of foreign affairs for the EU postponed negotiations on arch 16. The European Council of March 22-23 nevertheless granted a final extension to Croatia.

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Subsection 6. The European unification process

Jabko Nicolas

La France face à la Constitution européenne : un héritage mal assumé

in *Critique Internationale*, N°28 - Juillet / Septembre 2005

Comme l'illustre l'exemple de la Bosnie-Herzégovine, la relation décisive sur laquelle cet article met en lumière le poids des facteurs institutionnels dans la détermination des préférences françaises quant à l'avenir de l'Europe. Le gouvernement français a été obligé de prendre acte du reformatage du débat à la Convention et de l'héritage institutionnel européen. Cette logique institutionnelle a été prépondérante par rapport aux ambitions de puissance nationale, aux considérations sur l'efficacité du processus de décision et à la vision de l'Europe des dirigeants français. Elle a ensuite plombé le débat du référendum, car elle n'a jamais été positivement assumée.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Jean Carlo

La PESD e la PESD nell'Unione allargata

in *Affari Esteri*, Anno XXXVII, n. 145 , 117-134

No abstract available



Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Marian Michel

La campagne référendaire: du chaos à une nouvelle exigence politique?

in *Esprit*, n. 315, juin 2005

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Bonetti Paolo

La chiesa è relativista. Le ragioni dell'europa federale

in *Critica liberale*, n. 115, maggio 2005

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Rubio Llorente Francisco

La constitucionalizacion del proceso de integracion europea

in *Revista de Occidente*, n. 284 , 5 - 22

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Robles Carrillo Margarita

La coordinación de políticas nacionales en el marco de la Unión Europea

in *Revista Electrónica de Estudios Internacionales*, Número 10/ 2005

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Calamia Pietro

La crisi europea

in *Affari Esteri*, Anno XXXVII, n. 148 , 723-729

No abstract available



Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Venturini Franco

La difesa e l'Unione Europea

in *Affari Esteri*, Anno XXXVII, n. 145 , 135-140

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

de Witte Bruno

La dimensione nazionale della revisione dei Trattati europei

in *Quaderni Costituzionali*, numero : 1, marzo 2005 , 39-66

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Beghini Alessandro

La dimensione sociale ed economica del Trattato costituzionale dell'Unione europea

in *Affari Sociali Internazionali*, n. 3, 2005

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

von Thadden Rudolf

La fin d'une époque ? Le couple franco-allemand dans une Europe en mutation

in *Revue des deux mondes*, Octobre / Novembre 2005

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Ninatti S.

La formula parlamentare europea dagli esordi al Trattato costituzionale

in *Rivista italiana di diritto pubblico comunitario*, n. 6 , 1395-1431



No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Fishkin James

La mia proposta di un Sondaggio Deliberativo europeo

in *Reset*, Numero 90, Luglio / Agosto

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Colelli Andrea

La parola senza la realtà. Il trattato "costituzionale" alla prova di talune popolazioni europee

in *Democrazia e diritto*, Anno XLIII, n. 2 , 240-252

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Delpech Raphaël - Paugam Jean-Marie

La politique commerciale de l'Union européenne: le fédéralisme clandestin

in *Politique Etrangère*, 4/2005 (hiver)

L'Union européenne a longtemps usé de sa politique commerciale comme d'une politique extérieure de substitution, assurant son propre développement et modelant ses partenaires à son image. Cependant les difficultés internes – intérêts économiques et politiques divergents – et externes – négociations de l'OMC, politiques de la Chine ou des concurrents américain ou japonais – mettent à mal le modèle d'une Europe au fédéralisme inachevé, menant une politique étrangère qui ne s'assume pas comme telle.

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Mahjoub Azzam

La politique européenne de voisinage: un dépassement du partenariat euro-méditerranéen

in *Politique Etrangère*, 3/2005, (automne).

La politique européenne de voisinage peut approfondir le partenariat euro-méditerranéen et aider plus décisivement à la réforme des sociétés du Sud. Mais il faudrait reconnaître le droit au développement comme objectif central, avec les conséquences qui en découlent; clarifier l'horizon du rapprochement avec l'acquis communautaire; et que les membres de l'Union acceptent de s'ouvrir dans deux domaines essentiels pour leurs partenaires: les produits agricoles et



l'immigration.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Perez Villalobos M.C.

La política exterior y de seguridad común en el Tratado constitucional de la Unión Europea

in *Revista de Derecho Constitucional Europeo* , n. 3 Anno 2

<http://www.ugr.es/~redce/ReDCE3/12perezvillalobos.htm>

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Angel Benjamin

La préparation de l'élargissement de la zone euro

in *Revue de l'Union européenne/Revue du Marché Commun et de l'Union européenne*, Numero 490, juillet-août , pp.

434-440

With 11 countries on its doorstep, the Euro zone will be expanding greatly in the coming five years. The article analyses the position of new member countries in relationship to convergence criteria (inflation, public debt, interest rate, deficits...) and legal requirements to be complied with in order to be admissible for the Euro zone, and also casts some light on the Commission's doctrine. It draws some lessons from the Euro transition of the first group of participants and gives information about efforts underway in applying countries to prepare the material introduction of the Euro. Lastly, it tries to explain the origin of survey results showing the reluctance of new member country citizen towards the single currency.

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Panarari Massimiliano

La questione francese

in *Mulino (il)*, n. 3, maggio-giugno, 2005 , 559-568

ABSTRACT: Il «no» francese alla Costituzione europea deve essere letto al di là dell'opposizione all'Unione politica da parte dei cittadini d'Oltralpe. È un segnale che, grazie alla sua nettezza, impone all'attenzione di tutto il continente le difficoltà sociali ed economiche di un grande Paese. È in larga misura il rifiuto di una politica percepita come fattore di incremento delle differenze sociali.

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Nicotra Ida

La ratifica del Trattato sulla Costituzione europea



in **Quaderni Costituzionali**, numero : 1, marzo 2005 , 165-166

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Ziller J.

La ratification des traités européens après des référendums négatifs: que nous disent les précédents danois et irlandais?

in *Rivista italiana di diritto pubblico comunitario*, n. 2 , 365-376

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Rozès Stéphane

La renationalisation du débat européen

in *Debat (Le)*, N° 136 septembre-octobre 2005

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Margiotta Broglio Francesco

La sfida delle libertà di religione o convinzione nel Trattato costituzionale dell'Unione Europea

in *Rivista di Studi Politici Internazionali*, Volume 72, n. 2 , pp. 265-272

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Wahl Jean

Le 29 mai, et après?

in *Revue de l'Union européenne/Revue du Marché Commun et de l'Union européenne*, Numero 493, décembre , pp. 629-630



No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Levade Anne

Le Conseil constitutionnel aux prises avec la Constitution européenne

in *Revue du droit public et de la science politique en France et à l'étranger*, n. 1 , 19-50

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Kassim Hussein

Le Royaume-Uni et le Traité constitutionnel européen

in *Critique Internationale*, N°28 - Juillet / Septembre 2005

L'expérience britannique dans la négociation du traité constitutionnel est instructive et paradoxale. En ce qui concerne le Royaume-Uni, la façon dont ses préférences ont été élaborées met en cause les assertions de l'intergouvernementalisme libéral, théorie dominante en la matière. Sur le Traité constitutionnel, le New Labour a adopté une approche positive et constructive fort différente de l'attitude des précédents gouvernements, mais son refus de mobiliser l'opinion publique intérieure a contribué à empêcher l'avènement de ce qui aurait été une «Constitution britannique». Si les circonstances lui ont évité de tenir le référendum qu'il avait promis, le gouvernement n'a finalement réussi qu'à s'aliéner ses partenaires européens à l'étranger et, sur le front intérieur, à laisser aux eurosceptiques remporter une victoire par défaut.

Section C) Regional integration processes

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Cagiati Andrea

Le alternative alla Costituzione europea

in *Affari Esteri*, Anno XXXVII, n. 147 , 545-553

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Heller Agnes

Le grandi narrazioni dell'identità europea

in *Lettera Internazionale*, n. 83, 2005

No abstract available



Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Frosini Tommaso Edoardo

Le istanze democratiche nel processo di costituzionalizzazione europeo

in *Federalismi*, Anno III, n. 20

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Draetta Ugo

Le lezioni da trarre dai primi "no" ai referendum sulla costituzione europea

in *Comunità Internazionale (La)*, n. 3, vol. LX, terzo trimestre , 457-469

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

285 - 304

Le principe de primauté du droit de l'Union

in *Revue Trimestrielle de droit européen*, n. 2 , Ritleng D.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Quermonne Jean-Louis

Le traité constitutionnel européen est-il un acte fondateur?

in *Politique Etrangère*, 2/2005, (été).

Les dispositions du traité constitutionnel doivent être examinées par rapport à trois critères: la synergie entre logique interétatique et logique supranationale, en particulier quant au pouvoir de décision; le mode de décision dans les instances intergouvernementales; et la hiérarchie des normes juridiques. À l'égard de ces critères, le traité lève nombre d'ambiguïtés et dessine, en réalité, une troisième voie entre l'intégration supranationale et la coopération des États.

Section C) Regional integration processes



Subsection 6. The European unification process

Roux Jérôme

Le traité établissant une Constitution pour l'Europe à l'épreuve de la Constitution française
in *Revue du droit public et de la science politique en France et à l'étranger*, n. 1 , 59-112

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Claes Monica

Le “clausole europeee” nelle costituzioni nazionali
in *Quaderni Costituzionali*, numero: 2, giugno 2005 , 283-320

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Janning Josef

Leadership coalitions and change: the role of states in the European Union
in *International Affairs* , issue 4, vol. 81, july , 821-834

The role of states in the European Union has not diminished over the history of the organization's institutional development. On the contrary: since the fall of the Berlin Wall, member-state influence over Union affairs actually seems to have grown. This is attributable both to the weakening of the supranational elements and to the expansion of intergovernmental activity in key policy areas. Added to this, the growth in the number of EU member states, and the diversity that now exists in an EU of 25, have reinforced the network of relationships, both bilateral and multilateral, between member states. Consequently, the EU has both centripetal and centrifugal forces at work, with member states drawn together in a continuing formal integration process and driven towards building tactical associations among themselves.

This article discusses the relationship between the formal and the informal layers of integration in Europe, and points to the changing constellations and coalitions among the current member states. Special attention is given to the cleavages that emerged between the EU governments over the negotiations on treaty reform, from the Treaty of Maastricht to the Treaty on the European Constitution. With regard to the power structure within the EU, the article outlines the perspectives of a 'Big Three' core coalition as successor to the Franco-German motor.

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Carrubba Clifford J., Murrah Lacey

Legal Integration and Use of the Preliminary Ruling Process in the European Union



in **International Organization**, issue 2, vol. 59, april , 399-418

ABSTRACT: Scholars agree that the preliminary ruling system of the European Court of Justice has been instrumental in promoting European integration; however, no consensus has been reached as to why the system is used. Although many explanations have been posited, there has been no systematic comparative test among them to date. In this article, we perform this test. We find evidence that transnational economic activity, public support for integration, monist or dualist tradition, judicial review, and the public's political awareness influence use of the preliminary ruling system.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Portero Molina José Antonio

Legitimidad democrática y Constitución Europea

in **Revista de Derecho Constitucional Europeo** , n. 3 Anno 2

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Kaddous Christine

Les accords bilatéraux II entre la Suisse et l'Union européenne. La Constitution européenne et le process de ratification

in **Schweizerische Zeitschrift fur Internationales und Europaeisches Recht**, Heft 1, 15. Jahrgang , 5-10

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Constantinesco , Vlad

Les compétences et le principe de subsidiarité

in **Revue Trimestrielle de droit européen**, n. 2 , 305 - 318

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Blumann Claude

Les institutions de l'Union dans le cadre du Traité établissant une Constitution pour l'Europe

in **Revue Trimestrielle de droit européen**, n. 2 , 345 - 374



Section C) Regional integration processes

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Jeanbart Bruno

Les opinions européennes face au traité constitutionnel
in *Politique Etrangère*, 2/2005, (été).

Les différences dans les modes de ratification du traité constitutionnel handicapent l'émergence d'un débat européen commun. Toutes les opinions européennes traduisent néanmoins deux caractères majeurs: un soutien à la légitimité du processus de construction européenne et une ignorance largement répandue quant au contenu concret des textes soumis à ratification. Parmi d'autres éléments, cette indifférence relative constitue une base pour une opposition ranimant d'anciennes peurs.

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Van den Brink Rinke

Les raisons des Néerlandais
in *Monde Diplomatique (Le)*, juin 2005, 20

Près de 62 % de « non » : comment a-t-on pu en arriver là ? Les Pays-Bas, un des six pays fondateurs de la Communauté, sont l'Etat pro-européen par excellence : ils n'ont jamais manifesté la moindre réserve par rapport à la construction européenne. Certes, en près de cinquante ans, leurs citoyens n'ont à aucun moment été consultés sur le processus d'intégration européenne. Mais ceux-ci n'ont jamais donné non plus le moindre signe de contestation de la ligne pro-européenne de leurs gouvernements successifs. Seule la population luxembourgeoise a assuré, un temps, un soutien plus massif au projet européen.

Il faut dire que, longtemps, les Pays-Bas reçurent plus du budget européen qu'ils ne lui apportèrent. En 1992, la réforme de la politique agricole commune (PAC) entreprise par le commissaire européen irlandais Ray MacSharry inversa la tendance : Amsterdam paie désormais plus qu'il ne touche. Et, depuis 1999, aucun autre pays membre ne contribue davantage pro capita à la caisse de l'Union que les Pays-Bas (1).

Néanmoins, en dépit de ce qui attribue aux Néerlandais une prédisposition pour l'avarice, cette générosité des Pays-Bas n'avait pas, jusqu'ici, soulevé d'opposition sérieuse. Même Pim Fortuyn (2) et son groupe n'en faisaient pas grand cas : le leader populiste entendait bien sûr renégocier le niveau de la contribution néerlandaise à l'Union, mais en tenant compte de la richesse du pays.

Pourquoi l'opinion a-t-elle basculé ? Ce n'est pas le fruit du débat sur l'Europe. Le changement



radical d'attitude des Néerlandais s'explique d'abord par la crise de la politique. La percée du parti de Pim Fortuyn a révélé le fossé existant entre les partis et leurs électeurs, mais aussi entre un grand nombre de mouvements sociaux et leurs membres. A preuve ce sondage du « NOS Journaal » du 21 mai dernier : les grandes centrales syndicales, le mouvement de la paix, les associations des droits de l'homme, le Touring-Club, les organisations écologistes, le patronat, les Eglises, défendaient ardemment le « oui », mais la majorité de leurs adhérents... le « non ».

En fait, la politique néerlandaise est devenue schizophrène. Seuls 23 députés sur 150 s'opposaient à la « Constitution » européenne. Majorité et opposition ont fait campagne ensemble pour le « oui ». Mais la moitié des électeurs du Parti du travail (PvdA, social-démocrate, opposition) et du Parti populaire pour la liberté et la démocratie (VVD, libéral conservateur, majorité) n'ont pas suivi. A un moindre degré, il en va de même des électeurs de l'Appel chrétien-démocrate (CDA, majorité) et de l'alliance Verts-gauche Groen Links (fusion des anciens communistes, des pacifistes, radicaux de gauche et chrétiens de gauche). Seuls les Démocrates 66 (D66, social-libéral) peuvent se targuer d'un électorat partisan, aux deux tiers, du « oui » défendu par le parti.

Dans le camp du « non », les électeurs ont obéi largement aux consignes des états-majors : 90 % de ceux du Parti socialiste (SP), une ex-formation maoïste devenue populiste de gauche, et 96 % de ceux de M. Geert Wilders, qui cherche à récupérer l'électorat de Fortuyn (3). Dissident, depuis septembre 2004, du VVD, M. Wilders prônait une ligne encore plus dure sur l'immigration, l'intégration et l'insécurité et refusait, contrairement à son parti, l'adhésion de la Turquie à l'Union ; et il s'est encore radicalisé après le meurtre du cinéaste Theo Van Gogh, le 2 novembre 2004, par un jeune fondamentaliste (qui appartiendrait, selon la police, au groupe terroriste Hofstadgroep). Dans un premier temps, il semblait avoir réussi son pari : les sondages, fin novembre 2004, lui promettaient autant de députés que la Liste Pim Fortuyn en 2002. Mais, selon une enquête d'opinion récente, en cas d'élections législatives, il n'obtiendrait que trois sièges, malgré sa campagne contre la Constitution européenne.

« Trahis » par leurs représentants traditionnels, les Néerlandais ont transformé la nature du référendum du 1er juin. Il ne s'agissait plus de se prononcer uniquement sur le traité constitutionnel européen, mais aussi sur l'adhésion de la Turquie à l'Union, l'immigration, l'élargissement et ses dangers pour l'emploi, l'accroissement du chômage, l'introduction de l'euro et la hausse des prix qui s'ensuivit, la dégradation de la santé publique et de l'éducation nationale, sans oublier l'insécurité...

Bref, les Néerlandais se sont saisis du scrutin pour sanctionner l'ensemble de la politique de la coalition au pouvoir. La politique européenne du gouvernement n'était plus qu'un thème parmi d'autres, bien plus importants. Et le référendum a permis au peuple de présenter la facture à « ceux d'en haut » : la victoire du « non » constitue donc un sévère avertissement à l'« élite » gouvernement, opposition, hommes et femmes politiques, directions des grandes organisations sociales, etc.

Longtemps, cette élite n'a pas cru que le « non » pouvait l'emporter. Elle n'a pris conscience que trop tard de la colère d'une partie de l'opinion. Comme en 2002, année de la révolte populiste de droite. Rien, il est vrai, ne laissait présager à l'origine une telle vague : en novembre 2004, seuls 10 % des électeurs annonçaient qu'ils voteraient « non », 39 % se prononçant pour le « oui » et 41 % restant indécis (10 % ne comptaient pas voter). Mais, en mars 2005, l'opinion a basculé : le « non » ralliait 24 %, le « oui » 22 %, les indécis 48 % (avec 7 % d'abstentions). Et, le 27 mai, le décrochage s'imposait : 52 % de « non », 29 %



de « oui », 16 % d'indécis (3 % d'abstention). Le « non » français allait accentuer la tendance.

Cette évolution doit beaucoup à une campagne animée par les partisans du « non », en premier lieu le SP, fort de 44 000 adhérents, presque tous militants. Omniprésent dans la rue, ce parti avait acheté beaucoup de temps d'antenne. Ses annonces publicitaires jouaient sur les craintes de nombre de Néerlandais vis-à-vis de l'Europe ; y compris de l'euro et de ses conséquences.

En outre, les partisans du « non » ont bénéficié d'un allié inespéré : la campagne du « oui ». Jamais une campagne ne fut aussi contre-productive. On a entendu le libéral social Laurens-Jan Brinkhorst, ministre de l'économie et promoteur du référendum, déclarer que ce dernier était une erreur, les citoyens ne connaissant pas suffisamment la Constitution. Le ministre de l'intérieur et libéral conservateur Joan Remkes a appelé le camp du « non » à ne plus jouer la carte de la peur... alors même que les députés européens de son parti présentaient un film de propagande pour le « oui » mobilisant les victimes de la Shoah, les milliers de musulmans exterminés à Srebrenica et les victimes de l'attentat islamiste de Madrid... Et le ministre de la justice Piet-Hein Donner a mis en garde contre une situation à la yougoslave en cas de victoire du « non »...

L'efficacité de cette campagne fut redoutable. Seul problème : elle a surtout convaincu les électeurs de voter « non (4) »... Un « non » qui n'est donc ni clairement à gauche ni clairement à droite : on y retrouve les deux composantes. Voilà qui n'est pas sans rappeler la « révolte Fortuyn » : ce dernier, malgré son discours xénophobe, islamophobe, sécuritaire et anti-élites, bref populiste de droite ; avait su mobiliser autour de lui des électeurs de tous les partis, de l'extrême droite jusqu'à la gauche de la gauche. Le « non » néerlandais comporte, pour une part, des caractéristiques similaires

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Marian Michel

Les trois métamorphoses de la politique française après le référendum

in *Esprit*, n. 317, août 2005

No abstract available

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de Búrca Gráinne

Limiting EU Powers

in *European Constitutional Law Review*, Volume 1 - Issue 01 , 92-98

One of the central issues arising during each of the Intergovernmental Conferences which has taken place since that of Maastricht, which inscribed the notion of limited conferred competences for the first time in the EC Treaty, has been the attempt to establish clear limits to the powers of the European Community and Union. The 'delimitation of competences' was placed on the initial post-Nice agenda of 2000 alongside only three other issues, and the 'division and definition of competence' was listed as the first of the pressing 'challenges and reforms' of the Laeken Declaration of 2001. No



surprise, then, that this question was once again amongst the key questions for debate during the Convention on the Future of Europe, occupying the attention of at least two working groups (those on complementary competences and subsidiarity), and surfacing in many other political and academic debates on the proposed Constitution.

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Navarro Gonzales A.

Los retos principales de la Unión Europea

in *Revista de Derecho Constitucional Europeo* , n. 3 Anno 2

<http://www.ugr.es/~redce/ReDCE3/14albertonavarro.htm>

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Xuereb Peter G.

Loyalty and Solidarity

in *European Constitutional Law Review*, Volume 1 - Issue 01 , 17 - 20

While the Union's powers and responsibilities are ever on the increase and co-operation deepens as the Union begins to take positions more easily in the areas of freedom, security, justice and defense, it is seeking to keep the Member States and the Union together via the duties of loyalty. These are spelled out in general terms in Article I-5, and in more specific terms in specific contexts, such as those of the Common Foreign and Security Policy [Article I-15(2)]. Article I-5 is entitled 'Relations between the Union and the Member States', but it is also central to the relations between the Member States themselves in terms, for example, of the exercise of their voting rights in the Council of Ministers. The Article consolidates provisions that are currently scattered over various Treaties but not without adding some novelties.

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Lenzi Guido

L'Europa dopo i referendum francese e olandese

in *Affari Esteri*, Anno XXXVII, n. 148 , 740-751

No abstract available



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Goujon Alexandra

L'Europe élargie : légitimation et politisation de la politique de nouveau voisinage de l'Union européenne
in *Politique européenne* , n. 15, 2005

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

HineDavid

L'Italie et la Convention constitutionnelle : avant, pendant et après
in *Critique Internationale*, N°28 - Juillet / Septembre 2005

Les préférences constitutionnelles exprimées par l'Italie à la Convention européenne n'ont guère différé de celles qui apparaissent finalement dans le projet de traité, du moins en ce qui concerne les principales dispositions constitutionnelles, contrairement à certaines analyses exprimées au début du processus, selon lesquelles le gouvernement Berlusconi n'était plus sur les positions italiennes traditionnelles (préférence pour des solutions fédérales et des institutions centrales plus fortes). Toutefois, il semble bien que, depuis lors, une forme d'eurosepticisme se fasse jour au gouvernement, dans un contexte de tensions au sein de la coalition et de difficultés économiques et budgétaires. Pour le moment, c'est surtout le rôle de la Commission qui est contesté mais on peut s'attendre à voir s'étendre les critiques à d'autres questions institutionnelles, surtout si la construction européenne devient, pour la première fois en Italie, un terrain de bataille électorale entre les partis.

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Nelli Feroci Ferdinando

L'Unione Europea: tra la crisi del Trattato costituzionale e i dilemmi dell'allargamento
in *Comunità Internazionale (La)*, n. 4, vol. LX, quarto trimestre

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

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Calamia Pietro

L'entrata in vigore della Costituzione europea
in *Affari Esteri*, Anno XXXVII, n. 146 , 347-355

No abstract available



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Lager Carole

L'euro, symbole d'identité européenne?

in *Etudes Internationales*, 1, Mars 2005

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

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Tousignant Nathalie

L'impact du Comité Adonnino (1984-1986): Rapprocher les Communautés européennes des citoyens

in *Etudes Internationales*, 1, Mars 2005, 41-60

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Cavallari Lilia, Debora Di Gioacchino

Macroeconomic Stabilization in the EMU: Rules Versus Institutions

in *Review of Development Economics*, Volume 9, Number 2, May, 264-276

This paper investigates the macroeconomic implications of different regimes of international fiscal coordination and monetary-fiscal cooperation in a monetary union with independent fiscal authorities, that act strategically vis-à-vis a common central bank. In the presence of other policy goals than cyclical stabilization, such as interest rate smoothing and fiscal stability, we show that coordination among national fiscal authorities can reduce output and inflation volatility relative to the non-cooperative setting in specific circumstances, as in case of demand disturbances, while turning potentially counterproductive otherwise. The adverse effects of union-wide coordinated fiscal measures can be attenuated in a regime of global coordination, namely, when a centralized fiscal stabilization is coordinated with the common monetary policy as well.

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Keeler John T.S.

Mapping EU Studies: The Evolution from Boutique to Boom Field 1960–2001

in *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 43, Issue 3, September, 551-582

This article employs original data sets to map the development of EU studies since its inception and to assess that development within the broader context of trends in west European studies. Dissertation and article data are used to chart the contours of three eras of EC/EU studies that have unfolded since 1960. The article addresses the extent to



which the transformation of EU studies from boutique to boom field since the 1990s has entailed diversification as well as expansion of the EU scholarly community – a geographic diffusion of expertise and training (accelerated on both sides of the Atlantic by substantial increases in funding for EU research), an increase in attention to EU issues by comparative politics specialists drawn to the study of 'an ever closer union', a proliferation of new topical subfields, an increase in the number of journals publishing significant articles on the EU, and a reshaping of the relationship between American and European scholars specializing in EU studies.

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Kaeding Michael, Selck Torsten J.,

Mapping Out Political Europe: Coalition Patterns in EU Decision-Making
in *International Political Science Review* , n. 3, vol. 26, july , 271-290

ABSTRACT: This article evaluates member states' and supranational institutions' preference patterns in European Union decision-making. We present a research design that encompasses data on the policy profiles of the 15 member states, the Commission, and the European Parliament for 70 European legal acts that were negotiated just before the May 2004 enlargement. We apply principal-component analysis which results in reduction of the different policy issues into a three-dimensional solution. The Commission and the European Parliament are much more favorable toward increased integration than the Council members are. Thus, there appears to be a "north versus south" coalition pattern rather than a "Franco-German axis." The positions of Ireland and Belgium indicate that the member states' status as net contributors or net receivers of European Union subsidies are important. Our findings do not support the pro-less integrationist argument nor the left-right dimension that reconciles economic and sociopolitical issues.

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Börzel Tanja A.

Mind the gap! European integration between level and scope
in *Journal of European Public Policy* , Volume 12, Number 2 / April , 217-236

Explaining the 'task expansion' of the European Community has been at the heart of neofunctionalism. While previous studies have focused on the transfer of competencies from the national to the European level, this paper also looks at the procedures according to which policy decisions are taken at the European level (scope). Distinguishing between scope and level reveals an interesting puzzle. It is common wisdom that the integration of external and internal security has seriously lagged behind. Since the Maastricht Treaty we have witnessed a significant task expansion of the EU into these two last bastions of national sovereignty. But while the achieved level of integration is rather similar, the scope of integration differs significantly. Justice and home affairs have subsequently been brought under the supranational framework of the first pillar. Common foreign and security policy and European defence policy, by contrast, are still firmly confined to the realm of intergovernmentalism. This disparity between level and scope of European integration poses a serious theoretical challenge—not only to neofunctionalism.



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D'Atema, A.

Modelli federali e sussidiarietà nel riparto delle competenze normative tra UE e gli Stati membri

in *Diritto dell'Unione europea*, Vol. 1 , pag. 56-76

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

D'Atena Antonio

Modelos federales y subsidiariedad en el reparto de las competencias normativas entre Unión Europea y Estados miembros

in *Revista de Derecho Constitucional Europeo* , n. 3 Anno 2

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

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Jabko Nicolas

Monnaie et politique en Europe

in *Critique Internationale*, N°27 - Avril 2005

Cet article analyse les raisons de la difficile réforme du Pacte de stabilité et de croissance lors du sommet européen de mars 2005. Le débat sur le Pacte a fait renaître une tension latente entre deux ensembles de motivations opposées qui ont conduit à la création de l'euro au cours des années 1980 et 1990. De ce point de vue, la réforme de 2005 est une solution dilatoire, qui laisse le jeu politique assez largement ouvert.

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Williams Garrath

Monomaniacs or Schizophrenics?: Responsible Governance and the EU's Independent Agencies

in *Political Studies*, Volume 53, Issue 1, March , pp. 82-99

This paper examines the creation of independent agencies within the EU, such as the European Environment Agency (EEA) and the European Central Bank (ECB). Majone and others have argued the case for European regulatory agencies. Such agencies can provide for continuity, expertise, accountability and effective authority – in short, an institutionalisation of responsibility. Against this optimism, I argue that a dilemma of institutional design naturally arises from the agencies' situation in the EU. On the one side, we risk creating powerful agencies that institutionalise monomania– that is, agencies that single-mindedly and all-too-effectively pursue narrow agendas, inadequately checked



by other bodies. On the other, we are also likely to encounter relatively impotent agencies which institutionalise schizophrenia– that is, agencies that must scout around for audience and support, and hence are unable to act effectively.

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Amato Giuliano

Nach der Sintflut

in *Internationale Politik*, n. 7, 60. Jahrgang, Juli, 13-16

ABSTRACT: „Weiter so“ ist nach Frankreich und den Niederlanden nicht möglich. „Viel besser“ ein Muss Nach der Ablehnung der Europäischen Verfassung in Frankreich und den Niederlanden sind nur zwei Optionen sinnvoll: den Prozess in der Hoffnung auf bessere Zeiten einzufrieren oder eine scheinbare „Mission impossible“ zu wagen. Eine Liberalisierung voranzutreiben, den Sinn einer Erweiterung zu erklären, den Mangel an Wachstum und das Demokratiedefizit der EU mutig anzusprechen. Denn das ist keine unerfüllbare Aufgabe, sondern eine Notwendigkeit.

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Subsection 6. The European unification process

Ziller Jacques

National Constitutional Concepts in the New Constitution for Europe

in *European Constitutional Law Review*, Volume 1 - Issue 03, 452-480

Precedents in European Union member states for the negative referenda in France and The Netherlands on the Constitution for Europe. Evolution of the investiture of the Commission: parallel with France under Third and Fourth Republic. Double headed executive (President of the European Council and President of the Commission) and 'double hats' (Union Minister for Foreign Affairs) in line of the European constitutional tradition. The unborn 'Legislative Council' and its Austrian and German counterparts. The aborted 'Congress of the Peoples of Europe': forum for 'State of the Union' speech, not a electoral body. Protection of minority rights in the Constitution for Europe due to insistence of the Hungarian government; foreign to the dominant Western constitutional concepts. Representative democracy and the formal concept of law: European Laws and Framework Laws as 'Acts of Parliament'. Strict limits on the possibility to delegate legislation: German, Italian, French roots. European Laws and Regulations: unachieved hierarchy and French precedent. Judiciary as a relative minor branch of government as in the British and French traditions. No German Verfassungsbeschwerde or Spanish recurso de amparo, but probably more annulment procedures and preliminary questions on legality and constitutionality than before. Parallels with German federal concepts: Union Law über Alles; no rigid Kompetenzkatalog and joint competences; distribution of competences not limited to law-making. More than lip service to decentralisation. Constitutional ping-pong and intertwined constitutionalism: territories d'outre-mer and outermost regions.



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Ziller Jacques

**National Constitutional Concepts in the New Constitution for Europe
in *European Constitutional Law Review*, Volume 1 - Issue 02 , 247-271**

Notion of constitutional concept varies over time and space. Constitution for Europe as a further step in guaranteeing rights and separating powers. Amongst others French, Italian, German and Swedish national concepts in the Treaties of the European Communities and of the European Union. Several causes for difficult tracing of national concepts in the Constitution for Europe. Convention method: instead of by diplomats and EU experts, drafting by members of Parliament and (former) members of Government. More room for national concepts. The Intergovernmental Conference: the Empire strikes back, but with mixed impact. Parallels with other constitution making procedures. Concept of constitution: structure and size no argument for denying constitutional character; Constitution octroyée v. contrat social; Franco-American revolution v. British tradition.

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Peters Jit

**National Parliaments and Subsidiarity: Think Twice
in *European Constitutional Law Review*, Volume 1 - Issue 01 , 68-72**

It is a popular misunderstanding that European citizens' lack of interest in the European Union has to do with the powers of the European Parliament. These powers have been constantly strengthened over the years, but that did not enhance voters' interest in European affairs. Even with the granting of European citizenship and the introduction of the euro, voters did not get interested, as the low turnout at the elections of members of the European Parliament on June 2004 (less than 45 %) attests. These elections even saw the rise of anti-European parties in several Member States, like the Independence Party (UKIP) in the United Kingdom. These elections, however, dealt more with national issues and the confidence in national governments than with European issues.

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Duina Francesco , Oliver Michael J.

National Parliaments in the European Union: Are There Any Benefits to Integration?

in *European law journal*, March 2005 - Vol. 11 Issue 2 , 173-196

Scholars and observers alike agree that the European Union has weakened national parliaments. This article posits that such a view, while generally accurate, ignores ways in which the EU has helped national parliaments in their function as regulators of society. It identifies two key mechanisms: precedent setting and policy transfer. First, the EU has produced laws on topics considered beyond the traditional remit of national parliaments. The EU's intervention has justified the production of unprecedented domestic laws that go well beyond the incorporation of EU principles. This has expanded the legislative reach of national parliaments. The article considers the experiences of Italy and The Netherlands in the area of antitrust. Second, the EU has fostered an environment conducive to cross-national lesson drawing. The resulting knowledge has helped the design of more effective domestic legislative frameworks. This has confirmed the viability of national parliaments as regulatory institutions. The article examines the Open Method of Co-ordination and its application to the areas of employment and social inclusion. It concludes with a discussion of parliaments in future Member States and in Mercosur.

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Vössing Konstantin

Nationality and the Preferences of the European Public toward EU Policy-Making

in *European Union Politics* , Vol. 6, n. 4, December , 445-467

Analyses of covariance for Eurobarometer data from 1990 to 1994 demonstrate a significant effect of individuals' nationalities on their preferences toward the scope and content of European Union policy-making, while controlling for sociodemographic characteristics. The observed national differences are more pronounced for the scope than for the content dimension. An investigation of the causal mechanisms underpinning these effects concludes that it can be either national identities or nation-specific constellations of political conflict that mediate the effect of nationality for a particular nation. These novel findings qualify the expectations of the European political space approach concerning the existence of an integrated and somewhat autonomous space of political contestation toward the EU, but the observed decline of cross-national differences over time indicates that at least a trend in this direction exists.

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Hix Simon

Neither a Preference-Outlier nor a Unitary Actor: Institutional Reform Preferences of the European Parliament

in *Comparative European Politics*, n. 2, vol. 3, july , 131-154

ABSTRACT: The European Parliament's preferences on constitutional reform matter, and mattered more in the recent reform of the EU Treaties than ever before. This article looks at the formation of institutional reform preferences in the



European Parliament by investigating the variance in institutional preferences among the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). The article reviews the two main claims in the literature ³/₄ that the Parliament is a preference-outlier and a unitary-actor ³/₄ and tests the validity of these claims through a statistical analysis of the preferences of MEPs for various treaty reforms, as expressed in a survey in 2000. The findings demonstrate that MEPs are not particularly pro-integrationist on treaty reform issues and do not have homogenous preferences on these issues. One possible explanation of the gap between the existing theoretical assumptions and the actual preferences of MEPs is that the structure of representation and decision-making in Parliament and EU Council means that European Parliament decisions are usually further from the status quo than Council decisions.

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Tomás Valás<caron>ek

New EU Members in Europe's Security Policy

in Cambridge Review of International Affairs , Vol. 18, n. 2, July , 217-228

What impact will the 2004 round of enlargement have on the European Union's common foreign and security policy? This article argues that the new members' arrival in theory strengthens the Euroatlantic camp within the EU. This impact has, however, been limited by the accession states' difficulty in exercising effective influence in Brussels so far, and their foreign policy is also coming under pressure at home because of the unpopularity of the Iraq War. The newcomers hold distinct views on the EU's policy toward Russia and other countries of the former Soviet Union. On this point, their efforts have begun to slowly but demonstrably transform the European Union's own involvement in countries on the EU's eastern frontier. In addition, the first signs are becoming apparent of the new members' effective imprint on the EU's common foreign and security policy.

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Whitman Richard

No and after: options for Europe

in International Affairs , issue 4, vol. 81, july , 673-688

The French and Dutch 'no' votes in referendums on the European Union Constitutional Treaty have thrown the EU into turmoil. The messages from both referendums are that public dissatisfaction with European integration is widespread and there is a disjuncture between the views of citizens and those of elites.

The original purpose of the process that produced the Constitutional Treaty was to bring the EU closer to its citizens. However, the text that was negotiated was an unwieldy document intended to satisfy diverse requirements but difficult to explain concisely. After the completion of negotiations some governments, for reasons of political expediency, took decisions to hold referendums on the treaty, but the future of The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe that took three years to complete is now uncertain. Furthermore, member states are divided about whether to press ahead with



ratification after the two recent 'no' votes. What is the range of alternatives to member states if they wish to salvage the treaty or component parts? Finding a way through this current situation is the task the British government faces as it takes on the EU presidency from 1 July 2005.

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Padoa-Schioppa Tommaso

Non mentire sul NO francese

in **Mulino (il)**, n. 4, luglio-agosto, 2005 , 636-643

No abstract available

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Archibugi Daniele

Notes on Democracy in the European Union

in **European Union Review**, Vol. 10 n. 1

On soutient souvent que les institutions de l'Union Européenne ne seraient pas suffisamment démocratiques et qu'une intégration plus poussée risquerait d'augmenter ce déficit démocratique. Toutefois, il serait peut-être mieux de se poser une contre-question: quel serait le taux de démocratie existant dans chaque Etat Membre de l'Union Européenne en l'absence des institutions communautaires? Le projet européen a été un véhicule formidable de démocratie qu'il a consolidé au Sud aussi bien qu'au Nord du continent tout en augmentant graduellement la représentativité, la transparence et la participation dans les institutions communautaires.

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Andrea Cagiati

Oltre la Costituzione europea

in **Affari Esteri**, Anno XXXVII, n. 145 , 31-37

No abstract available

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Eijffinger Sylvester C. W.

On a Reformed Stability and Growth Pact

in **Intereconomics**, Volume 40 No. 3 • 2005 , pp. 141-147

No abstract available



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Hölscher Jens Jarmuzek Mariusz

Overvalued or Undervalued Euroland Entry?

in **Post communist economies**, Volume 17, Number 2 / June, 2005 , Pages: 235 - 250

This study addresses the question of the conversion rate upon joining the European Union with respect to the accession countries of Eastern Europe. The article argues in favour of an undervalued exchange rate in order to promote income generation in the new member countries. For this purpose a strategy of managed float is proposed. Countries not having the preconditions to pursue such a strategy should adopt a currency board arrangement.

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Selck Torsten J., Rhinard Mark

Pares Inter Pares? The Bargaining Success of the Commission, the Council, and the Parliament in European Union Legislative Negotiations.

in **Swiss Political Science Review - Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft - Revue suisse de science politique**, Volume 11, Issue 3, Autumn 2005 , 123-140

This research note tries to determine how politically successful the Council, the Commission, and the European Parliament are in the area of EU legislative decision-making. After reviewing the literature, a research design is presented which incorporates information on the policy preferences of the different institutional actors for 70 recent EU legislative decisions that were negotiated under the consultation and the codecision procedure. We use correlation and OLS regression to analyze the distances between what the EU institutional actors want and what they eventually get out of the process. The findings of the analysis are that (1) the preference profiles of the three actors are rather dissimilar, and that (2) the success rates of the Council are higher than the rates of the Commission and Parliament.

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Villa Alessandro

Per una democrazia ambientale europea

in **Equilibri**, n. 2, anno IX, agosto , 433-438

No abstract available

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Gaisbauer Helmut P.

Polen und der Verfassungsvertrag in der ICG 2003 als klassisches two level game?

in *Oesterreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft* , 2005/3 , 295-310

POLAND AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY IN THE ICG 2003: A CLASSICAL TWO LEVEL GAME?

Examining the Brussels summit failure in December 2003 within the heuristic concept of two level games (Robert D. Putnam), this contribution suggests that the applied concept doesn't explain the preferences on the Polish Level II properly. It can be shown that the legitimacy of the European Convention and "its" constitution was seriously contested by an "impossible coincidence" of EU-accession and constitutionalisation process.

It was in the decisive weeks before the referendum on accession when the Convention has been debating the most substantial reforms of the very power structure of the Union. This led to a governmental discourse policy aiming at avoiding the "convention" becoming a topic in parliamentary and public discourse.

After the constituency has confirmed the governmental accession policy by referendum the government tried to catch up with the developments in the convention and began a fierce fight against the new system of voice-weighting proposed by the convention.

This inconsistent stance of the Polish government can be explained by the contradictions it was exposed to due to the coincidence of accession and constitutionalisation process. However, the opposition managed to put the already poor performing government under additional pressure through politicisation of the issue: "Nice or death", meant to minimise the win set for the Polish delegation in the negotiations on the decisive Brussels summit mid December 2003.

The contribution concludes that the summit failure cannot be interpreted simply as an IGC two level game. Taking the convention process seriously does hence impose serious questions on the whole concept and leads to a pessimistic assessment on the theoretical value of Putnam's concept for this case.

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Bulmer Simon, Padgett Stephen

Policy Transfer in the European Union: An Institutional Perspective

in *British Journal of Political Science*, issue 1, vol. 35, january , 103-126

ABSTRACT: Although the concept of policy transfer attracts growing attention in political science, its application to the European Union remains underdeveloped. This article offers a comprehensive conceptual account of EU policy transfer. It starts from the institutionalist premise that transfer processes and outcomes will vary between differently constituted governance regimes. Three forms of EU governance are identified; hierarchy, negotiation and 'facilitated unilateralism'. The article develops hypotheses about the linkages between institutional variables and transfer outcomes, assessed on a scale from emulation to influence. Hypotheses are set against empirical evidence drawn from a variety of policy areas. We find evidence to support the general hypothesis that stronger forms of policy transfer occur in more highly institutionalized governance regimes. The evidence also points to micro-institutional variables shaping transfer outcomes: the powers accruing to supra-national institutions; decision rules; and the density of exchange between national actors.



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Védrine Hubert

Pour l'Europe : repartir du réel. Entretien

in *Debat (Le)*, N° 136 septembre-octobre 2005

No abstract available

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Cassen Bernard

Pour une Europe de l'innovation démocratique,

in *Monde Diplomatique (Le)*, juillet 2005

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

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Reestman Jan Herman

Primacy of Union Law

in *European Constitutional Law Review*, Volume 1 - Issue 01 , 104-107

One of the legal cornerstones of 'formal federalism' is the capacity of any rule of EC Law to override any rule, including those of constitutional rank, of the Member States. The primacy doctrine has been introduced by the Court of Justice in *Costa v. ENEL* (1964). It can be read in two ways. In the first place it may be held to imply the supremacy of Community law, i.e., the idea that Community law has a higher rank than even the national constitutions and is hierarchically superior to it, as the Court itself sometimes has expressed it (Simmenthal, 1978). This may be called the existential reading. Alternatively, there is a more modest interpretation implying mere practical priority or precedence, as in traffic rules. For this practical interpretation there are equally arguments to be found in the Court's case-law: the aims of the EC-treaty cannot be accomplished if domestic law were to prevail over Community law.

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Lothar M.

Procedimientos de producción de derecho: El procedimiento legislativo ordinario
in *Revista de Derecho Constitucional Europeo* , n. 3 Anno 2

<http://www.ugr.es/~redce/ReDCE3/03michael.htm>

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Claes H. de Vreese and Hajo G. Boomgaarden

Projecting EU Referendums

in *European Union Politics* , Vol. 6, n. 1, March , 59-82

This study tests competing hypotheses about public support for European integration and projects referendum voting behaviour. It emphasizes anti-immigration sentiments as a key variable for understanding reluctance about integration. Drawing on survey data, it is shown that anti-immigration sentiments, economic considerations and the evaluation of domestic governments are the strongest predictors of both attitudinal support for integration and individuals' propensity to vote 'yes' in a referendum on the enlargement of the European Union (EU).

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Melchionni Maria Grazia

Quale domani per quest'Europa?

in *Rivista di Studi Politici Internazionali*, Volume 72, n. 2 , pp. 201-221

No abstract available

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Perret Bernard

Quand l'Europe se caricature

in *Esprit*, n. 313, mars 2005

No abstract available

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Halimi Serge

Quand la gauche renonçait au nom de l'Europe - Les promesses du « non »

in *Monde Diplomatique (Le)*, juin 2005 , 20 - 21



Au lendemain du référendum français, les avocats de la Constitution ; grands médias en tête ; ont repris leurs attaques contre la majorité des électeurs, soupçonnés d'irresponsabilité ou de xénophobie. Tout aussi inadaptée au message des Français paraît la réponse du président de la République, M. Jacques Chirac : un simple replâtrage ministériel marqué par le retour au gouvernement de M. Nicolas Sarkozy, pourtant avocat ; un modèle libéral rejeté par le suffrage universel. Cet autisme des milieux dirigeants européens face aux préférences et aux priorités des populations souligne le défaut majeur de la construction communautaire. Dès ; origine, ; édifice européen a été bâti en catimini et imposé par une élite sociale à des domaines de la vie collective toujours plus nombreux (lire De la rébellion à la reconstruction). Au point que la « construction de ; Europe » en est progressivement venue à ressembler à la destruction de certaines des valeurs proclamées au départ (lire Contre la concurrence, ; émulation). En réalité, cette surprise est relative : plusieurs fois dans son histoire, la gauche française a pu mesurer le poids des contraintes ; une Europe libérale sur un projet de transformation sociale.

Par Serge Halimi

Transformation sociale ou invocation des « contraintes européennes » ? Seule une réécriture conservatrice de ; histoire a conduit à poser comme inédite une question qui ne ; est pas. Mais le risque d' ; une collision entre les ambitions de la gauche française et un environnement international qui ; inciterait à en rabattre ne date pas d' ; hier.

Le débat relatif au projet de Constitution européenne a réactivé des termes connus. D' ; un côté, ceux qui, soucieux de rompre avec un ordre libéral, interrogent : « N' ; est-ce pas le propre de toute entreprise qu' ; elle se fixe des objectifs avant d' ; en avoir réunis toutes les conditions ? » De ; autre, ceux qui ne croient plus à la transformation de la société concluent : « Et vous pourrez dire tout ce que vous voudrez aux chefs d' ; entreprise, et moi aussi. Ils iront toujours là où il y a la meilleure productivité, le meilleur rendement et le meilleur profit. » La première citation provient du Projet socialiste de 1980 ; la seconde eut pour auteur ; homme qui avait fait de ce projet la charpente de son programme présidentiel. Entre les deux positions, la volontariste et la désabusée, treize années s' ; étaient écoulées, à ; issue desquelles François Mitterrand, confronté à la déroute électorale de ses amis politiques, ne pouvait faire mieux que théoriser son impuissance.

Dans ; absolu, le pari d' ; utiliser ; Europe comme un levier pour rompre avec ; ordre existant en France n' ; est pas incongru. Si, d' ; après les mots de Victor Hugo, les « va-nu-pieds superbes » de la Révolution française ont autrefois foulé le « monde ébloui » des monarchies continentales, la France progressiste avait su profiter en retour des analyses de ; Allemand Karl Marx sur le Second Empire, de ; action du Hongrois Léo Frankel, ministre du travail pendant la Commune, de ; apport décisif de la Main-d' ; uvre immigrée (MOI) dans la formation des premiers groupes de résistance, du concours des républicains espagnols aux maquis de la Libération.



Mais, au-delà de cette histoire, occultée au demeurant, parler de « solidarités européennes » a en général servi aux socialistes français de prétexte ; ou de prétexte ; à un virage conservateur (1). Dans les années 1930, l'alliance franco-britannique amène le Front populaire à contredire ses ambitions économiques et à abandonner la République espagnole. Au lendemain de la guerre, « Europe » devient utopie de substitution qui permet de maquiller des renoncements fondamentaux, politiques et stratégiques. Plus près de nous, elle sert d'instrument à la redéfinition philosophique du projet de la gauche, de « machine à refroidir les passions nationales (2) ». Y compris quand les socialistes affectent d'entrevoir derrière un « marché où la concurrence est libre et non faussée » la « construction d'espaces de régulation qui ajoutent aux Etats-nations pour maîtriser les turbulences du capital (3) ».

En général, l'évolution de la gauche gouvernementale a épousé celle d'une communauté européenne de plus en plus soucieuse de protéger le « capital » des « turbulences » de la revendication sociale. Cette double métamorphose, nationale et continentale, souligne la difficulté propre à toute comparaison historique : au fil des ans, les mots « gauche », « droite », « concurrence », « régulation » changent de sens (4). Au départ, le libéral doit se retenir ; à l'arrivée, le socialiste s'est converti.

Prenons deux exemples symétriques. M. Raymond Barre, traducteur en 1956 des textes de l'économiste autrichien ultralibéral Friedrich Hayek, devient, onze ans plus tard, vice-président de la Commission européenne. Son mandat bruxellois, qui coïncide avec de grandes grèves ouvrières en France (1968) et en Italie (1969), lui interdit néanmoins, comme à tout autre, de s'inspirer des idées de Hayek, à moins d'encourir une vigoureuse riposte sociale. Mais, inversement, quand la contre-révolution libérale donne sa mesure, le socialiste Jacques Delors est l'un de ses architectes au ministère français des finances (1981-1984), puis à la présidence de la Commission européenne (1985-1994). Et il pourra se vanter d'avoir, à Paris, « obtenu la suppression de l'indexation des salaires sans une grève ».

Il y a quelques semaines, inquiet de la puissance du mouvement d'opposition au projet de Constitution, l'historien conservateur René Rémond déplorait que « l'utopie révolutionnaire » soit « en train de tuer l'utopie européenne (5) ». L'inverse aurait sans doute moins incommode. Or c'est ce qui est produit à plusieurs reprises.

En 1936, le gouvernement de Léon Blum entend extraire l'économie française d'une dépression que les socialistes ont analysée en termes keynésiens : « Cette crise est due à une rupture d'équilibre entre la production et la capacité générale d'achat. » Adossé à une politique de relance budgétaire, le relèvement des salaires consécutif aux grandes grèves de juin 1936 doit, selon eux, contribuer au réveil de l'activité et à la baisse du chômage. Mais le succès d'une telle stratégie exigera une dévaluation immédiate du franc et un contrôle des changes (6).

La priorité accordée à l'alliance britannique conduit le Front populaire à y renoncer. Un expert influent, Emmanuel Monick (7), présente à Léon Blum l'arbitrage qui lui échoit en ces termes : « De deux choses l'une. Ou bien vous instaurez le contrôle des changes, vous imposez un dirigisme strict, vous mettez la France en autarcie ; et alors vous êtes obligé d'instituer un régime autoritaire qui risque de glisser vers le totalitarisme. Ou bien vous ouvrez les frontières, vous maintenez un régime de liberté des changes, et vous devez alors vous appuyer sur Londres et Washington pour opérer un ajustement des monnaies en même temps qu'une coalition des régimes démocratiques (8). » Totalitarisme solitaire ou démocraties solidaires, un tel « choix » ; comme celui, identique, qu'on présente en mars 1983 ; autorise guère à hésiter...



Il va lier les mains du Front populaire. Les effets déflationnistes d'une monnaie surévaluée annulent le coup de fouet escompté d'une relance de la demande. Et lorsque la dévaluation intervient quand même, c'est trop peu et trop tard : Léon Blum a accepté de négocier son taux et les mesures d'accompagnement avec les Britanniques et les Américains.

Malgré une fuite des capitaux massive, Blum renonce aussi au contrôle des changes, pourtant inscrit dans le programme de la gauche. C'est selon lui un système « que, par-dessus toute autre raison, le gouvernement juge incompatible avec les affinités et les nécessités de sa politique internationale ». Les conservateurs britanniques ont obtenu ce qu'ils voulaient. Ils exigeront peu après que la « coalition des régimes démocratiques » chantée par Emmanuel Monick, abandonne au fascisme l'Espagne républicaine.

Au lendemain de la guerre, une « construction de l'Europe » puissamment encouragée par les Etats-Unis soude les socialistes à des coalitions de « troisième force » peu hantées par le souci du progrès social. Pourtant, instruite de ses déboires précédents, la gauche française (communistes compris) a créé ou conforté à partir de 1945 des outils d'intervention publique (contrôle de la monnaie, du crédit, des « hauteurs de l'économie ») destinés à lui permettre de ne pas toujours dépendre de la bienveillance du capital. Selon les mots du général de Gaulle, le contexte de l'époque, « social ou socialiste », permet que ces transformations soient « réalisées sans secousses. Certes, les privilégiés les accueillent mélancoliquement. Certains s'en feront même de secrets griefs pour plus tard. Mais, sur le moment, tous, mesurant la force du courant, s'y résignent aussitôt et d'autant plus volontiers qu'ils avaient redouté bien pire (9) ».

Mais « plus tard », ce sera très vite... Le besoin de crédits américains venant épauler le « programme européen » que les Etats-Unis appuient vide de leurs potentialités socialistes les transformations issues de la Libération. Echec total alors ? Non, car simultanément s'édifie ce « modèle français » d'économie mixte aujourd'hui attaqué par les libéraux, Sécurité sociale et statut de la fonction publique compris. Pourtant, si chacun ou presque est interventionniste en 1944-1947, pour les uns l'Etat doit se substituer à un système capitaliste à la fois économiquement inefficace et socialement injuste. Pour les autres, le rôle de la puissance publique consiste à fouetter l'énergie du secteur privé, pas à s'y substituer plus longtemps que nécessaire.

A la fois commissaire au Plan et « homme des Américains », Jean Monnet incarne la seconde école de pensée. Loin d'avoir une France socialiste pour projet, le « père de l'Europe » entrevoit plutôt une situation où, comme aux Etats-Unis, les capitalistes seront imbus du dynamisme que confère l'esprit d'entreprise. Adossés aux crédits du plan Marshall, l'Etat et le projet européen doivent selon lui bousculer un patronat national conservateur, pas procéder à la redistribution du pouvoir économique (10).

L'analyse de Monnet trouve des émules dans la gauche réformatrice. Certes, le Parti socialiste SFIO fait mine de rêver, à la Libération, que « l'Europe se verra imposer par les événements de prendre la route du socialisme ». Mais, dès 1950, Léon Blum a admis qu'une « intervention active de l'Etat » pourrait aussi, comme aux Etats-Unis, régénérer utilement le système en place : « Alors que la loi du capitalisme américain est : Permettre à des entreprises jeunes de naître, il semble que la loi du capitalisme français soit : Permettre à des entreprises vieilles de ne pas mourir. »

Trente-cinq ans plus tard, M. Lionel Jospin paraît lui faire écho : « La France n'a pas une classe de patrons à la hauteur de son génie et de ses ambitions. C'est une donnée de son histoire. Affaiblir le secteur public, lâcher la



bride à la partie la plus rétrograde du patronat ; qui empêche mais ne lâche rien ; ne créera ni confiance ni dynamisme. »

Ce n'est que progressivement qu'il faudra choisir entre le dessein d'une « modernisation » impulsée par les pouvoirs publics (entreprises nationalisées, politique du crédit) et celui d'une mise à niveau sous la pression de la concurrence européenne. Une et l'autre voie paraissent en effet s'épauler jusqu'au jour où le dogme libéral se durcit. « Europe » n'a pas toujours été obligé à privatiser ni à faire pression sur les acquis des salariés. Les Etats-Unis pas davantage : des entreprises nationalisées (Charbonnages, SNCF, EDF) ont compté au nombre des principaux allocataires du plan Marshall ; par souci de contenir le communisme sur le Vieux Continent, Washington déplore plusieurs années après la guerre le sort lamentable échu à la classe ouvrière française.

Dès 1947, le besoin de crédits américains, la guerre froide et les équipées coloniales ont détruit toute perspective d'un gouvernement de gauche en France. Désormais alliée au centre droit, la SFIO se rabat alors sur un discours « européen » destiné à enjoliver une politique antisociale à l'intérieur et une subordination atlantique à l'étranger. La fin des années 1940 annonce donc un peu le glissement droitier qui interviendra en 1983, deux ans après l'élection de François Mitterrand à l'Elysée. Quand, cette fois, conforté par l'embourgeoisement de leur base sociale, le virage libéral des socialistes paraît consommé.

Après une analyse convenue, la gauche aurait, en 1981, commis une effroyable bêtise en mettant en œuvre un programme radical qui ignorait l'étendue de l'imbrication de la France dans l'économie internationale. Cette erreur se serait promptement traduite par une série de crises financières (déficits, dévaluations). Lesquelles obligèrent les socialistes à rejoindre au plus vite la piste des politiques de « rigueur » empruntées par leurs prédécesseurs conservateurs (MM. Valéry Giscard d'Estaing et Raymond Barre) et par leurs partenaires européens (M. Helmut Kohl et Mme Margaret Thatcher).

En vérité, une reconstitution est inexacte. Car la gauche n'avait pas attendu 1983 pour comprendre que l'interdépendance économique risquait de faire chavirer une politique solitaire de « rupture avec le capitalisme ». Un pays engageant une politique de relance devait donc, selon elle, « pouvoir se prévaloir de la nécessité de limiter un gonflement sans limite qui briserait le redémarrage de son expansion ».

Alors même que les préférences communautaires existaient encore, la concurrence et la spécialisation étaient conditionnées à un résultat : « La liberté des échanges n'est pas un dogme. C'est un moyen qui se justifie dans la mesure où il contribue à la croissance et à un meilleur emploi, non quand l'effet en est de propager tour à tour ou tout à la fois l'inflation, la déflation et le chômage. » Enfin, la « reconquête du marché intérieur » imposait que le verrou monétaire soit desserré : « Au niveau européen, le Parti socialiste ne peut cautionner le système monétaire européen actuel, c'est-à-dire l'alignement des monnaies plus faibles sur le deutschemark, qui, en attendant une nouvelle sortie en catastrophe, justifie une austérité renforcée (11). »

La plupart de ces orientations commerciales et monétaires furent cependant écartées par François Mitterrand le jour même de son arrivée à l'Elysée (12). On pense ici à l'avis donné par Emmanuel Monick en 1936 puisque, d'après M. Jacques Delors lui-même, le choix de 1981 (confirmé deux ans plus tard) s'expliqua pour partie par le désir de ne pas menacer la « correspondance nécessaire entre la politique économique du président de la République et sa politique étrangère ». C'est-à-dire ses « efforts pour relancer la construction européenne ».



Après 1983, le projet de « rupture avec le capitalisme » est mis en bière. Comme au temps des années 1950, la « construction européenne » lui sert d'utopie de rechange. Cependant, en raison du cours ouvertement libéral et libre-échangiste qu'elle a désormais emprunté, le virage de la « rigueur » ne peut pas seulement représenter le refuge d'une stratégie socialiste en position de faiblesse. Il doit devenir le prélude à son abjuration définitive. Nombre des instruments nationaux forgés dans le passé par la gauche française afin d'équilibrer la puissance du capital (contrôle démocratique de la politique monétaire, de l'investissement, rôle des services publics) seront d'ailleurs détruits par elle sur l'autel du grand marché.

Anticipant, dès juin 1982, le tête-à-queue des socialistes français, Pierre Rosanvallon met en avant les contraintes de ce qu'on appelait pas encore la « mondialisation » : « Dans une économie ouverte, la marge de manœuvre est étroite. On échange pas que des biens et des services, ce sont inévitablement des politiques économiques que l'on finit également par être contraint d'importer (13). » Or, pour Rosanvallon et ses amis modérés, il ne convenait surtout pas de réduire la contrainte exercée par une « économie ouverte » sur une aspiration à « changer la vie ». Il fallait au contraire entériner l'étroitesse de la marge de manœuvre qui en découlait. Elle interdirait aux gouvernants de gauche de « faire des bêtises » ou, pour le dire autrement, de rester fidèles à un programme cherchant à contenir la domination du capital. Le sud coulant du commerce international allait même, espérait Rosanvallon, précipiter la « fin de l'exception française », dont en 1988 il consignerait le décès ; un peu prématuré ? avec deux de ses amis de la Fondation Saint-Simon (14).

Assumer les règles de ce « jeu cruel »

En septembre 1989, M. Michel Rocard procédera à d'autres funérailles. Premier ministre de l'époque, il enterre les espoirs d'Europe sociale que son parti a longtemps nourris : « Nous avons une majorité de gouvernements conservateurs dans la communauté. Ils pensent que la meilleure façon de faire de l'expansion, c'est de laisser les gens gagner de l'argent n'importe comment, de ne pratiquement pas taxer le capital et ses revenus (15). » Sa conclusion ? « Les règles du jeu du capitalisme international sanctionnent toute politique sociale audacieuse. Il faut assumer les règles de ce jeu cruel pour faire l'Europe (16). »

Quelques semaines plus tard, la chute du mur de Berlin apporte une justification rétrospective aux barreaux de petit temps de la gauche de gouvernement. Ils pourront désormais reprendre, mais sur le mode de la désolation feinte, le cri de victoire de Mme Margaret Thatcher : « Il n'y a pas d'alternative. »

Le socialiste Pascal Lamy vient d'être désigné directeur général de l'Organisation mondiale du commerce (OMC), c'est-à-dire policier de l'ordre libéral international. Il avait autrefois conseillé M. Pierre Mauroy à Matignon, puis M. Jacques Delors à Bruxelles, enfin dirigé une grande banque en voie de privatisation. La mue paraît achevée. Et, dans le libre-échange que M. Lamy professe, l'internationalisme progressiste pèse moins lourd que le verrouillage d'un espace marchand qui saura imposer à la société des règles favorables aux employeurs : « Les chefs d'entreprise français sont européens parce qu'ils ont compris que la remise en ordre et la marchandisation de l'économie française se sont faites par l'Europe, grâce à l'Europe et à cause de l'Europe (17). »

Tantôt promesse de liberté, d'ouverture, de métissage, tantôt proclamation d'impuissance à transformer l'ordre social, la « mondialisation », « l'Europe » (peu à peu dépouillée de ses protections communautaires), ont construit une machine de guerre qui a permis de défaire le contrat social « sans tirer un coup de



feu », de manipuler le sentiment internationaliste pour favoriser les solidarités du capital, de prétendre défendre le « plombier polonais » pour imposer que le moins cher gagne, de rabâcher l'existence de « contraintes internationales » pour occulter que leur pression fut accrue par une volonté et par des politiques (18).

Ce discours de la fatalité feinte et cette pédagogie de la soumission sont un trait permanent de l'histoire. L'imprévisible percée du 29 mai français ne suffit pas à inverser les dévastations sociales qu'elles ont imposées au monde. Mais, dès lors qu'une telle victoire encouragera de prochaines offensives, elle ouvre déjà la perspective de nouvelles surprises.

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Subsection 6. The European unification process

Questions sur la Constitution Européenne. Entrevue avec Giuseppe Vedovato

in *Rivista di Studi Politici Internazionali*, Volume 72, n. 3 , pp. 446-452

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Newman Michael

Quite the opposite. The EU crisis and the Left

in *Radical Philosophy*, Issue: 133 - September/October 2005

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

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Kühnhardt Ludger

Quo vadis Europa? - Essay

in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, Band 36, 2005

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

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Pinelli Cesare

Ratifica e referendum: verso la conclusione del processo costituente europeo?

in *Politica del diritto*, n. 1 , 69 - 84



No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Angelika Hable

Reflections on the reform of competences in the treaty establishing a constitution for Europe
in *Regional and Federal Studies*, Volume 15, Number 2 / June , 145 - 162

One of the most complex constitutional issues in the European Union is the delimitation of competences. On 18 June 2004, the Intergovernmental Conference approved the text of a Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. In accordance with the Laeken mandate, it contains several changes to the current system designed to clarify, simplify and adjust the division of competences between the Union and the member states. This article examines the order of competences proposed in the Constitutional Treaty in the light of the challenge to create a more democratic, more transparent and more efficient Union.

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Subsection 6. The European unification process

Subacchi Paola

Reforming economic governance in Europe: exploring the road to effective coordination
in *International Affairs*, issue 4, vol. 81, july , 741-756

The European Union is at a crossroad. In recent years it has been going through a major review of its institutional design without, however, clearly defining its role and scope. The credibility of its institutions is adversely affected by the widening gap between ambitious economic goals and the dismal performance of the economy in some member countries. Structural reforms have been progressing at a painfully slow pace. Popular support has been decreasing alarmingly. The need to confront poor economic performance and to embark on urgent market-structural reforms, as well as the problem of harmonizing national interests with those of the EU as a whole, have highlighted how the institutions and processes can be dovetailed. This article aims at contributing to the debate on economic governance and policy coordination in Europe. Looking at the genesis and the recent reform of the Stability and Growth Pact, it focuses on how the European Monetary Union macroeconomic policies are likely to be governed in the future and what the possibilities are for establishing effective economic and monetary governance. The Pact represents the most developed, albeit controversial, attempt to provide a framework for coordination of policies among sovereign states. Such coordination should help to achieve an appropriate fiscal–monetary mix, enhancing the credibility of monetary policy by insisting that member states governments do not spend more than they can finance through taxation. The Pact's recent revision is certainly the first step in the right direction, especially because it links macroeconomic stability with the goals of the Lisbon Agenda—job creation, market-structural reforms and social cohesion.

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Johansson Karl Magnus, Raunio Tapio

**Regulating Europarties. Cross-Party Coalitions Capitalizing on Incomplete Contracts
in Party Politics**, Volume 11, Issue 5, September , pp. 515-534

Political parties organized at the European level, Europarties, have become more relevant actors in the European Union. Constitutional and legal rules have recognized their role in the EU political system, they now receive funding from the Union's budget and the strengthening of the European Parliament offers them more opportunities for influencing the EU policy process. Drawing on extensive interview material, we explain why and how Europarties have strengthened their position and show the crucial part played by coalitions of leading personalities of the Europarties. In piecemeal fashion, these coalitions have capitalized on 'incomplete contracts' ever since the opening created by the Party Article in the Maastricht Treaty and have successfully argued for a stronger position for the Europarties. Analysing the regulation, we combine rational choice and historical institutionalism and in the concluding discussion look ahead at the future of Europarties.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Gerkrath Jörg

Representation of citizens by the EP

in European Constitutional Law Review, Volume 1 - Issue 01 , 73-78

As it is obviously impossible for the modern 'demos' to assemble in order to take political decisions, democratic representation is an inevitable tool in large democracies. Representatives have to stand for and to act for the people as a whole. Accordingly, the principle of representative or parliamentary democracy is a fundamental constitutional principle shared by all the Member States of the Union. Democracy doubtlessly works on the national level; the Member States' decisional powers, however, are fading with the constant transfer of competences towards the European level. This leads to a system of European 'multi-level governance' with wide consequences for the linkage between the represented peoples of the Member States and their representatives on both national and European levels.

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Rynning Sten

Return of the Jedi : Realism and the Study of the European Union.

in Politique européenne , n. 17, 2005

Many observers of European Union affairs discard the theory of Realism in the belief that this "crude" theory of sovereignty and conflict cannot grasp the "sophisticated" politics of dialogue and compromise in the EU. However, this rejection is based more on a false stereotypical view of Realism than on the insights generated by real Realism. In consequence, the purpose of this article is two-fold : to debunk the stereotype, and to outline strengths and weaknesses in the Realist research agenda.



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de Witte Bruno

Revision

in **European Constitutional Law Review**, Volume 1 - Issue 01 , 136-140

Many proponents of the Constitutional Treaty admit that this document is far from perfect, indeed quite disappointing in many respects, but argue that the Treaty should be seen as a step in the long process of European integration rather than an end-point. It will be possible to learn from the failings of the new Treaty and correct them later on, just like this Treaty itself has corrected some of the mistakes, and fill in some of the blanks left by earlier Treaty revisions.

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Gagliardi Alberto

Stato e regioni nel processo di integrazione europea

in **Quaderni Regionali** , n. 1 , 9 - 14

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Lübbe Hermann

Subsidiarität. Zur europarechtlichen Positivierung eines Begriffs

in **Zeitschrift für Politik**, Jahrgang 52, Heft 2, 2005 , 157 - 168

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Barber N.W.

Subsidiarity in the Draft Constitution

in **European public Law**, Volume 11 (2005) - Issue 2 , 197-205



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Cooper Ian

Subsidiarity to the Rescue: Why the "Early Warning System". Should be Salvaged from the Constitutional Treaty

in *Intereconomics*, Volume 40 No. 4 • 2005 , p. 185

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

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Koopmans Tim

Subsidiarity, Politics and the Judiciary

in *European Constitutional Law Review*, Volume 1 - Issue 01 , 112-116

Since the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, the principle of subsidiarity is to govern the exercise of powers between the European Community and the Member States in areas that do not fall within the exclusive competence of the Community. According to the treaty provision, the principle means that the Community can only take action if and insofar as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community. A similar provision is now part of the draft 'European Constitution' 2003; it merely adds that Member State action can be taken at the national, the regional and the local level. Even without this useless supplement, the definition of subsidiarity looks fairly complicated.

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Bribosia Hervé

Subsidiarité et répartition des compétences entre l'Union et ses États membres dans la Constitution européenne

in *Revue du droit de l'Union Européenne*, n. 1 , 25 - 64



Section C) Regional integration processes

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Vignudelli Aljs

Sulla forza del Trattato costituzionale europeo

in **Quaderni Costituzionali**, numero : 1, marzo , 159-164

Section C) Regional integration processes

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Crum Ben

Tailoring Representative Democracy to the European Union: Does the European Constitution Reduce the Democratic Deficit?

in **European law journal**, July 2005 - Vol. 11 Issue 4 , 452-467

Even if the institutions of representative democracy that have developed in the nation-state context cannot be simply transposed to the European Union, for practical and normative reasons they do provide the main starting point for any reflection on the EU's 'democratic deficit'. This article draws upon the Constitution prepared by the European Convention to reconstruct the concept of representative democracy in the EU. Drawing on the proposals put forward, it identifies two distinctive challenges that need to be overcome if the concept of representative democracy is to be successfully applied to the EU: the multilevel character of the polity and the shift of the centre of political gravity from legislative to executive politics. The article then examines the extent to which the institutional proposals contained in the Constitution go to meet these two challenges and also highlights some aspects in which these proposals fall short.

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Knaus Gerald, Cox Marcus

The "Helsinki Moment" in Southeastern Europe

in **Journal of Democracy**, Volume 16, Number 1, January , pp. 39-53

After the accession of ten new member states in 2004, the European Union seeks to expand its sphere of stability and prosperity toward the southeast, from Croatia all the way to Turkey. While democratic consolidation and economic development is already underway in Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey, other countries of the region appear to be falling behind. Although the European Union has declared that all these countries share "a common European destination," the various strategies being pursued to bring them to that destination differ profoundly. Three models may be discerned: traditional capacity-building; authoritarian state-building (in the two European protectorates of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo); and member-state building (in the official EU candidate countries of Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia, and Turkey).



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Zucca Lorenzo

The Barroso Drama: All Roads Lead to Rome

in *European Constitutional Law Review*, Volume 1 - Issue 02 , 175 - 181

Italian governmental crisis at the origin of Rocco Buttiglione's nomination. Hearing before Civil Liberties committee and unprecedented rejection of Buttiglione. October events trigger changes in Italian governmental team. The EU: a Catholic conspiracy?

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Eijsbouts W.T.

The Barroso Drama: Campidoglio, Rome – 29 October 2004: How the Form Was Brought to Matter

in *European Constitutional Law Review*, Volume 1 - Issue 02 , 155 - 174

Meeting of constitutional form and matter. Matter in the sense of Machiavelli's 'political life', clashes between the establishment and the people. EU investiture struggle and its outcomes. Structural elements of the EU Constitution: authority, representation, political federalism.

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Mariatte Flavien

The Barroso Drama: France: The Jacques Barrot Way

in *European Constitutional Law Review*, Volume 1 - Issue 02 , 196-202

Fluctuating French media attention for Barroso's drama. Chirac's support for Manuel Barroso. Appointment of European Commission and French Constitution. French debate on candidacy Barrot and the assigned transport portfolio. Offer extreme right party to save Barroso's team. The unmentioned embezzlement.



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van Keulen Mendeltje

The Barroso Drama: Kroes At All Cost To the Roots of the Dutch Presidency's Failure
in *European Constitutional Law Review*, Volume 1 - Issue 02 , 211-216

Dutch debate on choice of candidate for European Commission. Criticism EP on Neelie Smit Kroes's candidacy. Dutch incapacity to find a solution. National inter-party struggles and impact on European affairs.

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The Barroso Drama: Reality for the EU Constitution
in *European Constitutional Law Review*, Volume 1 - Issue 02 , 153-154

In importance for the Union's constitutional evolution, the October 2004 events at least equal the European Constitutional Convention, including the IGC. This is the idea behind the following tens of pages in this issue of *EuConst* devoted to their analysis. Eight authors have been involved in putting together this story, seven of whom are young researchers from different countries in the Union. Their participation allowed many national aspects of the drama to be brought out in a way which otherwise would have been impossible.

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Beukers Thomas

The Barroso Drama: The Invisible Elephant Member States' Collective Involvement in the Appointment of the Barroso Commission
in *European Constitutional Law Review*, Volume 1 - Issue 02 , 217-225



Collective involvement of member states. Law and practice of nominating the European Commission president and his team. The responsibility to resolve the political conflict and the failure of the Dutch Council presidency. The European Council providing the political authority necessary for a solution.

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Subsection 6. The European unification process

Douglas Alexander

The Case for Global Europe

in Review of International Affairs (The) , Vol. LVI, n. 1119, July–September

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Bialasiewicz Luiza, Elden Stuart, Painter Joe

The Constitution of EU Territory

in Comparative European Politics, n. 3, vol. 3, september , 333-363

ABSTRACT: This paper offers a contribution to debates around the reconfiguration of political space in the project of European integration. Its specific focus is the Draft Constitution of the European Union, and its problematic understanding of territory. It claims that there is a profound ambiguity between senses of territory in the Draft Constitution, which in part aims to transcend existing territorial divisions and notions of territory, particularly those associated with the nation-state. This is an aspirational sense of Europe as a putative space of values and area of solidarity, illustrated through the ideal of territorial cohesion. On the other hand, territory is being re-inscribed in the Constitution in a 'hard' sense, organized through border controls, jurisdictional limits and a concern with territorial integrity and sovereign rights. In providing a reading of the draft Constitution itself, analysing the tensions and silences within its text, the article seeks to contribute to wider debates concerning the European project and its values, and the contribution social theory and political geography can make to an assessment of them.

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Fossum John Erik and Menéndez Agustín José

The Constitution's Gift? A Deliberative Democratic Analysis of Constitution Making in the European Union

in European law journal, July 2005 - Vol. 11 Issue 4 , 380-440



Our aim in this article is to consider whether the Union's deliberation over and decision-making on constitutional norms, can contribute to render it more democratic. From a normative perspective, the way a constitution is forged has deep implications for its democratic legitimacy. In light of recent events, we consider how procedural changes in constitution-making might contribute to rectify the Union's democratic deficit. To do so we first develop a thin model of constitution-making based on the central tenets of deliberative democracy. Through this we seek to outline how a legitimate constitution-making process will look from a deliberative democratic perspective. Second, we distil out some of the core characteristics of the Intergovernmental Conference (hereafter, IGC) model and assess this against the normative model, to establish the democratic quality of the IGC model. Third, we assess the current Laeken process by means of spelling out the central tenets of this mode of constitution-making, and we assess it in relation to the normative standards of the deliberative model. In the fourth and final step, we consider what contribution constitution-making might make to the handling of the EU's legitimacy deficit(s). We find that the Laeken process, in contrast to previous IGCs, was explicitly framed as a matter of constitution-making. It carried further the democratization of constitution-making, through its heightened degree of inclusivity and transparency. However, when considered in relation to the deliberative-democratic model, it is clear that the Laeken Constitutional Treaty cannot be accorded the full dignity of a democratic constitution. The Constitutional Treaty can however lay the foundations for We the European people to speak.

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Reich Norbert

The Constitutional Relevance of Citizenship and Free Movement in an Enlarged Union.

in *European law journal*, November 2005 - Vol. 11 Issue 6 , 675-698

The concept of citizenship is analysed on three seemingly contradictory levels: its integration by the recent case law of the European Court of Justice into the existing free movement *acquis*, its restriction in the accession treaties with new Member States concerning free movement of workers, and its redefinition by new Member States themselves. The result is a somewhat blurred picture: While the European Court of Justices uses citizenship to fill gaps left by primary and secondary law mostly with regard to non-discrimination, the accession treaties have allowed a 're-nationalisation' of free movement, against the promises of equality inherent in the citizenship concept, which also includes nationals from new Member countries. The concept of citizenship itself in new Member countries, as the examples of Latvia and Estonia on the one hand, and Hungary on the other demonstrate, is very much related to the (somewhat sad) lessons of the past and therefore highly politicised; it has not been shaped with regard to free movement in the EU. The author suggests a gradual 'communitarisation' of citizenship itself even though the EU seems to miss competence in this area, for example, by paying greater attention to residence as basis for Community rights.

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Wessels Wolfgang

The Constitutional Treaty – Three Readings from a Fusion Perspective

in *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 43, Issue s1, September , 11-36



No abstract available

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Zimmer Christina, Schneider Gerald, Dobbins Michael

The Contested Council: Conflict Dimensions of an Intergovernmental EU Institution

in **Political Studies**, Volume 53, Issue 2, June , pp. 403-422

Recent research has tried to uncover the political space in which the Council of Ministers of the European Union decides. Rather than the left-right conflict or a cleavage between governments with national and supranational attitudes, this article shows that a redistributive dimension, decisively shapes the interactions in this most important legislative body of the European Union. In contrast to extant studies, we employ ex ante rather than ex post preference data and rely on correspondence analysis as a means to identify the underlying dimensions of contestation. The article concludes with an empirical investigation of how enlargement will affect the emerging political space within the European Union. Our quantitative analysis suggests that the gulf between net-contributors and net-receivers will further deepen.

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Rasmussen Hjalte

The Convention Method

in **European Constitutional Law Review**, Volume 1 - Issue 01 , 141-147

Since the ratification of the Treaty of Maastricht, the 'democratic deficit' is used as a term to describe the democratic deficiencies of the European integration process. What is the influence of the citizens on the process of governmental and constitutional decision-making? Due to the distance between the powers of the Community and the nation state, the power of the executive over parliamentary bodies and the fact that a lot of decision-making takes place behind closed doors, greater democracy and transparency is needed.

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Mathern James D.

The Court of Justice and the Union Citizen.

in **European law journal**, November 2005 - Vol. 11 Issue 6 , 722-743

Over a decade since the conception of the Union citizen, the aim of this article very simply is to measure his growth and maturity with a sustained analysis of the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice in this regard. After all, it was Advocate



General Lèger who stated that it was for the Court to ensure that its full scope was attained. The article focuses predominantly on three areas of study: Member State nationality law and citizenship, the effect and meaning of Article 18 EC, and the ever-evolving right to equal treatment for the Union citizen. It is fully updated in the light of recent case law, the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, and the newly adopted Directive 2004/58 EC.

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Knook Allard

The Court, the Charter, and the vertical division of powers in the European Union

in **Common Market Law Review**, issue 2, vol. 42 , 367-398

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

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Geradin Damien

The Development of European Regulatory Agencies: What the EU Should Learn from American Experience

in **Columbia Journal of European Law**, Vol. 11 n. 1 , 1 - 52

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Karlas Jan

The ESDP-building process and conflict prevention: intergovernmental policy-making and institutional expertise

in **Journal of International Relations and Development**, Volume 8, Number 2, June , 164-191

Most of the proposals that emerged in the process of building the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) of the European Union (EU) in the 1999-2001 period did not contain any ideas with regard to conflict prevention. At the same time, only weak commitments to conflict prevention were initially made in this process. However, the EU ultimately made substantial conflict prevention commitments in the ESDP-building process and decided to carry out the reform of conflict prevention as one of its policy fields. This article seeks to identify those factors that determined the final outcome of the negotiations on conflict prevention in the ESDP-building process. To this end, it puts forward and evaluates two competing explanations of the analyzed case based on theoretical approaches to European integration, namely liberal intergovernmentalism and rationalist institutionalism. The article argues that the outcome is best explained by a synthesis of the liberal intergovernmentalist null explanation claiming that state interests constitute the most decisive variable and the institutionalist explanation underlining the agenda-setting power of the European Commission and the Secretary General/High Representative (SG/HR).



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Charillon Frédéric

The EU as a Security Regime

in *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Volume 10, Issue 4 , pp. 517-533

No abstract available

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Gerald Baier

The EU's Constitutional Treaty: Federalism and intergovernmental relations – lessons from Canada

in *Regional and Federal Studies*, Volume 15, Number 2 / June , 205-223

As the European Union has sought to develop a political and cultural personality beyond mere trade and regulatory harmonization, the modern federal model has an obvious appeal. Federalism's advantages for diverse or widely dispersed populations have always included the notion of legitimate shared rule as well as scope for local autonomy. Intergovernmental relations like those in Canada can emerge when governments enjoy relative autonomy yet are obliged by the complexities of modern governing to consult and collaborate in order to be more effective within their own spheres of jurisdiction. This article examines a number of the provisions in the EU's Constitutional Treaty and measures them against traditional notions of federalism and federal constitutionalism. On the basis of these criteria, many of the provisions of the Constitutional Treaty are found wanting. An examination of the practice and experience of Canadian federalism further demonstrates the problems to which these provisions might lead.

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Parry John

The EU: a model for conflict resolution?

in *Federalist Debate (The)*, Year XVIII, n. 3, November , 22-25

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Costa Olivier, Foret François

The European Consociational Model: An Exportable Institutional Design?

in *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Volume 10, Issue 4 , pp. 501-516



No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Smits René

The European Constitution and EMU: An appraisal

in *Common Market Law Review*, issue 2, vol. 42 , 425-468

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Schmitt Hermann

The European Parliament Elections of June 2004: Still Second-Order?

in *West European Politics*, n. 3, vol. 28, may , 650-679

ABSTRACT: A quarter of a century ago the first series of European Parliament elections were characterised as second-order national elections. Much has changed since, which might have had an impact upon this diagnosis. In this article the central assumptions and predictions of the second-order elections model are restated and evaluated against the outcome of the 2004 European Parliament election and a post-election survey. Surprisingly enough, the findings confirm the persisting second-order nature of EP elections for Western Europe. Matters look very different, however, in the eight new Central and East European member countries.

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John W. Sap

The European President

in *European Constitutional Law Review*, Volume 1 - Issue 01 , 47-51

The European Council's personal, elected and mandated presidency is without a doubt one of the major innovations in the Constitution. It is also its most fought over and precarious novelty. Until the last stages of the Convention, the great majority of small Member States' representatives maintained staunch opposition against the idea. In the end, however, they all reluctantly dropped resistance in the face of the praesidium's intransigence, supported by the major Member States. With its new chairman, the European Council can be considered the great winner among the Union institutions. Apart from becoming a full European institution (Article I-18), it is getting structured leadership. Article I-21 of the Draft European Constitution states that the European President is to be elected by the European Council, by a qualified majority for a term of two and a half years, and cannot serve more than two terms. The President may not hold a national mandate. In order to understand this new function, one needs to look into its origin, powers, strengths and weaknesses.



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Best Edward

The European Union's Constitutional Crisis: Causes and Consequences

in *Intereconomics*, Volume 40 No. 4 • 2005 , p. 180

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

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W.T. Eijsbouts

The European Way. History, Form and Substance

in *European Constitutional Law Review*, Volume 1 - Issue 01 , 5 - 11

Between 11 March and 29 October 2004, between Madrid and Rome, the European Constitution has turned from an uncertain possibility into a certain (albeit not full) reality. The day of the Madrid train bombs killing 190 and wounding 1500 is as inseparable from the history of the Constitution as the date of its signature, 29 October. Those events of 11 March (and the ensuing government blunders) moved the Spanish people to end the reign of Aznar's Popular Party. This in turn unblocked the Constitution talks that had got gripped, among other things, due to Spanish intransigence in December.

In several ways the particular sequence or succession of events from 11 March to 29 October can also be seen as symbolic for this particular European Constitution. Let us select three angles: an historic, a formal and a substantive one.

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Urban Sabine

The European Welfare State Under Pressure: Between European And Global Integration; Some Critical Issues

in *European Union Review*, Vol. 10 n. 1

La fin du XXe siècle et le début du XXIe marquent un tournant dans la gouvernance des sociétés occidentales et de la philosophie morale qui la sous-tend. En termes simplifiés on observe un conflit entre un principe de solidarité sociale, largement influencée par une longue tradition humaniste européenne, et un principe de solvabilité enraciné dans la pratique d'une économie de marché libérale et activé par le principe de compétitivité à l'échelle globale qui est érigé en



doctrine dominante depuis une quinzaine d'années. Les tensions qui en résultent sont considérables, à tous les niveaux de la vie sociétale, et suggèrent une action politique volontariste. Le présent article cherche à analyser les éléments du changement systémique en cours et présente les pistes d'un nécessaire processus de transformation, étant entendu que celui-ci est difficile car il touche à des variables fondamentales de la vie en société telles que le respect de la dignité et du capital humain, le bien-être et donc la capacité productive et innovatrice du système de production. L'Union européenne a démontré dans le passé qu'elle savait mettre en œuvre des politiques et des structures novatrices, tout en s'appuyant sur sa diversité interne ; elle a aujourd'hui la responsabilité d'un nouvel effet de démonstration.

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Feld Lars P.

**The European constitution project from the perspective of constitutional political economy
in Public Choice**, Volume 122, Numbers 3-4 , 417 - 448

Three topics of a European constitution are discussed. First, basic arguments from constitutional political economy that aim at restricting representatives' potential misuse of powers in a European Union with extended competencies are summarized. Since a European demos does not yet exist, an extension of competencies of the European Parliament is not sufficient in order to legitimate political decisions at the EU level. The introduction of elements of direct democracy in the European constitution would shape the creation of such a demos and lead to a stronger control of the European legislature and executive. Second, the introduction of direct democracy in the European constitution is proposed in order to reduce the European democratic deficit. Third, the creation of a European federation requires a more transparent assignment of competencies and rules to resolve conflicts between different centers of power. A European federation should be organized according to the principles of competitive federalism.

Revised version of my Inaugural Lecture held at the Philipps-University of Marburg on 9 May 2003.

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Andrew Moravcsik

**The European constitutional compromise and the neofunctionalist legacy
in Journal of European Public Policy** , Volume 12, Number 2 / April , 349-386

Neofunctionalism, a framework rather than a theory, has long played an important role in EU scholarship. Yet initial versions were overly comprehensive, incompletely specified and, as a result, non-falsifiable. Once concrete claims about the history of the EU are specified more precisely, they tend to be invalid: national preferences rarely result from unintended spillover, supranational entrepreneurs are rarely decisive – findings often disguised by poor theoretical specification and selection bias in EU scholarship. For the study of the EU today, the most important weakness of neofunctionalism is that its focus on 'ever closer union' obscures the emergence over the past decade of a stable constitutional equilibrium – a European Constitutional Compromise. This compromise is unlikely to be undermined by substantive, institutional, or ideological developments over the medium term – because current constitutional arrangements are substantively effective, institutionally protected, and democratically legitimate. The EU has reached constitutional maturity.



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Rosenfeld Michael

The European treaty–constitution and constitutional identity: A view from America

in *International Journal of Constitutional Law*, Vol. 3 n. 2-3 , 316-331

No abstract available

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586 - 617

The Impact of the EU Enlargement on Economic and Monetary Union: What Lessons Can Be Learnt From the Differentiated Integration Mechanisms in an Enlarged Europe?

in *European law journal*, January 2005 - Vol. 11 Issue 1 , Allemand Frédéric

Within the context of balancing the issues stemming from a widening and deepening of the European Union, differentiated integration mechanisms are taking shape as new organisational concepts for Community integration. Yet the increasing leverage granted to them from an institutional perspective could jeopardise the unity of the Community legal order . . . unless differentiated integration is regarded as a means and not as an end in itself; as such its success therefore depends on its ability to maintain the long-term interests of all the Members States to go further in the EU integration. Faced with its own enlargement problems, EMU has demonstrated an aptitude to some extent for absorbing the non-participating States. Four distinct legal reasons have emerged from research into its functioning and relations between the different categories of Member States to justify its attractive force. An assessment of the current and future enhanced cooperation frameworks using these four elements demonstrates the existence of essentially cooperative systems, whilst their appeal is only modest.

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Kumm Mattias

The Jurisprudence of Constitutional Conflict: Constitutional Supremacy in Europe before and after the Constitutional Treaty

in *European law journal*, May 2005 - Vol. 11 Issue 3 , 262-307

One of the core constitutional questions for national constitutional courts in the EU in the past decades has been whether to accept the claim made by the Court of Justice that EU law is the supreme law of the land, taking primacy even over conflicting national constitutional provisions. With the inclusion in the recently adopted Constitutional Treaty of a clause explicitly confirming the 'primacy of EU Law' appearances suggest that the EU is about to establish a



characteristic of mature, vertically integrated, federal states such as the USA. This article argues that this view is mistaken. It develops a comprehensive jurisprudential framework for addressing constitutional conflicts, 'Constitutionalism Beyond the State' (CBC). CBS detaches the discussion of supremacy and constitutional conflict from a statist framework; provides a jurisprudential account that explains and justifies the highly differentiated, context-sensitive and dynamic set of conflict rules that national courts have in the past adopted; and provides the lacking theoretical basis for the more attractive, but undertheorised sui generis accounts of European constitutional practice that have recently gained ground in the literature. CBS provides a jurisprudentially grounded reconstructive account of why the issue of constitutional conflict is as rich and complicated in Europe as it is and why it is likely to remain so even if the Constitutional Treaty is ratified. The article then goes on to make concrete proposals addressed to national constitutional courts and the Court of Justice respectively about how, in application of the developed approach, constitutional conflicts ought to be addressed doctrinally. It includes a proposal to read the new 'constitutional identity' clause as authorising Member States as a matter of EU Law to set aside EU Law on constitutional grounds under certain circumstances.

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Törö Csaba

The Latest Example of Enhanced Cooperation in the Constitutional Treaty: The Benefits of Flexibility and Differentiation in European Security and Defence Policy Decisions and their Implementation

in *European law journal*, January 2005 - Vol. 11 Issue 1 , 641 - 657

Section C) Regional integration processes

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Barber N. W.

The Limited Modesty of Subsidiarity

in *European law journal*, May 2005 - Vol. 11 Issue 3 , 308-325

This paper provides an account of the European principle of subsidiarity that presents it as a principle of democratic structuring: engaging both with the allocation of powers to existing democratic institutions and with the creation of new democratic institutions. In the process of discussing the European principle, a contrast is drawn with the Catholic principle of subsidiarity and with the rival doctrine of national self-determination. It is argued that the European principle is a central part of the Union's constitutional identity, and, as such, crucial to an understanding of the European project.



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Ferreira-Pereira Laura C.

The Militarily Non-Allied States in the Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union: Solidarity 'ma non troppo'

in *Journal of Contemporary European Studies* , n. 1, vol. 13, april , 21-37

ABSTRACT: This article aims to address the adaptation of Austria, Finland and Sweden to the Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union throughout the 1990s. This is done in the light of official positions adopted during the IGC 1996/97 leading up to the signing of the Amsterdam Treaty, and also within the context of the Cologne Summit of June 1999. This article argues that while those militarily non-allied states affected the progress of Maastricht's second pillar, they had no impact upon the prospective defence dimension, from which they had distanced themselves from the outset. This found justification in legally imposed as well as domestically motivated limitations. Derived from continued adherence to the principle of non-participation in military pacts and non-participation in wars, those limitations have precluded these states from adopting an all-encompassing approach towards the foreign and security policy of the EU. In the specific purview of the CFSP, this could be seen in their resistance towards the building up of a European common defence as well as in the endorsement of a limited mutual solidarity.

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Paster Thomas

The New Modes of EU Governance: Combining Rationalism and Constructivism in Explaining Voluntarist Policy Coordination in the EU

in *Oesterreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft* , 2005/2

Voluntary policy coordination and the exchange of "good practice" through the "Open Method of Coordination" have recently led to a widespread debate in political science. Does the OMC have the potential to lead to domestic policy adjustments? And if yes, what are the necessary conditions? This article addresses these questions from a theoretical perspective by comparing and combining a rationalist and a constructivist perspective. Preference convergence, shadow of hierarchy and differential empowerment are identified as the key explanatory factors for paradigmatic policy learning that are offered by a rationalist approach. The constructivist perspective stresses the importance of intense communicative and coordinative discourse for persuasion and diminished knowledge uncertainty. In this article I argue, first, that a complementary usage of these two antithetical, but not incompatible, approaches allows for an improved assessment of the OMC's problem-solving capacity and, second, that, based on the identified conditions for effective policy coordination, the problem-solving capacity of the OMC is likely to be limited.



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Prange Heiko, Kaiser Robert

The Open Method of Coordination in the European Research Area: A New Concept of Deepening Integration? in Comparative European Politics, n. 3, vol. 3, september , 289-306

ABSTRACT: New modes of governance such as the open method of coordination (OMC) have gained much attention to develop the European polity more effective and more democratic. The Lisbon European Council in 2000 and the succeeding Councils applied the OMC to several policy areas and it is now considered an important new governance mode. However, assessing a 'lack of application' $\frac{3}{4}$ as compared to what the European Commission has been initially expected $\frac{3}{4}$ in the case of the European Research Area, this article questions the method as it is currently applied as a general tool to improve effectiveness and legitimacy in European policy-making. We argue that the boundaries for applying the OMC mainly stem from the multi-level character of the policy field, the structural diversity of national innovation systems, as well as from varying system performances and their competition for resources. Our conclusions point to the conditions to enhance effectiveness and legitimacy of European Union governance $\frac{3}{4}$ that is, to deepen integration $\frac{3}{4}$ by open coordination.

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de la Rosa Stéphane

The Open Method of Coordination in the New Member States - the Perspectives for its Use as a Tool of Soft Law in European law journal, January 2005 - Vol. 11 Issue 1 , 618 - 641

The open method of coordination (OMC) has introduced a shift with the traditional legal instruments set up by the Treaty. Its introduction was initially supposed to favour more 'flexibility' and 'openness' in the community legal order. After a presentation of the OMC, this article intends to provide an assessment of the OMC's implementation in the ten new Member States. It displays that the OMC is sometimes far from his initial purposes, and in consequence needs to a certain extend, to adapt some of the guidelines and to clarify its legal bases. It concludes with a critical appraisal of the use of the OMC as itself, which should be imbricated in the community.

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Llamazares Iván

The Popular Party and European Integration: Re-elaborating the European Programme of Spanish



Conservatism

in **South European Society & Politics**, Volume 10, Number 2, July - special issue: The South European Right in the 21st Century: Italy, France and Spain , pp. 315-332

Since the democratization of the Spanish system, the right has undergone a series of rapid ideological and organizational changes. This article examines the shifts in European position of the Popular Party (PP) in the context of these broader programmatic changes. It explores the shift from post-Franco solidarism to neoliberal economic policy in the context of the European market, the development of an intergovernmental perspective on European governance and its Atlanticist orientation. In particular it considers the role that José Maria Aznar has played in the redefinition of PP European policy from the historical ideological stream of Spanish conservatism. It finds that the view of Spanish nationalism retaining paramount importance symptomatic of traditional conservatism remains strongly rooted in the PP's European programme.

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Eijsbouts W.T.

The Purse and the Power

in **European Constitutional Law Review**, Volume 1 - Issue 01 , 117-122

Purse power has been a hot item throughout the Union's history and was again much fought over during the Convention and the Intergovernmental Conference. The Constitution has indeed produced a number of significant changes. What makes the subject so hot? It is not just the money. The Union's budget is no more than that of a single smaller Member State. Most of the expenses are, moreover, fixed. That the budget should be so hot is probably because fighting over money is a good test of strengths generally (with a neat and immediate outcome). This explains the role the purse has always played in constitutional history. True to the grand tradition then, as soon as the European Parliament was given powers in the matter (1975) and got directly elected (1979), it had fights over the EU budget. This was mainly a wedge to break a share for itself in the legislative process. In the years that followed, it has in fact gained more legislative than financial powers. And the Union has been kept short, not on legislative powers but on money.

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Yataganas Xenophon , Tsebelis George

The Treaty of Nice, the Convention Draft and the Constitution for Europe Under a Veto Players Analysis

in **European Constitutional Law Review**, Volume 1 - Issue 03 , 429-451

Triple majority for changing the status quo in Treaty of Nice (2001): qualified majority of weighted votes, majority of countries, qualified majority of the population. Convention proposal (2003): requirements from three to two by dropping the qualified majority of weighted votes and reducing the qualified majority threshold of the population from 62% to 60%. Important consequences for the political institutions of the Union: 1) facilitates political decision-making; 2) reduces



relative weight of governments participating in the Council and increases the importance of the European Parliament; 3) reduces the role of the judiciary and bureaucracies in the Union in favor of the political process. Consequences of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe signed in Rome 29 October 2004. Exactly in the middle between Nice and the European Convention.

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Von Bongdandy Armin

The prospect of a European republic: What European citizens are voting on
in **Common Market Law Review**, issue 4, vol. 42 , 913-941

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

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Nicolaidis Kalypso

The struggle for Europe
in **Dissent**, fall, 2005 , 11-17

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

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King Anthony

Towards a Transnational Europe: The Case of the Armed Forces
in **European Journal of Social Theory**, Volume 8, No. 3, August 2005 , 321-340

Following Milward and Moravcsik's injunction that the analysis of European integration requires evidence-based empirical observation, this article focuses on one area of state activity - the armed forces - to illustrate the current trajectory of state transformation in Europe. The article argues that European armed forces are becoming 'transnational'. They are undergoing a process of concentration and transnationalization. Budgets and resources are focusing on specialist military units, organized into joint rapid reaction forces, which are co-operating at an increasingly lower level with other similarly concentrated units in other states. The article concludes by suggesting that the transnationalization of the armed forces reflects the wider transformation of states; across a range of activities, states are contracting to concentrate on their core functions and co-operating ever more closely with each other to fulfil them.



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Andreas Follesdal

Towards a stable finalité with federal features? The balancing acts of the Constitutional Treaty for Europe
in *Journal of European Public Policy* , Volume 12, Number 3 / June , 572-589

The Constitutional Treaty for Europe (CTE) strengthens federal features of the future European political order, and makes the federal tradition of political thought more salient. Stable and legitimate federal political orders require multiple forms of balancing, and many of the changes in the CTE are improvements on the Nice Treaty in these aspects. The CTE goes some way toward creating a European political order with federal features more likely to both merit and facilitate trust and trustworthiness among Europeans. Central features are the increased role of human rights, national parliaments, the European Parliament, and political parties, all operating under greater transparency. The gains in trust and trustworthiness may be worth some apparent efficiency losses in promotion of 'the European interest'. Such trust is crucial if the institutions are to foster willing support and 'dual loyalty' toward the individual's member state and toward the union as a whole among the citizenry and officials.

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Fidrmuc Jarko

Trade Structure during Accession to the EU
in *Post communist economies*, Volume 17, Number 2 / June, 2005 , Pages: 225 - 234

This article discusses the degree of trade restructuring between the EU and the new member states during the accession process. Intra-industry trade is selected as a composite indicator of trade structure. Factor endowments, market size and distance are the most important determinants of intra-industry trade. The estimations for the OECD countries are used to compute predictions for EU15 trade with the CEE countries. In general, this approach predicts well the EU15 trade structure with CEE, which proves significant restructuring in the new member states. High shares of intra-industry trade imply lower welfare losses and less resistance to further deepening of integration in the participating countries.

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Dominese Giorgio

Transizione verso l'allargamento: ripensare il prossimo governo europeo. Un punto di vista italiano
in *Economia Pubblica*, Fascicolo 4

No abstract available



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Pizzetti Federico Gustavo

Trattato 'Costituzionale' europeo e ordinamenti costituzionali nazionali: profili di un rapporto circolare di continua e reciproca relazione-integrazione'

in *Filangeri (il) - rivista di diritto pubblico*, n. 1 Gennaio - Marzo , 3-56

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Fabry Elvire, Lebas Colomban

Trois scénarios pour une PESD

in *Politique Etrangère*, 2/2005, (été).

La Politique européenne de sécurité et de défense souffre, en dépit de ses progrès (avancées institutionnelles, opérations extérieures...), de faiblesses fondamentales (oppositions entre Européens, traditions des grandes diplomaties, bref absence d'une réelle politique étrangère commune). Les risques et menaces émergents incitent néanmoins à visualiser son futur à travers trois scénarios: celui de la "Grande Suisse", celui des "Noyaux durs", et celui du retrait américain d'Europe.

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Sicardi Stefano

Turchia, Europa, unione Europea. Il difficile rapporto fra requisiti geografico - culturali e valoriali - universali (editoriale)

in *Diritto pubblico comparato ed europeo*, n. 1 , Xv - XX

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

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Bali Aykan Mahmut

Turkey and European Security and Defence Identity/Policy (ESDI/P): A Turkish View

in *Journal of Contemporary European Studies* , n. 3, vol. 13, december , 335-359

No abstract available



Section C) Regional integration processes

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Müftüler Baç Meltem

Turkey's Political Reforms and the Impact of the European Union

in South European Society & Politics, Volume 10, Number 1, April , pp. 17-31

The European Union has played the most important role in stimulating political change in post-World War II Europe. Turkey had to become more democratic in order to attain candidacy for EU membership in the second half of the 1990s, and when it became a candidate, it had to adopt sweeping political reforms in order to fulfil the EU's accession criteria so that accession negotiations could begin. Thus, this article proposes that Turkey's EU candidacy since 1999 has stimulated Turkish political and legal reforms and intensified the Europeanization process in Turkey. The article analyzes the political reforms in Turkey in the light of EU membership and argues that Turkey's Europeanization is greatly motivated by the EU

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Diez Thomas

Turkey, the European Union and Security Complexes Revisited

in Mediterranean Politics, Volume 10, Number 2, July , pp. 167-180

In 1999, Barry Buzan and the author used Regional Security Complex Theory to argue that Turkey and the European Union (EU) should look for alternatives to full Turkish EU membership. This was based on the security stability that Turkey as an insulator in the international system would provide; on the argument that there was a conflation of westernization and Europeanization in Turkey that served to suppress civil society actors; and on the increasing differentiation of the EU. This article reviews the validity of this argument in the light of the changes that have taken place since 1999 in both Turkey and in the EU, including the constitutional and legal changes and the rise of the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) to power in Turkey, and the 2004 enlargement and the agreement of a constitutional treaty in the EU. It is argued that in the light of these developments, the proposals Buzan and the author presented in 1999 were mistaken. The EU should pursue the course of EU membership, as the perspective of such membership is better suited to provide stability and to strengthen civil society actors in Turkey. However, it is also contested that there will be increasing differentiation within the EU, which will affect what the full membership of Turkey actually means.

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Cardone Andrea

Tutela dei diritti, Costituzione europea e giustizia costituzionale: alcuni spunti per un modello integrato

in Diritto pubblico, n. 2, maggio-agosto , 365-426

Section C) Regional integration processes

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Nicolaïdis Kalypso

UE: un moment tocquevillien

in *Politique Etrangère*, 3/2005, (automne).

La voie constitutionnelle choisie a échoué parce qu'elle n'a pas pris la vraie mesure des contradictions actuelles de la construction européenne. L'exigence de démocratisation, qui demeurera, et l'ambition constitutionnelle, devront être redéfinies dans un vaste débat sur la durée nécessaire de la transition politique, et sur le but ultime de l'intégration. Dans ce débat, la place de la France sera centrale; mais les Français devront sans doute faire évoluer fondamentalement leur vision de l'Europe future.

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Hassner Pierre

Un compromis dynamique pour l'Europe

in *Esprit*, n. 317, août 2005

No abstract available

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Galera Victoria A.

Un marco institucional renovado. La Comisión de la Unión Europea

in *Revista de Derecho Constitucional Europeo*, n. 3 Anno 2

<http://www.ugr.es/~redce/ReDCE3/06adoraciongalera.htm>

Section C) Regional integration processes

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Sarmiento Daniel

Un paso más en la constitucionalización del tercer pilar de la Unión Europea. La sentencia Maria Pupino y el efecto directo de las decisiones marco

in *Revista Electrónica de Estudios Internacionales*, Número 10/ 2005

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Losano Mario G.

Una carta fondamentale per l'Unione Europea: costituzione o trattato?

in *Teoria del diritto e dello stato*, n. 1 - 2005



No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

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Aubourg Valérie

Une constitution pour l'Europe, regards croisés : la perception américaine de la constitution européenne, 2002-2004

in *Critique Internationale*, N°26 - Janvier 2005

En 1952-1953, lors du premier projet de Constitution européenne rédigé par l'assemblée ad hoc de la CECA, comme en 2002-2003, pendant les travaux de la Convention européenne présidée par Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, les Européens n'ont pas manqué de faire référence à la Convention de Philadelphie de 1787 et à la Constitution américaine. Les réactions américaines en revanche diffèrent fortement, et le net soutien des années 1950 a fait place à une attitude plus complexe et plus réservée. Qu'ils soient franchement hostiles, sceptiques, bienveillants ou critiques, ou plutôt partisans, les commentateurs du projet constitutionnel européen sont fortement influencés par les débats politiques et juridiques internes aux États-Unis.

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Buguet Béatrice

Union européenne, projet de traité constitutionnel: éléments d'analyse

in *Revue du droit public et de la science politique en France et à l'étranger*, n. 2 , 475-492

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

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Galasso Giuseppe

Unione europea e coscienza comunitaria

in *Nuova Storia Contemporanea*, Anno IX, n. 2, marzo-aprile

(Excerpt)

<http://www.lelettere.it/periodici/nsc/estratti/galasso.htm>

Section C) Regional integration processes

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Jori Paolo

Unione europea, stato e regioni: sviluppo del processo di integrazione negli ordinamenti giuridici

in *Amministrazione italiana (Ia)*, n. 2 , 188 - 207



No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Paruolo Silvana

Unione europea: avviata la ratifica della Costituzione europea

in Affari Sociali Internazionali, n. 1, 2005

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

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Schäfer Armin

Verfassung und Wohlfahrtsstaat: Sozialpolitische Dilemmas der europäischen Integration

in Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft, Heft 4, 2005, 120-141

ABSTRACT: Die Erweiterung der EU würde angesichts zunehmender ökonomischer und sozialer Heterogenität der Mitgliedsstaaten Formen der abgestuften Integration erfordern. Aber Differenzierung gilt als unvereinbar mit dem Kernstück des Integrationsprojekts, dem einheitlichen Binnenmarkt. Der Verfassungsvertrag zeigt keinen Ausweg aus diesem Dilemma auf. Viele Wähler haben bei den Referenden gegen ihn gestimmt, weil sie fürchten, dass sich nach bei Fortschreibung des aktuellen Kurses die Asymmetrien des Integrationsprozesses noch verstärken werden.

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Thürer Daniel

Verfassungsfragen rund um einen möglichen Beitritt der Schweiz zur Europäischen Union

in Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Internationales und Europäisches Recht, Heft 1, 15. Jahrgang

The purpose of this article is to clarify constitutional conditions, modalities and contexts of a possible future accession of Switzerland to the European Union. Three dimensions are analysed: (1) Integration of European Union Law into the framework of the Swiss Constitution; (2) its effects on Swiss (semi-)direct democracy, and (3) a possible contribution of Switzerland to the process of European integration.

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Kemmerer Alexandra

Verfassungskitsch ist keine Lösung

in Internationale Politik, n. 7, 60. Jahrgang, Juli, 36-39

Die Hochglanz-EU ist am Ende. Nicht aber der Vertrag



Section C) Regional integration processes

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Garcia-Duran Huet Patricia

Vers l'Europe des Eurorégions? L'objectif de "cohésion territoriale"

in *Revue de l'Union européenne/Revue du Marché Commun et de l'Union européenne*, Numero 491, septembre , pp. 499-502

Towards a Europe of Euro-Regions? The territorial cohesion objective.

Transeuropean co-operation has already exceeded the strictly national framework. An increasing number of regions and cities are working at various levels, with territories in other member countries. The gradual reinforcement of the territorial cohesion objective can only increase the trend.

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Ernesto Gallo

Verso un nuovo impero europeo?

in *Teoria Politica*, Vol. 21, Fascicolo 1

Some scholars have been recently arguing that current European political system shows some features which were typical of the Middle Ages. The European Union, neither a state nor a federation nor a confederation, shares with its imperial ancestor, the Holy Roman Empire, several traits: both live together with decentralized authorities, show weak institutional structures, overlapping levels of power, and face difficulties when playing outside their blurred borders, to mention only few aspects. Shall we conclude that the Union is a kind of post-national empire, although embedded in a democratic political culture? Differences are greater than supposed. While medieval emperors ruled together with a kind of international of noblemen, the EU is striving to develop a supranational, democratic community. Moreover, the Union has contributed to the convergence between democratic and non-democratic countries, and enhanced the economic level of its poorest regions. Differences with material damages brought about by medieval and Habsburg imperial policies and wars are striking. The article argues that the EU is no democratic empire: on the one hand, this category constitutes a kind of logical contradiction; on the other, the weaknesses of the democratic structure of the Union can be understood in the framework of a process which shows the emergence of the first supranational community of states and citizens in history: a community, as in the wording of the «founding fathers», not an empire.

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Bellon André

Votez bien, ils feront le reste

in *Monde Diplomatique (Le)*, juillet 2005 , 6

La principale préoccupation de la droite : garder le pouvoir ; mon plus grand désir : vous le rendre. » Avec lyrisme et plus ou moins d'arrière-pensées, le candidat à l'élection présidentielle de 1974 François Mitterrand stigmatisait la crise de la représentation politique. Il en rendait la Constitution de la Ve République responsable et il



avait, en partie, raison. La suite a prouvé combien plus vaste était la question : l'élection en élection, le fossé est approfondi, l'abstention et les votes blancs se sont développés, jusqu'au désastre du 21 avril 2002. La légitimité des élus et des élites politiques est de plus en plus contestée par les électeurs.

Depuis trente ans au moins que la question est posée, plusieurs types d'explications sont avancées : institutionnelles (dans le cadre de la mondialisation, les choix politiques ne se traitent plus par le débat traditionnel), économiques (les contraintes laissent peu de latitude aux citoyens), politiques (la montée de l'abstention est normale et caractéristique de la démocratie moderne)... S'y ajoute un discours élitiste (les questions sont trop complexes pour qu'un électeur puisse les comprendre et y apporter réponse), professoral (nous n'avons pas assez expliqué) ou carrément condescendant (les électeurs sont irresponsables)...

La particularité commune à ces brillantes analyses est qu'elles ne cherchent pas à redonner vie à la démocratie. Bien au contraire, elles théorisent un changement de paradigme : elles évoquent même plus une crise de celle-ci, mais une évolution vers une sorte de « postdémocratie » qui est qu'une manière d'avaliser la fin de cette démocratie.

Si, en effet, jusqu'aux années 1980, le combat démocratique pouvait être caractérisé par des moments intenses - dont l'élection présidentielle de 1981 reste un symbole -, les affrontements politiques n'ont été, depuis lors, que peu marqués par les débats de fond. Bien plus grave, l'esprit démocratique recule au profit de l'acceptation de contraintes de la mondialisation présentées comme insurmontables, l'intérêt général s'efface en faveur d'intérêts parcellaires autant que fugitifs. Le citoyen n'est plus un acteur de la démocratie, mais son créancier passif.

Pression des intérêts mondialisés ? Evidemment. Absence de courage politique ? Sans doute. Mais, bien pis, acceptation par la classe dirigeante, de droite comme, malheureusement, de gauche, des arguments conformes, d'une vision unique et fatale du monde. Il faut avoir entendu certains ministres socialistes, après le tournant de 1983, s'extasier devant leur propre courage à mener une politique que refusaient leurs électeurs pour mesurer le fossé idéologique qui s'est creusé entre le peuple et ses représentants.

La crise qui se développe partout en Occident n'est pas une crise politique traditionnelle où le peuple manifeste son exaspération devant les mesures prises par ses représentants, mais une différence fondamentale de vision. D'un côté, les citoyens souhaitent être représentés, avoir des porte-parole politiques. De l'autre, les « élites » estiment savoir ce qu'est le bien commun, s'estiment porteuses d'un intérêt général d'essence quasi immanente, y compris contre leurs propres concitoyens. La légitimité ne procède donc plus du peuple. C'est ainsi qu'Alain Minc, interrogé sur l'uniformité de la Commission - exclusivement composée d'énarques - qu'il présidait et qui avait élaboré le rapport sur « La France de l'an 2000 » (1), répondit que « lorsqu'on veut interdire aux élites de s'exprimer, on risque de verser dans le populisme (2) ».

Le responsable politique moderne doit donc se soumettre aux contraintes des forces dominantes contre les revendications populaires. Cette évolution aristocratique se voit officialisée par l'évolution sémantique : répondre au peuple, c'est être populiste ; parler de souveraineté populaire, c'est être souverainiste. Dans le même temps, le label « populaire » est décerné par le milieu médiatico-politique. Ainsi, Pierre Assouline, dans l'émission qu'il animait sur France Culture, a-t-il pu déclarer à son invité Bernard Kouchner (3) qu'il était « un des deux hommes politiques les plus populaires de France », déclaration ahurissante



lorsqu'on sait que l'ancien ministre socialiste a systématiquement été battu lors de toutes ses tentatives électorales.

Véritable coup d'Etat historique : alors que, en démocratie, les citoyens jugent les responsables, la postdémocratie permet, en quelque sorte, aux responsables de juger les citoyens. Ainsi M. Lionel Jospin, après son échec du 21 avril 2002, demande-t-il qu'on cesse de « se montrer complaisant à l'égard de ceux qui n'accomplissent pas leur devoir civique (4) ». Ainsi M. Anthony Blair, lors de la guerre en Irak, déclare-t-il que le rejet manifesté par le peuple britannique est la conséquence d'« une émotion qui se comprend », mais qu'elle « n'a pas d'importance politique ». L'idée d'un suffrage contrôlé, voire censitaire, se répand de façon insidieuse. Dominique Strauss-Kahn, dirigeant du Parti socialiste (PS), déclare par exemple : « Du groupe social le plus défavorisé, on ne peut malheureusement pas toujours attendre une participation sereine à une démocratie parlementaire. Non pas qu'il se désintéresse de l'histoire, mais ses irrptions s'y manifestent parfois dans la violence (5). »

Résurgence de la souveraineté des peuples

L'abstention croissante aux élections n'est donc pas un signe de désaffection par rapport à la démocratie, mais la conséquence naturelle de la dilution de la souveraineté populaire. La forte participation au référendum du 29 mai montre, à l'inverse, la résurgence de la souveraineté d'un peuple qu'on disait disparu sur une scène qu'on croyait désertée ; ce peuple a considéré que la question posée lui donnait, pour une fois, une véritable influence. A l'inverse, les réactions des dirigeants et des principaux médias ont été celles de responsables délégitimés. Rien que de très logique. Mais leur outrance révèle l'ampleur de la remise en cause d'une organisation du pouvoir qu'ils croyaient définitivement installée.

La politique rejoint ici la philosophie. Car la dilution de la démocratie n'est pas le produit des circonstances comme veulent le faire croire ceux qui parlent de « déficit démocratique » à la manière dont on parle du bilan comptable d'une entreprise à redresser. Elle s'inscrit dans une évolution de la pensée, des référents philosophiques, au travers de ce qu'on a appelé la philosophie postmoderne et qui s'est fortement attachée à la déconstruction du sujet politique. D'après Michel Foucault, « le sujet n'est pas une substance ; c'est une forme, et cette forme n'est pas surtout ni toujours identique à elle-même ; vous n'avez pas le même type de rapports lorsque vous vous constituez comme sujet politique qui va voter... ou lorsque vous cherchez à réaliser votre désir dans une relation sexuelle (6) ».

Alors que la définition du citoyen repose sur une unité autant que sur une certaine pérennité, y a-t-il encore un citoyen, quelle peut être la réalité de l'individu politique dans une telle conception ? Ces thèses sont la négation même de tout espace public. Si la citoyenneté est relative à la question posée, il n'y a plus ni intérêt général ni citoyen. La démocratie n'a plus qu'un sens relatif, et l'universalisme n'est qu'un particularisme comme les autres. Alors, le sociologue Alain Touraine peut déclarer : « La démocratie représente plus directement que dans le passé la subordination de l'organisation sociale à un principe non social, celui de la liberté humaine. » Il ajoute : « Nous nous définissons de moins en moins par ce que nous faisons, et de plus en plus par ce que nous sommes, par le sexe, l'âge, l'ethnie, la nationalité, la religion, etc. (7). »

Le mouvement populaire que caractérise le 29 mai est consubstantiellement lié à la bataille des idées. La philosophie, qui a toujours su accompagner l'évolution historique, pourrait enfin se réveiller, sortir des salons conformistes et retrouver son lien avec l'humanité.



Ce n'est, en effet, pas un hasard si le changement de paradigme démocratique s'est cristallisé sur le traité constitutionnel. Le projet européen a épousé une idéologie de la mondialisation avant tout porteuse de contraintes, d'obligations, de fatalités... Issue de l'idée généreuse d'un peuple mondial, elle supprime, de fait, tout peuple en tant qu'acteur politique, soumettant la politique à des décisions d'essence supérieure, à des acteurs peu apparents. La construction européenne, fondée sur l'aspiration des peuples européens à bâtir un espace de paix et un avenir de progrès, a tenté de faire épouser aux citoyens une cause qui ne les concernait pas. C'est ce que résume Alain Touraine lorsqu'il déclare avec brutalité : « En France, le mot "libéralisme" était imprononçable, alors on en a trouvé un autre, "Europe" (8). »

Les « pères fondateurs » de l'Europe, tout particulièrement Jean Monnet, ne cachaient pas leurs réticences à l'égard de la souveraineté populaire, leur conception technocratique et économiquement libérale de la politique. Traumatisés par la seconde guerre mondiale, puis par la guerre froide, peu de responsables ont su faire l'analyse des risques que leur projet européen faisait peser sur la démocratie. Pierre Mendès France fut de ceux-là. Prenant, le 18 janvier 1957, position à l'Assemblée nationale contre le traité de Rome, il déclarait : « Le projet du marché commun tel qu'il nous est présenté est basé sur le libéralisme classique du XXe siècle selon lequel la concurrence pure et simple règle tous les problèmes. L'abdication d'une démocratie peut prendre deux formes, elle recourt soit à une dictature interne par la remise de tous les pouvoirs à un homme providentiel, soit à la délégation de ses pouvoirs à une autorité extérieure, laquelle au nom de la technique exercera en réalité la puissance politique, car au nom d'une saine économie on en vient aisément à dicter une politique monétaire, budgétaire, sociale, finalement une politique au sens le plus large du mot, nationale et internationale. »

Le « traité établissant une Constitution pour l'Europe » n'est somme toute que l'aboutissement ultime de cette logique, la dernière pièce qui rend le puzzle bien visible. Seule une basse propagande pouvait, à ce stade, traiter d'anti-Européens ceux qui refusaient cette sacralisation. La seule question valable était celle du pouvoir politique, et ce texte donnait officiellement la légitimité politique à un être abstrait, le marché. Cette légitimité abstraite donnait elle-même une légitimité concrète à des « élites » qui, très naturellement, ont, dès l'annonce du référendum, déclaré qu'il n'y avait qu'un seul vote possible : oui.

Le oui ayant, par définition, aucune valeur si on ne peut pas dire non, le débat sur les présomées avancées démocratiques du traité ne pouvait qu'être incompréhensible (9). Il fut donc détourné et enlisa de façon absurde autour des nouveaux pouvoirs d'un Parlement européen privé - comme d'ailleurs de plus en plus les Parlements nationaux - des attributs réels du pouvoir en matière économique et sociale. Il égara autour du renforcement du rôle du citoyen, en particulier autour d'un droit de pétition, sorte d'équivalent du droit de supplique auprès du roi sous l'ancien régime et qui n'était, au mieux, que la conséquence naturelle de la liberté d'expression.

En fait, ce projet de traité était, sans doute, la première construction juridique cohérente d'une démocratie postmoderne autour d'une citoyenneté floue, d'un citoyen plus sujet du marché-roi qu'acteur d'une volonté collective, enfin autour d'une absence de peuple. Car il n'y a pas de peuple dans cette construction européenne, le seul corps politique évoqué dans le traité étant, plus ou moins, l'ensemble des pétitionnaires, relatif à une question particulière, tout comme la citoyenneté, dans les visions postmodernes, est relative à la question posée. La mondialisation que nous impose le discours officiel oublie le peuple ou même le déconsidère : par exemple, dans leur livre *Empire*, Antonio Negri et Michael Hardt expliquent que le peuple, supposant une forme d'unité, tend à étouffer la « multitude des individualités (10) ». Le citoyen ne serait ainsi plus un être politique, il serait un parmi la multitude.



Il est des moments, dans l'histoire, où les choses, soudain, se clarifient. Le 29 mai 2005 restera, peut-être, un de ces moments. Porteurs d'un projet économique concurrentiel purement dogmatique, les libéraux sont apparus antilibéraux sur le plan philosophique. Les discours sur la démocratie se sont révélés des miroirs aux alouettes. Les médias les plus importants ont manifesté leur soumission à des intérêts privés.

« Penser, c'est dire non », affirmait le philosophe Alain. Dans des circonstances exceptionnelles, et face à des difficultés qui le sont tout autant, les citoyens ont, majoritairement, retrouvé la volonté de dire non. Ce geste n'est pas circonstanciel : il est la réaffirmation d'une identité politique, d'une reconstruction du citoyen. Il est, surtout, la proclamation qu'il n'y a pas de démocratie sans débat.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Jiri Zemanek

Voting in the Councils: A Compromise, No Revolution

in European Constitutional Law Review, Volume 1 - Issue 01 , 62-67

The European Council actually, as a rule, takes decisions by consensus, as its major function is to bring a primary political impetus into the integration process through 'conclusions', 'principles', 'guidelines', and 'joint strategies' or 'recommendations' not having the force of a legal act. This is a customary rule; it is not stipulated in Article 4 EU. Consensus may be regarded as a 'soft' unanimity, reached without voting, in a silent way (no opposing statements), and allowing – within the framework of the common position – some divergences by individual Member States.

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Cindy Skach

We, the Peoples? Constitutionalizing the European Union

in Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 43, Issue 1, March , 149-170

This article reviews arguments in favour of a formal, written constitution for Europe, and concludes with a better suggestion - a Basic European Law. The article also criticizes the wholehearted embrace of 'popular constitution-making'. It does so by drawing on comparative evidence from constitution-making processes in various historical time periods and world regions. It poses three essential questions to organize the debate. First, why a European constitution? Second, what kind of European constitution? Third, how a European constitution?



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Grant Charles

What If the British Vote No?

in *Foreign Affairs*, May/June n° 3/2005

If ratified, the new EU constitution will change the way the union works. It cannot take effect unless approved by all 25 members, but in only one country -- the United Kingdom -- do polls show that a majority oppose the document. Still, a rejection there would throw Europe into a constitutional crisis. And it could ultimately harm transatlantic relations as well.

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Tanja A. Börzel

What can federalism teach us about the European Union? The German experience

in *Regional and Federal Studies*, Volume 15, Number 2 / June , 245-257

The article uses insights from comparative federalism to reflect upon the structure and functioning of the European Union. The analysis shows that the EU corresponds rather closely to the model of cooperative federalism. The EU's structural deficiencies are revealed by comparison with German federal experience, which helps explain why the EU has manoeuvred itself into a double legitimacy trap in which declining problem-solving capacity (output legitimacy) can no longer compensate for the lack of democratic participation and accountability (input legitimacy). The article then assesses whether the Constitutional Treaty will be able to provide an escape route from the double legitimacy trap.

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Gerard Delanty

What does it mean to be a 'European'?

in *Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research*, Volume 18, Number 1 / March , 11-22

The paper explores the notion of Europeanism, asking the question: what does it mean to be a European? In much the same terms as in Michael Walzer's often-cited essay 'What does it mean to be an American?', Walzer's analysis will serve as a point of departure for a discussion of different conceptions of European self-understanding. Some points of contrast will be made between American hyphenated identities and European identity, conceived of in terms of a notion of cosmopolitanism.

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Subsection 6. The European unification process

Alesina Alberto, Angeloni Ignazio, Schuknecht Ludger

What does the European Union do?

in **Public Choice**, Volume 123, Numbers 3-4 , 275 - 319

The goal of this paper is to evaluate the attribution of policy prerogatives to European Union level institutions and compare them to the implications of normative policy models and to the preferences of European citizens. For this purpose we construct a set of indicators to measure the policy-making intensity of the European Union (European Council, Parliament, Commission, Court of Justice, etc.). We confirm that the extent and the intensity of policy-making by the EU have increased sharply over the last 30 years, but at different speeds, and in different degrees, across policy domains. In recent years the areas that have expanded most are quite remote from the EEC's original mission of establishing a free market zone with common external trade policy. On the contrary some policy domains that would normally be attributed to the highest level of government remain at national level. We argue that the resulting allocation of prerogatives between the EU and member countries is partly inconsistent with normative criteria concerning the assignment of policies at different government levels, as laid out in the theoretical literature.

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Subsection 6. The European unification process

Burns Charlotte

Who Pays? Who Gains? How do Costs and Benefits Shape the Policy Influence of the European Parliament?

in **Journal of Common Market Studies**, Vol. 43, Issue 3, September , 485-506

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Große Hüttmann Martin

Wie europafähig ist der deutsche Föderalismus?

in **Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte**, Band 13-14, 2005

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Zervakis Peter A., Hierlmann Dominik

Wie geht es weiter, Europa?

in **Europäische Rundschau**, Heft 3, 2005

No abstract available



Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Opitz Maximilian

Wie viele Gegensätze verträgt Europa? Geistige Grundlagen und ausgewogene Steuerungen der Erweiterung und der Vertiefung der EU

in *Politische Studien*, Heft 402, 56. Jahrgang, Juli-August , 52-58

No abstract available

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Subsection 6. The European unification process

Grimm Dieter, Haltern Ulrich, Joas Hans, Pernice Ingolf, Preuß Ulrich K., Sabathil Gerhard, Schuppert Gunnar Folke

Wie weiter mit Europa?

in *Blätter für deutsche & internationale Politik*, Dezember, 2005 , 1447-1461

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Guisan Catherine

Winning the Peace: 'Lost Treasure' of European Integration?

in *Rivista di Studi Politici Internazionali*, Volume 72, n. 3 , pp. 453-470

No abstract available

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Winston Churchill and the Unification of Europe

in *Rivista di Studi Politici Internazionali*, Volume 72, n. 2 , pp. 222-232

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Melchior Josef

Zur Leistungsfähigkeit des EU-Konvents

in *Oesterreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft* , 2005/3 , 263-278

ABOUT THE PERFORMANCE OF THE EU-CONVENTION



The paper investigates the problem solving capability of the EU-Convention concerning democracy, efficiency, and capacity to act. The author distinguishes between two dimensions of performance: content and process. The political mandate of the Laeken-Declaration and the procedures usually followed by intergovernmental conferences are used as measures of the two dimensions. The analysis finds out that the EU-Convention stayed within the limits of the Laeken-mandate and contributed to the further incremental constitutionalization of the EU including only few innovations. The formulation of a single constitutional text is regarded as an extraordinary achievement of the Convention, which is attributed to certain characteristics of its operation that differ from those of intergovernmental conferences.

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Cartabia Marta

“Ispirata alla volontà dei cittadini degli Stati d’Europa”

in **Quaderni Costituzionali**, numero : 1, marzo 2005 , 9-38

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 6. The European unification process

Rask Madsen Mikael

« La Cour qui venait du froid. » Les droits de l’homme dans la genèse de l’Europe d’après guerre

in **Critique Internationale**, N°26 - Janvier 2005

Issue aussi bien des stratégies de la guerre froide que des idéologies universalistes juridiques et politiques de l’après-guerre, la Convention européenne de sauvegarde des droits de l’homme et des libertés fondamentales (CESDH) et ses institutions ont progressivement conquis une position de source et origine suprêmes des droits de l’homme en Europe. A partir de témoignages des acteurs clefs de l’institutionnalisation et de l’autonomisation juridique de la Convention, cet article analyse la montée en puissance de cette institution comme un exemple du processus d’européanisation d’après guerre.

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Subsection 6. The European unification process

Marchat Philippe

Élargissement et Constitution. Quelles frontières pour quelle Europe ?.

in **Revue de l’Union européenne/Revue du Marché Commun et de l’Union européenne**, Numero 486, mars , pp. 141-148

Where will the borders of the future Europe lie?



The European construction process has been underway for more than half a century now. We have seen a great many stages in this process unfold between April 18th 1951, the date on which the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was set up, and the most recent enlargement of the European Union on May 1st 2004, which saw the admission of 10 new member states at the Council of Copenhagen. As a result, the original six-nation Europe created by the treaty of Rome in 1957 has successively risen to nine states in 1973, ten in 1981, twelve in 1986, fifteen in 1995, twenty-five in 2004, and should reach twenty-seven members in 2007 when Bulgaria and Romania join. The membership of Turkey, (an associate member since September 1963 and which submitted an application for membership in September 1987, this being accepted for consideration in 1999, although this consideration process should last for several years) now poses a fundamental problem concerning the future and above all the nature of what is today the European Union, the union created on 1st January 1995, including among other things the introduction of euro. Those for and against the admission of this new member state with its very special characteristics have clashed, putting forward their respective arguments at the very moment when each of the twenty-five member states must ratify the laboriously negotiated European Constitution, either via a parliamentary vote or a popular referendum. This unfortunately (and illogically) risks influencing the outcome of the votes. Additionally, the future of this new European grouping is far from being clearly defined, although it now resembles a free-trade area more than the European world power envisaged by some, without however ruling out the prospects that various "closer cooperation" projects may fortunately be envisaged.

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Frankenberger Hans-Dieter, Nonnenmacher Günther

Überladen, überdehnt: EU in der Krise

in *Europäische Rundschau*, Heft 3, 2005, 3-8

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 7. Inter-regional Cooperation

Gialdino Rolando E.

Le nouveau règlement de la Cour interaméricaine des droits de l'homme

in *Revue trimestrielle des droits de l'homme*, n. 64

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 7. Inter-regional Cooperation

Denysyuk Vitaliy

"Wider Europe" contre "Wider Russia": l'UE prône une coopération Sud-Sud accrue pour réussir le partenariat avec les NEIO

in *Revue de l'Union européenne/Revue du Marché Commun et de l'Union européenne*, Numero 493, décembre, pp. 636-648



Wide Europe VS. Wider Russia: the EU Recommends increased South-South cooperation to achieve a successful partnership with the surrounding European countries.

The EU has ongoing regional co-operation plans in several regions and sub-regions in the world. What sub-regional integration for surrounding countries does the European Union want? Does it want economic integration or political integration? The EU's choice is increasingly that of economic integration with and between bordering countries in the East and South. We suggest that the coincidence between both geo-economic plans (wider Europe and wider Russia) and the simultaneous negotiation of both those preferential liberalisation agendas is the best economic alternative for surrounding European countries.

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Subsection 7. Inter-regional Cooperation

Mary Farrell

A Triumph of Realism over Idealism? Cooperation Between the European Union and Africa
in *Journal of European Integration*, Volume 27, Number 3 / September , 263-283

Relations between the European Union and Africa predate the origins of the EU itself. With the Lomé Convention of 1975, relations between the two regions were set on a more solid footing with a highly institutionalised framework of cooperation, hailed at the time as a partnership of equals. The successor to the Lomé Convention, the Cotonou Agreement, is now also portrayed as an innovative form of interregional cooperation, a form of hybrid interregionalism between the formal regional grouping of the European Union and a 'constructed' region, comprising the African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries. This article suggests that the EU approach to interregionalism is itself evolving, and the cooperation with the ACP group does not reflect any sustained commitment on the part of the European Union to patterns of cooperation and partnerships built up in the past.

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Subsection 7. Inter-regional Cooperation

Barbé Esther, Soler i Lecha Eduard

Barcelona + 10: Spain's Relaunch of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
in *International Spectator (The)*, Vol. XL, n. 2, April-June

Several important changes in the global, Mediterranean, European and Spanish context have influenced the development of the EMP in the last ten years. Yet, today's drastically changed environment could both restrict the margin of manoeuvre for advances in the EMP and open up new opportunities for progress. These are the considerations that convinced the Spanish government to undertake hosting a second Barcelona conference, known as Barcelona + 10.

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Subsection 7. Inter-regional Cooperation

Baoyun Yang

China and Asia-Europe Cooperation



in **International Studies**, n. 3-4, vol. 42, october , 347-355

ABSTRACT: Even though relations between Asia and Europe remained largely unexplored during most part of the period following the Second World War, the end of the Cold War has created conditions for better relations between the two. The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) provides the most important basis for cooperation between the two continents. China is taking keen interest in this regard by initiating steps towards deepening the Asia-Europe partnership, thanks to globalization. From a Chinese perspective, the cooperation promotes its own economic reforms programme. Asia-Europe cooperation also facilitates the security dialogue between ASEAN-EU and China. That the US at times becomes a factor in affecting China-EU relations is a matter of concern for both the sides. An important area of cooperation relates to the establishment of a new multipolar international order.

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Subsection 7. Inter-regional Cooperation

Hettne Björn, Söderbaum Fredrik

Civilian Power or Soft Imperialism? The EU as a Global Actor and the Role of Interregionalism

in **European Foreign Affairs Review**, Volume 10, Issue 4 , pp. 535-552

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 7. Inter-regional Cooperation

Brown Drusilla K., Kiyota Kozo, Stern Robert M.

Computational Analysis of the US FTAs with Central America, Australia and Morocco

in **World Economy**, Volume 28, Number 10 , 1441-1490

We use the Michigan Model of World Production and Trade to assess the economic effects of the US bilateral FTAs negotiated with Central America, Australia and Morocco. The model covers 18 economic sectors in each of 22 countries/regions and is based on version 5.4 of the GTAP database for 1997 together with specially constructed estimates of services barriers and other data on sectoral employment and numbers of firms. The distinguishing feature of the model is that it incorporates imperfect competition in the manufacturing and services sectors, including monopolistic competition, increasing returns and product variety. The modelling focus is on the effects of the bilateral removal of tariffs on agriculture and manufactures and services barriers. Rules of origin and other restrictive measures and the non-trade aspects of the FTAs are not taken into account due to data constraints. The computational results indicate that the benefits of bilateral FTAs for the United States and partner countries are rather small in both absolute and relative terms, and that far greater benefits could be realised if the United States and its FTA partners adopted unilateral free trade and especially if multilateral free trade was adopted by all countries/regions in the global trading system.

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Subsection 7. Inter-regional Cooperation

Pace Michelle

Conclusion: Cultural Democracy in Euro-Mediterranean Relations?



in **Mediterranean Politics**, Volume 10, Number 3, November , pp. 427-437

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 7. Inter-regional Cooperation

Schäfer Isabel

Die Euro-Mediterrane Partnerschaft und der Nahostkonflikt

in **Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte**, Band 45, 2005

No abstract available

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Subsection 7. Inter-regional Cooperation

Silvestri Sara

EU Relations with Islam in the Context of the EMP's Cultural Dialogue

in **Mediterranean Politics**, Volume 10, Number 3, November , pp. 385-405

Starting from the awareness that Islam is both an internal and an external crucial factor the EU has come to deal with at the turn of the century, this article examines recent EU attitudes and initiatives towards Islam and Muslims with a focus on the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). In this context, particular attention is given to the increased international concern with the development of its third basket, the one devoted to cultural and social exchanges across the Euro-Mediterranean space.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 7. Inter-regional Cooperation

Fusacchia Alessandro

Europa e Africa. La Comunità economica europea e l'associazione dei territori d'oltremare (1955-1957)

in **Contemporanea - Rivista di storia dell'800 e del '900** , n. 2, aprile 2005 , 267 - 298

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 7. Inter-regional Cooperation

Lutz Holländer, Ronja Kempin

Europas Platz an der Sonne - Afrika und die europäische Sicherheitspolitik

in **Blätter für deutsche & internationale Politik**, Mai, 2005 , 593-599

No abstract available



Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 7. Inter-regional Cooperation

Amin Samir

Europe, Asie : quel rapprochement ? Face à l'hégémonisme des Etats-Unis : les conditions d'un rapprochement euro-asiatique

in *Pensée (La)*, Fascicule 05/341 , 83-95

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 7. Inter-regional Cooperation

Harders Cilja

Europäische Mittelmeerpolitik aus arabischer Sicht

in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, Band 45, 2005

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 7. Inter-regional Cooperation

Thompson Henry, Toledo Hugo

FTAA and Colombia: Income redistribution across labor groups

in *International Review of Economics and Finance*, Volume 14 number 2 , 203-212

Colombia is set to enter the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA), and internal income redistribution can be anticipated. A specific-factors model of production with seven skilled groups of labor is applied using projected price changes for the three major sectors of the economy. Every labor group, except production labor, is projected to lose. The manufacturing capital gains at the expense of capital in agriculture and services. Predicted effects are large, suggesting that economic policy should begin to focus on the pending adjustment to FTAA.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 7. Inter-regional Cooperation

Del Sarto Raffaella A., Schumacher Tobias

From EMP to ENP: What's at Stake with the European Neighbourhood Policy towards the Southern Mediterranean?

in *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Volume 10, Issue 1 , pp. 17-38

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 7. Inter-regional Cooperation

Santa-cruz Arturo



From Santiago to Lima: The organization of American States and political integration in the Americas after the cold war

in *Global Change, Peace & Security*, n. 2, vol. 17, june , 123-140

ABSTRACT: This article looks at the pattern of political integration that has been taking place in the Americas since the 1990s. It is argued that the ideological convergence in the hemisphere has contributed to the emergence of a distinct regional normative structure to support democracy. The article begins with a brief summary of my theoretical baselines, constructivism and neoliberal institutionalism, and subsequently discusses the adoption of the 1991 Santiago Commitment to Democracy and Resolution 1080, briefly reviewing the four instances in which the new instrument was applied. I then consider the 2001 Inter-American Democratic Charter, and look at the Venezuelan situation since the 2002 unsuccessful coup. I conclude by evaluating this 12-year-long process from my two theoretical baselines.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 7. Inter-regional Cooperation

Garavello Oscar

Gli accordi dell'Unione europea con i paesi emergenti: verso nuove strategie bilaterali e regionali

in *Economia Pubblica*, Fascicolo 4

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 7. Inter-regional Cooperation

Pace Michelle

Imagining Co-presence in Euro-Mediterranean Relations: The Role of 'Dialogue'

in *Mediterranean Politics*, Volume 10, Number 3, November , pp. 291-312

This article attempts to draw upon the work of a key thinker on dialogue, Mikhail Bakhtin, to shed light on dialogue in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. It also draws upon the work of Bruce Tuckman's 1965 forming, storming, norming and performing group development model. By applying these theoretical frameworks to the specific case of Euro-Mediterranean relations, the article aims to uncover the challenges facing EU-Mediterranean partners in developing mutual relations through dialogue. It also suggests ways in which obstacles to improved Euro-Mediterranean dialogic ties could be overcome.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 7. Inter-regional Cooperation

Schumacher Tobias

Introduction: The Study of Euro-Mediterranean Cultural and Social Co-operation in Perspective

in *Mediterranean Politics*, Volume 10, Number 3, November , pp. 281-290

No abstract available



Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 7. Inter-regional Cooperation

NICET-CHENAFD Dalila , WACHS Arnaud

Les relations commerciales bilatérales des pays du bassin méditerranéen à l'heure de l'élargissement de l'UE: une approche de type gravitaire

in *Economie Appliquée*, N° 1

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 7. Inter-regional Cooperation

Nowak-Lehmann D. Felicitas, Martínez-Zarzoso Inmaculada

MERCOSUR-EUROPEAN UNION TRADE: How Important Is EU Trade Liberalization for MERCOSUR's Exports?

in *International Trade Journal*, vol. 19, Number 1 / Spring , 31 - 66

In this study, MERCOSUR's past exports to the EU under the protectionist environment of the period between 1988 and 1996 are examined and an attempt is made to determine MERCOSUR's exports' growth potential in a liberalized EU market. A sectoral study is considered indispensable since tariff and non-tariff trade barriers vary strongly among sectors. The influence of the macroeconomic environment on MERCOSUR's exports is examined in a dynamic panel analysis. A simulation study based on a quite comprehensive evaluation of EU trade barriers is performed for the Argentinean case to evaluate the impact of EU trade liberalization.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 7. Inter-regional Cooperation

Nordbruch Götz

Mediterrane Partnerschaft?

in *Blätter für deutsche & internationale Politik*, Dezember, 2005 , 1436-1439

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 7. Inter-regional Cooperation

Julie Gilson

New Interregionalism? The EU and East Asia

in *Journal of European Integration*, Volume 27, Number 3 / September , 307-326

This article examines the types of region-to-region dialogue evident in relations among the states of the European Union and East Asia, with a particular focus on ASEM and the EU-ASEAN dialogue. It examines how the EU utilizes interregionalism as one mechanism for managing economic and political relations with a growing yet disparate region. For the states of East Asia, ASEM offers a means of dealing collectively with twenty-five European states, provides a



first-hand examination of the practices of regional integration and establishes a framework in which East Asia can present itself as a regional political and economic entity and realize the 'third side' in a global triangle of regional blocs. Building upon a particular historical trajectory of relations among the states of the EU and East Asia, ASEM represents an important space for articulating not only the nature of region, but also the role of non-state actors, which have increasingly come to occupy a significant position in transnational affairs.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 7. Inter-regional Cooperation

Paruolo Silvana

Partenariato euro-mediterraneo: dal decimo anniversario del processo di Barcellona al nuovo programma di lavoro

in *Affari Sociali Internazionali*, n. 3, 2005

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 7. Inter-regional Cooperation

Makriyannis Miltiadis

Reinvigorating the Parliamentary Dimension of the Barcelona Process: The Establishment of the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly

in *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol. 16, N. 2, Spring 2005

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 7. Inter-regional Cooperation

Grabendorff W.

Relaciones triangulares en un mundo unipolar: américa del norte, la unión europea y américa del sur

in *Análisis político*, n. 55

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 7. Inter-regional Cooperation

Malmvig Helle

Security through Intercultural Dialogue? Implications of the Securitization of Euro-Mediterranean Dialogue between Cultures

in *Mediterranean Politics*, Volume 10, Number 3, November, pp. 349-364



This article analyses the consequences of framing Euro-Mediterranean Dialogue between Cultures within a context of security. On the basis of the Copenhagen School's conceptualization of security, it shows that security concerns very forcefully serve to legitimize the need for an ambitious dialogue based on key ideals of Critical Theory. Yet, there is a backside to securitization. Securitization also brings extreme politization and heightened attempts of governmental control, which ultimately compromise those very ideals on which dialogue is based.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 7. Inter-regional Cooperation

Del Sarto Raffaella A.

Setting the (Cultural) Agenda: Concepts, Communities and Representation in Euro-Mediterranean Relations in Mediterranean Politics, Volume 10, Number 3, November , pp. 313-330

Since 9/11, inter-cultural dialogue, in the Euro-Mediterranean area and beyond, has unintentionally reproduced the 'clash of civilizations' thesis. A rethink of the concepts of 'cultures', communities and their representatives points to the agenda-setting function of inter-cultural dialogue, which also legitimises specific interpretations of regional and international politics. In spite of some positive developments within the EMP's inter-cultural dialogue, this article recommends a departure from the rhetoric of 'inter-cultural dialogue' altogether. Instead, a clear distinction between cultural co-operation and the promotion of sustainable development and human rights is necessary, along with the establishment of a trans-cultural dialogue that defines similarities and differences across states and regions along thematic lines.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 7. Inter-regional Cooperation

Karen E. Smith

The EU and Central and Eastern Europe: The Absence of Interregionalism in Journal of European Integration, Volume 27, Number 3 / September , 347-364

In contrast to its relations with many other areas of the world, the EU's relations with Central and Eastern Europe are not 'interregional'. The EU has developed intensive bilateral relations with the Central and East European countries, which has allowed it to use economic and political conditionality to encourage them to undertake reforms — and successfully so. It has promoted sub-regional cooperation, but not consistently or extensively, and strong sub-regional groupings have not evolved in Central and Eastern Europe. The 'big-bang' enlargement of 2004 extended the EU's regional model to much of the European continent, but is not an example of interregionalism. The shadow of enlargement has also created considerable challenges for the EU in its relations with its new neighbours.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 7. Inter-regional Cooperation

Wesley Scott James

The EU and 'Wider Europe': Toward an Alternative Geopolitics of Regional Cooperation? in Geopolitics, Vol. 10, n. 3, Autumn , 429 - 454



In response to enlargement, the EU's 'Wider Europe' initiative and emerging European Neighbourhood Policy envisage 'positive interdependence' with neighbouring countries of the 'East' and 'South'. 'Partnerships' are seen as an alternative to direct EU membership and thus as a sustainable incentive for regional cooperation. In order to be effective, such regional partnerships must transcend market logics and accommodate heterogeneous economic and socio-political realities. However, Wider Europe is characterised, in terms of realpolitik, by competing rationales of 'stability', 'prosperity', 'sustainability' and 'security' and thus by considerable potential for exclusionary policies. It is unclear whether exclusion can be counterbalanced by multilevel and 'de-centred' forms of regional engagement that also define Wider Europe. Applying a pragmatic approach, discussion will centre on rationales, discourses and reconceptualisations of European space upon which the notion of Wider Europe is being constructed and on whether they signal gradual changes in the direction of a 'post-Westphalian' geopolitics.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 7. Inter-regional Cooperation

Fredrik Söderbaum, Patrik Stenlund, Luk Van Langenhove

The EU as a Global Actor and the Dynamics of Interregionalism: a Comparative Analysis
in *Journal of European Integration*, Volume 27, Number 3 / September , 365-380

This article presents a comparative analysis of the role of interregionalism in the European Union's foreign policies and external relations, with a particular focus on some of the most important regions around the world: Africa, Asia, South America, North America and Central and Eastern Europe. After a brief comparative assessment of the EU's interregional relationships, the article provides three partly overlapping and intersecting accounts of the variation in the policy of interregionalism across regions: (i) promoting a liberal internationalist agenda; (ii) building the EU's identity as a global actor; and (iii) promoting the EU's power and competitiveness. The analysis concludes by sketching some ingredients of an emerging research agenda on the study of the EU's foreign policy and interregionalism.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 7. Inter-regional Cooperation

Fredrik Söderbaum, Luk Van Langenhove

The EU as a Global Actor and the Role of Interregionalism
in *Journal of European Integration*, Volume 27, Number 3 / September , 249-262

This article introduces the topic of this special issue, namely the study of the EU as a global actor and the role of interregionalism. It starts with mapping out the general theme and the key questions that guide the issue, such as: to what extent are regions becoming 'actors' of world politics; what is the strength of interregionalism in the EU's foreign policies towards regions and across sectors; why is interregionalism being pursued and who are the actors driving such policy; and what are the implications for world order and global governance? Region-to-region interactions are no novelty, as such, but they have only recently started to emerge on a more comprehensive scale. Interregionalism is related to changes in world order and needs therefore to be historically situated. The authors suggest that interregionalism needs to be related both to globalisation and to the restructuring of the nation-state, but above all to



'the regionalist movement'. In the second section, the emergence of interregionalism is presented from an historical perspective and the concept of interregionalism is discussed. The article ends with a brief overview of the structure and content of the special issue as a whole.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 7. Inter-regional Cooperation

Sebastian Santander

The European Partnership with Mercosur: a Relationship Based on Strategic and Neo-liberal Principles
in *Journal of European Integration*, Volume 27, Number 3 / September , 285-306

Since the early 1990s, the European Union has developed new instruments to consolidate its external action, especially in 'low politics'. These new instruments include the signing of interregional arrangements with other regional groups. The EU's region-to-region strategy towards the Common Market of the South (Mercosur) is in keeping with the latest trends of interregionalism. Since the birth of Mercosur, the EU has given technical, financial and diplomatic support to South America's new regionalism. The long-term goal is to conclude a region-to-region agreement in the political, cooperation and trade fields. By providing this support, the EU plays a role as an 'external federator' for new regional experiences through its interregionalist projects. Although 'new interregionalism' is a corollary of the new regionalism, interregionalism can contribute to the consolidation of regionalism. Moreover, by encouraging economic multilateralism, interregional arrangements can improve the governance of globalisation.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 7. Inter-regional Cooperation

Aliboni Roberto

The Geopolitical Implications of the European Neighbourhood Policy
in *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Volume 10, Issue 1 , pp. 1-16

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 7. Inter-regional Cooperation

Vinod K. Aggarwal, Edward A. Fogarty

The Limits of Interregionalism: The EU and North America
in *Journal of European Integration*, Volume 27, Number 3 / September , 327-346

The EU has been pursuing interregionalism as a key element in its commercial policy. This strategy has been manifested in agreements with Mercosur, East Asia and the Southern Mediterranean, among others. In the case of North America, however, the EU has developed a series of bilateral relationships with Canada, Mexico and the United States — rather than a region-to-region link. This article focuses on the role of sectoral interests, economic security



competition and identity formation to examine why the EU has not developed an interregional relationship with North America. The evidence suggests that, of these factors, economic security competition appears to be the strongest factor preventing the formalisation of an EU–North American link. Moreover, the article demonstrates the importance of internal dynamics within counterpart regions as a key element in the analysis of interregional accords.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 7. Inter-regional Cooperation

Moulakis Athanasios

The Mediterranean Region: Reality, Delusion, or Euro-Mediterranean Project?
in *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol. 16, N. 2, Spring 2005

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 7. Inter-regional Cooperation

Stetter Stephan

The Politics of De-Paradoxification in Euro-Mediterranean Relations: Semantics and Structures of ‘Cultural Dialogue’
in *Mediterranean Politics*, Volume 10, Number 3, November , pp. 331-348

This article analyses, from a systems theoretical perspective, ‘cultural dialogue’ in the context of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. It proceeds in four steps. First, the article looks from a perspective of symbolic bordering processes into the semantics of identity that shape the observation of two distinct cultures in the Euro-Mediterranean area. Second, it takes a closer look at Self/Other distinctions on which these semantics of cultures are based, thereby addressing in particular the valorization of identities. Third, it discusses the politics of de-paradoxification, which become institutionalized through ‘cultural dialogue’, thereby focusing on its structural conflictual disposition. Finally, the article proposes a world societal perspective on symbolic bordering processes in the Euro-Mediterranean area that might avoid some of the pitfalls of ‘cultural dialogue’.

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 7. Inter-regional Cooperation

Sharon Pardo, Lior Zemer

Towards a New Euro-Mediterranean Neighbourhood Space
in *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Volume 10, Issue 1 , pp. 39-77

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 7. Inter-regional Cooperation



Aras Bulent

Turkey and the GCC: An Emerging Relationship

in *Middle East Policy*, Volume 12, Issue 4, Winter , pp. 89-97

No abstract available

Section C) Regional integration processes

Subsection 7. Inter-regional Cooperation

Jünemann Annette

Zehn Jahre Barcelona-Prozess: Eine gemischte Bilanz

in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, Band 45, 2005

No abstract available

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 1. Federalism

Jürgen Habermas

Equal Treatment of Cultures and the Limits of Postmodern Liberalism

in *Journal of Political Philosophy*, Vol. 13, Issue 1, March , 1-28

No abstract available

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 1. Federalism

Juhász József

Ethno-Federalism: Challenges and Opportunities

in *Review of International Affairs (The)* , Vol. LVI, n. 1118, April–June

No abstract available

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 1. Federalism

Caravita Beniamino

Federalismo, federalismi, Stato federale

in *Federalismi*, Anno III, n. 21

No abstract available

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 1. Federalism



Pistone Sergio

La pace come condizione della democrazia

in *Federalista (Il)/Federalist (The)*, Anno XLVII, n. 2 , 71-89

No abstract available

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 1.Federalism

Andreas Kalyvas

Popular Sovereignty, Democracy, and the Constituent Power

in *Constellations*, Vol. 12, Issue 2 June , 223-244

No abstract available

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 1.Federalism

Figueiredo Rui J. P. de - Jr., Weingast Barry R.

Self-Enforcing Federalism

in *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization*, Volume 21(issue 1) , 103-135

How are constitutional rules sustained? We investigate this problem in the context of how the institutions of federalism are sustained. As Riker (1964) emphasizes, a central design problem of federalism is how to create institutions that at once grant the central government enough authority to provide central goods and police the subunits, but not so much that it usurps all public authority. Using a game theoretic model of institutional choice, we argue that, to survive, federal structures must be self-enforcing: the center and the states must have incentives to fulfill their obligations within the limits of federal bargains. Our model investigates the trade-offs among the benefits from central goods provision, the ability of the center to impose penalties for noncompliance, and the costs of states to exit. We also show that federal constitutions can act as coordinating devices or focal solutions that allow the units to coordinate on trigger strategies in order to police the center. Finally, the model generates a number of comparative statics concerning the degree of central power, the division of rents between the states and the center, and the degree of "central goods" provided as a function of the characteristics of the constituent units.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 1.Federalism

Brown Garrett Wallace

State Sovereignty, Federation and Kantian Cosmopolitanism

in *European Journal of International Relations* , Vol. 11, n. 4, December , 495-522

This article examines the role of states in Kantian cosmopolitanism and seeks to clarify the relationship between the rights of states and the concept of cosmopolitan law. The argument is made that states play an important role within Kantian theory, but that the concept of absolute sovereignty is also ultimately rejected. The article examines the Kantian argument for domestic right, international right and cosmopolitan right, and provides an alternative view of these



conceptions against the argument that Kantianism involves the removal of states and the creation of an overarching global government. It establishes that Kantian cosmopolitanism provides a normative ethical global order without the existence of a world government. From this discussion, the relevance of Kantian cosmopolitanism is also examined in relation to contemporary International Relations theory.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 1. Federalism

King Loren A.

The Federal Structure of a Republic of Reasons

in Political Theory, Volume 33, n. 5, October, 629-653

Following Rawls, many political liberals hold reasonableness in high regard. Reasonable citizens can disagree, however, and some may find their arguments routinely ignored in elections and legislatures. Should we be troubled by such failures of institutional responsiveness as a matter of justice? The author argues that the expectation of such failures would lead parties in an original position to favor certain classes of institutions over others: A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism together suggest a particular federal structure to a republic of reasons.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 1. Federalism

Jan-erik Lane and Svante Ersson

The riddle of federalism: does federalism impact on democracy?

in Democratization, Vol. 12, n. 2, April, 163-182

Does federalism matter for democratic longevity? Most scholars would reply first 'yes', and then most probably add 'very positively'. We show in this article that one should not take for granted that federalism constitutes a positive for democratic stability. This surprising result, derived from a regression approach where the impact of federalism is tapped while controlling for other factors constituting embeddedness, explains why many federal states have authoritarian regimes or unstable governments. More research on federalism is needed without harbouring preconceptions about the outcomes of this kind of political decentralization. One must separate between formal and real federalism as well as between various forms of political decentralization. The findings of this article tend to support the sceptical appreciation of federalism in the literature on political institutions.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2. Nationalism

Aissaoui Rabah

«Combattants pour rester «Algériens … algériens»’: National Identity and Difference in the



Nationalist Discourse of the Étoile Nord-africaine (ENA) and the Parti du Peuple Algérien (PPA) in Inter-war France

in *Modern and Contemporary France*, Volume 13, Number 2 / May, 2005 , 209 - 224

If the Algerian war of independence (1954–1962) is perceived by many observers as one of the bloodiest anti-colonial struggles of the twentieth century, the last decade has been marked by the deepening crisis which has dragged Algeria into a violent civil war (‘la deuxième guerre d'Algérie’) and by a sense that the Algerian nation is still in a process of formation. This article aims to go back to the origin of modern Algerian nationalism and explore some of the ways in which Algerian national identity was constructed in the discourse of Algerian nationalists in the inter-war period in France. It highlights three key processes which shaped Algerian ethno-national identity: firstly, an emphasis on difference and on the irreconcilability of North African Muslims' identity with Frenchness (and therefore a rejection of France's assimilationist claims); secondly, strong references to French democratic and revolutionary principles, and to Islam as underpinning the Algerian nationalist project; and finally the essentialising of North Africans' ethnicity and an emphasis on Algerian Muslims' Arabness.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2.Nationalism

Mager Anne

‘One Beer, One Goal, One Nation, One Soul’: South African Breweries, Heritage, Masculinity and Nationalism 1960–1999

in *Past and Present*, Volume 188, Number 1, August 2005 , 163 - 194

No abstract available

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2.Nationalism

Berger Stefan

A Return to the National Paradigm? National History Writing in Germany, Italy, France, and Britain from 1945 to the Present

in *Journal of Modern History*, Volume 77, Number 3, September 2005

No abstract available

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2.Nationalism

Facal Joseph, Choquet Sabine, Zarka Yves Charles

Actualité du souverainisme. Entretien avec Joseph Facal

in *Cité, philosophie, politique, histoire*, n. 23

YVES CHARLES ZARKA ET SABINE CHOQUET : Est-ce qu'il y a un acte de naissance du souverainisme au Québec ?



Et si tel est le cas, est-il lié à la visite du général de Gaulle au Québec et à la célèbre phrase : « Vive le Québec libre ! » qu'il a prononcé à Montréal le 24 juillet 1967 ?

JOSEPH FACAL : On peut bien fixer tel ou tel moment comme acte de naissance du souverainisme contemporain, cela restera toujours un exercice très arbitraire. Sous une forme ou sous une autre, l'idée de faire du territoire québécois un pays, une nation ayant ses pouvoirs propres, s'exprime et se manifeste depuis plus d'un siècle. La différence est que ce qui, au siècle dernier, pouvait sembler marginal s'est aujourd'hui transformé en un mouvement social dans lequel se reconnaissent des millions de personnes. L'historiographie qui consiste à dire que le mouvement souverainiste a été mis au monde par le général de Gaulle est donc recevable, mais un peu simpliste. En réalité, la contribution essentielle du général de Gaulle a été de faire connaître au monde entier la problématique québécoise. Cependant, avant même son arrivée, il existait déjà depuis quelques années des personnes qui soutenaient que l'un des aboutissements légitimes de la quête d'identité québécoise serait l'avènement d'un nouvel État souverain.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2.Nationalism

Kurien Prema A.

Being Young, Brown, and Hindu. The Identity Struggles of Second-Generation Indian Americans
in *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography* , Vol. 34 n. 4 , 434-469

The "new second generation," the children of post-1965 immigrants, is the focus of scholars who recognize that it is the critical generation who will determine the future patterns of race and ethnicity in the United States. Based on a case study of a Hindu Student Council chapter at "Western University" in California, this article looks at how the attempts by second-generation Indian Americans to deal with issues of race brought many of them to the organization but also produced conflicts and cleavages within it. The purpose of my analysis is to argue that religious institutions often play a crucial role in the identity construction of new Americans and that the complex interplay between race, ethnicity, and religion has been ignored by the dominant sociological models of immigrant incorporation. I also show how and why conventional American categories of race and ethnicity are often inadequate for understanding the experiences of contemporary immigrants and their children.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2.Nationalism

Voglis Polymeris

Book Review: In Search of a Convenient Past: Nationalism, Violence and Historical Writing in Twentieth-century Europe

in *Journal of Contemporary History* , Volume 40, No. 2 - April 2005 , 381-388

No abstract available

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2.Nationalism

Xiaodong Wang



Chinese Nationalism Manifesto

in *Heartland – Eurasian Review of Geopolitics*, Number 3, "Chindia. The 21st Century Challenge", pp. 39-47

Nationalists catch on in the Middle Kingdom as a reaction to "reverse racism" that preaches China's inferiority in comparison with the great powers. Democracy as premise of China's rise on the world's stage. Why we don't trust the United States.

(Full text available at http://www.eheartland.com/_lib/_docs/2005_03_chindia_the_21st_century_challenge.pdf)

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2. Nationalism

Dragojevic Mila

Competing Institutions in National Identity Construction: the Croatian Case

in *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, Volume 11, Number 1, Spring 2005, 61-87

National identity traits are not "fixed"; and an ethnic group may emphasize distinct traits at different stages of national identity construction. This study examines the case of Croatia, where religion was stressed in an earlier phase of identity construction while language has become the principal group-distinguishing feature in the most recent period. It is argued that language was chosen primarily by secular elites with a goal not only of distinguishing between "us" and "them"; but also in order to secure a privileged status within their own group.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2. Nationalism

Marra Realino

Comunità etniche, solidarietà, nazione in Max Weber

in *Filosofia Politica*, n. 3, Dicembre, 445-458

No abstract available

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2. Nationalism

Woodward Susan L.

Construire l'État : légitimité internationale contre légitimité nationale ?

in *Critique Internationale*, N°28 - Juillet / Septembre 2005

Comme l'illustre l'exemple de la Bosnie-Herzégovine, la relation décisive sur laquelle repose la légitimité nationale de l'Etat – celle qui s'établit entre les responsables politiques, les fonctionnaires et les citoyens – n'est pas prise en compte dans les stratégies élaborées par les donateurs et les organisations internationales pour soutenir le processus de state building. En pratique, cette relation n'est sérieusement prise en compte que dans la mesure où elle peut contribuer à l'établissement de la légitimité internationale. La légitimité intérieure reste ainsi secondaire par rapport au but premier



qu'est la construction d'un Etat internationalement acceptable. Il est en conséquence probable que de tels Etats resteront instables.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2.Nationalism

De Giuseppe Massimo

Costruire la nazione nel Messico post-rivoluzionario. Il ruolo dell'educazione indigena e campesina in Contemporanea - Rivista di storia dell'800 e del '900, n. 2, aprile 2005, 233 - 266

No abstract available

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2.Nationalism

Miller David

Crooked Timber or Bent Twig? Isaiah Berlin's Nationalism in Political Studies, Volume 53, Issue 1, March, pp. 100-123

Isaiah Berlin is often regarded as one of the sources of contemporary liberal nationalism. Yet his own attitude to nationalism, and its relation to his liberalism, remains unexplored. He gave conflicting definitions of nationalism in different places, and although he frequently contrasts more benign with more malign forms of nationalism, the terms in which he draws the contrast also vary. In Berlin's most explicit account, nationalist doctrine is presented as political, unitary, morally unrestricted and particularist, but these four dimensions are separate, and on each of them alternative nationalist positions are available. Berlin's account of the sources of nationalism is also ambiguous: his analysis of the Jewish condition in European societies and his support for Zionism contrasts with his diagnosis of the origins of German nationalism. Comparing Berlin with later liberal nationalists, we see that his liberalism prevented him from presenting a normative political theory in which liberal and nationalist commitments were successfully combined. Such a theory can indeed be developed, but the challenge that emerges from Berlin's writing is to explain how real-world nationalism can be kept within liberal limits.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2.Nationalism

Ossipova Erika V.

Culture and theater as foundation for national identity formation in the Russian far east: where Europe meets Asia
in **Nationalities Papers**, Volume 33, Number 1, March 2005, 59-70

No abstract available

Section D) Federalism as a political idea



Subsection 2.Nationalism

Wrede Martin

Der Kaiser, das Reich, die deutsche Nation - und ihre "Feinde". Natiogenese, Reichsidee und der "Durchbruch des Politischen" im Jahrhundert nach dem Westfälischen Frieden

in *Historische Zeitschrift*, Band 280, Heft 1: Februar 2005

Nach der Krise des Dreißigjährigen Krieges konnte sich das Alte Reich seit den 1670er Jahren trotz aller fortbestehenden Heterogenität sehr deutlich konsolidieren; getragen wurde diese Konsolidierung von einer Welle des Reichspatriotismus. Nicht allein, aber auch nicht zuletzt ausschlaggebend für beide Momente waren die Auseinandersetzungen mit den verschiedenen Reichsfeinden - Schweden, Türken und Franzosen -, die in jener Zeit zu bestehen waren. Die Reichskriege schufen Reichserfahrung, und sei es solche "aus zweiter Hand", die den Reichsuntertanen durch zahllose Flugschriften vermittelt wurde, sie erzwangen eine "Verdichtung", die Kaiser, Stände und Untertanen beider Konfessionen als Solidar- und Erinnerungsgemeinschaft beisammen hielt. Reich und deutsche Nation definierten sich vor allem durch ihren Gegensatz zu Frankreich wie auch durch die Siege über die Türken. Hier wurden wirksame und politisch nutzbare Feindbilder erzeugt und unterhalten. Der kurbrandenburgische Versuch, auch Schweden zu einem solchen "Feindbild" aufzubauen, schlug demgegenüber fehl, da hier das Machtpotenzial des "Feindes" weithin als zu gering angesehen wurde. Auch diese Auseinandersetzung zeigt indes, dass gerade Amt und Person des Kaisers Bezugspunkt und Kristallisationskern von Patriotismus und Identität der gesamten, multikonfessionellen, "föderalen" Nation darstellte. Mit den unter kaiserlicher Ägide erzielten Teilerfolgen bei Reichsreformen und Reichskriegen war das Modernisierungspotenzial des Reiches jedoch ausgeschöpft. Indem die unmittelbare Bedrohung durch auswärtige Feinde gebannt war, lockerte sich der Zusammenhalt; Rekonzessionalisierung und "Europäisierung" der Reichspolitik ließen neue Konfliktlinien hervortreten, die sich in der dynastischen Krise des habsburgischen Kaiserhauses als nicht mehr überbrückbar erwiesen. Ohne gemeinsame "Feinde" und ohne über territoriale wie konfessionelle Grenzen hinweg internalisierte gemeinsame "Feindbilder" traten Kaiser, Reich und Nation nach 1740 mehr und mehr auseinander.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2.Nationalism

Kaelberer Matthias

Deutschmark nationalism and Europeanized identity: Exploring identity aspects of Germany's adoption of the Euro

in *German Politics*, Volume 14, Number 3, September, pp. 283-296

What does the adoption of the euro tell us about German national identity? Are there elements of national identity that can help explain Germany's acceptance of European monetary union? The prevailing literature often portrays the internal German debate about the euro as a battle between Germany's 'Europeanized identity' – which pushed in favor of the euro – and 'Deutschmark nationalism' and national economic pride – which emphasized retaining the Deutschmark. In contrast, this paper argues that the distinction between Germany's Europeanized identity and economic nationalism is exaggerated. Rather than viewing it as a constraint on German acceptance of the euro, economic pride already represents a form of post-national identity. Unlike language or ethnicity, economic pride does not function well as an identity marker. Deutschmark nationalism was so obviously a constructed form of identity that it was open to alternative interpretations as well. Most importantly, there is no logical barrier to expanding the principles behind Germany's economic success to the rest of Europe. The paper concludes that extending the basic principles of the



German monetary order to the rest of Europe was a consistent solution to this interaction of different identity issues at stake in the German debate over the euro.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2. Nationalism

Henderson Ailsa, McEwen Nicola

Do Shared Values Underpin National Identity? Examining the Role of Values in National Identity in Canada and the United Kingdom

in *National Identities*, Vol. 7 n. 2 , 173 - 191

This article examines whether shared national values form a vital component in the construction and development of national identity. In so doing, it challenges Kymlicka and Norman in their assumption that shared values have little relevance for national identity. Drawing upon competing nationalist discourses in Canada, Quebec, Scotland and the United Kingdom, we argue that the idea of shared values serves as a useful tool in shaping and reinforcing national identities within multinational states. Such values contribute to defining the collective conception of national identity, describing who we are as a people, and what it is that binds us together while distinguishing us from others.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2. Nationalism

Nederman, Cary

Economic nationalism and the "spirit of capitalism": civic collectivism and national wealth in the thought of John Fortescue

in *History of Political Thought*, Vol. 26, Issue 2 , 266-283

In her 2002 book *The Spirit of Capitalism*, Liah Greenfeld argues that the emergence of nationalistic economic doctrines in Europe, and especially in Britain, after about 1600 constitutes the salient explanation for the capitalist 'take-off' in the modern West. This paper re-examines a central feature of Greenfeld's analytical apparatus, namely her strict distinction between 'collectivist' and 'individualistic' approaches to nationalism that she believes holds so much of the key to persistent differences in levels of political and economic development among nations even today. According to Greenfeld, only the individualistic version of nationalism is capable of promoting the convergence of personal and public economic interest and the competitive spirit of economic internationalism. The paper investigates a nationalistic theory, spun out of a series of tracts written in the second half of the fifteenth century by the English lawyer John Fortescue, that is clearly rooted in a medieval, collectivistic outlook but which promotes economic values (economic achievement, competitiveness and prosperity) that comprise Greenfeld's 'spirit of capitalism'. I argue that Fortescue offers a powerful counterexample to Greenfeld's central explanatory framework.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2. Nationalism

Kornprobst Markus



Episteme, nation-builders and national identity: the re-construction of Irishness

in *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 11, Issue 3, July 2005 , 403-422

There are many disagreements among the three main paradigms of the nationalism literature. Yet most modernists, ethno-symbolists and constructivists agree that elites play a key role in inventing and re-inventing nations. Notwithstanding this insight, none of these schools of thought has generated a compelling answer to the question of why the inventors of a certain nation build, out of an infinite number of possibilities, a particular nationness. Analysing the case of twentieth century Irish identity, this article seeks to shed light on this question by inquiring into the process through which elites come to imagine the nation that they seek to build. I argue that epistemic understandings of the world delineate which kinds of national identity are conceivable for, and plausible to, nation-building elites.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2. Nationalism

Zhu Yuchao, Blachford Dongyan

Ethnic minority issues in China's foreign policy: perspectives and implications

in *Pacific Review (The)* , Volume 18, Number 2, June , pp. 243-264

As a multinational state, China's ethnic minority issue (e.g. Tibet and Xinjiang) is always a large political concern. China often treats this issue exclusively as a sovereignty matter and refutes outside criticism. What is the viable explanation of China's position? Is China's behavior consistent with the global norms and international law, especially the principle of national self-determination? This paper addresses these questions through an examination of China's ethnic minority issues in the context of foreign policy and international relations.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2. Nationalism

Rushton J. Philippe

Ethnic nationalism, evolutionary psychology and Genetic Similarity Theory

in *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 11, Issue 4, October 2005 , 489-508

Genetic Similarity Theory extends Anthony D. Smith's theory of ethno-symbolism by anchoring ethnic nepotism in the evolutionary psychology of altruism. Altruism toward kin and similar others evolved in order to help replicate shared genes. Since ethnic groups are repositories of shared genes, xenophobia is the 'dark side' of human altruism. A review of the literature demonstrates the pull of genetic similarity in dyads such as marriage partners and friendships, and even large groups, both national and international. The evidence that genes incline people to prefer others who are genetically similar to themselves comes from studies of social assortment, differential heritabilities, the comparison of identical and fraternal twins, blood tests, and family bereavements. DNA sequencing studies confirm some origin myths and disconfirm others; they also show that in comparison to the total genetic variance around the world, random co-ethnics are related to each other on the order of first cousins.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2. Nationalism

Kuyucu Ali Tuna



Ethno-religious 'unmixing' of 'Turkey': 67 September riots as a case in Turkish nationalism

in *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 11, Issue 3, July 2005 , 361-380

This article examines the structural and ideological factors that paved the way for the eruption of violence against non-Muslims in Turkey on 6 September 1955. I argue that the conventional explanations that treat this instance of collective violence either as spontaneous rioting caused by over-excited masses or as a government conspiracy that eventually got out of control are insufficient in that they fail to answer how and why so many people participated in these riots when we know that nothing on this scale ever took place in the history of the republic. In order to adequately understand the dynamics behind these riots one first needs to situate them in the broader historical context of the emergence, development and crystallisation of Turkish nationalism and national identity that marked the non-Muslim citizens of the republic as the 'others' and potential enemies of the real Turkish nation. This historical analysis constitutes the first part of the article. Since ethno-national riots do not always occur whenever there are conflicting identities, one also needs to explain the processes through which ethno-national identities become radicalized and polarized. Thus, in the second part of the article, I focus on the economic, political and social conditions of the post-single-party era (post-1950) that helped to radicalise the sentiments of the growing urban populace against the non-Muslim 'others'. I argue that it was the socio-economic, ideological and political transformations of the Democrat Party era that made it possible for ethnic entrepreneurs and state provocateurs to mobilise the masses against a fictitious enemy.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2. Nationalism

Cross Sharyl, Komnenich Pauline

Ethnonational identity, security and the implosion of Yugoslavia: the case of Montenegro and the relationship with Serbia

in *Nationalities Papers*, Volume 33, Number 1, March 2005 , 1-27

No abstract available

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2. Nationalism

Ahmed Imtiaz

Futures beyond nationalism

in *Futures*, issue 9, vol. 37, november , 905-924

No abstract available

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2. Nationalism

Vladislavljevic Nebojsa

Grassroots groups, Milošević; or dissident intellectuals? A controversy over the origins and dynamics of the mobilisation of Kosovo Serbs in the 1980s

in *Nationalities Papers*, Volume 32, Number 4, December 2004 , 781-796



No abstract available

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2.Nationalism

Caplan Richard, Pouligny Béatrice

Histoire et contradictions du state building

in *Critique Internationale*, N°28 - Juillet / Septembre 2005

Ces dix dernières années ont vu un regain d'intérêt pour le state building et les « protectorats internationaux ». Les précédents historiques comportent des leçons importantes pour la pratique contemporaine mais celles-ci sont bien souvent mal connues par les ingénieurs de la construction étatique d'aujourd'hui. En outre, ces derniers ne sont guère attentifs aux contradictions fondamentales qui gênent les initiatives de state building. Le projet politique de la reconstruction d'Etats en faillite, cela devient évident, non seulement est idéologiquement marqué, mais en outre ne tient pas compte de ce que la sociologie historique nous a appris sur la complexité des processus qui président à la construction des Etats et des nations

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2.Nationalism

Haesly Richard

Identifying Scotland and Wales: types of Scottish and Welsh national identities

in *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 11, Issue 2, April 2005 , 243-263

How are national identities and the 'imagined communities' (Anderson 1991) upon which they are based linked? This article demonstrates that Q-methodology, which allows each participant to express his or her own 'personal nationalism' (Cohen 1996) while simultaneously highlighting how these individual assessments aggregate into coherent, shared types of national identity, provides a means of empirically assessing the linkage between the micro- and macro-components of national identity. When applied to the cases of Scotland and Wales, the six types of national identity three each in Scotland and Wales highlight distinctions that reflect, as well as challenge, the ubiquitous academic division between civic and ethnic national identities. They also illuminate the differing natures of contemporary Scotland and Wales, with particular emphasis on the observation that the Welsh imagined community appears to be fundamentally more contested than the more easily forged Scottish imagined community.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2.Nationalism

Kearton Antonia

Imagining the 'Mongrel Nation': Political Uses of History in the Recent Scottish Nationalist Movement

in *National Identities*, Vol. 7 n. 1 , 23 - 50

This article examines the political uses of three historically rooted myths in the recent Scottish nationalist movement: Scotland's civic nationhood, and the traditions of popular sovereignty/contractual government and freedom. The empirical focus is on the recent nationalist movement of the 1980s and 1990s. The article examines how political elites draw selectively on historical myths to support contemporary aims, and argues that in so doing they actively mould



traditions and project a vision of the continuity of the nation which is essentially ahistorical. This analysis also critically engages with the dominant understanding of Scotland's civic nationhood.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2.Nationalism

Zake Ieva

Latvian nationalist intellectuals and the crisis of democracy in the inter-war period

in *Nationalities Papers*, Volume 33, Number 1, March 2005 , 97-117

No abstract available

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2.Nationalism

Styliane Philippou

Modernism and National Identity in Brazil, or How to Brew a Brazilian Stew

in *National Identities*, Vol. 7 n. 3 , 245 - 264

In the first half of the twentieth century, the second discovery of Brazil aimed to couple political independence with cultural emancipation, and demanded the invention of an authentic Brazilian tradition to serve as the basis of an autonomous modern Brazilian art. The quest for modernity was parallel to an intensified quest for *brasilidade*, emphasising all things that differentiate Brazilian culture from European culture. National identity was defined as rooted in race mixing, a cultural amalgamation of the European with the tropical. This article explores the strategies of *Brasilianisation* that Brazilian Modernist artists applied to their construction of Brazil's national heritage and their assimilation of Modernist cosmopolitan artistic trends.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2.Nationalism

Pendás, B.

Nación, comunidad nacional y otros conceptos no intercambiables.

in *Cuadernos de pensamiento político*, n. 6

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2.Nationalism

Rich Dorman Sara

Narratives of nationalism in Eritrea: research and revisionism. Dedicated to the memory of Alex Naty (1957-2003)

in *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 11, Issue 2, April 2005 , 203-222



Eritrean politics is increasingly captured in competing narratives of nationalism. 'Official' narratives emphasize Eritrea's purported stability, orderliness, and uniqueness. This discourse defends and supports the current government's policies. In contrast, recent research challenges those policies, and contributes to a nationalist counter-narrative. This article seeks to investigate the discursive power of conventional narratives and the implications of new research for accounts of state and nation-building in Eritrea. The Eritrean case – one of the newest states in the world – intersects with and informs a number of broader debates on nationalism and nation-building: the impact of globalization, secessionism, and war as well as the relationship between ethnicity and nationalism. The penetration of state and nation-building projects into every sector of Eritrean life means that all social research is deeply politicised. Journalists and researchers have long been key players in the contested process of conceptualising Eritrean nation-hood, and this continues in the post-liberation period. Research thus both buttresses and challenges official discourses, even where it is not explicitly framed in terms of nationalism.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2. Nationalism

Kuzio Taras

Nation building, history writing and competition over the legacy of kyiv rus in Ukraine
in **Nationalities Papers**, Volume 33, Number 1, March 2005 , 29-58

No abstract available

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2. Nationalism

Sutherland Claire

Nation-building through discourse theory
in **Nations and Nationalism**, Vol. 11, Issue 2, April 2005 , 185-202

The article sets out to demonstrate the value of discourse theory for studying nationalism as an ideology. It looks at the debate surrounding the concept of discourse and its manifold meanings before examining Laclau and Mouffe's discourse theory, with particular reference to the concept of hegemony and the influence of Gramsci on their work. This leads to a discussion of the relevance of discourse theory to a study of nationalist ideology, especially the antagonistic dynamic between nation-state and minority nationalisms. Not only does discourse theory serve to embed the omnipresence of ideology within a useful hierarchy of mega and micro discourse, but it also provides a conceptual toolbox for analysing nationalist ideology at the empirical level.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2. Nationalism

Stieve Thomas

National Identity in Niagara Falls, Canada and United States
in **Tijdschrift voor economische en sociale geografie (Journal of Economic & Social Geography)** , Volume 96, Issue 1, February , pp. 3-14

Some theories contend that national identity is dependent and contingent on having others. However, other theories



suggest that national identity is based on traits that all members of the group share. These two competing ideas, called relational and unifying characters respectively, are explored using the two border cities of Niagara Falls, Canada and Niagara Falls, the United States. I argue that each national identity present, the Canadian and American, represent the two characters and that national identity can be viewed as a spectrum. Using content analysis, each city's newspaper is studied for its expression of both characters.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2. Nationalism

Stanbridge Karen

Nationalism, international factors and the 'Irish question' in the era of the First World War in Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 11, Issue 1, January 2005 , 21-42

The 'Irish question' encompassed negotiations leading to the partition of Ireland in 1921. The paper considers factors that contributed to the growing tendency for the major players involved in the struggle Irish nationalists, unionists and British officials to adopt postures that were mutually irreconcilable. Conceptualising the problem in terms of Rogers Brubaker's 'triadic nexus' model of nationalisms reveals that the rigidity was encouraged by the dynamic interaction of nationalist representations employed by the three parties in response to the postures adopted by their rivals. Further, international factors specifically, the prevailing international definition of nation and the position taken by the authority in place to adjudicate claims of nationhood combined with regional pressures to consolidate Irish, Ulster and British nationalisms in such forms that militated against a compromise solution. By amending Brubaker's model to include international as well as regional forces, the analysis shows how understanding of the Irish contest can be enhanced if conceived as issuing from the continuous and reflexive interaction of three distinct nationalisms with and within an international context that itself was structured with respect to questions of nation.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2. Nationalism

Özcan Ali Kemal

Nationalism: Distilling the Cultural and the Political

in Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, Volume 11, Number 2, Summer 2005 , 163-193

This essay examines the core feature of nationalism which sits at the center of all its manifestations and phases. The literature is overwhelmingly engaged with the 'faces' or 'types' or taxonomies of the 'elusive' concept of nationalism. I endeavor to single out the genuine 'nationalism as realpolitik' distilled from the needs and rights and even deviancies of ethnic masses. The context of the debate, therefore, concerns itself with the working of national politics instead of its wording.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2. Nationalism

Howe Paul



Nationalist Idealisation and the State

in *National Identities*, Vol. 7 n. 1 , 79 - 102

Walker Connor has argued that the conflation of nation and state leads to muddled thinking about both concepts. While his advisory is well-taken, the decoupling of nation and state can be taken too far, for nation and state are intimately conjoined in the modern era. There are important ideational constructs embedded in the practices and principles of modern state governance that condition the ideology of state-oriented nationalists. This idealisation of community is less marked among nationalist activists whose concerns are primarily cultural rather than political. The differences are illustrated through the words and actions of individuals and organisations involved in the nationalist movements of Quebec and Brittany.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2. Nationalism

Kronenberg Volker

Patriotismus heute – Eine ernsthafteDebatte über Gemeinsinn in Deutschland tut Not

in *Politische Studien*, Heft 400, 56. Jahrgang, März-April , 82-92

No abstract available

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2. Nationalism

Mulcahy Conor

Pre-determined: the march 23, 2003 constitutional referendum in chechnya and its relationship to the law of self-determination

in *Boston College International and Comparative Law Review*, Vol. 28 n. 1 , 179 - 196

A common debate among legal scholars focuses on the extent to which the international legal principle of self-determination remains relevant in the post-colonial period. Even those commentators who consider it still to be a significant, active concept in public international law disagree over its actual content. While many suggest that peoples entitled to the right of self-determination have a right to secede and form their own state, scholars disagree as to the circumstances under which the right develops. This Note examines the current status of the law of self-determination in the particular context of Chechnya. It describes how, though the law of self-determination would not allow Chechnya to secede from Russia unilaterally, Russian abuses associated with the March 23, 2003 constitutional referendum in Chechnya violated Chechnya's right to internal self-determination. Thus, the constitution is void under international law.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2. Nationalism

Whitaker, Robin

Questions of national identity

in *Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power*, Volume 12, Number 4 / October-December , 585-606



No abstract available

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2. Nationalism

Bruner M. Lane

Rhetorical Theory and the Critique of National Identity Construction

in *National Identities*, Vol. 7 n. 3 , 309 - 327

A striking feature of scholarship on national identity is the relative absence of rhetorical theory, or theory related to the persuasive dimensions of discourse, especially given the fact that rhetorical theorists have been concerned with the manufacturing of public opinion and collective identity for over two millennia. To address this absence, this article discusses how rhetorical theories dealing with narrative theory, the social construction of publics, rhetorical constraints, ideology critique, public memory, political history and post-national identity help both to illuminate and critique emergent patterns of national identification.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2. Nationalism

Armstrong Karen

Rhetorical nationalisms. Internal and external relations

in *European Journal of Cultural Studies*, Volume 8, No. 1, February 2005 , 84-100

The international news during the summer of 2004 was full of ethnic fighting and a 'war on terrorism'; that reached around the world. These events raise again the topic of nationalism. Using examples of rhetorical nationalism from two cases, Finland and the United States, this article examines these two distinct expressions of nationalism, how they are based on differing systems of valuation and on whether the message is directed to internal or external relations. Internally-directed nationalism may result in ethnic fighting but it is usually territorial, while externally-directed nationalism has global repercussions.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2. Nationalism

Urbinati Nadia

Ripensare la cittadinanza, oltre la sovranità

in *Reset*, Numero 89, Maggio / Giugno

No abstract available

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2. Nationalism

Dubuc Alain, Sabine Choquet



Sortir de nos mythistoires. Entretien avec Alain Dubuc

in *Cité, philosophie, politique, histoire*, n. 23

SABINE CHOQUET : Est-ce qu'il y a encore une chance pour que le mouvement souverainiste apparaisse comme un mouvement d'avenir ? Et si, pour vous, il n'est pas porteur d'un projet qui permette le développement du Québec, pouvez-vous nous en indiquer les raisons ?

ALAIN DUBUC : Je ne crois pas que le souverainisme soit un mouvement d'avenir et qu'il puisse en devenir un car, dans sa forme même, il cherche à résoudre des problèmes propres au Québec des années 1960. Le mouvement souverainiste est né de l'existence d'une oppression réelle dont souffraient les Québécois francophones – oppression qui se manifestait dans leur incapacité de s'épanouir et de s'imposer au sein du Canada en raison de leur langue et de leur culture. Cette situation a engendré chez les francophones un sentiment d'injustice et un mécontentement qui ont explosé quand le Québec, au début des années soixante, a produit des élites capables d'exprimer cette colère. C'est cette colère qui a donné naissance au projet consistant à créer un pays où les Québécois cesseraient d'être minoritaires et seraient à l'abri de l'oppression. Aujourd'hui, la situation a considérablement changé. Il y a bien sûr toujours des tensions au sein du Canada et la situation des Québécois francophones, minoritaires au Canada, restera toujours inconfortable. Mais l'oppression qui a justifié et donné naissance au mouvement souverainiste n'existe plus, ce qui lui a fait perdre sa principale raison d'être.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2. Nationalism

Muro Diego, Quiroga Alejandro

Spanish nationalism. Ethnic or civic?

in *Ethnicities*, Vol. 5 n. 1 , 9 - 29

In recent years, it has been a common complaint among scholars to acknowledge the lack of research on Spanish nationalism. This article addresses the gap by giving an historical overview of 'ethnic' and 'civic' Spanish nationalist discourses during the last two centuries. It is argued here that Spanish nationalism is not a unified ideology but it has, at least, two varieties. During the 19th-century, both a 'liberal' and a 'conservative-traditionalist' nationalist discourse were formulated and these competed against each other for hegemony within the Spanish market of ideas. In the 20th-century, these two discourses continued to be present and became backbones of different political regimes. However, after the emergence of the Basque and Catalan nationalist movements, Spanish nationalists unified as a counter-force to these regional sources of identity. In fact, one can see 20th-century Spanish nationalism as a dialectical struggle between the centre and the periphery.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2. Nationalism

Anna Moltchanova

Stateless National Groups, International Justice and Asymmetrical Warfare

in *Journal of Political Philosophy*, Vol. 13, Issue 2 , June , 194-215

No abstract available



Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2.Nationalism

Bunce Valerie

The National Idea: Imperial Legacies and Post-Communist Pathways in Eastern Europe in East European Politics and Societies, Volume 19, Number 3, Summer , pp. 406-442

Why has the national idea played such a powerful role, both positive and negative, in the regime, state, and economic transitions that have taken place in post-communist Eurasia? This article emphasizes the powerful but variable effects of imperial rule in this region, beginning with the Habsburgs and continuing through the more recent experiences of the Soviet bloc and the Yugoslav, Soviet, and Czechoslovak ethnofederations. The national idea, a product of very different experiences in the West, was transformed when moving eastward in the nineteenth century, largely because imperial contexts are not state contexts. The political empowerment of the national idea continued when imperial dynamics returned to the region with the rise of communism. As a result, post-communist Eastern Europe was unusually well situated to privilege nationalism in the struggles over new states and new economic and political regimes.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2.Nationalism

Volcic Zala

The Notion of 'the West' in the Serbian National Imaginary in European Journal of Cultural Studies, Volume 8, No. 2, May 2005 , 155-175

This article deals with the imagery of 'the West' in contemporary Serbia. In an analysis of interviews with young Serbian intellectuals, it evaluates how they use the metaphor of the West to construct their self-image. Furthermore, it discusses how Serbian responses to European stereotyping and 'Othering' of the Balkans can function as a form of celebratory appropriation, acceptance and exploitation of these stereotypes. It explores the 'self-exoticization' process as a reaction to the real or imagined western stereotyping that is detected in Serbian narratives, with the overall objective of demonstrating the urgency of critically rethinking the notion that the identity of European remote areas mirrors western interests and stereotypes. Serbian narratives echo the ongoing struggle over the definition and purpose of belonging to Europe in relation to a global economy. Memories, traditions and stereotypes of belonging are not just invented, but also actively encouraged and negotiated within Serbian society.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2.Nationalism

Béland Daniel

The Politics of Territorial Solidarity. Nationalism and Social Policy Reform in Canada, the United Kingdom, and Belgium in Comparative Political Studies , Vol. 38 n. 6 , 676-703



Despite the recent proliferation of literature on nationalism and on social policy, little has been written to explore the possible interaction between the two. This article explores two essential aspects of the relationship between substate nationalism and welfare-state development in Canada (Québec), the United Kingdom (Scotland), and Belgium (Flanders). First, the article shows how the processes of identity formation/consolidation and territorial mobilization inherent to substate nationalism often involve a social policy dimension. Second, it analyzes the ways in which substate nationalism has affected welfare-state development in recent decades. Substate nationalism can impact social policy making in at least two ways: by reshaping the policy agenda at both the state and the substate levels and by reinforcing regional policy autonomy, which is depicted as an alternative to centralist schemes. To explain significant variations between the three empirical cases, the article underlines specific institutional, ideological, and socioeconomic factors.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2. Nationalism

Gledhill J.

The Power of Ethnic Nationalism: Foucault's Bio-power and the Development of Ethnic Nationalism in Eastern Europe

in National Identities, Vol. 7 n. 4 , 347 - 368

Although the 'civic' and 'ethnic' brands of nationalism are frequently contrasted, the origins of the civic/ethnic dichotomy remain under-theorised. By building upon Michel Foucault's *The History of Sexuality*, Volume 1, this article argues that, during the eighteenth century, the articulation of power shifted across the board from a pre-modern control over the ending of life, to a modern expression of power as control over the production of life (dubbed 'bio-power' by Foucault). Given the Foucauldian claim that power is built upwards from 'its most infinitesimal mechanisms', it is suggested that expressions of bio-power were first enacted in that social structure most amenable to biological manipulation—the family—and then expanded upwards towards the widest understanding of a kin collective—the ethnic group. As the shift to bio-power took hold, so too did visions of the political nation-state begin to take shape in Eastern Europe. A fusion of doctrines of self-determinism with the expression of power as 'control over the production of life', then saw the ethnic nation-state gain credence as a social and political construct in Central and Eastern Europe. This article takes Romania as a case study through which the mechanisms of this exploratory argument can be illustrated.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2. Nationalism

Abizadeh, Arash

Was Fichte an ethnic nationalist? On cultural nationalism and its double

in History of Political Thought, Vol. 26, Issue 2 , 334-359

Even though Fichte's *Reden an die deutsche Nation* (Addresses to the German Nation) arguably constitutes one of the founding texts of nationalist political thought, it has received little scholarly attention from English-speaking political theorists. The French, by contrast, have a long tradition of treating Fichte as a central figure in the history of political thought, and have given considerable attention to the *Reden* in particular. While the dominant French interpretation, which construes the *Reden* as a non-ethnic cultural nationalist text, provides a welcome corrective to those who impute unmediated ethnic nationalism to Fichte, it is ultimately flawed for missing the text's crypto-ethnic character. While Fichte officially defines nationality in terms of language and culture, his linguistic-cultural nationalism ultimately collapses into



ethnic nationalism. This collapse, signalled by his appeals to Abstammung and Abkunft, is propelled by the fact that, ultimately, the appeal to language and culture is incapable of securing immortality, which is the supposed source of its motivational power for Fichte.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2. Nationalism

Sluga Glenda

What is national self-determination? Nationality and psychology during the apogee of nationalism

in *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 11, Issue 1, January 2005 , 1-20

The idea of national self-determination propounded at the 1919 peace conference centred in Paris marked a new era in international relations. In this article I re-examine the history of the idea of national self-determination in this period by situating it in the context of 'the psychological turn'. I argue that national self-determination came to serve as a popular philosophical basis for post-war democracy among Entente liberals at a time when the Enlightenment equivalence between democracy and 'self-determination' was under challenge from new scientific depictions of the unconscious and irrational, and the biologically determined self. The focus of my discussion is the psychological discourse that threaded through the versions of national self-determination articulated by British and French intellectuals during World War I.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 2. Nationalism

Anderson David M.

Yours in Struggle for Majimboism: Nationalism and the Party Politics of Decolonization in Kenya, 1955-64

in *Journal of Contemporary History*, Volume 39, No. 3 - July 2004

Since the ending of colonial rule, the struggle for independence in Kenya has been seen as a triumph for the nationalist politics of the Kenya African National Union (KANU), the party that was victorious in the 1963 elections and held power until 2002. This article returns to the party politics of decolonization to reconsider the alternative vision of Kenya's future then promoted by KANU's rival party, the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU). KADU supported majimboism (regionalism), a proposal for decentralization in which six or more provinces would each have equal status. In the heated politics of the early 1960s, majimboists were derided by KANU as tribalists. Under the de facto one-party state of Kenyatta's KANU government, the majimboist cause was obscured by the nationalist project. This article returns to the forgotten history of majimboism to argue that the debates of the early 1960s remain relevant in contemporary Kenya. It outlines the politics of the majimbo debate of the 1960s to argue that regionalism was rooted in a colonial system of political mobilization. Those who supported majimboism were minorities, both African and European, fearing economic domination because of the underdevelopment of their regions, or political exclusion in a nation state dominated by more populous ethnic groups. The electoral politics of region and nation took shape within KADU and KANU respectively. The article goes on to analyse the importance of the Regional Boundaries Commission of 1962 in consolidating public support behind the two parties. The conclusion examines the revival of majimboism in the re-emergence of multi-party politics during the 1990s. Many of the constitutional claims made by KADU in the early 1960s are now again under consideration by the National Rainbow Coalition (NaRC) government, and majimboist ideas can be heard from KANU, now in opposition. Majimboism reflects a fundamental tension between region and nation that was not adequately addressed in the independence settlement. Its current revival highlights the limitations of the colonial



model of government that Kenya retained. For that reason, regionalism may yet be a more enduring political project than was nationalism.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 3. Federalist authors, personalities and organizations

Holton Woody

"Divide et Impera": Federalist 10 in a Wider Sphere

in *William and Mary Quarterly*, Vol. LXII, No. 2 April 2005 , 175 - 212

A month before publishing Federalist 10, James Madison sent his friend Thomas Jefferson a confidential summary of its thesis. "Divide et impera, the reprobated axiom of tyranny," Madison wrote, "is under certain qualifications, the only policy, by which a republic can be administered on just principles." Historians have shied away from the republican Madison's embrace of the strategy of divide and rule, which Americans of his era associated with that archetypical counselor to despots, Niccolò Machiavelli.¹ One way to make sense of Madison's statement is to place it in two insufficiently studied contexts: the discussion of the proper size of polities and legislative districts among his contemporaries and the contests over taxation and debt on which the dimensions debate was, to a large extent, based. Most of the men who attended the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia during the summer of 1787 joined Madison in the belief that transferring certain crucial duties from the thirteen states to a polity of continental proportions would solve one of their most vexing problems. As Douglass G. Adair pointed out in his 1943 doctoral dissertation, the framers ensured that the one popularly elected branch of the new national government, the House of Representatives, would be "carefully checked and balanced by a quasi-aristocratic (or plutocratic) senate, the electoral college, the presidential veto, and by judicial review." Some of the convention delegates proposed a battery of additional restraints on tyrannical majorities, including life terms for some elected officials, high property qualifications for voters (and still higher ones for officeholders), a congressional veto of state laws, and indirect election of the House of Representatives. These proposals put the framers in a quandary: how could they place the new government sufficiently beyond the reach of popular influence to ensure that it acted responsibly without making it so unresponsive to the popular will as to not only violate their highest ideals but also jeopardize ratification?

The delegates' solution was to reject the most blatant restrictions on popular power in favor of subtler ones. For instance, the convention defeated Madison's inflammatory proposal to allow the national legislature to overturn state laws, but quietly gave that power to the federal courts. The framers also discovered that they could limit popular influence over the most crucial government functions, especially the levying of continental (federal) taxes and the regulation of debtor-creditor relations, simply by shifting them from the states, where the median population was two hundred fifty thousand souls, to a new national government that encompassed all 3.5 million Americans. Because congressional districts would encompass about ten times as many voters as the constituencies where state assemblymen were chosen, federal elections stood a much better chance of producing responsible officeholders.³ Furthermore, after the Constitution shifted certain vital government duties to a polity that combined the territory of all thirteen states, grassroots efforts to pressure elected officials would rarely acquire that essential ingredient of political power: unity.

Yet not all categories of citizens would find unity equally elusive. Some interest groups—those the federal convention delegates and like-minded men considered the most virtuous—would outdo others at the art of coalescing. Well-to-do city dwellers (especially merchants), veteran officers, and investors in government bonds were much likelier than ordinary farmers to achieve the level of internal cooperation that was needed to exert influence on a



government that embraced the combined territories of the thirteen states. Taking note of this disparity in organizing ability, the supporters of the Constitution affirmed that it would filter out unjust efforts to influence public officials but allow salutary influences to pass through.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 3. Federalist authors, personalities and organizations

Oberg Barbara

A New Republican Order, Letter by Letter

in *Journal of the Early Republic*, Volume 25, Number 1, Spring , pp. 1-20

The article examines Thomas Jefferson's correspondence around the time of the election of 1800 and in the first months of his presidency, using these letters to elucidate Jefferson's view of politics, leadership and governance. Jefferson employed correspondence and letter writing, often under the guise of disinterestedness, as a way to disseminate news to his political supporters. They were also a vehicle for solidifying a party that shared his governing vision. After his election, Jefferson resorted to letter writing, occasionally concealing his identity as author at post-time to prevent interception, to shape a cabinet composed of sympathetic Jeffersonian republicans. Jefferson thus used the mails to craft a government and a political agenda that reflected his ideological position. Meanwhile Jefferson was dealing with the reciprocal correspondence from a broad constituency of ordinary Americans that reached his desk, including letters of support, congratulatory epistles and petitions for jobs.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 3. Federalist authors, personalities and organizations

Castaldi Roberto

A history of world federalism: lessons for european and world federalists

in *Federalist Debate (The)*, Year XVIII, n. 2, July , 54-57

No abstract available

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 3. Federalist authors, personalities and organizations

Mosconi Nicoletta (a cura di)

Altiero Spinelli

in *Federalista (II)/Federalist (The)*, Anno XLVII, n. 2 , 117-129

No abstract available

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 3. Federalist authors, personalities and organizations

Holton Woody

An "Excess of Democracy" - Or a Shortage?: The Federalists' Earliest Adversaries

in *Journal of the Early Republic*, Volume 25, Number 3, Fall , pp. 339-382



At the Constitutional Convention, both Elbridge Gerry (on May 31) and Alexander Hamilton (on June 18) identified the principal problem facing the United States in the aftermath of the Revolutionary War as an "excess of democracy." In short, the American Revolution had gone too far. Although prominent modern scholars tend to echo that judgment, we will never fully understand the context in which the Constitution was created until we give serious consideration to the people who took the contrary position that the Revolution had not gone far enough. They demanded annual elections, the right to instruct their representatives, small legislative districts, an ample money supply, low farm taxes, lower-house legislative supremacy, and a roughly equal distribution of property. Their diverse tools for obtaining these objectives included conventions, committees of correspondence, rhetorical broadsides accusing their opponents of lacking the natural human capacity for fellow-feeling, efforts to harmonize divergent proposals using the printed word, insurrections (and, much more commonly, appeals to public officials' fear of rebellion), and, perhaps most strikingly, the deliberate withholding of assembly representatives. In many ways, their critique of the Framers' elitist economic and political ideas was considerably more fundamental than the issues raised by the Framers' next (and considerably better-known) round of adversaries, the Anti-Federalists.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 3. Federalist authors, personalities and organizations

Vayssière Bertrand

Du Plan Schuman, à la Communauté politique européenne : Quand l'Europe s'annonçait fédéraliste (1950-1953). L'histoire d'un malentendu.

in *Politique européenne* , n. 15, 2005

Au début des années 50, les gouvernements européens semblent prêts à faire des concessions importantes à ceux qui prônent une Fédération, afin de mieux résister aux pressions soviétiques. Parmi les propositions prises en considération, celle d'une Assemblée européenne semble la plus hardie, car elle touche au cœur de la souveraineté politique de chacun des Etats. Cet article cherche à étudier l'Union européenne des Fédéralistes comme dispensateur d'idées, agissant en une période propice face à des interlocuteurs en apparence enfin sensibilisés, tout en cherchant à comprendre comment et pourquoi l'Europe peut devenir, ou cesser d'être, un sujet fort d'actualité.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 3. Federalist authors, personalities and organizations

Rossolillo Francesco

Il rivoluzionario

in *Federalista (II)/Federalist (The)*, Anno XLVII, n. 1 , 7-18

No abstract available

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 3. Federalist authors, personalities and organizations

Levi Guido

Il sexenio democrático tra riformismo, repubblicanesimo e federalismo: alcune considerazioni su cinque recenti



contributi storiografici

in *Spagna Contemporanea*, Anno XIV, n. 27 , pp. 147-156

No abstract available

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 3. Federalist authors, personalities and organizations

Jahn Beate

Kant, Mill, and Illiberal Legacies in International Affairs

in *International Organization*, issue 1, vol. 59, january , 177-207

ABSTRACT: While the revival of the concept of “imperialism” appears to be a reaction to recent political challenges, I argue that it has always been at the core of liberal thought in international relations. While liberal internationalism enlists the authority of Immanuel Kant, at its heart one finds the security dilemma between liberal and nonliberal states as well as the propagation of particularist law under a universal guise. This un-Kantian liberal thought, however, has a classical precedent in John Stuart Mill, with whom it shares the justification of imperialist policies. A historically sensitive reading of Mill and Kant, however, can explain the striking failures of liberal internationalism in spreading liberal institutions as well as reducing international conflicts.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 3. Federalist authors, personalities and organizations

Limiti Giuliana

L'Europa di Mazzini

in *Affari Esteri*, Anno XXXVII, n. 147 , 644-649

No abstract available

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 3. Federalist authors, personalities and organizations

Gibson Alan

Madison on democracy, property and civic education: a reply to Matthews and Sheehan

in *Review of Politics (The)*, Vol. 67, N. 1, Winter , 69-76

No abstract available

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 3. Federalist authors, personalities and organizations

Claus Laurence

Montesquieu's Mistakes and the True Meaning of Separation

in *Oxford Journal of Legal Studies*, Volume 25, Number 3, Autumn , 419-451



In *The Spirit of the Laws*, Montesquieu concluded that a constitution of liberty could best be achieved, and had been achieved in Britain, by assigning three essentially different governmental activities to different actors. He was wrong. His mistaken conclusion rested on two errors. First, Montesquieu thought that the primary exercise of powers could durably be divided only where those powers differed in kind. Second, Montesquieu failed to recognize the lawmaking character of executive and judicial exposition of existing law. This article analyzes implications of Montesquieu's mistakes for modern claims, both in Britain and in the United States, that liberty and the rule of law are promoted by separating power in certain contexts. In particular, this article questions the British Government's recent claim that the values underlying separation-of-powers theory call for removing ultimate appellate jurisdiction from the House of Lords. It also traces Montesquieu's influence on the American founders' attempt to separate power along essentialist lines, and considers some sub-optimal consequences of that attempt, including the non-delegation quandary and the emergence of an unchecked judicial lawmaker.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 3. Federalist authors, personalities and organizations

Raath Adries, De Freitas Shaun

Rebellion, Resistance and a Swiss Brutus?

in *Historical Journal (The)*, Volume 48, Issue 01, March

Early sixteenth-century Germany and Switzerland witnessed, amongst their peasants, a growing dissatisfaction with economic exploitation and the increasing power of political rulers. The Protestant Reformation at the time had a profound influence on the moulding of this dissatisfaction into a right to demand the enforcement of divine justice. The Swiss reformer, Huldrych Zwingli, provided parallels for the demands of the peasants, while the German reformers, Martin Luther and Philip Melancthon, criticized the rebellious methods of the peasantry. Against this background the young Swiss reformer, Heinrich Bullinger, responded more positively towards the claims of the peasants by opposing the views of the Lutheran reformers in his play *Lucretia and Brutus*. In this drama, Bullinger propounds the first steps towards the development of his federal theory of politics by advancing the idea of oath-taking as the mechanism for transforming the monarchy into a Christian republic. The idea of oath-taking was destined to become a most important device in early modern politics, used to combat tyranny and to promote the idea of republicanism.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 3. Federalist authors, personalities and organizations

Martin Robert T. W.

Reforming Republicanism: Alexander Hamilton's Theory of Republican Citizenship and Press Liberty

in *Journal of the Early Republic*, Volume 25, Number 1, Spring, pp. 21-46

During his life and ever since, Alexander Hamilton has been criticized as an opponent of republicanism, even a closet monarchist. Recent scholarly efforts to rescue Hamilton from these interpretations have succeeded perhaps too well, making him out to be a moderate, mainstream republican of his day. This essay assesses Hamilton's public performance during the late 1780s and 1790s as a defender of a particular federalist vision of republicanism. Drawing on a central conceptual divide over the proper virtue of republican citizenship should citizens have "confidence" in their elected leaders or maintain a "vigilant" scrutiny of them? The essay explores Hamilton's stress on confidence in his vision of republican citizenship and freedom of the press. The theory he publicly developed and defended is judged less



moderate than others have suggested, but Hamilton's philosophy is best understood as an energetic, elitist reformulation of republicanism.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 3. Federalist authors, personalities and organizations

Kirsch James J. - Sensenig Victor J.

Steps toward nationhood: Henry Laurens (1724-92) and the American Revolution in the South
in *Historical Research*, Vol. 78, Issue 200 - May 2005

Henry Laurens's political career ranks among the South's crucial contributions to the Revolution and American nationhood, contributions that historians have largely neglected. This article attempts to estimate this Southern role through an examination of Laurens's life and letters, and the political culture of his home state, South Carolina. Laurens and others in the South, despite an incongruous commitment to slavery, gave the emerging nation a distinctly Southern stamp by advocating state federalism, the sovereignty of the people through democratic legislature, and a strong executive.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 3. Federalist authors, personalities and organizations

Rosser J. Barkley, Jr.

The Road to Serfdom and the world economy: 60 years later
in *European Journal of Political Economy*, Volume 21, Issue 4, December 2005

We consider Friedrich Hayek's Road to Serfdom in light of global ideological and economic developments during the 60 years since its publication. Specific problems considered include socialism and planning, whether national socialism was really socialism, whether Hayek's views could be labeled as social democratic and whether his critique of social democracy was too strong, and his discussion of the prospects for international economic order. While often right and enormously influential, Hayek himself agreed that some of his predictions did not become true.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 3. Federalist authors, personalities and organizations

Kimber Charles

The birth of Federal Union
in *Federalist Debate (The)*, Year XVIII, n. 1, March, 10-14

No abstract available

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 3. Federalist authors, personalities and organizations



Rossolillo Francesco

The relations between politics and culture in the experience of the European Federalist Movement in Italy in Federalist Debate (The), Year XVIII, n. 2, July , 6-10

No abstract available

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 3. Federalist authors, personalities and organizations

Niess Frank

Weltfrieden durch Weltregierung? Albert Einsteins Vision vom Atomzeitalter in Blätter für deutsche & internationale Politik, November, 2005 , 1381-1388

No abstract available

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Fukuyama Francis

"Stateness" First

in **Journal of Democracy**, Volume 16, Number 1, January , pp. 84-88

Rebuilding political orders after conflict faces two conundrums. The first is that externally-provided governance can undermine the long-term ability of societies to develop their own self-sustaining indigenous political institutions. This was a problem faced by both the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq and the High Representative in Bosnia. The second conundrum is the often contradictory dictates of state-building and democracy promotion: the first seeks to build power, the second to limit it. There is ultimately no optimal way of solving either problem, though recent experience suggests that small-footprint approaches emphasizing local ownership and early transition to local control will work best.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Browning Gary K.

A globalist ideology of post-Marxism? Hardt and Negri's Empire

in **Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy**, Vol. 8, n. 2, June , 193-208

Hardt and Negri interpret contemporary sovereignty and politics in the light of a theory of contemporary globalization that is taken to supersede Marxism and former ideological standpoints of the Left. In particular, Hardt and Negri highlight how their reading of empire and multitude breaks with the teleology of Marxism and accepts the openness of events. They advertise the novelty, which is held to consist in their recognition of a thoroughly socialized and globalized world in which there exists no predetermined historical subject of liberation. Hardt and Negri, however, exemplify the continuity between Marxist and post-Marxist ideological standpoints. The continuity between classical Marxism and Hardt and Negri's notion of empire and its supersession resides in the affinity between the normative values that shape Marx's



reading of history and the emancipatory character of the multitude, which frames the notion of empire. Hardt and Negri offer a radical Leftist reading of globalization that contrasts with alternative ideological notions that inform more orthodox interpretations of globalization, and thereby points to the ideological character of theories of globalization.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Meissner Christopher M.

A new world order: explaining the international diffusion of the gold standard, 1870–1913

in **Journal of International Economics**, Volume 66, Issue 2, July 2005

The gold standard gradually became an international monetary regime after 1870. Similarly, some nations in the European Union are waiting to adopt the euro while others have joined immediately. What explains the timing of exchange rate regime adoption? To find out, the international diffusion of the gold standard is analyzed. Duration analysis shows that network externalities operating through trade channels, the desire to decrease borrowing costs on international capital markets, and the level of development matter. Some evidence shows that the level of exchange rate volatility or inflationist agricultural interests did not matter for the timing of adoption.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Krasner Stephen D. Pascual Carlos

Addressing State Failure

in **Foreign Affairs**, July/August - Vol 84, Number 4, 2005

In today's interconnected world, weak and failed states pose an acute risk to U.S. and global security. Anticipating, averting, and responding to conflict requires more planning and better organization -- precisely the missions of the State Department's new Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Roach Steven C.

Arab States and the Role of Islam in the International Criminal Court

in **Political Studies**, Volume 53, Issue 1, March , pp. 143-161

This article assesses the various disagreements between Arab and western states that surfaced at the 1998 Rome Conference and Preparatory Commission. It also discusses the relationship between state repression and cultural adaptation by examining the undeveloped domestic criminal systems of Arab states and the ambiguous role played by shariah (Islamic law) in the constitutions of many of them. It argues two main points: that more mutual accommodation will be needed to resolve these and future conflicts between Islamic and international law; and that such conflicts between the ICC and Arab states expose the need for further cultural adaptation to the ICC Statute. It is out of this process of cultural adaptation that the relationship between Islam and serious international crimes will evolve.



Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Moratinos Miguel Angel

Barcelone, entre bilan et relance

in *Politique Etrangère*, 3/2005, (automne).

Le processus de Barcelone a permis d'avancer dans le domaine des coopérations économiques et d'élargir les questions débattues entre les rives nord et sud. La démocratisation des sociétés et la sécurité régionale n'en ont par contre que peu bénéficié. Pour l'avenir, le gouvernement de Bruxelles est prêt à proposer une association plus étroite des pays du sud-méditerranéen à l'Union. La conférence de Barcelone II, qui doit se tenir en novembre, devrait donner, à tous niveaux, un nouvel élan au partenariat.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Ingram James D.

Can Universalism Still Be Radical? Alain Badiou's Politics of Truth

in *Constellations*, Vol. 12, Issue 4 December , 561-573

No abstract available

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Xenias Anastasia

Can a Global Peace Last Even If Achieved? Huntington and the Democratic Peace

in *Review of International Studies (The)*, Volume 7, Issue 3, October , 357-386

Current events have surfaced new challenges in the international state system. These are alternatively characterized as state versus substate conflicts, religious conflicts or the outgrowth of the rise in fundamentalism, class struggle between the West and the Third World resulting from globalization, and the lack of democratic government in those states that breed terrorists. Whereas religious conflict is difficult to fix if true and globalization hard to stop, the democratic peace offers promise because changing the form of government is a conceivable goal. But would it help? Samuel Huntington provides an interesting, if unintended, challenge to the democratic peace in both *The Third Wave* and *The Clash of Civilizations*. If democracy is reversible under some circumstances, can it really lead to a lasting peace? If there are cultural divisions in the world, are these necessarily united by polity? If racism is real, does polity really eliminate it? Based on Huntington, the democratic peace falters.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous



Bieler Andreas

Class Struggle over the EU Model of Capitalism: Neo-Gramscian Perspectives and the Analysis of European Integration

in *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy*, Vol. 8, n. 4, December , 513-526

This essay provides a critical engagement with neo-Gramscian perspectives on European integration, dealing with their core theoretical assumptions as well as empirical analyses of individual aspects of European integration. It is argued that by drawing on Gramsci's rejection of economic determinism, his thinking on the agency-structure problem, as well as his work on how to conceptualise the role of ideas, neo-Gramscian perspectives as a critical theory are able to analyse the social purpose of European integration. The conclusion identifies several shortcomings in the neo-Gramscian literature on European integration, namely (1) the neglect of national and European institutions and their structural impact on social forces as main collective actors; (2) the related oversight of possibilities for change within the existing institutional structure; (3) the neglect of studying resistance to neo-liberal restructuring in Europe; and (4) the missing analysis of trade unions and labour as potential actors within movements of resistance.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Carla Andrea

Community Security: Letters from Bosnia. A theoretical analysis and its application to the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina

in *Peace, Conflict and Development*, Volume 7, Issue 7, July , pp. 217-250

No abstract available

Full text available at <http://www.peacestudiesjournal.org.uk/docs/July05Carla.pdf>

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Biancheri Boris

Cooperazione e comunicazione per un nuovo equilibrio mediterraneo

in *Impresa & Stato*, Ottobre/Dicembre N.69/2004

C'è una certa contraddizione in atto in questo momento nel rapporto euromediterraneo. Il Mediterraneo ha accresciuto la sua importanza strategica: negli ultimi anni, per una serie di fattori quali la lotta al terrorismo, l'incidenza della guerra in Iraq, è diventato ancor più un centro sensibile, un'area di rischio e di potenziali instabilità. Questo fatto comporta, per l'Europa, una nuova riflessione perché proprio contestualmente a questo processo, l'Europa attraversa una fase di allargamento e il peso specifico dell'area continentale europea si accresce sensibilmente. Due Paesi mediterranei di grande importanza politica e culturale come Cipro e Malta entrano nell'Unione Europea; ma se facciamo il conto materiale del peso degli abitanti dell'Unione Europea, vediamo che i nuovi membri dell'Europa centro-orientale assommano a 77 milioni di abitanti e i due nuovi membri mediterranei a un milione di abitanti; che il prodotto interno lordo dei nuovi membri dell'Europa centro-orientale è di circa 440 miliardi di euro e quello dei nuovi membri mediterranei



di circa 11 miliardi di euro. Quindi, il peso del continente europeo si accresce. È comunque forte la convinzione che il Mediterraneo rappresenti nel contesto generale e internazionale un'area di particolare importanza e sensibilità. Non basta più mantenere l'area in quella sorta di equilibrio che si è conservato per tanto tempo e che tuttavia è stato insufficiente per segnare dei progressi veramente sensibili; occorre ricostruire un equilibrio e per realizzarlo è necessaria la cooperazione dei Paesi dell'area mediterranea. Inoltre, la dimensione del Mediterraneo è soggetta a nuove definizioni. L'area mediterranea risente dell'influenza di quelle zone di "retrotterra mediterraneo": il Golfo, il Mar Nero, lo stesso Caspio che agiscono e interagiscono sugli equilibri del Mediterraneo, ma il cui centro di gravità è altrove. Il Mediterraneo, dunque, si trova non soltanto a confrontarsi con i problemi esistenti al suo interno, ma anche con quelli che provengono dalle aree vicine che ne influenzano la stabilità. Credo quindi sia lecito dire che il Mediterraneo attraversi obiettivamente una fase di difficoltà: spetta in primo luogo all'Europa il compito di ricostruire un equilibrio. L'importanza della comunicazione

Che cosa si può fare concretamente? Che cosa ognuno può fare nel proprio ambito? Credo che il settore della comunicazione sia fondamentale. Il Mediterraneo ha costituito e costituisce tuttora un'area dove la comunicazione è insufficiente sia all'interno dell'area, sia da quest'area verso l'esterno. Gli eventi del Mediterraneo sono immediatamente noti se si tratta di catastrofi, terremoti, atti di guerriglia o di terrorismo, ma la realtà quotidiana, quello che avviene giornalmente nell'ambito della politica di ciascuno dei Paesi rivieraschi del Mediterraneo, nell'ambito dell'economia, della cronaca quotidiana, della cultura, dello sport, nell'ambito di tutto ciò che rappresenta la vita quotidiana dei suoi abitanti rimane sconosciuto. È insufficiente anche la conoscenza all'interno dell'area mediterranea. Spesso constatiamo che in parte le difficoltà del dialogo vengono dalla difficoltà di trovare un interlocutore che risponda. L'interlocuzione con la sponda Sud e la sponda orientale del Mediterraneo non è facile anche per un difetto di comunicazione al proprio interno. L'agenzia ANSA ha cercato di sopperire a questa mancanza comunicativa con la costituzione di Ansamed, un notiziario in italiano, inglese e arabo e del nuovo portale web, il cui obiettivo non è solo quello di portare notizie italiane nel Mediterraneo, ma di portare, in modo unitario, selettivo ma comprensivo, tutto ciò che ha rilevanza nella vita politica, economica e culturale dell'area mediterranea all'attenzione sia dei Paesi del Mediterraneo stesso, sia dei grandi media internazionali. Per far questo non bastano le forze dell'ANSA, ma occorre la collaborazione di tutte le forze e le agenzie che operano nei singoli Paesi del Mediterraneo: solo attraverso questo assemblaggio si può produrre un prodotto che veramente attiri anche l'attenzione dei grandi media internazionali. Esiste poi un interrogativo rilevante: cosa definisce in fondo il Mediterraneo? Non è un'unità etnica, non è un'unità linguistica, religiosa, politica, storica; è certo un'unità geografica, ma che cos'è, in realtà, che fa il Mediterraneo? Sentiamo che c'è qualcosa di comune, ma di che cosa si tratta? Ognuno dà le proprie risposte. Ritengo che se una somiglianza esiste, occorre andare a cercarla non in alto, nella stratosfera politica, ma in basso, nella vita quotidiana, ad esempio nel caffè. Non nel caffè prodotto, ma nello spazio del caffè, ossia il luogo dove si entra, ci si incontra, ci si siede a un tavolo, ci si introduce, si vive insieme, si discute, si litiga, poi si fa pace e poi entrano dei nuovi interlocutori. Quello dei Paesi del Mediterraneo è sempre uguale ed è diversissimo dal bar americano, dal pub inglese, dalla pasticceria viennese o tedesca; è il caffè del Mediterraneo. Se si dovesse immaginare un simbolo della vita mediterranea, lo cercherei nel caffè del Mediterraneo. Che sia a Smirne, che sia a Rabat, che sia a Palermo, che sia a Marsiglia, che sia a Milano, c'è qualche cosa nel caffè del Mediterraneo che ci unisce e mi auguro che questa unione rimanga.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Anievas Alexander

Critical Dialogues: Habermasian Social Theory and International Relations

in Politics, Vol. 25, Issue 3, September, 135-143



The works of Jürgen Habermas have been a theoretical inspiration for many students of international relations (IR). To date, however, the majority of critical IR approaches drawing from the Habermasian perspective have done so on purely philosophical grounds. This article will thus explore the utility of the social-theoretical aspects of Habermas's work for critical inquiries into world politics. To this end, it will examine four main elements of his work: the theory of communicative action; public sphere; lifeworld/system architecture; and discourse ethics. It will be argued that adopting the Habermasian conceptual apparatus provides a social-theoretical route to explaining the contradictory and often paradoxical nature of international relations in the epoch of 'globalisation'. While various constructivist approaches to IR have recently offered more socially-oriented applications of Habermas's theoretical framework, the majority of these studies have done so from predominately non-critical standpoints. This article will thus seek to explore the utility of Habermas's work in offering a critical social theory of world politics.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Christoph Knill

Cross-national policy convergence: concepts, approaches and explanatory factors

in *Journal of European Public Policy* , Volume 12, Number 5 / October , 764-774

Although there is an increasing number of studies on policy convergence (in recent years especially in the context of Europeanization and globalization research), we still have a rather limited understanding of this phenomenon. This deficit can be not only traced back to a lack of empirical findings, but is also the result of the heterogeneous and partially inconsistent theoretical literature on policy convergence. Although policy convergence constitutes a central concept in comparative public policy, it is not always consistently used and mixed up with related but not equivalent concepts. It is thus a basic objective of this paper to clarify the analytical relationship between policy convergence and related concepts used in the literature. Moreover, different approaches for the assessment and measurement of policy convergence will be presented. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of causes of policy convergence.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Rossen-Stadtfield Helge

Demokratische Staatlichkeit in Europa: ein verblassendes Bild

in *Jahrbuch des öffentlichen Rechts der Gegenwart*, Band 53, 2005

No abstract available

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

De Michelis Gianni

Dentro il “nuovo ordine mondiale”

in *Impresa & Stato*, Ottobre/Dicembre N.69/2004



Sono del parere che il nostro Paese non abbia ancora messo a fuoco adeguatamente l'importanza - e la centralità strategica, sul piano geo-politico - rappresentata dalla questione euromediterranea. Questa affermazione trova conferma tanto dalla valutazione del peso e dell'evidenza che i mezzi di informazione, tranne qualche eccezione, hanno riservato fino ad oggi a tale problema, che dal grado di attenzione - che è poi conseguenza del primo atteggiamento - da parte dell'opinione pubblica, il cui coinvolgimento rispetto a esso è stato e appare piuttosto distaccato e superficiale. Ci sono, è vero, e bisogna riconoscerlo, realtà, come quella milanese, in cui il comportamento di fronte alla questione euromediterranea ha assunto tutt'altra caratterizzazione, distinguendosi per la consapevolezza, il livello e la qualità dell'analisi, ma in generale, la valutazione riflette sostanzialmente il giudizio critico che ho espresso al riguardo. Bisogna riconoscere, tuttavia, che negli ultimi tempi qualcosa ha cominciato a muoversi. Intendo dire che, sia pure limitatamente ad alcuni settori, si sta procedendo nella direzione giusta, cioè verso un corretto approccio alla questione euromediterranea nella consapevolezza che da ciò non solo discendano per il nostro Paese vantaggi e opportunità di ordine politico, ma dipendano aspetti rilevanti anche sul piano economico, specie riguardo al Nord dell'Italia. Al punto che non è azzardato affermare che il futuro dell'economia italiana e, quindi, dell'economia del Nord, sarà strettamente legato (se non addirittura dipendente) alla capacità che il Paese mostrerà di avere rispetto all'esigenza di rendere concreta questa nuova strategia di attenzione verso il Mediterraneo. In realtà, il problema non è nuovo e si trascina da decenni, ma tanto l'Italia quanto l'Europa hanno dedicato sempre poca attenzione a un tema che oggi, invece, torna prepotentemente alla ribalta esigendo scelte precise e chiare. Non si può perdere altro tempo. Sussistono ragioni oggettive che, di fatto, ci pongono in termini ultimativi di fronte a un passaggio ineludibile, al punto che o saremo capaci di affrontarlo nei termini giusti e, quindi, di superarlo in maniera adeguata, o ci troveremo di fronte a problemi di tale complessità da rendere ancora più difficile e precario il non già facile quadro politico-strategico europeo e mondiale. Tenterò, sia pure brevemente, di mettere in luce questi elementi oggettivi con cui siamo chiamati necessariamente a fare i conti, che sono tanto di ordine economico-commerciale che politico.

Ragioni economiche-commerciali

Direi che, preliminarmente, possono essere individuate tre questioni centrali: il problema di come si organizza la crescita; la tecnologia; il cambiamento della configurazione dell'economia globale, cioè della logica di interconnessione tra le varie parti del pianeta. Tutto questo è destinato ad avere una conseguenza straordinaria: si chiude, infatti, un'epoca durata 500 anni. Il Mediterraneo è stato il primo grande sistema economico del mondo: per quattromila anni, dal terzo millennio a.C. al 1492, ha rappresentato la principale e più estesa area di libero scambio del pianeta, che ha visto protagonisti prima i Sumeri, poi i Fenici, quindi i Greci, i Romani e gli islamici. Dopo questa grande fase espansiva e di sviluppo, la geografia degli scambi, delle relazioni tra i popoli è cambiata, riflettendosi anche sul Mediterraneo e sul suo ruolo nella storia del mondo. Di conseguenza, quest'area è andata via via periferizzandosi, conoscendo un periodo di forte declino all'interno del quale ha finito per prevalere la logica del conflitto su quella della cooperazione. Quello che oggi ci troviamo di fronte e che siamo chiamati ad affrontare con gli strumenti giusti, è un importante cambiamento, l'inizio di una fase nuovamente in linea con le antiche tradizioni e con il ruolo storico svolto dal Mediterraneo nel corso dei millenni. Lo scenario attuale, dunque, tende a mutare radicalmente. L'irrompere dell'economia mondiale dell'Asia dell'Est e, credo a brevissima scadenza, del sub continente indiano, cambierà infatti molto rapidamente la geografia delle relazioni e ridarà un valore importante ai rapporti tra l'Asia dell'Est, il sub continente indiano e l'Europa, riposizionando al centro l'area del Mediterraneo. Per quanto riguarda le relazioni commerciali da e per l'Europa, attraverso il Mediterraneo, penso che si possa parlare di una loro decuplicazione in cinque anni. Si profila all'orizzonte, dunque, un cambiamento a trecentosessanta gradi, con tutte le conseguenti opportunità che tale nuova situazione offrirà a quella parte dell'Europa che guarda al Mediterraneo. La rotta più breve è quella che investe tutti i mercati europei, compresi i più nordici, dai porti del Mediterraneo: i porti di Marsiglia, Genova, Trieste, Venezia (e quelli più in giù, di Gioia Tauro, Brindisi, Taranto) hanno un'occasione straordinaria per ritrovare quel ruolo che avevano totalmente perso nel corso dei secoli a favore di Rotterdam, Amburgo, Anversa o Londra. Questo processo, però, come dicevo, presuppone un'immediata capacità di reazione, di organizzazione e di realizzazione infrastrutturale.



Ragioni "politiche"

Ci sono anche altre ragioni, di carattere "politico", con cui bisogna sapersi misurare affrontando il tema della nostra discussione. Una è certamente la questione del conflitto militare in Iraq: se non saremo in grado di governarlo e di risolverlo nel rispetto degli obiettivi per i quali esso è scaturito - vale a dire la lotta al terrorismo e, principalmente, al fondamentalismo islamico e la parallela creazione in quel Paese di un sistema di governo democratico - sarà impossibile restituire centralità al Mediterraneo e i rapporti mondiali, inevitabilmente e conseguentemente, si altereranno. È necessario, in rapporto a questo scenario, compiere una sorta di analisi costi/benefici. L'esistenza di questa nuova geografia degli scambi aumenta enormemente, infatti, l'utilità e l'opportunità di compiere ogni sforzo necessario per superare il conflitto in corso e, di riflesso, lavorare per non perdere un'occasione storica a favore di questa parte del mondo. La partita che si gioca è sostanziosa. Ciò anche riguardo agli equilibri del pianeta, giacché il cuore del cosiddetto "nuovo ordine mondiale"- quello che tanti in Europa non sono riusciti ancora a cogliere e che, invece, in America, anche se con qualche errore hanno capito - si gioca proprio qui; specificatamente, nella capacità di combattere e vincere la sfida, non del terrorismo ma del fondamentalismo islamico, vale a dire della nuova minaccia totalitaria del XXI secolo che può essere risolta sia con mezzi militari sia, soprattutto, sul piano politico. Ma c'è un altro elemento, sempre di carattere politico, che rende urgente (e, per l'Italia, assolutamente prioritaria su tutte) la questione mediterranea: la configurazione dell'Europa. L'allargamento a 25 ha messo in moto un processo dal quale dipenderà l'Europa nei prossimi 50 o 100 anni e il rischio di quella che chiamo una possibile "deriva baltica", vale a dire l'ipotesi di un'Europa che modifica la sua configurazione passando da un asse Sud-Nord lungo il Reno e il Rodano, a un asse Ovest-Est attraverso Parigi, Berlino, Varsavia, Mosca. Un baricentro che, in altri termini, si sposterebbe verso Nord, con un'Europa che, in questo caso, inevitabilmente, si chiuderebbe a fortezza, fissando il suo confine meridionale lungo le Alpi e scegliendo come propria "logica" e "proiezione" strategica la difesa di una zona di sviluppo oltre questo confine. La conseguenza di questo scenario sarebbe chiara e scontata: lasciare al disviluppo, al conflitto, al terrorismo, all'immigrazione clandestina, le zone del Sud Italia. È un rischio fortissimo, che si deve e si può evitare in un solo modo: rafforzando rapidamente, concretamente ed efficacemente la dimensione mediterranea dell'Europa. Per l'Italia, in particolare, è una questione di sopravvivenza. Se prevale, come è auspicabile, una posizione che protende verso la pace nel Mediterraneo, puntando quindi a sfruttare le opportunità offerte dalla nuova geografia degli scambi; se, in altre parole, prevale l'obiettivo di imprimere una forte accelerazione alla dimensione mediterranea dell'Europa, per il nostro Paese si aprirà un periodo che non è azzardato immaginare tra i più positivi e proficui della sua storia. In caso contrario, sarà esattamente l'opposto. C'è, infine, una terza questione di rilievo politico, che si traduce nella proposta sulla quale l'Italia lavora da anni: la cosiddetta logica di Helsinki trasferita nel Mediterraneo allargato, nel grande Medio Oriente. In questo senso, la portata e i riflessi di una scelta di questo tipo appaiono chiari ormai anche agli Stati Uniti, la cui disponibilità a proseguire lungo questa direzione, in maniera più concreta non solo rispetto all'Italia ma all'intera Europa, mi sembra sia ormai accertata tanto sul piano dell'azione militare e politica che dell'impegno economico. Basti pensare, ad esempio, alle iniziative, di chiara apertura anche commerciale, a favore della Giordania e del Marocco. Mi avvio alla conclusione, accennando a due altri aspetti che ritengo importanti per la questione di cui stiamo discutendo. Due campi di azione rispetto ai quali l'Italia può veramente giocare un ruolo fondamentale. La prima è quella che chiamo "organizzazione dello spazio della comunicazione", intendendo come tale non le reti fisiche, ma la televisione, Ansamed. L'Italia non dovrebbe limitarsi a singole iniziative, pur lodevoli e importanti, ma assumere la leadership mettendo in campo una strategia complessiva in questo settore. Su questo terreno i vantaggi sarebbero notevoli, visto che nello spazio della comunicazione rientrano anche le questioni legate alla cultura, al dialogo tra le religioni e via dicendo: tutti aspetti e materie, cioè, su cui noi potremmo certamente, e a ragione, disporre di vantaggi e di potenzialità in più rispetto ad altri. L'Italia può fare molto anche su un altro fronte, proponendo che entro il 2005 si passi dalla logica dei PEN a quella dei TMN, dei Trans Mediterranean Network, e che l'intera logica in cui questo obiettivo viene inserito favorisca la riorganizzazione, l'infrastrutturazione e il collegamento del Mediterraneo. Qui, in questa sfida, gli imprenditori sono chiamati evidentemente a fare la loro parte. È un'occasione straordinaria per tutti. Se questo scenario, questi campi



d'azione, riuscissero a concretizzarsi, per l'intero sistema italiano nei prossimi decenni si aprirebbero prospettive enormi. E una sfida possibile. Concretamente a portata di mano. Perché, allora, insieme, con l'appoggio dell'Ipalmò e di tutti gli altri soggetti che vorranno partecipare, non mettere in piedi, prima del 2005, un'ipotesi di Trans Mediterranean Network e presentarla, come proposta del nostro Paese, agli altri partner europei arrivando così a Barcellona 2 con un progetto concreto? Mi sembrerebbe una buona base di partenza per voltare pagina e andare nella direzione giusta.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Marmin Michel (a cura di)

Di fronte agli USA, o l'Europa o il nulla

in *Diorama*, n. 274, novembre-dicembre , 21-25

intervista a Philippe Grasset

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Ginsburgh Victor, Ortuño-Ortin Ignacio Weber Shlomo

Disenfranchisement in Linguistically Diverse Societies. The Case of the European Union

in *Journal of the European Economic Association*, Vol. 3, Issue 4 - June 2005 , pp. 946 - 965

We consider a linguistically diversified society and examine the notion of language disenfranchisement when some individuals are denied the full access to documents and political process in their native tongues. To calculate the disenfranchisement indices we use the Dyen percentage cognate matrix of linguistic distances between Indo-European languages and apply survey and population data on language proficiency in the European Union. We then determine optimal sets of official languages that depend on society's sensitivity against disenfranchisement and comprehensiveness of the chosen language regime. We also discuss the language situation in the European Union after its last enlargement.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Borrmann Axel, Busse Matthias, Neuhaus Silke

EU/ACP Economic Partnership Agreements: Impact, Options and Prerequisites

in *Intereconomics*, Volume 40 No. 3 • 2005 , pp. 169-175

No abstract available

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Jullien François

Eine Dekonstruktion von außen. Von Griechenland nach China, oder: Wie man die festgefügt Vorstellungen



der europäischen Vernunft ergründet

in *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie*, 53. Jahrgang, Heft 4, 2005

No abstract available

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Robinson William I.

Gramsci and Globalisation: From Nation‐State to Transnational Hegemony

in *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy*, Vol. 8, n. 4, December , 559-574

This essay explores the matter of hegemony in the global system from the standpoint of global capitalism theory, in contrast to extant approaches that analyse this phenomenon from the standpoint of the nation‐state and the inter‐state system. It advances a conception of global hegemony in transnational social terms, linking the process of globalisation to the construction of hegemonies and counter‐hegemonies in the twenty‐first century. An emergent global capitalist historical bloc, lead by a transnational capitalist class, rather than a particular nation‐state, bloc of states, or region, is pursuing a hegemonic project. The US state is seen as the point of condensation for pressures from dominant groups to resolve problems of global capitalism. US‐led militarisation is a contradictory political‐military response to the crisis of global capitalism, characterised by economic stagnation, legitimacy problems and the rise of counter‐hegemonic forces.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Maronta Fabrizio, Polansky David

How to become the # 1

in *Heartland – Eurasian Review of Geopolitics*, Number 2, "The Power of Israel" , pp. 97-108

Tracing out the course of American history, a constant strain between principles and action emerges. The founding criteria of stars-and-stripes Republic make it qualitatively different from the other actors on the world's stage. Reasons and phases of the territorial and geopolitical expansion.

Full text available at http://www.eheartland.com/_lib/_docs/2005_02_The_Power_of_Israel.pdf

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

de Benoist Alain

Il diritto alla differenza non può essere negato

in *Diorama*, n. 274, novembre-dicembre , 1-6

No abstract available



Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Ermolli Bruno

Il processo di integrazione euromediterraneo nel nuovo contesto internazionale

in *Impresa & Stato*, Ottobre/Dicembre N.69/2004

I punti su cui occorre soffermare l'attenzione per capire lo sforzo della Camera di Commercio di Milano nel processo di integrazione euromediterraneo sono essenzialmente tre: 1) lo stato dell'arte e il perché dell'impegno nel Laboratorio euromediterraneo; 2) le attività svolte nel corso dell'ultimo anno: dai propositi della prima conferenza annuale euromediterranea fino alla realizzazione concreta dei progetti e delle attività presentate in tale sede; c) la presentazione del programma del Laboratorio di questo anno, delle proposte relative, dei progetti e delle attività che dovranno essere realizzati entro la prossima conferenza euromediterranea, che si terrà nel 2005. L'iniziativa del Laboratorio euromediterraneo è stata inaugurata nel 1999, in stretta collaborazione con il Governo e coordinata dalla Camera di Commercio di Milano. La sua vision e la sua mission sono molto chiare. La vision è che il bacino del Mediterraneo rappresenta una delle più importanti aree del mondo in termini geo-politici, religiosi, economici, artistici e culturali; area con la quale l'Europa e l'Italia, nel panorama della competizione globale, devono certamente integrarsi. La mission è quella di sviluppare, quotidianamente, un'intensa attività di analisi, ricerca, nuove progettualità, costruzione di reti di alleanze con tutti quei soggetti che lavorano per rendere i Paesi mediterranei e i rispettivi sistemi economici e sociali più sviluppati, meno distanti e disomogenei. La "regia" che presiede il Laboratorio è quindi quella di "ascoltare" le peculiarità e le attese dei diversi Paesi mediterranei, come in una vera e propria agorà, distillando idee e progetti che a vario titolo agevolino il processo di integrazione dell'area e soprattutto favoriscano il suo sviluppo economico e sociale. Ma, come in ogni altro laboratorio, il metodo insegna che dopo l'ascolto, l'analisi delle fattibilità, la progettazione e le verifiche sull'attuazione dei progetti stessi, è necessario un momento di comunicazione dei progetti proposti e di controllo delle iniziative portate a termine. Il Laboratorio euromediterraneo ha, quindi, individuato il suo momento di catalizzazione dei progetti e di verifica degli stessi nella Conferenza euromediterranea di Milano. Tale appuntamento, divenuto permanente, rappresenta un momento di confronto cruciale, soprattutto nella prospettiva di quanto stabilito dal processo di Barcellona, che fra soli 6 anni porterebbe alla famosa area di libero scambio che coinvolgerà oltre 600 milioni di persone.

Le attività svolte

Il primo risultato raggiunto è stato quello di rendere annuale l'appuntamento con il Laboratorio. Alcuni numeri testimoniano il raggiungimento di questo obiettivo: alla conferenza di quest'anno hanno partecipato circa 80 relatori, di cui oltre la metà provenienti dalla costa Sud dei Paesi dell'area mediterranea. Il secondo obiettivo, riguardava la necessità di disporre di ulteriori risorse finanziarie per sostenere il processo di integrazione. A tal fine il Governo italiano, durante il semestre di Presidenza europea, è riuscito ad accelerare alcuni processi decisionali. Inoltre, pur in assenza ancora di una Banca euromediterranea, totalmente dedicata allo sviluppo dei Paesi Med, ci sono stati importanti segnali di maggiore attenzione e sono state adottate alcune misure in sede BEI che vanno nella giusta direzione. Il terzo obiettivo, si riferiva alla creazione di un fondo di investimento - l'Euromed Fund - specificamente dedicato agli operatori che intendono investire nell'area mediterranea. Il Fondo è oggi una realtà, in fase di avvio, con un capitale iniziale di 45 milioni di euro, destinato a crescere ulteriormente, per sostenere concretamente nuove joint ventures italomediterranee. Nato su iniziativa della Camera di Commercio di Milano, che ha avuto il merito di idearlo e svilupparlo, il Fondo ha ricevuto da subito l'appoggio di importanti gruppi bancari italiani, unitamente alle primarie istituzioni multilaterali e ai governi regionali, prima fra tutte la Regione Lombardia. È la prima volta in Italia che nasce un fondo di private equity, generato con risorse private e pubbliche, a supporto degli investimenti italiani nell'area



mediterranea: questo a dimostrazione dell'attenzione che il sistema bancario italiano, in particolare Banca Intesa, San Paolo IMI e Unicredit, ripone nel processo di internazionalizzazione delle PMI, in un mercato di importanza strategica quale il Mediterraneo. La BEI e la Regione Lombardia hanno da subito compreso le caratteristiche di innovazione del progetto, assicurando un costante appoggio nella sua realizzazione. Il Fondo sarà, infatti, il primo che la BEI realizza sul Mediterraneo con investitori italiani. Il Fondo, con sede a Milano, ha caratteristiche fortemente innovative. Non si tratta di un'agevolazione finanziaria, ma di uno strumento flessibile che acquisisce partecipazioni nelle nuove joint ventures italo-mediterranee che verranno create e si avvarrà della collaborazione di società mediterranee specializzate in private equity; sarà infine dotato di un advisory board euromediterraneo, composto da eminenti personalità italiane e mediterranee. La Camera di Commercio di Milano, con l'ausilio del Laboratorio euromediterraneo, ha poi dato attuazione a numerose altre iniziative sollecitate nel corso della scorsa conferenza. Programmi di formazione a distanza, in collaborazione con Banca Mondiale e il supporto del Ministero Affari Esteri, sono stati realizzati fra Milano e diversi Paesi mediterranei (Marocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egitto, Giordania, Turchia), su temi che vanno dalle politiche per lo sviluppo del settore privato e delle PMI ai modelli organizzativi delle strutture intermedie quali le Camere di Commercio o le Associazioni di imprese (industriali, ecc.). È stata, inoltre, rafforzata la presenza della Camera di Commercio di Milano nel Mediterraneo. È in fase di apertura, infatti, un ufficio in Marocco a disposizione delle imprese italiane interessate a delocalizzare in loco. Tale ufficio va ad aggiungersi agli uffici già operativi in Egitto e Tunisia. Inoltre, a seguito del Memorandum firmato nel corso della conferenza dello scorso anno, si è lavorato anche per l'apertura di un ufficio commerciale siriano presso l'azienda speciale Promos, che va ad affiancare quello già esistente per l'Egitto. Sono aumentate le missioni di imprese nell'area, in Turchia, Egitto, Tunisia, Siria. È stata realizzata anche una fiera a Tripoli e sono allo studio altre iniziative in Marocco, Algeria, Libano e Giordania. Sono stati poi realizzati importanti lavori di analisi e di studio, che hanno dato vita a svariati incontri pubblici su temi economici, finanziari e culturali e che spesso si sono tradotti in pubblicazioni. Il 2003 è stato dunque un anno di lavoro intenso che, grazie anche alla Presidenza italiana dell'Unione Europea, ha riportato il Mediterraneo al centro dell'attenzione della comunità nazionale e internazionale.

Il ruolo del Sistema Italia e di Milano

L'importanza del 2004 è tanto più evidente in quanto rappresenta un vero e proprio anno di svolta per il consolidamento dei risultati ottenuti, ma anche per una maggiore sensibilizzazione e coinvolgimento della nuova Europa a 25 nei progetti verso la Regione mediterranea. Il Sistema Italia non può perdere questa opportunità e Milano deve svolgere quel ruolo propositivo che le è proprio, a beneficio di tutto il Paese, per far sì che il nostro territorio diventi sempre più la principale porta dei Paesi mediterranei da e verso l'Europa. La Camera di Commercio di Milano crede molto nella vocazione di Milano come "terra di mezzo": Milano deriva infatti il suo nome da mediolanum, che indica esattamente la posizione di mezzo. Il capoluogo lombardo deve porsi come metropoli internazionale, capace di promuovere iniziative coordinate verso il Mediterraneo, attivando politiche di rete con tutte le altre città italiane e i territori interessati, con le Istituzioni, con le imprese, con le Università e con i luoghi d'arte. Esiste, infatti, la concreta possibilità che, insieme a quello geografico, il baricentro della politica di cooperazione europea e dello sviluppo economico venga spostato a Est. Senza sottovalutare l'Est europeo, per l'Italia e per il suo posizionamento competitivo, il Mediterraneo è molto importante. I cambiamenti in atto nell'area mediterranea sul piano delle riforme economiche, sociali e politiche, sono certamente positivi; tuttavia, diversi problemi devono essere ancora affrontati con decisione se si vuole realmente favorire lo sviluppo del settore privato, come ad esempio le lungaggini doganali, le legislazioni fiscali complesse, le infrastrutture carenti. Queste economie - sebbene molto diverse tra loro - presentano inoltre un fortissimo divario con le economie più avanzate, incrementi demografici molto significativi e tassi di crescita ancora troppo lenti per rispondere alla futura domanda di occupazione. Vi sono però anche alcuni segnali confortanti: in questo contesto di congiuntura negativa per l'interscambio commerciale risulta evidente come i Paesi del Mediterraneo appaiono in controtendenza rispetto all'andamento generale. La crescita dell'export nazionale verso tali Paesi è di tutto rilievo (+4,5%) e ancor più elevati risultano i tassi di crescita della Lombardia e di Milano (che fanno segnare rispettivamente il +8,8% e il +5,9%). Il primo partner, in termini assoluti, risulta la Turchia con una quota pari a oltre il 30% dell'export totale verso l'area del



Mediterraneo; segue la Tunisia, che nel corso degli ultimi anni ha visto aumentare la propria importanza, raggiungendo una quota del 14% circa. Se accanto a ciò si considera anche l'aumento fatto registrare dall'import dell'Italia proveniente dai Paesi mediterranei (+3,5%), il quadro che emerge è quello di un'area i cui flussi commerciali con l'Italia, già rilevanti, sono in continua e positiva evoluzione. Il numero complessivo delle imprese italiane che partecipano all'interscambio commerciale con gli undici Paesi del Mediterraneo qui considerati è di 20.498. Esse sono concentrate principalmente nelle attività manifatturiere (56,8%), nel commercio (16,2%) e nell'artigianato (12,8%). Anche in questo ambito, l'area milanese, con 2.734 imprese (pari al 13,3% del totale nazionale e con un peso del 40% sul totale lombardo) risulta di gran lunga la prima provincia italiana. Inoltre, tra i cosiddetti quattro motori d'Europa, la nostra Regione risulta quella con il valore maggiore delle esportazioni nel 2003, seguita rispettivamente dal Rhône Alpes, Baden-Württemberg e Catalogna. Più critica è invece la situazione relativa agli investimenti diretti esteri: il Sistema Italia, per numero di investimenti realizzati nell'area Med, si colloca rispettivamente dopo Francia, Spagna, Regno Unito e Germania. A ogni modo, su un totale di 901 imprese partecipate da operatori italiani con sede nei Paesi della costa Sud ed Est del Mediterraneo, 352 (pari al 37%) sono partecipazioni di imprese lombarde e di queste ultime 187 appartengono a imprese milanesi (pari al 21% del totale nazionale). Alle 901 imprese partecipate fanno capo 89.262 addetti per un fatturato complessivo pari a 9.420 milioni di euro.

La presentazione delle proposte, dei progetti e delle attività

Il programma di attività per il 2004/2005 prevede innanzitutto l'istituzione presso la Camera di Commercio di Milano del Mediterranean Business Center: un centro di promozione economica dei Paesi del Mediterraneo finalizzato alla loro promozione sui mercati italiano ed europeo. In tal modo sarà incrementata la presenza sia "fisica" che "virtuale" del nostro Paese nel Mediterraneo. Prendendo ad esempio gli accordi già in essere con Paesi quali Siria ed Egitto, si propone di ospitare, presso un centro attrezzato dalla Camera di Commercio di Milano, i rappresentanti delle istituzioni economiche di tutti i Paesi mediterranei. Tale opportunità dovrà essere sviluppata con uno spirito di reciprocità e permetterà alla Camera di Commercio di Milano di aumentare la presenza di uffici nelle capitali dei Paesi Mediterranei, al fine di favorire la cross fertilization fra operatori italo-mediterranei. Il programma 2004/2005 prevede la partecipazione della Camera di Commercio di Milano al capitale della news agency AnsaMed, il primo network di informazione italiano in lingua araba. Si ritiene, infatti, che tutti i Paesi del Mediterraneo debbano poter disporre di informazioni tempestive, attendibili e facilmente comprensibili sull'Italia e sull'Europa, e che pertanto una completa informazione a due vie sia uno degli strumenti più importanti per un'integrazione mediterranea più consapevole. La Camera di Commercio di Milano è poi impegnata nella promozione di strumenti alternativi di risoluzione delle controversie. La propria Azienda speciale Camera Arbitrale di Milano, nell'ambito di una specifica iniziativa denominata "Progetto Mediterraneo", offre alle imprese (non solo di grande dimensione ma anche PMI) e ai professionisti una serie di strumenti rapidi, economici e riservati (quali l'arbitrato e la conciliazione) per la risoluzione delle liti commerciali. Accanto a questo ruolo di promozione del business, la Camera Arbitrale di Milano organizza corsi e seminari su temi legati alla cosiddetta "giustizia alternativa", in collaborazione con i Paesi dell'area mediterranea. Tra le altre iniziative proposte vi è anche la prima Fiera campionaria per i prodotti dei Paesi mediterranei a Milano, da realizzare in collaborazione con Fiera Milano, in grado di offrire ai Paesi espositori una vetrina privilegiata per esporre il meglio della loro produzione nel polo fieristico più importante d'Europa. Inoltre, in occasione della prossima edizione di Progetto Città 2005, che inaugurerà ad aprile il nuovo Polo Fieristico di Milano, saranno coinvolti alcuni dei principali rappresentanti dei Paesi Med nel settore delle public utilities, al fine di aumentare la collaborazione con gli operatori italiani del settore. Inoltre la Camera di Commercio di Milano, in collaborazione con le Università Bocconi e Cattolica, favorirà la formazione dei migliori "cervelli" mediterranei attraverso corsi Master e PHD. Si tratta di un progetto ambizioso grazie al quale le due Università milanesi ospiteranno diversi studenti dando loro la possibilità di specializzarsi attraverso dei corsi post laurea. Il progetto prevede periodi di specializzazione anche da parte degli studenti milanesi nei vari Atenei del Mediterraneo. Infine vi è la collaborazione con il Piccolo Teatro di Milano per il primo festival del Mediterraneo: artisti, attori e musicisti provenienti da tutti i Paesi del Mediterraneo realizzeranno al Piccolo una kermesse totalmente dedicata ai loro suoni, alla loro musica, al loro modo di



fare arte. L'obiettivo dichiarato è quello di facilitare la conoscenza di modalità diverse, ma altrettanto affascinanti, di concepire e comunicare l'arte in tutte le sue differenti espressioni.

Conclusioni

Le proposte presentate rivelano con chiarezza la visione e la missione che la Camera di Commercio di Milano si è prefissata per l'integrazione e lo sviluppo delle relazioni italo-mediterranee. La formula che ha ispirato ogni proposta si compone, però, di fattori critici di successo che devono essere ben declinati e interpretati:

- analisi economico sociali approfondite e discusse fra i protagonisti di tutti i Paesi mediterranei;
- informazioni tempestive e aggiornate sulle evoluzioni dei diversi Paesi, delle diverse istituzioni e delle diverse economie, per approfondirne la conoscenza in modo attendibile;
- antenne in tutte le principali capitali euromediterranee, per lo scambio della conoscenza degli operatori, dei prodotti e delle opportunità economiche e sociali;
- capitali finanziari per stimolare l'avvio di nuove imprese italo- mediterranee, che assorbano lavoro, creino profitto e producano benessere per i Paesi in via di sviluppo dell'area med;
- fiere campionarie e missioni economiche per stimolare gli scambi commerciali e gli investimenti infrastrutturali;
- investimenti sul capitale umano, sia attraverso la formazione a distanza sia attraverso corsi di specializzazione, allo scopo di creare una generazione di "cervelli" euromediterranei;
- infine, premiare le differenze in materia di produzione artistica, scoprendo il patrimonio storico della più grande e importante culla della civiltà, il Mediterraneo.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Elges Reinhold

International Statebuilding - Time to Reconsider

in *Oesterreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft* , 2005/2 , 177-190

The article proposes that in order to better understand current approaches to international statebuilding, it is essential to revisit the central concepts on which they are grounded. It proposes that disaggregating statebuilding and looking anew at its various components reveals not only its immense scope but also the need to question current practices. Statebuilding is in essence about the development of institutions that manage state-society relationships. Institutions are more than formal rules: equally important are their informal norms and how both are being enforced in practice. This bears on the transferability of institutions. The article suggests that emphasis should be more on the processes of institutional development than on the imposition of pre-packaged 'solutions'. However slow and inefficient domestic decision making processes may be, they are indispensable to create sustainable change.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Harrington Austin

Introduction to Georg Simmel's Essay 'Europe and America in World History'

in *European Journal of Social Theory* , Volume 8, No. 1, February 2005 , 63-72



The text comprises a translation of Georg Simmel's article, "Europa und Amerika: eine weltgeschichtliche Betrachtung", first published in *Das Berliner Tagblatt* in July 1915, with a short introduction by the translator. The article is the counterpart to Simmel's better-known essay "The Idea of Europe", first published in March 1915, reprinted in 1917 in lightly revised form in Simmel's collection of texts on Germany and the First World War, *Der Krieg und die geistigen Entscheidungen*. In both essays, Simmel develops a vision of the future of Europe after the destruction of the war as a fragile cultural totality that both encompasses national identities and at the same time transcends them.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

de Benoist Alain

L'identità non deve essere un ghetto

in *Diorama*, n. 274, novembre-dicembre , 7-18

No abstract available

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Passera Corrado

L'integrazione euromediterranea e il ruolo delle banche

in *Impresa & Stato*, Ottobre/Dicembre N.69/2004

La ricchezza politica, culturale ed economica dell'area euromediterranea può portare a un laboratorio di soluzioni di cui il mondo ha un grande bisogno. Il concetto di euromediterraneo non è più un concetto vago o che tocca solo altri: l'Italia è un Paese euromediterraneo, il mix di popolazioni, culture, religioni, approcci deve essere parte della nostra vita e del nostro impegno. Anche se, nello specifico, il nostro impegno è soprattutto economico, la cornice deve essere politica, culturale e umana in senso ampio. È una grande opportunità anche in termini dimensionali: stiamo parlando di una popolazione di 600 milioni di persone che potrebbe risultare integrando Europa e Paesi del Mediterraneo, la più grande combinazione di popolazioni diverse che mai sia stata creata; stiamo parlando di un mercato di dimensioni enormi, di un potenziale di investimenti diretti verso questi Paesi di dimensioni molto importanti. Non siamo gli unici a muoverci. Altri, gli Stati Uniti per primi, si stanno muovendo. Non è, quindi, soltanto un'opportunità da cogliere, ma è anche un'opportunità che potremmo perdere se non sapremo agire. La direzione mi sembra chiara: occorre puntare a una grande area di libero scambio, ma non basta. Si tratta anche di spingere nella direzione di un avvicinamento progressivo a quei parametri di partecipazione all'Europa unita che ha permesso recentemente a dieci Paesi di farvi parte. Dobbiamo puntare sulle piccole e medie imprese: questo è il tessuto più fertile per lo sviluppo di rapporti e presenze; queste aziende, tante volte accusate di non saper trovare il coraggio per fare investimenti al di fuori del Paese, stanno, al contrario, dimostrando un grande attivismo in quest'area del mondo: prendiamo, ad esempio, la Tunisia, dove sono oltre 800 le presenze italiane, più del doppio rispetto a cinque anni fa. Possiamo dire che stiamo facendo abbastanza? No: anche l'area di libero scambio che sembrava realizzabile entro il 2010, non sarà raggiunta e probabilmente il ritardo sarà di 7-10 anni. Se si considerano poi i fondi messi a disposizione di questa Regione, sembrano tanti, ma in realtà non lo sono. Prendiamo, per esempio, i fondi MEDA: circa 5 miliardi, poi effettivamente pagati meno della metà. I fondi



Femip dovevano diventare la Banca Mediterranea sul modello dell'EBRD, ma non si vedono ancora segnali significativi. Ci sono però anche alcune novità importanti, come ad esempio l'attivismo di Sace per essere partner più attiva, sia nel breve che nel lungo termine, anche con i Paesi OCSE e non soltanto coi Paesi non OCSE.

L'impegno di tutti e di Banca Intesa

Ci sono dunque segnali di impegno maggiore per supportare l'attività commerciale e finanziaria in questi Paesi, ma sono ancora molte le ragioni di non soddisfazione in termini di nostro impegno in questa direzione. Un accenno al protezionismo dell'Europa: in certi campi siamo eccessivamente aperti; non lo siamo in altri campi, come quello agricolo e tessile, che per questi Paesi sono particolarmente rilevanti. Possiamo aspettarci di più dalle nostre Istituzioni, da noi stessi, dai nostri Paesi e dall'Europa; possiamo e credo dobbiamo aspettarci qualcosa di più anche dai Paesi interessati del Mediterraneo. Non c'è dubbio che c'è stata una certa incapacità di muoversi in modo coordinato. Una maggiore integrazione Sud-Sud (interna al gruppo dei Paesi Meda) consentirebbe a questi paesi di raggiungere una maggiore massa critica, una maggiore uniformità negli standard e nella regolamentazione. Se vogliamo spingere nella direzione degli investimenti diretti in questi Paesi, dobbiamo aspettarci un maggiore ammodernamento in termini di infrastrutture giuridiche, legali, istituzionali, amministrative; in molti di questi Paesi manca ancora un'architettura finanziaria completa indispensabile per far sì che aziende, soprattutto di piccole e medie dimensioni, possano investirvi. Quindi, se non possiamo dirci ancora in nessun modo soddisfatti di quello che abbiamo realizzato, dobbiamo suddividerci le responsabilità e le cose da fare. Un accenno soltanto a Banca Intesa: credo sia la banca italiana più impegnata in quest'area, siamo presenti con quattro uffici al Cairo, Beirut, Ankara e Tunisi, quest'ultimo aperto pochi mesi fa; siamo, credo, la banca con la più alta quota di mercato in termini di finanziamento e di interscambio, sia sull'import che sull'export; su queste transazioni in quasi tutti i Paesi del Mediterraneo abbiamo quote di almeno il 25%, con punte del 35 (Libano e Giordania sono quelle più alte). Siamo una banca che ci crede non soltanto a parole, ma investendo concretamente, formando, mantenendo nel tempo una serie di presenze forti di persone competenti in tutta questa area. Recentemente abbiamo sottoscritto un accordo di collaborazione con Afrexibank per facilitare le attività dei nostri imprenditori con tutti i Paesi africani e, quindi, anche con quelli del Mediterraneo; abbiamo partecipato al fondo di private equity Euromed creato per iniziativa della Camera di Commercio di Milano. Stiamo guardando ad altri Paesi con grande interesse: stiamo facendo un'analisi approfondita per un investimento importante in Turchia, Paese al quale diamo grande importanza e che consideriamo già sulla strada dell'entrata nell'Europa dei 25. Banca Intesa, in questi ultimi due anni, ha rifocalizzato molto la sua attività all'estero concentrando gli investimenti diretti nell'Europa centrale e dell'Est; ha eliminato le presenze operative in quei Paesi dove le imprese italiane non avevano più bisogno di un aiuto diretto, come Francia, Germania, Spagna, e sta invece investendo molto in quei Paesi dove, senza una banca di casa, è più difficile entrare e lavorare: abbiamo aperto una banca in Russia, stiamo rafforzando la presenza in Cina, stiamo ipotizzando di fare la stessa cosa in India. In questa logica, Banca Intesa considera il Mediterraneo come un'area di altissima priorità. Concludendo, la crescita economica è una priorità per tutti noi, ma non ci stiamo dando abbastanza attenzione, né come Paese, né come Europa. Il Mediterraneo è una formidabile opportunità di crescita sia per l'Europa sia per i Paesi del Mediterraneo, certamente è un'opportunità clamorosa per l'Italia. Sappiamo cosa una politica coraggiosa e lungimirante può creare: se guardiamo all'effetto che si è creato nei Paesi dell'Europa centrale e orientale attraverso l'operazione di avvicinamento all'Europa e se guardiamo al flusso enorme di investimenti che questo processo ben gestito ha portato, possiamo immaginare che, se tutti faremo le cose che è necessario fare, questo effetto crescita, questo effetto sviluppo possa nei prossimi anni ricrearsi anche nei Paesi meglio gestiti del Mediterraneo.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Nolte Ernst



La civiltà occidentale: questioni e problemi

in *Nuova Storia Contemporanea*, Anno IX, n. 1, gennaio-febbraio

(Excerpt)

<http://www.lelettere.it/periodici/nsc/estratti/nolte.htm>

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Paye Olivier

La gouvernance: d'une notion polysémique à un concept politologique

in *Etudes Internationales*, 1, Mars 2005, 13-40

No abstract available

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Flauss, J. F.

La presence de jurisprudence de la Cour Supreme de Etas- Unis d'Amerique dans le contentieux européen de droits de l'homme

in *Revue trimestrielle des droits de l'homme*, n. 62, pag. 313-332

No abstract available

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Dockès P.

La raison et les passions: Hobbes et l'échec d'une coordination décentralisée

in *Economies et Sociétés*, Juin (série "Histoire de la pensée économique" N° 36)

No abstract available

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Schmid Dorothée

Le partenariat, une méthode européenne de démocratisation en Méditerranée?

in *Politique Etrangère*, 3/2005, (automne).

Le projet de Barcelone vise à la stabilisation par la démocratisation des sociétés partenaires, elle-même inséparable de l'ouverture économique. Les stratégies de démocratisation européenne et américaine ont chacune leur logique:



elles pourraient se rapprocher si l'Union européenne précisait son offre et les voies de son action. Dans les circonstances actuelles, cela suppose d'abord un investissement plus grand des membres de l'Union les plus concernés par les choix méditerranéens.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Martin Éric

Le projet de Convention internationale sur la diversité culturelle comme réponse au marché mondial de la culture (Note)

in *Etudes Internationales*, 2, juin 2005 , p. 201

No abstract available

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Aron Raymond

L'Europe, avenir d'un mythe. Conférence prononcée au Sénat lors de la remise des prix Robert Schuman, Montaigne et Goethe, le 13 mai 1975.

in *Cité, philosophie, politique, histoire*, n. 24

Voici donc réunis, grâce à la Fondation FVS, les lauréats des prix Robert Schuman, et ceux des prix Montaigne et Goethe, les uns voués à la tâche ingrate de traduire en institutions et en action quotidienne l'idée d'une Europe unie, les autres désireux d'enrichir le trésor commun de notre culture. Peut-être la Fondation, en offrant aux hommes d'État l'occasion de rencontrer des professeurs ou des savants, a-t-elle voulu, par delà les charmes d'un dialogue fugitif, nous inviter à la réflexion sur l'essentiel. Que signifie aujourd'hui l'idée européenne, l'idée de l'unité européenne ? Au temps de la chrétienté, une certaine unité naissait d'une foi commune, elle s'exprimait dans une Église et dans les universités, elle n'excluait ni la diversité des ethnies ni les centres du pouvoir, multiples et autonomes. Elle imposait par intermittence la trêve de Dieu mais non la paix durable ou l'obéissance aux mêmes lois.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Gerring John

Minor Parties in Plurality Electoral Systems

in *Party Politics*, Volume 11, Issue 1, January , pp. 79-107

Present research on minor party performance consists largely of single-country studies or pooled studies including a raft of widely varying electoral systems. This study examines the topic from a cross-national perspective, but is limited to democratic polities with single-member districts and first-past-the-post rules. An original dataset is compiled including 217 elections drawn from 37 countries and several historical eras. Five political-institutional factors are explored: (1)



federalism, (2) presidentialism, (3) electoral system institutionalization, (4) party organization, and (5) electoral volatility. The evidence suggests that major party hegemony is more complete in polities with unitary constitutions, parliamentary executives, long-enduring electoral systems, strong party organization and low electoral volatility.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Koch Guido

Nation und Nationalismus bei Meinecke

in *Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft* , 15. Jahrgang (2005), Heft 2 , 419-445

Friedrich Meinecke's distinction between a civic and an ethnic nation is frequently used in public discourse on nationalism as well as in academic research. In recent usage, however, the two types are opposed in a biased way - open vs. closed, peaceful vs. aggressive - so that rereading Meinecke offers an instructive view of the concept of nation which is now concealed. It can be demonstrated that Meinecke had a complex understanding of both the liberal nation and the ideology of nationalism. Public opposition to religious headscarves, for example, gives rise to the supposition that the German nation could learn from Meinecke to understand itself not only as ethnic but also as civic. Last not least, Meinecke's individualism covers a drift from national towards cosmopolitan thinking as can be experienced to some degree in the process of European unification.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Hermes Joke, Gray Ann, Alasuutari Pertti

New Europe, new cultural studies?

in *European Journal of Cultural Studies*, Volume 8, No. 2, May 2005 , 131-133

No abstract available

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Dimitrakopoulos Dionyssi G.

Norms, Interests and Institutional Change

in *Political Studies*, Volume 53, Issue 4, December , pp. 676-693

This paper provides a norms-based account of institutional change. It compares two cases of attempted change, one successful and one unsuccessful. The argument advanced is that norm-based change occurs when the norms are congruent with the perceived interests of the actors who have the power to take on the decision. Norms affect the process of institutional change not only by providing legitimacy to some forms of political action, but also by shaping the actors' perception of their interests as well their strategies. It is argued that norms, in that sense, help political actors combine Max Weber's zweckrational (goal-orientated) and wertrational (value-orientated) categories of behaviour. Empirical evidence drawn from the context of the evolving European Union supports this argument.



Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Kaldor, Mary

**Old Wars, Cold Wars, New Wars, and the War on Terror
in International Politics**, Vol. 42, n. 4, December, 491-498

Attempts to think of the new world in terms of the old prevent us from dealing with the realities of today's globalized world. We can only develop alternative strategies against war if we see how different the new wars are from previous conflicts. Currently, our security conceptions, drawn from the dominant experience of the Second World War and the Cold War, make an understanding of contemporary insecurity impossible.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Goux Jean-Joseph

**Progrès de l'histoire, économie de marché, mondialisation
in Esprit**, n. 319, novembre 2005

Cette relecture de l'œuvre de Turgot permet de revenir sur une des premières formulations de l'idée philosophique de progrès de l'histoire humaine. Or, cette idée de progrès est solidaire du processus de mondialisation : c'est au moment où devient visible une certaine unité du monde que peut se formuler la première vision cohérente du progrès historique. Le retournement avec la situation actuelle, où l'inquiétude succède à l'optimisme, n'en est que plus spectaculaire.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Piaia Gregorio

**Radici cristiane e identità europea: nichilluminismo?
in Rivista di Storia della Filosofia**, 2005, Fascicolo 1

No abstract available

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Grodnick Stephen

**Rediscovering Radical Democracy in Habermas's Between Facts and Norms
in Constellations**, Vol. 12, Issue 3 September, 392-408

No abstract available



Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Isaac Joel

Republicanism: An European Inheritance?

in *European Journal of Social Theory*, Volume 8, No. 1, February 2005 , 73-86

No abstract available

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Gow Greg

Rubbing shoulders in the global city. Refugees, citizenship and multicultural alliances in Fairfield, Sydney

in *Ethnicities*, Vol. 5 n. 3 , 386-405

This article investigates how recently arrived refugees living in Fair-field - the most culturally diverse locality in Sydney - relate to citizenship and experience belonging in a global city context, where different people are compelled to live side by side. Extending Ang's notion of 'togetherness in difference', the discussion explores the formation of horizontal alliances in a multicultural locality. Two small-scale empirical examples demonstrate how locations for citizenship are actualized outside the frame of the nation state, and signal the contours of a progressive multicultural politics, in this case, neighbours collectively dealing with landlord authorities, and young people discussing their encounters with Australia's immigration regime.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Ball Nicole

Strengthening democratic governance of the security sector in conflict-affected countries

in *Public Administration and Development*, Volume 25 Issue 1 , 25 - 38

Security for people, communities and states is essential for sustainable development, democratisation and conflict mitigation. Politicised, badly managed or ineffective security bodies and justice systems often create instability and insecurity, largely due to the lack of effective democratic systems. Strengthening democratic security-sector governance after conflict presents enormous challenges, particularly: (1) developing and implementing a legal framework consistent with international law and democratic practice; (2) developing effective, well-functioning civil management and oversight bodies; (3) developing viable, accountable and affordable security forces; (4) ensuring that the institutional culture of the security forces supports the legal framework, international law, good democratic practice and civil management and oversight bodies. Addressing these challenges requires professional security forces, capable civil authorities, rule of law and regional approaches. Reform activities should be guided by local ownership, sensitivity to the politics of reform, local capacity, local context and a comprehensive sector-wide framework. Local stakeholders must make hard decisions about priorities on the availability of domestic resources available and the costs and benefits of accepting external assistance.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea



Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Krasner Stephen D.

The Case for Shared Sovereignty

in **Journal of Democracy**, Volume 16, Number 1, January , pp. 69-83

Both socio-economic and actor oriented approaches to the development of democracy imply that poorly governed polities are unlikely to make progress. Socio-economic conditions are deteriorating in many poorly governed states. Because borders are fixed, violent state death is rare, foreign assistance is available, and raw materials can be exported, political leaders in many poorly governed states do not have an incentive to craft self enforcing pareto improving agreements with their own populations. Shared sovereignty arrangements, institutions in which authority would be shared by external and internal actors, would offer the possibilities for pareto improving agreements that would not otherwise be available.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Mauthe Barbara

The Notion of Sovereignty and Its Presentation Within Public Law: A Critique on the Use of Theory and Concepts

in **Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly**, Vol. 56, No. 1 , 63-82

No abstract available

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Monten, J.

The Roots of the Bush Doctrine: Power, Nationalism, and Democracy Promotion in U.S. Strategy

in **International Security**, n. 4, vol. 29, spring , pag. 112-156

The promotion of democracy is central to the George W. Bush administration's prosecution of both the war on terrorism and its overall grand strategy, in which it is assumed that U.S. political and security interests are advanced by the spread of liberal political institutions and values abroad. In an approach variously characterized as "democratic realism," "national security liberalism," "democratic globalism," and "messianic universalism," the Bush administration's national security policy has centered on the direct application of U.S. military and political power to promote democracy in strategic areas. In a summer 2004 interview, Bush expressed his "deep desire to spread liberty around the world as a way to help secure [the United States] in the long-run."¹ According to Bush, "As in Europe, as in Asia, as in every region of the world, the advance of freedom leads to peace."² This generic statement of cause and effect is also applied specifically to terrorism: "democracy and reform will make [Middle Eastern states] stronger and more stable, and make the world more secure by undermining terrorism at its source."³ More broadly, the Bush administration proposes a liberal international order grounded in U.S. military and political power; as its 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) contends, the unparalleled U.S. position of primacy creates a "moment of opportunity to extend the benefits of freedom across the globe... [the United States] will actively work to bring the hope of democracy, development, free markets, and free trade to every corner of the world." This view appears to be contingent on...



Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Gereffi Gary, Humphrey John, Sturgeon Timothy

The governance of global value chains

in *Review of International Political Economy*, Volume 12, Number 1 / February , 78-104

This article builds a theoretical framework to help explain governance patterns in global value chains. It draws on three streams of literature – transaction costs economics, production networks, and technological capability and firm-level learning – to identify three variables that play a large role in determining how global value chains are governed and change. These are: (1) the complexity of transactions, (2) the ability to codify transactions, and (3) the capabilities in the supply-base. The theory generates five types of global value chain governance – hierarchy, captive, relational, modular, and market – which range from high to low levels of explicit coordination and power asymmetry. The article highlights the dynamic and overlapping nature of global value chain governance through four brief industry case studies: bicycles, apparel, horticulture and electronics.

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Pettoello Renato

Verso la terra d'Europa

in *Rivista di Storia della Filosofia*, 2005, Fascicolo 1

No abstract available

Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Thies Cameron G.

War, Rivalry, and State Building in Latin America

in *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 49, Issue 3 , 451-465

Scholars of Latin America have recently begun to apply the bellicist approach to state building to the region, the central claim of which is that wars are a great stimulus to centralizing state power and building institutional capacity. This article argues that current applications of these models of state building are too narrowly specified to be of much use in Latin America or elsewhere in the developing world. Replacing the focus on interstate war with the more general phenomenon of interstate rivalry, alongside the consideration of intrastate rivals, allows us to account for the impact of both external and internal forces on the development of the state. I demonstrate the utility of this approach through several cross-sectional time-series analyses that provide evidence that external and internal rivals affect the Latin American state in a manner consistent with the general nature of bellicist theory.



Section D) Federalism as a political idea

Subsection 4. Various/Miscellaneous

Williams Michael C.

What is the National Interest? The Neoconservative Challenge in IR Theory

in *European Journal of International Relations* , Vol. 11, n. 3, September , 307-337

Despite its controversial influence in American foreign policy and international politics, neoconservatism has received comparatively little attention in IR theory. This article seeks to contribute to a critical engagement between IR theory and neoconservatism by providing an account of the theoretical foundations of neoconservatism and its distinctive approach to the national interest. Examining these foundations reveals a series of areas in which IR can engage substantively with neoconservatism. Perhaps most surprisingly, it also demonstrates the renewed relevance of classical Realists such as Reinhold Niebuhr and Hans Morgenthau, whose thinking not only addressed themes at the heart of contemporary neoconservatism, but who also provided prescient warnings of the dangerous directions in which neoconservative understandings of the national interest could lead.